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THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
Preface 
Early in 1951 a group of interested members of the faculty of The 
University of Michigan Law Scho?l conceived the idea of a research 
project, the purpose of which would be to investigate the principal 
unique legal problems being created and likely to be created in the fu-
ture by peaceful uses of atomic energy. The group planned the prep-
aration and publication of a series of manuscripts which might ulti-
mately emerge as one or more printed volumes dealing with the legal 
problems affecting this new form of energy. Many phases of the sub-
ject were scrutinized, including the rule-making and licensing powers 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, the censoring of scientific infor-
mation, liability for radiation injuries to persons and property, patent 
rights, state regulatory activities, imd other areas of possible interest. 
In July 1951 the Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project, the Univer-
sity's major program of research in all phases of peaceful uses of the 
atom, made a substantial grant in support of the proposed study of legal 
problems. The law faculty group, consisting at the outset of Professors 
Samuel D. Estep, William ]. Pierce, and the undersigned, organized 
and embarked upon the program. Later Professors Eric Stein and 
William W. Bishop were added. A small research staff was recruited 
and the studies were commenced, beginning with an intensive exami-
nation of the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 
In the summer of 1952, an Institute on Industrial and Legal Prob-
lems of Atomic Energy was organized and held in the Law Quadrangle 
in Ann Arbor. This proved to be one of the earliest of the many con-
ferences held in this country resulting from the development of atomic 
enterprise, and it served to give very great stimulus to the research 
work being carried on within the staff of the Law School. The pro-
ceedings were published by the School and were widely distributed. 
In 1956 a second summer conference was held, this time a "work-
shop," with a prepared agenda and working papers distributed in ad-
vance to the invited participants, who included not only lawyers but 
also engineers, A. E. C. staff members, scientists, health officials,· and 
economists-a truly "inter-disciplinary" undertaking. The objective 
was to elicit concentrated thinking and interchange of ideas between 
knowledgeable people concerning atomic legal problems, and to pre-
cipitate these ideas in concrete form for the guidance of those respon-
sible for current legal developments in the field. Again, proceedings 
were published and were widely distributed. 
v 
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Throughout the years manuscripts on various phases of the subject 
have been prepared by the research staff or by the members of the fac-
ulty engaged in the project. Little by little the materials, which now 
emerge as this volume entitled Atoms and the Law, took shape in 
manuscript ·form. Principal interest finally centered on tort liability 
for radiation injuries, workmen's compensation for such injuries, fed-
eral statutory and administrative provisions regulating atomic activi-
ties, state regulation of atomic energy, and finally, in the later years, the 
international aspects of the subject. These became principal headings 
in the volume which is now being published. 
As the project unfolded, those of us who were participating in it 
became increasingly impressed with the feeling that here was something 
unique in legal research, for we were engaging in a task that involved 
not only frontiers of the law but also one which was ever so closely in-
terwoven with the science and technology of tomorrow. In carrying out 
the project, it became necessary for us to proceed as far as possible to 
master a new scientific field, one with a new vocabulary and a radically 
different set of concepts. This certainly enhanced interest in the task, 
not to mention increasing the difficulty of carrying it forward. In 
addition, it afforded us an even more fascinating prospect, namely, the 
possibility of creation of a center for legal studies related to the new 
technological world, with its great variety of new facets-automation, 
water resources problems, aviation, etc., thus to make our contribution 
in providing the legal framework to facilitate the adjustment of scien-
tific advances to the social order of which we are a part. 
The acknowledgements which we should make to those who have 
helped in the preparation of this volume are almost too numerous to 
mention. On the financial side we have already mentioned the Michi-
gan Memorial-Phoenix Project, which made the initial grant-in-aid, 
and whose Director, Dean Ralph A. Sawyer; and Assistant Director, 
Professor Henry J. Gomberg, have been continuously helpful and en-
couraging. We have also received most generous support from the 
Detroit Edison Company, whose President, Walker L. Cisler, has led 
the way in the field of private atomic enterprise; from the William W. 
Cook Endowment Fund of the Law School; and from the Ford Foun-
dation, whose grant-in-aid made in 1958 has not only helped with the 
completion of this volume but has made possible the continuation and 
broadening of the Law School's program of atomic legal research. 
Finally we must mention the most encouraging support of several of 
our loyal alumni who .have been attracted by the project and have 
wished to contribute to it. 
PREFACE Vll 
Acknowledgements must also be made to the many who have con-
tributed to the research and preparation of. the manuscript for the 
volume. Those of us who assume responsibility. on the title page could 
never have completed the task without the participation of Professor 
Eric Stein and his one-time United States Department of State asso-
ciate, Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, who wrote the chapter on the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency; Courts Oulahan, now on the legal 
staff of the Atomic Energy Commission, who wrote on the Commis-
sion's administrative procedures; and Professor Horace W. Dewey, a 
graduate of the Law School, now in the Department of Slavic Lan-· 
guages of the University, who wrote the chapter on Soviet atomic 
developments. Then there has been the valued contribution of the sev-
eral research assistants who have worked on the project-Rinaldo L. 
Bianchi, John W. Birchall, Mrs. ·Mimica Janez, Frederick Juenger, 
Lawrence P. King, Charles D. Olmsted, Ivor M. Richardson, Michael 
Scott, and Marvin 0. Young. Finally, credit must be given for the 
skillful and diligent assistance of those who helped prepare the manu-
script for the printer-Miss Alice J. Russell, Assistant Editor, Michi-
gan Legal Publications; Miss Sharon Greene; and Mrs. Jean Her-
shenov. This has truly been a team project, and each member of the 
team has served faithfully and well. 
·One unique and worthy by-product of the Law School's Atomic 
Research Project is the extent to which those who have been engaged 
in it have been called upon to take active parts in outside activities re-
lated to the atomic age. We have participated in Congressional hearings 
on atomic matters; in activities of American Bar Association and State 
Bar committees; in the Power Reactor Development Company's Fermi 
Reactor, now under construction near Monroe, Michigan; in the draft-
ing of state regulatory legislation on the subject; in the activities of 
the Fund for Peaceful Atomic Development; in the offering of a sem-
inar as a part of the Law School curriculum; and in giving innumer-
able public addresses to all manner of groups, legal, lay, and technical. 
These by-product features have added interest and value to the task, 
and in a very real sense have, we believe, given us the opportunity to 
render some statesman-like service on one of the unique frontiers of the 
current scene. 
A principal difficulty confronting us at all times has been the velocity 
with which changes have taken place during the period. New tech-
nical developments, new statutes, and even new concepts have followed 
one another in rapid succession-some of them even during the recent 
Vlll PREFACE 
weeks during which the manuscript has been in the printers' hands. 
This kaleidoscopic nature of the scene has made it impossible to keep 
the manuscript completely current with respect to all details, but it has 
seemed wiser to publish while the manuscript is reasonably timely than 
to lose the advantage of timeliness in the interest of technical perfec-
tion. Notwithstanding the difficulties, however, the task has been re-
warding, and we hope the end result will make a worthwhile contribu-
tion to a fascinating new field. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
June 27, 1959. 
E. BLYTHE STASON, DEAN 
The University of Michigan Law School 
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PART I 
TORT LIABILITY AND 
RADIATION INJURIES 
Chapter I 
ORIGIN AND TYPES OF RADIATION INJURIES 
A. Introduction 
We are in the midst of a revolutionary technological development 
that may be as profound as the Industrial Revolution of the 19th 
century. Although peaceful employment of atomic energy has been 
comparatively meager to date, scientists, industrialists, economists, 
and many others have already recognized its potentiality. The failure 
of the 19th century legal profession to accommodate the law to the 
changes of the Industrial Revolution was a principal contributory cause 
for ·the creation of statutory workmen's compensation. The 2oth 
century legal profession must move much more quickly to guide the 
adjustment of the law to this ·new revolutionary source o£ energy. The 
profession must be prepared to modify existing rules and to assist in 
the formulation of new doctrines to meet the unique problems which 
are certain to arise.1 
The development of peacetime uses of atomic energy undoubtedly 
will have some of its greatest impacts on that portion of the law dealing 
with personal injury and property damage, usually denominated tort 
law. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the possible impact of 
this new technological. revolution on this branch of the law. 
Before the lawyer can consider the changes, major and minor, that 
will have to be made, he must acquaint himself with the basic scientific 
facts and theories of atomic energy. He must know something of the 
uniqueness of this source of energy if he is to understand its effect on 
the legal system. To handle the tort cases that will arise the lawyer 
will be required to master a new vocabulary, including such unfamiliar 
terms as neutrons, electrons, protons, positrons, isotopes, half-lives, and 
ionization, not to mention the anti-proton and the neutrino. There-
fore, before analyzing the effect of atomic energy on the rules of law 
governing tort liability, we shall discuss some of the basic character-
istics and technology of atomic energy and its potentiality for causing 
injuries to persons and property. 
1 Some have argued that traditional tort rules will adequately meet the challenge 
of atomic energy. Becker and Huard, "Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy In-
dustry," 44 Geo. L. ]. 58 (1955). 
3 
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B. The Scientific Background 
The theories of nuclear physics which are generally accepted today 
by scientists are nevertheless theories only. Like all other scientific 
theories we may find someday that they are somewhat inaccurate, or 
at least incomplete. Nevertheless, the atomic theory of matter does 
seem to explain many phenomena of nature with reasonable satisfac-
tion, and it is possible to use the theory to develop truly startling 
practical techniques for industry, medicine, and research. Further-
more, accepted theories are certainly sufficiently useful to enable the 
lawyer to evaluate the possible effect of the new atomic techniques on 
the general principles of tort law. 
I. Atomic Structure 
According to present-day understanding, all matter is made up of 
infinitely small atoms which are, in turn, mostly empty space with a few 
subatomic particles of· much smaller size. Each element has its own 
particular number of these particles. The principal components of atoms 
are neutrons, protons, and electrons. At the core or nucleus of an atom 
are found protons, which are positively charged particles, and neutrons, 
which are particles without electrical charge. Negatively charged elec-
trons move around the nucleus in orbits with diameters about Io,ooo 
times that of the nucleus. In stable atoms the number of electrons 
matches the number of protons of the nucleus. This numerical cor-
respondence provides an electrical equilibrium since the protons and 
electrons neutralize each other. The neutrons are already electrically 
neutral and thus do not affect the equilibrium. There is, however, a 
limit to the number of particles which can be contained in the nucleus 
of an atom of a particular element. Overstuffing of the nucleus will 
produce instability, and the atom will discharge the surplus in the form 
of various types of radiation, all more or less harmful to human tissues. 
The atoms of the various .elements are identified in several ways. 
One is by reference to the combined number of protons and neutrons 
in the nucleus. This number is referred to as the mass number and is 
the atomic weight of this element. Atoms are also identified by the 
number of protons within the nucleus. This is the atomic number of 
the element. The chemical properties of an atom, on the other hand, 
depend upon the number of orbital electrons. However, as already in-
dicated, the number of electrons in an atom is equal to the number of 
protons. Therefore, atoms with the same atomic number, as distin-
guished from mass number, always form the same chemical element 
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and react chemically in exactly the same way for all practical purposes. 
Frequently we find atoms with the same number of orbital electrons 
(also with the same number of protons or atomic number) but a dif-
ferent number of neutrons in the nucleus. We speak of these as dif-
ferent isotopes of the same chemical element. These terms can be 
understood best by reference to specific elements. 
The simplest element of all is hydrogen which has one proton and 
one orbital electron. It is consequently the lightest of all elements and, 
in its most common form, has a weight, or mass, of approximately 
one. The heaviest naturally occurring element is uranium, with an 
atomic weight (mass number) of 238, derived from 92 protons (atomic 
number 92) and 146 neutrons in its nucleus. Between these two natu-
rally occuring elements 90 others are found, varying in atomic weight 
according to a "periodic scale." In addition, science has thus far 
produced by artificial means certain other so-called transuranic ele-
ments which are even heavier than uranium. They are neptunium 
(93 Np 239),2 plutonium (94 Pu 239), americium (95 Am 241), 
curium ( 96 Cur 242), berkelium ( 97 Bk 243), and californium 
(98 Cf 244), and recent newspaper articles report still two more in the 
ascending series. All of these artificial elements are unstable. 
One orbital shell, housing one electron, is found around the nucleus 
of the hydrogen atom. Moving up one place in the periodic scale, we 
find helium, an atom which has two protons and consequently needs 
two electrons to attain a state of electrical equilibrium. According to 
atomic theory, two electrons will fill the capacity of the innermost 
electron shell. The saturation of the orbital shell causes helium atoms to 
enjoy a state of absolute repose, and thus helium is an inert gas. 
The next atom on the scale (lithium) has three protons in the nucleus 
and thus requires three electrons .for stability. One orbital shell being 
filled, a new shell must be used to house. the new electron. The capacity 
of the second shell is eight electrons. Lithium, therefore, is an element 
with but one electron in a shell eager to harbor eight. Consequently, 
chemically speaking it tends to combine readily with atoms of other 
elements. Moreover, since orbital connections between lithium atoms 
are favored by their structure, lithium is a solid notwithstanding its 
low atomic weight. 
After saturation of the second shell, a new one will be started, and 
so on until seven shells have been formed for the heaviest elements. 
2 The first number represents the atomic number and the second the atomic mass or 
weight. 
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The several shells are capable of absorbing different numbers of elec-
trons. For example, the fourth outer shell builds up to eighteen elec-
trons, the fifth up to thirty-two, the sixth up to eighteen, etc. As each 
orbital shell is filled to capacity, there is a recurrence of elements with 
similar characteristics in the form of inert gases. A single electron in 
a new shell will produce a recurrence of an alkali metal such as lithium . 
. When a shell hungry for new electrons cannot procure them by 
nuclear reactions, that is, by their reception jointly with the acquisition 
of new protons in the nucleus, an atom will eagerly resort to chemical 
reactions to fill its needs. Combinations will take place, forming mole-
cules of various chemical compounds. For example, hydrogen atoms, 
with but one electron in an orbit capable of supporting two, will tend. 
to link with any atom whose outer shell can accommodate another 
electron. Oxygen is such an· atom and readily joins with hydrogen to 
form a molecule of water. 
Neutrons, or . electrically neutral particles, resulting from a com-
bination of protons and electrons, can be present in various numbers 
in the nuclei of the atoms of the same elements. It is due largely to 
the activities of neutrons; under varied stresses as we shall see, that 
nuclear reactions take place and radiations are emitted. 
2. Atomic Radiation . ~ 
An unstable nucleus strives for stability in a number of ways, any 
one of which can be'the source of injurious radiation. These include 
( 1) alpha emission, (2) beta emission, ( 3) positron emission, and 
(4) K capture. Radiations also take the form of gamma rays. The 
reaction of neutrons on matter also results in radiation. 
Alpha emission is the ejection of an alpha particle from the nucleus. 
An alpha particle consists of two protons and two neutrons bound 
together.8 An atom subject to alpha emission loses four units of its 
weight number and two units of its positive electrical charge. This loss 
of two or more protons changes the atom to one of an element lower 
on the atomic scale. This method of radioactive decay is called alpha 
radiation and is confined almost exclusively to very heavy atoms fouud 
in nature, such as uranium, thorium, and radium. . 
Beta rays are really not rays but are particles and consist simply of 
electrons ejected from the atom at ·extremely high speeds. The ejection 
of an electron only does not alter the atomic mass number of the 
a Helium nuclei are made up of 2 protons and 2 neutrons. 
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nucleus, but may involve a change in the atomic number. This latter is 
likely to happen when excess neutrons are present in the nucleus. An 
excess neutron tends to eject an electron and turn into a proton. This 
additional proton in the nucleus changes the atom to an element one 
higher on the atomic scale. Where two or more neutrons turn into 
protons, several transmutations may occur. This process is spoken of 
as beta decay. Beta radiation is the most common mode of decay of 
radioisotopes. 
At this point it is interesting to note that beta decay often is initiated 
when the nucleus of a heavy atom (high on the atomic scale) under-
goes alpha emission (i.e., giving off particles consisting of two neu-
trons and two protons). The new nuclei thus formed are apt to have 
too many neutrons. The conversion of neutrons to protons, by emis-
sion of electrons (beta particles), will follow in the struggle for sta-
bility. This means that both alpha particles and beta rays may emanate 
from the same ·source. 
Positron emission is another stabilization process which is en-
countered when protons are in excess in the nucleus. A positron has 
the same order of mass as an electron, but possesses a positive charge. 
It is formed when the proton, which has a far larger mass than the 
electron, attempts to bring electrical balance into the atom's structure 
by turning into a neutron, which is electrically neutral. If enough 
energy is present in the nucleus to allow this transformation, a positron 
is ejected without material alteration of the atomic mass and with the 
loss of a unit of positive charge. \Vhere not enough energy is present, 
the nucleus reaches stabilization by the so-called "K capture" method. 
K capture is essentially the capture of an electron by a surplus pro-
ton. The first electron shell is known as the K orbit, and the second 
one as the L orbit. The captured electron usually comes from the K 
orbit, but occasionally from the L. The acquired electron is absorbed 
by the excess proton and a neutron is formed. Stabilization through 
positron emission or K capture may be followed by emission of gamma 
radiation. 
Gamma rays are not subatomic particles, but rather electromagnetic 
waves like heat, light, and X-rays. Gamma rays travel at the speed of 
light and have, in general, shorter wave lengths than X-rays. ·Because 
of this shorter length, they have considerably greater penetrating 
power. Gamma rays usually are the product of energy changes in the 
nucleus of the atom and often follow emission of beta particles, while 
X-rays are the product of energy changes in the inner electron shells 
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of the atom, usually as a result of bombardment by beams of electrons. 
The netttron is another source of injurious radiation. If ejected 
from the nucleus of an atom, as, for example, in the operation of a 
nuclear reactor or in the detonation of an atomic bomb, neutrons be-
come highly dangerous. They have great penetrating power and can 
make other substances radioactive. 
Each of the foregoing types of radiation can be injurious to persons 
or property under certain circumstances. This study will be concerned 
with the legal aspects of damage from such radiations to both property 
and persons, but only insofar as such damage occurs in the course of 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. No consideration will be given to the 
damage caused by atomic bombs to either persons or property. 
It should also be remembered that at present we are still talking 
about incompletely formulated and partly proven theories of atomic 
energy. The technology is continuously advan~ing. New discoveries 
are being made--new theories evolved. The lawyer will have to keep 
abreast of new developments for they may have an impact on such 
legal problems as causal relation, proof, damage, and the other matters 
with which the profession must deal. 
C. Radiation Injuries 
1. Historical Background 
Several generations ago miners of pitchblende in Czechoslovakia died 
of pulmonary ailments at a rate thirty times greater than that of the 
general population. Modern medicine has since identified the ailment 
as lung cancer. It is believed that the inhalation of radioactive radon, 
a gas emanating from the disintegration of component substances of 
pitchblende, caused the cancerous growths and the consequent greater 
incidence of mortality among the miners. 
But unawareness of the possible harmful effects of radiation per-
sisted. When radium was discovered, the early workers with this ele-
ment, out of ignorance, carried this source of radioactivity on their 
persons and as a result suffered injuries. The first manifestations of 
injury were usually erythema or reddening of the skin. 
The use of X-rays in early stages of development claimed its share 
of victims and helped focus attention on the severe menace to human 
health inherent in radioactivity. Typical of the manner in which tech-
nicians and scientists discovered the damaging effects of X-rays is the 
case of a doctor who had frequently exposed his hands to X-rays in the 
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course of his experiments. The skin of his hands developed erythema 
aggravated by intense itching. Soon the skin became tough, pig-
mented, and glossy. Despite use of all medical remedies then available, 
an ulcerous area of his hand developed a malignancy. Even amputation 
failed to prevent death. Many other scientists and technicians have 
died of similarly induced cancers. 
Possibly the best known of the early cases of injuries to employees 
caused by radioactivity are those of the radium dial painters of New 
Jersey (1917-24). Eighty women were employed to paint watch dials 
with luminous paint containing a small amount of radioactive material. 
The painters pointed the bristles of their brushes with their lips to keep 
them fine enough for their work. Each time they touched the bristles 
with their lips they ingested some of the radioactive substance used to 
make the paint permanently luminous. Many of these women developed 
anemia and bone tumors and died with symptoms of radium poison-
ing. Several years elapsed before it was discovered that radioactive 
material had been causing severe damage to blood-forming cells, thus 
precipitating the diseases. A sorrowful case stemming from the dial-
painting episode was brought to court by a woman painter who began 
to experience symptoms of radium necrosis twelve years after she left 
the company's employment. She died shortly after bringing the action, 
but, in any event, the two-year statute of limitations had barred her 
claim. · 
The most spectacular cases of radiation injuries to date are those 
caused by the detonation of two atom bombs over Japan during World 
War II. The full extent of radiation injuries suffered in those two 
explosions is not known as yet. The whirling cloud of radioactivity 
released by the bombs must have contaminated a sizable area, but the 
most seriously contaminated victims, those in the proximity of ground 
zero, were killed by the blast or heat effects of the explosion, and thus 
the radiation effects could not be traced in all of their ramifications and 
ultimate consequences. 
One of the most recent cases of radiation injuries, one having inter-
national repercussions, arose from the exposure of Japanese fishermen, 
following a hydrogen bomb test conducted by the United States in the 
Pacific. In this instance there was also property damage in the form 
of contamination of fish as well as the vessels of the fishermen. 
In contrast with numerous cases of personal injury, about the only 
evidence we have of early appreciation of property damage arising 
from radiation is the effect of radiation on photographic film. Roentgen 
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apparently shielded his equipment, not to protect himself, but to pre-
vent his film from fogging. This well may have saved him from the 
personal injuries that other early scientists experienced. 
_While We.have learned much about the dangers of atomic radiation 
and how to guard against injuries to persons and property, as is clearly 
indicated U:ly the almost phenomenal safety record of federal atomic 
energy o~ions, it seems perfectly certain that there will be many 
instances of injury to persons and property as a peacetime industry de-
velops an'd widespread use of radiation sources becomes common! It 
is necessary, therefore, that the lawyer who handles such cases have a 
thorough&1tnderstanding of the mechanics of radiation injury. 
2. Ionization 
According to current theories, atomic radiations (chiefly alpha, beta, 
gamma, and neutron) cause damage to humans and to other living 
tissues and materials because of their so-called "ionizing" effect. Ions 
are atoms or molecules in an electrically excited state and are created 
when the electrical balance of an atom or molecule is upset by the gain 
or loss of an electron. If an atom loses one electron, it is left with a 
p<>sitive charge and becomes a positive ion. For example, a proton is 
a hydrogen atom with the single orbital electron removed, leaving a 
positive hydrogen ion with a single unit of charge. An alpha particle 
is an atom of helium whose two orbital electrons have been removed, 
leaving a positive helium ion wtih two units of charge. The resultant 
positive ion and the free electron are commonly referred to as an ion 
pair. However, it is possible to have a negative ion formed when in 
some manner an atom or molecule picks up an extra electron from 
another atom or molecule. The resultant negative and positive ions 
are also referred to as an ion pair. The injury potential of radiation is 
usually put in terms of the number of ion pairs it will create in passing 
through a given length of material, such as living tissue. 
Alpha particles which carry positive electrical charges and beta 
particles which carry negative electrical charges cause ionization in 
substantially the same manner. Being electrically charged, when mov-
ing through. matter they exert electrical forces which ionize a small 
fraction of the atoms or molecules along their paths. The kinetic en-
ergy originally possessed by the alpha or beta particle is transferred to 
the atom or molecule hit or particle ejected. 
• For>example, an explosiQn involving radiation hazards occurred in a New York 
City laboratory of the Sylvania Corporation in July 1956. 
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The maximum depth to which an alpha or beta particle can penetrate 
depends upon its energy and mass as well as the nature of the material 
through which it passes. The charged particle, as it passes through 
matter, loses a fairly uniform amount of energy each time it creates an 
ion pair.5 A larger mass or a greater quantity of energy in a particle 
causes a greater amount of ionization, The depth of penetration of the 
particle into a particular m~terial varies inversely with the density of 
that material. This can be illustrated by comparing the ionizing power 
of alpha and beta particles. 
Because the mass of the alpha particle is more than 7,000 times that 
of the beta particle it has been found that, whereas an alpha particle will 
produce about so,ooo to 100,000 icm pairs per centimeter of air at at-
mospheric pressure, a beta particle of the same energy will create only 
about 30 to 300 ion pairs per centimeter. However, being much smaller 
and faster, the beta particle has a range of nearly a thousand times that 
of the alpha particle so that. the total number of ion pairs created would 
be approximately the same. S. · This follows from the fact that it nor-
mally takes just about 32.5 electron volts of energy to create an ion 
· pair, whether it comes from ;m alpha or beta particle or other source 
of energy. 
From the standpoint of injury from radiation it is perhaps more im-
portant to think in terms of how much material it takes to completely 
absorb the ionization potential of alpha and beta particles, because this 
determines what shielding is required to prevent ionizing radiation or 
how deep the penetration .will be into a given material, e.g., animal 
tissue. In air an alpha particle will have a range of from one inch to 
three and one-half inches, while the ionization. from a beta particle will 
be reduced to zero in from four inches to forty-three feet, in each case 
the exact penetration depending on the energy of the particular particle. 
In water or paper or animal tissue .004 inches (or four mils) will stop 
essentially ail alpha particles and two mils will stop most alpha parti-
cles. Some beta particles will be stopped by such thicknesses and even 
the most powerful naturally occurring ones will be stopped by some-
thing like two inches of animal tissue. It should also be mentioned that 
positive beta particles, called positrons, act like negative beta particles 
but have an additional characteristic. They tend to combine very quickly 
with an electron on the outer orbit of some atom; and when they do so, 
5 32.5 electron volts for every ion pair formed. Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic 
Energy 131 ( 1950). 
8 Glasstone, Principles of Nuclear Reactor Engineering §2.29, p. 65 (1955). 
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energy in the form of annihilation radiation (similar to gamma rays) 
is given off. 
Gamma rays differ from alpha and beta particles in at least two 
important respects. In the first place, they are rays and not particles : 
they are like heat and light in this respect. (X-rays, bremsstrahlung, 
and annihilation radiation, though not coming from nuclear transi-
tions, are so much like gamma rays, differing really only by reason of 
lower energies, that a description of gamma ray characteristics will 
suffice to cover them as well.) The second important distinction be-
tween gamma rays and alpha and beta particles is that the rays are not 
electrically charged. From the standpoint of injury to persons or 
property the most important consequence of these characteristics is that 
gamma rays are absorbed exponentially in passing through matter. 
This means it is theoretically impossible to shield against all gamma 
radiation. However, it is possible to reduce ga~ma radiations to the 
point where they are relatively unimportant. 
The reactions of gamma rays upon absorbing material which pro-
duce ionization, directly or indirectly, are several in number and are 
too complex to be described adequately in this brief discussion. Suf-
ficiently important to merit mention, however, are three factors. The 
first is the photoelectric effect (which is most important for low en-
ergy gamma rays interacting with material of high atomic mass). This 
consists of the transfer of the whole gamma ray photon energy to an 
electron which is ejected from the atom. This electron acts as a beta 
particle and has an energy equal to the excess energy of the gamma 
ray photon over that necessary to overcome the binding energy holding 
the electron to the atom. When the photoelectron is ejected, another 
electron from an outer orbit takes its place in the atom and this transi-
tion in turn gives off X-rays of low energy which in turn may cause 
the ejection of an outer orbit electron. In this way the whole energy 
of the gamma ray photon is absorbed. 
The second method by which the gamma ray affects target material 
is the Compton effect, a process in which the gamma ray photon makes 
an elastic collision (bouncing, like two billiard balls colliding). with 
an outer electron of the absorbing material. Some of the photon's en-
ergy is retained and part is transmitted to the electron. The photon 
itself is scattered or deflected from its original path. The Compton 
effect is most significant in the case of gamma rays of the middle 
ranges of energy. There is no absorption of the gamma ray but only 
a decreasing of its energy. 
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As the energy of the gamma ray photon increases, the photoelectrical 
and Compton effects diminish, and the third method of interaction, 
pair production, occurs. When high energy photons pass near the 
nucleus of an atom, the photon is absorbed, and an electron-positron 
pair is created. These particles travel in a forward direction, and their 
absorption takes place in an exponential manner, theoretically never 
being I007o complete. 
While the penetration range of gamma rays is much greater than 
alpha or beta particles and cannot be given definite limits because of 
the exponential absorption, it is possible to utilize a practical thickness 
of shielding which will reduce gamma radiation to apparently insig-
nificant proportions. For example, in water alpha particles of 1-Mev 7 
will penetrate .0004 centimeters, beta particles of 1-Mev will penetrate 
·39 centimeters, while 1-Mev gamma rays will go through 70 centi-
meters before the energy is reduced to one per cent of the original 
energy. In general, the higher the energy the greater the thickness of 
a given material needed to reduce the gamma rays to a given fraction 
of their original energy. Likewise, the greater the density of the ab-
sorbing material the less thick need it be to absorb a given fraction of 
the original energy. · 
Neutrons are like alpha and beta. particles in that they have mass-
they are particles. However, they are like gamma rays in that they are 
electrically neutral and have very high penetrating power. Apparently, 
the neutron does not cause ionization directly, but it can do so indirectly 
by causing alpha and beta particles and gamma rays to be emitted which 
in turn will cause ionization as already indicated. 
Neutrons come from several sources. If a natural alpha emitting 
element, such as radium or polonium, is mixed with one of the light 
elements, such as beryllium, boron, or lithium, neutrons of varying but 
fairly high energies are emitted. Gamma rays of intermediate energies 
can cause the emission of neutrons of uniform energies when interact-
ing with the nuclei of certain elements, particularly heavy hydrogen 
(deuterium) and beryllium. However, the principal source of neu-
trons is found in the chain reaction in a nuclear reactor in which atoms 
of uranium or other fissionable material are broken apart with a re-
sultant emission of neutrons in large quantities. 
Neutrons generally react with the nuclei of atoms in two ways : 
abs()rption, in which the neutron penetrates the nucleus and causes other 
particles to leave, and scattering, in which the neutron remains free 
T Mev is the symbol for I million electron volts. I d. at §I.so, p. IJ. 
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after collision with a nucleus but transfers to it some of its energy. 
The details of neutron reactions are too complex for statement here, 8 
but some basic knowledge is fundamental for the lawyer who is to 
engage in the legal problems of atomic enterprise. 
The absorption process takes place principally with so-called slow 9 
or thermal neutrons and may result in at least four phenomena. An 
alpha particle or a proton may be ejected, though this occurs only 
rarely, happening only with a few isotopes of low mass number; gamma 
rays may be emitted; or fission may take place. Gamma ray emission 
is the most common of the four. In all four reactions it is believed that 
when the neutron is first captured by the nucleus of the target material 
a new isotope of the same element is formed, which is then in a highly 
excited state. Very shortly the new nucleus either expels a particle 
(alpha or proton), emits gamma rays, or fissions (breaks into two or 
more parts). , · · 
When a neutron is absorbed, the new isotope (same number of pro-
tons and electrons and therefore the same chemically but with a greater 
atomic weight or mass number) is quite often radioactive. The isotope 
may not only go through beta decay but also may give off gamma rays. 
This means that when material undergoes neutron bombardment. dam-
age can ensue as a result of the beta and gamma radiation. From the 
standpoint of injury to living tissue it should be noted that hydrogen 
which is so prevalent in such tissue readily absorbs neutrons. This 
absorption process makes neutron bombardment very dangerous to liv-
ing persons and animals. It also means, however, that water with its 
high hydrogen content serves as an effective shield to protect personnel 
from neutron radiation damage. 
Fast neutrons react with target material largely by way of scattering 
or fission, not so often by particle ejection or gamma ray emission. 
(A reaction of the latter sort takes place with oxygen, however, and is 
important since air and water are often used as coolants and both con-
tain oxygen.) Scattering can be either elastic or inelastic. In inelastic 
scattering the neutron is absorbed, a neutron of lower energy is 
emitted, and the excess energy is emitted as gamma ray photons. This 
type of scattering is more likely to occur in the case of high energy 
neutrons. Parenthetically, it is also true that inelastic scattering in 
material of low mass number results from gamma radiation only if 
8 Even if it could be assumed that the writers fully understood what is now known. 
9 Even slow neutrons travel more than a mile per second. 
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the gamma ray energy is high. This means that light elements such 
as water or paraffin are the best moderators for slow neutrons. 
Elastic scattering takes place when the neutron collides with the 
nucleus but is only slowed down, not absorbed, and some of the energy 
is transferred to the target nucleus. By this process the neutron is 
gradually reduced in velocity and finally becomes a slow or thermal 
neutron. The energy level at which it becomes a thermal neutron is 
dependent on the temperature of the target material, hence the name 
thermal. 
The rate at which nuclear reactions from neutron bombardment 
takes place is dependent on the number of neutrons, their velocity, and 
the amount and kind of target nuclei. Only with certain amounts of a 
few elements do we have the proper combination of factors necessary 
to sustain a so-called fission chain reaction. Other elements, such as 
boron and cadmium, instead of fissioning absorb neutrons readily and 
can be used to control the fission process in reactors. Still others, such 
as deuterium, beryllium, and carbon (or graphite) are used as modera-
tors because they slow down neutrons very effectively. The low neutron 
absorption characteristic of aluminium, zirconium, and stainless steel 
makes them particularly suitable structural materials for reactors. 
The chain fission reaction is a special kind of fission in which there 
are enough excess neutrons from the fission process and enough target 
material to make possible a continuous series of fission reactions. When 
this right combination is present we have what is usually called a 
nuclear reactor. When a reactor is in operation-the chain fission proc-
ess taking place-:-there are many. radiation hazards immediately pres-
ent. In addition to the neutrons and gamma rays already described as 
resulting directly from any fission reaction, there are also delayed neu-
trons and gamma rays. Botl). apparently are the result of decay of 
radioactive isotopes which are formed when fission takes place. One 
of the most important sources of possibly harmful radiation from 
nuclear reactors is found in these isotopes. For example, there are more 
than eighty different fission fragments created when thermal neutrons 
bombard uranium 235, and nearly all such fragments are radioactive. 
Each of these eighty lead, through a decay process, to the formation of 
other radioisotopes, so that more than 200 such isotopes are present 
shortly after fission takes place. Most of them emit gamma rays and 
beta particles, and the half-lives of these radioactive fragments range 
from a small part of a second to a million years. 
The great variety of radiations resulting from fission makes the re-
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actor shielding problem a very complex and difficult one to solve, 
especially if economy of construction is a factor, as it certainly will be 
in industrial applications. As a practical matter any shielding that will 
stop the neutrons, both fast and slow, and the gamma rays, will be 
enough to stop alpha and beta particles and even the protons that may 
be ejected. However, shielding is subject to many complications, in-
volving much more than just the reactor core of fissionable material. 
The reactor coolant very well may become contaminated, and it must be 
carefully shielded. During chemical processing of spent radioactive 
fuels account must be taken of the highly radioactive character of the 
fission fragments, and adequate shielding must be provided. As neutrons 
and gamma radiations pass through the shielding material, they will 
react with and cause further nuclear reactions in the shield itself, just 
as in the core of the reactor. Such reactions caused by fast neutrons 
towards the outer edge of the shield are particularly dangerous. It 
should also be remembered that a material which will either capture 
slow neutrons or slow down fast ones or absorb gamma rays will not 
necessarily serve to shield against all three types. The determination 
of the proper combination of shielding materials for a given reactor 
is the task of the trained specialist. 
All of these radiations either directly or indirectly cause ionization of 
the material through which the radiations pass. In respect to damage 
to human tissue, Glasstone has the following to say : 
18.7. Little is yet known of the exact mechanism whereby 
ionizing radiations produce their effects, although several ex-
perimental researches are in progress with the hope of throw-
ing light on this problem. The number of ions formed in 
the body, and presumably the number of molecules affected, 
by radiation may be quite small, yet the result can be fatal. 
It is known that the radiations affect the individual cells of 
which the body is composed, possibly by destroying the en-
zymes that determine their particular functions. In brief, all 
cells contain protoplasm, consisting of a central body, or nu-
cleus, suspended in a viscous liquid medium, called the cyto-
plasm. The cell as a whole is surrounded by a membrane 
through which pass the salts, sugars and so on, required for 
its maintenance. Within the nucleus is the substance chroma-
tin which, at the times of cell division, forms the chromo-
somes; the latter, whose number and shape are characteristic 
of each species, carry the hereditary factors. 
18.8. There are reasons for believing that the proteins present 
in the chromosomes are particularly sensitive to the ionizing 
influence of radiations .... Even if the details are not un-
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derstood, the over-all effects on the cell are well known; 
among the results observed have been the breaking of the 
chromosomes, swelling of the nucleus arid of the entire cell, 
destruction of the cell, increase in viscosity of the proto-
plasm, and greater permeability of the cell membrane. The 
broken cells and other biological debris tend to clog the capil-
laries and so interfere with the circulation of the blood. 
18.9. In connection with the behavior of individual cells it 
has been noted that the process of cell division, known to bi-
ologists as mitosis, is delayed by exposure .to radiation. Fre-
quently the new cells that are formed are unable to undergo 
mitosis, so that their number does not increase. It is possible 
that this effect, together with cell destruction referred to 
above, underlies the use of gamma radiation for inhibiting the 
proliferation of the cancerous cells in malignant tumors. . . . 
There is, however, a curious paradox in this connection, which 
emphasizes the difficulty in understanding the biological ef- · 
fects of radiation. While controlled treatment with gamma 
rays can stop cancerous growth, continued exposure to radia-
tion in excess of certain limits may cause a cancer to be 
formed. 
18.10. Unfortunately, the animal body has not developed an 
instinctive defense against radiation as it has against heat and, · · 
to some extent, against ultraviolet light. Consequently, there 
can be severe radiation damage without any realization at the 
time on the part of the subject. The nature and extent of the 
symptoms which develop later may vary with the individual. 
They depend on the type of radiation, on the depth to which 
the radiation has penetrated, on the extent of the body ex-
posed, on the amount of radiation absorbed, and also upon 
whether the exposure was chronic, that is, repeated or pro-
longed so as to lead to a cumulative effect, or acute, that is, 
received in one large dose. All types of excessive exposure to 
radiation appear to have one factor in common; there is in-
variably a delay, which may be weeks, months or years, 
before the final, and worst, effects become apparent.10 
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The specific long-range effects of ionization in humans may en-
compass any one or more of the following: genetic damage, sterility, 
fetal damage, cancer, leukemia, leukopenia, cataracts, bone necrosis, 
epilation, shortened life span, and death. Erythema, or reddening of 
the skin, or "burn," varying in intensity with the amount of exposure, 
is a short-range .effect. In severe cases, erythema is followed by blister-
ing and formation of lesions. 
With respect to property damage a distinction should be drawn 
1o Glasstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 502 (1950). 
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between things that. are living and inanimate materials. Vegetable and 
animal life, being made up of living reproducing cells and tissues, are 
apt to suffer various types of injuries from ionization in about the 
same fashion as humans. Materials, such as steel, which are not made 
up of living cells, can also be affected by ionization but the effect is 
almost always non-permanent. Nuclear scientists have found that the 
heavier particles, such as neutrons, protons, and alpha particles, may 
upset ·the molecular structure of such materials as a result of elastic 
coll.isions. These effects can usually be removed by raising the tempera-
ture of the materiaJ. In some cases changes in the molecular structure 
may even prove beneficial. As in the case of ionization, scientists do 
not yet agree on the explanations for these changes. In the case of non-
metallic materials such as plastics the effects of radiation can be very 
harmful, as is the case with most organic materials. This fact raises 
special problems in utilizing lullricants and special materials for com-
ponent parts of nuclear reactors. It should also be remembered that 
exposure of materials to a high neutron flux may create radioactive 
isotopes. This may be harmful but may also be very helpful under 
certain circumstances when a particular isotope is desired. 
Certain radioactive substances, in addition to the harmful effects 
produced by the emission of alpha, beta, or gamma rays, cause damage 
because of their deleterious che~ical effects. Plutonium, uranium, and 
isotopes of various other elements have poisonous effects on humans 
or animals, quite aside from their radioactive properties. Likewise, 
certain of the substances are very corrosive, particularly at high tem-
peratures. But these qualities present lawyers with nothing uncommon 
or mysterious in tort litigation and need no special consideration. 
3· Measurements of Radioactivity 
Lawyers handling radiation cases must also familiarize themselves 
with the scientific concepts and terminology concerning the amounts 
and rates of radiation given off by radioactive isotopes of the various 
elements. An understanding of these is essential to an evaluation of the 
risks incurred and the existence of negligence, if any, in atomic energy 
activities. The most important terms are radioactive half-life, bio-
logical half-life, curie, and roentgen. 
All of the radioactive isotopes, whether naturally existing (such as 
uranium 235 or 238, thorium 232, and radium) or artificially created 
(such as uranium 233 and plutonium 239), gradually change to some 
stable isotope or element by the discharge from the nucleus of either 
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an alpha particle (a helium nucleus) or a beta particle (an electron), 
or in the case of some artificial isotopes by emission of positive beta 
particles or positrons. This radioactive decay takes place at a given 
rate which is different for each radioactive isotope. This rate of decay 
is usually expressed in terms of the radioactive half-life, i.e., the time 
it takes for one-half of the radiation activity to dissipate or decay. 
Isotopes are known to exist whose half-life is about a millionth of a 
second and also some whose half-life is billions of years. For example, 
thorium 232 has a half-life in the billions of years, while thorium 233 
has a half-life of twenty-three minutes. It is· also important to re-
member that radioactive decay takes place in an exponential fashion; 
i.e., one-half of the radioactivity is emitted in the first half-life; then 
one-half of the remaining activity (or one-fourth of the initial activity) 
decays in the next equal half-life period; one-half of the remaining 
activity (or one-eight of the initial value) decays in the next half-life; 
etc. After seven half-lives I/I28 (less than I%) of the· initial activity 
remains. The radioactive haff-life of a particular isotope is important 
in determining the amount of radiation received by tissue or other 
materials. The length of exposure multiplied by the rate of decay of 
the isotope (half-life) determines how much has been received in a 
particular case. 
The radioactivity present in a particular material is usually meas-
ured in curies. One curie is the number of nuclei that disintegrate 
(decay) in one second in a gram of radium, i.e., 37 billion per second: 
If a sample of some radioactive material disintegrates at this rate it 
is said to have an activity of one curie. A millicurie is I/I,ooo of a 
curie and a microcurie is I /I ,000,000 of a. curie. The terms kilocurie 
(I ,ooo curies) and megacurie ( I ,ooo;ooo curies) are used to indicate 
the activity in large amounts of radioactive material. 
The relationship between radioactive half-life and the total radiation 
given· ofF by any particular material is shown by the fact that it takes a 
larger quantity of a slowly decaying material to give off one curie of 
radiation in a given time than it does in the case. of a fast decaying 
isotope. 
In determining the permissible amounts of radiation (curies) to 
which persons or living tissue may be .subjected, or the dam,aging effect 
of ionizing radiation received, use will be made of ~nother term.~hich 
lawyers must understand, the roentgen. Th~ roentgen is the amount 
of X-ray or gamma ray radiation that will. create in a given amount 
of dry air at standard temperature and pressure, ion pairs carrying a 
given quantity of electricity. · 
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This dosage unit is really a compromise because the actual biological 
damage process is complex and little understood, but the roentgen is 
the dosage unit used in view of the prevailing opinion that biological 
damage to the living organisms is due mainly to ionization caused bv 
radiation. The radiation dose represented by the roentgen indicat;s 
only the total amount of X or gamtl)a radiation absorbed. The dosage 
rate is the amount of radiation (i.e., roentgens) absorbed in a given 
time, e.g., a second or an hour. It should be mentioned that the. absorp-
tion ability of air varies with the energy of the radiation so that the 
roentgens of energy received from a given source vary with the in-
tensity of the source as well as with the amount of material in the 
source. The strength of such a source is usually expressed in rhm, i.e., 
the quantity of a given source of gamma rays that gives off one roent-
gen per hour in air at a distance of one meter. 
If the roentgen is translated into energy, it is found that each gram 
of dry air absorbs 83.8 ergs for each roentgen of radiation. In different 
materials the amount of energy absorbed per gram per roentgen, 
however, is different. For example, one gram of soft tissue absorbs 
93 ergs and one gram of bone absorbs I so ergs or more, as compared 
with 83.8 for air. But the dose in roentgens expresses a constant not 
dependent on the nature of the material exposed to radiation or the 
amount of energy which this material absorbs. It should also be noted 
that the ionizing effect of a given source of radiation falls off inversely 
with the square of the distance from the source, a fact which makes 
considerable separation from radioactive sources important in protec-
tion against radiation hazards. The actual determination of dosage and 
dose rates is a complex problem to be left to the scientists. 
Since the roentgen is a measuring unit only for the ionizing effect 
of X and gamma rays, other terms are used to denote the effects of all 
types of radiation, including alpha and beta particles and neutrons. 
Rep (roentgen equivalent physical) is one such term and means the 
dose of any nuclear radiation that results in 83 ergs of energy being 
absorbed in one gram of tissue. Recently this has come to be used to 
indicate absorption of 93 ergs in tissue to make it equivalent to gamma 
absorption in tissue rather than air. Obviously, however, it does not 
hold for bone absorption (I so ergs). 
A new dosage unit was adopted in I953, the rad. It means the 
absorption ·of IOO ergs per gram of material imparted by ionizing 
radiation at the point of interest. It differs from the rep in that it does 
not describe the material absorbing the dose. (The rep is eighty-three 
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or ninety-three ergs absorbed by tissue.) In soft tissue, however, the 
rad is about equal to the rep. 
Because neither the rep ncir the rad (measures of amount absorbed) 
describe the biological effect of absorption in a particular material 
another term has been coined, rem (roentgen equivalent man). This 
expresses the amount of rads or reps received but in terms of the 
relative biological effect a given amount of ionizing radiation would 
have in particular tissue. The biological effect will differ greatly depend-
ing on the nature of the radiation. For example, those ionizing particles 
which cause more ionization per unit of travel along their path (such 
as alpha particles) generally have the greater biological effect. This 
effect is compared to the biological effect of X-rays of a certain energy, 
and the resultant quantity is called the relative biological effect or RBE. 
This RBE varies with the kind of tissue or organism receiving the 
radiation, the rate at which the particular amount of radiation is re-
ceived, and the kind and amount of biological effect. For purposes of 
determining the. amount of radiation protection needed these variables 
are in practice reduced to a single value of the RBE for different 
effects of a specific type of radiation, i.e., the RBE which is the highest 
under the circumstances. Using these values for the RBE, roentgens 
or reps or rads can be converted to rems. 
4· Personal Injuries 
Although the manner in which radiation causes personal injuries, 
the types of injuries, and the doses required to cause specific injuries. 
are not yet fully understood by scientists, some of the factual data that 
will be important to lawyers have been identified. As we shall see, 
some of this information leads to the con<;lusion that the task of the 
lawyer is going to be a difficult one when he attempts to prove that a 
specific injury was caused by a given exposure to ionizing radiation 
of all or part of the human body, or that it was even caused by radia-
tion at all. 
a. Radiosensitivity 
One complicating factor in framing workable legal rules for peaceful 
uses of atomic energy is ·the difference in susceptibility to radiation 
injury not only among individuals, but also among age groups. More-
over, there are susceptibility differences between particular organs and 
tissues in the human body. It is estimated, for example, that a dose 
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of 400 roentgens is lethal for about one-half of the population.11 
Likewise, some of the tissues and organs of the body will endure ex-
tensive exposure before harmful results appear, whereas other parts 
are easily damaged by comparatively low amounts of radiation. Al-
though the reasons for the differences in radiosensitivity are not known, 
it seems clear that certain tissues and organs such as lymphoid tissue 
and bone marrow where blood constituents are produced, the mucose 
membrane lining the.stomach, and the reproductive organs are the most 
sensitive. On the other hand, nerve cells, muscle tissue, and fully 
grown bone are among the least sensitive. The skin, liver, and kidneys 
have an· intermediate sensitivity. 
b. Whole Body Exposure 
Another variable in determining the effects of irradiation of the 
human body is that of whole as against partial body exposure. When 
only particular organs or parts of the body are exposed, a person or an 
animal can normally withstand many times the dosage of radiation 
that usually would be lethal if administered to the whole body. Indeed, 
this is fortunate, for it means that the destructive power of radioactivity 
can be localized and utilized to treat a variety of pathological conditions. 
In sufficient concentrations radiation may be used to destroy deseased 
tissue such as that found in malignant growths. As much as 5,000 
roentgens may be used to treat a small skin cancer whereas exposure of 
the whole body to even one-tenth of this amount would kill most people. 
When the entire body is exposed to radiation, a very complex problem 
arises of trying to determine the total effect. Since various parts of the 
body have differing degrees of radiosensitivity a certain dose of radiation 
over the whole body will probably affect some parts very seriously and 
others not to any discernible extent. Despite all of the complexities and 
uncertainties, scientists up to very recently have pretty generally agreed 
that a weekly whole body exposure of 0.3 roentgen or rem per week is 
a permissible upper limit for repeated exposure. It is true that recently 
certain geneticists have concluded that no dosage is too small to increase 
the likelihood of genetic damage and also to shorten the life span of the 
exposed person. In 1957 the National Committee on Radiation Protec-
tion recommended that for occupational conditions the maximum per-
missible accumulated do.~e. in rems, at any age equal five times the 
number of years beyond age eighteen, provided that no annual increment 
u An average chest X-ray· would probably administer a dose of about 1 roentgen. 
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exceed fifteen rems. For the entire population, the maximum permissible 
dose to the gonads from all sources of radiation, including medical and 
other man-made sources, and background radiation, is not to exceed 14· 
million rems per million of population over the period from conception 
up to age thirty and one-third of that amount in each decade thereafter. 
These permissible dose figures take account of another characteristic 
of radiation exposure which seems to be true whether we are considering 
either whole body or only partial body exposure-namely, that, in gen-
eral, a given amount of radiation will cause less damage if spread over 
a longer period of time. Overexposure occasioned by daily relatively low 
intensity radiation is called chronic, while overexposure by a relatively 
large dose received in a short time interval is called acute overexposure. 
It seems clear that all types of radiation overexposure, whether 
chronic or acute, and whether of the whole or only part of the. body, 
have at least two effects in common. In both cases there seems always 
to be a delay, whether of weeks, months, or years, before the final and 
the worst effects manifest themselves. Likewise it seems clear that in 
sufficient quantities overexposure can cause any of the specific types of 
damages discussed later in this chapter. 
· Aside from these specific injuries, however, there is a rather par-
tiCular set of reactions of the human body to acute whole body over-
exposure. The reactions of the body to such exposure usually appear in 
four phases : ( 1) nausea, vomiting, and general lassitude, such as ex-
perienced by patients undergoing intensive radium or X-ray treatment 
(sometimes called "radiation sickness") ; ( 2) a phase of relative well-
being lasting from a few days to a few weeks depending on the severity 
of the radiation dose; ( 3) a period of intense reaction including 
prostration, loss of appetite, loss of weight, rapid heart action, fever, 
bleeding of the gums and loss of hair, lasting from days to weeks or 
until death occurs in severe cases; and ( 4) a period of gradual recovery 
lasting up to six months. Any acute overexposure is accompanied by the 
same significant changes in the blood cells found in cases of chronic 
ove.rexposure. 
, c. Cumulative Effect 
Another complicating factor in atomic radiation cases is the cumula-
tive effect of overexposure. Such ari effect is suggested by the preceding 
discussion and very definitely plays a part in the determination of the 
permissible or tolerance dose, presently set at 0.3 rem per week. 
Many radiation effects are believed to be of a threshold character; 
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that is, unless the dose is more than a certain minimum, no injury will 
result. This is consistent with the fact that all life on the earth is con-
tinually bombarded by radiations from cosmic rays, from radioactive 
material always present in air and water, and from radioisotopes, such 
as carbon 14 and potassium 40, always present in the human body with-
out any apparent or obvious resulting harm. The assumption is that 
exposure up to certain levels of intensity, at least for certain parts of the 
body, is offset by the powers of recovery of the body which are great 
enough to preclude cumulative damage. 
It seems quite clear, however, that in certain cases there definitely is a 
cumulative effect such that damage that would not result from a single. 
small dose will occur if that small dose is repeated often enough. For 
example, a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences on radia-
tion injury makes the categorical statement that there is no dose too 
small to have a genetic effect or to shorten the life span. Our knowledge 
about such cumulative effects and under what circumstances they occur 
is quite incomplete at the present time, but the ramifications in radiation 
injury cases are obvious. For example, one exposure, which by itself 
falls within permissible limits, may make subsequent seemingly permis-
sible exposures quite damaging. Accordingly, full knowledge and 
records of past exposures will be required in order to prevent really 
harmful exposures which otherwise appear to be perfectly within per-
missible limits. Again, once an individual has received the maximum 
permissible accumulation of radiation, essential X-ray exposure for 
medical purposes may be foreclosed because of the serious risk of total 
overexposure. 
d. External and Internal Radiation Hazards 
The harmfulness of radiation depends not only upon the radiosensi-
tivity of the individual or the various tissues affected and the nature and 
dosage of exposure, but also upon the type of radiation and its immedi-
ate location in respect to human tissues. Some sources of radiation 
may create little hazard if located outside the body but may be highly 
dangerous if within the body. Therefore, lawyers who are to be involved 
in atomic affairs must understand the factors involved and methods of 
radiation protection that are available if they are properly to handle 
personal injury cases involving radiation. 
( I ) External Sources 
As explained earlier, .alpha and beta particles have only slight pene-
trating power. Consequently if the alpha or beta source is outside the 
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body, no observable harm results from the alpha radiation, and even 
from high energy beta radiation the damage will usually be limited to 
severe skin burn. However, it shoul<;i be remembered that both alpha 
and beta activity is often accompanied by gamma ray emission. 
Gamma rays from external sources are very dangerous, particularly 
if they are so-called hard gamma rays (i.e., rays that have a very high 
energy). As pointed out above in the discussion of gamma rays, they, 
like X-rays, are absorbed in an exponential manner and thus theoretically 
can travel through any thickness of material, including body tissue. Not 
only do gamma rays create electrically excited nuclei which may upset 
the biological balance within body tissue, but also they cause the emission 
of electrons or beta particles inside the body which in turn cause ioniza-
tion. Such beta particles released in close proximity to internal tissues 
can do great damage to radiosensitive organs and tissue that would 
never be endangered by such particles from an external source. 
Neutrons, though they do not cause ionization directly, do cause con-
siderable biological damage indirectly. If the neutrons are of the so-
called slow type, most of this damage is caused by their capture by 
hydrogen and nitrogen nuclei which are plentiful in living tissue. 
Capture of neutrons in hydrogen nuclei produces gamma ray photons 
some of which will cause ionization in surrounding tissue and some of 
which escape from the body. Capture of neutrons by nitrogen nuclei 
also causes emission of protons which, like alpha particles, dissipate their 
energy in a short distance but the ionization is very substantial. The 
reaction of slow neutrons with other material in the body seems rela-
tively insignificant. 
If the neutrons are fast, i.e., of high velocity, a somewhat different 
sequence of events takes place. Most of the energy from such neutrons 
is lost in elastic collisions with hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen 
atoms found in the body tissues. The target atom acquires kinetic energy 
which is then lost by elastic collisions with other atoms, by ionization, 
and by excitation. If fast neutrons hit nitrogen 14 atoms, protons may 
be ejected, as explained above, and carbon 14 may be formed which is 
itself a beta emitter. If the collision with nitrogen 14 is accompanied by 
sufficient energy, alpha particles will also be emitted. All of these reac-
tions take place within a short distance from the nucleus hit by the fast 
neutron. Fast neutrons after a sufficient number of collisions lose 
energy and become slow neutrons. 
In considering the biological damage caused by neutrons it is im-
portant to remember that the secondary effects will very likely take place 
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deep in the body, particularly if fast neutrons are involved, for neutrons, 
like gamma rays, lose their energy exponentially; they are not stopped 
by the skin as are alpha and beta particles. Neutrons are particularly 
harmful because hydrogen is such an important and abundant element 
in the body and is such an excellent absorber of neutrons. It is also 
important to remember that while most of the ionizing energy from 
slow neutrons comes from gamma rays emitted from neutron absorption 
by hydrogen, the greatest biological effect is probably caused by the 
nitrogen-proton reaction. This is because the whole energy of the proton 
is absorbed very close to the point of origin, while gamma rays are ab-
sorbed at considerable distances or may even escape the body without 
absorption. The RBE (relative biological effect) of protons may be 
ten times greater than the RBE of gamma radiation. 
( 2) Internal Radiation 
As previously stated, so far as known, biological damage from radia-
tion is caused by ionization and is the same whether the radiation is 
internal or external in origin. However, the effects from specific types 
and sources of radiation can vary greatly depending on whether the 
source is internal ~r external. This results from the fact that certain 
chemicals have a tendency to concentrate in certain body tissues. Ac-
count must also be taken of the fact that radiation from outside the 
body is reduced in strength to a greater or lesser degree as it passes 
through the body tissues. 
Radioactive material may enter the body through the processes of 
breathing, eating, or drinking such materials or through cuts and abra-
sions. As is true with external sources, the quantity of material ingested 
is an important factor in determining the dose received. However, there 
are several factors relating to the dose actually received from an in-
ternal source which are not present when the source is external. Ex-
posure to external sources can be terminated by simply removing either 
the source or the person to a safe distance. However, once a source is 
located within the body, exposure is continuous until the quantity of 
radiation is depleted either by radioactive decay in accordance with 
known rates (usually measured in radioactive half-lives) or by biologi-
cal elimination (such as through urine, feces, or perspiration). The rate 
of elimination is measured by the biological half-life, which means the 
time required for natural processes to eliminate one-half the quantity 
taken into the body. By combining the radioactive and biological half-
lives an effective half-life is determined, i.e., the time required for the 
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initial amount of radioactivity to be reduced to one-half its initial value 
by both elimination and radioactive decay. For example, cesium has a 
radioactive half-life of thirty-seven years but is readily eliminated by 
the body, having a biological half-life of about fifteen days. Plutonium, 
on the other hand, has not only a very long radioactive half-life but also 
an extremely long biological half-life. 
Another factor that determines how much of a radioactive material 
the body retains is the method of introduction into the body. As an ex-
ample, iodine (including radioactive iodine I 3 I which is commonly 
used) entering the digestive tract has a retention rate of nearly 100%. 
Plutonium 239, on the other hand, if taken into the digestive tract is not 
absorbed nearly so readily as it is if it is drawn into the lungs. Strontium 
go, however, has about as great a retention rate as plutonium 239 in air, 
but nearly twice the rate of plutonium 239 if taken into the digestive 
tract. Natural uranium is similar to plutonium 239, being retained only 
slightly if in water but much more so if in air. 
As important as the retention rate in determining the biological dam-
age that will be caused by an internal radiation source is the distribution 
of the source in terms of types of tissues or organs to which the source 
is attracted. The concentration of distribution is also significant. Tak-
ing examples again, iodine I3I localizes almost entirely in the thyroid 
gland. Because radio-iodine localizes in .such a small part of the body, 
the permissible quantity that can be ingested before the level of over-
exposure is reached is very much less than in the case of radioactive 
sodium 24, which is distributed rather uniformly throughout the body. 
Another important factor is the location of any concentration in rela-
tion to vital tissues or organs. Uranium 233, plutonium 239, strontium 
go, and calcium 45 (all radioactive isotopes) concentrate in the bones 
where they can radiate the very sensitive blood-forming marrow. More-
over, they are retained for very long periods, although there has been 
some success in the use of zirconium to speed the biological elimination 
of plutonium. 
In comparing external and internal radiation the type of radiation in-
volved must also be considered. As we have seen, alpha particles and 
even beta particles originating outside the body are not especially 
dangerous. They have very little if any internal effect because both are 
quickly absorbed by the skin; Gamma rays and neutrons,. however, have 
great penetration powers. If alpha or beta sources are taken into the 
body, a very different effect is noted. In such cases the radiation is 
totally absorbed close to the source (alpha much closer than beta, of 
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course), and this may well be very close to, if not actually in, a vital, 
highly radiosensitive organ. Gamma rays from internal sources, how-
ever, may actually pass through the tissues without absorption, and in 
any event their harmful effects will be distributed much farther from the 
source and, therefore, more widely throughout the body than those re-
sulting from internal alpha or beta radiation. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that safety procedures must take 
account of the great differences in possible biological damage caused 
by .external as compared with internal radiation. Lawyers handling 
radiation injury cases must be familiar with the factors creating these 
differences in order to determine the existence of overexposure and 
evaluate the possibility and extent of damage suffered by the injured 
person. Moreover, the evolution of technology in this area will have to 
be examined continually by lawyers who are concerned in one capacity 
or another with radiation injuries. 
e. Specific Personal Injuries 
So far we have discussed generally the damaging. effect of ionizing 
radiation and the nature of radiation hazards. Since the lawyers of the 
atomic age will be involved with fact situations in which specific injuries 
are alleged, the principal known types of injuries warrant mention. 
Once again, we wish to emphasize that little is currently known about 
the manner in which radiation causes injury, and undoubtedly future 
scientific experimentation and research will reveal many features of 
radiation damage that are either unknown or but little understood today. 
( 1 ) Genetic Damage 
Today biologists generally agree that our inherited characteristics are 
determined by the genes which we inherit from our parents. These 
submicroscopic units singly and in combination are believed to control 
such physical characteristics as color of hair and eyes, baldness, size, 
mental ability, etc. Genes in turn are strung together in microscopically 
visible threads of material called chromosomes which exist in human 
body cells in forty-eight similar but not identical pairs. Twenty-four 
chromosomes come from each parent and roughly they match each other. 
The genes found in the reproductive organs of the parents seem to be 
the essential ones in determining hereditary characteristics in the off-
sprmg. 
In general, the genes present in the fertilized egg do not change as the 
cells divide and as the mature human body develops. However, changes 
in the genes can take place as the result of exposure to heat, to some 
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chemicals (e.g., mustard gas), and to radiation. If the change is perma-
nent, it is called a mutation. If an ordinary body cell mutates, this 
change is passed along to other similar body cells by cell division, but it is 
not passed on to the children. If, however, the mutation occurs in a 
sperm or egg cell, the child resulting from the sperm or egg will inherit 
the mutated gene. Even the non-inherited mutation can have genetic 
effects such as reduced life span and reduced reproductive capacity, but 
the major genetic effect arises from inheritable mutations. It should also 
be mentioned that mutations can occur in the chromosomes. 
Genes may be either dominant or recessive in the sense that if the two 
genes, one from each parent, that control some physical characteristic 
are not similar, then one, being more powerful, dominates the other, 
although such domination is not wo% complete. A recessive gene 
characteristic will manifest itself fully only if both genes are recessive. 
The fact that mutant genes are usually recessive in character is very 
significant in considering the genetic effects of radiation. 
Being recessive, mutated genes do not ordinarily become apparent, 
particularly in early generations. This means that the genetic effect will 
be difficult, if not impossible, to prove in a legal sense, though scientists 
agree radiation does cause mutations. Since the recessive gene is not 
wo% dominated, however, it will manifest itself partially in every child 
of every generation carrying it. This manifestation may be in the form 
of shortened life span, reduction in fertility, or in any of the multitude 
of ordinary human ailments including susceptibility to disease. This 
means that the mutated gene will affect many more individuals than if it 
were dominant. If dominant and if involving a vital function or organ, 
it is likely to result in death or total inability to procreate. Genetically 
speaking, therefore, the recessive mutant gene has a very great impact 
indeed. 
Scientists do not agree as to the exact mechanism by which ionizing 
radiation causes mutations, 12 but they are agreed ( 1) that radiation does 
increase the possibility of a mutation, ( 2) that mutations, including 
spontaneous mutations (naturally occuring from cosmic rays and 
natural radiation perhaps), are almost all harmful, ( 3) that any radia-
tion increases the possibility of mutations no matter how small the dose, 
and ( 4) that mutation is a cumulative effect of radiation not dependent 
on a given dosage rate such as 0.3 rem per week. This last conclusion 
means that all radiation received by a particular person from the time 
12 One theory holds that radiation produces toxic substances affecting the gene; 
another says ionization breaks the chemical bond in the gene ; and a third says radia-
tion breaks the chromosomes into parts and an imperfect reunion is made. 
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of his conception until all of his children are born has possible genetic 
effects by increasing the probability of mutations which will be passed 
on to all of his descendants. In America, ·on the average, each child's 
parents have been living for thirty years at the time of birth so geneti-
cists use thirty years to determine the impact of mutations on the 
population as a whole. 
From natural background radiation, it is estimated that the average 
person receives 4·3 roentgens in thirty years. -Medical X-rays add three 
more roentgens over a thirty-year period for the average person. Atomic 
weapons testing at present rates adds between .02 and .5 roentgens in 
thirty years. 
Several responsible geneticists. have concluded that from thirty to 
eighty roentgens of radiation per person would double the present rate 
of mutations. To make this somewhat more understandable in human 
terms, if doubling of the mutation rate occurreq, some geneticists cal-
culate that instead of 2,ooo,ooo children having genetic defects in each 
generation (there are roughly xoo,ooo,ooo persons in each generation 
in this country), 4,000,000 children would have such defects. It is said 
that even a ten roentgen exposure of the whole population ultimately 
would create soo,ooo more mutation defects per generation. Other 
geneticists say that a ten roentgen dose to the gonads of the whole 
population would cause a total of s,ooo,ooo mutants in our population. 
These are rough estimates, of course, but they indicate the potential 
danger. 
From these calculations the Committee on Genetic Effects of Atomic 
Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences urges that our general 
population should not receive more than ten roentgehs to the repro-
ductive organs between conception and age thirty, this in addition to 
background radiation, but inclusive of radiation from medical X-rays. 
The committee also recommends that no one person receive more than 
fifty roentgens prior to age thirty and not more than an additional fifty 
roentgens from age thirty to age forty. 
The problems posed for the legal profession in the area of genetic 
effects call for more than the mere application of familiar principles of 
tort law. Some imaginative thinking is indicated. 
( 2) Sterility 
Radiation may produce sterility by causing degeneration of the cells 
in the layers of the epithelium in the testes from which spermatozoa 
develop. In females, although no gross changes in the ovaries seem to 
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occur, the ova will not develop normally after exposure, and the inci-
dence of miscarriages and premature births increases. 
The existence of damage in the form of sterility is ascertainable at an 
early date after overexposure. A case of sterility from radiation has 
already reached a court, but it was dismissed prior to trial when the 
claimant's wife happily developed pregnancy, a fact which served both to 
deprive the plaintiff of damages and to prevent any testing of familiar 
legal presumptions. 
Overexposure can cause either temporary or permanent sterility, but 
the likelihood of the latter is slight. Generally, a dose large enough to 
cause permanent sterility would be lethal. Exposure resulting from the 
atom bomb explosions in Japan caused many cases of temporary sterility 
among the population, but the vast majority of the victims have re-
turned to normalcy. The presence of other causes of sterility, such as 
malnutrition or disease, make accurat~ computations difficult. 
( 3) Fetal Damage 
Another type of injury which may result from radiation overexposure, 
particularly in the use of radiation in medical therapy, is fetal damage. 
Recent experiments upon mice exposed to radiation have shown that 
various kinds of abnormalities result from exposing mouse embryos to 
X-rays. The type of abnormality is influenced by the size of the X-ray 
dose administered and the state of development of the embryo. Ex-
posures as low as twenty-five to fifty roentgens have been shown to have 
an effect upon certain physical characteristics of the mice.18 However, 
gross monstrosities in human beings are not considered too probable 
since a severe overexposure is more likely to result in fetal death or 
miscarriage. Certain experts believe, however, that radiation therapy of 
the pelvic area during pregnancy may cause microcephalic idiocy, and 
before any such therapy is administered, the condition of the woman 
should be ascertained and the risks appraised.14 Fetal injury from 
chronic expo~ure to small amounts of radiation seems to be unlikely, 
although lack of sufficiently complete statistical information makes im-
possible the formulation of positive conclusions. 
(4) Cancer 
Cancer is another possible injury emanating from overexposure to 
radiation, although paradoxically radiation is also one of the brightest 
18 XI Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 18o (June 1955). 
u Behrens, "Cumulative Effects and Permissible Dosage Limits of Ionizing Radia-
tions," Atomic Medicine 135 (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949). 
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hopes for cancer cure today. The paradox stems from the fact that the 
ionizing radiation destroys both cancer cells and normal cells, and hence 
selective exposure may stop the cancerous growth. 
Some of the earlier cases of radiation cancer involved severe hand 
burns from repeated exposure of X-ray technicians. The skin became 
dry and cracked, and the fingernails developed ridges and became brittle. 
Upon the cessation of radiation exposure, this condition disappeared, 
only to develop into cancer after the lapse of a long period of time 
marked by the absence of further symptoms. Much of the evidence of 
radiation-induced tumors has been derived from experiments upon mice 
and rabbits, the experiments showing an increased incidence of lung, 
ovarian, and breast tumors in animals exposed to radiation. The cause 
of cancer is still a mystery, yet the results of the experiments upon 
animals are considered worthy of extrapolation to man, with the con-
clusion that the irritation produced by overexposure can produce malig-
nancy. Although the cause of cancer is not fully known, there is no 
question that such malignancy is one of the radiation injuries with which 
the law will have to contend. 
( 5) Leukemia 
Leukemia is the presence of an excessive number of leucocyte or 
white cells in the blood, and it may be caused by radiation damage to 
the blood-forming organs. Because of the subtleness of its onset, leu-
kemia is considered by many to be an even worse menace than cancer. 
Victims frequently are unaware of the presence of the malady until it 
has reached an advanced stage at which cure is impossible. Leukemia is 
a type of disease which is likely to result from chronic whole body ir-
radiation over a long period. Available data shows an incidence of 
0.53% leukemia mortality among physicians, as compared to 0.39% 
among the general population. 15 Other studies reveal the incidence 
among radiologists to be almost nine times that of other physicians.16 
From materials presently available, it would seem that the current state 
of knowledge concerning leukemia is comparable to that concerning 
malignant cancer. Thus, like cancer·, leukemia is regarded as one of the 
likely results of excessive irradiation, although the exact manner in 
15 Henshaw and Hawkings, "Incidence of Leukemia in Physicians," 4 ]. National 
Cancer Institute 339 ( 1944). See also Report of Committee on Pathological Effects 
of Atomic Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, p. 35. 
16 Ulrich, "The Incidence of Leukemia in Radiologists," New England ]. Med. 234 
{I94l}). . 
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which it is brought about is unknown. All that can be said is that with-
out the overexposure the victim might have developed the disease, but 
his overexposure also may have been the cause or a significant con-
tributing factor. The chief basis for deducing that cancer and leukemia 
result from radioactive exposure lies in the fact that chronic irritations 
seem to be a factor in the incidence of such malignancies, and ionizing 
radiation is a powerful irritant. 
( 6) Leukopenia 
Another disease with a high rate of incidence under conditions of 
overexposure to ionizing radiation is leukopenia, a deficiency of leuco-
cyte [white] cells in the blood. This condition is more likely to appear 
immediately following extreme overexposure to radiation, although it 
can also be produced by chronic overexposure to smaller quantities of 
radiation. Its victims are highly susceptible to infection and are unable 
to throw off minor diseases. 
Little statistical evidence is available relating to the incidence of 
leukopenia in occupations dealing with radiation as compared with other 
groups of the population. Animal experiments as well as instances in 
humans, however, seem to provide adequate evidence that radiation 
exposure can cause leukopenia. 
( 7) Damage to Bone Marrow 
Severe damage to the bone marrow c;:an also result from overexposure 
to radiation. Bone marrow damage usually results from total body ir-
radiation but may also appear after local irradiation. Bone marrow is 
particularly radiosensitive and tends to become gelatinous after excessive 
radiation. Since most of the blood constituents are manufactured in the 
radiosensitive bone marrow, the effect of overexposure is quickly trans-
mitted to the blood, and damage to the blood supply is followed by 
deleterious effects upon ·the body as a whole. In fact, hemological 
changes may prove to be one of the earliest and most effective symptoms 
for diagnostic study in detecting overexposure to radiation.17 Mature 
blood cells, after leaving the marrow, and even if they are not damaged 
by radiation, have a limited life span and must be replaced. Red blood 
cells seem to have a life span of about 125 days; platelets and granulo-
cytes reputedly have a life span of about three to five days; and lympho-
cytes usually live only for a few hours. Unless these cells are replaced 
17BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 457:941 (1956). 
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promptly, damage can be severe. Sufficient information is not yet avail~ 
able to explain the reasons for damage to the bone marrow, but it is 
certain that such damage occurs and that the production rate of blood 
cells by the marrow is affected. There is evidence to support the view 
that chronic exposure to even small amounts of radiation will cause 
damage to the bone marrow, but apparently little is known about the 
minimum dosage tending to cause damage. Individual differences in re-
spect to radiosensitivity doubtless bring about variations in the dosage 
necessary to cause damage. 
It should also be mentioned that radiation of bones seems to retard 
growth of epiphysis in immature bones. This may produce serious re-
sults in children subjected to radiation. Bone sarcoma may appear in 
even mature persons after· chronic overexposure. 
( 8) Cataract 
Cataract, an opaque condition of the lens of the eyes, is another in-
jury caused by overexposure to ionizing radiation. Since the only cases 
on record are those of cyclotron workers and the atomic bomb victims 
in Japan, cataract is often regarded as the result of .radiation damage 
caused by neutrons. However, X-rays and gamma rays will also pro-
duce cataract, although neutrons seem to be about forty times as effec-
tive. The development of a cataract does not necessarily result in per-
~anent loss of vision, for the opaque lens may be surgically removed.18 
However, the damage is severe, and the victim is permanently handi-
capped. Findings in Japan have led to the conchtsion that where radia-
tion has induced the formation of the first stages of a cataract, the 
cessation of over-exposure will stop further progress of the disease and 
surgical removal may riot be required. The exact manner in which 
cataracts are produced is not yet known, nor is there evidence of the 
exact effect of radiation upon the eye. 
( 9) Epilation 
The loss of hair was a common consequence of radiation among the 
Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb. This loss occurred mainly on 
the head, probably because it was more exposed to the bomb burst and 
thus absorbed more radiation. About thirteen days after exposure, the 
hair fell out in large quantities. This continued for about two weeks. In 
18 Some of the cyclotron workers in California had cataracts removed. After sur-
gery, reasonably effective vision was apparently restored. 
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a few months the hair began to return, and in no case was the epilation 
permanent. 
( 10) Other Injuries 
On the basis of animal experiments, some scientists believe that ioniz-
ing radiation, as a result of accumulated effects over the years, is re-
sponsible for shortened life span. Professor G. Hoyt Whipple, patholo-
gist of the University of Rochester, in a paper delivered at the Nuclear 
Engineering and Science Congress in December 1955, asserted, on the 
basis of animal experiments, that the exposure of a human being to 3/10 
of a roentgen per week for a thirty-year period could reduce the life 
span as much as three years. 
There is also the possibility of other injuries to organs of the body, 
such as the kidneys, the liver, the brain, etc., as the result of ionizing 
radiation, even without development of actual disease. Injuries to these 
organs in swine and cattle exposed to radiation during the atomic bomb 
test at Bikini, and in overexpbsed Japanese victims, bear out this possi-
bility, although exact knowledge as to the physiology of such injuries is 
at present lacking; One very likely effect of general bodily radiation in-
jury is a distinct reduction in the resistance to disease. 
f. Conclusions 
Continuous research is being conducted in the biological science~ on 
the types and causes of radiation injuries. Undoubtedly, new discoveries 
will be made that will increase man's knowledge of radiation hazards and 
the methods of treatment. However, this rather cursory examination of 
personal injuries from radiation indicates several unique hazards that 
are not encountered in typical industrial activities. Among the more 
significant features that lawyers must contend with in the atomic age 
are the following: ( 1) knowledge of the nature of injuries is still very 
limited; ( 2) there are differences in the radiosensitivity of individuals 
and of specific parts of the body; (3) the cumulative effect of radiation 
m~kes it difficult to place responsibility for an injury on any particular 
person or activity; ( 4) the differences in the effect of external and in-
ternal sources, as well as in the kind of ionizing radiation, raise difficult 
questions of proof; and (5) injuries may not be discovered until many 
years after exposure to radiation. 
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S· Property Damage 
Not only may humans suffer severe injury from exposure to radia-
tion, but also property may be damaged in a rather spectacular fashion. 
All living matter, including plant, aquatic, and animal life, can suffer 
many of the injuries already described in respect to personal injuries. 
Furthermore, some of these injuries may eventually result in injuries 
to persons. For example, if a cow eats radioactive material which is re-
tained in the flesh and is then eaten by humans, the personal injuries 
previously described in conjunction with ingested radioactive material 
possibly may arise. 
Property may be injured by the disposal of radioactive materials into 
sewer systems and streams, or by dumping them into the oceans of the 
world. The recent report of the Committee on Effects of Atomic Radia-
tion on Oceanography and Fisheries of the National Academy of Sci-
ences warns of the potential dangers to marine resources from such dis-
posal techniques~ Apparently all ocean water wherever located and at 
all depths eventually finds its way around to all of the ocean surfaces 
throughout the world. Conceivably, radioactive material can be assimi-
lated by algae in the water, which may subsequently be eaten by fish 
which will retain the radioactive isotopes. It is not difficult to envisage 
the loss that would result if a downstream fishery caught and canned 
a large number of fish contaminated by radioactive materials, especially 
if the radioactive content were sufficiently high to necessitate removal 
from the market by public health althorities to preclude human ingestion. 
The fact that a particular radioactive element will be perpetuated re-
gardless of chemical combinations through which it may pass raises 
special legal problems because of the remoteness, both in time and space 
from the original wrongful act, of injuries that may result. 
Growing crops, irrigated with water contaminated by radioactive 
wastes, may also be damaged as a result of radioactive materials being 
absorbed and retained. They may even be rendered inedible ·or un-
marketable. Crop damage can also result from the absorption of radio-
active materials from the air. This might happen, for example, when 
an atomic reactor is air-cooled and the discharged coolant is unduly 
radioactive. In one instance a person living in an area near a plant mak-
ing use of atomic energy was able to trace its location because the air 
was polluted with waste products which descended upon the plant life in 
the surrounding area, leaving small speckled marks on it. Because the 
spots always appeared on the same side of the plants, he was able to de-
duce the location of the atomic energy installation. If such radioactivity 
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descended regularly over an area where crops or flowers are grown, it is 
conceivable that their value might decrease even though the amount of 
transferred radioactivity might not be sufficient to affect the health of 
subsequent consumers. 
Injuries to nonliving matter are of a different nature. Exposure to 
neutron radiation may cause a machine, for example, to become so radio-
active that it cannot be used for its intended purpose without being a 
hazard to humans. In some cases, the half-life of the resulting radioiso-
topes may prevent use of the irradiated article for thousands of years. 
Because of the frequency of its occurrence, damage to unexposed 
film by exposure to radiation warrants special mention. Gamma radia-
tion will readily penetrate the packaging of unexposed film. It then 
transfers its energy to the film emulsion, thereby activating it as though 
by light. This kind of damage has occurred to film shipped in a railroad 
car or other conveyance together with a quantity of radium, the rays 
from which rendered the film unusable. Film damage has even been 
caused by the atomic bomb tests in Nevada. Radioactive materials "fell 
out" over a wide area, feeding a river, the water of which was used in 
the production of strawboard. It is reported that the strawboard was, 
in turn, consigned to the Eastman Kodak Company for use in packaging 
film and that the contaminated packaging exposed the film. 
Another type of property damage which may occur as a result of ac-
cidental contamination of an area with radioactive materials is the 
rendering of the area unsafe for human habitation or cultivation, 
thereby reducing land values. Such contamination may result from 
various causes, such as the crash of a plane carrying radioactive ma-
terials, 19 an accident to a truck carrying radioactive materials, etc. The 
latter situation actually arose on one occasion in the southwest. The 
community petitioned Congress for sufficient funds to contruct a new 
highway by-pass around the area. More severe contamination could 
result from a "burn up" or "melt down" of a nuclear reactor although 
the safety precautions tend to minimize the possibility. While a burn 
up is not of the same explosive quality as an atomic bomb, it could 
nevertheless destroy the reactor plant and scatter radioactive materials 
over the surrounding area. No burn up of major proportions has oc-
curred to date, and safety measures for the control of reactors are con-
stantly being improved. Such a catastrophe must, however, be con-
t9 The Civil Aeronautics Board does, however, require packaging designed to with-
stand quite severe shocks. 
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sidered within the realm of possibility, since there have been accidents 
in reactor operations, even though short of a major burn up. 
This very brief discussion of types of property damage caused by 
radiation is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely suggestive of the 
possibilities. However, it does illustrate that atomic energy presents 
several unique tort liability aspects since the creation of· a radioactive 
material may initiate a series of continuing property and personal injur-
ies that are almost beyond the range of present experience. 
D. Sources of Radiation 
We have hitherto discussed some of the basic scientific data concern-
ing the structure of the atotn, the types of radiation, and the hazards of 
radiation. It seems rather clear that the dangers of radiation cannot be 
separated from the processes which make nuclear energy so promising 
as an energy source and as an industrial and research tool for the wel-
fare of mankind. Therefore, a summary discussion of the sources of 
natural and artificially created radiation seems appropriate. 
1. Particle Accelerators 
High energy particle accelerators, popularly known as "atom 
smashers," produce radiation while operating and may also make target 
mater:ials radioactive. Primarily used in scientific research, cyclotrons, 
synchrotrons, betatrons, cosmotrons, bevatrons, etc., are used to ac-
celerate subatomic particles to tremendous velocities. Only electrically 
charged particles, such as protons, alpha particles, beta particles, and 
deuterons (the latter being the hydrogen nucleus with a neutron added), 
can be employed by the machines. The charged particles are set in mo-
tion in a complex machine utilizing the simple principle of reversing the 
electric charges in two separate sources, between which the particles pass. 
The particles, alternately attracted and repelled, move circularly during 
their journey toward the target atoms. Reversing a charge millions of 
times per second causes these atomic projectiles to acquire speeds ap-
proaching that of light. The impact on target atoms, depending on the 
total energy of the projectiles, and on the type of particle utilized, pro-
duces changes which manifest themselves in the form of artificial by-
product isotopes, some of which may be radioactive. In addition, exces-
sive energy is dissipated in the form of gamma radiation, and additional 
radioactivity may be given off in the form of dislodged neutrons. How-
ever, particle accelerators are extremely expensive to build and operate, 
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and they produce relatively meager amounts of radioisotopes. There-
fore, except to those in the immediate vicinity! they have not proved to 
be a hazardous source of radiation. 
One practical application of the accelerating principle is in the artificial 
production of X-rays. The ordinary X-ray tube is used to produce elec-
trons, to accelerate and direet them, and to cause the bombardment of a 
suitable metal target. Because an electron is a very light particle, it is 
readily deflected by orbital electrons surrounding the target nucleus. 
The consequent excitation of the electronic structure of the target atoms 
causes the emission of the X-rays. 
2. The Fission Process 
Although high energy accelerators made possible man-made radio-
. isotopes, it was the demonstration of the fissionable nature of the uran-
ium atom which really ushered in the atomic age. The fission process has 
made the mass production of more than 1,000 varieties of radioisotopes 
virtually a matter of routine. 
In 1939 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman in Germany proved that 
barium was produced by bombarding uranium with neutrons. Other 
scientist's immediately predicted that neutron bombardment of uranium 
caused the uranium nucleus to fission with the release of tremendous 
amounts of energy. Professor Enrico Fermi o{Italy also suggested the 
possibility that in splitting the uranium nucleus, neutrons were emitted 
which would cause the fission of other uranium nuclei, thereby creating 
a chain reaction. During World War II the chain reaction theory was 
proved by the construction of the first nuclear reactor under the 
abandoned football stadium at the University of Chicago. . 
In a reactor utilizing fissionable ur;mium 235, an independent neutron 
source is employed to release the initial supply of neutrons. The impact of 
the neutrons causes the uranium 235 atoms to split into fragments, form-
ing a number of other elements, releasing both heat and still more neu-
trons (since lighter elements can house fewer neutrons). Some of the 
free neutrons go forth to strike still other U 235 atoms, which also split 
with like consequences. This sequence of events repeats itself over and 
over again as long as there is fissionable material present in the reactor 
in so-called "critical mass" quantity, or until certain other control de-
vices are used to slow down or to stop the reactions. Insertion in the 
reactor of neutron-absorbing substances, such as cadmium, will serve 
this purpose. 
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Fission has made the neutron a very common nuclear projectile. 
Neutrons are produced in great quantities as a byproduct of the fission 
process, and they come forth with tremendous energies. "Fast" neu-
trons can be utilized in the production in atomic reactors of great quan-
tities and varieties of radioisotopes at reasonable cost. During the 
fission process a vast amount of radiation is released, and shielding must 
therefore, be provided to create a barrier between the reactor core and 
operating personnel. 
The atoms of various elements resulting from the breaking up of 
fissionable uranium are called fission "byproducts"; they are the "ashes" 
of the atomic furnace and are mostly radioisotopes of lighter elements. 
But, in addition, radioisotopes of an especially selected element can be 
produced in a reactor by placing a sample of such element within the 
core to become a target for the neutrons liberated during fission. When 
a neutron strikes a nucleus, it may be absorbed, ~hus forming a heavier 
isotope of the same element. Thereafter, the nucleus may have surplus 
energy, in which case it will emit gamma rays until it becomes stable. If 
the new nucleus is incapable of retaining the additional neutron as such, 
it may undergo beta decay. Further stages of transmutation occur, sev-
eral in number and characterized by different types of radiation, before 
the decaying process terminates with the formation of a stable isotope 
or element. 
This ability of nuclear reactors to cause transmutation of elements is 
utilized to turn U 238 into highly fissionable plutonium which is also 
capable of sustaining a chain reaction. This process has greatly en-
hanced the reserves of nuclear fuel available to mankind because U 238 
is 140 times as plentiful in nature as is U 235. The transmutation is 
accomplished by using properly moderated "spare" neutrons coming 
from the fissioned U 235 atoms to strike and add their weight to a 
quantity of U 238 placed in the reactor core for the purpose. The addi-
tion of a neutron to U 238 causes it to become U 239 which, being highly 
radioactive, will quickly emit an electron and then, having an excess pro-
ton, become neptunium, an element of atomic number 93 and atomic 
weight 239. Neptunium is similarly highly radioactive; it will eject an 
electron and become plutonium because of the excess proton. Plutonium 
is a man-made element with ninety-four protons and 145 neutrons. It is 
highly fissionable and has a long half-life. Furthermore, it is possible 
to produce a quantity of fissionable plutonium 239 which exceeds the 
quantity of U 235 consumed. 
Recently it has been· demonstrated that another fissionable isotope 
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of uranium (U 233) can be created from thorium by similar means. 
As a result of its experiments, the Atomic Energy Commission has 
announced that a thorium reactor can breed more fuel than it burns. 
This announcement has been characterized by Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg, 
Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, as the most important 
announcement of the Commission in connection with its five year re-
actor development program.20 This conclusion is based upon the fact 
that thermal neutrons can be employed to convert thorium into U 233 
whereas fast neutrons are essential to produce plutonium from U 238. 
A fast-neutron breeder reactor is extremely difficult to control and cool, 
but a thermal reactor does not present the same engineering difficulties. 
Therefore, thorium presents very attractive possibilities in the develop-
ment of breeder reactors which can increase substantially the quantity of 
fissionable material available for atomic power. 
3· The Fusion Process 
Another process which may eventually be employed to create radia-
tion is the fusion, or thermonuclear, process. Instead of splitting a heavy 
nucleus as in the fission process, the fusion process involves the merger 
of two light nuclei to form a heavier nucleus. This process also is 
accompanied by the release of large amounts of energy including heat 
and radiation. Although the process has been used in the so-called 
hydrogen bomb, techniques for controlling the process in reactors have 
not yet been devised. 
In January 1958 the Atomic Energy Commission and the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority announced significant progress in 
the research program aimed at controlling the hydrogen fusion reaction. 
The reaction itself may involve the merger of two atoms of deuterium, 
hydrogen with a mass of twice light hydrogen, to form a triton. Triton 
is the nucleus of a triple-heavy hydrogen atom called tritium. The reac-
tion may also involve the merger of deuterium and tritium to form 
helium. In either process a small proportion of the mass is· converted 
into energy. ·Deuterium is available in enormous amounts in the oceans 
of the world, but tritium must be man-produced from lithium. There 
are two major obstacles to producing power by fusing either the nuclei 
of deuterium or a deuterium-tritium mixture. First, a tremendous 
temperature is required to cause the reaction, and secondly, there are 
serious difficulties in creating a container that will hold the· hydrogen 
20 Weinberg, "Power Reactors," Editors of Scientific American, Atomic Power 36 
(1955). 
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gas after it has reached the required temperatures. It is estimated that 
a self-sustaining deuterium fire requires a temperature of 370,ooo,ooo 
degrees centigrade which is twelve to eighteen times the temperature of 
the sun's interior. A deuterium-tritium fire would probably require a 
temperature of so,ooo,ooo degrees centigrade, but tritium can only be 
produced from the supplies of lithium available in nature. The recent 
announcement has evidenced success in containing the reaction by the 
use of a magnetic field and temperature as high as 6,000,000 degrees 
have been reported, but only for infinitesimal periods of time. The 
magnetic field creates what is known as the "pinch effect," the gas being 
pinched· into a narrow column within a container so that the hot gas is 
prevented from touching the walls of the container and losing its energy.· 
Although no major: breakthrough has occurred in the thermonuclear re-
search projects, a significant beginning has been made and further prog-
ress can be expected. . 
The fusion process promises to have several advantages over the fis-
sion process. Recoverable uranium and thorium supplies are limited, but 
deuterium supplies seem inexhaustible. In addition, thermonuclear 
processes offer the possibility of producing electricity directly without 
the intervention of the costly process of producing electricity from heat 
through a heat-exchange system. Finally, in contrast to reactors using 
the fission process, thermonuclear reactors give promise of being ex-
tremely safe. The possibility of serious accidents because of failure of 
parts or mistakes by the operator are considered negligible. Moreover, 
there are no waste products which may be spread about in the burn up of 
a fission reactor and which create handling and disposal hazards. How-
ever, a fusion reactor may produce intense neutron radiation necessi-
tating adequate shielding, The neutrons probably could be used to pro-
duce radioisotopes for commercial and research usage. 
4. Natural Radiation 
A complicating factor, growing in importance with the increase of 
scientific information about cosmic and natural forces, is the natural or 
background radiation which may also be a contributing source of radia-
tion injuries. Man.is continuously exposed to the natural radiation com-
ing from the nuclear decay of elements composing the earth's surface 
and from outer space. To some extent the ground we walk on is radio-
active; the food we eat and drink is radioactive; the air we breathe is 
radioactive. The AEC has reported that: 
As scientists team to detect and measure nuclear radiation, 
they learn that we are constantly being exposed to radiation 
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from a variety of sources in the air, water and the earth. A 
number of radioactive substances occur naturally, and they are 
widely distributed in the earth's crust. It is estimated that a 
layer of soil one foot thick and one square mile in area will 
contain on the average, more than one gram of radium, 3 tons 
of uranium, and 6 tons of thorium. In addition, cosmic rays 
constantly bombard the earth. Cosmic . rays and the nuclear 
radiation from uranium, thorium, radium and other radioac-
tive materials in the earth's crust and in the air constitute 
what is called background radiation. 
Background radiation varies in intensity depending upon 
time of day, altitude, and the geology of the area, and to a 
minor extent, latitude. For example, at sea level in the North-
eastern part of the United States, about 6.5 cosmic-ray parti-
cles per minute cross a horizontal surface one square inch in 
area. At 15,000 feet above sea level, about 5 times that number 
will be observed, and at 55,000 feet elevation the rate is about 
7 5 times that at sea level. 
Rainfall also may increase background radiation. The exact 
mechanism causing this increase is unknown, but it is believed 
that either the falling rain droplets absorb the minute radio-
active particles naturally occurring in the air or the downward 
air flow accompanying rainfall blows these particles toward the 
earth's surface. Background radiation may increase as much 
as 10 fold as a result of rain or snow. 
Alpha, beta, gamma and cosmic radiations are included in 
"background" but because of the penetrating properties of the 
latter two, they are the principal components to be considered. 
Human beings receive between 8o and 8oo milliroentgens 
( o.o8 to o.8 r) per year from natural background sources. 
Since radioactive materials are widely distributed in the 
earth, air and water, it is not surprising that they occur natu-
rally in the tissues of human beings, animals and plants. Ra-
dioactive isotopes of such essential elements as carbon and 
potassium are incorporated into body tissue along with com-
mon stable forms. Water from many natural sources contains 
traces of radium, which accumulates in the skeleton once it is 
taken into the body. The radioactivity normally present in tis-
sues is minute and not harmful to health, but it may be meas-
ured in the laboratory.21 
43 
As in the case of man-made radiation, the impact of natural radiation 
on individual cells which compose the body is definitely harmful, but 
whether the damage is repaired or not is, as yet, uncertain. However, 
the fact that natural radiation may cause damage further complicates 
problems of proving radiation injuries. 
21 AEC, Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report 94-95 (1953). 
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E. Conclusion 
This very brief sketch of nuclear processes and of the nature and 
effect of radioactivity has been set forth in the belief that it constitutes 
essential technical background for a proper understanding of the unique 
legal problems confronting the lawyer in the atomic age. Once again we 
repeat our original brief caveat: the technology in this new field is not 
yet fully understood in many particulars, and the continually increasing 
knowledge of the atom will make more definite and certain the exact 
nature of radiation damage. Therefore, the lawyer must keep abreast 
of the expanding body of pertinent knowledge regarding atomic energy. 
Chapter II 
THE GENERAL IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY 
ON TORT LAW 
The purposes of this chapter are : (I) to acquaint the reader with the 
importance of atomic energy to society by describing some of the more 
important of its peaceful applications; ( 2) to describe how peaceful 
uses of atomic energy may result in injuries to persons and property; 
and (3) to suggest the legal problems that lawyers must deal with when 
advising clients of liability problems or trying tort liability cases in the 
atomic age. Analysis of the legal problems and possible solutions will 
be included in subsequent chapters. 
A. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
Any account of the peaceful applications of atomic energy is bound 
to become out-of-date rapidly because of the new discoveries that are 
being made almost daily. However, the potentialities of atomic energy 
in industrial, medical, agricultural, and research pursuits already are 
sufficiently well known to make it clear that atomic energy will play 
an ever-increasing role in society. The peaceful uses presently employed 
can be classified roughly into three major categories: (I) the use of 
the fission chain reaction process in reactors for the production of heat 
energy and radioactive isotopes; 1 ( 2) the use of sources of radioactivity 
where the radioactivity itself is employed for specific purposes; and (3) 
the use of radioisotopes as a tool or a research instrumentality. Each 
of these uses, as we shall see, involves certain hazards that may cause 
injuries to persons and property. 
I. Reactors and Their Hazards 
The discovery of method~ of ha~nessing the atom has revolutionized 
thinking on the problem of supplying the energy needs of modern so-
ciety. It has been estimated whereas one pound of coal can produce 
about 1.4 kilowatt hours of electricity, one pound of uranium could~ if 
fully consumed, release enough heat to produce 3,700,000 kilowatt hours 
1 The fusion process apparently has tremendous possibilities as a heat energy and 
neutron source, but since the technologic aspects apparently have not been solved, the 
fusion process will not be discussed. 
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oi electricity and is equivalent in heat energy to about 1,320 tons of coal. 
In the United States, which is extremely wealthy in conventional fossil 
fuel resources, including coal, oil, and gas, the availability of nuclear 
energy derived in the fission process means that we can measure our en-
ergy resources in terms of centuries rather than a few generations. For 
portions of the world less well endowed with fossil fuel resources, the 
fission process makes possible the attainment of a standard of living 
previously thought impossible. The discovery of a means of using the 
fusion process to produce peacetime power would increase the magni-
tude of available energy sources to an even more astonishing degree. 
Clearly we can expect an ever-increasing utilization of nuclear energy 
as a power source throughout the world even in the United States where 
an abundance of comparatively cheap fossil fuels will make it difficult 
for nuclear power plants to compete economically, especially during the 
research and development stages. In fact, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion has recently issued licenses for the construction of privately financed 
atomic energy power installations in the New York, Detroit, and Chi-
cago areas. 
To date, the truly dramatic potentialities of the controlled chain reac-
tion in reactors designed to produce electricity have overshadowed many 
other possible practicable uses. Reactors may be employed to space heat 
buildings and residences, to propel ships, locomotives, and airplanes, to 
supply heat in many industrial pursuits such as the manufacture of ce-
ment and brick, to produce radioactive and other chemicals, to test ma-
terials, to act as blast furnaces in the reduction of ores, to treat diseases, 
and undoubtedly to accomplish many other tasks that are yet to be en-
visaged. The imposing array of methods of commercial exploitation of 
the fission process puts the legal profession on notice that it will within 
the next decade be required to handle innumerable legal problems involv-
ing atomic energy. 
Assuming, as we must, that nuclear reactors are destined to become 
commonplace, lawyers must become acquainted with the technological 
processes involved to ascertain whether or not existing rules of tort law 
can be applied in cases of civil liability arising from reactor situations, 
or whether reactors will necessitate revision of the conventional rules of 
law. Without doubt, so. far as the law is concerned, the unique feature 
of reactors is that they present a continuous threat to persons and prop-
erty unless the utmost precautionary measures are taken. 2 The fission 
2 The .fusion process, if it .can be controlled, apparently would not present as great 
hazards as encountered in the fission process. 
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chain reaction process involves the release of large quantities of all types 
of ionizing radiation which, as described· in Chapter I, .can have ex-
tremely deleterious effects on all forms of life and property. Therefore, 
one of the most important technological problems in reactor construc-
tion and operation has been that of providing essential safety for em-
ployees and the surrounding community. Moreover, the fission process 
creates a sizable number of radioactive waste materials that create 
secondary hazards and even perhaps greater danger in the long run. 
Although all reactors have in common the purpose of utilizing a con-
trolled fission process, they vary substantially in design depending upon 
the manner in which they are to be utilized. Furthermore, several pos-
sible techniques may be employed for the same utilization. For power 
purposes alone, several different designs have been constructed or are 
in the process of construction and still others are yet in the planning 
stage. Reactor technology is still in its infancy, and it is not to be ex-
pected that in the years immediately ahead any single design will have 
proved its superiority over others. Reactor designs can be classified in 
many ways : ( 1) by the types of fissionable material used ; ( 2) by the 
speeds of the neutrons, either thermal (slow) or fast; ( 3) by the types 
of moderators (materials used to reduce the speed of the neutrons); 
( 4) by the coolants used to maintain heat levels; ( 5) by the structure of 
the reactor cores (heterogeneous if the fissionable material is placed in 
the reactor core in units separated by moderators and coolants and 
homogeneous if the fissionable material is uniformly mixed with the 
moderator in the reactor core with the coolant surrounding the core) ; 
( 6) by the chemical and heat reactions that occur in the reactor cores ; 
and (7) by the ability of the reactor to produce fissionable material in 
the' process of consuming fuel (breeder reactor). A single reactor de-
sign may incorporate several of these features. Obviously, a most im-
portant consideration for commercial reactors is the cost of the various 
types. 
Up to the present time water and sodium-cooled reactors have played 
the predominant roles in American power reactor development. Actual 
experience is largely confined to thermal (slow neutron) water-cooled 
types. With Atomic Energy Commission financial assistance, Westing-
house has constructed a pressurized-water reactor for the Duquesne 
Light Company at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. Another type of water-
cooled reactor, but one in which steam generation is permitted to occur 
in the .r-eactor core (experimental boiling water reactor), has been de-
veloped by Argonne National Laboratory, and it has recently been re-
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ported that the reactor operated at more than twice design capacity. 
Another type of water-cooled device is the homogeneous reactor being 
developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. An experimental 
sodium-cooled graphite-moderated reactor, built by North American 
Aviation, Inc., became ·critical in 1957. General Electric Company and 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company have cooperated in the development 
of a boiling water reactor at Pleasanton, California which also became 
operative in 1957. The Atomic Energy Commission has already con-
structed one fast neutron experimental breeder reactor and is in the 
process of constructing a sodium-cooled experimental breeder reactor 
at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. And, finally, the 
Commission has issued construction permits for three large power re-
actors.8 Oth~r reactor concepts for which experimental work is being 
completed are an organic-moderated reactor and a liquid metal-fuel 
reactor. In addition, several low energy research reactors which are air,. 
or gas-cooled have been developed. · 
Among the important factors to be considered in selection of a par-
ticular reactor for power purposes are: (I) safety in operation and in 
changing fuel elements; ( 2) economy in cost of fuel elements; (3) 
economy in cost of fuel reprocessing necessitated by efficiency-reducing 
contamination during the fission process; ( 4) reliability for continuous 
operation ; ( 5) reliability of essential materials in withstanding nuclear 
forces; and ( 6) heat-producing potentialities. Each of the major reactor 
types has specific advantages and disadvantages for the production of 
power on the basis of current experience. Therefore, in view of techno-
logical problems involved, selection becomes a question of judgment. 
During the present initial development stages, the choices must be made 
largely in the absence of conclusive technological data. The lawyer ad-
vising clients engaged in atomic power reactor projects must evaluate 
the possible legal consequences of any particular selection. 
The pressurized-water reactor seems to be the most highly developed 
technologically, but a considerable amount of information regarding 
specific features of the reactor remains classified. Nonetheless, on the 
basis of published data it would appear that pressurized-water reactors 
present several serious hazards, many of which are also inherent in other 
reactor designs. 
3A boiling water reactor (180,000 electric KW) is now under construction by the 
Commonwealth Edison group near Joliet, Illinois; Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. 
is building a pressurized water reactor (275,000 electric KW) at Indian Point, N.Y.; 
Power Reactor Development Co. is constructing a fast breeder reactor (100,000 elec-
tric KW) at Monroe, Michigan. For the more complete details of the reactor program 
see AEC Semi-Annual Reports. 
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Since the pressurized-water reactor has been successfully operated in 
the submarine U. S. S. Nautilus and is being used in the first large size 
central-station nuclear power plant in the United States at Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania, it may be of assistance to sketch the principal techno-
logical problems and hazards involved. The Shippingport reactor em-
ploys fifteen to twenty tons of uranium, slightly enriched in the uranium 
isotope 235. The reactor core contains closely spaced, zirconium-clad 
fuel elements arranged in a cylindrical shape six feet in diameter and 
seven and one-half feet high. The core and the water which acts as the 
moderator-coolant are housed in a pressure vessel, thirty-three feet high, 
twelve feet in diameter, with the plate of the vessel being eight and one-
half inches thick with a one-quarter inch cladding of stainless steel. 
Pressure in the vessel will be about 2,000 pounds per square inch which 
means that the water can reach a temperature of nearly 640° F before 
boiling. Therefore, the fuel elements cannot have a surface heat tem-
perature in excess of 6oo° F. Three different heat exchange systems 
(steam generators) will be operated at once, with a fourth to be con-
structed as a standby. In each system water will have to be pumped at 
the rate of 16,000 gallons a minute to remove the heat. The reactor 
vessel and the heat exchangers are enclosed in strong gas-tight con-
tainers, located underground in concrete and steel vaults. The contain-
ers act as shields against radiation hazards and minimize the possibility 
of radioactivity escaping in the event an accident occurs. 
Although it would appear that excess neutrons created in the fission 
process could be used to create new fissionable material from the non-
fissionable fertile uranium 238 so that the fuel elements could be used 
almost indefinitely, this is not the case. During the fission process, the 
new atoms which are the "ashes" or "waste products" of the nuclear 
furnace accumulate, and they tend to absorb the. neutrons so that the 
chain reaction cannot be sustained. Also, radiation causes the fuel 
elements to undergo changes both in size and in structure. Therefore, 
when approximately one per cent of the fertile material has been con-
sumed, it will become necessary to change the fuel elements and remove 
the waste products. The Shippingport reactor will be a major test of a 
system of removing fuel elements while maintaining the entire reactor 
under pressure. If in removing the elements, pressure falls, so that the 
water reaches its saturation (boiling) point at a lower temperature, 
serious disrupture of the reactor core may result in its disintegration 
with a possible release of radioactivity within the plant. In addition, if 
the underground chambers are breached, radioactive products may be 
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released in the atmosphere or into the subsoil, thereby endangering the 
surrounding community. In such delicate operations, it is not difficult 
to envisage the possibility that an accident may result in several persons 
being subjected to damage suits, including the reactor designer, the 
manufacturer of the mechanical apparatus for removing fuel elements, 
and the contractor who built the underground chambers, as well as the 
owner-operator of the facility. 
Nearly all of the "ashes" of a nuclear furnace are radioactive, emit-
ting both beta and gamma radiation. About eighty different radio-
isotopes are created in the fission process, and in the decay process the 
number increases to about 200 in a relatively short period of time. The 
half-lives of these radioisotopes vary from a few seconds to several 
years. Therefore, methods must be devised to protect personnel when 
spent fuel elements are removed and during the reprocessing of the fuel 
elements. Remote controls are therefore essential to the handling of the 
fuel elements. After removal, the fuel elements are stored under water 
for as long as 100 days. During the "cooling" period, short-lived iso-
topes decay sufficiently to make them an insignificant hazard in the 
separation process. Those isotopes with very long half-lives· are in-
significant because of their slow rate of decay. Despite the "cooling" 
period, however, the fuel elements, because of the isotopes of inter-
mediate half-lives, remain highly radioactive. Therefore, in separating 
the fission products from the fuel, utmost safety precautions must be 
taken. If the reactor power installation does not have its own processing 
facilities, spent fuel elements must be transported in sealed and shielded 
containers to other establishments. If, in transport, a container is broken 
and persons are exposed to the radiation, thereby causing injury, a ques-
tion arises as to who is liable-the carrier, the reactor owner-operator, 
the contractor hired to handle packaging, the manufacturer of the con-
tainer, or all of them. By contracting out this function, can the reactor 
owner-operator absolve himself from part or all of the liability? 
Because of the serious health hazard, waste fission products cannot 
be disposed of in the same manner as wastes from other industries. The 
wastes may be in liquid, gas, or solid form and, depending on the proc-
essing, may have different levels of radioactivity. Liquid wastes, which 
constitute the bulk of the material, are usually stored in underground 
·tanks. As reactors bt:come more commonplace, suitable storage sites 
will diminish in number, and accordingly this method of disposal is not 
considered very satisfactory. "The volumes of stored waste accumulated 
by· 1980 · are. estimated at 20 x 107 gallons, by 1990 at 6o x 107 
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gallons and by 2000 at 240 x 107 gallons." 4 Furthermore, the radia-
tion may create high temperatures in the liquid wastes and thereby cause 
them to become so corrosive as to cause breaches in the containers. 
Moreover, there is the problem of tankage leakage occurring because of 
deterioration of the material of the tank or as a result of geological 
changes resulting, for example, from an earthquake. If there is leakage, 
it may seep into rivers that supply water to communities or into indi-
vidual wells. Therefore, extreme caution must be taken on a purely geo-
logical basis in selecting sites. Again, problems of marshaling proof to 
impose liability in the event of injury may become difficult. The prob-
lems are complicated by the fact that injury may not occur until years 
after the waste products were originally stored. If some of the waste 
products can be converted to useful purposes, a desired end that seems 
a reasonable possibility, some of the waste disposal problems may be 
eliminated or at least minimized. 
Gaseous wastes are generally discharged into the atmosphere through 
high stacks. No significant hazard 5 is created if the spent fuel has 
"cooled" for a considerable period, and if meteorological conditions are 
satisfactory for the dilution of the radioactive gases in the atmosphere. 
If meteorological conditions are adverse, however, dangerous quantities 
of gaseous wastes may endanger persons and property in the vicinity. 
Another hazard is found in the possibility of the air in a processing fa-
cility becoming contaminated by absorbing small particleS of liquid or 
solid radioactive wastes .. Since this can present a serious problem, all air 
expelled from the plant is filtered. To reduce this hazard, the processing 
vessels are usually maintained under air pressure less than atmospheric 
in order to minimize the escape of radioactive material into the air. 
Solid wastes consist of substances that have been contaminated in a 
reactor or fuel processing facility, including those that have settled from 
liquid wastes. Some radioactive components and equipment can be satis-
factorily decontaminated, but in other cases it is not possible or desirable 
to do so, and therefore it is usually buried in the ground. This creates 
some of the same dangers as underground storage of liquid wastes. On 
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, some solid wastes are being buried at sea. 
~National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, "The Biological Ef-
fects of Atomic Radiation," p. 104 (1956). 
6 Maximum permissible concentration levels in the atmosphere should be established 
in the light of future discharge rate possibilities according to the Committee on 
Meteorological Aspects of the Effects of Atomic Radiation, National Academy of 
Sciences, National Research Council; "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation," 
p. 61 (1956). 
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However, for inland facilities, the cost of transporting solid wastes may 
be prohibitive. Thus, the reasonableness of the various methods of dis-
posal may vary in accordance with plant location. 
Throughout the entire fuel reprocessing operation two hazards are 
present. One is caused by the highly radioactive nature of the materials 
and the other arises out of the fact that the amount of fissionable ma-
terial at a given point may become critical so that a fission chain reaction 
occurs. To protect personnel, adequate shielding against radiation must 
be provided. All process vessels, equipment, pipelines, valves, etc., must 
be leakproof and shielded. The equipment particularly must be properly 
designed and manufactured with excellent workmanship to reduce re-
pair and maintenance problems. If maintenance is required, it can be 
handled only by those using remote control devices or entering the area 
after the equipment has been sufficiently decontaminated to avoid serious 
hazard. To avoid a chain reaction, which would cause serious damage 
within and possibly outside the plant, concentration of materials in any 
single vessel must be limited and separate vessels must be kept apart by 
an adequate distance. Since most of the operations in a fuel reprocess-
ing plant are inaccessible to humans, remote control instrumentation is 
essential to handle the operation and to sample the materials at the vari-
ous processing stages. A failure to install proper instrumentation or 
perhaps a failure in the instrumentation itself may result in the escape 
of highly radioactive materials into the atmosphere or in a concentration 
of fissionable materials which would cause a chain reaction. 
In addition to fuel reprocessing problems, reactor technology also 
encounters a series of difficulties in connection with the fabrication and 
cladding of the fuel elements, the type of moderator used, the materials 
used in the reactor structure, and the type of coolant. 
Uranium, other fissionable materials, and fertile source metals (such 
as thorium) react rapidly with oxygen ; and also at high temperature 
water has a particularly corrosive effect on these materials. Since fine 
chips or lathe turnings are a serious fire hazard if exposed to the air, 
fabrication of uranium metals must be. carried on in a vacuum or in an 
atmosphere of inert gas. Moreover, the fuel element in the reactor must 
be clad with a corrosion resistant material to prevent attack by air or by 
a water coolant and to prevent the escape of fission products and plu-
tonium produced in the fission process. The cladding must possess nu-
clear properties that will not interfere appreciably with the fission proc-
ess. Aluminum has been widely used as a cladding material in research 
reactors since it readily retains fission products. However, aluminum is 
IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY 53 
violently attacked by water at high temperatures. Therefore, it is not 
very suitable for power reactors since higher temperatures are more 
efficient in steam generation. It is for this reason that the Shippingport 
reactor fuel elements will be clad with zirconium which has suitable 
nuclear properties as well as a high resistance to corrosion. Even for 
zirconium the maximum safe surface temperature in water is only ap-
proximately 66o° F, so that a maximum operating water temperature 
of only about 560° F is poss,ible. Nevertheless, this compares favorably 
with the maximum permissible surface temperature with aluminum of 
400° F. Neither aluminum nor zirconium is satisfactory for a sodium-
cooled reactor which is to operate at very high temperatures. Stainless 
steel seems to be about the only present possibility for this purpose even 
·though it captures neutrons at a higher rate than either aluminum or 
zirconium. 
Another problem in respect to cladding is its removal when reprocess-
ing the fuel. Aluminum dissolves easily, but stainless steel and zir-
conium are fairly difficult to remove. It may be possible that more effec-
tive mechanical methods can be devised for the purpose ; but because of 
high-level radioactivity, this will have to be done by remote control. 
Because of the importance of the cladding, it can readily be seen that 
an error in the thickness or in the purity of the Cladding material can 
cause damage of very serious proportions. Erroneously using aluminum 
cladding in fuel elements to be operated at too high a temperature for 
the metal could result in the disintegration of all or part of the reactor 
core, with a resulting release of large quantities of highly dangerous 
radioactive gases and particles. Similarly, running a reactor at high 
temperature levels approaching levels where the cladding disintegrates 
in an attempt to reach the maximum steam generation capabilities could 
result· in an accident of catastrophic proportions. On the other hand, 
stainless steel jackets erroneously made thicker than necessary for the 
purpose may seriously impair the efficiency of the reactor because of 
excess absorption of neutrons. Careful engineering design is essential; 
and errors of judgment may, in the event of accident, give rise to legal 
liability. 
Other materials employed in reactors must also be chosen carefully. 
As noted in Chapter I, radiation can cause ionization of materials which 
may lead to chemical changes (particularly when they are interactive 
with water or organic materials) so that materials also suffer "radiation 
damage." Changes in the moderator, such as graphite, may affect the 
operation of the reactor; but relatively little is known about the nature 
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of the injuries to such materials or how they can be prevented. To add 
to knowledge in this area, the Atomic Energy Commission has con-
structed a materials testing reactor at Arco, Idaho. Non-metals also are 
affected by radiation, so lubricants and non-metallic parts of electrical 
equipment, control rods, containers, and seals, etc., may be adversely 
affected. Therefore, metals, as well as solid lubricants, such as graphite 
or molybdenum, must be used wherever possible. Where organic 
materials such as oil must be used, exposure to radiation should be 
minimized. 
Apparently the only substances which may be used as moderators are 
ordinary water, heavy water, beryllium, and graphite. Ordinary water 
must be absolutely pure since impurities capture neutrons and may be-
come radioactive, endangering the cooling system of the reactor as well 
as causing corrosion of metals. However, water has a relatively low 
boiling point so that pressures must be kept high if the generation of 
steam is to be prevented. As we noticed, in the Shippingport reactor 
pressures of approximately 2,000 pounds per square inch will be neces-
sary. This is a substantial figure, about equivalent to the pressure at 
nine-tenths of a mile under the ocean, so difficulties are involved in 
fabricating and constructing the reactor vessel. Heavy water is much 
more expensive than is ordinary water, but it has better nuclear proper-
ties. However, it, too, boils at a relatively low point; so high pressures 
are essential for power production purposes. Both ordinary and heavy 
water suffer decomposition when exposed to radiation, and hydrogen 
and oxygen gases are released. Since these are explosive, they have to 
be removed and recombined. In the homogeneous reactor there is even 
greater decomposition because fission products are formed within the 
uranium-water solution. Beryllium has excellent nuclear properties but 
has been reported as susceptible to corrosion in water. There is evidence 
that, if the metal can be more highly purified, this may increase corro-
sion resistance. However, beryllium itself is a poison and constitutes a 
serious health hazard, so extraordinary precaution must be taken to pre-
vent inhalation or ingestion. Graphite has been widely used as a 
moderator, but it is affected by nuclear radiation and reacts with oxygen 
at high temperatures. Therefore, in respect to moderators a difficult 
choice must be made, with all three factors of engineering suitability, 
safety, and expense being involved. 
For power production, reactors have as a primary function the pro-
duction of heat energy. Theoretically, extremely high temperatures, 
which provide the greatest efficiency in steam generation, are available in 
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the fission process. Modern conventional steam boilers, for example, 
operate at steam temperatures of about 1050° F. At high temperatures, 
however, uranium metal changes in size and shape to an extent that 
would seriously disrupt the reactor. Therefore, the temperatures sus-
tained within the reactor must be carefully controlled to prevent distor-
tion of the elements and to guard against the reactor's getting out of 
control. 
To use the heat produced in the reactor and to maintain proper heat 
levels, a coolant must be circulated through the reactor and through a 
heat exchanger in which steam is produced. The coolant should have 
adequate heat-transfer capabilities, not be susceptible to radiation dam-
age, and not seriously interfere with the neutrons during the fission proc-
ess. The coolant must be pumped continuously to prevent heat levels in 
the reactor core high enough to cause the reactor to "burn up" with the 
resulting release of radiation. An undue temperature rise in even a small 
portion of the reactor may be disastrous, so the reactor must be equipped 
with automatic safety devices which can shut down the chain reaction 
when necessary. However, some heat fluctuation is inevitable, and there-
fore the design of the controls presents difficult problems.8 A failure in 
the safety devices could have tragic consequences. Similarly, all the 
pumps, heat exchangers, valves, etc., must be absolutely leakproof and 
undergo rigid testing so that chances of a failure are reduced to the very 
mmtmum. 
As a coolant, air does not have good heat-transfer properties, and at 
high temperatures oxygen may cause damage to moderator, cladding, 
and structural materials. However, in research reactors, or reactors used 
to produce plutonium, where high temperatures are not essential, air can 
serve as a satisfactory coolant. Such air must be discharged through 
high stacks because of the contained radiation, but under unsatisfactory 
meteorological conditions hazards may develop. Hydrogen has good 
. heat-transfer properties but constitutes a serious hazard because of its 
explosive qualities. Helium also has good coolant characteristics, but 
because of its high cost and lighter-than-air quality it must be kept 
within leakproof vessels. · 
·Ordinary water seems particularly well-suited as a coolant because of 
its low cost and because of its suitability as a moderator. However, the 
water must be extremely pure, and it presents certain difficult problems 
because of its corrosive effect particularly at and above its boiling point, 
6 A recent report from the Argonne National Laboratory indicates that the fast 
breeder reactor may be very difficult to control. 
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which is relatively low. Therefore, high pressures must be used. Heavy 
water is even better as a coolant because of its nuclear properties, but 
it is extremely costly. Liquid metals, such as sodium, may also be used 
because of their good heat-transfer qualities. However, sodium is very 
difficult to handle because of its explosive quality if it comes in contact 
with air or water. Moreover, sodium becomes highly radioactive when 
subjected to neutron bombardment, a fact which increases the shielding 
problem. Furthermore, sodium may solidify in the cooling system when 
the. reactor is shut down and this necessitates auxiliary heating equip-
ment. In the second submarine-type reactor, sodium was to be used as a 
coolant;.but it was to flow through mercury, which in turn would flow 
through the heat exchanger to produce steam. In this way, the hazard 
that would be created (if a leak should occur and the sodium should 
contact the water with a resultant explosion) was to be minimized. 
However, because of leaks in the system the reactor was not accepted, 
and a Nautilus-type reactor was installed in the submarine. As in other 
instances in nuclear reactor design, compromises must be made and 
undoubtedly economic considerations will play a major role in commer-
cial reactor ventures. 
Reactors, like many other types of furnaces or engines, must have 
control mechanisms. In the case of reactors, however, largely because of 
the nature of the fuel, several difficult problems are encountered in de-
vising methods of starting the fission process, increasing power to the 
desired level, maintaining the desired level, and shutting down the re-
actor. At least the critical amount of fissionable material necessary to 
sustain a chain reaction must be present. This critical mass depends 
upon the fuel, reactor design, leakage, etc. Moreover, since heat and fis-
sion products cut down the number of available neutrons, the amount of 
fuel placed in the reactor must actually exceed the critical size. Since a 
chain reaction builds up very rapidly and a too rapid increase in power 
can be dangerous, the obvious answer is to control the rate of the chain 
reaction process. The different methods that might be employed to con-
trol the chain reaction involve either the diminution or removal of fuel, 
or the moderator, or the reflector (a blanket of material which scatters 
neutrons back into the reactor core), or the addition of a neutron ab-
sorber. Boron and cadmium capture neutrons very effectively. Accord-
ingly, control rods made of these materials may be inserted and with-
drawn from either the reactor core or the reflector to control the chain 
reaction. Absorber rods, however, cause a high loss of neutrons. For 
some purposes natural uranium might be used as an absorber and at the 
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same time to produce plutonium, or materials might be used that would 
create marketable isotopes. 
Not only are there different control mechanisms, but several different 
types of controls are needed in a reactor. To start the reactor, control 
rods called "shim-rods" are usually removed from the reactor core. 
Since the growth of the chain reaction must be closely regulated, shim-
rods should be designed so that they cannot move at high speed. Once 
the reactor has reached the proper power level, "regulating rods" are 
necessary to control rapid, variable changes. These should be capable 
of rapid movement but over small distances so that dangerous increases 
in the neutron flux are not possible. The design should be such that com-
plete withdrawal due to an operator's error or failure of any automatic 
controls would not permit an upsurge in power levels and a possible 
"burn up." As fuel is depleted and as fission products accumulate, regu-
lating rods may be completely withdrawn .. Further depletion or poison-
ing necessitates withdrawal of a shim-rod to maintain power levels, but a 
regulating rod must then be reinserted to the extent that a shim-rod is 
removed. Therefore it may be necessary to have a system of interlock-
ing the two types of rods. Another type of control is provided by "safety 
rods" which are used to shut down the reactor quickly in the event of an 
emergency. They must move very rapidly. By using different drive 
devices, shim-rods may also be used as safety rods. Finally, "back-up" 
safety devices are necessary for extreme conditions, such as an earth-
quake, when the safety rods may not move. In some reactors, back-up 
safety is supplied by boron shot or liquid absorbers which can be quickly 
placed in holes in the reactor. In homogeneous reactors, "dump" valves 
can be used to pour the liquid off into vessels having subcritical size. 
All of the various controls can be designed to operate automatically as 
well as upon push-button control by the operator. Where the human fac-
tor is involved a failure of the operator to notice changes in the reaction 
as shown by the instruments may result in a serious accident. Recently 
an operator of one of the experimental reactors at Arco, Idaho, failed 
to understand oral instructions and started control devices in operation 
which were not adequate to prevent an accident. Apparently once the 
inadequate control mechanisms had started their movement, it was 
impossible to change to other methods. Where the controls are auto-
matic, a failure of the measuring devices which start automatic control, 
or a failure in the automatic control mechanism itself, could result in a 
rapid upsurge in heat which would melt the reactor core and cause the 
release of dangerous quantities of radiation. 
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Because of the magnitude of the radiati"on hazard in the operation of 
reactors, extreme precautions must be taken to protect both employees 
and the general public. As a safeguard for the general public, reactors 
are usually located in exclusion areas. The AEC Advisory Committee 
on Reactor Safeguards has recommended that the exclusion area for a 
reactor capable of producing 250,000 kilowatts of heat power should 
have a radius of approximately five miles. This may be modified de-
pending on the inherent safety features of the reactor and special con-
struction features. For example, the Shippingport reactor will be housed 
in an underground chamber, and the experimental submarine reactor 
was located in a gas-tight steel sphere. In selecting reactor locations, the 
population density, geological conditions for disposal of wastes, and 
meteorological conditions must all be considered. 
Some of the most serious problems of radiation safety are en-
countered in respect to the operating personnel. As indicated in Chap-
ter I, the biological effects of radiation are not as yet fully understood, 
but it is known that radiation can cause several types of personal injury. 
The National Committee on Radiation Protection has established maxi-
mum exposure limits for humans, maximum radiation levels in air and 
water, and maximum limits of radioisotopes that may be accumulated 
within the body. To assure that the maximums are not exceeded con-
tinuous radiation monitoring is essential. Personnel should have· indi-
vidual monitoring devices so that if any employee receives unusual doses 
of radiation, measures can be taken to avoid further exposure in excess 
of the maximum. In certain cases radioactivity in the thyroid gland, 
where radioiodine accumulates, should be measured. In some cases 
analysis of the urine and feces shouid be made to determine if radioiso-
topes are being ingested. All areas around the reactor should be moni-
tored to determine the amounts of radioactivity on surfaces and within 
the air. If radioactivity is high, protective clothing and masks should be 
worn or remote control systems should be introduced. Outside the plant, 
there should be continuous monitoring of the air and plant life to de-
termine :whether or· not hazards are being created. There are several 
types of monitoring instruments that can be employed. A failure of 
these instruments to record properly could result in the continuance of 
operating procedures that endanger both personnel and the community 
by allowing radiation to exceed the permissible levels. 
To protect personnel and also to permit the satisfactory operation of 
the reactor control instruments, it is essential that the reactor be shielded. 
However, as we noticed in Chapter I, neutron and gamma radiation 
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cannot be reduced to zero because neutrons and gamma rays are ex-
ponential in nature. Therefore, the problem is one of reducing these 
rays to safe levels. For mobile reactors, such as in aircraft, shielding be-
cause of its bulk presents a major problem. Accordingly, in aircraft de-
sign other technical considerations may take precedence over the lowest 
possible radiation levels. 
Shielding should be capable of slowing down fast neutrons and ab-' 
sorbing gamma radiation (for which heavy elements are best suited), 
moderating slow neutrons (hydrogenous substances perform well), and 
capturing neutrons without producing high-energy gamma radiation 
(for- which boron appears to have exceptional qualities). The same 
material may perform all three tasks. Iron has been extensively used as 
a suitable heavy element. Lead is particularly capable of absorbing 
gamma radiation and slowing down neutrons, but it has not been widely 
used as reactor shielding because of its low melting point and its softness, 
making it unsuitable as a structural material. Ordinary concrete is very 
effective for moderating slow neutrons, but it is not satisfactory as a 
shield because of the absence of heavy elements. However, heavy ele-
ments, such as iron turnings or mineral barytes (largely barium sulfate) 
may be used in the concrete instead of sand and gravel, making an 
effective shield. To reduce the size of concrete shielding, the incorpora-
tion of boral, a combination of boron and aluminum, seems to be promis-
ing. At the present time, a shield of concrete and heavy elements appears 
attractive because of its low cost, but experimentation with air-water, 
lead-water, or ceramic shields may prove fruitful. 
In the shielding process, other difficulties are encountered where in-
struments, controls, and beam holes for inserting materials for produc-
ing radioisotopes must penetrate the shield. The various instruments 
and pipes may require further shielding to reduce the amount of radia-
tion to which personnel are exposed. When experiments are being con-
ducted, or fuel elements are being handled, mechanical or human reactor 
controls must be carefully coordinated. Possibilities of leakage must 
be checked continually, and personnel must be carefully trained to avoid 
contact with radiation beams. 
Although we have explored only superficially the technological prob-
lems of reactor design and operation, it seems clear that the slightest 
human or mechanical errors may create conditions that endanger per-
sonnel and the surrounding community. The magnitude of possible 
injuries is astounding. A release of large quantities of radiation may 
result in all the types of personal radiation injuries discussed in Chap-
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ter I. A whole city may have to be evacuated and decontamination proc-
esses used. In some cases, decontamination would not be satisfactory, 
and therefore the contaminated articles would have to be removed or 
that particular location may become uninhabitable until radiation natu-
raily diminishes to safe levels. The accidental contamination of a com-
munity's water supply alone could cause untold personal injuries and 
disrupt the entire economic life of the community. There can be no 
doubt that a major reactor accident could cause damages measured in 
the millions and hundreds of millions of dollars. This magnitude of 
potential damage litigation is apparently not encountered in other indus-
trial pursuits. 
2. Radiation Sources and Their Hazards 
The development of the nuclear reactor brought with it a very im-
portant byproduct-radioisotopes. For the first ,time a neutron source 
of sufficient power was available to produce radioisotopes of many dif-
ferent elements in abundance and at low cost. The physical phenomena 
of radiation, even that derived from relatively rare and enormously ex-
pensive radium, was early recognized as being extremely important in 
industry, medicine, agriculture, and other pursuits. When, after World 
War II, the government permitted purchase of radioisotopes produced 
in its reactors, a whole new technology was immediately stimulated, and 
innumerable practical uses of radiation have been developed. In fact, it 
is principally in the uses of sources of radiation to accomplish specific 
purposes that commercial exploitation of atomic energy has occurred 
in the United States, although reactors planned or in construction will 
soon change this. The estimated savings through process and quality 
controls in industry alone have been estimated as being at a rate of $400 
million annually. Moreover, new radiation devices which have con-
siderable promise are being rapidly developed, and the number of in-
dustrial users (now approximately I ,600) can be expected to increase 
in the years to come with resulting major contributions to the economy. 
First we will discuss some of the current and potential uses of radiation 
sources, and then we will proceed to review the nature of some of the 
hazards to persons and property arising therefrom. 
Thickness and Density Measuring Devices. By measuring the change 
in intensity of a beam of radiation it is possible to determine variations 
in the thickness or density of material through which the radiation beam 
passes. Typically, in gages employing radioactivity, the radiation source 
is stationary and is placed on one side of the material. On the other side 
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is placed a geiger counter, ionization chamber, or other device which can 
measure the changes in the radiation. These gages have been particularly 
useful in industries producing sheet materials,- such as steel, aluminum, 
copper, brass, plastics, paper, film, and tape. Radioactive thickness 
gages have advantages over mechanical gages. Because no mechanical 
contact is required, it is_ not necessary to stop or cut rolling sheet material 
to insert the gage. If the material to be measured is too hot, too soft, or 
easily marred by handling, radioactive gages have a further advantage. 
Moreover, radioactive gages are more sensitive and give higher precision 
than mechanical gages. In addition, they are easily adapted to automatic 
controls which can even be used to adjust the rollers thus permitting 
automatic correction of the defect. 
Because radioactive thickness gages require no interruption of pro-
duction, permit narrower tolerances to be maintained (thereby saving 
material), and can be used with automatic control devices to correct 
errors, their use means substantial savings· in many industries. For 
example, the amount of rubber needed to· make a safe tire reaches a 
limit beyond which quality is not improved by additional material. Sur-
plus rubber was formerly used as a safeguard but with radioactive gages 
exact amounts can be readily measured and savings have ensued without 
sacrifice of quality. Radioactive thickness gages may also be used to 
measure the thickness of plating or of abrasives, such as sandpaper, with 
similar advantages and consequent savings. Further possibilities exist 
in the measuring of the density of solids and liquids, such as oil, 
chemicals, soap chips, etc. 
The radioactive material which is incorporated into the gage is usually 
placed in a sealed metal container which has at least one area which is 
so designed that the radiation can pass through at the desired level of 
intensity. Necessarily, the container must be inspected regularly to see 
that no radioactive materials have escaped to contaminate surrounding 
equipment. In practice, the gages are sometimes sold outright by the 
manufacturers, but in many instances the radiation source is rented so 
that the supplier retains title. The supplier of rented radiation sources 
also undertakes the responsibility of inspecting. The manufacturers 
have in some instances sold the radiation source without such service 
where the user has the necessary equipment and experience to handle 
the health and safety problems connected with the gages. 
Similarly, liquid level gages can be used in many industries to locate 
substances in containers that are closed and hence inaccessible. The 
location of the level depends upon recording the intensity of a beam of 
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radiation. When the liquid, the height of which is being measured, 
comes between the source and the detector, there is a sharp decrease in 
the detector's radiation. Or in the alternative, radioactive floats are 
introduced into the liquid, and their radioactivity is detected from out-
side the wall. The point of radioactivity reveals the level of the liquid. 
Radiography. Radiographic testing which is used to inspect the in-
ternal structure of metal castings, welds, etc,, is not a new technique. 
X-ray machines and radium sources were previously used, but the avail-
ability of large quantities of high energy radiation sources such as cobalt 
6o has made it economically feasible to undertake more extensive radio-
graphic testing. The testing process consists of placing a radioactive 
source on one side of the specimen to be tested and a photographic film 
on the other. The film when developed reveals any flaws or cracks in the 
specimen since more radiation will penetrate the areas of defect and 
cause greater exposure on the film. Radiocobalt is approximately one-
fiftieth as expensive as radium and it has a greater gamma ray generat-
ing capacity for its weight. Cobalt sources can be machined to any shape 
before they are made radioactive by exposure to neutrons within a 
reactor. However, radiocobalt must be clad prior to usage because it 
tends to flake after exposure to neutron bombardment. 
Medical Uses. Radioisotopes and radiation sources have considerable 
promise for therapeutic uses by the medical profession. X-ray machines 
and radium have, of course, been employed for a number of years. 
Radioactive iodine and phosphorus have also been available as special-
ized therapy tools in very limited quantities for the few scientists having 
access to particle accelerators. Today, however, over Boo varieties of 
radioisotopes are available in substantial quantities for medical use. 
Availability is no longer a problem. 
One therapy technique makes use of the destructive qualities of radia-
tion. The radiation is directed at diseased tissue to destroy the unde-
sirable cells. However, healthy tissues located near the diseased tissues 
are also in danger of destruction, so the process must be cautiously 
handled. The radiation may be supplied from a source external to the 
body, it may be placed within the body near the diseased tissue, or a 
radioisotope may be injected in the body when the particular isotope has 
a tendency to concentrate chemically in the particular diseased organ. 
If reliance is placed on the selectivity of a particular isotope for certain 
body tissues, the half-life of the radioisotope is important. Too long a 
half-life may result in the continuation of radiation which damages 
healthy tissue long after the diseased tissue has been .destroyed. Like-
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wise, the biological half-life or rate of elimination from the body is 
important in such use of radioisotopes, as was explained in Chapter I. 
Considerable research is still needed before the therapeutic techniques 
now used experimentally can become standardized. 
As an external source, cobalt 6o, a very powerful gamma emitter, is 
replacing radium because of its low cost and less hazardous nature. The 
radioisotopes currently used most extensively internally are radioiodine 
131-, a gamma emitter, and phosphorus 32, a beta emitter. Because 
iodine is naturally attracted to and retained by the thyroid gland, radio-
iodine can be used for some of that gland's disorders. Hyperthyroidism,· 
or excessive hormone secretion of the thyroid with disabling symptoms, 
has been checked, if not cured, by radioiodine. Cancerous growths in 
the thyroid can be treated by the radiation from radioiodine. Angina 
pectoris has been relieved by radioiodine, apparently because it eases the 
load on a diseased heart by slowing down the activity of the thyroid. 
Radiophosphorus, which has an affinity for bone marrow, will radiate 
the blood-forming tissues and decelerate the production of blood cells. 
Administration of radiophosphorus has provided relief to patients 
afflicted with an oversupply of red cells (polycythemia subra vera) and 
has controlled, though not cured, the oversupply of white cells (leu-
kemia). 
Sterilization of Food and Drugs. Radiation sources can also be used 
to sterilize foods and drugs .. Microorganisms present in pharmaceutical 
products and items intended for human consumption can, if desired, be 
completely exterminated, but the quantity of radiation needed for the 
purpose increases greatly as lower forms of life are attacked. Absolute 
sterilization may require a dosage as high as approximately two million 
roentgens. The danger inherent in using this amount of radioactivity 
in foods and drugs is appare.nt when we consider that approximately 
400 roentgens constitutes a lethal dose for at least half of the human 
population. Apprehension has been expressed about the possibility of 
inducing subtle changes in the irradiated food or drug materials which 
could not be detected by ordinary chemical and physical means. The 
hazards in this respect do not arise from radioactivity as such, but from 
its side effects, such as the creation of pathogenic conditions or toxicity. 
However, short of sterilization, pasteurization of foods and drugs by 
means of ionizing radiation can be accomplished by much smaller doses 
of radioactivity. In pasteurizing a product most of the pathogenic bac-
teria are killed, but not all. Intensive experiments are being carried on 
to achieve practical results in this area. It has been reported that in 
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England irradiated onions and potatoes have already been supplied to the 
submarine crews of the Royal Navy. The United States Army is carry-
ing on a $s,ooo,ooo research program along this line. 
The advantage of either sterilizing or pasteurizing by the use of 
radiation consists of accomplishing these goals without significant in-
creases in temperature. Consequently there is the possibility of treating 
products that are heat-sensitive, protecting them from deleterious 
changes produced by heat sterilization, or from change of taste or other 
quality that might result therefrom. Packaged meats, canned milk, dried 
eggs, ice cream, and other mixes may be cited as examples. The steriliz-
ing or pasteurizing operation is normally applied after packaging, thus 
eliminating the possibility of contamination after radiation, a very im-
portant advantage. 
Cold sterilization of penicillin or other antibiotics, medical supplies, 
and sanitary products, bandages, sutures, etc., can also be effectuated; 
plasma and other blood components are made to last longer and the likeli-
hood of transmitting contagious disease is reduced. Beneficial effects 
can be produced by sterilization of hormones, vitamins, antibodies, and 
other products. Fruits, vegetables, and beverages can also be treated to 
increase appreciably their shelf-life. 
Static Eliminators. The hazards of static electricity, which is pro-
duced by friction, can be eliminated by the use of ionizing radiation. 
Static charges occur in manufacturing operations of sheet plastic, paper, 
motion picture film, in coffee . plants, in leather fabrication, in flour 
milling, and in many fine grinding operations. Automatic processes may 
be reduced in efficiency or even impeded by static electricity. The cutting 
of filmy materials, or the carding and warping of textile fibers are ex-
amples. Even more serious is the possibility of building up large electro-
static fields sufficient to give off sparks and thus create fire hazards in 
explosive atmosphere, such as that formed in industrial works using 
inflammable fluids or explosives, or that of a hospital operating room. 
Radioactive sources can be used to ionize the air surrounding the point 
of origin of a static charge. The ions in the air are attracted to surfaces 
of opposite signs, and the charge is neutralized. 
Exploration for Oil. The oil industry has found in the use of radio-
active sources a more efficient means of exploring the bowels of the 
earth. A portable neutron source, usually a mixture of radium, polo-
nium, and beryllium is lowered into the bore-hole of the well, along with 
a detecting device. To prevent the detector from being directly activated 
by neutrons from the source a shield is interposed. The operation con-
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sists of making readings of radioactivity reflected from the surrounding 
matter the nature of which is to be determined. Dry strata absorb the 
neutrons, but when neutrons encounter hydrogen atoms, many of them 
are "scattered back" and are revealed by the detector. A counter measures 
the activity, and electronic devices relay the information to the surface. 
The presence of either water or oil is shown by the hydrogen content 
thus revealed, and electrical conductivity tests are used to complete the 
identification. The use of radiation has revealed the existence of large 
reserves in many fields long believed exhausted. 
· Agricultural Uses. The ability of radiation to induce changes in the 
hereditary features of plants and animals has been turned to advanta-
geous use by science. Neutron irradiation of chromosomes and genes 
produces mutations that are frequently harmful, but occasionally bene-
ficial changes are induced. This fact has already led to the production of 
rust-resistant oats and better barley, wheat, and corn. A variety of 
peanuts has been produced which is leaf-spot resistant and yields about 
thirty. per cent more quantity per acre. A radiation-caused mutation in 
penicillin mold has made possible a much greater producing type. The 
radiation doses needed to bring about mutations are much larger than 
amounts lethal to humans and animals. In the process a minute portion 
of the total number of specimens show good mutation. The others are 
discarded as useless. It is for this reason that plant and seed irradiation 
is more practical than animal activation. Amounts of radioactivity large 
enough to produce mutations would have to be administered to large 
numbers of animals, and a considerable number of them would have to 
be sacrificed to obtain the favorable mutations in some of them. Never-
theless, radiation is currently being used on poultry to increase egg pro-
duction. 
Again, atomic energy offers at least partial relief from this country's 
three billion dollar yearly loss of agricultural yield due to insects. Low 
energy radiation renders various species of insects sterile, thus facilitat-
ing their eradication. Similarly radiation may be employed in the control 
of weevils and other insects in stored produce, in the elimination of in-
sect contamination in consumer packages of grain products, and for 
coating underground cables to inhibit mold and fungus growth. It has 
recently been suggested that railroad cars equipped with radiation 
sources be moved about the country during critical crop stages to reduce 
crop damage due to insects and spoilage. 
Miscellaneous Uses. Brief mention should also be made of certain 
other uses of radioactivity which indicate the important role that it will 
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play in the everyday life of the future. The use of cobalt 6o gamma rays 
to vulcanize rubber by radioactivity, instead of heat, shows promise of 
improving resistance of rubber compounds to oil impregnation and in-
creasing their serviceability under high or low temperature conditions. 
Radioactive devices for the scientificalty correct measurement of time 
are expected to be used in navigation, communication, and related re-
search, such as the study of variations in the rate of rotation of the 
earth. Conversion of sea water to fresh water may someday be brought 
to pass by use of radiation. Large-scale catalysis of chemical reactions 
is envisioned. Radioisotopes have been found to have useful applications 
in ventilation and air conditioning where they can minimize or eliminate 
hazards from explosions in ducts conveying finely ground materials. 
Better means of processing plastics, increasing their temperature re-
sistance, and adding to their strength can be achieved by the use of 
atomic energy. . 
Phosphorescent or fluorescent materials, activated by radioisotopes, 
make excellent luminous compounds, and the stock pile of fission prod-
ucts increases the availability of colors, of degrees of brightness, and of 
longer-lived materials. They can be used on instrument dials, road signs, 
advertising structures, ~nd as safety markings for buildings and mines. 
For example, when disruption of electrical power interrupts normal 
service, luminous signs might be used to guide personnel to safety. 
Ionization of the air-fuel mixture may be used to improve the per-
formance of internal combustion engines, for flame propagation is be-
lieved to depend in part on the agitation of the gas molecules. Because 
ions are agitated atoms or molecules and can be created by radiation, a 
long half-life isotope in a combustion engine may well improve the 
efficiency of low octane fuel and prevent knocking. 
Another probably common future use of radiation sources, based on 
the same principle as that employed in logging oil wells, is the determina-
tion of the density of the soil upon which structures or highways are to 
be built, and the amount of moisture in it. Simplification of construction 
procedures and improvement of quality and safety features in the build-
ing of highways, airport runways, or earth dams can be achieved by this 
means. Neutron sources and detectors will be used but will function on 
the surface instead of at considerable depths as in the case of oil wells. 
The tests will be conducted at intervals along the path to be used. 
Paul Weidlinger, a consulting engineer of the American Spciety of 
Chemical Engineering, suggests that powerful radiation could be used 
to rearrange the molecules in wood so that the result would be a stronger 
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and more durable product. Better plywood could thus be provided for 
houses, boats, and industry. The structural members of the material 
would be much thinner and lighter, and yet they would be stronger and 
more elastic. Fire resistance could be increased to the extent of eliminat-
ing the necessity of fireproofing and the cumbersome, expensive acces-
sories that come with it. Exploiting the ability of hard radiation to 
cross-link molecules, the plywood industry might be enabled to forego 
the use of glues. According to Mr. Weidlinger, enormous pressures may 
be used to cross-layer thin veneers, and heat action may cause the extru-
sion of natural lignin, while the application of hard gamma rays may 
cause the molecules to join without raising the temperature. This 
process would permit the processing of building materials into various 
shapes and would truly be like taking the substance apart and completely 
reassembling it. 
Innumerable other possibilities for the use of radiation, such as in 
batteries or for space heating of homes, have been suggested and are 
being investigated. Undoubtedly many other uses will be developed that 
will make the total contribution of radiation to the economy of possibly 
startling proportions. Therefore, we can expect radiation sources to 
become even more commonplace in the relatively near future. 
It must always be remembered, however, that utilization of radioac-
tive sources creates hazards to persons and property because of the dam-
aging effect of ionizing radiation. Recently, as pointed out in Chapter I, 
a group of prominent scientists has concluded that any radiation, no 
matter how small, is damaging to the living and perhaps more impor-
tantly to the descendants of the living. Therefore, users of radiation 
must exert all efforts to reduce radiation hazards. 
The number of ways in which the use of radiation may result in dam-
age is almost unending, but some deserve particular mention. The trans-
portation of radioactive materials from their point of origination to 
refiners and suppliers and eventually to consumers involves unusual 
hazards. Not only must carrier personnel be protected by shielding, but 
also protection must be afforded persons who are near the transporta-
tion vehicles, such as passengers or the casual passersby or persons work-
ing in buildings near railroad sidings where boxcars transporting radio-
active materials happen to be resting temporarily. A train or airplane 
accident may cause rescuers to be subjected to damaging radiation if the 
container has been broken by the impact of the wreck. Persons so ex-
posed will not know of their injury until possible corrective measures 
may be too late. Therefore, radioactive materials should be transported 
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in the most secure fashion and notices of a possible hazard should be 
conspicuous. 
Radiation sources are, of course, a hazard to personnel in the im-
mediate vicinity. Areas of high radiation levels must be blocked off or 
personnel unwittingly will be absorbing harmful radiation. Location 
within buildings but close to public passageways may cause harmful 
exposure to children playing outside the factory. The uninformed petty 
thief may carry home an extremely dangerous radioactive source unless 
the materials are carefully guarded and inventoried. A plant explosion 
or fire may break the container, scattering the radioactive material. 
Police and firemen who come to assist in putting out the conflagration 
may be exposed. 7 Plant visitors or even trespassers, such as children, 
must be excluded from access to the source so that the radiation beam 
will not be directed at themselves or others in the vicinity. This very · 
incomplete list of possibilities suggests the desirability of free use of 
exclusion areas with an abundance of warning devices and notices. 
Radiation injuries may also occur because of the cumulative effect of 
radiation, although the particular exposure is below safe maximums, as 
is also pointed out in Chapter I. For example, an employee may have. 
undergone radiation during therapy and then received additional radia• 
tion at work because of the impossibility of perfect shielding against 
gamma radiation. Or a patient may have been given radiation treat-
ments by one doctor and then given further radiation for possibly an-
other ailment by a second doctor. In both cases the amount of radiation 
at any one exposure would have been considered safe, but a cumulative 
radiation injury may occur. This suggests that monitoring of personnel 
should be continuous and perhaps every individual in the community 
should have a complete accurate record of exposures so that cumulative 
radiation can be ·estimated and damage avoided. Registration on a 
national basis was actually recommended by the Committee on Genetic 
Effects of Atomic Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences.8 
The erroneous shipment of a gamma source when the consumer has 
requested a beta source could lead to innumerable injuries because of the 
vast differences in· required shielding. Radiation injuries to persons 
and property may result from leakage in containers. Radioactive ma-
terials may be accidentally shipped to consumers of articles produced in 
the factory using radiation sources. Radioisotopes may be acci~entally 
thrown into sewers which empty into streams from which water is taken 
7 E.g., the explosion in the Sylvania Laboratory in New York City. 
s National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, "The Biological Effects 
of Atomic Radiation," p. 28 (1956). 
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for drinking or industrial uses. If a film processing plant used water 
containing radioactive materials, the film would be damaged. Dispos-
ing of radioactive materials in dumps that may later be the site of build-
ings may eventually result in injury to the occupants. When the radia-
tion level is no longer sufficient for the particular use but is still harmful 
to human life, adequate methods of disposal must be found or the same 
hazards may develop as in the case of disposal of the waste products 
created in the fission process. The possibilities for injuries seem in-
terminable, and unusual hazards are ·encountered because of the unique 
nature of radiation whereby injuries are suffered without the immedi-' 
ate interposition of the human sense perception. 
In conjunction with use of radiation sources, it should be noted that, 
although potential hazards are created by their use, failure to use radia-
tion techniques may similarly create hazards that may result in legal 
liability.· For example, a crucial casting for a mechanical device that has 
not been tested by radiography may break causing injuries to persons 
and property. Similarly, drugs or blood plasma not sterilized by radia-
tion may seriously infect patients. Furthermore, it is entirely possible 
that radiation usages may become so standardized in certain industries 
that a failure to take advantage of them may be evidence of negligence 
in any litigation based upon injuries caused by the product. 
In judging what radiation hazards are unacceptable, the hazard must 
always be weighed against the great benefits which can come from the 
use of atomic energy mechanisms. 
3· Radioactive Tracers and Their Hazards 
Radioisotopes have already been used in large quantities in tracing 
experiments and techniques in biology, industry, medicine, and agri-
culture. Since the beginning of the United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission's post-World War II program thousands of shipments have 
been made to thousands of institutions in this country and abroad. 
Moreover, the federal government is financing an extensive research 
program with laboratories at Brookhaven, Argonne, Los Alamos, Oak 
Ridge, Rochester, Arco, and other places. 
Because of the radiation they emit, inconceivably minute quantities 
of radioisotopes can be detected by very sensitive instruments. A so-
called ".labeled" or "tagged" atom, i.e., a radioactive isotope of a given 
chemical" element, as explained in Chapter I, is identical in its chemical 
behavior with its non-radioactive sister atoms. It can be "traced" 
through a series of chemical or physical reactions even in the presence of 
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great quantities of non-radioactive atoms of the same substance or of 
different substances. Complex and mysterious biological and industrial 
processes can be better understood by the use of proper radioisotopic 
tracer materials. Isotope labeling establishments are curr~ntly supplying 
numerous tagged compounds, such as sugars, organic acids, amino acids, 
pigments, alkaloids, proteins, and others. Medicinaf plants are being 
grown in an atmosphere of radioactivity to produce labeled drugs. 
There are, of course, limitations upon the practital use of tracers, 
and often a radioisotope of suitable degree of activity or half-life is not 
available. For example, no usable radioisotope of oxygen, nitrogen, or 
aluminum has been produced, or the amount of an isotope needed for a · 
certain tracer application may be too 'large to be safe. Moreover, the 
process of synthesizing the radioisotope into a compound posses'sing 
physical and chemical properties identical with the material under study 
is sometimes impos'sible or impractical. Despite these difficulties, how.:. 
ever, tracer techniques are widely used and highly successful. · The 
equipment needed for utiliza1ion of tracers is not expensive; the cbst of 
the radioisotopes themselves is low, and important additions to knowl-
edge may be made by their utilization. Their possible· usefulness for· 
known processes and for many not yet envisaged has caused authorita..: 
tive sources to hail them as one of the most significant contributions to 
the welfare of man so far derived from atomic energy, perhaps the most 
useful discovery since the microscope. 
A brief account of some of the more important current applications 
of tracer techniques will reveal the importance of radioactive tracers to 
society. 
Tracers in the Oil Industry. The oil industry has found profitable 
uses for radiotracers. After a period of use the walls of a pipeline may 
become encrusted with wax. Special scrapers, with a number of blades, 
are driven through a pipe by compressed air to remove obstacles and 
accumulations. If a scraper sticks in a pipe instead· of emerging at the 
other end, its location is difficult to determine. To facilitate identifica-
tion of the spot, a source of cobalt 6o in an aluminum container is at-
tached to the scraper. A geiger counter outside the pipe registers a re-
sponse to the gamma rays· emitted by the cobalt even through several 
feet of earth, and thus locates the scraper. 
Gasoline, diesel oil, stove oil, or oils of different qualities may be 
shipped successively through the same pipeline, and it is necessary to 
spot with accuracy the interfaces between any two substances as shipped. 
If a small quantity of radioactive material is injected into the line at the 
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interface, geiger counters placed at the desired cut off points indicate the 
arival of a new substance by signaling the radioactivity. Operators can 
then turn valves to direct the new shipment to its proper tanks. The ad-
vantage of the tracer technique is that it accurately locates the interface 
and measures the extent to which the adjacent materials have inter-
mingled in the pipeline. The amounts of radiation needed for this and 
similar strictly tracing functions are not particularly hazardous provided 
proper care is exercised in handling the radioactive materials themselves. 
_ A.gain, tracershave contributed to making oil well drilling safer and 
simpler. The use of acids in wells to render limestone or sandstone for-
matiqns permeable is often necessary, but it has been a hazardous and 
time-consuming operation for the reason that thousands of feet of tub-
ing had to be removed and disjointed to install accessory equipment for 
acidizing purposes. Radioiodine now reveals the level of the acid, which, 
by applying ·pressure according to instructions received from readings, 
can be kept at the bqttom of the well without danger ofcorroding tub-
ings or the casings of the wen. 
· Metal Wear Testing. A process has been developed for measuring 
the wear of engine parts and comparing the performance of different 
lubricants and fuels. It is ~ased on a weight loss system and is a quick 
and effective procedure. Under previous practices, an engine would be 
run for a long time, even months; then it would be dismantled a11d the 
weight of the parts being tested would be compared with their weight 
before the test. Using the "tagged atoms" procedure, piston rings or 
other parts can be irradiated in a reactor, placed in the engine, and the 
engine started. At any desired time interval, the oil may be drained off, 
and a geiger counter used to determine the amount of radioactive metal 
worn off in the operation. Accurate testing is possible without the ex-
pensive and time-consuming dismantling otherwise required. I~ is as-
serted that better engine oils have been produced as a by-product of this 
speedy and precise method of testing. 
The same technique can be applied to tools of many kinds to appraise 
their resistance and predict the duration of their life. Cutting tools may 
be made radioactive in ~ reactor. During their use microscopic frag-
ments of metal are worn off and intermingled with the metal chips of 
machined pieces. The radioactivity of the wastes determines instantly 
the wear of the tool. Previous methods required extended wearing of 
the tool to test. it effectively. 
Foods and Food Processing. By means of radiotracers simpler and 
more reliable methods of toxicological evaluation of ingredients are 
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open to the food industry. Food additives, whether for flavor, color, and 
texture, or as a preservative, must be harmless. Radioactivation of 
such additives, or proper labeling with a radioisotope, allows the re-
se~rch staff of the industry to follow the absorption, distribution, stor-
age, and excretion of ingested foodstuffs. Any abnormalities in the 
metabolic process such as excessive accumulation .or distribution may 
reveal nutritional hazards and call for discontinuance of a practice or 
the substitution of a safer chemical. 
Again, it often happens that food processors are interested in know-
ing the .rate of water penetration into food products. Experimental 
samples· are processed with radioactive water, and radiographic tests 
are made which indicate the water distribution at different stages. This 
technique has assisted the manufacture of better products. 
Even the much debated effects of smoking may be investigated by 
the use of radioactive tracers. A tobacco company has reported that it is 
conducting experiments to determine the disposition of the several in-
gredients of tobacco that are inhaled. Different constituents of tobacco 
are tagged and followed in the pathways inside the body. The distribu-
tion and rate of elimination thus observed may reveal important facts 
about the pathogenic effect of certain tobaccos or some of their con-
stituents. 
The contributions of tracing techniques to the improvement of many 
agricultural processes and to the expansion of knowledge concerning 
agricultural practices have been outstanding and are undergoing con-
stant expansion. It truly can be stated that imagination and ingenuity 
can extend the use of radioactive tracers to cover most areas of human 
activity. 
The efficiency of conversion of feed into meat by animals can be 
determined by tracing. The effect of adding certain elements may lead 
to better feed products. The utilization and elimination rate of feed 
components may reveal the cause of a diet deficiency and suggest ways of 
restoring pastures to a high nutritional value or of rendering valuable 
an area. of supposedly little worth. Experiments with tracers reveal 
whether inadequate growth in animals is due to low dietary intake or to 
the intake of adverse food elements. 
The use of tracers has revealed to science the processes of synthesis 
of foods and the degradative reactions that occur rapidly within the 
body. Earlier beliefs are being replaced by more adequate understand-
ing. Advances in dietetics have been made possible by nutritional studies 
based on tracing techniques. 
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The mineral components of certain feed supplements have been fol-
lowed in their paths through an animal system. To satisfy animal needs 
for small amounts of iodine, iron, copper, cobalt, zinc, etc., such sub-
stances are placed in "salt blocks" scattered around pastures. The use of 
radioisotopes reveals that certain minerals are being leached out without 
reaching the animal. This discovery has led to the manufacture of 
blocks containing water insoluble compounds. The effects of fluorine 
on calcium metabolism in animals has been studied with the use of tracer 
isotopes to measure the rate of bone growth and to determine the amount 
of fluorine, if any, to be used in water. Experiments have shown that 
the growth in the bone structure of animals supplied with a high fluorine 
content in their diet is only half that of the growth registered by animals 
that are fed a normal or low amount of fluorine. This discovery even 
has implications for use of fluorine to retard tooth decay in humans. 
Again, a substance called thiouracil shows great growth promoting 
possibilities and can be fed to pigs, poultry, and other farm animals to 
improve the efficiency of feed utilization. A drawback consists of the 
fact that thiouracil depresses the function of the thyroid gland and may 
even be deleterious to humans feeding on animals fattened on a thioura-
cil diet. Experiments have shown that if the substance is withheld from 
the diet of animals for two or three days befor.e they are slaughtered 
for human consumption, no significant amount is retained by the time 
they reach the market. This knowledge was gained by the use of radio-
active iodine as a tracer s~udying its uptake by the thyroid· gland when 
mixed with thiouracil. As a result of these demonstrations, the Food 
and Drug Administration has approved thiouracil as a satisfactory diet 
ingredient. 
Agricultural Uses. Radioactive tracers have disclosed much valuable 
information on the rate of plant uptake of commercial fertilizers. 
Tracers reveal under what conditions and at what stage of a growing 
cycle fertilizers should be applied for best results. Phosphates, tagged 
with radiophosphorus, permit discovery of the portions of phosphorus 
der~ved from the soil and the portions coming to the plant from fer-
tilizers. Thus it has been found that corn takes up phosphorus from 
applied fertilizers in its early stages, but that later the uptake is princi-
pally from natural phosphorus deeper in the soil. Tobacco growers have 
introduced savings as a result of the knowledge that phosphates spread 
at the surface have little value for their crops. 
Radiotracers can also be used to evaluate the natural fertility of the 
soil. The inhibiting effects of certain mineral components of the soil can 
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be assessed. It has been learned that a fertilizer may be good for a cer-
tain year, but that it will be harmful to a future type of crop in the sys-
tem of rotation. This has furnished valuable guidance for growers in 
the selection of their rotating crops. Dr. Walter F. Libby, a member of 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has estimated that proper 
utilization of radiation sources and radioisotope tracers in agriculture 
could save upwards of $2oo,ooo,ooo per year by reason of improved 
methods and materials. 
Photosynthesis, the process by which plants store sunlight and turn 
it into chemical energy, is the basis of all life on earth, and it is slowly 
unfolding its mystery through the aid of radioactive tracers. The hoped-
for dream of researchers is the artificial reproduction of the photo-
synthesis cycle which would make possible the production of organic 
foodstuffs from inorganic materials-from water, carbon dioxide, and 
solar energy. This would .even tend to obviate the. necessity of complete 
reliance upon soil and plant life as the source of food supply as we know 
it now. 
Tracers in Medicine. Great strides have been made in medicine with 
the use of r:adioisotopes as tracers. Radioiodine and radiophosphorus 
have proved most useful. When radioiodine is administered to a pa-
tient in a solution of water-the so-called "atomic cocktail"-it will 
quickly tend to concentrate in the thyroid gland. If the iodine taken up 
by the thyroid is less than the normal amount, cancer of the gland may 
be suspected; if too much concentration is registered, the gland may be 
overactive and need treatment. A detecting instrument placed over the 
gland signals the amount of radioactivity and tells the skilled technician 
much that the doctor needs to know. 
A new method of cancer diagnosis which utilizes tracing techniques 
has been ·inaugurated. It has been found that certain substances tend to 
concentrate in areas of overactive metabolism such as cancerous tissues. 
This fact has been exploited by injecting radioisotopes into the system 
and detecting the point or points of higher concentration of radioactiv-
ity. This technique helps to pinpoint the location of the tumor and may 
reveal the malignant nature of many kinds of growth. 
Radiocarbon and radioiron have yielded useful information about 
anemia and diabetes. The reason for overproduction of. white cells in 
leukemia sufferers is· better understood as a result of the use of tracers. 
For example, tracers have revealed that the white cells in leukemia pa-
tients are deficient in zinc. 
Radioisotopes disclose the distribution of drugs in the body. They 
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also facilitate studies of blood flow by taking advantage of the fact that 
the time employed by the blood to circulate between two given points can 
be determined by injecting radiomaterial at one point and determining 
the time of its arrival at the other. 
During a surgical operation it is often vital to know the amount of 
blood lost by the patient. An accurate method is afforded by the intra-
venous injection of radioiodine. The dilution of the radioisotope in a 
sample of blood extracted after sufficient time. for mixing has elapsed; 
reveals the prese11t blood volume. Blood preservation studies have been 
aided by the use of radiochromium. tagged red cells. The life processes 
of red cells are studied ·in this manner. 
The hazards connected with the utilization of radioactive tracers are 
substantially similar to those involved when using radiation sources: 
However, in tracer techniques only small amounts· of low energy ma-
terials are needed, and consequently the degree of hazard is not as great. 
Moreover, tracer techniques are usually employed by highly experienced 
personnel who are fully knowledgeful of the dangers. In industrial ap-
plications of radiation sources untrained employees are more likely to 
be utilized. 
Once again, as with radiation. sources, a failure to use radioisotopes 
as tracers may create hazards. If a fertilizer or drug is tested with the 
new tracer techniques, injuries may be avoided. A failure to determine 
possible dangers in a product by using the tracer technique may be evi-
dence of negligence in some instances. Therefore, although injuries 
may result from employing radioisotopic tracers,· other injuries may 
occur by not taking advantage of their value as a research and testing in-
strument. · 
B. General Tort Liability Problems 
In reading the foregoing discussion of the scientific aspects of atomic 
energy, its peacetime uses, and the potential hazards, lawyers without 
doubt have reviewed in their minds the legal principles applicable to 
litigation in the tort liability field. We shall now briefly describe some 
of the legal problems that we feel may be arising in the future with con-
siderable frequency, and in the succeeding chapters we shall analyze the 
more important rules of law currently applied in the tort and workmen's 
compensation fields and discuss possible solutions for specific problems 
unique in connection with peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
it should be especially emphasized that there will be an important in-
terrelationship between the law and atomic energy. In other words, the 
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law will affect atomic energy operations, for the lawyer will be obliged 
to advise his clients to pursue certain courses of action to avoid certain 
legal consequences. At the same time atomic energy will affect the law by 
stimulating the development of new legal principles to the new technol-
ogy, either by the courts or legislatures, or both. 
Perhaps the most crucial question is what general rules of tort liability 
will or should be applied to atomic energy activities. Should the ordi-
nary rules of negligence apply? Or should rules enforcing strict liability 
as in the case of an "ultrahazardous" enterprise be applicable? Should 
the same rules, negligence or strict liability, be applied to reactor opera-
tion as to the use of radiation sources or radioisotopes? As we men-
tioned earlier, the failure of the common law to adapt itself to industrial 
injury problems led to the enactment of statutory workmen's compensa-
tion. If common law rules are not again to be superseded, this time by 
statutory rules in the area of atomic energy enterprise, careful considera-
tion must be given to the evolution of judge-made common law. Or 
perhaps it may be found that, in some aspects at least, only statutory 
solutions will serve adequately to adjust atomic energy to the law. If, 
in judicial proceedings to impose civil liability, negligence must be found 
before the one who causes the damage is obliged to respond in damages, 
individual members or, indeed, the whole of society will bear a greater 
direct risk and burden. If strict liability rules are applied, a restricted 
part of society, i.e., atomic energy enterprise, must bear a greater direct 
economic burden, either through payment of claims or through increased 
costs of insurance. These economic burdens may, of course, be passed 
on to the general public in the form of increased prices for the product of 
such enterprise. In many instances, however, the potential economic 
burden may deter entrepreneurs from undertaking atomic energy activi-
ties. The nature of the general rules of law to be made applicable will 
also have its effect on the safety measures to be used in atomic energy 
operations. If strict liability is imposed, entrepreneurs will doubtless 
take the utmost precautionary measures which, of course, will increase 
the economic costs of utilizing atomic energy, undoubtedly retarding its 
development to some extent.-
We have already seen that reactor operation, radiation sources, and 
the storage and disposal of radioactive wastes all involve unusual haz-
ards that might be characterized as ultrahazardous in nature. We must 
ask ourselves many questions. What effect, if any, should be given to 
governmental approval of the operation as set forth in the form of 
atomic energy licenses ? Should or does such approval l?reclude the 
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courts from applying strict liability rules, particularly when the operation 
has been carefully inspected from the standpoint of health and safety 
by federal or state authorities? What is the effect of federal approval on 
state authority? Should liability be imposed for injuries to trespassers 
in view of the unique hazards? Should visitors and licensees be required 
to assume radiation risks? Should liability be imposed where an "Act 
of God," such as an earthquake or tornado, has caused injuries by 
spreading radioactivity throughout a community? Do workers "assume 
risks" such as possible_ genetic damage? 
The scope of potential liability based upon the applicable principles of 
tort law will have an effect on the type of business organization that may 
be used in atomic energy pursuits. If strict liability is imposed, it may 
encourage the establishment of separate corporations to handle atomic 
energy, legal entities divorced from business organizations already 
established in industry. Should use of a corporate device with limited 
assets be permitted in so hazardous a field? Should minimum insur-
ance coverage be required by' law? Lawyers in the atomic energy era 
will be called upon to assess all legal possibilities and undoubtedly will 
be asked to give advice that will protect investors to the greatest possible 
degree against possible tort claims. At the same time cognizance must 
be taken of the legitimate claims of individuals and groups who may be 
injured by atomic energy activities. 
In addition to the problem of the general rules of law to be applied to 
atomic energy, there are a number of specific problems that may arise. 
In determining the location of an atomic energy facility,· consideration 
must be given to the potential hazards and to the desirable exclusion 
area. Even before a plant is constructed, nearby inhabitants and land-
owners may seek to prevent the construction by seeking injunctions on 
the theory that the plant will be a nuisance. Some may seek to enjoin 
the construction while others may seek damages on the theory that the 
plant destroys property values. ·what will be their measure of success? 
What will be the effect of zoning ordinances in trying such cases? What 
will be the effect of licensing by the Atomic Energy Commission? Will 
use of underground chambers or gas-tight steel spheres reduce the suc-
cess of what is by some called "nuisance" litigation? Lawyers must 
analyze these questions in the light of local rules of law as well as federal 
laws and regulations, not to mention international legal principles, to 
advise properly when plant locations are being selected. 
A number of individuals and industrial organizations are currently 
engaged in designing nuclear reactors and atomic energy devices and in 
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supplying consulting services in the atomic energy field. In the current 
stage of-technological development, the alternatives have yet to be tested 
conclusively, so designs must be selected in the absence of conclusive 
data. What liability may be imposed on designers and consultants if the 
installation causes injuries? Once one type of installation or process 
is proved to be safe, what effect will this have on the area of choice if 
negligence claims are to be avoided? Can consultants and designers im-
munize themselves from liability? Should they be allowed to do so? For 
what kinds of injuries should they be liable? Should they he liable only 
to those in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear accident, or should they 
be liable to the film manufacturer who happens to purchase cardboard to 
package film that was made with water into which radioactive materials 
had leaked? When are the injuries so remote that liability should not be 
imposed? 
The construction firms and manufacturers of equipment used in 
atomic energy facilities also face possible tort ·litigation. Should or 
will the building contractor be held liable to persons injured due to 
slight defects in construction that permit leakage of radioactive ma-
terials? Should negligence rules be applied or strict liability rules? 
Should or will the manufacturer of equipment used in reactor or radia-
tion devices be liable for injuries resulting from defects in the product? 
Does it make a difference if the manufacturer did not know his product 
was to be used in a reactor and the defect would have caused only minor 
damage, or perhaps none at all, if the equipment had been used in a 
conventional industrial operation? For what kinds of injuries should 
contractors and manufacturers of equipment be held liable? If a radia-
tion source is rented, what should be the liability of the owner for in-
juries resulting from accidents? What is the effect of assuming an obli-
gation to inspect radiation sources on the liability of the user and of the 
inspecting firm? Can liability be avoided by contract terms or by dis-
claiming any warranties in respect to products ? 
What should be the liability, if any, of the owner-operator of a reactor 
who sells radioisotopes to others who negligently or accidentally cause 
injuries to persons and property? Because of the dangerous nature of 
the product must the seller investigate and ascertain the capacity of the 
purchaser to use the product safely? What is the effect of the securing of 
a license to use radioactive materials from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission? Would the seller be liable if he sold radioisotopes to a person 
not having a license? Can possible liabilities be avoided by any legal 
techniques? If reactor-owners are liable foF. immediate injuries caused 
by products sold to others, are they equally liable for remote injuries 
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where there has been a chain of intervening events with the possible lapse 
of a number of years? . 
Not only are there problems regarding specific rules of liability to be 
followed but also there are a number of problems arising out of the 
peculiar nature of radiation injuries'. Since the plaintiff is required to 
sustain the burden· of proof in litigation, he must first prove that his 
condition resulted from radiation, and thereafter he may find it very dif-
ficult to prove that his injury was caused by radiation from a particular 
source. Many of the same injuries occur even in the absence of radia-
tion, and thus there is the problem of the multiple cause or cumulative 
effect of radiation. Should the burden rest on the atomic energy user 
to prove that radiation did not cause the injury? If the burden of proof 
is placed on the atomic energy user, can he ever avoid liability even under 
negligence rules? If the burden of proof is made minimal for injured 
persons, will this create a convenient vehi<;le for nuisance litigation by 
any person having any complaint in an area where there has been the 
slightest rise in radiation levels? Should new rules governing the burden 
of proof be developed for atomic energy tort cases? What kinds of 
monitoring records should be kept to defend possible future injury 
claims? How can injured persons receive damages when classified data 
is involved which cannot be introduced as evidence? Should special 
courts capable of receiving security information be established? Or 
should the government assume liability when it prevents the introduc-
tion of the evidence necessary to prove an injured person's case? 
What claims can be made by a person who has received radiation 
damage only because of its cumulative nature when all of his exposures 
were below safe levels? Can he recover froin only the person who caused 
the exposure to go above the maximum permitted before cumulative 
effects begin? Or are all who contributed to the cumulative effect liable? 
Should every person be required to keep his own personal exposure 
record so that employers and doctors can rely on the record in subjecting 
an employee or patient to radiation? Can victims of degressive genetic 
damage seek damages from those who exposed their ancestors to harm-
ful radiation?. Should society bear the risk of genetic injuries? What 
advice should the lawyer give the atomic energy entrepreneur? 
In addition to the problems of proving injury, its cause, and the role 
ofthe defendant in causing the injury, other problems arise in respect to 
the procedural aspects of trying atomic energy tort cases. One problem 
is that of the adequacy of the typical statutes of limitations. When does 
the cause of action arise so as to start the statutory period-when the 
radiation accident occurs or when a person discovers his injury? If the 
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former, what protection, if any, should be given persons who discover 
injuries perhaps years later after the statutory period has run? Should a 
person who knows he has caused harmful exposures of radiation be re-
quired to notify possibly affected persons? If the statutory period does 
not commence until injuries are discovered, users of atomic energy will 
be called upon to defend against claims years later when witnesses are 
dead and evidentiary materials are no longer available. Should users of 
atomic energy, because of the peculiar nature of atomic injuries, be re-
quired to assume the risks of stale claims? 
Other problems arise out of the possible progressive nature of atomic 
energy in.juries. A person may receive an exposure which caused tempo-
rary sterility as its first noticeable effect. Years later malignancy may 
develop requiring amputation of limbs and perhaps death will ensue still 
later. If the person sues at the time he discovers sterility, can he attempt 
to prove possible future consequences? If he recovers only for the 
sterility, can he sue again at a later date when he discovers a malignancy? 
If legal rules prevent him from suing twice, should he be advised to delay 
damage actions until the latest permissible moment within the statute of 
limitations? Should any new rules be developed to handle possible pro-
gressive injuries? 
Another problem in atomic energy tort litigation arises out of the 
complex nature of the subject matter. Are juries equipped to handle 
highly technical data or will the technicalities so overwhelm them that 
they will be unable to assess the evidence? Will inability to handle the 
subject matter lead to verdicts for persons claiming injury or, on the 
other hand, for the defending users of atomic energy? Will the judges 
be able to give proper instructions dealing with scientific data? What 
should lawyers advise clients when faced with determining whether tort 
litigation should be tried by the judge or jury? Can hindsight be kept 
out of the deliberations in determining negligence and causation issues? 
Still other legal problems may arise because of the fact that a release 
of radioactive materials does not respect state or national boundaries. 
Which law should be applied in determining liability of an owner-opera-
tor when radiation has transcended state or national boundaries? What 
law should be applied if injuries occur on planes and trains traveling 
across state and national lines? The answers are crucial, of course, if 
one state follows ordinary negligence rules and the other invokes strict 
liability. Can legal devices be used to avoid liability under the law of 
other states or nations? Should there be an attempt to obtain uniform 
legislation covering atomic energy tort law so that the conflicts problems 
will be minimized? 
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Many of these problems also will be present in the workmen's compen-
sation field. The same problems of proof, of the statutory time limita-
tions, and of the peculiar nature of atomic energy injuries will be in 
evidence. In addition, workmen's compensation statutes will have to be 
evaluated to determine if they provide satisfactory coverage for atomic 
energy industries. If the state has lists of compensable injuries, radia-
tion injuries must be included. If general categories are set forth in the 
statute, they will have to be examined to ascertain if the coverage is as 
broad as necessary. Moreover, the scale of benefit payments may have 
to be revised to allow compensation for injuries that may not caus.e a 
diminution in wage earnings, such as sterility. 
These are among the many problems concerned with the tort liability 
aspects of atomic energy that have occurred to us. Undoubtedly others 
will occur to the reader and still further problems will arise in the future. 
Nonetheless, this listing serves to illustrate the problems that must be 
evaluated to determine what legal principles will be applied on the basis 
of common law concepts. Once these are evaluated, consideration should 
be given to changes in the law that should be made, either by the courts 
or legislatures, for the satisfactory accommodation of atomic energy in 
our society. In the succeeding chapters, we shall discuss the current rules 
of law as applied to atomic energy problems, and we shall suggest pos-
sible developments for the future. 
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Chapter III * 
NEGLIGENCE 
A. Introduction 
1. Limitations of Discussion 
It is not the purpose of this study to cover in detail all of the tort 
liability problems that will face those operating in the atomic energy 
field. Many, if not the great majority, of the cases in this area will 
present typical tort law problems susceptible to solution in the ordinary 
way according to the usual rules. ·Established legal scholars have ex-
plored and analyzed existing tort rules and have attempted to define and 
suggest future developments in the law of torts generally. Our purpose 
in writing this volume is not to second-guess these writers. Rather, we 
seek .to identify for the lawyer and business man those particularly 
troublesome or unique legal problems that will arise out of atomic 
energy. In discussing these selected problems it usually will- be necessary 
to work not from direct precedent but from the most nearly analogous 
cases, including some'on the frontiers of tort law. ·Where established 
legal rules would seem to provide inadequate or incorrect answers, 
alternative solutions or courses of action, legislative or judicial, will be 
suggested. 
Not all of the difficult legal problems will be in the areas of negli-
gence, product liability, and strict liability, but the atomic energy 
entrepreneur and the lawyer advising him will find that these problems 
will be the most unusual and the hardest to answer. In a real sense neg-
ligence, strict liability, and product liability cases cannot be separated 
into mutually exclusive categories. Nevertheless, it is convenient to 
analyze the problems under these separate headings. Questions peculiar 
to the. workmen's compensation area will be treated separately, even 
though many of the problems arising in the area of negligence will be 
present in workmen's compensation cases as 'well. · · · · · 
* The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of the following graduate 
students at The University of Michigan Law School: Charles D. Olmsted, B.S.F., 1951, 
LL.B., 1957, University of Michigan; Michael Scott, B.A., 1952, Cornell University, 
J.D., 1958, University of Michigan; Lawrence P. King, B.S., 1950, City College of the 
City of New York, LL.B., 1953, New York University, LL.M., 1957, University of 
Michigan; John D. Birchall, A.B., 1949, I,L.B., 1952, UniversitY of Michigan; Rinaldo 
L: Bianchi, Dottore in Giurisprudenza, 1947, University of :£lisa, A.B., 1951, M.A., 
1953, Wayne University, J.D.; 1955, Univetsity of Michigari. 
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There is a serious question as to whether ordinary negligence rules 
or strict liability concepts will or should be applied to atomic energy 
activities. A discussion of this question will be more meaningful if 
there is an understanding of the results that might be reached under 
ordinary negligence rules, because the limitations and possible inade-
quacies of ordinary rules then will stand out in sharper focus. It is for 
this reason that negligence rules will be discussed first and the question 
of whether those rules or strict liability concepts should govern the 
atomic energy area is postponed. 
2. Typical Negligence Analysis 
Whether the injury be to persons or property, courts and legal 
scholars generally view negligence actions as involving four elements. 
To recover damages every plaintiff must establish: ( 1) a duty of the 
defendant to use reasonable care, under the circumstances, in his rela-
tions with the plaintiff; ( 2) a breach of this duty by the defendant; 
(3) causation, both in fact and "proximately"; and (4) a legally recog-
nized loss or damage to persons or property. 
Of the four, the problems in causation and damages are the most 
peculiar and troublesome when considering atomic energy activities. 
Most of the duty problems will not be unique but there are several 
troublesome ones to be considered. In analyzing the application of tort 
principles as to each of these four elements, the peculiar characteristics 
of atomic energy must be kept in mind. 
3· Legally ~ignificant Peculiarities of Atomic Energy Activities 
Seldom, if ever, has such a significant scientific development come so 
rapidly. The existence of the neutron was not generally thought proved 
until 1932; the first reactor did not "go critical" until 1942. Yet nuclear 
energy has the potential to cause tremendous changes in our industrial 
society, if not throughout the world. There is a vast new science and 
technology with which the general public is quite unfamiliar and for 
which there are relatively few trained specialists. Even the specialists 
admit their science is so new that there are many very important con-
cepts which they understand but vaguely or are not aware of at all. 
A man cannot knowingly be negligent in fjliling to utilize a principle 
or concept which he does not know exists. This might lead to the con-
clusion that, since he did not know of a technique that might have 
prevented the accident, he was not at fault; lacking fault, in the ordinary 
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sense, generally there can be no recovery in a negligence action. On the 
other hand, it is also true that when an activity is known to be dan-
gerous it may be negligent to act in that area unless one is extremely 
well informed. It is important, from the standpoint of both domestic 
development and our position of world leadership, that atomic science 
be developed as rapidly as possible. The rules of law should not impede 
this progress unduly. Experimentation and boldness, which are neces-
sary for progress, must not be limited by the timidity that almost in-
. evitably follows imposition of too strict duty concepts or too strict a 
standard of negligence. 
Additional legal difficulties may well arise from the fact that the 
government has surrounded a not insignificant portion of the informa-
tion and knowledge about nuclear principles with the shroud of secrecy 
and the red tape of access permits. The person who wishes to avoid 
this time-consuming and expensive procedure may risk an accident that 
could have been avoided if all the information known to those persons 
working for the government or those having access permits had been 
known to him. This secrecy creates the further possibility that some 
injury situations may not be susceptible to trial in the ordinary manner 
because secret government information may be needed to determine 
facts in a particular accident. This has already been a troublesome 
problem in some instances. 
As pointed out in the technology chapter, the ordinary human senses 
are not capable of detecting radiation in most situations. Since a person 
may be seriously overexposed to radiation and be unaware of it for 
weeks, months, or even many years/ the lawyer is going to face some 
difficult problems in radiation cases, especially with respect to the matter 
of proof. This fact is going to present some extremely difficult proof 
problems. 
The general public views nuclear science as mysterious and frighten-
ing. This is not surprising when it is remembered that the science is so 
new and that it was first revealed to the public by the A and H-bombs. 
The veil of government-imposed secrecy and the fact that radiation 
cannot be detected by human senses adds to this fear. The consequence 
is very likely to be a great increase of cases in the area of mental 
disturbance, psychosomatic illness, and nuisance litigation aimed at 
preventing operation of atomic energy facilities. 
1 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1958, p. 21, col. 4, carries a report of the development of 
bone cancer 35 years after exposure to radium poisoning. The 42fld dial worker died 
in 1958 at the age of 57, 40 years after exposure. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1958, p. 31, col. 7. 
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Another singular characteristic of radiation is that it is cumulative 
in nature. What may be a perfectly permissible exposure ~ay con-
tribute to overexposure w~en added to other radiation, itself either 
permissible or wrongful. This characteristic will present some difficult 
proof and damage problems, not to mention duty questions of a type 
relatively unknown to tort law. It will also have an impact on multiple 
causation and joint tortfeasor cases. Difficult problems concerning the 
statute of limitations and conflict of laws doctrines also will arise as a 
result of this cumulative effect. 
Yet another characteristic of radiation is that many of the injuries 
caused by it can also be caused by other forces, known or unknown. 
Often it will be impossible to determine the specific causal factor for 
such conditions as cancer, cataract, and leukemia. In addition, there 
are many sources of radiation, such as natural background emissions, 
radioactive debris from bomb tests, radioactive. wastes from govern-
ment operations, and radiation treatment in the course of medical 
therapy. The effects on the human body and on property. are indis-
tinguishable from those arising from industrial use of radiation .. This 
characteristic of lack of identification. with the particular source will 
present some new problems for the lawyer. 
It should be note~ also that the causal connection between radiation 
and injury both as to amount and type often is speculative in nature. 
While scientists in general agree that certain injuries can occur as a 
result of overexposure to radiation, and in fact that some types of 
damage are caused by even quite small amounts, they cannot as yet state 
categorically that a certain amount of radiation in all cases will cause 
a certain kind of injury to all persons or even to most persons. For the 
most part, the impact of overexposure to radiation might be described 
as statistical in nature. The overexposure in most cases increases the 
incidence of such damage among a large number of persons and, there-
.fore, increases merely the chance of injury to a particular. individual. 
Another characteristic of radioactive materials is its great flexibility. 
As pointed out in Chapter I, there are· several types of radiation with 
differing characteristics and -injury potential depending often upon the 
particular way in which the person is exposed to the radioactive ma-
terial. Likewise there are many different kinds of radioacti~e isotopes 
of various elements whose length of radioactivity varies greatly .. Per-
haps as important legally as any characteristic is the fact that radio-
active isotopes of various elements chemically are identical with stable 
isotopes of the same element and remain radioactive through 'an kinds 
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of chemical reactions. Radioactive material, therefore, may remain a 
potential hazard for great lengths of time while it is processed through 
numerous extremely complicated chemical changes. Probably no other 
dangerous material is so insidious in character. 
4· Typical Atomic Energy Operations and Tort Liability 
Many of the activities in which atomic energy will play a part cannot 
even be foreseen. There are several types of operations now in use, 
however, as described in Chapter II. Although there may be legally 
significant differences between some of these operations, particularly as 
to duty and breach questions, the most interesting and most difficult 
tort liability problems are common to most or all of the presently 
known uses. 
Reactor Operations. The question most nearly peculiar to reactor 
operations is that of whether strict liability will or should be imposed 
upon the licensee. Application of manufacturer's liability rules, such 
as when a defective fuel element is supplied, 2 also presents some diffi-
culties. These will be discussed later in the chapters on strict liability 
and manufacturer's liability respectively. Assuming application of neg-
ligence doctrines, the use of foreseeability or proximate cause to deter-
mine the extent of the duty owed by the operator will need to be 
analyzed. To evaluate the extent of the duty the lawyer must consider 
not only the foreseeability that particular persons or property will be 
damaged if there is a reactor accident but also the foreseeability that 
specific types of damage will ensue. The cases concerning off-site 
liability of a landowner when there are intervening agents, and those 
deaJing with remoteness in time and space as they relate to the duty 
concept will be helpful in ~nsweririg these questions. 
·Little guidance is given by the cases to assist the operator in deter-
mining. what specific procedures, if followed, will preclude a finding 
that there has been a breach of the duty to use due care. Suggestions 
can be made, however, as to some general cautions that should be ob-
served; e.g., an obligation to keep abreast of technological development, 
a duty to reduce the hazard by giving warning and possibly providing 
rescue or treatment services,3 a·nd a duty.to make use of new techniques 
2 N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1957, p. 37, col. I,. reported worker was accused of deliberate 
damage to' uranium slugs manufactured for the government which might have caused 
serious hahn. 
a For example the AEC has announced a new service to deal with emergencies. AEC 
Info. Rei. No. A-127, June 10, 1958, "Atomic Energy Commission To Acquaint State 
and Local Officials with Services Available in Event of Radiation Incident." 
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made available through radiation. The effect of compliance or non-
compliance with government safety standards is of considerable con-
cern to the nuclear industry in determining whether or not the standard 
of conduct required of the reasonably prudent man has been breached. 
Aiso important is the scope of the duty to use due care as it applies to 
other persons such as firemen and policemen who are on the premises 
in an official capacity but not pursuant to an invitation of the owner. 
Equally significant to the entrepreneur will be the question of whether 
or not he will be vicariously liable for the negligence of third persons 
both on and off the reactor premises. This includes both transportation 
and disposal of waste products. The cases dealing with these questions 
will be treated in considerable detail. 
Fuel Fabrication and Reprocessing Operations. The legal problems 
arising from fuel fabrication and reprocessing operations agai~ involve 
manufacturer's liability and strict liability cot:~cepts discussed later. 
The questions concerning the use of foreseeability to determine duty 
and those concerning the determination of the existence of a breach of 
the duty to use due care in reactor operations are equally applicable here. 
Potential liability arising out of transportation and disposal of radio-
active materials will also be of concern. 
Waste Disposal. Many factors must be taken into account in pro-
viding for the disposal of radioactive wastes, whether from reactor 
operati"ons or from industrial, medical, or research use of radioactive 
sources. Geological, perhaps meteorological, and even oceanographic 
calculations must be considered along with the physical characteristics 
of the waste material. Is it in a gaseous, solid, or liquid form? Is it 
soluble in water? Does it undergo chemical reaction with surrounding 
materials? Is it a long or short half-life isotope? What type of radia-
tion is involved? Is the radioactive material likely to concentrate if 
taken up by plants, or ingested by animals or human beings? Mistakes 
as to any of these calculations might cause serious injury to property 
or persons. The answer to these questions as they affect duty and breach 
problems will not require any different analysis than for reactor and 
fuel operations. 
Aside from strict liability, the most interesting and difficult question 
is : What should be the legal effect of hiring an independent contractor 
or the federal government to dispose of the waste material which later 
causes damage? In determining liability of the one creating the waste 
material, should a distinction be drawn between using the federal gov-
ernment and a private concern? Should licensing of the disposal con-
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tractor by the AEC immunize the producer of the waste material from 
liability for the former's negligence? What should be the effect on the 
liability of the producer of the material and of the private concern 
which carries out the disposal operation if the AEC rules are followed? 
If they are not followed? These questions need careful consideration. 
Transportation of Radioactive Materials. Again laying aside the 
question of absolute liability, normal tort rules surely will provide 
answers to many of the questions in transportation cases; e.g., should 
the standard of . conduct imposed on the transportation company be 
greater or less depending on the method of shipment (air, rail, truck, 
water), the route chosen (heavily populated areas, etc.), or the type of 
material (long or short half-life, high or low intensity of radiation, 
type of radiation such as alpha, beta, or gamma)? Also susceptible to 
standard treatment are such questions as: Will the doctrine of fore-
seeability (or proximate cause) protect the shipper or transportation 
company from remote consequences of a release of radioactive ma-
terials; to whom is the duty' to use due care owed-persons shipping 
other goods, the crews or passengers of the transportation company, the 
general public who congregate around an accident, the rescuers, both 
official and gratuitous, who come to the scene of an accident; and what 
must the carrier do by way of checking the character and crating of 
"hot" shipments to avoid a charge of negligence? 
Not so easily answered is the question of what steps the transporting 
company must take to give warning of the dangerous character of the 
material while en route. The significance of compliance with govern-
ment regulations will be of concern to the carrier, just as for the reactor 
operator and processor. The liability standard to be applied when 
carrying material somewhat more dangerous than many others is im-
portant also. These questions and the most nearly analogous cases are 
discussed extensively, since little has been written about them. 
Industrial, Medical, and Research Use of Radioisotopes. In most 
cases the tort liability problems arising from such uses as that of cobalt 
6o for radiography, strontium go for thickness gauges, and iodine 131 
for medical diagnosis or therapy either can be dealt with under normal 
tort principles or are similar to those suggested before in discussing 
reactor and processor operations or transportation and disposal activi-
ties. Most of the duty and breach questions fit into the former, while 
the effect of government safety regulations and the application of 
vicarious liability concepts to disposal operations come within the latter 
category. 
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The discharge of small quantities of waste material into the air, a 
sewer system, or a river will present some situations for which existing 
tort printiples do not provide very clear or &a tis factory answers. This 
is true of reactor and .reprocessing operations as well as those involving 
use of radioisoptopes. These problems will be treated rather fully in 
the discussion of multiple causation cases. 
B. The Application of Negligence Principles to Atomic Energy Cases 
With a few exceptions, such as the Price-Anderson Bill creating a 
governm~nt indemnity program and a few other examples . of state 
statutes discussed in- Part III in connection with state regulations, there 
have been"JIO legislative attempts to solve the tort liability problems in-
volved intatomic energy cases. In the absence of statutory provisions 
one must' turn to analysis of tort cases in other areas of analogous 
activity, keeping in mind ( 1) that too-strict application of tort liability 
may undu1y discourage use of these new materia.ls which promise great 
benefits and ( 2) that the hazards are considerable, almost unique, and 
of a kind that often give no warning. As mentioned before, this analysis 
typically involves a four-fold categorization of the problems, the first 
of which is duty, including foreseeability and proximate cause. 
1. Duty---:-Foreseeability and Proximate Cause 
A complete treatment of the duty question, of necessity, would in-
volve a long, detailed analysis of the relationship between duty concepts, 
foreseeability, and proximate cause, since today most agree that the 
latter two terms actually are merely different verbalizations of the same 
basic duty concepts. Undoubtedly, the discussion would start with an 
analysis of the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co.' In 
this case a' railroad employee was negligent in assisting a passenger to 
board the train, causing the passenger to drop a package to the platform. 
The package contained fireworks which, when the package fell, dis-
charged and shook the platform. This caused a large scale some dis-
tance away to drop on Mrs .. Palsgraf, who had purchased a ticket for 
another train. She sued the railroad, claiming that the negligence of 
the employee ,caused her injuries and that the railroad, therefore, was 
liable. The opinions of the majority and dissenting justices exemplify 
the differences that exist among courts and legal scholars today con-
cerning the scope -of duty and to whom it is owed in negligence cases. 
4 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. W (1928). 
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As one writer in the field concludes, "The present state of the law is, 
then, one of troubled waters, in :which anyone may fish." 5 Professors 
Harper and James in their recent treatise indicate that courts and 
writers have from time to time taken the position that if defendants 
should anticipate that certain conduct is fraught with unreasonable 
probability of some harm to somebody, then the duty to refrain from 
that conduct is owed to anyone who may in fact be harmed by it. 6 These 
writers then add, however, that the view currently prevailing in this 
country does limit the duty to do or to refrain from doing a given act 
to ( 1) those persons or interests that are likely to be endangered by 
the act or omission, and ( 2) harm (to such person or interest) from a 
risk the likelihood of which may be by act or omission negligent_7 
Because these treatises and the writings of other scholars in legal 
journals have discussed so exhaustively the relationship between duty, 
foreseeability, and proximate cause, nothing is to be gained by another 
treatment here. All seem to agree that, in determining whether de-
fendant owes a duty to protect persons somewhat removed (as to space, 
time, or other relationship) against injuries not ordinarily to be ex-
pected, the policy determination is the same, regardless of whether 
"duty," "foreseeability," or "proximate cause" terminology is used. It 
is made by balanc.ing the desirability of compensating injured parties 
on one hand against the deterrent effect such recoveries will have on 
normal human activity and especially on development in new areas. 
The question often boils down to whether the plaintiff should assume 
such risks and provide for compensation through his own life, health, 
property, or income insurance or the defendants should provide com-
pensation through a public liability policy. 
In discussing the legal problems of atomic energy it seems best to 
avoid the confusion involved in distinguishing between these three 
terms. Regardless of which term is used, courts typically do not insist 
that the defendant be legally liable for every single consequence caused 
in fact by his negligent act. This is true even when strict liability is 
applied, apparently because, as discussed later, certain Classes of persons 
and injuries may not be allowed compensation. In analyzing the legal 
problems created by a new area of activity which presents a danger of 
serious harm to any person, the first question is to what extent will 
liability be imposed for all of the harm resulting from this action. It 
5 Prosser, Torts 171 (West Pub. Co., 2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]. 
82 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 1018 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Harper 
& James]. 
T /d. at 1018, 1019-
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is toward the solution of this problem as it relates to atomic energy 
operations that attention will be directed here. Recognizing that the 
trend is toward a system of strict liability, and what Harper and James 
describe as a social insurance philosophy of tort liability, it seems per-
fectly clear that this question will still have to be answered : Just how 
far will the responsibility for negligent action be imposed on the 
wrongdoer when a reasonably prudent man would think that the person 
injured or the injury (as to kind or amount) was quite remote or 
indirect? 
The great mass of legal writing on this subject apparently can be 
reduced· to nine or ten printed pages, if we accept the work of the 
authors of the two leading treatises in the area. 8 While Harper and 
James point out differences between their interpretation and that given 
by Dean Prosser to the PaJsgraf type of case, one cannot help but be 
struck by the remarkable similarity of their conclusions. We see nothing 
in the atomic energy area which would call for a different analysis of 
the scope of duty from that reached in these two treatises. The repre-
sentative cases discussed in detail in each of these treatises indicate how 
far courts will go in extending the scope of duty owed by the person 
using radioactive materials. 
Perhaps it is attempting to reduce the irreducible, but it seems fair 
to say, at least for analyzing atomic energy problems, that there are just 
two basic questions : ( 1) is the wrongdoing defendant liable only for 
those kinds of injury which would be reasonably foreseeable; and ( 2) 
is the defendant liable only to those plaintiffs injured by his wrong-
doing whom he reasonably could have foreseen might be injured? The 
authors of both treatises conclude that there are differences among the 
courts on both of these questions. 
As to whether the defendant is liable for unexpected types of injuries 
to a plaintiff who reasonably might have been foreseen to be injured in 
some way, Prosser states that "most courts agree that there may be 
liability for unforeseen consequences, beyond the original risk, to those 
within the zone of apparent danger." 9 Harper and James feel that the 
matter is left in some doubt when one considers all of the decided cases, 
but in general they agree with the broad statement made by Prosser.10 
Among the many cases cited to support this broad proposition is 
Rasmussen v. Benson.11 There the court permitted recovery for all 
s Prosser 165-73; Harper & James 1018-27. 
9 Prosser 171. 
10 Harper & James 1021 ff. · 
11 135 Neb. 232, 28o N.W. B9o (1938). 
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damages claimed even though one item- was the sickness and death of 
the plaintiff resulting from worry over the loss of live stock caused by 
the poisoned feed carelessly furnished by the defendant. Another ex-
ample is the famous Polemis case,12 where the court found liability 
since it was foreseeable that the negligent dropping of a plank into the 
hold of a ship might do some damage to the ship even if it was not 
foreseeable that it would cause a spark which would then start a fire 
which would destroy the ship. There are limits, however, to how far we 
can carry this idea. Even Harper and James point out that while it is 
negligent to allow a child to have a loaded pistol, liability will not be 
imposed for all of the harm which follows. Liability may follow even 
though it is not possible to foresee the particular persons that may be 
injured, because it is possible to foresee that injuries may occur if the 
child discharges the pistol.18 On the other hand they point out that, 
·while it is foreseeable that the child may drop the gun on somebody's 
toe or throw it through a window, the gun would be no more dangerous 
in this respect than any other object of a similar size and weight. They 
concluded that, while we could anticipate injury to some person from 
discharge of a firearm and that this would be an unreasonable risk, we 
could not foresee any unreasonable risk from dropping or throwing 
the gun. It is therefore possible that only certain types of injuries, even 
to plaintiffs foreseeably within the zone of danger, will be covered by 
scope of duty concepts. 
The question of foreseeability becomes much more significant when 
considering the second question: to what injured parties must the 
plaintiff respond? While the dissenting judges in the Palsgraf case 
(and the decisions in a few other cases) seem to take the position that 
once the defendant has been guilty of a breach of duty toward some 
one person he thereafter is liable for all damages to all parties injured 
as a result of that negligence, generally it is agreed that foreseeability, 
sometimes phrased in terms of proximate cause, is the criterion by 
which the courts determine whether the injury to the particular plaintiff 
is compensable.14 It seems somewhat illogical to use foreseeat='ity to 
determine which plaintiffs can recover but not to limit the kind of injury 
for which a foreseeable plaintiff can recover.13 In any event it is clear 
u In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. s6o. 
1s Harper & James 1022. 
H Prosser 170, 171 suggests that the majority view in Palsgra£ may not be followed 
in most cases. Cf. Harper & James' explanation at 1024-26. 
15 Prosser 171, "There appears to be an essential inconsistency in holding that one 
who can foresee harm to A is liable for unforeseen consequences to A, and refusing to 
hold him for unforeseen harm to B." 
94 TORT LIABILITY 
that at least in many jurisdictions some limitation will be placed by the 
court upon the types of injuries and the plaintiffs who will be allowed 
to recover. This determination will be made on the basis of what 
reasonably could be foreseen. The lawyer dealing with atomic energy 
cases certainly must keep this limitation in mind, but he also must note 
the trend toward a greater willingness to hold wrongdoers liable for 
more and more of the consequences of their wrongdoing. A few of 
these frontier cases will indicate the scope of this trend. 
The Tennessee court in 1940 16 allowed the jury to decide the question 
of whether it was reasonably foreseeable that when a customer fell on 
a defective mat in defendant's store another customer would be hurt in 
the rush to come to the first customer's aid. Although the question was 
left to the jury, the test still was whether the result was foreseeable. 
Two Wisconsin cases show how variable this concept of foreseeability 
can be in determining the scope of duty. In 1933 .in E. L. Chester Co. v. · 
Wisconsin Power & Light Co.,11 the Wisconsin court submitted to the 
jury the question of whether the particular injury which resulted from 
defendant's negligence in allowing gas to escape from a broken valve 
in a gas main should have been·anticipated by the defendant. The gas 
from the broken main seeped through twenty feet of earth and exploded 
under plaintiff's store building, demolishing it. The court submitted the 
question to the jury although it recognized that in general all that 
needed to be anticipated was some injury to the plaintiff. Again in 1952 
in Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater/8 the Wisconsin court was 
faced with a case brought against the operator of the motion picture 
theater for injury suffered by a plaintiff customer who was struck in 
the eye by a spitball shot from an unknown source. The alleged neg-
ligence was failure to control a group of rowdy hoodlums in the 
theater. The court decided that the jury should be left free to determine 
whether or not allowing such rowdyism to continue was negligent be-
cause it might result in spitballs being projected with injury to persons 
such as the plaintiff. The supreme court then went ahead to say that if 
the jury found the negligence was a "substantial factor" it would then 
be a matter of law for the court to decide whether or not public policy 
required that there be liability. In doing so the court overruled the 
Chester case to the extent that it allowed the jury to limit liability if it 
finds the injury too remote to be reasonably foreseeable. 
16 Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W .2d 495 (1940). 
17 211 Wis. 158, 247 N.W. 861 (1933). 
18 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952). 
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An English case involving a major submarine disaster is a good 
example of the use of foreseeability to limit the scope, of duty of a 
negligent defendant. In Woods v. Duncan 19 the shipbuilder and its 
~ubcontractor were guilty of negligence in painting over some test holes 
in torpedo tubes which were designed to show whether or not they were 
filled with water. In actions brought by widows of civilians who were 
riding the submarine during the test dive the House of Lords held that 
the companies were not liable for the deaths that ensued because of the 
sinking of the submarine when it filled with water. There were ques-
tions of whether the submarine officers who were handling the controls 
were intervening agents, and if the doctrine of res ipsa loqititur could 
be used to prove causation, but th,e point upon which most of the Lords 
agreed was that it was not reasonably foreseeable that painting over a 
test hole in the torpedo tubes would result in the flooding of the sub-
marine to the point where it would sink. The majority felt that the 
causal relation between the negligence of the defendant and the deaths 
was too remote to hold them' liable for the disaster, although it was a 
contributing cause-in-fact. They felt that the extraordinary loss of life 
was outside the scope of reasonable foreseeability and therefore outside 
the scope of duty owed by the defendant. 
In Mize v. Rocky Mo1tntain Bell Telephone Co./0 however, the 
Montana court felt that the defendants should have anticipated that 
their high tension wire might come into contact with an uninsulated 
telephone wire which was otherwise harmless. The consequent electro-
cution occurred at a point many miles distant from the place at which 
the high tension wire touched a guy wire running from one of the 
telephone poles to the ground. 
Somewhat more closely analogous to the situation that may possibly 
arise in connection with atomic energy operations are the fire and 
stream pollution cases. In an early case the Missouri court held the 
defendant railroad liable on the ground that it should have reasonably 
anticipated the injury that resulted and that there was no independent 
intervening agency which would excuse the defendant. 21 In this case 
grass on the right of way of the railroad was negligently set on fire. 
The fire burned the grass for a distance of three miles and then ap-
parently died out. A hard wind revived the dying fire the next day, 
however, and it finally destroyed the plaintiff's house some five miles 
19 [1946] A.C. 401. 
20 38 Mont. 521, 100 Pac. 971 (1909). 
21 Poeppers v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry., 67 Mo. 715, 29 Am. Rep. 518 (1878). 
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away. The court held the defendant liable, noting that high winds were 
not infrequent in the area and should have been anticipated. 
In a much more recent case the New Hampshire court made an 
interesting distinction that may be applicable to atomic energy situa-
tions. In Beard v. Boston and Maine Railroad 22 the court drew a line 
between the plaintiffs whose homes abutted the railroad property and 
those that were located four to six miles distant from the point where 
the fire was started by the negligence of the railroad. The cause of 
action arose under a statute imposing strict liability, but on the question 
of what plaintiffs were to be protected the court seemed to be using 
the foreseeability test. The court said : 
... [The statute] was not intended to apply to all damages 
... regardless of the intervening factors of time, distance, 
manner of communication and other circumstances which may 
vary from fire to fire. 23 
Two cases involving stream pollution show the conflict in approach 
one finds among the various courts. In Haag v. Lake Shore & Michi-
gan Southern Railroad Co. 24 a train loaded with crude oil was involved 
in a wreck caused by the negligence of the engineer who failed to 
notice a landslide on the tracks. The cars burst and the oil caught fire 
and ran into a nearby creek. The plaintiff's house, located several 
hundred feet downstream was damaged. The court held that it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that the engineer should have anticipated 
the burning of the plaintiff's property as a consequence of his negligent 
failure to keep a sharp lookout. The court mentioned among other 
things that applying liability to the defendant in this case "would be 
a severe rule to apply, and might have made the defendants responsible 
for the destruction of property for miles down Oil Creek." 2~ The court 
felt that the flowing stream was an intervening independent agency, 
making the cause too remote and hence the imposition of liability un-
justified. Three years later a New Jersey court came to the opposite 
conclusion 26 on somewhat similar facts. In this case there was a neg-
ligently-caused train collision. One of the trains included twenty-five 
cars loaded with oil. The oiJ. tanks burst and the contents ignited when 
they came into contact with the fire of the locomotive; the oil ran into 
a small creek and thence into a larger river and from there to the 
22 99 N.H. 469, 115 A.2d 314 (1955). 
23 /d. at 471, 472. 
24 Bs Pa. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653 ( 1877). 
25 I d. at 299· 
26 Kuhn v. Jewett, 32 N.J. Eq. 647 (188o). 
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plaintiff's building on the bank of the river. Criticizing the H oag 
decision, the court used the following language : 
. . . [W]here a fire originates in the negligence of a de-
fendant, and is carried directly by a material force, whether it 
be the wind, the law of gravitation, combustible matter exist-
ing in a state of nature, or other means, to the plaintiff's 
property and destroys it, and it appears that no object inter-
vened between the point where the fire started and the injury, 
which would have prevented the injury, if due care had been 
taken, the defendant is legally answerable for the loss. 27 
The so-called rescuer cases have brought forth some of the most 
extreme extensions of the foreseeable risk test in determining duty. 
Certainly similar situations will arise in the atomic energy area. One 
of the classic cases is Hines v. M orrow. 28 There the defendant was 
negligent in allowing a mud hole to remain in the highway. The 
plaintiff rescuer broke his wooden leg in attempting to tow a stalled 
car out of the hole. The wooden leg became stuck in the mud and a 
loop in the tow rope caught on the leg causing it to break. The court 
said this was foreseeable. Again in Lynch v. Fisher 29 we find another 
extension of the foreseeability doctrine. The defendant left a truck on 
the highway at night without lighting flares. Another car crashed into 
the unlighted truck and caught fire. The plaintiff, in the role of rescuer 
of the occupants of the car, returned to the car for a floor mat on which 
to put one of the victims. The husband of the victim for whom the 
mat was· being procured was temporarily deranged by the accident and 
shot the plaintiff in the leg with a pistol. The court held the truck 
owner liable because it was foreseeable that a car might crash into it and 
that somebody might come to the rescue, even though the particular 
co~sequences resulting in injury to the plaintiff could not be foreseen. 
The court said this was immaterial. 
If this kind of injury is within the scope of duty owed by a negligent 
defendant, it is not difficult to conclude that a rescuer of victims in 
transportation accidents where radioactive material is being transported 
would be allowed to recover for any radiation injuries he received in 
attempting to rescue crew or passengers. The courts now seem to hold 
that rescuers at least are foreseeable plaintiffs in such situations.30 
An interesting duty concept somewhat related to the rescue cases is 
27 ld. at 651. 
28 236 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). 
29 34 S.2d 513 (Lud Cir. C.A. 1947). 
30 Prosser 173. 
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found in L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks1 81 where a boy's finger was caught 
in an escalator in the defendant store. The court held that the defend;mt 
was liable although there was no negligence in the construction of the 
escalator. The defendant was held liable because it was slow in coming 
to the assistance of the boy and stopping the machinery so that he could 
be released. The court said there was a duty to come to the assistance 
of a person who had been injured by an instrumentality under the de-
fendant's control. This case raises a question as to the extent of the 
duty resting ~n a person controlling a radiation source who in a non-
negligent, and therefore non-liable, manner exposes another to radia-
tion. Perhaps there is a duty not only to stop the exposure as soon as 
possible, but also to see that the victim is at least warned of the need 
for specialized medical care. This latter suggestion, of course, is an 
extension of the facts in the Hicks case, but even treatment may be 
required if it should prove necessary to give immediate and specialized 
care to minimize the radiation injury. 
The reasoning of the Arkansas court in a case decided ten years ago 82 
certainly would· seem to be applicable to situations that can be antici-
pated in the atomic industry. In this case the defendant, a chemiCal 
company, had sold a weedkilling spray to be used in dusting crops with 
an airplane. The spray traveled downwind a considerable distance and 
damaged the crop on the plaintiff's farm. As will be discussed later,88 
the main concern of the court was as to whether or not the defendant 
was negligent in not having conducted research to determine how far 
wind could carry its spray. The case,' however, also stands for the 
proposition that distance and the intervention of natural forces do not 
prevent the imposition upon a defendant of a duty of due care to a 
remote plaintiff. 
Harper and James emphasize the similarity of the inquiry when 
determining what action is so unreasonably dangerous as to constitute 
a lack of care and what is the scope of the duty owed. They then 
point out: 
Neither inquiry stops with what might be called the physical 
range of foreseeable harm, or with mere proximity in time or 
space. In both we look to see what natural forces and what 
human conduct should have appeared likely to come upon the 
scene, and we weigh the dangerous consequences likely to flow 
from the challenged conduct in the light of these interven-
81220 Ind. 86,40 N.E.2d 334 (1942). 
s2 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). 
8S See text infra at note 54· 
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tions. And in this inquiry foreseeability is not to be measured 
by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is 
likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably 
thoughtful man would take account of in guiding practical 
conduct. Just as this broadening of the quest adds to the risks 
which may make conduct unreasonably dangerous, just so 
does it add to the range of duty. Dynamite caps carelessly left 
accessible to children may be long hidden or taken many miles 
before there is an explosion. An automobile made defectively 
in Detroit may be sold in Seattle or Miami before it brings 
harm. The victim of the explosion or the defect is none-the-
less within the class to which the duty is owed. u 
For each example they cite two cases upholding their conclusions. 
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The application of this kind of reasoning to atomic energy cases 
seems very likely. This means that the peculiarities of atomic energy, 
which will cause long delayed injuries, at great distances from the neg-
ligent act and possibly occurring after many chemical transmutations, 
will not prevent imposition of a duty to use due care toward all those 
parties who reasonably could have been foreseen as likely to come in 
contact with the radioactive material. 
It is the conclusion of the present writers that in those cases where 
strict or absolute liability is not applied, atomic energy cases, insofar 
as the scope of duty is concerned,· will be decided in accordance with 
the normal rules, although the fact situations will call for application 
of those rules in somewhat different situations than have been known 
heretofore. It seems rather clear that the courts will not impose a duty 
on defendants as to all persons that may possibly be injured by radio-
active substances negligently released. Whether stated in terms of scope 
of duty, foreseeability, or proximate cause, some such limitation seems 
very likely. "It is even possible that a court, as a matter of social policy, 
will place such a limit on possible plaintiffs so as not to impede unduly 
the development of a new industry. It seems equally clear, however, 
that the range of plaintiffs to whom the· atomic energy entrepreneur 
will be liable is extremely broad, and that time, space, and transforma-
tion characteristics of radiation sources will not place any very serious 
limitations on the rights of injured persons to recover. 
2. Breach of the Duty to Use Due Care 
In establishing his right to recover from a particular defendant the 
plaintiff must show not only that the defendant owed a duty to protect 
u Harper & James 1019-20. 
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plaintiff against the type of injury sustained, but he also must show 
that the defendant's actions were negligent in the sense that they did 
not meet the standard of conduct legally required in such circumstances. 
Frequently in analyzing the breach question courts will use the word 
"duty." They may say there is a "duty to use due care," or there is an 
affirmative "duty to warn" or to take advantage of new techniques. In 
these cases, however, courts are using it to state that the reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances, either would not do certain things 
or would do others, and if defendant fails to meet this duty it consti-
tutes a breach of the required standard of conduct. It is not enough, of 
course, merely to state that there is such a duty; the standard of con-
duct must be defined and this is a fact to be found by the jury or the 
court if there is no jury. At the appellate level this means that the 
inquiry is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the 
finding below. 
a. General Principles Concerning the Standard of Conduct 
There have been many attempts to define what is meant by negli-
gence. One of the earliest definitions by a legal scholar states that it is 
"conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing dam-
age." 85 The Restatement calls it conduct "which falls below the stand-
ard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable 
risk of harm." 86 Harper and James summarize it as failure to do "what 
the reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances.'' 87 
Prosser, after quoting the above, along with many other statements by 
courts and legal scholars, emphasizes the need for taking particular 
circumstances into account when he says, "The conduct of the reason-
able man will vary with the situation with which he is confronted. The 
jury must therefore be instructed to take the circumstances into account; 
negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable man would do 'under 
the same or similar circumstances.' " 88 
Much has been written 89 about what the reasonable man is and what 
constitutes a standard of conduct sufficient to avoid the charge of neg-
ligence. Very little of the literature is of any value to the lawyer advis-
as Terry, "Negligence," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1915). 
s6 Restatement, Torts §282 (1934). 
37 Harper & James 9(>2. 
38 Prosser 125. 
sa Prosser uses so pages beginning at Prosser 124- Harper and James use 120 pages, 
beginning at Harper & James 8¢. See also dozens of law review articles on all phases 
cited in each treatise on various phases of the concept of the reasonable man. 
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ing clients in the atomic energy business. The questions of whether 
defendant or his agents are blind, insane, drunk, of tender years, or 
have normal intelligence, memory, and perceptive abilities are not 
likely to be involved in radiation cases. In any event it is difficult to 
believe that a jury pays much attention to these distinctions lawyers 
have concocted to describe that hypothetical person, the reasonably 
prudent man, that "ideal-normal" being (if there can be such a 
combination). •o 
( 1 ) Specific Standard Not to Be Found in the Cases 
It would be helpful to the atomic energy lawyer if one could distill 
from the cases some specific standard of conduct expected of persons 
using dangerous material, compliance with which would give immunity 
from tort liability. Such analysis would be of great help to the nuclear 
entrepreneur in establishing operating procedures. Unfortunately, after 
searching literally hundreds o! cases, the writers have found nothing of 
any real significance establishing what is the standard expected of the 
reasonably prudent man. Certain general cautions will be suggested 
which have significance in establishing safety procedures, but it is im-
possible to state what constitutes due care in general-it always must 
be related to the specific facts of each individual situation. The authors 
have come to the conclusion, although with disappointment, that the 
treatise writers are correct when they state that the proper rule, and the 
one that almost always is followed by the courts is that the standard of 
conduct legally required "depends upon the circumstances." Prosser 
states it as follows: "Although the language used by the courts some-
times seems to indicate that a special standard is being applied, it would 
appear that none of these cases should logically call for any departure 
from the usual formula. What is required is merely the conduct of 
the reasonable man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, and 
the greater danger, or the greater responsibility, is merely one of the 
circumstances, demanding a greater amount of care." u He then con-
to In Herbert, Misleading Cases in the Common Law (2d ed. 1927), cited in Prosser 
1 25, the author characterizes the reasonably prudent man as "this excellent but odious 
character [who] stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice vainly appealing to 
his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own example." 
41 Prosser 147-48. For cases using language about the high degree of care, see, e.g., 
Read v. Lyons & Co., [1946] 2 All E. R. 471 (munitions factory~ictum); Rakowski 
v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 5 N.J. Super. 203, 68 A.2d 641 (1949) (discussed infra 
note 175); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942); and Chase 
v. Washington Water Power Co., 62 Idaho 298, 111 P.2d 872 (1941), both dealing with 
electric utility power lines, discussed infra Chapter IV. See also language in Chapman 
Chemical Co. v. Taylor, supra note J2. 
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eludes that while some courts talk in terms of degrees of care, really 
all they are saying is that the circumstances require somewhat greater 
precautions on the part of the defendant, but that it is still the same 
standard; i.e., what the reasonably prudent man would do under the 
circumstances. Harper and James put the concept in somewhat differ-
ent terms, but essentially it amounts to the same thing. They conclude 
that it is impossible to state in general what will be considered negligent 
or not negligent. Instead they say there are three factors which must be 
weighed in each case in determining whether or not the standard of 
non-negligent conduct was met by the particular defendant in the par-
ticular circumstances. These three factors are: ( 1) the likelihood of 
harm; (2) the seriousness of the potential injury; and (3) the value of 
the interest to be sacrificed.42 They conclude that the amount of caution 
required tends to increase with the likelihood that the conduct will cause 
damage to others. They also conclude that the amount of care demanded 
will increase with the seriousness of the injury that will result if an 
· accident happens. 
The first two factors must ·be balanced, though, against the third, 
that is, what is sacrificed if we are to avoid the risk created by the 
danger. Their conclusions are consistent with those drawn by Prosser 
and are aptly summarized by them in a quotation from an old Nebraska 
opinion. The case involved injury to children from playing on a railroad 
turntable, and the court said : 
The business of life is better carried forward by the use of 
dangerous machinery; hence the public good demands its use, 
although occasionally such use results in the loss of life or 
limb. It does so because the danger is insignificant, when 
weighed against the benefits resulting from the use of such 
machinery, and for the same reason demands its reasonable, 
most effective and unrestricted use, up to the point where the 
benefits resulting from such use no longer outweigh the 
danger to be anticipated from it. At that point the public good 
demands restrictions. For example, a turntable is a dangerous 
contrivance, which facilitates railroading; the general benefits 
reiulting from its use ·outweigh the occasional injuries in-
flicted by it; hence the public good demands its use. We may 
conceive of means by which it might be rendered absolutely 
safe, but such means would so interfere with its beneficial use 
that the danger to be anticipated would not justify their adop-
tion; therefore the public good demands its use without them. 
But the danger incident to its use may be lessened by the use 
42 H~rper & James 930-36. 
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of a lock which would prevent children, attracted to it, from 
moving it; the interference with the proper use of the turn-
table occasioned by the use of such lock is so slight that it is 
outweighed by the danger to be anticipated from an omission 
to use it; therefore the public good, we think, demands the 
use of the lock.48 
103 
There are a few situations in which the courts have tried to work 
out, as a matter of law, certain standards of conduct which, if met, 
will immunize the defendant from a charge of negligence, or, if not 
met, will establish negligence. The cases in which anything like a set 
of standards has been worked out, however, involve situations-having 
no application to atomic energy operations. Usually they have involved 
railroad crossing situations, such as the rule to stop, look, and listen. 
Sometimes, in automobile or pedestrian cases the courts have laid down 
absolute rules defining negligent action. None of these has any applica-
tion to the complicated scientific and engineering activities which will 
be involved in the atomic energy business. Actually, most of the cases 
merely state what the defendant did or failed to do, and the jury, or 
the court, as the case may be, concluded that this either was or was not 
negligent. Since most of the cases speak in these general terms, all that 
can be concluded is that what was held to be negligent conduct in any 
specific case will be held to be negligent again only if exactly the same 
set of circumstances arise. This latter condition means there is no 
practical value whatsoever in using these cases to determine whether or 
not a person's actions in a new situation meet the legal standard. A 
plaintiff has to show only that the defendant's conduct in the particular 
circumstances was not up to the prescribed standard; he does not have 
to show what would have constituted proper conduct. Courts have been 
reluctant to do more than conclude in a particular case that the standard 
of due care was or was not met without any real discussion of why 
this was so, other than that the reasonably prudent man under the 
circumstances would or would not have done it this way. We agree 
with the treatise writers that each case turns on its own facts and that 
a given set of circumstances seldom if ever arises a second time. 
It is true that Mr. Justice Holmes apparently felt that detailed 
minimum or maximum standards of conduct could be worked out by 
the courts over a period of years as situations occurred and reoccurred.'' 
' 8 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 903, 91 N.W. 
88o (1!)02). 
u "A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of ex-
perience which enables him to present the common sense of the community in ordinary 
104 TORT LIABILITY 
Desirable as this would be from the standpoint of the potential de-
fendant, the conclusion of the treatise writers that this is not what the 
courts have done seems justified. While much of the discussion in the 
treatises deals primarily with the question of whether it is for the court 
or the jury to determine negligence, it seems quite clear that the same 
conclusion would be reached whether the judge or the jury makes the 
final decision. It is generally agreed, of course, that the jury in the 
usual case should make the decision.45 
We see nothing in the atomic energy area to cause the application 
of any different rules for the standard of care than the one described 
above. The character of radioactive material, both as to its potentiality 
for harm and as to the likelihood that harm will result from its use, 
does not seem to call for the application of any different rules concern-
ing the required standard of conduct. In some cases, where the material 
is very dangerous and well might travel long distances, last a long time, 
and expose many people, extraordinary precautions will have to be 
taken. Where the danger is very slight surely the courts will find that 
much less by way of precautionary steps will be required. Because we 
have knowledge of the unusual characteristics of radioactive materials, 
however, it behooves the person using them to think seriously about the 
degree of risk involved and what precautions can be taken without 
undue impediment to the effective utilization of their many beneficial 
characteristics. 
( 2) Some General Cautions to Observe 
Although it is impossible to establish affirmatively what will be con-
sidered reasonable, perhaps it will give perspective to the atomic energy 
lawyer if we consider what courts have stated about the degree of 
caution that must be used if one is to avoid a charge of negligence. 
Sometimes courts speak of the need to use a high standard of care, but 
they seem to be saying merely that under the circumstances, because the 
instances far better than an average jury. He should be able to lead and instruct them 
in detail, even where he thinks it desirable, on the whole, to take their opinion. Further-
more the sphere in which he is able to rule without taking their opinion at all should 
be continually growing." Holmes, The Common Law 124 (1881). 
· • 5 In Detroit & M.R.R. v. Van Steinberg, 17 Mich. 99, 120-21 (1868), Judge Cooley 
remarked, "The case, however, must be a very clear one which would justify the court 
taking upon itself this responsibility .... The difficulty in these cases of negligent in-
juries is, that it seldom happens that injuries are repeated under the same circum-
stances ; and, therefore, no common standard of conduct by prudent men becomes fixed 
or known." 
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substance or situation may be quite dangerous, a reasonable and prudent 
man would use greater precautions, not that there is a higher basic 
standard of due care. For our purposes there are three groups of cases 
indicating at least certain kinds of precautions which might be required 
of persons dealing with radiation hazards. 
(a) An Obligation to Keep Abreast of Techno-
logical Developments-Use of Experts 
The concept most likely to be troublesome in atomic energy negli-
gence actions is the requirement that users of dangerous material keep 
abreast of available safety techniques and methods of evaluating haz-
ards. This is a new and rapidly developing science about which there is 
a great deal to be learned, even as to the fundamentals. Especially for 
the users of high level radiation sources within the intermediate range 
of radioactive half-lives, it is important to keep up to date as to safety 
techniques. 
An application of the general idea that one must keep up with the 
times is found in the decision in The T. J. Hooper case.46 The loss 
of two coal barges in a storm was held to be the result of the defendant's 
negligence in 'not equipping his tug with a radio receiving set which 
would have enabled the master to keep in touch with the shore and learn 
of the approach of the storm in time to have taken shelter. Judge L. 
Hand concluded that radio was a well known device in 1 9~8 and could 
have been installed quite cheaply. He reached this conclusion notwith-
standing the fact that of all the tug lines, only one used radio receivers 
on its boats. 
The degree of foresight that may be required in the name of what is 
reasonably foreseeable and what is a reasonable device for the preven-
tion of accidents is illustrated by Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., a Vlisconsin case decided in 1932.47 In this case 
the construction company (which is now in the business of constructing 
atomic reactors) was held liable for the injuries resulting from the 
explosion of a boiler tube. The tube had exploded under the pressure of 
eighty pounds of steam although it was designed to withstand one 
hundred-fifty pounds. Plaintiff's evidence consisted chiefly of the testi-
mony of a university professor of metallurgy. He had prepared sam-
ples of the tube for a microscopic examination to discover the texture 
46 6o F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1932). 
41 Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 204 N.W. 
392 (1932). 
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and structure of the steel and thus to ascertain its soundness. He 
testified that his examination of the steel indicated that there were 
impurities which well may have caused the rupture. The defendant in 
the case selected the highest quality steel available in the industry, 
made the usual hydrostatic test at a pressure of a thousand pounds to 
determine soundness, and found no leaks. The plaintiff's witness stated 
that he thought a microscopic examination was required if one was to 
be sure that the steel was sound. He admitted, however, that he knew 
of no single manufacturer or seller of tubes who made such an examina-
tion during the course of the manufacturing operations. In deciding 
whether this evidence justified submission of the question of due care 
to the jury the court stated: 
Is this evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find that the 
failure to i.nstitute the metallographic examination by de-
fendants constitutes negligence? We have concluded that it is 
sufficient. lt represents the judgment of recognized experts in 
the field as to the requirements of the art in which they are 
experts, and it is our conclusion that the jury might accept 
the opinions as establishing the reasonableness of instituting 
this test and the necessity for its institution in order to dis-
charge a duty of due care. The fact that it was not the prac-
tice of tube manufacturers generally to use these tests, and 
that such an examination is not incorporated in the specifica-
tions of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, or 
required or provided for in the Wisconsin Boiler Code, is 
certainly strong evidence against the position taken by the 
Professors McCaffery and McKay, but it does not dispose of 
their evidence as a matter of law .... Obviously, manu-
facturers cannot, by concurring in a careless or dangerous 
method of manufacture, establish their own standard of care.48 
In Trowbridge v. Abrasive Company of Philadelphia,49 plaintiff sued 
for damages caused by disintegration of an abrasive wheel. Here again 
the defendant followed the practice of the industry and tested only the 
centrifugal stress of its products. No test was made of the stress of 
vibration and impact or shock on grinding wheels and the possibility of 
disintegration from these forces. Again a university professor testified 
that adequate equipment for testing these stresses could and should 
have been designed for the abrasive industry since there was sufficient 
basic knowledge in other industries to make such tests feasible. A 
verdict of.$ISO,ooo was upheld. 
• 8 I d. at 218-19. 
49 190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. I9Sl). 
NEGLIGENCE 107 
These cases are very important for our purposes, not only because 
they indicate the necessity of making use of the best possible safety 
devices so long as they are economically feasible but also because the 
cases involved the use of expert witnesses to establish what is a reason-
able course of conduct under the circumstances. It is clear that the same 
kind of expert witness will be needed in most radiation cases. 
It should be remembered in considering this problem that it is not 
enough that the defendant use his own best judgment or that he believes 
he has acted with reasonable care. Beliefs or desires to act reasonably 
are never a defense.60 It is also true that in general one must comply 
with the customary practices of a particular industry or area of activity 
to avoid a charge of negligence, and that compliance with those cus-
tomary standards in many cases will justify a finding that the de-
fendant acted with due care.61 The cases discussed above make it 
perfectly clear, however, that compliance ·with the customs of the 
industry will not necessarily be sufficient, 62 but is merely evidence 
bearing on the question of 'what circumstances require by way of 
reasonable conduct. The cases also clearly demonstrate that, in dealing 
with material which calls for extra precautions and special knowledge, 
one must take advantage of advice that can be obtained from recognized 
experts in the field and that the standard of care usually will be the 
standard suggested by the experts. Certainly the cases described above 
follow this principle. 
One other case warrants discussion at this point, not only because it 
indicates the kind of imagination that may be required of a defendant 
but also because it illustrates the questions that may arise when expert 
witnesses are used. The defendant in Air Reduction Co. v. Philadelphia 
Storage Battery Co. 63 furnished tanks of oxygen under pressure to the 
plaintiff and provided a manifold to control the release of the gas. Fire 
broke out while the oxygen was being delivered through the manifold 
and the plaintiff's factory was destroyed. The experts produced by the 
plaintiff testified that a steel surface, especially if it was bored, when 
exposed to oxygen under pressure created a likelihood of fire. They 
also testified that the use of brass, copper, or cast pipe of any material 
would reduce the danger. In spite of the fact that the defendant's 
experts gave testimony leading to the opposite conclusion, the court 
50 The Gennanic, 196 U.S. 589, 25 S.Ct. 317 (1905); Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N.Y. 
II3 (1870); Prosser 124; Harper & James 874, 898. 
51 See cases cited at Harper & James 978, n. 5· 
52 Harper & James 977 ff.; Prosser 135 ff. 
63 14 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1926). 
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upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. This case again indicates the 
degree of foresight and the kinds of precaution for which the defendant 
may be held responsible. It seems to. be exactly the kind of situation 
that may arise in the atomic industry where much is still to be learned 
about the science. 
This case, of course, deals with a manufacturer's product liability, 
and the negligence questions arising in such cases are discussed more 
fully in Chapter V. These cases do furnish some general principles, 
however, which undoubtedly will control cases that do not involve 
product liability. Many of them do illustrate the degree to which the 
courts may hold a defendant responsible for following out a line of 
research directed toward minimizing the risks inherent in the use of 
materials which can cause serious injury. The Chapman Chemical Com-
pany case 64 (involving the spread of weedkiller dust for several miles 
so as to destroy the plaintiff's crops) and the Pittsburgh-Des Moines 
Company case ~5 - (concerning the failure of a new design of tank to 
hold liquefied gas) illustrate the proposition that, when dealing with a 
material known to have a great potential for harm, one is under an 
obligation to use extreme caution and explore all feasible means of 
reducing the risk of injury. 
All these cases demonstrate that it is not enough to have acted in 
good faith or to have depended upon the opinion of just any expert. 
They also make it clear that when experts differ as to what is a reason-
able standard of conduct the defendant probably will have to run the 
risk of submission of this issue to the jury. In some cases at least it 
will be necessary to go beyond the present custom of the industry in 
taking precautions. There is no reason to think these principles, de-
veloped chiefly in manufacturer's liability cases, will not be applied to 
negligence cases generally. It is recognized that radioactive materials 
are dangerous. The publicity that attended the dropping of the original 
A-bombs in Japan and the many testings of A- and H-bombs since then 
have made the general public aware of the dangerous potential of radio-
active materials. No one can plead ignorance of its dangerous qualities. 
Since the potential for harm is relatively great, the courts very likely 
will find, perhaps as a matter of law, that the handling of even small 
quantities of these materials without the advice of experts is negligence. 
Certainly a jury would be permitted to so conclude. In fact, this would 
54 St~pra note 32. 
55 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 166 F.2d go8 (3d Cir. 1948); Foley v. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. I, 68 A.2d 517 (1949). 
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seem to be justified by the policy decisions which Congress made in 
enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954-that this material is poten-
tially very dangerous and should be handled with due regard for the 
public health and safety. 
(b) Duty to Reduce Hazard After Accident-Ob-
ligation to Warn and Treat 
The above cases, and others noted in the product liability chapter, 
deal with what one might call a duty to discover dangers and to evolve 
precautionary techniques when using new and hazardous substances. 
The law of negligence ordinarily does not impose an affirmative, re-
sponsibility upon a person to use all reasonable efforts to save others 
from injury or to reduce injury which the person himself did not assist 
in creating. The escalator case 56 dealt with a situation where at least 
the defendant was responsible for the creation of the machine which 
did the injury and which the defendant had invited the public to use. 
This kind of case may indicate that the operator of an atomic reactor, 
even if he should not be held strictly liable, may be held to a standard 
of conduct which will minimize the losses occuring in the event of a 
non-negligent discharge of radioactive material endangering persons or 
property. While a categorical answer cannot be given, it would not 
seem unreasonable for a court to conclude that such entrepreneurs, 
should the accident happen and endanger many lives, must take proper 
precautions to reduce the resultant injury even though they are not held 
legally responsible for the accident itself. This may dictate that the 
reactor operator prepare plans to give warning of the danger should it 
arise, to cooperate in the evacuation of personnel if this seems wise 
under the circumstances, and to direct the decontamination procedures 
that may be required should a serious reactor burn-up occur. While the 
danger may be somewhat less in other activities involving the discharge 
of radioactive material into streams or into the air from other opera-
tions, the same basic principle would seem to apply. The user of radio-
active materials may be required not only to give warning of the dis-
charge and consequent danger but also to participate in the steps needed 
to minimize the resultant injuries. In the event of a serious reactor 
incident, it might be best not to warn people of the potential danger 
since such warning could cause panic. Certainly attempting the evacua-
tion of a large city within the space of a few hours before a radioactive 
~6 Supra note JI, where the defendant was held liable for not acting fast enough in 
aiding a boy caught in the escalator. 
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cloud covers the city might cost more lives than keeping people within 
their houses. This is nQt the kind of decision that should be niade by 
I 
default, however, on the theory that if one refuses to recognize a danger 
it may go away. It should be a decision deliberately reached, in con-
sultation with public officials who would, of course, have to participate 
in any such evacuation plan. Even persons who use radioactive ma-
terials in industrial or research operations where the potential for harm 
is much less should consciously make the same kind of decisions and 
work out disaster or accident plans with appropriate public officials, 
such as,. city water departments or highway police. 
(c) Duty to Use New Radiation Techniques 
Radioactive material not only has a great potential for harm but also 
an even greater potential for good by way of ·assistance in research 
efforts. This fact itself creates an interesting problem which might be 
described as the other side of the coin. As mentioned above, although 
the law ordinarily does not require affirmative action by one not re-
sponsible for the creation of a dangerous situation, there are certain 
situations in which it recognizes that the relationship between the par-
ties dictates that one of them take reasonable steps to prevent, minimize, 
or eradicate a dangerous situation. The most obvious example of this 
is the duty of the doctor to take reasonable steps to cure his patient. 
Even though he is not responsible for the patient's becoming ill, he is 
under an obligation to take such reasonable steps as. other doctors 
would take under the circumstances. Most of the malpractice cases have 
involved an affirmative action of the doctor which increased the injury. 
There seems to be no reason, however, why a doctor should not be held 
negligent if he fails to make proper use of new diagnostic or research 
techniques which radioactive isotopes make available to him. One can-
not foresee at the present time just what uses of radioisotopes will be-
come common practice in the medical profession, but it is not difficult 
to predict that many uses will become generally accepted. The use of 
radioactive iodine 131 to detect the malfunctioning of the thyroid in a 
new infant while still in the mother's womb (thereby preventing cretin-
ism) may be one example that someday will fit in this new category. 
The location of brain tumors and the treatment of hyperthyroidism by 
the use of such materials certainly is becoming more common, even 
though as yet it is not· so well established in .the medical community 
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that it would be considered a lack of professional skill to fail to use it.G7 
The situation here contemplated is more like the case where a patient 
goes to a doctor under the assumption that he needs treatment, and the 
doctor makes a faulty diagnosis. Kuhn v. Banker 58 comes close to 
illustrating this affirmative duty. There the doctor properly set part of 
a broken femur bone in the patient and a union apparently formed. The 
doctor was held guilty of negligence, however, for failing to use an 
X-ray photograph to determine the reason for the patient's complaint 
at a later time that there was a grinding sensation in her hip where the 
broken bone was located. The court clearly suggested that the attending 
physician was negligent in failing to use an X-ray photograph in these 
circumstances. The court held, however, that since no evidence was 
offered to show that the ultimate failure of the break to heal was caused 
by the failure to diagnose the case correctly there was no proof of 
proximate cause; therefore the directed verdict for the defendant was 
upheld. There are a number of other cases in which the court held in 
one way or another that failure to use X-rays as a diagnostic technique 
would constitute negligence under the proper circumstances.69 
Even though the defendant is in no way responsible for the plaintiff's 
dangerous position, these cases perhaps support the proposition that, 
because of the status relationship (in this case that of doctor-patient), 
the defendant is obliged to take account of new devices, information, or 
techniques which will make those services more adequate for the needs 
of the plaintiff. This responsibility might arise in connection with the 
designs, architectural plans, or scientific advice 60 used in a building, 
machine, or material going into the construction or operation of a 
reactor. Notwithstanding the fact that the malpractice cases indicate a 
very broad range of permissible judgment in which the professional 
person will not be held liable for a wrong judgment, it is possible that 
the courts may hold that the service must be rendered with imagination 
and with some ability to foresee the usefulness of new techniques. 
57 See T. J. Hooper case, supra note 46 (tug company liable for loss of barges in 
storm for failure to install radios) ; Marsh Wood Products Co. case, supra note 47 
(storage tank manufacturer liable for failure to use metallographic surveys of boiler 
tube steel) ; and a case reported in the N.Y. Times, June IS, I9SS, p. 63, cols. I, 2, in 
which a California couple initiated suit against Cutter Laboratories and a local retail 
distributor as a result of their four-year-old son's contracting polio after vaccination. 
Gs I33 Ohio St. 304, I3 N.E.2d 242 (I938). 
G9 115 A.L.R. 298 ff. (I938). 
so Prosser I32-33 cites dentists, attorneys, engineers, accountants, druggists, X-ray 
operators, oil well shooters, threshers, and restaurant operators as other skilled trades 
where one must use a certain minimum of skill and knowledge. 
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Radiation as a source of energy or as a research tool surely will present 
many such possibiliti~s. 
In discussing the standard of conduct required, Prosser makes one 
statement which might be interpreted as indicating the existence of an 
affirmative duty not unlike the kind suggested here. 
In many situations, a failure to disclose the existence of a 
known danger may be the equivalent of misrepresentation, 
where it is to be expected that another will rely upon the ap-
pearance of safety. The surgeon who remains silent when he 
discovers he has left his tools in the patient's anatomy, the 
landlord who leases defective premises, the landowner who 
permits a licensee to enter without warning of hidden perils, 
the seller or supplier of a chattel who fails to disclose its dan-
gerous nature or its concealed defects, each may be liable to 
the person with whom he deals, or to others to whom harm is 
to be expected through that person's reliance.61 
Again, in discussing the duty concept Prosser points out from other 
cases that when a person voluntarily assumes a certain relationship to 
others, there may be the duty of affirmative conduct. After stating that 
in mos-t 'of these cases the person held liable had made the situation 
worse than it was before, Prosser says: 
In four cases involving gratuitous repairs by landlords, any 
such requirement has been rejected, and the defendant has 
been held to the obligation of reasonable care in his undertak-
ing, although the ·plaintiff'has not been further endangered, 
misled or deprived of other help.62 
Although these statements, and the ca.Ses cited iri support of them, 
do not go quite as far as is suggested in our analysis above, recently 
they have been interpreted by the 4th Circuit C9urt of Appeals in a 
very broad manner. The decision comes rather close to the· kind of 
affirmative duty we are suggesting. In· Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 
v. Stapleton,68 the court held the defendant corporation liable for failing 
to inform the plaintiff employee that a routine medical examination 
had indicated an inactive tuberculosis spot on his lung. After stating 
that there was no evidence that the tuberculosis which the employee had 
throughout the period of his employment was caused in any way by the 
fault of the company or the company doctors (there was no assertion of 
malpractice nor of negligent failure of the company to carefully select 
61 Prosser 146, 
62 ld. at 187. 
63 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956). 
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a qualified physician), the court held the company liable for not hav-
ing notified the employee of these periodic. findings of an inactive 
tuberculosis spot. Finding that the disclosure could have been made 
mo_st conveniently by personnel other than the doctors who made the 
examination and that the information was of a sort which they cer-
tainly could have given to the employee, the court said : 
Failure of the appellant to disclose to Stapleton what its 
records showed his condition to be was clearly a violation of 
its duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety. By remaining 
silent, the appellant permitted Stapleton to rely upon a tacit 
assurance of safety despite its k!J.owledge of the existence of 
danger ... , . To warn Stapleton of a known but hidden de-
fect on its property would have been appellant's clear duty . 
. . . Its duty to warn him of the known but hidden danger 
here was no less clear. 64 
Admitting the validity of the company's argument that it was under no 
obligation to make a physical examination and that it should not be 
penalized for voluntarily undertaking more than its legal duty, the 
court nevertheless said : 
But, when it undertook to do so, Stapleton was entitled to and 
did rely on the expectation that he would be told of any 
dangerous condition actually disclosed by that examination. 
The appellant was therefore liable for injury to Stapleton 
caused by its negligent omission to advise him of his tubercu-
lar cbndition. 65 
The court relied upon the statements from Prosser quoted above, but 
this does not seem completely justified. The case, however, indicates a 
situation in which a status condition quite unrelated to any obligation 
to give aid to or protect the plaintiff in the way contemplated neverthe-
less may impose a duty upon the defendant to take some kind of affirma-
tive steps to give any knowledge he has of potential dangers. The 
court's emphasis upon the reliance of the plaintiff that a dangerous con-
dition would be reported to him suggests the possibility that an unex-
pected affirmative duty may result from status conditions that at first 
glance would not seem to require any action by the potential defendant. 
This reasoning might be applied to all who use radioactive material 
which exposes another even though such users were not legally liable 
for the exposure itself. 
64 /d. at 232. 
65 /d. at 232-33. 
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b. Effect of Statutory or Administrative Rulings 
The liability of a person handling radiation sources cannot be de-
termined fully without a consideration of the impact of statutory and 
administrative health and safety regulations. The number and scope of 
such statutes and regulations, both federal 66 and state,67 is considerable. 
These rules and regulations will have considerable effect on the decision 
as to whether or not the defendant has been negligent. 
All of the writers on the subject seem to agree that this problem 
breaks down into two kinds of cases: ( 1) those in which the statutes 
specifically provide civil liability for a breach of the statutory standards 
or the administrative regulations issued thereunder; and ( 2) those in 
which the statute provides only a criminal penalty or simply prohibits 
action with an injunctive type of enforcement that in no way deals spe-
cifically with the problem of tort liability of the violator.68 For our 
purposes there is no need to discuss the first· category because the 
federal statute dealing with health and safety matters in atomic energy 
contains no provisions on possible civil liability from a failure to comply 
with one of the health and safety regulations of the AEC. There is one 
catch-all penalty provision, however, making it a crime to violate any 
of the regulations of the AEC.69 This certainly would include safety 
regulations. All other criminal penalty provisions very clearly are di-
rected at violations involving danger to national security.70 In this re-
spect the federal statute is like the Federal Food and Drug Act, 71 not the 
Federal Safety Appliance Act.72 A reading of the entire legislative 
history of the Atomic Energy Act of. 1954 has produced not a single 
88 Infra Part IV. 
87 Infra Part III. 
8 8 Restatement, Torts §§285-86. See generally Morris, "The Relation of Criminal 
Statutes to Tort Liability," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1933); Morris, "The Role of Crimi-
nal Statutes in Negligence Actions," 49 Col. L. Rev. 21 (1949); James, "Statutory 
Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases," II La. L. Rev. 95 (1951); Notes, 32 
Col. L. Rev. 712 (1932); 19 Minn. L. Rev. 666 (1935); 13 Com. L. Q. 634 (1928); 
27 Va. L. Rev. 240 (1940); 15 Brooklyn L. Rev. 246 (1950). See also Lowndes, 
"Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361, 367 (1932). 
89 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, Chap. 18, §223, 68 Stat. 191, 958. 
10 I d. at §§221, 222, 224-31. 
71 See Kaplan, "Variations on a Single Theme-The Impact of the Pure Food 
Statutes on Civil Liability," 13 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. II (1958). 
7 2 Harper & James 994, n. 1, citing statutes and cases. There is not even an indirect 
indication of a legislative attempt to provide a standard of conduct for civil damage 
cases such as that in the legislative history of the Federal Safety Appliance Act and 
the provision that any employee injured as a result of a violation of the safety require-
ments of the act should "not -be deemed to assume the risk thereby occasioned." 
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reference to the question of the effect of federal health and safety regu-
lations on civilliability.78 Nor is there anything in the legislative history 
or the provisions of the Price-Anderson government indemnity amend-
ment which gives any hint whatsoever of a congressional intent on this 
question.74 We are presented, therefore, with the second situation : 
What will be the effect of federal health and safety regulations on civil 
damage suits arising in the atomic energy areas subject to federal regu-
lation? The same general rules apply to a violation of a state statute 
(and regulations issued pursuant thereto) if violation is made criminal 
or subject to administrative enforcement, but nothing is. said about civil 
liability. 
In a sense all of the federal health and safety standards are adminis-
trative in character as are many of the standards set up under state 
statutes, so it is important to. note the distinction that some courts draw 
between statutory and administrative standards. Some give greater 
weight to statutory standards, yet all writers on the subject seem to 
agree that the important issue. in both cases is whether to apply a rule 
of "negligence per se" or one of ortly "evidence of negligenct;." 7 ~ This 
same distinction is observed when considering cases in different states 
when both are dealing with only statutory standards. The real issue in 
most cases is whether violation of a standard, whether statutory or 
administrative, is "negligence per se" or only "evidence of negli-
gence." 76 For our purposes, therefore, hereafter the distinction between 
statutory and administrative standards is ignored exc,ept where it is 
mentioned specifically. 
One further major point should be kept in mind when considering 
this problem. Although most of the cases have dealt with the question 
of whether failure to comply with a statutory standard imposes absolute 
liability, is negligence per se, or is only evidence of negligence, there is 
another group of cases, in· which the defendant pleaded complhmce with 
· the statute or administrative standard as proof, either conclusive ·or 
presumptive, that he has met the requirement of acting as a reasonably 
prudent man under the circumstances. As pointed out later, this possi-
bility has considerable significance for the person handling radioactive 
materials.· 
TS Probably the equivalent of 5,000 pages in an ordinary book when hearings are in-
cluded. There are some references to health and safety matters but nothing referring 
to this question. 
n Insurance amendments discussed infra at end of Part III. 
11 Morris articles, mpra note 68; Harper & James 987-1014. 
76 Harper & James IOII, n. 57, and Morris, "The Role of Administrative Safety 
Measures In Negligence Actions," 28 Tex. L. Rev. 143, 145 (1949). 
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(I) Failure to Comply 
Except in a few odd or anomalous cases which all writers criticize, 
mere proof that the defendant (or the plaintiff where contributory 
negligence is pleaded as a defense) has failed to comply with some 
regulatory or administrative rule of conduct and that the plaintiff has 
suffered injury is not sufficient to establish a breach of the standard of 
conduct which constitutes negligence. 77 There must, of course, be a 
cause-in-fact relationship between the defendant's action and the plain-
tiWs injury. This is true in every negligence case regardless of whether 
or not there has been breach of a statutory requirement. Almost all 
courts agree that no weight should be given to the fact that the de-
fendant breached a statutory standard if the standard was not estab-
lished to protect the particular class of persons that includes the plaintiff, 
or if the standard was not created to guard against the particular injury 
suffered by the plaintiff. The leading case in this area is Goriss v. 
Scott 78 where the court refused to hold that the defendant's violation 
of the statute requiring carriers by water to provide separate pens for 
stock was any evidence of negligence in caring for the sheep which 
were washed overboard in a storm. It was clear that the act was 
directed at keeping sheep or cattle from being exposed to disease on 
their way into the country.· 
In many American cases this doctrine has been applied in situations 
arising under various types of regulations. Examples are, statutes con-
trolling the length of time that trains may obstruct crossings, regula-
tions determining where motor vehicles may stop or park when the 
regulations are directed at traffic problems such as delay and congestion 
but are not intended to prevent collisions, provisions requiring licenses 
for automobile drivers or physicians where the driver or physician 
actually was competent and met the normal standards of conduct even 
though he had no license, or Sunday laws which are meant either to 
observe a religious day or provide a day of rest but not to prevent 
vehicles which may be involved in accidents from going on the highway, 
or to prevent business men . from fraudulently misrepresenting goods 
that they sell. 79 While the policies underlying statutes setting up such 
standards of conduct occasionally are very narrowly construed, in gen-
77 The odd cases are cited by Harper & James g6, nn. 6, 7, 8. 
78 [1874] L.R. 9 Ex. 125. 
79 Prosser 157-58; Harper & James 1002-1004- For a recent case, see Permenter v. 
Milner Chevrolet Co., 91 S.2d 243 (Miss. 1956) (defendant left keys in car and thief 
ran into plaintiff some distance away). 
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eral the courts give them rather broad construction so long as the hazard 
actually created comes within the general scope of the harm legislated 
against and there is a cause-in-fact relationship between the defendant's 
breach of the standard and the plaintiff's injuries. A recent English 
case 80 illustrates this liberal interpretation trend. The statute required 
that roofs in mines should be made secure. Apparently it was directed 
at preventing injuries from falling roofs. In this particular case the 
cause of the injury was somewhat different. Before the plaintiff came 
to the place of injury the roof had fallen, and the pile of debris caused 
the cart in which he was riding to be derailed. The House of Lords 
overruled the Scottish court's decision which held that this was a dif-
ferent kind of harm from that intended to be covered by the statute. 
The House of Lords thought that the statute was directed toward 
preventing personal injury generally; therefore, since the failure to 
shore-up the mine roof properly was the cause of the plaintiff's injury, 
the defendant lost his argument to the effect that the obstruction on the 
road was too remote from the negligent ·breach of the statutory stand-
ard. There are many American cases which would accord with this kind 
of broad construction of the statutory purpose in setting up a standard 
of conduct. 
The other generally recognized requirement in treating violation of a 
statutory standard as negligence is that the person injured must fall 
within the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute. A good 
example is a statute which makes illegal normal business activity on 
Sunday. If a train running on Sunday kills a cow on the tracks, the 
mere fact that the statutory prohibition against running trains was 
breached is not sufficient to allow the owner to recover damages from 
the railroad. An even more graphic example of this proposition, per-
haps, is the statute which requires that trains blow whistles when ap-
proaching crossings. Even if the whistle is not blown and a cow is 
killed, it seems rather clear that the statute was not intended to warn 
cows. Another example is the blackout statute enacted for the protec-
tion of the public at large and not for an air-raid warden attempting to 
put out a light showing in violation of the statute.81 This statutory 
purpose limitation is also applicable to the issue of contributory negli-
gence, at least in most courts today.82 
There is another kind of case in which violation of a statutory stand-
so Grant v. National Coal Board, [1956] 1 All E.R. 682. 
81 Cases are collected in Prosser 154. Harper & James 1004. 
s2 Harper it James 1004. 
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ard will not be taken as evidence or proof of the defendant's negligence 
toward the plaintiff. While there is some difference of opinion among 
writers as to the exact theory for this exception, 83 there is general 
agreement that the courts will excuse certain violations of statutory 
st~ndards. Some of the cases involve situations where the defendant 
was not at fault and yet violated the statute, such as, in driving on the 
highway at night without tail lights which had gone out under circum-
stances beyond the driver's control, or driving on the lefthand side of 
the street where is was impossible to meet the statutory standard of 
driving on the right because of temporary obstruction, or when an 
emergency arises not within the control of the defendant and the only 
reasonable course of action is to do something in violation of the 
statute, or taking some precautionary measure that is even better than 
that required by the statute even though the statute itself is not com-
plied with. 
A very interesting excused-violation argument was made in Ursprung 
v. Winter Garden Co.84 The regulation of the superintendent of build-
ings, requiring a guard around an elevator shaft, had not been published 
since there was no legal requirement for publication. The court excused 
the defendant on the ground that there was no proof that he knew of 
the existence of the code. One writer suggests that there are real possi-
bilities for more frequent use of this kind of defense. 83 
One of the distinctions most often discussed is whether violation of 
the statutory or administrative standard is negligence per se or only 
evidence of negligence. Writers seem to agree 86 that the weight of 
authority still is in favor of negligence per se. There is a very respect-
able minority, however, which holds that it is only evidence of negli-
gence, and there is some indication that the trend of authority is in this 
direction.87 The reasons for and against each rule are presented very well 
by Harper and James.88 For the most part, writers who have given 
serious consideration to the problem agree that the rule should be one 
of evidence of negligence only. When one takes into consideration the 
number of exceptions that must be worked out by the courts when they 
supposedly follow a negligence per se rule, the evidence of negligence 
sa Prosser 158; Harper & James 1004 et seq. 
84 183 App. Div. 718, 169 N.Y.S. 738 (1918), discussed in Morris, supra note 76 at 151. 
8 5 Morris, supra note 76 at 146-47. 
8 6 Early writers thought this; see Prosser 161; Harper & James 997; Morris, supra 
note 76 at 146-47. 
87 Harper & James 1013. But see contrary suggestion by Kaplan, supra note 71 at 47. 
88 Harper & James 997-1001. 
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only seems the preferable one. Undoubtedly one of the reasons why 
some writers take this position is because the negligence per se rule 
often defeats the plaintiff when he is accused of contributory negligence 
on the ground that he violated some statutory standard. It is true that 
the negligence per se rule often imposes liability on the defendant or 
prevents the plaintiff from recovering in a situation where the viol~tion 
is without fault or negligence in any realistic sense. 
As mentioned before, the fact that the standards may be administra-
tive rather than statutory does not change the result except in some 
jurisdictions. As Morris indicates in his excellent article,89 there are 
several jurisdictions in which it is held that violation of administrative 
regulations is negligence per se. He points out that actually the dif-
ference between the rule of negligence per se and the rule of evidence 
of negligence only probably is of little significance in most cases. As 
long as violation can be considered evidence of negligence it is ad-
missible, and this is as far as the plaintiff's lawyer usually needs to go 
because it allows him to submit the case to the jury. It is quite unlikely 
that jurors will make very much of the subtle distinction between the 
two rules. Morris even suggests that as a matter of trial technique 
plaintiffs' lawyers, except in the most extreme cases, ought to avoid 
asking an instruction calling for negligence per se rules to be applied. 
His theory is that this does not really change the jury's attitude and it 
does run the risk of a reversal on appeal if the appellate court follows 
the rule that violation is only evidence of negligence rather than neg-
ligence per se. 
It is safe to generalize that the practical result in most cases is that 
violation of a statutory or administrative standard makes a prima facie 
case of lack of due care. This leaves open the possibility that the de-
fendant may be able to show in his particular case that the violation of 
the rule should not be considered negligence, . as suggested later in dis-
cussing the validity of administrative rules. It is our opinion that 
defendants should be forced to accept the burden of showing affirma-
tively why their failure to comply with the administrative regulations 
should not be treated as negligence in the particular case. Although some 
writers on the subject avoid using the prima facie case terminology in 
drawing their conclusions, in effect they reach an equivalent result. The 
Minnesota court in the recent case of Lynghaug v. Payte expressly ap-
plied the prima facie rule where a car owner had unknowingly failed 
to keep his muffler in such condition as to prevent the escape of carbon 
se Morris, supra note 76. 
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monoxide into the interior of the car, as the statute required. The 
court said: 
In the absence of excuse or justification, liability follows as a 
matter of law if, upon proof of violation, the negligence is the 
proximate cause of the injury. The burden of going forward 
with the evidence and establishing excuse or justification or 
such other defense as may be available shifts to the de-
fendant.90 
It should be remembered, of course, that adopting the prima facie 
case rule cuts both ways; while in many cases it will help the defendants 
avoid liability by allowing them to show why their action was not neg-
ligent in spite of the violation of the rule, in other cases it will help the 
plaintiffs avoid a defense of contributory negligence per se when they 
violate some administrative or statutory rule of conduct. Harper and 
James even go so far as to suggest that where the rule is one of negli-
gence per se a double standard ought to be used. so that it is only evi-
dence of negligence when used against a plaintiff to show contributory 
negligence. 91 Their avowed position, that all tort law ought to be 
regarded as a method of compensating as many plaintiffs as possible 
and distributing the risk of injuries as widely as possible, is probably 
their real reason for wanting to eliminate the negligence per se rule. 
Dean Prosser agrees with their conclusion that the rule should be evi-
dence of negligence only.92 
The evidence of negligence rule allows a greater degree of flexibility 
so that account may be taken of individual differences between cases. 
Such a rule certainly will cause much less theoretical difficulty for 
courts when they are faced with the cases which have given rise to the 
many exceptions to the rule of negligence per se. Also it seems emi-
nently more satisfactory in a fast developing field such as atomic 
energy where statutory and administrative standards are likely to be-
come quickly outmoded and inadequate. 
Attacking Administrative Regulations 
The federal standards of conduct applicable to atomic energy activi-
ties are all administrative in form rather than statutory. The same is 
true of most of the state standards. Nevertheless consideration should 
be given to the possible diff~:rences between the rules applying to the two 
90 247 Minn. 186, 195-96, 76 N.W.2d 66o ( 1956). 
91 Harper & James 999, 1000, n. 21. Cf. Prosser 163, n. 92. See also cases collected 
in Anno., 58 A.L.R.2d 68o ( 1958). 
92 Prosser 162, n. 83. 
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·kinds of standards, i.e.} statutory and administrative. One of these di f-
ferences is that departure from statutory standards found in criminal 
laws may result in imposition of a type of absolute liability. No such 
cases have been found where the violation is of administrative standards 
only.98 
The most significant distinction between the two, however, is that the 
defendant sometimes may attack the soundness of an administrative 
standard. There are a few statutory standards so ridiculous (e.g.} a 
six m.p.h. speed limit) 94 that a court might not enforce them. For the 
most part, though, once a statute which includes a specific standard has 
been enacted, no court will undertake to reverse the judgment of the 
legislature as to what is the proper standard of conduct. This is not 
quite so true where the standard is established by an administrative 
regulation. 
When an administrative ruling has been violated, a good argument 
can be made in a damage suit that it is invalid or unsound on grounds 
other than those suggested thus far as excuses for non-compliance. 
Morris gives an excellent statement of the argument. 95 When an attack 
is made upon the validity of an administrative safety rule in a proceed-
ing to enforce it, the question decided by the court is quite different than 
when its validity is attacked in a damage suit. In a proceeding to en-
force the rule it can be argued that the measure is so unreasonable as 
to. be arbitrary and therefore invalid either because it is not authorized 
by the statute or because it is unconstitutional. Courts iri such cases, 
however, .will not invalidate the measure so long as an honest and 
reasonable administrator might adopt such a rule. A considerable de-
gree of discretion is left to the administrator in such cases even though 
it tpight be proved quite easily that a sounder measure could have been 
promulgated. On the other hand, in a damage-suit based upon proof of 
negligence because of violation of an administrative safety rule, expert 
witnesses might agree that the particular safety measures taken by the 
particular defendant were actually better precautions than those pre-
scribed by the administrative rule. They at least might testify that the 
administrator's rule was not the general standard of safety adopted by 
those who deal with the matters which were the subject of the lawsuit. 
To make the violation of an administrator's rule under such circum-
stances absolute proof of negligence in a damage action seems quite 
unjustifiable. 
98 Morris, supra note 76. 
94 Prosser 154, n. J. 
95 Morris, supra note 76 at 152 ft. 
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Another factor that influences courts when the administrative regu-
latory program is being enforced directly is concern that the upsetting 
of one rule may weaken the whole regulatory program and make the 
administrative process quite ineffective. This consequence does not 
follow from a holding in a particular damage suit that a particular 
violation of the administrative rule does not constitute negligence per se. 
Finally, it should be noted that when there is a direct action to enforce 
an administrative rule it nearly always involves a specific determination 
by the administrative agency that the particular defendant actually has 
violated the regulation. On the other hand, in a damage suit based upon 
violation of the regulation, the administrator typically will have made 
no specific ruling that the defendant's conduct was a violation of regu-
lation. It is not nearly so easy for the court as for the administrator to 
take into consideration the possibility that there was practical com-
pliance with the administrative regqlation. To this may be added the 
argument (also applicable when making violation of a criminal statute 
negligence per se) that in the administration and enforcement of statu-
tory or administrative regulations, the prosecutor or administrator can 
use common sense in deciding ·whether the particular action of the de-
fendant under the particular circumstances really amounted to a viola-
tion in substance of the statute or administrative standard of conduct. 
There is no similar restraint on a plaintiff who is making use of the 
violation to prove the defendant's negligence, since his only desire is 
to recover damages in the particular case. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing possible arguments there is in fact 
very little actual authority allowing such attacks to be made upon ad-
ministrative rulings. On the other hand Morris failed to find any cases 
holding that defendant's proof of the unreasonableness of the adminis-
trative ruling is inadmissible.96 The possibility of using such a defense 
in an atomic energy case should not be overlooked by counsel. In an 
area that has developed as rapidly as has the technology of atomic 
energy, it would not seem at all unlikely that with new developments a 
sounder safety measure might be found than the one promulgated by 
the administrative agency on the basis of prior information. If com-
petent experts can demonstrate the greater soundness of the new prac-
tice followed by the particular defendant, there would seem every reason 
to hold that the defendant's conduct was not negligent even though he 
was in violation of the administrative regulation. 
98 I d. at 154-55· 
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Invalid Statute or Administrative Regulation 
Another matter that arises in connection with the use of violation of 
either statutory or administrative standards of conduct as proof of neg-
ligence is the use to be made of such rules or standards of conduct when 
the statute or administrative order itself is 'held invalid. All writers 
seem to agree 97 that if the standard of conduct is invalidated because it 
is so arbitrary as to be a lack of due process, or is not authorized by the 
statute, the regulations should not even be admitted as evidence~ On the 
other hand, it is also true that the statutory or administrative standard 
may be invalidated on a ground that in no way attacks its validity as a 
general statement of the conduct to be expected of a reasonably prudent 
man under the circumstances. The invalidity·may be because of failure 
to observe some procedural requirement for the enactment of a statute, 
or some technical procedural flaw in adopting the regulation. If the con-
tents of the regulation have been made generally known or at least are 
known to the particular defendant at the time he acted, all seem to agree 
that the safety standard should be admitted at least as evidence of 
negligence. 
Effect of Federal Pre-emption 
One other possible ground for invalidity of a state standard, not 
mentioned in any of the cases nor by writers in this field, is that of 
federal pre-emption. There may be several reasons for finding that 
pre-emption invalidates a state rule, and its use as evidence of negli-
gence should depend perhaps on the reason. Pre-emption rriay be found 
because of an actual conflict between the federal and state standards. 
On the other hand it may arise from the federal government's taking 
over a general regulatory area even though the specific federal regula-
tions have not been adopted and made effective yet. If the latter is the 
case, the probative value of the invalid state·imposed standard as evi-
dence of negligence is not diminished, although it may be if there is 
an actual conflict between the two governmental standards. 98 
A closely related consideration is involved when the administrative 
regulation, while valid, has no application to the particular defendant. 
This happened in a California case, Polk v: City of Los Angeles,99 
where the plaintiff was killed while trimming trees, when he came into 
contact with a worn spot in the insulation of the line of the defendant 
97 I d. at 152. Prosser 16o, n. 66, 162, n. 81; Harper & James 1001-14. 
98 See discussion of federal pre-emption generally, infra Part III, Chapter V, Sec-
tion E and specifically discussion infra under damages in nuisance. See also infra dis-
cussion in text at note 699 fl. 
99 Polk v. City of Los Angeles, z6 Cal.2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 ( 1945). 
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power company. The company apparently had not followed the practice 
of making frequent and thorough inspections of its lines as required by 
the regulatory commission which controlled such practices on the part 
of privately owned power companies. The company was city owned and 
therefore not within the jurisdiction of the commission. On appeal the 
court assumed for purposes of argument that there was no authority of 
the commission over this power company but nevertheless held that the 
standard of care set down in the commission's regulations was admis-
sible to prove the standard required of all similar utilities. 
Standards Set by Unofficial Bodies 
A question not unrelated to those discussed above arises when the 
defendant has departed from the standards set down by a national 
safety group. In the area of radiation hazards there is such a committee, 
the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement, 
which has been very effective over a long period of years in the promul-
gation of radiation safety rules.10° Certainly the safety regulations sug-
gested by this national committee should be received in evidence on the 
negligence question. There is precedent for this in several cases in 
which the National Electrical Safety Code published by the United 
States Bureau of Standards has been received in evidence to prove de-
parture from a reasonable standard of conduct.101 In the usual case, 
violation of the code suggested by the national committee probably 
would be accepted by the jury as rather conclusive proof of negligence. 
(2) Compliance as Proof of Non-Negligent Conduct 
Governmental safety standards have significance in tort actions not 
only when they have not been complied with but also when they have 
been followed by one accused of negligence. Many of the considerations 
already discussed as important in determining the effect of non-compli-
ance are equally applicable when compliance is asserted as proof of non-
negligent action. In addition, while the leading treatises almost ignore 
the problem, 102 Morris has made an excellent general analysis of this 
aspect of the problem both as to criminal statutes 103 and administrative 
100 For references to the recommendations of this committee, see infra notes 139-43 
of Part III, Chapter s. 
1o1 Morris, supra note 76 at 157. 
102 Prosser 163, 164 and Harper & James 1014 devote one short paragraph to this 
aspect of the problem. 
103 Morris, "The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions," 49 Col. L. Rev. 
21, 42 (1949). 
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regulations.104 Nevertheless, the matter will be so vital in radiation 
damage actions that consideration of the application of these general 
concepts to radiation cases is warranted here. Extensive administrative 
regulation of safety matters at both the federal and state levels already 
exists, and most users are willing to abide by them. Use of compliance 
to show non-negligence should be very frequent. 
In considering the effect of such standards it is important to keep in 
mind that most of the safety measures dealing with radiat~on hazards 
involve a judgment based on the balancing of society's interest in the 
rapid development of this promising new field against the known fact 
that injuries to specific persons and genetic damage generally are anal-
most inevitable result of any use of radiation.105 Likewise important 
in considering the weight to be given to compliance is the fact that the 
development of new knowledge is very rapid in this field as indicated 
by the substantial reduction in the maximum permissible exposure 
standard in recent years.106 In the light of these facts, what significance 
should be attached to compliance with governmental safety standards 
in tort actions ? 
It is not possible to reduce all of the cases to a set of simple rules, 
generally accepted and sufficiently complete to answer even most of the 
cases likely to arise. Nevertheless, a few general statements can be made 
with considerable assurance. One is that in many cases courts have ac-
cepted compliance with a criminal statutory standard as more or less 
conclusive proof that the defendant did not act negligentiy.107 On the 
other hand, numerous cases have held that a criminal statute states only 
a minimum standard and, therefore, it always is possible for the plain-
tiff to show that compliance with this standard does not meet the stand-
ard of conduct dictated by negligence rules.108 The same is true of ad-
ministrative regulations.109 Again, as indicated before in the discussion 
of failure to comply with such standards, it seems to be agreed generally 
that proof of compliance with criminal statutory or administrative 
standards certainly should be accepted as some evidence of having used 
due care but that it ought not to be accepted as conclusive proof. Ex-
isting treatments of the subject do not discuss the effect of compliance 
with a civil statutory standard but there would seem to be no reason for 
104 Morris, supra note 76 at 157 ff. 
10s See supra Chapter I, subsection on genetic damage. 
1oe See Part Ill, Chapter V, subsection C. 
107 Morris, supra note 103. See also cases cited in sources cited infra note 108. 
tosJd. at 45, n. So; Harper & James 1014. n. 66; Prosser 164, n. 1. 
too Prosser 164, n. 2. 
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treating this case differently from that in which there is non-compliance. 
Possible distinctions were discussed in the last section and are applicable 
here. 
The present writers feel that, in general, compliance with govern-
mental radiation regulations should be accepted in negligence cases as 
evidence of having acted reasonably but should not be used as conclusive 
proof because there are too many variables in such a rapidly developing 
field. We would apply this rule generally to civil statutory and adminis-
trative regulations as well as criminal. Because there has been so little 
written about the significance of compliance with administrative regu-
lations, it will be helpful to examine some representative cases. We also 
suggest that there are certain radiation situations in which compliance 
should be treated as conclusive proof of non-negligence. 
In an Arkansas case, Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. Deshavo,110 
a telephone company and a power company wer~ found to have acted 
with due care in the construction of their lines. Farmers felled a tree 
where the lines crossed, however, and caused the telephone line to be-
come charged. When sued by a telephone operator who received a shock 
while using the line, the companies argued that they had complied with 
the utility regulations for the construction of intersecting lines and 
could not be held liable. The court held that once compliance was shown 
the burden was on the plaintiff thereafter to prove that particular acts or 
conditions created by the companies amounted to negligence. This 
seems to treat proof of compliance as establishing non-negligence unless 
something other th.an the mere creation of the condition by the defend-
ant is shown. There are many general radiation regulations of this 
same sort, both state and federal, so there are many situations in which 
the rationale of the Arkansas case could be used by one defending a 
suit for'negligent injuries to another person. 
An interesting use of compliance with administrative regulations was 
made by a plaintiff to meet a claim of contributory negligence in Rine-
hart v. Woodford Flying Senice, Inc., a West Virginia case involving 
a landing accident at a local airport.111 While a flying contest was being 
conducted at a local airport the usual landing rules had been changed. 
The defendants contended that the plaintiff's pilot, under the circum-
stances, should have circled the field until he saw how the planes were 
110 199 Ark. 1078, 138 S.W.2d 397 (1940). Cf. Merlo v. Public Service Co., supra 
note 41 and Chase v. Washington Water Power Co., St,pra note 41. 
111 122 W.Va. 392, 9 S.E.2d 521 (1940). The reverse twist is also shown by a recent 
English case, Marfin v. United Steel Co., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 104. 
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landing and taking off. The court found, however, that the plaintiff's 
pilot had complied with the ordinary regulations dealing with landings 
and, therefore, he had acted correctly and was under no duty to deviate 
from these regulations and observe local conditions to determine that a 
different practice for landing was being followed. The court even re-
jected the defendant's offer of testimony of officials of the federal gov-
ernment, whose regulations the plaintiff· had followed, to show the 
meaning of the regulations in such situations. The court said the 
regulations were not ambiguous and the plaintiff was justified in follow-
ing them. Compliance here amounted to a rule of conclusive proof. 
Opportunities to use this type of reasoning should arise often in radi-
ation cases where someone has been exposed to radiation but in a situa-
tion where the amount of radiation received, or the circumstances in 
which it was received, does not violate applicable health and safety 
regulations. The compliance can be argued to prove reasonable conduct 
by the defendant, or a lack of contributory negligence by the plaintiff. 
Perhaps of greater significance for the reactor operator are cases like 
Johnson v. Maine Central Railroad,112 where a government commission 
had directed the defendant railroad to place warning signs and a flash-
ing signal in a certain way at a particular grade crossing. The commis-
sion also had regulated the speed of trains· over this crossing and the 
defendanf had complied with all the orders. The court approved the 
directed verdict for the defendant railro'ad; stating that· the admini-
strative instructions and the compliance with them was conclusive 
proof of the use of due care. The analogy is very close to that of are-
actor license, which the AEC, with the advice of its Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards, issues only after determining that the 
location, construction, design, and proposed operating procedures of 
the plant are such as to provide the necessary protection of the public 
health and safety. In respect to these matters; the government agency 
makes an express finding, in a specific case, concerning a designated 
radiation device or use of radioactive material to the ·effect that the 
defendant's actions are consistent with due regard for public health and 
safety. If the reasoning of the Maine court should be followed, there 
could be no finding of negligence in design and operation plans: 
Cases such as Panama Mail Steamship Company v. Davis/18 also 
illustrate the rationale that may be used in some radiation situations. In 
this case public health service officials had inspected the ship after fumi-
112 141 Me. 38, 38 A.2d 884 (1944). 
118 79 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1935). 
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gation by poisonous gas and certified that the holds were safe. A steve-
dore ordered into the holds by the ship's officers was injured because 
one of the holds actually was not safe. The circuit court held that judg-
ment for the stevedore was erroneous because the steamship company 
reasonably had relied upon the health officials' pronouncement that t~1e 
holds were safe. Much reliance was placed upon defendent's good faith 
and acceptance of the health officials' determinations as justification for 
finding the company not negligent. 
These cases do not present a situation quite like that arising from the 
fact that the AEC has made the radiation exposure for government 
contractors' employees considerably stricter than the old standards 
which still are applicable to licensees operating their own facilities. It 
seems clear that the reason for the delay in imposing the stricter stand-
ards on licensees is to give them a reasonable time in which to adjust 
their safety programs. Here, then, is a case where expert opinion indi-
cates that the safer course is to reduce exposure limits; yet, on balancing 
all the equities, stricter standards should not be imposed at the present 
time on private licensees. In view of our present lack of knowledge as 
to exactly how damaging small doses are likely to be over a long period 
of time, the Commission's exposure regulations cannot be said to fix 
definitively the point at which radiation becomes unacceptably danger-
ous. The Commission's finding, however, apparently is a deliberate at-
tempt to balance such factors as the dangers, the necessity for promot-
ing development, and the expense of safety precautions. Taking into 
account all the interests involved, the standards admittedly are a reason-
able compromise._ In most cases at least, there will be a reliance by the 
defendant upon the standards established by the government agency. 
On the other hand, it is known that there is very good opinion that a 
stricter standard is a safer course of conduct. Where the AEC has 
made a deliberate judgment on the specific issue of maximum exposure 
levels, it may be that this is a case in which a judge should hold that 
compliance with the requirement is conclusive proof of compliance with 
a reasonable standard of conduct.114 For a state court not to accept such 
a determination by a federal agency in an area where the federal body 
has the powers to issue rules and regulations may be considered uncon-
stitutional state action because of federal pre-emption.115 
In general, however, it is important to recognize that mere compli-
114 Such a view is suggested in Morris, supra note 103. Harper and James criticize 
this view. 
115 See Part III, Chapter V, subsections E2b(1) (a) (i) and (ii) 
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ance with a statutory or administrative standard often should not be 
treated as conclusive proof of due care. There are cases 116 indicating 
that in a particular situation it should have been clear to the defendant 
that bare compliance with a statutory standard or administrative regu-
lation is not what a reasonably prudent man would do under the cir-
cumstances. Undoubtedly, this would be true if the defendant's radia-
tion expert was aware of the fact that the administrative regulations 
clearly were too lax or that they did not fit the particular situation. This 
will be true as our knowledge of radiation increases and we discover 
new dangers not known at the time the pertinent administrative regula-
tions were issued. It seems quite likely that in this kind of case the new 
and higher standard of care, agreed on by experts in the field, will be 
applied. Similarly, certain emergencies might arise as to a particular 
employee or member of the public whose previous exposures made any 
further exposure inadvisable. Such exposure as permitted by the general 
regulations might be negligence in these circumstances. 
Administrative Silence · 
Another situation closely related to this limitation is the case where 
an attempt is made to use the fact that the administrative rules are 
silent on the point as evidence of the fact that a particular safeguard is 
not needed. There will be cases, of course, in which a failure of the gov-
ernment agency to order a safeguard to be taken is a deliberate decision 
that it is not needed. There will be other situations, however, in which 
silence merely means that the point has not been considered and, there-
fore, it has no significance in determining whether or not due care re-
quires such action: This idea is exemplified in one of the leading rail-
road cases, Grand Trunk Ry. v. lves, 117 involving the question whether 
the absence of a crossing flagman constitutes negligence on the part of 
the railroad. The-commissioner was authorized to require crossing flag-
men but had not ordered one at the particular crossing where the acci-
dent happened. Apparently, the situation at the crossing was such that 
it was quite reasonable to think that a flagman would be needed. The 
court held that the commissioner's order which did not include a direc-
tion for the employment of a flagman could not be accepted as an ad-
ministrative determination that one was not needed. In many cases the 
mere fact that the administrator has passed on some aspect of a particu-
lar installation does not mean that he has passed ·on all aspects. 
It also is possible that the administrator's regulation may not take 
116 Prosser 164; Harper & James 1014. 
117 144 u.s. 408. 12 S.Ct. 679 (I8gi). 
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account of a particular situation that may arise. This is illustrated by 
a case in which a power company, although it had conformed to the 
clearance rule of the National Electric Code, had not given warning 
about an installation that was dangerously close to some construction 
work which its employees knew about. The company was found to be 
negligent notwithstanding its compliance with the Electric Code.118 
There would seem to be no reason why the same rule would not apply 
in the case of a statutory or administrative ruling concerning radiation 
safety. 
There also are cases in which the plaintiff has been allowed to attack 
the soundness of an· administrative rule, compliance with which is used 
by the defendant as proof that he used due care.119 This is quite like 
permitting the defendant to attack the soundness of a standard when 
the claim is made that his non-compliance is proof of negligence. On 
the other hand, if the regulation is attacked because of a lack of juris-
diction over a particular defendant, this should not make invalid its 
use as evidence of what is reasonable. So long as the regulation sets up 
a reasonable standard of care for this type of situation the court well 
may hold that the defendant is still entitled to a verdict because he has 
proved compliance with the standard of care expected of a reasonably 
prudent man; i.e.} by showing compliance with the administrative 
standard. 120 
c. The Care Owed to Licensees and Others 
The liability of owners and ~ccupiers of land to various classes of 
persons who come on the land is a question about which there is con-
siderable confusion as to analysis and terminology as well as conclu-
sions in decided cases.121 As some of the opinions in recent cases and 
all the legal writers point out, the old arbitrary distinctions drawn be-
tween licensees, trespassers, invitees, the public, and employees are not 
very helpful in the decision of actual cases. The cases support the gen-
eral conclusion that even as to trespassers the old familiar rule of no 
duty to use due care so long as the defendant takes no affirmative action, 
is being modified, imposition of liability depending upon the kind of 
trespasser and whether or not there is some kind of expectation of con-
118 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1934). 
us Morris, supra note 76 at 164 
120 ld. at 165. 
121 Prosser 445-62; Harper & James 147o-1505; Keeton, "Personal Injuries Resulting 
from Open and Obvious Conditions," 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 629 (1952); Anno., 55 
A.L.R.2d 525 (1957). 
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tinued trespass. Certainly as to licensees the rule seems to be shifting 
toward imposing somewhat greater liability on the owner of the land. 
There are many cases, however, in which the courts even today draw 
a rather fine line between the standard of conduct owed to a licensee 
and that owed to an invitee, particularly if the invitee is on the premises 
because of some possible pecuniary benefit to the occupier of the land. 
There is nothing unique in the atomic energy situation which calls for 
any different analysis from that already available in the literature. To 
the extent that the courts of the state in which an atomic energy instal-
lation is located draw the lines sharply or not at all for most purposes, 
the same should and probably will be done in cases which involve radia-
tion injury. 
There are two situations, however, in which applicability of existing 
rules to radiation injury cases may impose some unusual standards of 
conduct on the atomic energy entrepreneur. His lawyer should be par-
ticularly careful to take account of these possibilities in planning the 
owner's course of action. · 
Duty to Warn 
One of these involves the duty of the owner or occupier of land to 
give warning concerning unusual types of hazards that may not be de-
tected or observed by the visitor or the danger of which the visitor 
might not be expected to appreciate. As to these hazards there seems 
little reason to believe that the courts will make any substantial distinc-
tion between licensees and invitees as such. They are much more likely 
to decide the cases on the basis of whether, under the particular circum-
stances, the defendant acted unreasonably in not notifying the visitors 
of the specific danger.122 Most of the cases which have dealt with this 
problem have involved situations much more mundane than radiation 
hazards. Nevertheless, the rationale of these decisions seems quite ap-
plicable to radiation cases. 
A typical example is a 1951 Delaware case, Maher v. Voss. 123 There 
the injured woman was an invited guest in the home of the plaintiff. In 
going to get her coat in what she thought was a closet she injured her-
self when she fell down a stairway. The defendant's motion to dismiss 
on the ground that the plaintiff was a licensee only and that therefore 
no affirmative duty was owed to her was denied. The court said that 
the ·old and familiar rule of non-liability did not apply even to a gratu-
itous licensee if the defendant knew of the dangerous condition and had 
122 Harper & James 1473; Prosser 459· 
1 28 46 Del. 418, 84 A.zd 527 (1951). 
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reason to believe that the licensee might not discover the condition or 
realize the risk. The court also said that it would be negligent for the 
possessor of the land to permit the guest to remain on the land without 
making the condition reasonably safe or warning her about it. The 
court then concluded : 
The complaints in these cases charge that defendants' neg-
ligence consisted of a failure to warn Mrs. Maher of the true 
nature of the "closet," which is averred to be a grave hazard 
to one ignorant of its character, when defendants should have 
known that their guest might be entrapped by it. Under the 
rules stated above, it cannot be said that the complaints are so 
clearly defective in showing actionable negligence as to war-
rant a dismissal thereof.124 
The court concluded that it could not say as a matter of law that it was 
beyond the "realm of reasonable foreseeability" that the guest would 
not realize the danger or appreciate its real extent. 
Assumption of Risk 
Keeton, in his excellent article, 125 points out the second situation to 
be noted by the nuclear lawyer. He warns that even as to dangers that 
are realized by the plaintiff there are cases in which failure to act upon 
his knowledge of the danger still will not constitute contributory neg-
ligence so as to prevent recovery from the defendant. He points out 
that in these cases the assumption of risk argument no longer consti-
tutes a defense for the possessor of land. He says: 
The idea is sometimes advanced that, for relief to be denied, 
the full extent of the danger must be as open and obvious to 
the plaintiff as it is to the defendant. Apparently, therefore, 
the mere fact that the plaintiff is in a position to be aware 
of the existence of an appreciable chance of falling is not suf-
ficient to deny relief if the defendant was in a better position 
to understand the full extent of the damage. It is doubtful 
that this idea has been fully utilized. It would seem generally 
that proprietors ought to know more in most instances about 
the dangers of a particular kind of construction or a particu-
lar type of floor than most users and that there would be very 
few cases where recovery would be denied as a matter of law 
on the ground of assumption of risk.126 
The applicability of this doctrine in atomic energy cases seems quite 
likely. Whether in a particular case it will be found that the plaintiff did 
124Jd. at 423-24· 
12s Keeton, sr~pra note 121 at 642 If. 
126 ld. at 647, 648. 
NEGLIGENCE 133 
or should have realized the full extent of the risk may depend on 
whether or not he is experienced and knowledgeable as to radiation haz-
ards. Certainly there are likely to be many visitors who will be in no 
position to understand the nature or extent of the hazard present. 
Under the rules suggested by these cases probably it will be a jury ques-
tion as to whether defendant acted with reasonable care in failing to 
give any warning at all or in giving the kind of warning he did. One 
result might be reached as to a physicist or nuclear engineer and another 
to a sightseer or other guest who has no knowledge of radiation haz-
ards. This would be particularly appropriate since the ordinary senses 
of man do not detect the presence of danger by sight, sound, smell, or 
touch in the usual radiation case. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out 
in the discussion of radiation technology, what may be a dangerous or 
harmful dose to one person may not be to another, and the visitor may 
be in no position to make such a distinction. For example, consider the 
presence of a visitor who is a pregnant woman. It is well known that 
irradiation of the embryo during the gestation period creates a signifi-
cant possibility of serious injury. Depending on the circumstances, 
including the amount of radiation to which such a visitor might be ex-
posed accidentally, it might be safer for the occupier of land where ra-
diation sources are present to deny access to women of pregnable age.127 
Warning to Public 0 fficials 
In considering the duty to warn visitors, those concerned with radia-
tion hazards should take into account the problem of liabiiity to public 
employees who come on the property as a matter of right but not in any 
realistic sense at the invitation of the landowner. There are many per-
sons in this class-postmen, meter readers, inspectors, firemen, police-
men, etc. For our purposes, the obligations owed to firemen and police-
men present the most interesting legal questions. 
While the physical danger presented by the situation in Shypulski v. 
Waldorf Paper Products Company 128 is quite different from the haz-
ards inherent in radiation. exposure, the reasoning of the court would 
seem to be equally applicable to the case of a fireman fighting a fire on 
premises where radiation hazards are present. During the course of in-
specting the defendant's building to make sure the fire had been ex-
tinguished entirely, a concrete block wall in the factory collapsed and 
seriously injured the plaintiff fireman. The plaintiff alleged that the wall 
was so constructed that it could not withstand lateral pressure in any 
127 Infra note xo68. 
128 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951). 
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amount, that it therefore constituted a trap which was dangerous to 
anybody in the warehouse, and that these facts were known to the de-
fendant. All during the time the firemen were present there also were 
present officers, agents, and employees of the defendant company 
observing the actions of the plaintiff and other firemen. After rejecting 
the old analysis which placed firemen and similar persons in the cate-
gory of licensees or perhaps even trespassers rather than invitees, and 
accepting the Prosser thesis 129 that such persons have a status sut 
generis,. the court then said : 
Since firemen have the unique status just described, it fol-
lows that the duties owed to them may properly be unique. 
. . . Even the rule that firemen must accept premises as they 
find them has been described by this court as being a hard 
rule. It is apparent that both in Minnesota and elsewhere the 
trend of decisions is to avoid extending these harsh rules be-
yond their present limits, and, at least, in the case of the "wil-
ful or wanton" rule, the tendency is to whittle it away with 
exceptions. At the same time, a respectable body of authority 
has developed to support the rule that firemen are entitled to 
be warned of hidden dangers known to the landowner or oc-
cupant .... 
Certainly, no meritorious reason can be advanced to justify 
the view that a property owner, with knowledge of a hidden 
peril, should be allowed to stand by in silence when a word of 
warning might save firemen from needless peril. The burden 
of a duty to warn of hidden perils falls lightly upon the land-
owner in comparison with the cost of his silence, which is fre-
quently measured in the lives and limbs of firemen and in the 
sorrow and suffering of their families. Although firemen as-
sume the usual risks incident to their entry upon premises 
made dangerous by the destructive effect of fire, there is no 
valid reason why they should be required to assume the ex-
traordinary risk of hidden perils of which they might easily 
be warned. Two courts at least have held that firemen do not 
assume such risks, and, for the reasons already stated, we 
regard that holding as sound. . . . 
In spite of the recognized split of authority on the question 
presented in this case, we believe that the better rule by far 
is that landowners and occupants alike owe a duty to firemen 
to warn them of hidden perils where the landowner or occu-
pant has knowledge of the peril and the opportunity to give 
warning.180 
1 29 Prosser 400-62. 
1ao Supra note 128 at 397-402. 
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The court approved the overruling by the lower court of defendant's de-
murrer to the complaint and held that the complaint stated a cause of 
action. 
One of the cases cited in support of its ruling by the Minnesota court 
is a very interesting New York Court of Appeals opinion, Jenkins v. 
JIJ-321 W. 37th St. Corp.} dealing with responsibility of the landowner 
to give warning to firemen of unusual hazards.131 The plaintiffs were 
~ew York firemen who were seriously injured when gasoline which 
had collected in a closed basement room exploded as the firemen were 
fighting a fire in the room. The first explosion, which started the fire, 
occurred when the building superintendent was in the room, and he also 
was present when the firemen arrived and entered the building. The 
gasoline apparently had seeped into the sump pump in defendant's sub-
basement from storage tanks in a neighboring building through an old 
underground rivulet. There was no suggestion that the defendant was 
in any way negligent in creating the dangerous ·condition. The superin-
tendent had known of the condition, however, and had warned his 
superiors of the strong odor of gasoline. The court stated that the pres-
ence of small quantities of gasoline ordinarily would not constitute an 
unusual hazard, but that its presence in a closed room in which a fire 
was burning did constitute a situation which the jury might find to be 
an unusual hazard. The court concluded : 
If such a danger existed to the knowledge of the defendant or 
its agent, the defendant was under a duty if it had opportu-
nity to give warning of the peril. . . . 
This affirmative proof, together with the undisputed fact that 
while the superintendent was in the sub-basement an explosion 
had occurred, warranted a finding by the jury that.defendant 
or its agent in charge had notice of the unusual hazard into 
which the firemen unknowingly walked. Opportunity to warn 
the plaintiffs of the peril might be inferred by the jury from 
the fact that the superintendent was on the premises when 
the firemen arrived and knew of their arrivaP32 
The court ordered a new trial, however~ because of an error in· the ad-
mission of evidence concerning impeachment of the testimony of a 
witness. 
This type of case, involving an unusual type of hazard, is to be dis-
tinguished, however, from the kind of case where the hazard even from 
181284 N.Y. 397, 34 N.E.2d 503 (1940). For a quite similar case involving gas, see 
Kentucky & W.Va. Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W.2d 537 (1942). 
132 Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., supra note 131 at 401, 402. 
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a dangerous substance such as gasoline could not be considered unusual. 
For example, everyone knows that gasoline tanks in a burning car are 
likely to explode,138 or that structural conditions of a building (such as 
a porch) may become dangerous with natural deterioration or improper 
construction and may cause injury. A court may find that such danger 
is not an unusual hazard from an inherently dangerous substance.1a. It 
also is possible that a court will hold in such cases that, if the gratuitous 
licensee is actually aware of the peril he may not recover, as a recent 
New Jersey case held.135 The Minnesota court, however, recently held 
that merely because a dangerous condition might be open and obvious 
during daylight hours, this fact does not immunize the owner from a 
liability if at other times, such as darkness, the dangerous condition 
would not be obvious, provided that the owner had reason to believe 
that the licensee might come on the premises under such circum-
stances.136 
Applying these principles to radiation cases, while distinctions may be 
made, depending on the intensity and type of radiation sources present 
in the building, in the usual situation it would seem quite likely that the 
court would find that radiation materials constitute an unusual hazard, 
particularly since their presence will be known only if there is warning 
or if the fire department furnishes its fire fighters with radiation detec-
tion instruments. Actually, during the course of fighting a fire, it is 
quite possible that even if the fire itself does not release radioactive 
material from its proper containers (such as thickness gauges, experi-
mental equipment or supplies in research laboratories, or possibly even 
from a reactor container) the firemen themselves in the course of fight-
ing the fire may cause the radioactive material to spread. This may 
create serious hazards, at least to those fighting the fire, if not also to 
others in the vicinity. It is our opinion that under these circumstances 
it is very likely that courts will hold that there is a duty to give fair 
warning. 
Moreover, the character of the danger is such that the techniques of 
protecting personnel from radiation hazards will require sufficient ad-
vance notice to prepare the fire fighters for the unusual situation. It 
would not be surprising to find a court saying that the owner of the 
183 Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 App. Div. IJI, 136 N.Y.S.:zd 129, aff'd 309 N.Y. 
819, 130 N.E.2d 616 (1954). 
13• Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304. 282 S.W.zd 445 (1955). See also Dotson v. 
Haddock, 46 Wash.2d 52, 278 P.2d 338 (1955). 
185 Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 104 A.zd 68g (1954). 
136 Malmquist v. Leeds, 245 Minn. 130, 7I N.W.2d 863 (1955). 
NEGLIGENCE 137 
property had to go further than simply giving notice at the time of a 
fire to the firemen who arrive at the scene. The radiation danger present 
at a fire is illustrated by the explosion a few years ago in the Sylvania 
plant in Bayside, New York.187 It would seem not unreasonable tore-
quire users of radioactive material to keep fire departments advised of 
the presence of the radioactive material. Undoubtedly it would be wise 
for fire departments to plan for the emergencies which may arise from 
the existence of radiation hazards. That the obligation to give adequate 
warning is not to be lightly regarded or easily discharged by the de-
fendant is indicated by a New York case, Schwab v. Rubel Corpora-
tion,188 in which the plaintiff was allowed to go to the jury on the ques-
tion of whether the warning given by defendant's employees was 
adequate when all he did was to warn one of the firemen of the existence 
of a dangerous dismantled elevator shaft. The court held that it was 
for the jury to decide whether warning one fireman was sufficient or 
whether more should have been warned. 
The rule is usually stated as requiring the warning which a reason-
able and prudent person would give under the circumstances. It usually 
is suggested that it is not realistic to require that the danger be called 
to the attention of everyone fighting the fire. This would place too 
heavy a burden upon the defendant.189 It also would be wise as a general 
precaution to post conspicuous warnings of potential radiation hazards, 
at least in the dangerous areas of the building, if not throughout the 
building. In emergency situations, such as is the case when fire occurs, 
this quite likely would not be considered sufficient, but the court might 
hold that this much at least is required for purposes of warning not only 
inspecting firemen, policemen, or similar officials, but also visitors to 
the. premises, whether licensees or invitees. 
In view of the above cases the person having possession of radioac-
tive materials would be well advised to control very strictly the persons 
1 87 For an extensive report concerning this 1956 fire caused by the double explosion 
of thorium, see N.Y. Tim"s, July 3, 1956, p. I, col. 2, and p. 15, col. 2; July 4, 1956, 
p. 37, col. I; July 7, 1956, p. 33, col. 4; July II, I956, p. 54. col. 5; and July 12, I956, 
p. 51, col. 3· 
188 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234 (1941). 
189 Moscow Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, IS Ohio App. 310, aff'd Io8 Ohio St. 
377, 140 N.E. 770 (1921). A general warning by way of a manager's shout, "Get out 
of here," was held insufficient to meet this standard in Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 
362, 3 N .E.2d 686 ( 1935). A recent case beautifully exemplifying the need for labeling 
dangerous material is United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. I956); a 
sheriff was hurt while helping fight a fire in a tank car which had not been labeled to 
indicate its dangerous contents. 
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allowed in the vicinity of the radioactive material and the conditions 
under which such presence is permitted. 
d. Decided Radiation Cases and the Standard of Conduct 
Except for cases where a doctor is charged with malpractice in treat-
ing patients, very few cases have dealt with radiation injuries specifi-
cally. Our discussion of the breach of the duty to use care would not 
be complete, however, without a consideration of these few. \Vith the 
rapid growth of the use of radioactive isotopes in medical diagnosis and 
treatment the rules of law applied by the courts in malpractice cases in-
volving the use of X-rays will assume increasing importance. In addi-
tion, even the malpractice cases may prove useful as analogies in other 
radiation injury situations. 
( 1) Medical Malpractice Cases 
The courts apparently agree that the use of X-rays for medical pur-
poses is to be governed by the same principles that govern physicians 
and surgeons in general. There is no reason to believe that a different 
standard will be applied if the radiation source is a radioactive isotope 
rather than an X-ray machine.140 The statement of the general rule in 
Lett v. Smith is fairly representative: 
"A person undertaking the use of X-rays is held to the 
same measure of responsibility as in administering other 
forms of medical treatment. He impliedly contracts with the 
patient that he possesses the ordinary skill and learning of 
members of his profession and that he will exercise reason-
able skill, care and diligence in his treatment."141 
Perhaps the statement by Justice Rutledge in Christie v. Callahan is a 
somewhat more informative statement of the rule. 
The physician is not an insurer of health. He undertakes only 
for the standard of skill possessed generally by others practic-
ing in his field, and for the care which they would give in 
similar circumstances. He must have latitude for play of rea-
sonable judgement, and this includes room for not too obvi-
ous or gross errors according to the prevailing practice of his 
craft. Generally the standard must be shown by experts and 
uo The only non-X-ray case we found was Hubach v. Cole, 133 Ohio St. 137, 12 
N.E.2d 283 (1938). 
1416 La. App. 248, 26o (1927), adopting the statement in 13 A.L.R. 1414 See also 
Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. I, .13, 76 S.E.2d 461 (1953), and Facer v. Lewis, 326 Mich. 
702, 711, 40 N.W.2d 457 (1950). 
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so must the departure from it. But there are cases in which 
the result of medical or surgical treatment, considered in the 
light of the circumstances attending and following it, may 
warrant an inference of negligence.142 
139 
This statement is made immediately following one recognizing that 
the advantages are with the physician, particularly when he is a special-
ist, because other physicians are reluctant to testify against their col-
leagues in negligence cases. 
: As pointed out by the court in Kuttner v. Swanson 148 the rule means 
that the doctor must have knowledge reasonably to be expected of a 
man of his profession and must use that knowledge carefully in the 
particular case. 
Use of New Ideas 
While no cases have been found which actually turned on the point, 
courts occasionally have referred to the fact that a physician must use 
the ordinary care and skill of his profession, "giving due consideration 
to modern advance and learning." 144 Usually this is not a critical issue 
because it is assumed that ordinary care involves use of new knowledge 
generally known to the profession. Certainly one cannot read the many 
X-ray cases based upon malpractice charges in which the plaintiffs have 
succeeded without concluding that in most cases the finding of negli-
gence was based upon the failure to use new knowledge developed over 
the years. By implication these cases seem to hold that a failure to take 
account of new developments constitutes a lack of due care~ If it is true 
that failure to take advantage of new techniques such as X-rays for 
diagnosis of fractures is negligence,145 there is no reason why the op-
posite should not be true. As new information is gained as to the situa-
tions for which radiation cannot be used safely, doctors should be found 
negligent if they ignore this new knowledge. 
Geographical Standards 
A question more closely related to the obligation to become familiar 
with new developments is whether it is justifiable to use a local rather 
than a national standard for measuring reasonable professional skill. 
Many statements in the cases of the general rule concerning the requi-
site professional care and skill are to the effect that the standard is the 
142 124 F.2d 825, 828 (App. D.C. 1941). 
148 59 Ga. App. 818, 820, (1939), cert. den., 2 S.E.2d 230. 
144 Hazen v. Mullen, 32 F.2d 294, 296 (App. D.C. 1929), quoting from a non-X-ray 
case, Clayton v. English, 23 F.2d 745, 748 (App. D.C. 1927). 
145 See cases cited Harper & James g68, notes 16, 17, and also cases cited in 1958 
General Digest, Am. Dec. System, on failure to use X-rays. 
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care used by persons of equivalent training "in the local community." 146 
Yet in none of these cases was the question carefully considered by the 
court. Some cases, however, indicate that locality is not to be considered 
and it is submitted that this is the better view for the courts to adopt, at 
least in radiation cases. The court in King v. Ditto 147 did not state that 
locality is not a fact, but it did hold that in this particular case compli-
ance with local standards did not prevent a finding of negligence. The 
reasoning of the court in the more recent case of McElroy v. Frost is 
preferable in the light of general information about radiation and par-
ticularly because of the development of specialization and the use of 
journals. to keep practitioners up to date. The court there said: 
The medical testimony relative to the nature, extent and 
cause of plaintiff's injuries has been set out above. It is true 
the witnesses were not from the same community but, with 
one exception, the medical evidence in plaintiff's behalf came 
from specialists in their particular field. It is a matter of com-
mon understanding that a proper method of treating human 
ailments by X-ray would not vary from place to place or state 
to state. What is the best practice in one place likewise would 
be the best in another. This reasoning is the basis of the de-
cision in Giles v. Tyson, Tex. Civ. App., 13 S.W. 2d 452, 
cited by defendant, wherein it is expressly held than an expert 
in the use of X-ray can testify to what is proper use thereof, 
since such proper use would be the same whether in New 
York or Texas. Such reasoning provides a complete answer 
to the argument advanced in this respect.148 
Standards for Specialists 
In addition to the geographical factor, a further question arises as to 
whether or not the specialist in radiology will be expected to use more 
skill than the average practitioner if he is to avoid a charge of negli-
gence. The court in Kuttner v. Swanson 149 seems to reject this conten-
tion. The contrary was specifically held by a Canadian court in McCaf-
frey v. Hague, the court stating: . 
It is clear from the evidence that the defendant miscalcu-
lated the dosage; it was of too high intensity and too long ex-
posure. This finding is on the defendant's own evidence. A 
146 See Lett v. Smith supra note 141; Nance v. Hitch, supra note 141; Blankenship 
v. Baptist Mem. Hosp., 26 Tenn. App. 131, 144. 168 S.W.2d 491 (1942); Wemett v. 
Mount, 134 Ore. 305, 315, 292 Pac. 93 ( 1930) ; Kuttner v. Swanson, supra note 143 at 
819; Harper & James 969, n. 18. 
147 142 Ore. 207, 215, 19 P.2d 1100 (1933). 
us 268 P.2d 273, 279, 28o (Okla. 1954). 
t4o Supra note 143 at 821. 
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higher degree of skill is required from one who holds himself 
out to be a specialist as the defendant did. . . .150 
Use by General Practitioners 
141 
Closely related to this question is that of whether or not the use of 
radiation by the general practitioner constitutes negligence. In McElroy 
v. Frost/51 one expert even testified that X-ray treatment was too dan-
gerous for a general practitioner to use. He testified that it was not jus-
tified in the treatment of a skin disorder of the scrotum until other 
tjeatment had failed. With the increase in medical specialization this 
will become a growing problem, even though general practitioners will 
resist attempts to limit their right to practice any medical technique. 
tertainly at this stage of development in the use of radioisotopes and 
with our growing knowledge of the proper use of X-rays, much can be 
said for the contention that only radiologists are trained to determine 
the proper dosage and take the proper precautions to safeguard against 
overexposure.162 With the development of new techniques for reducing 
the damaging effect on tissue from radiation, it is important to make 
use of experts who will keep up with all developments.158 
Even if there is no requirement that only experts should handle 
radioactivity, there can be very little doubt that the trend toward in-
creased specialization will have an effect upon the standard of care and 
skill to which the general practitioner must conform. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the writing and teaching of the specialists, who 
generally are responsible for new developments, inevitably cause the 
accepted standard of care to change. Second, there is an obvious tend-
ency on the part of plaintiffs in malpractice cases to call upon specialists 
to testify as expert witnesses. In no case have we found that a defend-
uo [1949] 2 W.W.R. 539, 542. See also Eatley v. Mayer, 10 N.J. Misc. 219, 158 Atl. 
4II (19J2). 
tn Supra note 148. 
152 Our private conversations with radiologists lead us to believe they generally think 
so and many competent internists apparently do refer such treatment cases to radi-
ologists. 
as See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1958, p. 41, col. 2, wherein it was reported that radi-
ation poisoning may be curbed by chemicals, if given victim soon enough; and N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 13, 1958, p. I, col. 3, reporting that pills (AET compound) capable of 
halving the biological effects of a radiation dose may be available soon for experimental 
use on humans. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1958, p. 39. col. I, reporting possibility 
that parathyroid extract may be helpful, especially if taken just before exposure to 
radiation. The French report they have had success using bone marro-w transplants, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1959, p. 4, col. 3. See examples of new developments of informa-
tion as to internal dose, soil disposal, drinking water, neutron detection techniques, and 
laundering of protective clothing, reported in Health Physics, Vol. I, No.2, Sept. 1958. 
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ant general practitioner was permitted to challenge testimony on the 
ground that the witness was a specialist, not a general practitioner. 
Where expert witnesses have been challenged successfully the reason 
given is that they did not practice in the same geographical area as the 
defendant. Even this geographical distinction now seems to be vestigial 
with respect to the use of X-rays and radium. Theoretically the expert 
witness is supposed to testify regarding the general and accepted prac-
tice in the profession which is the standard to which the physician must 
conform, but it would be unrealistic to assume that his testimony will 
be unaffected by his special knowledge. It also would be unrealistic to 
ignore the fact that the jury is more likely to be impressed by such testi-
mony than by that of other general practitioners. These influences 
would seem to indicate that, out of the mechanics of trial procedure, 
there may come a substantive change in the standard. The general prac-
titioner well might be advised against undertaking irradiation treatment 
for the more serious ailments in the vital areas of the body, unless 
referral to a specialist is not feasible. 
On the other hand it is perfectly clear that considerable room must be 
permitted for differences of opinion or judgment so long as reasonable 
care has been used in making that judgment. The court in Butler v. 
Rule rejected the contention that in the use of an X-ray machine the 
highest degree of care should be exercised, and quoted the following 
language with approval : . · 
"The law thus requires a surgeon to possess the skill and 
learning which is possessed by the average member of the 
medical profession in good standing, and to apply that skill 
and learning with ordinary and reasonable care. He is not 
liable for mere error of judgment provided he does what he 
thinks is best after a careful examination. He does not guar-
antee a good result, but he promises by implication to use the 
skill and learning of the average physician, to exercise reason-
able care, and to exert his best judgment in the effort to bring 
about a good result." u• 
In that case the decedent received X-ray treatment of a twelve-month 
sarcoma on the left groin because surgical treatment was no longer pos-
sible. The X-ray treatment resulted in a third-degree burn that was very 
painful and death followed in three months. The court reversed the 
judgment for the plaintiff because of the trial court's instructions con-
cerning the high degree of care. 
Again, in Hazen v. Mullen 155 the court decided that a carefully 
154 29 Ariz. 405, 416, 242 P. 436 (1926). 
155 Supra note 144. 
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formed judgment that a bold course of intense X-ray treatment was re-
quired did not constitute a lack of due care. In this case X-ray treat-
ments were administered over a ten-month period, arresting a danger-
ous condition that would have led to death. The only alternative was an 
extremely difficult operation. Although the disease was cured, plaintiff 
suffered X-ray burns as a result of the treatment. The court reversed a 
judgment for the plaintiff on the ground of insufficient evidence to sup-
port a verdict of negligence since the defendant doctor reasonably could 
have concluded that bold measures were needed to treat a dangerous 
condition. Apparently medical authorities agree that very aggressive 
treatment for serious illnesses sometimes is called for in spite of the 
fact that X-ray burns may result. A malignant growth treated too 
lightly may become somewhat immune and later doses will have to be 
much greater if they are to be effective.158 
There is an additional protection for medical practitioners in a mal-
practice case. The courts usually take the position that the area of dis-
cretion and judgment is broad enough to include the right to follow a 
given treatment procedure so long as there is a respectable minority of 
competent doctors that would follow it even though another procedure 
would be followed J>y a majority of practitioners. m · 
Contracting for Higher or Lower Standard 
In some circumstances, for example when the doctor gives express 
assurances that specific results can be achieved, the doctor may in effect 
contract for a higher degree of care and become almost an insurer. 
Thus in a California case the doctor was held to his assurances that no 
scar would result from the use of radiation treatment of swollen glands 
on the plaintiff's neck.158 The moral for the expert is, "Do not make 
promises as to results." 
Equally significant is the converse possibility that a patient may con-
tract to relieve the doctor of the risk of a negligence action where the 
doctor warns the patient of the danger involved in the use of repeated 
X-ray treatment. In one case, Gross v. Robinson/59 after three attempts 
156 Dunlap, "Medicolegal Aspects of Injuries from Exposure to X-Rays and Radio-
active Substances," 11 Mo. L. Rev. 137 (1946). · · 
1 51 Blankenship v. Baptist Mem. Hosp., supra note 146 at 148; Wemett v. Mount, 
supra note 146 at 313; and Harper & James !)69, n. 20. 
158 Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 P. 8o (1923). The only real defense 
was when the two year statute of limitations began to run. See also Stewart v. 
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957), where the court said a contract was 
made to use caesarian section delivery and failure to do so made the doctor liable for 
damages for a stillborn child. If our understanding of obstetrics is right the case was 
very shaky on the causation question, which was not· even discussed by the court. 
159 203 Mo. App. n8, 218 S.W. 924 ( 1918). 
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to take X-ray pictures with a defective machine the doctor warned the 
plaintiff of the danger of further exposures. Nevertheless, being re-
quested by the patient to take a diagnostic picture, further exposures 
were made and serious injury resulted. The court intimated that in 
proper circumstances the patient might assume risks but that in this 
particular case he did not assume the risk that the doctor would be neg-
ligent. The court concluded that there was evidence that the doctor was 
negligent in not realizing that his machine was faulty and that repeated 
use created ~a serious danger. 
Some General Ca.utions-Accurate Measurements and Records 
Just as is the case with breach of duty generally, few specific precau-
tions can be suggested to avoid the charge of negligence in the use of 
radiation. It seems perfectly clear from such cases as McElroy v. 
Frost/60 however, that treatment and even diagnostic use of X-rays 
(the same standard surely will be applied to the. use of radioisotopes) 
has become a very exacting science in which guess work and approxima-
tion are not sufficient. In that case the court found it significant that the 
defendant physician used an ordinary yardstick to measure the distance 
between the patient and the machine and an old alarm clock to time the 
exposures rather than the automatic devices available on other ma-
chines. The court likewise criticized the fact that the defendant often 
left the patient unattended during treatment periods. According to ex-
pert testimony, the exposure of the scrotum to 246o roentgens was 
enough to cause permanent sterility and the development of a fatal 
cancer. 
One positive precaution that would seem to be indicated for a physi-
cian who uses radiation in the treatment of patients is indicated in 
Thomas v. Lobrano.161 The plaintiff sustained extensive injuries, diag-
nosed as "bilateral auxiliary chronic radiodermatitis" (burned armpits). 
The facts were somewhat complex but the failure of the defendant 
physician to keep an accurate record of doses and times of exposure 
played a very significant role in the conclusion of the court that the evi-
dence of negligence clearly was sufficient to support the jury's judg-
ment for the plaintiff. With respect to the failure to keep adequate 
records the court said : 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the use of x-ray 
treatments is highly dangerous and it follows that the careless 
or inefficient administration of x-ray therapy is susceptible of 
160 Supra note 148. 
161 76 S.2d 599 (La. App. 1954). 
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disastrous consequences. It is true that Dr. Lobrano contends 
that records are relatively unnecessary to his administration 
of x-ray therapy. We not only question the correctness of this 
assertion but we are convinced that the record of the instant 
case is completely destructive of any claim of justification for 
such a conclusion. In the light of the established fact that the 
x-ray department of the Sanitarium accommodates an aver-
age of between 20 to 40 patients per day for photographs and 
treatment, we think the failure of the physician in charge of 
the department to maintain and avail himself of proper in-
formation which should be reflected by adequate records is 
a dangerous practice. . . . 
. . . We think the defendant has failed to discharge this bur-
den and to clear himself of the charge of negligence which is 
predicated upon his failure to have kept complete and accurate 
records of the treatment of the patient, Mrs. Thomas.182 
145 
In malpractice cases some difficulty in determining whether the 
proper standard of conduct has been followed undoubtedly arises from 
the fact that cases all too frequently fail to distinguish between the 
various aspects of a physician's duty. A doctor must first diagnose the 
patient's condition, then must determine and recommend treatment; 
and, finally, the treatment must be administered. The courts tend to 
refer to a general standard of care and skill, and allow considerable 
latitude for errors in judgment, regardless of which part of the physi-
cian's function has occasioned the injury in the particular case. While 
the courts so far have not differentiated between diagnostic and thera-
peutic uses of X-ray, it would seem well for them to do so. 
Distinguishing Diagnostic and Treatment Uses 
As more is learned about the dangerous attributes of radiation, the 
medical profession is beginning to develop humility with respect to its 
use and to recognize that in most if not in all cases radiation should be 
used as a treatment device only by radiologists. In many cases the use 
of radiation for treatment by a general practitioner probably should be 
considered as negligence. Moreover, while radiation levels generally are 
not as dangerous in diagnostic uses as in treatment techniques, it still 
is unwise to make any unnecessary use of radiation. 
For both diagnostic and treatment purposes it is becoming more im-
portant that the operator be expert in the use of new equipment and 
techniques to obtain the maximum results with the minimum of ex-
posure. This again probably should lead eventually to a rule that it is 
negligent for a general practitioner to use radiation except at quite low 
1e2 /d. at 612-13. 
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levels or when the particular technique for a specific condition has been 
thoroughly standardized. 
Standards for Operation of Equipment 
In any event, the very liberal standard 168 applied when considering a 
doctor's judgment or discretion should not be used in considering oper-
ation of such dangerous equipment. It is one thing to say that a doctor 
should not be too quickly second-guessed as to a diagnosis or a decision 
on a course of treatment. It is quite another to say that he should be 
given great. discretion in deciding how to operate the equipment to 
achieve the desired results. Radiologists are becoming much more exact 
in determining the amount of radiation needed to achieve certain re-
sults and how the radiation should be applied so as to do the least pos-
sible damage. The loose manner in which X-rays and other radiation 
sources frequently have been used in the last thirty years has come 
under criticism by the medical profession itself. It has begun to take 
note of the necessity of avoiding unnecessary exposure even to diag-
nostic X-rays. In each case considered judgment should be made of 
whether or not the need for information outweighs the dangers in-
volved in subjecting the patient to radiation.164 
Hypersensitivity to Radiation 
One other aspect of the X-ray malpractice cases may have signifi-
cance in radiation injury cases arising from the use of radioisotopes for 
medical and other purposes. Frequently the defendant physician con-
tends that the injury to the patient resulted, not from a lack of due care, 
but because of the hypersensitivity of the particular patient to X-rays. 
In nine of sixteen cases collected in a recent A.L.R. annotation, 165 this 
defense was held to be inadequate. The fact that it was successful in 
seven indicates it may be available in a proper case.166 
The Wisconsin court in Nelson v. Newell 167 placed an important 
limitation upon the use of hypersensitivity as a defense. The defendant 
physician offered the hypothesis that hypersensitivity of the patient 
might explain the injury that resulted from the X-ray treatments, but 
1sa Harper & James g68, 969. 
164 Hodges, "Health Hazards in·the Diagilostic Use of X-Ray," 166 ].A. MA. 577, 
583 (1958). 
165 41 A.L.Rzd 329 (1955). 
166 The seven cases where the defense successfully asserted hypersensitivity were in 
states which do not use the res ipsa laquitur doctrine in such cases. The other nine 
were in states which apply res ipsa loquitur. The courts did not always discuss the 
relationship between hypersensitivity and res ipsa loquit11r, however. This relationship 
problem will be discussed later in the section on proof problems. 
167 195 Wis. 572, 217 N.w: 723 (1928). 
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he did not offer evidence that the particular patient was especially sen-
sitive. The court stated that if a finding of negligence could be set aside 
merely on the speculation that the patient might be hypersensitive, mal-
practice cases involving the use of X-rays could never be successfully 
prosecuted. 
In Hess v. Rouse 168 another possible limitation upon the use of 
unusual susceptibility as a defense was indicated. The court noted that 
experts testified to the effect that hypersensitivity usually appeared 
after the first or second treatment but in this particular case the burns 
did not appear until after the third treatment. The court concluded that 
hypersensitivity was not the cause of the burns. Moreover, the court 
accepted testimony that lack of hypersensitivity could be assumed even 
though the first exposures were to other parts of the body. 
In Lewis v. Casenburg 169 an expert testified that not only does hyper-
sensitivity appear after the first one or two treatments but also that 
the likelihood of a person being hypersensitive to radiation was very 
slight. Under the facts of the case, however, hypersensitivity as a de-
fense did not seem persuasive in view of the fact that 161 separate X-
ray treatments of the patient's abdomen had been given by the defend-
ant. On· the other hand, the court in Kuttner v. Swanson 170 held that 
the jury was authorized to find that plaintiff had an idiosyncrasy of 
peculiar susceptibility on the basis of evidence that the three doses 
administered were not enough to produce injury in the absence of idio-
syncrasy. Again, in Nance v. Hitch 171 the court attached significance 
to the testimony of an expert to the effect that individual idiosyncrasy is 
a factor with respect to X-ray burns and that the only way to determine 
whether a patient has unusual susceptibility is to burn him. This testi-
mony was a persuasive factor in the court's decision to reject the 
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; one cannot assume safely that 
a burn necessarily indicates. negligence, the court concluded. 
One other fact should. be pointed out in ~onnection with the cases in-
volving a defense of hypersensitivity. Those in which hypersensitivity 
has been asserted success fully are in general more recen~ than those in 
which it was.unsuccessful, the former being decided mostly in the past 
thirty years while the others were prior to 1930. The trend, therefore, 
may be in favor of the defense, but a possible explanation is that in-
16s 22 S.W.:zd 1077 (Tex. Civ. App; 1929). 
169 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d SoB· (1928). 
17,0 Sttfrra note. 146. 
111 Supra note 141. 
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surance companies are not defending malpractice cases unless the 
chance of success is very good. 
(2) Radiation Injuries Not Involving Medical Mal-
practice 
There are at least three non-malpractice radiation injury cases which 
deal with the problem of a breach of duty to use due care. Each of them 
deals with the liability of an employer to an employee who received 
radiation injury. They are especially important, therefore, to the atomic 
energy entrepreneur in assessing his legal responsibilities where radio-
active material is being used. 
The first is Vallat v. Radium Dial Company/'2 where the plaintiff 
alleged that in 1929 she was employed by the defendant as a radium 
dial painter. She claimed that the defendant took no safety precautions 
with respect to particles of radium dust in the atmosphere where she 
worked and that she inhaled and swallowed 'these particles, which 
produced anemia, rarefaction of the bones, alveoli of the jaws, and 
other disorders. The complaint charged that the illnesses resulted from 
a violation of an Illinois statute (typical of those found in many states) 
providing that employers "shall, for the protection of all employees en-
gaged in [peculiarly hazardous]. .. work or process, adopt and pro-
vide reasonable and approved devices, means or methods for the pre-
vention of such industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to 
such work or process." The State Departm~nt of Factory Inspection 
was authorized to promulgate rules and require compliance with these 
standards. 
The defendant company filed a motion for judgment on the ground 
that the occupational disease act was unconstitutional because it failed 
to set up an intelligible standard of duty and therefore violated the due 
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The company also 
contended that the act violated the separation of powers concept of the 
state constitution because it unlawfully conferred legislative powers 
on the State Department of Factory Inspection. Further, the defendant 
supported the motion for judgment by arguing that plaintiff had neither 
a common law nor a statutory remedy because the complaint showed on 
its face that she was not an employee of the defendant when the disease 
became manifest, and, finally, it was claimed that the suit was not filed 
within two years after the ·cause of action accrued. 
The court invalidated the statute on the ground that the phrase 
"reasonable and approved devices, means or methods for the prevention 
172 JOO Ill. 407, I¢ N.E. 456 (1935). 
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of such industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to such work 
or process" did not meet the requirements of due process of law. These 
words were held to be vague and indefinite, not furnishing an intelligent 
standard of conduct to be observed by the employers. The court also 
concluded that the delegation to an official of the power to define words 
not of common knowledge is unwarranted and void. Today it is un-
likely that many state courts would hold this a violation of the separa-
tion of powers concepts, and certainly the delegation of authority is no 
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.178 While the Illinois court confused the two is-
sues, the question of a standard definite enough to give sufficient notice 
to meet a due process requirement is treated much more liberally (or 
loosely) today than formerly, particularly in connection with adminis-
tratively enforced statutes. The opinion of the court is not clear as to 
whether the Department of Factory Inspection had actually prescribed 
standards of conduct to be followed by employers in such cases as in-
volved here. If the standards were laid down before the time of employ-
ment of the plaintiff as a radium dial painter, then there could be no 
question of notice, but simply one of whether or not there was a lawful 
delegation of legislative power.m So long as notice of a specific stand-
ard of conduct is given by the administrator before any liability at-
taches, there usually is no problem of notification. It seems quite un-
likely that today such a case would be decided on these grounds, and 
hence the case is not particularly significant in connection with prospec-
tive radiation injuries. 
The next case is far more significant for the atomic energy entre-
preneur. If it should be followed by other courts, it might mean that 
compliance with nationally recognized radiation standards in effect 
constitutes a prima facie, if not a conclusive, defense against a charge 
of failure to use due care. This case is Rakowski v. Raybestos-Manhat-
tan, Inc., decided in 1949 by the New Jersey Superior Court.115 The 
11a Separation of power in the states is only a question of republic form of govern-
ment and is a non-justiciable issue. See discussion in Jaffe, "An Essay on Delegation 
of Legislative Power: II," 47 Col. L. Rev. 561, 581 ff. (1947). On republican form 
of government, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 (1849); Pacific States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 32 S.Ct. 224 (1912). 
174 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 66o (1944) is a perfect example 
of such a case (involving price regulations during World War II). Comment, 53 Mich. 
L. Re.v. 264 (1954) is the most complete collection and analysis of various factors to 
be considered that was found. See particularly 27o-72. 
175 5 N.J. Super. 203,68 A.2d 641 (1949), certif. den. 3 N.J. 502,70 A.2d go8 (1949). 
An award of $52,8oo was given to an Australian worker whose leg had to be amputated 
because of radiation burns received from a small radioactive capsule carried in his 
pocket for 6 days. Atomic Industrial Forum, April 1958, p. 27. 
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plaintiff was employed by the defendant in the X-ray department to 
operate a fluoroscope to test rubber belting for defects. The controls for 
the fluoroscope were in a room separated from the machine, and the 
pl~intiff viewed the operation through a lead glass window. Evidence 
submitted by the defendant indicated that the construction of the room 
and the operation of the machine were such that the radiation which 
could be received by an operator even with the door open was substan-
tially less than the permissible dosage for such installations under ac-
cepted national standards, including that of the American War Stand-
ard Safety Code for Industrial Use of X-ray. Tests made before and 
after the suit was commenced revealed that at no time was the maxi-
mum radiation in the room where plaintiff worked more than one half 
of the suggested permissible dose of 12.5 milliroentgens per hour for 
~ an eight-hour day and a six-day week. Plaintiff alleged that prior to her 
employment she had enjoyed good health and in fact passed the physical 
examination necessary for. employment in the defendant's plant. She 
also alleged that although she was only twenty-five years old, after 
commencing to operate the machine she underwent ·a premature meno-
pause and. suffered telangiectasis in the central portion of her face, a 
condition which manifests itself by showing the fine superficial capil-
laries and giving an appearance of premature aging. Expert witnesses 
called by the plaintiff testified that her condition was attributable to the 
absorption of X-rays that penetrated the room in which she worked. 
The experts set up their own standard as to what would be reasonable 
care under the circumstances, a standard which apparently was con-
siderably different from that set up by the American Standards Asso-
ciation. The plaintiff charged that the trial court erred in directing a 
verdict ·for the defendant, claiming that she had made a prima facie 
case. In stating the general rule concerning the degree of care required, 
the court said : 
It is the general rule that the mere fact that an instrumen-
tality may become dangerous to others does not constitute its 
possessor an insurer against injury that may result therefrom. 
Liability for negligence in respect to dangerous instrumen-
talities, as liability for negligence generally, arises from the 
failure to use due care. A higher degree of care is required in 
dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs 
of life or business which involve little or no risk. The law 
exacts of one who puts a force in motion that he shall control 
it with a skill and care in proportion to the danger created 
and with appliance~ which, in view of the circumstances, are 
reasonably safe. In other words, the essential requirement of 
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due care under the circumstances necessarily implies that the 
care required to prevent injury to others in using a dangerous 
instrumentality is a great or high degree and every reasonable 
precaution suggested by experience and the known dangers of 
the ~ubject ought to be taken.176 
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In other words, a man of ordinary prudence when using a dangerous 
machine. must take greater precautions. As the court stated it, quoting 
from an earlier case: 
"Rather does it mean the exercise of that degree of care, of 
that manner of fulfillment of duty, which comprehends a cir-
cumspection, a foresight, a prevision which has due and 
proper regard to reasonably probable contingencies." 177 
The court also approved the following language: 
"Every peril, it is safe to say, including such as are termed 
'latent' or 'hidden,' need not be discovered, since liability for 
negligence in keeping a dangerous instrumentality is not abso-
lute. If, however, common experience has demonstrated that 
dangers lurk in the method adopted or in the instrumentality 
maintained by a person, he rests under the obligation of ascer-
taining the peril and taking precautions to avoid injury there-
from." 178 
The court, nevertheless, held that defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict was properly granted, because, even under the proofs submitted, 
there was insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict that defendant 
was negligent even though he was dealing with a dangerous instrument. 
Since the testimony revealed that the defendant's construction, installa-
tion, and operational techniques complied with the generally accepted 
standards, and since the defendant used a competent and recognized 
radiation expert who had advised the two room installation, all necessary 
precautions had been taken for the reasonable safety and protection of 
the operator of the machine. The court said that plaintiff's experts 
could not use a standard of their own but should have shown that the 
defendant's installations and operations were not in conformity with 
the "standard practice in the industry." The court concluded that a con-
trary rule "would mean that industrial concerns would be subjected to 
the mere caprice of juries, and held accountable for actionable negli-
gence regardless of whether they adopted a recognized standard of in-
stallation or not." 179 In effect this is tantamount to a rule that compli-
178 /d. at 207. [Emphasis added.] 
177 /d. at 2o8. See also same idea expressed in cases discussed supra at note 40. 
178 I d. at 2fYJ. 
179 /d. at 210. 
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ance with established codes concerning radiation means that there can 
be no inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, even if it 
should be accepted as true that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the 
X-rays that penetrate the room in which she worked. The court did not 
co~sider the question of whether the industry standard was sufficiently 
high, it merely assumed it and refused to accept the standard asserted 
by plaintiff's experts. 
If this view should be followed generally in radiation cases, it would 
make the problem of tort liability a much easier one to solve. The opin-
ion of the court, however, may be contrary to the views of treatise 
writers;. they are inclined toward the view that proof of compliance 
with a safety code, whether established by unofficial experts in the field 
or by statute or official administrative rulings, should be treated merely 
as evidence of use of due care.180 
Moreover, from the opinion in the Rakowsk~ case one cannot con-
clude without question that the court is holding that compliance with 
such a safety code is conclusive for the defendant. This is a fair impli-
cation from some of the language used, but the plaintiff rested her case 
solely on the testimony of experts as to what they would regard as a 
reasonable standard. So far as the opinion indicates, no attempt was 
made to show directly that compliance with the accepted standard would 
not meet the standard of what a reasonably prudent man would do 
under the circumstances, although this is implied rather clearly by the 
testimony solicited from the plaintiff's experts. It might be possible for 
plaintiff in a subsequent case involving similar compliance to show that 
the code promulgated by the National Committee on Radiation Pro-
tection is somewhat out of date and, therefore, compliance with it 
might not amount to reasonable care. The recent establishment by the 
Atomic Energy Commission of a standard of exposure for its own em-
ployees of roughly one third of that which is still permitted for em-
ployees of licensees raises this possibility. The AEC apparently thinks 
that the lower dosage probably should be adopted from the standpoint 
of the workers' safety. Nevertheless, on balancing the interests of 
society in developing the atomic energy industry against admittedly 
only a possible danger from such low level radiation, the higher level 
is considered reasonable. All things considered, too much reliance 
should not be placed on the Rakowski case, although it is an important 
precedent. 
The third case in point is Kress v. City of Newark, decided in New 
1so Supra Section B, 2 a. 
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Jersey in 1950.181 In this case the plaintiff was the employee of the 
Newark City Hospital where she worked at first as a maid and later in 
the X-ray department, where she helped prepare patients for photo-
graphing. After several years in this task she was assigned to the devel-
opment room, and until 1941, some eight years after she was- first em-
ployed, her exposure to X-rays was minimal. In 1942, however, the 
plaintiff was asked to become an X-ray technician. She received no for-
~al training, "learning" by watching other technicians whom she 
as~isted. After a relatively short period of observing she was given a 
portable X-ray machine to be used in the wards. She was furnished no 
portable safety screen and frequently stood across the table from the pa-
tient in such a manner that she also would be exposed. While taking 
d~ntal X-rays she often held the film in place herself. This occurred as 
many as sixty times a week over a period of several years, during which 
time she received no warning of the danger inherent in the X-ray beam . 
.A· blood count was never taken during this period, except once on the 
occasion of an operation. Only once, in 1944, did a doctor suggest that a 
monitor film be attached on her uniform. On development the film 
·showed presence of X-rays. It was not until a year or two later, how-
ever, that plaintiff noticed spots on her hand which she showed the chief 
of the X-ray department. In August, 1946, the plaintiff's finger acci-
dentally was torn open and a biopsy was made by a doctor in another 
New York hospital. She ceased working in the X-ray department at that 
time, and was referred to a doctor who confirmed a diagnosis of skin 
cancer. Further operations were performed in later years, and, finally, 
in 1949 the whole surface of her hand down to the tendon sheet was 
removed. Prognosis at the time of the trial was that amputation would 
probably have to follow, with no guarantee that the cancer would be 
arrested. One of the experts in the case was Dr. Arthur Mutcheller, a 
biophysicist and radio-physicist, specializing for twenty years on the 
effect of radiation upon living material. He testified that standard prac-
tice in the use of portable X-ray machines called for a protective screen 
for the operator. He stated that in taking dental X-ray pictures the 
standard procedure was to use a lead screen, and to prohibit holding 
the film in place by the technician. 
The lower court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss on four 
grounds : ( 1) plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of establishing 
181 9 N.J. Super. 70,74 A.2d 902 (1950). A statement reported in N.Y. Times, Febru-
ary 20, 1959, p. 10, col. 4. indicates hospital operators of radiation sources are not well 
enough protected. 
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defendant's negligence; (2) she was guilty of contributory negligence; 
(3) a municipality can only be liable for "affirmative wrongdoing"; 
and (4) a charitable institution is not liable for the negligence of its 
agents. On the first two grounds the court on appeal held that there 
was sufficient evidence to raise a question properly to be decided by the 
jury. On the third ground, the court decided that if the jury found that 
the city put the X-ray machine into operation without a lead screen, 
without giving adequate instruction to the plaintiff as to the dangers, 
and without periodic use of monitor film and adequate protective gloves 
and apron, then the city was clearly "an active wrongdoer." The court 
felt that· this was quite like cases involving unguarded holes and ditches 
where proper safeguards are not taken, and quoted with approval the 
opinion recorded in the Rakowski case. As to the fourth ground, the 
court held that a hospital was not a "charitable" institution with respect 
to the plaintiff, who was not a beneficiary of the charity but an employee 
of the hospital. 
Conclusion 
In a field developing as rapidly as atomic energy, particularly as to 
our knowledge of the injurious effect of radiation, it would be most 
unfortunate if statutes, administrative regulations, or decisional rules 
should develop hard and fast lines as to what is or is not a reasonable 
standard of conduct. Some dramatic discovery, for example some 
simple chemical or drug which will either give considerable immunity 
or considerably reduce the aftereffects of radiation exposure/82 could 
be important in determining whether or not the conduct followed by 
the defendant in a particular case meets the standard of reasonableness. 
Some such discovery might reduce dramatically the risks involved in 
temporary, fairly high radiation exposure, or make it perfectly reason-
able to expose persons to higher levels of radiation if the new tech-
niques were used. 
The converse is equally true. If new concepts and techniques are 
found, an employer or other user of radioactive materials should not 
be allowed to adhere stubbornly to a code previously promulgated and 
accepted in the industry. This variable standard of conduct will not be 
quite as comfortable for the defendant as would be the official pro-
nouncement. He would like to know exactly what standard of care will 
be considered reasonably prudent action. Nor will it be as good for the 
plaintiff who would like to be able to prove his case merely by showing 
non-compliance with official standards, yet it would seem more nearly 
182 See supra note 153. 
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fair in individual cases. A defendant's reasonableness should be judged 
by taking into account the techniques, new as well as old, which are 
available for reducing the hazard or preventingthe aftereffects of ex-
posure. This is important, for example, in a case such as the recent Oak 
Ridge. accident where at least one worker was reported to have received 
320 rads.188 It might become standard practice to have employees who 
undertake these operations during which serious exposure would result 
in the event of an accident take such pills as may prove to be effective 
in reducing the injurious consequences of exposure. Compliance or non-
compliance with industry safety codes certainly should be given weight, 
and in most cases perhaps should constitute prima facie, if not conclu-
sive, proof, when no evidence to the contrary is introduced. Courts, 
however, should avoid a rigid rule and decide individual cases on the 
basis of the specific evidence produced. 
As suggested in the Lobrano case, 184 due care probably requires the 
user of radioactive material to keep accurate and detailed records of his 
operations. Not only doctors 'and radiologists, but also other users of 
radioactive materials should keep such records. Often it will prove help-
ful to the defendant himself. Certainly, it seems a necessary require-
ment to protect the potential plaintiff because without such information 
it becomes very difficult for him to prove injury from radiation at a 
particular time and from a particular source, except in the most obvi-
ous cases such as when third degree burns result. Possibly a rule re-
quiring the keeping of careful records should be adopted and combined 
with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine so as to make failure to keep such 
records a prima facie case of negligence. This is discussed later in con-
nection with res ipsa loquitur.185 
(3) The Use of Expert Testimony 
Running through all of the radiation cases so far discussed is a com-
mon problem. How does one prove that the defendant .in the particular 
case did or did not meet the standard of conduct of a reasonably pru-
dent man under the circumstances? Must expert testimony be used or 
will lay testimony serve the purpose? Harper and James state the gen-
eral rule as follows : 
Except for malpractice cases (against a doctor, dentist, etc.) 
there is no general rule or policy requiring expert testimony as 
18s Infra Chapter IV at note 125. 
18~ Supra note 161. 
185/nfra discussion in text beginning at note 1146, particularly at notes 1234-35. 
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to the standard of care, and this is true even in the increas-
ingly broad area wherein expert opinion will be received. On 
the other hand, any given matter may conceivably be so far 
out of the range of general experience that a jury will not be 
allowed to decide upon the reasonableness of an actor's conduct 
without the aid of expert testimony which at least explains to 
the layman the esoteric problems and the possibility and prac-
ticability of precautions. ***Courts could very easily expand 
the area in which expert testimony is required to establish the 
standard of conduct, but the tendency has been instead to re-
solve doubtful questions in favor of allowing the jury to de-
cide the issue of negligence without its aid.186 
One situation in which the courts have not resolved doubtful ques- · 
tions concerning the need for expert testimony in favor of enlarging the 
jury's sphere is when a doctor is accused of malpractice. There may be . 
cases where "negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would 
have no difficulty in recognizing it," 187 but in general the plaintiff must 
use experts to show a lack of reasonable professional skill. 
In a recent case, Facer v. Lewis, the Michigan Supreme Court said: 
Although we have held that leaving a sponge in a wound is 
not good medical practice and does not require the testimony 
of expert witnesses to establish this fact, the proper or im-
proper use of X-rays does require the testimony of experts.188 
In this case the defendant doctor used X-rays to treat the decedent for 
warts on his foot. The patient suffered a radiation burn severe enough 
to cripple him and he sued for damages charging defendant with negli-
gence. Upon his death his administratrix was substituted as party plain-
tiff. The only expert testimony offered by the plaintiff was to the effect 
that in X-ray treatment procedure intensity, time and distance are im-
portant factors in determining the proper dose. The only evidence in-
dicating negligence was that of decedent's son describing what the de-
fendant had done in treating his father's foot. Defendant moved for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that only an ex-
pert can establish negligence in such a case. In approving the trial 
court's granting of the defendant's motion the court said: 
Although laymen generally are acquainted with the fact 
that X-rays are destructive and may result in burns or other 
186 Harper & James 966-67. 
187 Harper & James 968 (quoting from 7 Wigmore, Evidence §2090 (3d ed. 1940)) 
and cases cited at n. 15. To these should be added Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 
383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928), where the court said that the exposure period was such 
that "even the merest tyro would know was improper." Even the defendant admitted it. 
188 Facer v. Lewis, supra note 141 at 713. 
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serious conditions, yet the testimony of plaintiff's own medi-
cal witness was such as to clearly demonstrate that an X-ray 
treatment for warts involves questions of skill, judgment and 
practice beyond the knowledge of laymen and upon which a 
jury would need the advice of experts to determine whether 
or not the claimed acts of defendant were improper. We be-
lieve the facts in the case at bar are such that the questions 
of negligence became exclusively for expert testimony.189 
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A Mississippi decision, Waddle v. Sutherland/90 appears at first 
reading to reach a contrary result. After X-ray treatment by the de-
fendant of the plaintiff for eczema his leg had to be amputated because 
of radiation burns. Both sides presented expert testimony and in addi-
tion the plaintiff testified as a witness in his own behalf, apparently de-
scribing acts and circumstances concerning the final treatment tending 
to show an overdose of X-ray because of overlapping.191 The plaintiff 
also testified that defendant stated at the time of his last treatment that 
this was going to be a strongt;r dose than he had previously given. The 
plaintiff's wife testified that the defendant doctor told her that they 
would probably have to amputate both of his legs and that the doctor 
blamed himself for the bums, not his assistant: "it was his mistake and 
not hers." The trial court instructed the jury that, in deciding whether 
the doctor treated the plaintiff in a "proper manner and with ordinary 
care and skill," and whether there was any negligence on the part of the 
defendant in the use of the X-ray machine, they could consider only the 
testimony of those "who themselves possess the skill required to admin-
ister such treatment and qualify themselves as expert in such treat-
ment. . . ." The trial court's verdict was for the defendant doctor. 
The supreme court reversed, using the following language : 
By the instruction given appellee, copied above, the court 
told the jury, in effect, that ·in considering and deciding the 
issues of fact, they were confined alone to the evidence of the 
experts. By this instruction the court necessarily excluded 
from the consideration of the jury, not only the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur embodied in the two instructions given ap-
pellant, but also the evidence of both appellant and his wife, 
to the effect that appellant's injuries were the result of a third 
189 I d. at 714. 
190 156 Miss. 540, 126 So. 201 (1930). 
191 Overlapping results when the operator fails to keep the beam sufficiently narrow. 
To avoid unnecessary exposure of the good tissue, particularly at the surface, repeated 
deep therapy X-rays are focused on the deep spot from different surface angles. If the 
beam is not narrow there will be overlapping and therefore unnecessary exposure of 
the surface which can lead to serious burns. 
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degree bum, which fact he had admitted to appellant's wife, 
along with the statement that such bum was the result of his 
fault, and not that of Miss Satterfield, his assistant. 
. . . In a case depending upon expert testimony alone such 
instruction would be proper; but this is not that kind of a 
case. This is a case where there is nonexpert testimony, as 
well as expert testimony bearing on the issues. The effect of 
this instruction was to tell the jury not only to disregard the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur embodied in two of appellant's 
instructions, but also to disregard the evidence of both appel-
lant and his wife.192 
It is also important that the plaintiff's testimony was in addition to that 
of his own expert witnesses. 
Laying aside the fact that Michigan does not apply res ipsa loquitur 
to this type of case while Mississippi does, it is possible to reconcile 
these cases on a ground that well might be a satisfactory basis for deter-
mining when expert testimony is required and when it is not. If the lay 
testimony goes only to a description of events occurring during a treat-
ment and to reporting comments made by an attending physician or his 
assistants, there is only the question of probative value to be attached to 
the evidence. But if the lay witness attempts to show that this action 
constitutes lack of careful and prudent attention by the doctor because it 
is not in accordance with the care and skill ordinarily expected of a doc-
tor under these circumstances, this would seem to be outside the area of 
knowledge of a non-expert witness, unless it is a situation where the 
"merest tyro" could determine that ordinary care and skill was not 
used. The court in Butler v. Rule seems to make just this distinction, 
although the only expert testimony there was to the effect that the treat-
ment was given as the defendant testified and that it was proper. Be-
cause there was conflict as to how far the machine was placed from the 
patient the court said: 
However, if there was evidence as to the manner in which 
defendant administered the treatment in conflict with his test-
imony, and tending to show that in some essential the treat-
ment was not given as defendant stated, the expert testimony 
to that extent would fail, and a question of fact for the jury 
arise.193 
The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, however, because the in-
structions to the jury were based upon the wrong standard of care. 
192 Supra note 190 at 550, 551. 
1 93 Supra note 154 at 412. ·see also supra note 140. 
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In Christie v. Callahan all the expert witnesses testified that the treat-
ment, if given by the defendant doctor as described by him, was reason-
able. Nevertheless, the jury had found the doctor to be neglige~t. The 
majority of the court of appeals stated: 
The jury must have found that the treatments were not given 
exactly as Dr. Merritt testified they were, and that, unfortu-
nately, he gave more than the amount proper for treatment of 
pilonidal cyst. . . . 
The opposing view appears to be based on the theory that 
negligence in X-ray treatments can be shown only by direct 
and positive testimony of X-ray specialists to specific acts of 
negligence taking place in the course of the treatment. A 
burden so heavy is not required either by the general law of 
negligence or by the Sweeney case. Generally speaking, direct 
and positive testimony to specific acts of negligence is not re-
quired to establish it. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, 
either alone or in combination with direct evidence.194 
The majority concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's finding that the defendant had been negligent. 
Where the only question is whether or not the actions of the defend-
ant doctor met the accepted standard of reasonable care and skill under 
the circumstances, surely it would be proper to insist on expert testi-
mony. When this is the case, a statement by the California court in 
Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute indicates the typical judicial 
attitude: "The,question as to whether there has been a breach of this 
standard of care is one which can be resolved only by the testimony of 
experts." 195 
Where testimony by experts creates a conflict as to what is a proper 
course of treatment in a particular case, the opinion of the court in the 
Blankenship case is typical. _The court said: 
In view of this divergence of opinion among the specialists it 
cannot be said that it should be left to a jury of laymen to 
determine which method of treatment is right, which would 
be the effect of saying that the court erred in directing a ver-
dict for the defendant Hospital in this case.196 
Later in the same opinion the court said : 
As long as there is room for an honest difference of opinion 
among competent physicians, a physician who uses his own 
194 Supra note 142 at 839. 
195 102 Cal. App.2d 293, 2g6, 227 P.2d 473 ( 1951). 
196 Supra note 146 at 142. Not to be confused, however, with the case where action 
did not conform to either school or they both agree on this point, W emett v. Mount, 
supra note 146. 
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best judgment cannot be convicted of negligence, even though 
it may afterward develop that he was mistaken. . .. 
And where there is a difference of opinion among physi-
cians or surgeons with reference to the treatment to be given 
in a particular case, a physician will not be held liable for mal-
practice if he follows the course of treatment advocated by a 
considerable number of physicians of good standing in his 
community. It would not be competent for a court or jury in 
such a case to say that a physician who followed either of said 
different methods of treatment was negligent.197 
On the other hand, in Simon v. Kaplan the court said that where 
expert testimony for the plaintiff and the defendant was in conflict, it 
would not set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff because, "in these 
circumstances we are not warranted under the law, in disturbing the 
verdict of the jury." 198 The decision of the majority in the Christie 
case,189 allowing the jury to decide the question .of negligence, did not 
really involve a question of the doctor's judgment being a reasonable 
one. The attack was not on the opinion of the expert witnesses for the 
defendant but on the accuracy of the defendant doctor's statement as 
to what was done. It might be argued, however, that the doctor also was 
accused of not using proper treatment and the court did allow the 
jury's finding to stand. 
Another problem concerning the use of expert witnesses may prove 
very important in atomic energy cases. It is the training and experience 
that qualifies a person as an expert on radiation injuries. The general 
rule certainly is that stated by the court in Young v. Stevens: 
Appellant's first point is that it was error to permit certain 
expert testimony to be given by witnesses who were licensed 
physicians. The questions had to do with X-ray and the like, 
and the argument is that because these physicians did not hold 
themselves out as specialists in that branch of the profession 
they were not competent to testify thereon. It is well estab-
lished that having qualified as medical doctors they are com-
petent to testify on all medical subjects upon which they claim 
sufficient ability to express an opinion. The qualification of an 
expert is for the determination of the trial court and such 
determination will not be disturbed where the ruling is sup-
ported by evidence. . . . 200 
101 Supra note 146 at 144. 
198 321 Ill. App. 203, 210, 52 N.E.zd 832 (1944). 
100 Supra note 142. 
2oo 132 N.J.L. 124, 126, 39 A.zd 115 (1949). 
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As to the weight to be given to testimony of various expert witnesses, 
however, the fact pointed out by the court m Thomas v. Lobrano is 
true: 
It has been well and soundly established with reference to 
the evaluation of the opinion testimony of expert medical 
witnesses that the conclusions of qualified specialists in the 
various fields of medicine are entitled to greater weight than 
that accorded the opinions of general practitioners.201 
In deciding this question of the use of expert testimony, it is most 
important that the court take into account the distinction previously 
suggested 202 between the operation of radiation equipment and deciding 
whether or not to use it for diagnosis and treatment. The proper way 
in which to use the radioactive source or technique has now been de-
veloped into a fairly complex science in which the amount of voltage, 
size of the opening, type of shielding, and the distance from the ma-
chine to the affected area are all important calculations that can and 
must be made with considerable accuracy. Unless the person using the 
equipment is prepared to make the calculations and to use the machines 
with expert care, he ought not to attempt it, even though he is a licensed 
physician. In addition, in determining what is due care, a court should 
not accept loose practices followed in a particular local community. As 
is indicated by the court in the McElroy case,203 knowledge of the use 
of radioactive sources is nation-wide and there would seem to be no 
reason to allow local practices of a small group, even of licensed physi-
cians, to vary from the standard now generally accepted throughout the 
country. 
Even more important in the atomic energy cases will be the question 
of whether persons not licensed to practice medicine should be allowed 
to testify. Since a great deal of our knowledge in this area is being de-
veloped by experts who are not licensed physicians (biologists, physi-
cists, chemists, and others with similar scientific training), it would 
seem quite ridiculous for the courts to refuse to recognize the validity 
of opinion testimony given by such persons, especially in non-malprac-
tice cases. Although the question was not litigated specifically, such non-
physician experts were allowed to testify and their testimony given 
great weight in several recent cases.20' The court in the Rakowski case, 
201 Supra note 161 at 614. 
2o2 See discussion supra at notes 173, 164. 
203 Supra note 148. 
204 Kress v. City of Newark, supra note 181 at 74 (bio-physicist and radio-physicist 
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apparently allowed non-medical experts to testify for they refer to the 
plaintiff's "medical and expert witnesses." 205 In addition, non-medical 
experts participated in establishing the standards which were promul-
gated by the American Standards Association and admitted as evidence 
in the case. 
( 4) Conclusions 
The general impression one gets from reading the radiation cases is 
that there is a growing tendency among the courts to recognize that it 
has become general knowledge among informed people that the use of 
radiation is something to be undertaken only if due consideration is 
given to the substantial dangers inherent in its use. The courts are be-
ginning to recognize that the use of such materials has developed into a 
fairly exact science as far as measurement and production techniques are 
concerned. It also is true that the courts apparently are insisting that 
recognition be taken of new advances by any one who uses such ma-
terial, whether he be a doctor or an industrialist. It is not suggested, 
however, tliat courts will hold doctors liable for errors in judgment as to 
the amount of radiation necessary to cure diseases or in drawing fine 
lines as to how much radiation can be risked, all things considered. Cer-
tainly the reasonable-man standard would require the advice of radia-
tion experts in most cases, at least at the time of setting up the plan of 
operation and installing the radioactive source or operational technique. 
In the light of the rapid development of specialized knowledge in this 
area, it also would seem that there are some instances, both in the area 
of medical practice and that of industrial uses, where radiation should 
not be used without the supervision of a person fully qualified in the 
field. This would be true in the operation of a nuclear reactor as well as 
in many other cases involving less severe radiation hazards. The better 
part of valor would be to use the expert-the reasonably prudent man 
will. Our suggested model state statute accepts this premise. 206 
specializing in effects of radiation cin living tissue) ; Henslin v. Wheaton, 91 Minn. 219, 
221, 97 N.W. 882 (1904) (a professor of physical sciences specializing in electricity); 
Lamme v. Ortega, 267 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Colo. 1954) (radiology-physicist and expert in 
use of X-ray machines). See also La Porte v. U.S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 
(D.C.N.J. 1935) (court referred to non-medical experts needed in radiation field). 
20 5 Supra note 175 at 211. The opinion does not state this fact specifically but it is 
clear that the experts must have been non-doctors. 
zo6 Infra Part III, .Chapter VI. 
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3· Vicarious Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractors 
a. Introduction and Limitations of Discussion 
Remembering that radioactive material is uniquely insidious not only 
because it gives no warning to the usual human senses but also because 
in many cases its hazard continues for many years and in some cases 
centuries, and finally because the radiation source cannot be turned off 
like a machine, the owner or operator surely will consider seriously the 
possibility of immunizing himself from some of the consequent tort 
liability. One of the ways in which immunity may perhaps be obtained 
is through the use of independent contractors for certain operations. 
Therefore, consideration must be given to the concepts of vicarious lia-
bility.207 It does not fit well into either duty or breach analysis and is 
treated separately here although admittedly both duty and breach ideas 
are involved. 
Vicarious liability is a very broad subject. It covers the whole ambit 
of principal-agency, master-servant, independent contractor, and joint 
enterprise. Many aspects of vicarious liability would seem to present no 
significant problems in atomic energy situations, at least in the sense of 
being unique or unusually troublesome. For example, the rules of 
master-servant will not be changed for radiation cases. The same is 
true as to joint enterprise questions. 
The use of independent contractors, however, will create trouble-
some questions. Yet even within this area there are many questions 
which present no peculiar problem for our purposes; e.g., where to 
draw the line between an employee and an independent contractor. The 
distinction between an independent contractor and an employee is not 
nearly so significant as it once was in tort cases. The important question 
today seems to be not whether the negligent person was an employee or 
an independent contractor but, assuming he was an independent con-
tractor, whether his negligence will be imputed to the one who hires 
him. Without question the old immunity said to follow automatically 
from hiring an independent contractor {who by definition was not 
within the control of the other contractingparty) now has so many ex-
ceptions that it is scarcely recognizable as a general rule. This is quite 
consistent with the general trend toward extending liability, such as in 
20 7 Prosser 350 ff; Harper & James 1361 ff; early Annot., 23 A.L.R. 984-II35 (1923). 
For California cases, see Comment, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 762 (1956), and for West Virginia 
cases see Brown, "Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in West Vir-
ginia," 55 W.Va. L. Rev. 216 (1953). 
164 TORT LIABILITY 
product liability cases to be discussed later,208 and the extension of lia-
bility of the independent contractor himself for injuries taking place 
after his work has been accepted but caused by conditions created by his 
negligence which he reasonably could have foreseen might cause inju-
ries to a third party. 209 This trend is also discernible in cases involving 
the liability to be imposed on the employer for the negligence of an in-
dependent contractor. It should not be assumed, however, that all dis-
tinctions will be ignored and that the independent contractor's negli-
gence will always be imputed to the other party. In this regard the 
English courts evidently have been moving in the direction of expanded 
liability more rapidly than have American courts.210 On the other hand, 
there have been some moves in Parliament recently to reverse this trend 
although English legal writers have criticized this attempt. 211 
b. Liability of Owner or Occupier of Property 
Once an independent contractor relationship has been found, one of 
the most frequently litigated questions deals with the liability of an 
owner or occupier of land for the negligence of an independent contrac-
tor whose work on the premises causes injury to others. It is in this area 
that the courts are moving most rapidly toward looking upon the inde-
pendent contractor almost as an, employee of the owner and holding the 
latter liable for negligence of the former. Typical of this trend is a re-
cent Wisconsin case, N echodomu v. Lindstrom, 212 which held the owner 
of a building liable when an independent contractor doing construction 
work on the property allowed a young child to place his hand in a mix-
ing machine in which there were exposed, revolving blades. This de-
cision is somewhat unusual for even in cases where courts find that an 
independent contractor was performing a duty which can not be dele-
2os Infra Chapter V. 
209 Annot., 58 A.L.R.:zd 865 (1958), particularly at 8g1 ff. The cases cited clearly 
bear out the conclusion stated in the annotation. A striking example of imposing such 
liability is Roush v. Johnson, 139 W.Va. 007, 8o S.E.:zd 857 (1954), where a faulty 
installation of electrical connections caused the electrocution of a moving company em-
ployee long after the installation was made. 
210 Prosser 358, citing Chapman, "Liability for the Negligence of Independent Con-
tractors," soL. Q. Rev. 71 (1934). 
211 Munkman, "Liability for the Acts of an Independent Contractor," 107 L. J, 245 
(1957). A recent English case certainly moving in this direction, but which could be 
explained under some of our American decisions requiring the owner to see that reason-
able precautions are taken, is Balfour v. Barty-King, [1957] I Q. B. 496, noted 1957 
Camb. L. ]. 132. 
212 26g Wis. 455, 6g N.W.2d 6o8 (1955), noted 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 128 (1955). 
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gated by the owner, the latter is not responsible for what is usually 
termed "collateral negligence," meaning that some specific part of the 
operation being performed by the independent contractor was not un-
usually dangerous nor unexpected. A carpenter using a hammer, saw 
and nails in the usual way is an example. It is arguable, however, that 
in the Wisconsin case the job required the presence of this mixing ma-
chine so the danger was inherent in the job, not just incidental or "col-
lateral" to it. In one sense, however, this is true of all "collateral negli-
. gence" cases. Whether or not "collateral negligence" terminology is 
used, the basic question remains : Is this the kind of action for which 
the independent contractor only should be held liable, or is the nature 
of the negligence and the activity of the independent contractor so es-
sential a part of the job desired by the owner, the kind of accident so 
foreseeable, and the danger so unusual that immunization of the owner 
should not be allowed ? 218 
Certain activities generally are carried out by an independent con-
tractor and are thought to be'delegable, for example, transportation of 
passengers by taxi, or the use of ordinary carpenter tools to do routine 
jobs in which the risk is not too great. 
The cases involving independent contractors working on the property 
of the other contracting party have become so numerous that annota-
tions usually group them under separate headings for each part of 
building and construction work; e.g., excavation and refill work,214 
demolition work,215 excavation that affects adjoining realty,218 and 
awnings,217 to mention only a few. It has even been argued in a recent 
Michigan case, Cary v. Thomas,218 that such liability ought to carry 
over to the ordinary home owner. In this case a home was fumigated 
by an independent contractor who was competent and carefully picked 
by a home owner who undoubtedly had no expertise in such matters. 
Two dissenting judges would have held the defendant liable because 
the danger was great. The plaintiff was a water softener serviceman 
who was overcome by cyanide gas when he entered the home after the 
independent contractor failed to block all the entrances by posting 
21s Prosser 359-62; Harper & James 1395-1410; and particularly Smith, "Collateral 
Negligence," 25 Minn. L. Rev. 399 (1941). 
214 33 A.L.R.2d 7 (1954). 
2u I d. at 89. 
2t6Jd. at 111. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 288 (1952) for liability where the independent 
contractor. sets a fire and negligently allows it to spread. 
211 34 A.L.R.2d 486, 493 (1954). 
218 345 Mich. 616, 76 N.W.2d 817 (1956). One of the dissenting justices was Smith, 
supra note 213. 
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notices. Pttre Oil Co. v. Lassing 219 is another recent case in which the 
independent contractor concept gave immunity from liability. An inde-
pendent repairman working on gasoline pumps at a filling station negli-
gently flipped a lighted match into the gasoline tank bin. This is a good 
illustration of an instance in which a court places considerable emphasis 
on whether or not the contractor is really independent and therefore not 
subject to the control of the employing party as to methods of perform-
ing the task. 
Significant for our purposes are two types of casei concerning work 
by independent contractors on the owner's property in which the courts 
often hOld the owner liable for the contractor's negligent actions. The 
first type deals with damage caused during construction, repair, or 
maintenance which are not a normal part of the day-to-day operation 
of the business. "Collateral negligence" 220 is the term used in construc-
tion and repair cases to state the policy question of whether or not to 
impute the contractor's negligence to the employer. In the second type of 
case, concerning harm done in the course of the normal day-to-day 
operation of the owner's business, the question is usually put in terms of 
"non-delegable duty." 221 Writers and courts often use a third phrase, 
"inherently or intrinsically dangerous," 222 to state the policy question. 
Actually, in all these cases the same test should be used to determine the 
liability of the employer for the independent contractor's negligence, 
when the employer himself could not be considered as having acted 
negligently within the ordinary standards. The policy question in each 
situation is whether to allow the employer to shift the tort responsibility 
to an independent contractor or to insist that the employer remain re-
sponsible for any negligence, even that of the independent contractor. 
The activities of an independent contractor which will be the non-dele-
gable responsibility of the employer are those which are appropriately 
described as involving "unusual danger" rather than being "inherently 
dangerous" or involving "collateral negligence." The phrase "non-
delegable" merely states the court's conclusion that the activities involve 
"unusual"' hazard. 
By the word "unusual" it is meant that the risk of harm is somewhat 
219 222 F.zd 886 (6th Cir. 1955), noted 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 268 (1956). 
220 Prosser 361 ; Harper & James 1410; Smith, supra note 213. 
221 Prosser 359; Harper & James 14o6. 
222 Prosser 36o; Harper & James 14o8. See language of "unusual danger" in Olah 
v. Katz, 234 Mich. 112, 117, 207 N.W. 892 (1926), and Scales v. Lewellyn, 172 N.C. 
494, 497, 90 S.E. 521 (1916). See also cases collected and distinctions made in 23 
A.L.R. 1016, particularly at 1084 (1923) and 21 A.L.R. 1229 (1922). 
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greater than normal either because the harm is relatively serious or ex-
tensive, involves danger to a great many persons, or is of a unique or 
unexpected type. 
It should be understood that this discussion concerns the liability of 
the employer for the negligent acts of the independent contractor, not 
for the negligent acts of the employer himself. In many situations the 
employer himself may be negligent, such as, (I) in failing to use care in 
selecting a competent independent contractor, ( 2) in failing to give an 
independent contractor the necessary information to avoid unnecessary 
danger, (3) in failing to prepare properly for the independent con-
tractor's operation, or (4) in failing to meet all the statutory standards 
or administrative regulations which may govern a particular operation 
while it is still clearly within the control of the employer. The only 
situation of significance in atomic energy operations is that in which 
the employer is Qeing held for the negligence of the independent con-
tractor although the employer himself has not been negligent in any of 
the respects just mentioned. · 
It also is assumed here that the nature of the operations is such as not 
to be classed as "ultra-hazardous" within the doctrines of absolute or 
strict liability. 228 Liability in the cases here discussed, and as limited 
above, should be determined by deciding whether or not the activities are 
somewhat out of the ordinary; if so; they are "non-delegable" and the 
owner is liable for the independent contractor's negligence. 
(I) For Operations Performed on the Premises 
During Construction 
It seems quite unlikely that many cases will arise in which harm from 
radiation hazards will occur during _construction, repair, or mainte-
nance operations. Certainly during the construction of a reactor there 
is no radiation hazard until the building is completed and all component 
parts have been carefully tested. Even in the repair and maintenance 
operations for which an independent contractor is likely to be called, 
radiation hazards are not always present because often such periodic 
maintenance activities will have to be carried on only after the radio-
active material has been removed. For accidents happening at the con-
struction, repair, or maintenance stage and not involving radiation 
hazards, there is no reason to believe that the principles to be applied in 
atomic energy cases will differ from other situations. To the extent 
22s This problem is discussed infra Chapter IV. 
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that radiation hazards are an integral part of the contractor's opera-
tions, such as if an independent contractor is called in to do a repair job 
and makes us_e of radioactive material to make radiographic inspections 
of machinery, or if he is called in to do a clean-up job after radioactive 
material has been accidentally released in the area, 224 it is likely that the 
court will classify this kind of activity as "inherently dangerous," or, 
as we would say, the kind of activity which involves "unusual" hazards. 
If this is the case, responsibility for these operations will be non-
delegable. 
Excavation cases are good examples of situations in which courts 
have drawn lines in terms of the degree of danger from the excavation. 
If it is of such a character and in such a place that unless unusual pre-
cautions are taken there is a substantial risk of a passerby falling into 
it, the courts conclude the duty to use due care is non-delegable. If, how-
ever, the excavation is made in a remote location where visitors are not 
expected, the duty may be delegated and the independent contractor's 
liability will not be imputed to the employer. 225 The same distinction is 
drawn in the cases involving demolition of buildings.226 
An excellent example of this distinction is the decision by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Whalen v. Shivek. 221 The plaintiff 
was killed while walking on a sidewalk adjacent to the building where 
the independent contractor was engaged to remove the parapet at the 
top of the building. The contractor did not construct a barrier on the 
sidewalk below, and his employees negligently allowed a piece weighing 
about two hundred pounds to drop on the plaintiff. Finding both the 
tenant and the owner of the building liable, the court said: 
We recognize that the principle with which we are con-
cerned does not apply to cases where the danger does not come 
from work performed with proper skill and care, "but comes 
only from an unskilful or negligent act of the contractor or 
his servants, even if a lack of skill or care on the part of some 
of the persons engaged in the business reasonably may be ex-
pected." .... But we are of opinion that a finding was war-
ranted in this case that the removal of the parapet by the con-
tractor, in the circumstances disclosed here, involved work of 
such kind that it would probably cause injury to persons using 
2 24 Eg., Tracer Labs, Inc., was called in to clean up after an accident in the Texas 
plant of another company using radioisotopes under license from the AEC. A.E.C. Re-
lease No. 1213, Nov. 6, 1957. 
225 33 A.L.R.:zd 7 (1954), especially 52 ff. 
226[d. at 89. 
227 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950). 
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the sidewalk below unless special precautions were taken . 
. . . [The court then distinguished a previous case involving 
repair of a chimney where a brick fell onto the sidewalk as 
follows.] The work there involved consisted in taking bricks 
off of the chimney for a few feet and relaying them. What 
happened, the court said, was "a mere detail of the work" 
arising from negligence which was not a probable conse-
quence of the work. A different case is presented here where 
the contractor was engaged in removing from a building 
bordering on a public sidewalk a parapet containing blocks 
weighing approximately two hundred pounds and in a state 
of disrepair. 228 
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There are literally dozens of cases of this nature but the reasoning and 
result of Whalen v. Shivek exemplify the modern attitude of the courts. 
Certainly, if a radiation hazard is at all significant it seems quite likely 
that courts will find that the use of such material even during construc-
tion, repair, or maintenance operations involves the kind of unusual 
hazard for which the owner will continue to be liable even if the only 
negligence in the ordinary sense is that of the independent contractor. 
This will be true even though the operation does not amount to an 
"ultra-hazardous" activity such as to result in strict liability. A distinc-
tion is drawn between such activity and the less hazardous operation 
which nevertheless possesses sufficient potentialities for harm to others 
so that it can not be delegated to an independent contractor, thus reliev-
ing the operator from liability. 
The same reasoning is the basis for the holding in most jurisdi~tions 
that the owner who hires an independent contractor to excavate for a 
building is liable for the negligence of that independent contractor in 
not properly shoring up the excavation so as to give the necessary 
lateral support for abutting buildings. The courts always refer to this 
as a type of work in which it is readily foreseeable that a substantial 
risk of harm is involved unless special precautions are taken. In such 
cases, if the independent contractor is negligent, the owner who hires 
him will also be liable even though otherwise the owner is not care-
less. 229 Probably if radioactive material is used, at least if it is sufficient 
in quantity and intensity to present a substantial risk, the operator him-
self will be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. 
A recent opinion in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fegles 
22s /d. at 151. 
229 Law v. Phillips, 136 W.Va. 761, 68 S.E.2d 452 (1952), and other cases annotated 
in 33 A.L.R.2d III, 131 (1954). 
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C onst. Co. v. McLaughlin C onst. Co. 230 illustrates the possible criteria 
that may be used by a court in deciding whether to hold the employer 
liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. In this case the 
prime contractor, rather than the owner of the land, was held liable for 
the negligence of a sub-contractor. The sub-contractor's employees 
allowed hot rivets to fall on timbers and other inflammable material 
being used by another contractor doing a different job on the premises. 
In holding the contractor liable for the sub-contractor's negligence, 
the court said : 
An. employer or primary contractor is liable for injuries 
caused by the failure of an independent contractor to exercise 
due care with respect to the performance of work which is 
inherently or intrinsically dangerous. "An employer may not 
divest himself of the primary duty he owes to other members 
of the community by contracting with others for the perform-
ance of work, the necessary or probable result of which is in-
jury to third persons." ... This exception places an absolute, 
nondelegable duty upon the employer to see that all reasonable 
precautions shall be taken during the performance of the 
work to the end that third persons may be adequately pro-
tected against injury. 
Work not inherently dangerous under some circumstances 
may be inherently dangerous under other circumstances. 
Thus, construction work near a street or sidewalk may, by 
reason of proximity to the street or sidewalk, be inherently 
dangerous. Riveting, while not inherently dangerous under 
all circumstances, becomes inherently dangerous if done over 
men and materials where no protection is afforded the men 
and materials below. 281 
There is no reason to· assume that radioactive materials being used by 
an independent contractor in the course of construction, repair, or 
maintenance are less dangerous than "hot rivets." 
During Normal Operations 
The cases that are much more likely to arise involve radiation haz-
ards which cause harm as the result of the normal operation of the 
owner, even though the negligence that makes it possible for the radia-
tion to cause harm is that of an independent contractor. Liability prob-
ably will be imposed on the owner and operator of the reactor regard-
less of whether or not the negligent act was committed by the building 
230 205 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1953). (An interesting early case allowing delegation in 
conducting a fireworks display is Deyo v. Kingston Consol. R.R., 88 N.Y.S. 487 
(1904).) 
231 I d. at 640. 
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contractor who constructed the reactor tank, the supplier who furnished 
defective cores, the architects who designed the building, the repairmen 
who were negligent in repairing piping that carried radioactive mate-
rial, or the installers or repairers of the ventilation system which filters 
out radioactive particles before air is discharged into the atmosphere or 
water into the river. Even though we assume that the operation of a 
reactor, or the use of a radiation source for radiography or of radio-
active isotopes in research or industrial processing will not be classified 
as ultra-hazardous/82 such activities, at least where the danger is at all 
significant because of type or amount, will be considered to create an 
ususual hazard and will therefore be non-delegable. Consequently, the 
owner probably will be vicariously liable for the negligence of the in-
dependent contractor. Within the class of non-delegable duties Prosser 
lists such matters as the duty of a carrier to carry its passengers in 
safety and to maintain safe railroad crossings, or of a municipality to 
keep its streets in repair or to refrain from obstructing a public high-
way, or of an employer to provide employees with a safe place to work. 
Concerning the line to be drawn between the non-delegable and the 
delegable duties, he states : 
It is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the non-dele-
gable character of such duties may be determined, other than 
the conclusion of the courts that the responsibility is so im-
portant to the community that the employer should not be per-
mitted to transfer it to another.288 
Harper and James, in commenting upon the line to be drawn between 
delegable and non-delegable or inherently dangerous and non-inherently 
dangerous activities, say: 
At present the line is a ragged and irrational one somewhere 
between the two extremes. Several. factors have been sug-
gested as significant, but closer examination of their signifi-
cance proves disappointing. Thus an operation's threat to 
highway travel has been thought important; and indeed the 
duty of care owed to travelers with respect to adjacent prem-
ises, or work done in the highway itself, may not be dele-
gated. Nor perhaps may the obligation of care in working on 
scaffold over the sidewalk. On the other hand the duty of 
care in driving automobiles and trucks along the highway is 
fully delegable though this operation presents an infinitely 
greater threat to travelers than do premises or structures near 
or over the highways.2u 
282 See infra Chapter IV on strict liability. 
233 Prosser 359· 
284 Harper & ] ames 1409. 
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The opinion of the Kentucky court in Brown Hotel Co. v. Size-
more, 285 in which the hotel was held liable for injuries to the plaintiff 
when he fell into a manhole negligently replaced by the coal company 
delivery man, illustrates the typical approach of courts which apply the 
non-delegable duty concept. The court said : 
The courts are quite uniform in holding that there is an 
affirmative duty of seeing that a coal hole or similar servitude 
is properly guarded or protected when being used, and, as 
well, that the covering has been safely replaced; that the owner 
or possessor cannot absolve himself from liability or avoid 
performance of the duty by leaving it to another, such as the 
deliveryman of coal. The owner or possessor cannot receive 
the benefits of having the coal company use the chute to sup-
ply him with coal and at the same time renounce all interest or 
concern as to the condition it is left in, which may be to the 
manifest jeopardy of persons using the public thoroughfare 
being caught in the trap of an open hole or insecure cover-
ing.236 
* * * * * 
The displacement evidently was not obvious or apparent at a 
casual glance. But we do not think that fact excuses the de-
fendant. The basis on which liability of the Hotel Company 
was submitted in the instruction was whether the Hotel Com-
pany should have discovered the loose lid within the interval 
of time. The correct basis should have been whether the Com-
pany exercised ordinary care and vigilance to discover the 
condition. The instruction was perhaps more favorable to the 
defendant than it was entitled to. It is not to be overlooked 
that the burden had shifted to the defendant to justify its 
non-action. The jury was authorized in law to find as a fact 
that the defendant was guilty of negligence.237 
The rationale of the court seems to be that where the public generally 
is so likely to be endangered by a negligent act of an independent con-
tractor on a public way abutting the owner's property, the owner will 
be held liable for the contractor's negligence if the act is not done care-
fully; the situation is not ultra-hazardous nor normally hazardous, it is 
unusually hazardous. The unusualness of the hazard here is two-fold: 
there is a great likelihood that someone wiii be hurt from such negli-
gence and the number of persons who wiii be exposed to danger in a 
public way is great. 
235 303 Ky. 431, 197 S.W.2d 9II (1946). 
236 I d. at 436. 
237 /d. at 439· 
NEGLIGENCE 173 
A recent lower court case in New York, Thibault v. City of New 
Y ork/88 illustrates another situation in which a court is likely to find a 
non-delegable duty, even though the danger does not affect the public 
generally nor create a hazard for a large number of persons. Only a 
small group of employees was endangered but the hazard was unusual 
in the sense that severe harm was likely to result, in this case death by 
electrocution. The contracting company which installed an overhead 
electric line for a city elec_tric trolley bus system and the city itself were 
both held liable for the electrocution of a lineman resulting from faulty 
installation of insulators. In concluding that both the city and the 
contractor were liable, the court said: 
Whatever the cause, it is clear the failure to inspect and re-
move it proximately produced the accident, and the jury so 
found. It seems to me that neither the City nor the con-
tractors could escape the obligation for thorough inspection. 
Though an electrical installation is a hazardous undertaking 
to workers and public. alike, concededly neither of these 
parties inspected the insulator which, being defective, added 
to that hazard. The contractors plainly convenanted with the 
City. . . that such equipment would be free of defects. They 
could reasonably anticipate that its own linesmen would be 
exposed to danger while making mechanical adjustments. 
They also knew that the City would energize the system to 
make the test runs. Their admitted failure to inspect and re-
move the dangerous device therefore constituted active negli-
gence on their part . 
. . . Clearly the City's act of energizing the lines for test 
run purposes, without its own prior "full and minute inspec-
tion", as . provided for by. Contract Article 29, and with 
knowledge that mechanical adjustments would thereafter be 
made, also constituted active negligence. 
. . . sound public policy demands that he who authorizes 
a basically hazardous work be vigilant regardless of who per-
forms it and whether or not he voluntarily participates in or 
controls its operation. . . . The logical corollary to this rule 
is that in the course of basically hazardous work positive 
care be exercised by the owner even though he be promised 
indemnity by the person authorized to perform it.239 
238 154 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1956). 
239/d. at 342-43. [Emphasis added.) A similar duty was placed on the federal govern-
ment for the death of an electric power lineman kiiied as the result of the government 
employee's failure to see that an independent contractor doing rehabilitation work turned 
off the current before the men climbed the poles. Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 
721 (E.D. Tenn. S.D. 1955). To be distinguished is the problem of a general contrac-
tor's liability for negligence of a sub-contractor under an express indemnity agreement 
with the owner; City of Polytechnic v. Redmon, 217 S.W. 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). 
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In effect the court is saying it is negligence not to inspect the work done 
by an independent contractor. If this is "active negligence" then it is a 
non-delegable duty situation. 
Burns v. Vaughar£ 240 may be another example of a case imposing 
vicarious liability on an owner of land. In this case a farmer hired an 
airplane pilot to dust crops with 2, 4-D. The defendant admitted that he 
knew that the dust was dangerous but claimed that he had taken care to 
instruct the pilot not to release the dust if there was any wind. The 
owner defendant nevertheless was held liable for the damage that re-
sulted to other crops on adjoining land in spite of the fact that he tried 
hard to stop the pilot after a breeze came up but did not succeed in time 
to prevent the damage. The court said that the jury could find from this 
evidence that the owner was negligent notwithstanding the precautions 
he had taken to warn the pilot and to stop him once a breeze arose. The 
court does not refer to the pilot an an independent contractor but the 
situation is one in which it is likely that the pilot was not an employee 
and the court states that the basic facts are similar to those in a previous 
case in which it seems quite likely that the pilot was an independent 
contractor. 241 This case, if actually it involved an independent con-
tractor, goes even further than cases which hold the owner of land 
liable for injuries resulting from construction work where objects fall 
on public sidewalks rather than on the. owner's own property. The 
damage occurred at a point more than a mile distant from defendant's 
land, not immediately adjacent to it. Nevertheless, liability is imposed 
because the activities are being carried out on the owner's own prop-
erty, and the injuries result quite directly and almost simultaneously 
with the performance of the operations themselves. 
The use of radioactive materials on one's own property is likely to be 
at least as "unusually hazardous" as uncovered man-holes, power lines, 
or 2, 4-D. 
(2) For Operations Performed off the Premises 
The on-site cases discussed above make it rather clear that the user 
of atomic energy, even if his operations are not "ultra-hazardous," will 
240 216 Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949). See annotation on liability for damages of 
all kinds arising from crop spraying, 12 A.L.R.2d 436 (1950). That such duties cannot 
be delegated, see cases collected at 440, including another Arkansas case. 
241 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). At 639 
the court said the dusting was done "by an aviator whose regular business it was to 
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be held responsible in damages to persons injured through the negli-
gence of independent contractors who carry out operations in the 
premises. These operations often will involve "unusual hazards" and, 
therefore, will be non-delegable. In reaching this result the courts have 
ignored the independence of the contractor and the consequent inability 
of the owner to control the contractor's employees except by telling 
the contractor to have his employees do things a certain way or stop 
work altogether. Liability has been imposed on the employer or owner 
regardless of how responsible the independent contractor was and 
whether or not he was able financially to respond for damages. The 
theory of the cases is that the duty simply is not delegable because the 
operations present an unusual hazard. Logically, therefore, argument 
can be made that the concept of non-delegable duty also should be ap-
plied to off-site operations involving unusual hazards. On this question, 
however, the answer is not nearly so clear. Legal literature and judicial 
opinions considering the question apparently are almost non-existent. 
Will or should the user, such as a reactor operator, be allowed to im-
munize himself from liability for certain operations, such as transpor-
tation of radioactive material, fuel fabrication, or disposal of radio-
active waste products, by hiring an independent contractor ? The 
question posed assumes that the one hiring the services is not dealing 
with "ultra-hazardous" activities and in every other respect has acted 
as a reasonably prudent man would act. It is assumed that due care has 
been used in the operator's designs, requests, and specifications, as well 
as in giving notic.e of the dangerous nature of the commodity, in han-
dling the material including preparation for shipment, in complying 
with all statutory requirements and administrative regulations, and in 
carefully selecting a competent independent contractor. Once the activ-
ity is found to be unusually hazardous, in determining the vicarious 
liability of the user or owner, should it make any difference whether 
the operation is performed on or off the premises? The dearth of treat-
ment of the problem may indicate that all lawyers assume vicarious 
liability should not be imposed or perhaps it only means that plaintiffs' 
lawyers have not seen the logical possibility of applying the modern 
trend to off-site cases. The answer to this policy question will be very 
important to those engaging in atomic energy activities, and it should 
take into account the effect of liability or non-liability on wise develop-
ment of nuclear enterprise. 
dust crops .... " It stated that the operator had engaged in crop dusting for 22 years 
from Florida to California and from Mexico to Canada. 
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(a) Decided Cases 
( i) Transportation 
The only recent case found which possibly deals with the liability of 
a shipper for the negligence of a carrier is Pope v. Edward M. Rude 
Carrier Corp./42 decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court in 1953. 
The plaintiff was injured when dynamite exploded while being carried 
on a public highway by a contract carrier which was licensed and regu-
lated by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Both the carrier and the 
shipper, DuPont, were sued. The court held that neither the shipper 
nor the licensed regulated contract carrier which transported high ex-
plosives were carrying on a nuisance, and the doctrine of strict liability 
was not applicable. In holding both the shipper and the licensed and 
regulated contract carrier not to be subject to nuisance or strict liability 
doctrines, the court reasoned : 
The manufacture and the shipment of dynamite and its trans-
portation by carrier are lawful and essential business enter-
prises. High explosives, such as dynamite, are valuable, im-
portant and necessary articles of commerce and industry. 
Without their manufacture and transportation for many es-
sential uses the economy of the nation would be restricted and 
impaired. There is no allegation that either defendant in 
manufacturing, shipping or transporting the dynamite before 
or at the time of the explosion violated any provision of any 
law of the United States or of this State or any valid regula-
tion imposed by the authority of either of them, or that the 
design or the construction of the equipment used was faulty 
or improper, or that there was any delay in transporting the 
shipment or any undue stoppage in the movement of the truck 
or any storage of the dynamite which would imperil the safety 
of the public or subject the dynamite to any unnecessary haz-
ard which would cause it to explode. m 
In holding the manufacturer and shipper of high explosives subject to 
the same kind of liability as the carrier, the court cited American Juris-
prudence to the effect that "The same rule that applies to the carrier in 
the transportation of explosives, namely, that it is not an insurer 
against injuries, but is liable only for negligence, applies also to the 
shipper." 244 The court therefore dismissed the first and third counts, 
based on nuisance and strict liability theories respectively, as to both the 
licensed contract carrier and the manufacturer. The second count, how-
242 138 W.Va. 218, 75 S.E.2d 584 (1953). 
243 I d. at 226. 
244 !d. at 243; 22 Am. Jur. 203 (1939). 
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ever, alleged that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied because ex-
plosives if properly handled ordinarily do notexplode. The court held 
that this was not subject to demurrer even if no specific acts of negli-
gence were alleged. 
If this case should be accepted as good authority it would mean ( 1) 
shipping and transporting a dangerous explosive is neither a nuisance 
nor an ultra-hazardous activity, even though the manufacture or stor-
ing of it may be, so negligence rules govern; and ( 2) if a master-
servant relationship exists, the shipper may be liable for the negligence 
of the carrier and res ipsa loquitur may be applied. The language of the 
opinion clearly implies that unless the shipper is· guilty of negligence 
himself there is no liability even if the carrier (including common as 
well as contract according to the opinion) 245 is negligent; but this is 
not a holding in the case. The lower court certified the question of 
whether or not the relationship of independent contractor existed but 
the supreme court held that each count contained an allegation that the 
relationship of master-servarit existed and this had to be accepted on 
demurrer. 
The language to the effect that a shipper's liability is only for negli-
gence is made even more doubtful as authority for refusing to apply 
vicarious liability principles because the concept of unusual hazard was 
not even mentioned. Its usefulness is reduced further by the fact that 
the only authority cited is the quotation from American Jurisprudence. 
The quotation itself is nothing but a repetition of an earlier statement 
in Lawyers' Reports Annotated which says : 
... [I]t has been held that a shipper of crude petroleum is 
not bound to so protect and guard it that harm therefrom 
shall come to no one, but his duty is performed by providing 
a suitable vehicle, able to encounter the usual risks of trans-
portation. 246 
Even this statement is based upon a single case, Goodlander Mill Co. v. 
Standard Oil Co./41 in which the shipper was excused from liability 
for a fire resulting from overflowing oil caused by a leaky valve since 
the consignee of the oil in operating the valve was an intervening agent. 
The court said : 
The shipment of such an article of commerce casts upon the 
shipper a certain duty to the public,-that of providing a 
suitable vehicle for the petroleum in all respects adapted to 
245 I d. at 242. 
246 1916B L.R.A. 730. 
247 63 Fed. 400 (7th Cir. 1894). 
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the purposes of carriage, and able to encounter the usual risks 
of transportation, so that the petroleum in its transit should 
not be exposed to danger of ignition from causes incident to 
its transportation, reasonably to be anticipated. We think that 
to be the true limit of the shipper's duty, and that duty, as it 
appears to us in this case, was properly discharged. The pe-
troleum was contained in a tank impervious to fire. The ship-
ment reached its destination in safety. The case is not like 
that of the shipment of explosives, the character of the ship-
ments being concealed. [Citations omitted.] Here the con-
tents of the tank were declared by the peculiar construction 
of the car. The properties of the petroleum were known to 
the consignee and to the public equally with the defendant. 
They are a matter of common knowledge. There was here no 
disguise and no concealment. 248 
The court in another part of the opinion emphasized the fact that de-
fendant's negligence in connection with the valve was not the proximate 
cause of the fire because of the delay in time and remoteness in. space 
between the negligent act and the accident. 
If accepted at face value, the language quoted indicates that so long 
as the dangerous material is plainly marked and so packaged that it can 
withstand the ordinary strains of shipment, no liability will be imposed 
upon the shipper. Surely vicarious liability for the negligence of the car-
rier would not be imposed either. In light of recent trends in tort law, 
however, this case is of doubtful value as a precedent, except in West 
Virginia. The intervening agent and lack of privity arguments used by 
the court are not consistent with the trend today. The emphasis upon 
remoteness in time and space likewise is not consistent with current con-
cepts. In addition, radioactive materials may be differentiated from 
crude oil and be found to present an unusual hazard. 
Unfortunately no other recent transportation cases have been found 
clearly dealing with the vicarious liability of a shipper. All other discus-
sions and cases dealing with a shipper's liability involve negligence of 
the shipper himself, such as in failing to meet packaging, notification, 
or marking requirements. 249 Even these cases almost always concern in-
jury to employees of the carrier, not to the public generally. The West 
Virginia opinion, therefore, is not a satisfactory precedent on the 
question of a shipper's liability for negligence of an independent car-
rier. 
248 !d. at 404. The Deyo case, supra note 230, denying vicarious liability in shooting 
fireworks is probably also explained by its vintage-before the more liberal (loose) 
modern trend. 
249 See cases discussed and cited in 22 Am. Jur. 203 (1939) and rgr6B L.R.A. 730. 
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Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland/50 decided in 1914, may be another 
off-site transportation case. An explosion occurred on the chartered 
vessel Alum Chine while it was being loaded with dynamite by an in-
dependent contractor stevedoring company hired by the charterer. Suit 
was brought against the stevedoring company and the charterer for the 
death of several men and for damage to ships and other property in the 
vicinity of the Alum Chine. The explosion was found to have been 
caused by the negligence of the foreman of the stevedoring company. 
The charterer was found to have hired a competent company to do the 
loading and the court refused to impose vicarious liability, although 
plaintiffs argued that the work was inherently dangerous and therefore 
non-delegable. The court stated : 
The rule that responsibility is on the independent con-
tractor alone does not apply when at the inception of the 
undertaking a man of ordinary reason should know that in 
the natural course of thit:Igs the work would certainly or prob-
ably result in injury to another, unless some distinct and defi-
nite precautions be taken, although the details of the work be 
done with due care; as, for example, guarding a hole dug in 
the street, or protecting buildings close to blasting operations 
from rocks which would probably strike them, or protecting a 
wall when excavating by it. But the exception does not extend 
to work which could be surely performed with safety upon 
the sole condition that due care be exercised in the details of 
its execution. 
Applying this rule, the Munson Company [the company 
which hired the stevedore company to load the vessel] is not 
liable. Loading dynamite, gasoline, gunpowder, naphtha, and 
other inflammable or explosive substances is necessary to com-
merce and is not a nuisance. [Citations omitted.] There was 
no distinct and definite precaution to be taken, so as to make 
sure that due care in the details of the work would make it 
safe. It was not disputed that dynamite may be loaded with 
perfect safety, if adequate care be taken against concussion 
and heat. There was no danger of either, except from the de-
tails· of the work, and therefore the independent contractor 
alone was liable. 251 
Neither this opinion nor that of the lower court m considers the ques-
tion of whether the arrangement was a bare-boat (demise) charter, in 
which the charterer takes over all management and operation functions, 
2 50 219 Fed. 827 (4th Cir. 1914), affirming 213 Fed. 51 (D.C. Md. 1914). 
251 I d. at 833-34-
252 Maryland v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 Fed. 51 (D.C. Md. 1914). 
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or a charter of affreightment, in which the owner continues in posses-
sion and is responsible for all operations. 2 G8 Where there is any dispute 
as to which type of charter is involved, however, the courts lean to af-
freightment, 2G4 and in such cases liability for injuries to third persons 
ordinarily is imposed on the owner, not the charterer.m If this was the 
type of charter in the Foard case it lays down a rule of no vicarious lia-
bility in an off-site situation involving the handling of dangerous ma-
terial because the accident happened on property owned and legally 
controlled by another. On the other hand, if the boat was legally in the 
possession and control of the charterer, it simply is an on-site situation 
in which the court refused to find that an unusual hazard was involved. 
Perhaps the case means that in determining the vicarious liability of an 
employer for the negligence of an independent contractor no distinction 
is to be drawn between on-site and off-site cases. The way in which the 
lower court opinion describes the policy question involved certainly 
makes no such distinction. 258 
258 Robinson, Admiralty 594 (1939). 
254 /d. at 597· 
2UJd. at 614. 
256 Supra note 252 at 86-87: "To them the Foard Company seems called on to pay'-
a high price for a very trifling error of judgment. On the other hand, if the decree 
here made shall be affirmed above, all that the Foard and the Stevedoring Companies 
have will make good to the libelants but a fraction of what they have lost. It is no 
comfort to them to tell them that dynamite is necessary to modem industry. Few of 
them had an appreciable interest in shipping the dynamite to the Isthmus. Many of 
them had none at all except that which they shared with everybody else. What hap-
pened at Communipaw and to the Chine shows how widespread disaster an explosion 
of dynamite may cause. That they should bear the loss does not seem fair to them. It 
is natural that they should feel that every one who had a part in causing the dynamite 
to be stowed on the ship should be liable to them. On the other hand, what has been 
said shows that it does not seem to be in accordance either with natural justice or with 
settled.legal principles to make every one who has any part in the handling of the dy-. 
namite answerable for all the consequences of an explosion, although he was not in 
fault either in person or through some one for whom under the ordinary rules of law 
he must answer. It may be that some day the law will be so moulded that more exact 
and complete equity may be done. Public opinion has apparently come to the conclu-
sion that workmen should be indemnified against the pecuniary consequences of accidents 
suffered by them in the course of their employment. Hereafter a step further may be 
taken. It may then seem justto, compensate all persons who without fault of their own 
suffer from industrial accidents. Such a policy may be wise. Even if it be, courts would 
·not be now justified in holding liable for the consequences of the accident him who 
directs the shipment o.f an explosive or who knowingly and willfully takes any part in 
such shipment or permits it having power to prevent it. Whether indemnification shall 
be given at all, and if so how, is a complex problem. It is for the Legislature to work 
out. In this case the court may not impose the burden upon either the city or upon any 
person or corporation who w;1s no more directly responsible for the explosion than was 
the Munson Line." 
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Williamson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co./51 decided in 1954, per-
haps should be treated as an off-site transportation case. A tree-trim-
mer was hired by the defendant telephone company to prepare the way 
for erection of telephone wires. He was negligent in driving his em-
ployees from work one day,· causing the plaintiff to be injured. The 
court found that the tree-trimmer was an independent contractor and 
refused to hold the telephone company liable. This case, however, al-
though it involves off-site transportation, is not very good authority on 
the vicarious liability que-stion. The defendant's material was not being 
shipped and was not the cause of the injuries. More importantly, driv-
ing a car today, although an inherently dangerous operation in one 
sense, hardly classifies as one presenting an unusual hazard as the con-
cept is used in the vicarious liability cases. 
(ii) Other Cases Involving Off-Site Activities 
The question of ·vicarious. liability for the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor may arise in off-site activities other than transpor-
tation. An injured party may seek to impose liability upon the person 
who hires another to carry out such off-site activities on the same basis 
discussed already in connection with both the on-site and transporta-
tion cases, namely, the activity presents an unusual hazard and liability 
for negligence cannot be avoided by delegating the operation to another. 
The. policy considerations influencing the courts seem to be the same. 
These cases illustrate how shadowy the line between on-site and off-site 
cases can become once it is determined that the specific activity has been 
requested by the employer of the independent contractor. 
In Scales v. Lewellyn,258 the defendant city raised the street grade, 
cutting off access to several houses, including the one in which the 
plaintiff was a tenant. The city hired an iqdependent contractor to raise 
each of the houses, this operation of necessity not being performed on 
city property. The negligence of the contractor in shoring up the porch 
of the house where the plaintiff lived caused the latter's injuries, Al-
though the court held that the city was not liable because the operation 
was not inherently dangerous and presented no unusual hazard, the 
opinion rather clearly implies that if it had, liability would have been 
imposed. 
Judge Learned Hand; in Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co.,259 in 
2 57 265 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1954). 
258 Supra note 222. 
259 176 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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determining whether or not a contractor should be held vicariously 
liable for the negligence of an independent sub-contractor, clearly ap-
plied the same test as used when the owner is sued. The plaintiff's hus-
band, an employee of another contractor, was killed because of the prior 
negligence Of the sub-contractor in stringing high tension wires. The 
plaintiff argued that the main contractor was liable because it was an 
inherently dangerous operation which was non-delegable. Judge Hand 
said: 
In such cases the law imposes the duty of inspection upon the 
owner or contractor in invitum, and forbids him to delegate it, 
just as it does when a statute or an ordinance directly imposes 
such a duty. Often the factor which appears particularly to 
determine "the inherent danger" is the proximity of the work 
to a highway, since it is then more likely that any mischance 
will do harm, but these are merely instances of the general 
doctrine. Nor are the decisions anomalous which hold that the 
duty to inspect upon such occasions does not extend to mat-
ters "collateral" to the work itself. These do not concern the 
;existence of the duty to inspect, but the extent of the inspec-
tion required. 260 · 
Judge Hand concluded that if the jury found the sub-contractor liable, 
it "might also find the Contractor liable." 261 This seems to be holding 
that the employer cai:mot avoid liability .for the negligence of an in-
dependent contractor when ususual hazards are involved, at least if an 
inspection would have· discovered the dangerous condition, since surely 
Hand was not suggesting that the law question. of whether or not to 
impose vicarious liability was for the jury. 
In some older cases involving the laying of pipelines, 262 pipeline 
companies which hired independent contractors to carry out certain 
operations were not held vicariously liable for the negligence of the in-
dependent contractors which caused h1juries either to employees of the 
contractor or third persons. In both cases the operations, if performed 
negligently, could and did create a quite hazardous situation. These 
might be considered on-site cases in the sense that the pipeline com-
panies undoubtedly had easements to use the adjoining property during 
2 60 I d. at 240. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Holt v. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Co., 145 F.:zd 862 (5th Cir. 1944) (Negli-
gence of independent contractor in using dynamite causCd employee of another contrac-
tor to be injured); O'Hara v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 244 Mo. 395, 148 S.W. 884 
(1912) ·(A sub-contractor was alleged to have been neiligent in piling pipes for use in 
building a pipeline, causing injury to a third party). 
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their construction work. Perhaps the same explanation could be applied 
to the Person case on the theory that the contractor had temporary con-
trol of the property during the construction period, although in the 
Person case the army camp property itself was owned by the govern-
ment. In none of the three opi.nions, however, is any distinction between 
on- and off-site cases discussed. 263 
In Doran v. Flood 264 vicarious liability was held applicable to the 
building contractor who hired another to haul timbers to be used as 
piles to the building site. The death of plaintiff's son resulted from the 
negligence of the hauler as he was dragging the timbers along the 
streets to the site, clearly an off-site situation. The court held that the 
owners who had contracted to have the building constructed were not 
liable because they had nothing to do. with procurement of the piles. The 
principal contractor would be liable vicariously, however, if his under-
standing with the hauler was to drag rather than truck the timbers 
through the streets. The court said : 
Those who have work, dangerous in itself, and requiring 
particular care, dpne, cannot shield themselves by letting it out 
to others without providing for the necessary care. If these 
defendants had contracted for dragging these logs along the 
streets as they were dragged, and so dragging them caused 
the injury, they would, without doubt, be liable. Letting the 
hauling for that distance at that price, to a person not a com-
mon carrier, who had no trucks or connection with facilities 
for doing it otherwise than by dragging, would have some 
tendency towards showing that the understanding with the 
defendants was that it was to be done by dragging, as it was 
done.285 
The court specifically withheld judgment as to whether or not liability 
would be imposed if the arrangement were found to permit the hauler 
to choose a method other than the one way contemplated. The one con-
templated happened to be unlawful because of a city ordinance prohibit-
ing such operations. The case can be interpreted to mean that vicari-
ous liability is imposed only when the arrangement in effect controls 
the mann~r in which the independent contractor is to work. Yet appar-
ently the only control was the price paid, which was so low as practically 
to limit the methods to the one used, which was unlawful and negligent. 
There was nothing in the contract specifically allowing the employer to 
control the method. 
263 See also similar case discussed in connection with on-site cases, s11pra note 230. 
264 47 Fed. 543 (Cir. Ct. S.D. N.Y. 1891). 
265 I d. at 544-
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The question of whether or not to impose vicarious liability on the 
employer has arisen in a series of logging operation cases when an in-
dependent contractor has been hired to transport the logs to the mill of 
the employer. In one, McDonell v. Rifle Boom Co./66 such liability was 
imposed for much the same reason applied in Doran v. Flood. 261 The 
terms of the arrangement were such that the operations could be car-
ried on only in the manner actually used by the contractor. The em-
ployer was held liable when the logs being handled by the independent 
contractor jammed and caused the river to flood plaintiff's land. To 
meet the conditions imposed by the contract the river operations had to 
be carried out in this manner and the court imposed liability on the mill 
owner on the theory that for practical purposes it had not relinquished 
control. Although it had no power under the contract to control the con-
tractor's operations directly, it had done so effectively because of the 
performance required of him by the contract. Cl~arly this is an off-site 
situation in which vicarious liability is imposed, yet the reasoning of 
the court, as in the Doran case, is remarkably like that used in the on-
site cases discussed above. 268 The similarity is particularly marked in 
the cases involving spread of fire from one piece of property to that 
owned by the plaintiff, 269 it being impossible sometimes to determine 
whether it was an on-site or off-site situation.210 
266 71 Mich. 61, 38 N.W. 681 (1888). 
2 67 Supra note 264. 
268 See discussion in text supra notes 224 to 241. 
269 Cases are collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 241, 288 ff. (1952). The opinion of 
the court in St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. v. Madden, 77 Kan. So at 91-92, 93 Pac. 
586 (1go8), is typical: "We find no difficulty in determining that the work of burning 
the fire-guard was a part of the operation of the road. The company could not, there-
fore, absolve itself from the liability by letting out the work to an independent con-
tractor, for the reason that it owed to the plaintiff an obligation, placed upon it by the 
law, to respond in damages for all injuries by fire thus caused; and for the further 
reason that it employed a dangerous agency which in the experience of every one re-
quired that precautions be taken to prevent damage to the property of others. Thus a 
second duty was cast upon the railroad company not to cause the work to be done, 
either directly by its employees or indirectly by a contractor, without seeing that pre-
cautions were taken to prevent the escape of fire and consequent injury to the property 
of plaintiff. Neither of these obligations, or duties, could be avoided by delegating the 
performance of the work to another." 
2 70 See, for example, John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Hewitt, z87 Fed. 120, 122 (4th 
Cir. 1923). The owner of land hired an independent contractor to carry out a logging 
operation knowing that inflammable debris would collect along the railroad right of 
way over which the logs were carried. Fire, set in the negligently accumulated debris, 
spread to neighboring land and the landowner was held responsible. The court rea-
soned: "In our view, the work which defendant contracted to have done was of that 
character commonly described as intrinsically or inherently dangerous, and, if this be 
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Other logging cases,271 however, indicate that vicarious liability will 
not be imposed when the independent contractor floating logs down 
river to the hiring company's mill is not so narrowly limited in his 
methods or timing by the performance terms of the contract. The courts 
concluded that the operations (which were off-site, though this was not 
discussed in the opinions) were sufficiently separate to justify denying 
liability. Plaintiffs argued that floating logs was inherently dangerous 
but the courts did not accept the contention. The courts, however, did 
meet squarely the basic policy question involved in all independent con-
tractor vicarious liability cases; i.e., are the operations distinct enough, 
is the danger not too unusual, is the economic value to society of this 
activity sufficient to allow the emp~oyer to immunize himself against 
tort liability by hiring competent independent contractors for certain 
operations? 
A similar result in another early off-site case was reached by the 
Washington court in Johnston v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co.212 
Here the sub-contractor, in removing dirt from the main operation, set 
up a counter-weight sled device to help his horses keep the wagons 
loaded with dirt from running down hill too fast. The plaintiff was 
inju·red when the taxicab in which he was riding struck this device. 
Again the court found that the operations of the independent contractor 
were not controlled by the principal contractor and so refused to impose 
liability on him for the former's negligence. The court said that the 
inherently dangerous exception did not apply because placing the drag 
in the street did not relate to the actual performance of the work con-
tracted for but only to the manner of its performance.213 
In Woodard v. A. F. Coats Lumber Co.,214 the Oregon court used 
true, it follows, we think, that the contractee may not, under such circumstances, let 
the work to others to ·do, and avoid liability in case it is negligently done; for where 
danger to the property or person of others is likely to attend the doing of the work, the 
liability of the contractee is not avoided by committing it to someone else to do. Under 
the circumstances as they here obtained, defendant owed the duty to the owners of 
neighboring property to see that the work was carefully performed, and that proper 
means were adopted by which the consequences of the negligent accumulation of com-
bustible material on the right of way would be avoided; in other words, to see that the 
mischief which would likely occur did not occur by removing the danger or otherwise 
adopting such precautionary measures as experience has shown to be necessary under 
like conditions." 
2n Carter v. Berlin Mills Co., 58 N.H. 52 (1876); Town of Pierrepont v. Loveless, 
72 N.Y. 2II (1878). 
21285 Wash. 551, 148 Pac. 900 (1915). This case comes closer to the on-site situa-
tion since the injury occurred closely adjacent to the main operation on adjoining land. 
unlike the logging cases. 
278 ld. at 557. 
274 97 Ore. 302, 191 Pac. 668 (1920). 
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much the same reasoning when plaintiff, a fisherman, sued for damages 
to his nets caused by oil which leaked from a barge which had sunk 
while being operated negligently by an independent sub-contractor. The 
barge had been hired to carry defendant's wood but oil was left in the 
bottom of the barge from previous operations for other persons. Find-
ing that the barge company was an independent contractor and that 
towing barges was not "inherently dangerous or liable to inflict damage 
upon another," 275 the court refused to hold the lumber company liable 
for the negligence of the tug operator. 
Although the logging and the Johnston and Woodard cases might 
be considered as transportation cases, the injuries resulted not from the 
dangerous nature of the commodity being transported but from the way 
in which the independent contractor carried out his operations. Unless 
the particular method of operating is specified by the contract or is in-
directly dictated by the terms of the contract, the courts generally re-
fused to impose on the employer vicarious liability for the negligence 
of the independent contractor, even though the operations certainly 
involved as unusual hazards as many of those in on-site cases where 
such liability was found. These cases illustrate the possibility that courts 
will find certain operations sufficiently separate to permit the employer 
to avoid liability for the independent contractor's negligence in carrying 
on operations having considerable hazard potential. They all, however, 
are rather old cases. 
(iii) Waste Disposal Operations 
The problem of vicarious liability for an independent contractor's 
negligence surely will arise to trouble the atomic energy producer or 
user when it comes to disposing of radioactive wastes or "garbage." It 
is perfectly clear that in the light of the dangerous nature of radioactive 
material there is a real obligation ·of the user to take special precautions 
to insure proper disposal. Recognizing the unusual character of such 
material, surely the courts will say that due care requires that greater 
precautions be taken than an! required for ordinary waste disposal 
procedures. In most cases such wastes certainly will be considered as 
dangerous as empty five gallon shellac cans 276 or oil filters, 217 and so 
275/d. at 3o8. 
276 Salas v. Whittington, 77 Cal. App.2d 90, 174 P.2d 886 (1946). A shellac can 
exploded when put in fire by a small boy who had found the can in a trash pile used 
in common by defendant and the boy's parents. Defendant held liable. 
277 Justice v. Amherst Coal Co., 101 S.E.2d 86o (W.Va. 1958). Defendant dumped 
oil filters in a trash pile which he knew was frequented by children. Defendant was 
held liable for injuries to child hurt when filters exploded. 
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cannot merely be tossed into the trash pile, literally or figuratively. On 
the other hand, if care commensurate with the dangers is used, author-
ity exists denying recovery to an injured party even when the w~ste 
material is dangerous explosives. 278 
Assuming, however, that a person such as a reactor operator is care-
ful to choose a competent chemical processor or disposal agent who has 
been licensed by the AEC and meets his packaging and notification re-
sponsibilities, but the disposal operation is done negligently, will the 
operator be liable vicariously? The number of cases found which deal 
specifically with off-site disposal actually can be counted on one hand, 
once cases involving a negligent owner or employer are excluded. 279 
Even as to these, factual distinctions are not difficult to make; three 
deal with garbage and one with sewage. 
The Garbage Cases. The case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
Chenault 280 involved the disposal of cattle killed in a train wreck on the 
defendant's road. The railroad's roadmaster contracted with a butcher 
to remove the d~ad cattle to the butcher~s pasture some two or three 
miles out of town. The butcher assured the roadmaster that this was 
far enough away so as not to,bother anyone. The butcher's pay for dis-
posing of the cattle was the hides of the eighteen head. The butcher 
placed the cattle in his pasture but close enough to the plaintiff so that 
they becaiJ1e a nuisance. The court permitted damages to be recovered 
for the nuisance in spite of the claim by the railroad that the butcher 
was an independent contractor who had undertaken to dispose of the 
carcasses so as not to create a nuisance. The courts total discussion of 
278 Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. I9S2), and Iokepa v. United 
States, ISS F.Supp. 394 (D.C. Hawaii, I9S8). Both involved explosives left after the 
property had been thoroughly searched by the federal government. for unexploded shells 
and other weapons used during war-time training maneuvers. The properties at the 
time of the explosions no longer belonged to the government. In each case the court 
found that the government had conducted its decontamination searches carefully and 
was not to be held liable .. There was no dependence in either case upon the doctrine of 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. IS, 73 S.Ct. 9S6 (I9S3), that the government, 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, had not submitted to suits for injuries resulting 
from discretionary acts of government officers. It might also be argued that there was 
an element of assumption of risk in each case since the people occupied or used the 
property knowing of its prior use but the reasoning of the court in neither case based 
its decision on this idea. 
279 Liability is imposed if the owner is negligent himself in garbage or refuse disposal 
operations, Annot., IS6 A.L.R. 714. 734 (I94S), or is negligent in supervising how 
others use the city disposal site, City of San Antonio v. Mackey, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 
36 S.W. 700 (18¢). 
280 31 Tex. Civ. App. ss8 (1903). 
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the policy involved and its reasons for deciding that the railroad was 
liable is as follows : 
It was due the public by appellant to dispose of the carcasses 
so as to prevent a nuisance, and this duty could not be dele-
gated to someone else, and appellant thereby escape liability. 
It was responsible for the acts of Phillips in failing to prop-
erly dispose of them. 281 
On a motion for additional conclusions of fact, the court stated that 
they found the following: 
I. Defendant exercised ordinary care in selecting E. J. 
Phillips as a suitable person with whom to contract for the 
removal of the carcasses. 
2. Phillips employed his own means and facilities in re-
moving the carcasses from the defendant's right of way near 
Garland to his pasture remote from said right of way. He 
was an independent contractor, provided it was possible as 
a matter of law for the defendant railway company to create 
such a relation in the disposition of such cattle. 282 
Fourteen years later the Alabama appellate court had occasion to 
decide a remarkably similar case, Southern Ry. Co. v. Robertson.288 
The plaintiff sued the defendant railroad for creating a nuisance by 
putting the carcass of a dead animal so close to the plaintiff's residence 
that the odors of decay were more than barely perceptible. The rail-
road's defense was that an independent contractor, not the railroad or 
any of its employees, was responsible for creating the nuisance. After 
stating that there were two exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability for the acts of an independent contractor-one, inherently 
dangerous work and two, where "certain duties" are owed-the 
court said: 
The common intent of the defendant and Cornett was to rid 
the defendant's premises of a nuisance that would result 
from having the carcass on the defendant's premises, and in 
accomplishing this result, a nuisance was created, to the an-
noyance and hurt of the plaintiff, so, assuming that Cornett 
was an independent contractor, the defendant would be lia-
ble .... 
Negligence of the defendant is not an essential element in 
an action for damages resulting from a nuisance; the action 
is founded on the wrongful act in creating or maintaining a 
281/bid. 
282 I d. at 559. 
288 16 Ala. App. ISS (1917). 
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nuisance-in this case, in creating it. . . . The application 
for rehearing ignores the principle that the defendant owed 
the plaintiff a duty not to create a nuisance on his premises. 
If we should grant the contention that the defendant could 
avoid liability by employing an independent contractor in 
such cases, then by employing an irresponsible insolvent who 
could, with impunity, violate the rights of a third party 
the rule of law imposing a duty on a principal would be 
rendered futile and useless.284 
189 
The court then stated that the question of fact was for the jury, in 
any.event, as to whether Cornett was an agent or an-independent con-
tractor of the defendant railroad. 
Courts probably will not ignore completely the fact that the injured 
plaintiff often will be suing a public utility or other large corporation 
which is covered by an insurance policy and the government indemnity 
program. On the other hand, the applicability of these cases to the 
atomic energy problem we have posed is not clear. In the Chenault 
case it is possible to interpret the brief statement of facts and conclu-
sion of the court as meaning that there was in fact an agreement be-
tween the roadmaster and the butcher as to where the carcasses were 
to be removed, and that the roadmaster was negligent in failing to in-
vestigate personally and determine that this disposal site did not create 
a nuisance. Even the Alabama case might be read as involving an 
agreement between the defendant's foreman and the independent con-
tractor as to where the carcass was to be placed. If this is true, then 
these cases come much closer to McDonell v. Rifle Boom Co./85 in-
volving an independent contractor hired to float logs down a stream. 
In that case the court held the company liable for the negligence of the 
independent contractor since to carry out the terms of the contract, he 
was forced to do the very thing which caused the injury. 
Even if this fact is not read into either of the cases, some important 
distinctions should be recognized before applying them to the disposal 
of radioactive waste material. In neither case was the independent con-
tractor licensed or controlled in any way by a governmental agency. 
Likewise, there was no evidence of special qualifications or expertise 
in disposal operations, though admittedly there is not much special 
knowledge needed in disposing of dead animals. In addition, while 
dead animals may create a hazard to health, for the most part the haz-
ard is one of obnoxious odors only. In the case of radioactive waste 
284/d. at 156. 
285 Supra note 266. 
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materials there is a health and safety danger to property and partic-
ularly to persons. The danger may be great and it usually will last a 
greater length of time than the smell of a decaying carcass. These 
cases, however, deal with the disposal of waste material which is 
usually classified as garbage, a term sometimes used to describe the 
fission products of the atomic energy business. 
The third garbage case, Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee/88 presents a 
situation somewhat closer to the problem of disposing of radioactive 
waste materials. The commissioners of public works for the city of 
Milwaukee hired a contractor to dump all garbage and refuse collected 
within the city in Lake Michigan at some point not less than fifteen 
mile from the city. A right to suspend the work or to let it to some-
body else in case of "improper or imperfect performance" was re-
served by the city. The court held that this did not give the city the 
power to direct and designate the dumping place, and, therefore, the 
city was not liable for damages when on two occasions the garbage 
dumped by the independent contractor was carried by the ordinary 
currents and movements of the lake waters to the spot where the plain-
tiff's fish nets were located, damaging the nets. The court said: 
It requires no citation of authorities to show that, if the 
act which caused the damages was the work of an independ-
ent contractor, the city is not liable. Whether the person 
whose act caused the damages was, in legal contemplation, 
an independent contractor, is sometimes debatable on the 
facts. The test is, Had the defendant the right to control 
the conduct of the person doing the work, as respects the 
mode and manner of doing it, in the particular complained 
of? 2s1 
There are several difficulties in using this case to answer our waste 
disposal problem. In the first place, it was decided in 1896 before many 
courts developed the idea of inherently dangerous material and non-
delegable duties. Certainly the dependence of the court upon the in-
dependent contractor analysis with no recognition of the non-dele-
gable duty principle makes it doubtful authority, even though it is true 
that unless garbage is properly disposed of and particular care taken 
in the disposal operation there will be very undesirable results both as 
to odors and health hazards. In Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee it re-
sulted in damage to property only. Perhaps more important is the fact 
that the court, after holding the city not liable because an independent 
286 92 Wis. 263, 65 N.W. 1~30 (18g6) 
2a1 I d. at 265. 
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contractor was used, said that if the commissioners of public works 
had used their own employees in this work the city still would not be 
liable, "for it is a public service, as distinguished from a corporate 
duty. In that respect, it is like the fire, health, or police departments of 
cities." 288 A different result might have been reached if a private con-
cern were disposing of its own wastes. 
One other case was found in which there at least is some language 
concerning the power to contract away liability for disposal of waste 
material. In People v. City of Los Angeles/89 several outlying cities 
had contracted with the City of Los Angeles to dispose of their sew-
age. It was disposed of in such a way that, when swept back to shore, 
it caused damage to the beaches along the ocean. The court said : 
A primary obligation rested upon appellants to dispose of 
sewage accumulating within their respective boundaries, 
and an equally binding obligation rested upon them to dis-
pose of the sewage in s~ch a way that it would entail no in-
jury to other parties. And appellants cannot relieve them-
selves by contract with other municipalities of their primary 
obligation imposed upon them by law [The contract with 
Los · Angeles is irrelevant.] . . . There rested upon appel-
lants a bouQden duty to dispose of their sewage in such a 
manner as not to bring injury or damage to others. It there-
fore follows, that the fact that the screening plant and sub-
marine tube at Hyperion are owned, maintained and con-
trolled by the city of Los Angeles does not relieve appellants 
of responsibility for the admitted public nuisance sought to be 
abated, if they contributed thereto.290 
The fact situation seems analogous, the language denying immunity 
from liability is strong, and the case is the most recent found. The dif-
ficulty for present purposes is that it was not only an action by the 
state rather than by a private individual but also it was an action 
merely to abate a nuisance, not to recover damages. Even as to abate-
ment of the nuisance, the only liability sought to be avoided was a duty 
to contribute toward the construction of a new disposal system for the 
whole area which would treat the sewage adequately and prevent pollu-
tion of the ocean and beaches. The case involved the question of 
whether the outlying cities had to help Los Angeles finance a new 
plant, or could insist on their original contract. The language was 
288 I d. at 266. 
289 83 Cal. App.2d 627, rSg P.2d 489 (1948). 
2uo I d. at 643. [Emphasis added.] 
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directed to this liability, not the quite different one involved in a 
damage action by a private person harmed by the pollution. 
In the event an injury is claimed to have been caused by radioactive 
waste, it will be very difficult to identify not only the particular radio-
active material but also the person or independent contractor who 
handled it. Therefore, as the use of radioactive materials becomes 
more widespread, it will become increasingly important to attain cen-
tralized control of disposal operations. At the present time most dis-
posal operations are under the control of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. 291 
(b) Conclusions Concerning Off-Site Operations 
Existing cases do not give a very satisfactory answer to the ques-
tion of whether or not vicarious liability will be imposed on the em-
ployer for the negligence of an independent contractor handling radio-
active wastes in off-site situations. Courts do differ on the policy con-
clusion to be drawn in individual cases, both on and off-site, but they 
all are peculiarly uncommunicative as to precisely why in a particular 
case the hazard is or is not unusual enough to preclude delegation of 
liability. Proper development of this new industry, however, is de-
pendent to some extent upon the answer to this question. The authors 
suggest that the answer should depend upon two factors ; the degree 
of unusualness of the hazard created, and the distinctness of the oper-
ation delegated to the independent contractor, both considered in the 
light of what effect a rule of non-delegable duty will have on develop-
ment of the industry and what effect a rule of delegable duty will have 
on the public possibly subject to the hazard created. The following 
conclusions are suggested by the authors. 
The transportation of radioactive materials, whether by land, water, 
or air, undoubtedly will create some considerable risks, possibly to 
the passengers and employees of the carrier, to the property of ship-
pers, or even to the general public should an accident occur. The ex-
tent of the hazard will vary greatly from case to case, depending upon 
the intensity and type of the radiation as well as whether it is in the 
form of a liquid, gas, or solid. Surely liability should not be imposed 
upon the shipper as a general rule and perhaps never so long as he is 
careful in all respects, including the choice of a competent, licensed 
common earner. 
291 The AEC is not given i!lrisdiction over some radioactive materials such as radium 
and radioactive isotopes produced other than in reactors. 
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The question is not whether someone must assume liability to com-
pensate for negligently caused injuries but rather, is it to be imposed 
upon the shipper or carrier? Undoubtedly a competent, lice~sed 
common carrier will carry normal public liability insurance coverage 
and there would seem to be little reason for breaking down the 
traditional dividing line among various industrial operations. Tra-
ditionally one of these has been that between transportation and other 
phases of business activities. If an accident caused by the negligence 
of the carrier should release radioactive materials, the hazard to 
other property ordinarily would be much less than that created by the 
shipment of other kinds of materials regularly transported on com-
mon carriers. Explosives, dangerous chemicals, and various highly 
inflammable materials have a much greater destructive potential as to 
property than will radioactive materials in many if not most cases. De-
contamination in every situation will not be possible but in many it 
will be quite feasible to remove the radioactive material with no sub-
stantial injury to the property itself. 
When the number of persons possibly endangered and the extent 
and seriousness of the injuries that might result are considered, the 
same result should be reached as to personal injuries arising from 
shipment of such materials. The danger of personal injury from 
shipment of ordinary explosives and inflammables in the usual case 
will be much greater, both as to numbers and seriousness of injuries. 
In fact, except for the possibility of ingesting radioactive materials 
into the human body, it is doubtful that the risk is nearly as great. 
With adequate labeling/92 increased public awareness of the nature of 
radiation hazards, and particularly with special training for rescue 
personnel, injury to great numbers of persons through accidental re-
lease of radioactive material should be less likely than in the case of 
carrier wrecks involving explosives, dangerous chemicals, and inflam-
mable material. In general, the risk is no more unusual, if as much so. 
When the negligence of the carrier is the sole cause of the accident, 
the number of persons and the extent of injury caused by inhalation 
or ingestion of radioactive material does not warrant breaking down 
the desirable separation of responsibilities in business operations 
which allows some activities to be carried on by independent contrac-
tors. This is the case particularly when the carrier is licensed by the 
federal government and its activities in transporting such material 
will be regulated closely with relation specifically to the health and 
292 On the duty to label, see supra note 139. 
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safety problem. A rule imposing vicarious liability would tend to 
cause shippers to transport their own material and more danger to the 
public might be created than if use is made of carriers who have 
enough business in such shipments to acquire the necessary special 
knowledge and take the required precautions to protect the public. 
Administration of health and safety rules will be less difficult than 
if there are many persons engaged in shipment operations. If a car-
rier were not so licensed and controlled a different result perhaps is 
justified, but even here if a competent ·and financially responsible car-
rier is selected, it is doubtful that the traditional line between trans-
portation and other business activities should be broken down. 
Fabrication of fuel elements and similar activities related to work on 
the radioactive material before it is shipped to the ultimate user should 
be treated in the same way as transportation cases so far as the vicari-
ous liability question is concerned. This conclusion is limited to harm 
from accidents that occur while the independent' contractor is working 
on the product; it is not meant to apply to injuries which occur after 
the user has started to make use of the material in his regular opera-
tions. The question of the user's liability for a defect resulting from 
the supplier's negligence and of the supplier's liability for such defects 
after the material reaches the ultimate user surely will be governed by 
the usual rules. 293 
Although no very closely analogous cases were found on this prob-
lem, those found (all quite old) suggest that vicarious liability would 
not be imposed, 294 except possibly where the contract in effect dictates 
the method to be used by the independent contractor. 29~ The modern 
trend in general to expand liability in negligence situations may lead 
more plaintiffs to assert the unusual hazards idea in off-site cases. It 
is likely, therefore, that courts will have to decide whether to impose 
vicarious liability on the employer for the independent contractor's 
negligence. The policy justification for forcing the user of the material 
(e.g., the reactor operator) to supervise personally all of the supplier's 
plant operations to guard against negligence is questionable. 
At the present time, the reactor operator apparently does not make 
his liability insurance effecti~e untii he is ready to operate the reactor. 
In addition, apparently the AEC does not yet require the fuel fabrica-
tor to take out financial protection under the indemnity amendments 
293 See discussion of enterprise liability, infra Chapter V, and cases concerning lia-
bility of a landowner for defective construction discussed supra note 227. 
294 Cases discussed in text supra at notes 258-75. 
2os See cases discussed in text supra at notes :264, :266. 
NEGLIGENCE 195 
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.296 The consequence of these two 
facts is that the government indemnity program does not cover . the 
fuel fabricator's operations; nevertheless, vicarious liability should 
not be imposed on the reactor operator if he uses due care in selecting 
the fabricator. The hazard involved in fuel fabrication operations is 
not nearly as great as that arising from the accumulated fission prod-
ucts resulting from reactor operations. The fabricator's public liability 
policy, even without the government indemnity program, should 
cover any liability that would result and should provide adequate com-
pensation for damages imposed. If coverage is not adequate, the solu-
tion should be to require financial protection and give government 
indemnity coverage, not shift responsibility for the independent sup-
plier's negligence to the reactor operator. If it is shifted, participation 
in atomic energy activities by the relatively small user who is inter-
ested in industrial or research uses, not reactors, probably will be 
discouraged considerably. The small operator, perfectly capable of abid-
ing by safety requirements and meeting financial protection responsi-
bilities for his own small operation, undoubtedly would not be equipped 
or want to supervise the plant operations of a supplier, nor would 
he feel justified in assuming liability for injuries to the supplier's em-
ployees or third parties injured through the supplier's negligence. The 
risks involved in fuel fabrication are not so unusual as to justify adop-
tion of a rule of liability having this effect. 
If the fuel reprocessing operator is negligent, however, the haz-
ard could be considerably greater, though the operation is as distinct 
as that of fuel fabrication. Reprocessing operations often will in-
volve great quantities of highly radioactive fission products with great 
potential for harm. In this respect these operations raise the same con-
siderations presented by reactor waste . disposal activities and should 
be treated in the same way. 
Even disposal and reprocessing operations generally should be con-
sidered a separate function. The entrepreneur who creates the neces-
sity for disposal or reprocessing should not have to assume vicarious 
liability for the negligence of the reprocessor or disposal concern. The 
most impelling reason for this legal result is that there is so much to be 
gained by centralized disposal operations carefully controlled or even 
conducted by the federal government itself through the AEC or its 
contractors. It would be very unwise to adopt a rule which would lead 
individual entrepreneurs to undertake the disposal operation them-
298 See discussion of federal indemnity legislation, infra, in text at notes 1265 ff. 
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selves. If they are to be held liable for the negligence of the disposal 
contractor, however, they will tend to do just this. Because it is desir-
able to concentrate materials in preparing them for disposal and to 
dispose of them in designated places, it would seem that creating a 
separate and distinct disposal operation is the best solution. Where an 
entrepreneur contracts with a disposal company which has been spe-
cifically licensed 297 and approved by the AEC with particular care 
directed to the question of preserving the public health and safety, it 
is best that only this company, or the federal government if it carries 
out the operation itself, be liable. So that the public which might be 
damaged by the negligent disposal operations can have the benefit of 
the indemnity program, however, the AEC should license such per-
sons, req1tire them to show financial responsibility and sign imJemnifi-
cation contracts so as to bring the $soo,ooo,ooo government indem-
nity coverage into effect. . 
There may be reason to impose upon the atomic energy user full 
responsibility for all operations carried on by his own employees or on 
his own premises by independent contractors; the trend of recent cases 
makes this result very likely in a radiation case. On the other hand, it 
would seem that reprocessing and waste disposal operations are suffi-
ciently distinct and so closely regulated by the AEC that our tort lia-
bility rules should recognize them as distinct. If this is not done the 
small atomic energy operators will be seriously deterred from con-
tinuing in the field even though their specific activities create no un-
usual hazards (either in terms of number of people exposed or the kind 
of exposure involved) and do not call for a high financial protection 
requirement. 
An additional reason for separating such functions for purposes of 
tort liability is to avoid some extremely difficult proof problems. The 
complications of proving whose radioactive material does specific dam-
age are considerable. The disposal operator often will mix the material 
from several users making it impossible to tell whose was responsible 
for what injury. This might lead to making all who contributed some 
material liable for all damages from any of it and this is too much for 
most small operators. Instead the law should allow compartmentaliza-
tion to the extent suggested, even as to tort liability rules. 
The authors do not suggest, however, that a manufacturer of radio-
297 E.g., American Mail Lines, Ltd., has been licensed to dispose of waste products 
from the Boeing Airplane Company operations. Very specific limitations on the dis-
posal method are imposed by the license. AEC Press Rei., July 31, 1958. 
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active material should not be held on a product liability basis as dis-
cussed in Chapter V. Neither do they mean to suggest that the user 
of the material should be immunized from injuries that occur during 
his use of the material even though the injury results from negligence 
of a supplier. He should be responsible for seeing that proper materials 
and proper procedures are used in his own operations. It also seems 
perfectly reasonable to hold the user to a standard of conduct which re-
quires him to be extremely careful not only in his preparation of such 
materials for reprocessing, transporting, or disposing but also in label-
ing and giving adequate notice and in selecting competent licensed 
contractors. 
So long as strict liability is not imposed upon all atomic energy 
operations, (and it should not since many of them are not even as 
hazardous as some normal business activities) and so long as there is 
careful governmental control directed specifically toward protecting the 
public health and safety, some compartmentalization of tort liability as 
well as operational activities should be allowed where it seems perfectly 
natural and useful and is not adopted solely to avoid liability. Such ~ 
rule should aid considerably in the development and diversification 
of atomic energy activities. When and if, as seems likely, separate in-
surance companies write atomic energy risk policies, it will become 
very important to decide which persons having contact with the par-
ticular material alleged to have caused damage are to be held liable. At 
the present time, since there are two separate insurance funds furnish-
ing two separate insurance coverages for atomic energy hazards, the 
question may still be important. While the government is the only 
source of recovery if the damages go above the financial protection 
requirements set by the. AEC for a particular operator, it is important 
to determine who is to be held liable up to the point where the govern-
ment does take over. As insurance operations and the whole atomi~ 
energy. business fall into more normal, standardized business patterns, 
it will be quite important that recognition be taken of this vicarious 
liability problem. Perhaps a legislative solution should be adopted. In 
our opinion it would be desirable to allow some compartmentalization 
along the lines suggested. 
In deciding whether to apply the "inherently dangerous" or, as we 
prefer, the unusual hazard concept to fuel reprocessing or waste dis-
posal operation, at least one line should be drawn-between cases 
where the injured person is a member of the general public and those 
in which the injured person is an employee of the independent con-
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tracting company carrying out one of these distinct operations. The 
same distinction is applicable also to transportation and fuel fabrica-
tion cases. A radiation accident that occurred at Oak Ridge recently il-
lustrates the kinds of situations that will arise as greater use is made 
of radioactive materials. 298 Eight employees of the plant received sig-
nificant exposures to radiation, one as much as 320 rad. The exposure 
occurred when a critical mass was created accidentally during handling 
of enriched uranium in the form of a slurry. 
There will be similar types of accidents in all of the operations 
which we suggest are distinct, with the possible exception of transpor-
tation. It may be entirely satisfactory, as a matter of policy, to impose 
vicarious liability on the landowner for dangerous conditions which 
cause injury to the employees of an independent contractor if the neg-
ligence creates an unusual hazard, such as is found in the construction 
cases. Surely, however, there is no policy justification for applying 
such rules to a . fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, or disposal 
operation employee whose injury results solely from the negligence of 
his own employer. His injuries certainly should be and in some cases 
would be covered by workmen's compensation carried by his em-
ployer.299 
Where the user has carefully selected a licensed operator for one of 
these distinct activities and has been careful to give the necessary in-
formation and to properly label material so that the independent con-
tractor is advised of the dangers involved, the best position would 
seem to be not to impose vicarious liability upon the user for damages 
caused by the independent contractor, even when the injury is to in-
nocent third parties. In any event, surely there is no justification for 
holding the user vicariously liable for negligent injuries to employees 
of an employer-independent contractor. 
This is a quite different problem from that involved in the product 
liability and construction cases where a manufacturer who is negligent 
in producing or building some article is held liable after the product 
has been turned over to other persons for their sale or use.800 In those 
cases the person is being held liable for damages caused by his own 
negligence, not for the negligence of another party carefully selected 
and duly licensed to carry out a particular function by a governmental 
agency charged with regulating the very problem of health and safety 
298 The facts of the incident are set out, infra, Chapter IV at note 125. 
299 See discussion of workmen's compensation, infra, Part II. 
soo See discussion of enterprise liability, infra, Chapter V. 
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vyith which we are concerned. There seems little reason to shift respon-
sibility for these distinct operations or to encourage attempts by . the 
employer to control the independent contractor's operations far re-
nwved from the employer's own operations. 
4· Damages-Interests Protected 
a. Introduction - Limitations on Discussion - General 
Theory of Compensation 
Some aspects of the damage problem typically are treated as part of 
the duty concept, so1 while others usually are discussed after the other 
three elements-duty, breach, and causation-have been shown. Pros-
ser does not consider it a separate question; to the extent that he dis-
cusses it he does so in connection with individual types of action.302 
On the other hand, the general theory of damages in negligence ac-
tions is treated as a separate problem by Harper and James.803 
In part, this difference of opinion undoubtedly arises from the fact 
that frequently a court's determination of whether or not to allow 
compensation for a particular kind of injury is tied up with proof 
difficulties, real or imaginary. Courts will often cite the difficulty in 
attaining reasonable certainty of proof as a reason for denying re-
covery for certain kirids of injuries. In dealing with the underlying 
policies, it will help our analysis if the damage question is separated 
into two parts: ( 1) what types of injuries will be considered compen-
sable, assuming that causation can be proved, or, in other words, what 
kinds of interests will the law of negligence protect by allowing a 
damage action against a person who has invaded another's interest; 
and ( 2) what kind of proof should a court consider, or let the jury 
consider, in determining (a) whether· the particular defendant has 
caused injury to the plaintiff, and (b) the extent of this injury. In 
resolving these questions a social policy determination must be made 
as to what interests should be protected by our legal system against 
negligently caused harm. Some of the injury situations arising from 
overexposure to radiation will be decided unjustly if present proof 
difficulties are used to deny any recovery for invasion of a particular 
interest. Fortunately the trend seems to be away from any arbitrary 
limitation upon compensable interest; it is in the direction of treating 
so1 Harper & James 1028 ff; Prosser 174 ff. 
302 E.g., Prosser 40 (mental disturbance), 56 (trespass), 416 (nuisance), 566 (mis-
representation), 593 (libel and slander), 765 (injurious falsehood). 
so3 Harper & James ch. 25 at 1299. 
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the proof problem as a matter of procedure, not as a matter of limita-
tion upon the types of interest protected against negligent invasion. 804 
Not all radiation injuries will present unique damage considera-
tions; in fact, many will not. In determining whether or not to allow 
recovery in tort actions it would seem to make little difference whether 
the loss was caused by radiation or by fire, explosion, automobile ac-
cident, or scalding by hot liquid. If personal property is destroyed the 
usual rule of allowing the value of the property before the accident, 
less any salvage value,S06 surely will be used. In personal injury cases 
loss of earnings and even of earning capacity, medical and similar 
expenses arising from the injury, and pain and suffering will be com-
pensable in the normal way when the loss arises because of overex-
posure to radiation. 306 Several types of radiation injury, however, 
are relatively unknown in tort litigation or present damage issues in 
such a way that the serious inadequacies in current damage concepts 
are dramatically revealed. These latter types are our concern here; they 
include ( 1) prenatal-both post-conception and genetic, ( 2) sterility 
and related incapacities, (3) increased susceptibility to disease (la-
tent in juries), ( 4) shortened life span, and ( 5) several miscellaneous 
injuries such as inability to continue in a chosen field of work, psychic 
injuries, and lost business profits because of the proximity of a re-
actor or other radiation operation. The difficult proof matters will be 
discussed in the following section; but we feel proof difficulties should 
not determine whether a type of interest should be protected in general. 
In a specific case,lack of proof may call for denial of recovery. 
This analysis is oriented specifically toward radiation cases, but the 
problems are basic to tort litigation generally; and it is our hope that 
a fundamental contribution will be made to achieving a more realistic 
and therefore satisfactory concept of damages. Legal· scholars have 
written relatively little on this general subject, yet it is extremely im-
portant. It would seem to be one of the remaining frontiers of de-
velopment in the law. 807 The discussion of damages that follows in 
this and in the next section on proof should be of interest to all law-
304 Prosser I74-7S; Harper & James 1028-29. Both condemn use of proof problems 
as a basis for denying recovery for prenatal injuries. The same is true for mental dis-
turbance and to some degree as to lost profits from injury to property. See Harper & 
James IJOS. 
30G Harper & James IJIG-11. 
soo See generally id. at 1316-23. 
307 See the foreword by Wright to the symposium of articles on "Damages for Per-
sonal Injuries," in 19 Ohio St. L.J. ISS (1958). 
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yers who deal with tort problems. The policy decisions to be made are 
extremely important, not only to interested parties, such as potential 
plaintiffs and defendants, but also to society as a whole because the 
group may suffer from any serious diminution in the value of per-
sons or property. The manner in which our legal system distributes 
this loss may even have a considerable impact on our economy. We 
have attempted to identify these problems, to analyze the most nearly 
analogous cases, and to suggest policy solutions. 
Rightly or wrongly, in dealing with negligently caused injuries, the 
Anglo-American system generally has adopted the principle of allowing 
c'ompensating, not punitive, damages. As Harper and James put it: 
What then is compensation? The primary notion is that 
of repairing plaintiff's injury or of making him whole as 
nearly as that may be done by an award of money. The 
"remedy [shotild] be commensurate to the injury sus-
tained." "[W]hoever does an injury to another is liable in 
damages to the extent of that injury." Sometimes this can 
be accomplished with a fair degree of accuracy. But obvi-
ously it cannot be done in anything but a figurative and es-
sentially speculative way for many of the consequences of 
personal injury. Yet it is the aim of the law to attain at 
least a "rough correspondence between the amount awarded 
as damages and the extent of the suffering," or other in-
tangible loss. 308 
The appropriateness of applying the compensation .theory of dam-
ages to tort cases in general and to radiation cases specifically is as-
sumed in the following discussion and also when making suggestions 
for more adequate solutions. So long as tort law provides damages 
for negligent injuries, compensation seems to be the best theory to 
adopt, even though measuring the amount of damages to be awarded 
is very uncertain in many cases. Radiation injuries will not present 
different considerations as to these matters; but we will point out 
where existing law, at least as applied to nuclear accidents and often 
as applied in tort cases generally, does not give results which are a 
logical or. fair application of the compensation principle. Decided cases 
too often illogically deny recovery for injury to an interest which is no 
different from an interest for which in another type of case recovery 
is allowed. On the other hand, double recovery is in effect allowed in 
other cases because the courts have failed to recognize that two claims 
for damages supposedly ·for different interests of different victims 
308 Harper & James 1301. 
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actually, to some extent, are duplicating claims. This is particularly 
true in the area of personal injuries as will be pointed out in discuss-
ing the rights of parents and next of kin under wrongful death and 
survival statutes. The overlapping nature of the claims should be 
recognized and duplication of awards avoided. Although it should be 
as complete as possible, only one recovery should be allowed to each 
victim for each injury. 
b. Prenatal Injuries-Post-Conception and Genetic 
The social policy involved in the question of whether to allow dam-
ages for injuries to unborn children is one which the greatly acceler-
ated use of radiation will bring into very sharp focus. Until the last 
ten years there were very few claims for compensation involving in-
juries received by the child while being carried by the mother and al-
most every case denied recovery. Since 1949, however, the number of 
cases has increased and there has been a dramatic shift toward recog-
nizing that the interest of the embryo or foetus, is a legally protected 
one. Moreover, legal scholars have begun to comment on this prob-
lem. 809 There is need for more adequate analysis and a resolution of a 
number of uncertainties as to damages arising during this post-concep-
tion period. More important, legal periodicals have contained no discus-
sion whatsoever 810 and no reported opinion has been found that deals 
in any way with the problem of genetic damage.811 Yet scientists are 
unanimous in their opinion that exposure to radiation causes genetic 
damage, at least in that it increases the risk of genetic mutation. To 
understand adequately the legal concepts that will be applied to the solu-
tion of the genetic damage problem, it also is important that a careful 
analysis be made of the existing cases and legal principles which are ap-
plied to the non-genetic, prenatal, post-conception injury cases. 
In discussing whether the unborn will be protected against negligent 
8°9 See Harper & James 1028-31. See also Frey, "Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa 
Mere," 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 85 (1927); Muse & Spinella, "Right of Infant to Recover 
for Prenatal Injury," 36 Va. L. Rev. 6u (1950); McBride & Norvell, "The Extension 
of Tort Liability in the Field of Pre-Natal Injuries," 26 Ins. Counsel ]. 148 (1959); 
Notes, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 166, 167 (1951); 35 Cornell L. Q. 648 (1950); 63 Harv. L. 
Rev. 173 (1949); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (1950); 34 Minn. L. Rev. 65 (1949) ; [1951] 
Wis. L. Rev. 518; 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950); 39 Cornell L. Q. 542 (1954); 8 Vand. L. 
Rev. 521 (1955); 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953). Further, see Seavey, Book Review, 45 
Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1931); Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 312 (1952). 
a to Only discussion found is reference to problem in Workshops on Legal Problems 
of Atomic Energy 25, 27 (U~ of Mich. Law School 1956). 
su See discussion infra notes 374-75. 
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invasion by another, it is assumed that the plaintiffs have established, 
either under the rules of strict liability or of negligence, that a duty 
was owed to the parent and that the duty was breached. It also is neces-
sary to prove causation even though in many cases this will present 
real difficulties. There already is general agreement among experts, 
however, that overexposure to radiation will result in some kind of 
injury. This certainly is true as far as injury to the foetus itself is con-
cerned, sufficient radiation giving rise to the possibility of microce-
phalic idiocy. In addition, irradiation of the parents' gonads followed 
by the birth of a deformed child shows causal relation with sufficient 
probability to satisfy existing rules. Even if this were not the case, as 
our knowledge of radiation exposure and genetic damage increases, it 
may well prove possible to satisfy the causation-in-fact requirement. 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to deal with proof of causation 
(which undoubtedly will present difficulty in genetic damage cases) if, 
as a matter of social policy, it is decided unwise to allow damages for 
invasion of this interest. It seems more logical, therefore, to discuss 
the question of whether this is an interest to be protected, prior to a 
discussion of the problems of proof as they relate to causation. 
If justification is needed to support the proposition that the court 
ought first determine whether there will be any recovery at all (rather 
than to assume that the proof problem is too difficult), it can be found 
by looking at the opinions in states where the cause of action is always 
denied. In only three decisions on the subject, so far as we have dis-
covered, has the court concerned itself with proof of the causal rela-
tion between the act complained of and the resulting damage to the 
foetus. 312 In the others the courts either assumed that the proof prob-
lem was too difficult without in any way analyzing or even suggesting 
what the difficulties would be or how the proof problem differed from 
that arising in other tort actions, or else decided there should be no 
such substantive right without discussing the proof problem. Prac-
tically all of the cases treat the substantive right question as different 
and separate from the causation question. 
s12 Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. App. 1951) (woman 
jolted in bus accident and medical testimony showed no causal connection so no re-
covery); Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947) (court found no evidence 
of causal connection to fright from assault by defendant since no medical testimony 
offered, and there was evidence child died from measles or pneumonia) ; Montreal 
Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 ·D.L.R. 337 (fall from tramway by mother and club-
footed child born ; found to be supported by enough evidence to go to jury which held 
for plaintiff). 
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(I) Injury to the Embryo or Foetus 
For purposes of discussing the question of whether or not damages 
should be awarded for injury to the child while in the mother's womb, 
several important distinctions should be made, although courts seldom 
have made them. The first is to distinguish between the right of the 
child, or his estate, and that of his parents. In discussing the rights 
of all plaintiffs the existing cases fall into two additional categories: 
(I) those allowing recovery in certain fact situations; and ( 2) those 
denying recovery under all circumstances. Within jurisdictions allow-
ing recovery, a further distinction must be made between three kinds 
of cases: (I) where the foetus was viable (able to survive if deliv-
ered) at the time of impact of the force set in motion by the defendant 
and the child lives for some period of time after birth, no matter how 
short, ( 2) where the foetus is viable at the time of impact but is born 
dead, and (3) where the embryo is not viable ·at the time of impact 
but is born alive showing an injury resulting from the impact. To be 
completely consistent a fourth category should be established, i.e., 
where the embryo is not viable at the time of impact and is born dead, 
although no case on this point has been found. 
{a) Rights of the Child 
All but one 818 of the writers start their discussion of the problem 
with the I884 Massachusetts case, Dietrich v. Northampton,S 14 in 
which the opinion was written by Justice Holmes. Five years pre-
viously, however, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Kansz v. Ryatt-,315 
decided that a husband could not sue a defendant physician for pro-
ducing his wife's miscarriage, the plaintiff contending that he was 
damaged by being deprived of offspring by the miscarriage. The court 
said: 
Regarding, for the purposes of this case, the rights of the 
father as to an infant in ventre sa mere to be the same as 
though the offspring were in life-a point that we do not 
determine-he cannot recover for injury to such offspring 
except for the loss of services resulting therefrom. Addison 
on Torts, 907. Plaintiff does not and cannot claim for loss 
of services of an unborn child. Whether he could have 
claimed for future services to be rendered after the birth of 
s1s Ramsey, "Liability for Prenatal Injuries," 1956 Ins. L. J. 151, 152. Also 10 
A.L.R.:zd Io69 (1950). 
814 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. ~ep. 242 (1884). 
315 51 Iowa 232, I N.W. 485 (1879). 
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the child we need not consider, for no such claim is found in 
the petition. We may suggest that such a claim for damages 
would be based upon very remote and uncertain consequences 
of the act complained of. It is hardly probable that it would 
be allowed by the law. 818 
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As the court decided the case it does not involve the rights of the 
child but rather those of the parent for loss of services, a quite dif-
ferent question to be discussed later. The court's suggestion as to the 
remoteness and uncertainty of the consequences of the miscarriage for 
damages of this kind, however, is indicative of the kind of concern 
that has caused some courts to deny recovery even to the child. 
It was Holmes' opinion in the Dietrich case, however, that un-
doubtedly set the pattern of judicial decision in this country until 1949, 
when suddenly the decisions started going the other way. In denying 
recovery to the administrator of the child assumed to have lived a 
few minutes after a premature birth caused by a defect in the highway 
of the defendant town, Holmes wrote: 
. . . [I] f we should assume, .irrespective of precedent, 
that a man might owe a civil duty and incur a conditional 
prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being, and if we 
should assume also that causing an infant to be born pre-
maturely stands on the same footing as wounding or poison-
ing, we should then be confronted by the question raised by 
the defendant, whether an infant dying before it was able 
to live separated from its mother could be said to have be-
come a person recognized by the law as capable of having a 
locus standi in court, or of being represented there by an 
administrator. . . . 
The Pub. Sts. c. 207, §9, ... punish unlawful attempts 
to procure miscarriage, acts which of course have the death 
of the child for their immediate object; and, while they 
greatly increase the severity of the punishment if the woman 
dies in consequence of the attempt, they make no corre-
sponding distinction if the child dies, even after leaving the 
womb. This statute seems to us to shake the foundation of 
the argument drawn from the criminal law, and no other 
occurs to us which has not been dealt with. 
Taking all the foregoing considerations into account, and 
further, that, as the unborn child was a part of the mother 
at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not 
too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her, 
we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not embrace 
the plaintiff's intestate within its meaning; and have not found 
818 /d. at 234. (Emphasis added.) 
206 TORT LIABILITY 
it necessary to consider the question of remoteness or the ef-
fect of those cases which declare that the statute liability of 
towns for defects in highways is more narrowly restricted 
than the common law liability for negligence.817 
In his usual succinct but also obscure-as-to-meaning style, Holmes 
does not make clear exactly what his reason is for denying recovery, 
except to deny the validity of the analogy to criminal law and property 
law (where potential rights of the unborn are recognized). It would 
seem that the main thrust of his opinion is that until the child is born 
no person in .being is hurt. His opinion did not consider the question 
0 f remoteness. 
There is one further suggestion in Holmes' opinion which has re-
ceived little attention in later cases or discussions of the problem but 
which should not be ignored. This is that the child is a part of the 
mother until actual birth, which Holmes suggests might give the 
mother grounds for a damage action. · 
Courts which deny recovery, even when the child lives and suffers 
a serious defect resulting from a prenatal injury, differ as to the rea-
sons for doing so. The following would seem to be a fair summary 
of the various grounds that have been or could be suggested to deny 
recovery: ( 1) there is no common law precedent allowing recovery, 
or precedent in a particular jurisdiction denies recovery so that denial 
must continue to be the result under the doctrine of stare decisis; 818 
(2) any unborn infant is a part of its mother and has no separate 
juristic existence until it is born alive; therefore, there is no duty of 
care owed to it prior to birth; 819 ( 3) the causal relationship between 
81T Supra note 314 at 16-17. 
818 Squillo v. New Haven, 14 Conn. Supp. 500 (Super. Ct. 1947) ; Dietrich v. North-
ampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), f'eaff'd in Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 
179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952) and Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 
(1950); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 6o, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. 
United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); ovef'ruled, Steggall v. Morris, 
363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 
(1942); Ryan v. Public Serv. Co-ordinated Transp., 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 
(Sup. Ct. 1940); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Morgan 
v. United States, 143 F. Supp. s&> (D.C. N.J. 1956) (applying Pennsylvania law); 
Rimpa v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 37 Erie 267 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Jacketti v. Pottstown 
Rapid Transit. Co., 67 Montg. Co. L.R. 37 (Pa. C.P. 1950); Gorman v Budlong, 23 
R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901). 
819 Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 6n, loS So. s66 (Ig26); 
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) and Smith v. Luck-
hardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939), both overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415 
Ill. 422, ·H4 N.E.2d 412 (1953) (allowing cause of action); Drabbels v. Skelley Oil 
Co., 155 Neb. 17, so N.W.2d 229 (1951); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 200, 133 N.E. 
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the negligent act and injury being too difficult to prove and the possi-
bilities of pure speculation creating so great a danger of a fraudulent 
or fictitious claim, it is unfair, and perhaps impracticable from the 
standpoint of overloading the courts, to allow recovery for such 
claims; 820 (4) to recognize a cause of action of an unborn infant 
raises the spectre of an action by the child against the mother for her 
negligence,821 to which might be added the related problems of con-
tributory negligence of the mother and assumption of risk by the 
mother in her relations to the defendant.322 
As the Table of Cases appended at the end of this section indicates, 
slightly more than one-half of the fifty jurisdictions in this. country 
have faced the question in some form. 823 Considering all the cases de-
cided in this country, the very clear preponderance of authority is now 
in favor of allowing recovery, at least where the foetus is viable at the 
time of the injury and is born alive. Legal writers are practically 
unanimous in approving recovery for prenatal injuries 824 but they fail 
to consider the question of who ought to recover for invasion of what 
567 (1921) and Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 
(2d Dep't 1913), both overruled, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 6g1 
(1951) (recovery allowed); In re Roberts' Estate, 158 Misc. 6g8, 286 N.Y.S. 476 
(Surr. Ct. 1936); Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943), overruled, 
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, IS2 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) (recovery 
allowed); Lipps v. Milwaukee E. Ry. & L. Co., 164 Wis. 272, IS9 N.W. 916 (1916) ; 
Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. (Ir.) 6g (18g1). 
3 20 Krantz v. Cleveland, Akron, Canton Bus Co., 32 Ohio N.P. (n. s.) 445 (1933) 
no longer the law in Ohio as a result of Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, supra 
note 319; Magnolia Coca Cola Bot. Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 
(193S); Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W.2d 3SO (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). 
321 Implied in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, su.pra note 319. 
322 Suggested in so Mich. L. Rev. 166, 168 (19SI). 
s2s Twenty-seven jurisdictions have faced the problem. 
324 Prosser 174 ff; Harper & James 1028-31; Anderson, "Rights of Action of An 
Unborn Child," 14 Tenn. L. Rev. ISI (1936); Barry, "The Child en Ventre sa Mere," 
14 Austl. L. ]. 3SI (1941); Winfield, "The Unborn Child," 4 U. of Tor. L. J. 278 
(1942); Cason & Collins, "May Parents Maintain an Action for the Wrongful Death 
of an Unborn Child in Missouri?" IS Mo. L. Rev. 211 (19SO); Comment, "Tort Lia-
bility for Prenatal Injury," 24 Tul. L. Rev. 43S (19SO); Note, "Tort Actions for In-
. juries to Unborn Infants," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 282 (19SO); Muse & Spinella, supra note 
309; A. A. White, "The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries," 12 La. L. Rev. 383 
(19S2); Ramsey, supra note 313; Lambert, Reviews of Leading Cases, 19 NACCA 
L. J. 230 (19S7); McBride & Norvell, "The Extension of Tort Liability in the Field 
of Pre-Natal Injuries," 26 Ins. Counsel J. 148 ( 19S9) ; noted, 32 Va. L. Rev. 1203 
(1946); 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (19SO); so Mich. L. 
Rev. 166 (19SI); 39 Cornell L. Q. 542 (19S4); 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. IIS4 (1954); 14S 
A.L.R. 1104 ( 1943) ; 10 A.L.R.2d 634, 639 ( 19so) ; 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 ( 19so) ; 27 
A.L.R.2d 12s6 (1953). 
208 TORT LIABILITY 
interest. Whether only the child, only the parent or next of kin, or both 
the child and survivors ~hould recover is not considered, leading to 
the possibility that double recovery will be allowed, the existence of 
wrongful death and survival statutes compounding the confusion. As 
suggested later, it is very important to differentiate between the re-
covery of the child and that of others such as parents; but the cases 
do not do so, being content to decide generally there should be re-
covery for prenatal injuries or there should not. 
The argument that there is no common law precedent in other 
jurisdictions no longer is a valid one when the question of whether or 
not to allow recovery is raised in a jurisdiction which has not had 
occasion to consider the matter. Actually several courts have refused 
to follow stare decisis where previous decisions in that jurisdiction 
denied recovery. As the New York Court of Appeals said in the 1951 
case of Woods v. Lancet, 825 in overruling an earlier decision denying 
recovery: 
What, then, stands in the way of a reversal here? Surely, 
as an original proposition, we would, today, be hard put to it 
to find a sound reason for the old rule. Fallowing Drobner 
v. Peters (supra) would call for an affirmance but the chief 
basis for that holding (lack of precedent) no longer exists. 
And it is not a very strong reason, anyhow, in a case like 
this. Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their 
business dealings should not be changed in the middle of the 
game, but what has that to do with bringing to justice a tort-
feasor who surely has no moral or other right to rely on a 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals? Negligence law 
is common law, and the common law has been molded and 
changed and brought up-to-date in many another case. Our 
court said, long ago, that it had not only the right, but the 
duty to re-examine a question where justice demands 
it. . 828 
The court then continued in answer to the charge that such changes of 
the law were for the legislature: 
The same answer goes to the argument that the change 
we here propose should come from the Legislature, not the 
courts. Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we 
abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, 
when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory 
court-made rule. Perhaps, some kinds of changes in the com-
825 Supra note 319. 
828 ld. at 354· 
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mon law could not safely be made without the kind of fact-
ual investigation which the Legislature and not the courts, is 
equipped for. . . . [referring to the study' of the Law Re-
vision Commission] The report, itself, contained no recom-
mendations for legislation on the subject but that apparently 
was because the commission felt that it was for the courts 
to deal with this common-law question.827 
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In the Woods case the plaintiff alleged injuries received during his 
ninth month in his mother's womb. The court held that the foetus at 
that ~ime had a separate 'existence. 
As to the "separate existence" argument, at least in the case of a 
viable· foetus, both legal writers and the majority of courts have now 
carried over the analogies from the criminal law and property fields 
(where separate existence for some purposes is recognized). They say 
that'medically there is a separate being and there is no reason why in-
jury to this being should not be treated separately from that of the 
mother. There are many recent cases expressly rejecting the no sep-
arate existence objection to recovery.828 
Kelly v. Gregory 829 is the one decision squarely holding that, if cau-
sation can be shown, a negligent defendant will be held liable for in., 
juries sustained during the third month of pregnancy and, therefore, 
probably while non-viable. The court felt that the decision of the Court 
of Appeals in Woods v. Lancet 830 should be applied whenever there is 
"biological separability," which the court held could be clearly demon-
strated as beginning at conception. 
Kelly v. Gregory was cited by the Georgia court in Hornbuckle v. 
Plantation Pipe Line Co.831 In the Hornbuckle case it was held that 
827 I d. at 355-56. 
828 Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App.2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1st Dist. 1954); Prates 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, n8 A.2d 633 (Super. Ct. 1955); Tursi 
v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, III A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955); 
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 2o8 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Rod-
riquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, II4 N.E.2d 721 (1953); Amann v. Faidy, supra note 319; 
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. App. 1955); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 
(La. App. 1923); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); 
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 
269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Steggall v. Morris, supra note 318; Woods v. Lancet, supra 
note 319; Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 8o9 (1950); Williams v. 
Marion Rapid Transit, supra note 319; Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 
(1955); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, sttpra note 312; Smith v. Fox, [1923] 3 
D.L.R. 785. 
829 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). 
330 Supra note 319. 
331 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). 
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the trial court properly overruled a general demurrer to a petition 
for relief which simply alleged that defendant's negligence caused 
prenatal injury to the plaintiff; there was no allegation that the foetus 
was viable at the time. The Chief Justice in the Hornbuckle case con-
curred in holding that relief should be granted for prenatal injuries 
but only if the embryo was "quick." "Quick" is to be distinguished 
from "viable" because it demands only separate existence that can be 
recognized but not that the embryo be able to survive if born. Fearing 
that carrying the cause of the action back to a point of time before 
the embryo is quick will make the courts a "dumping ground for faked 
and fraudulent suits," the Chief Justice concluded: 
If a baby can sue for injuries sustained five seconds after 
conception, as the majority rules, why not allow such suits 
for injuries before conception, even unto the ·third and 
fourth generations ? 832 
He concluded that it should be a matter of proof in each case upon 
the facts and not a matter of law as to when the baby becomes quick, 
although this might take place prior to four months after conception. 
The reduction to an absurdity argument of the Chief Justice is par-
ticularly interesting because it raises the very problem that radiation 
exposure of potential parents clearly creates, a subject that will be dis-
cussed below under genetic damage. 
One other jurisdiction possibly rejects the viability distinction, al-
lowing recovery when the injury in received before viability. The Mary-
land court, in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,ssa seems to suggest that the 
dividing line ought not be viability (capability of life separate from 
the mother), but rather whether the child is quick, in the sense that it 
can be recognized medically, i.e., when the embryo is a separate life 
within the mother. The court said: 
Some of the later cases attempt a distinction between a 
child which is viable and one which is not. . . . This is an 
apparent effort to correct the early doctrine that the child is 
a part of the mother by bringing it more in line with known 
medical facts. Children. are frequently born prematurely and 
live. And at times they have been removed from a dead 
mother and have survived. At some period in their growth 
they reach a stage where they can live apart from their 
mother. But, from a medical point of view, a child is alive 
within the mother before the time arrives when it can live 
8S2 !d. at 5o6. 
ass 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951). 
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apart from her. If it is injured at a time when, according to 
Blackstone it is "able to stir in the mother's womb" there 
would seem to be just as logical a basis for allowing it to re-
cover, as if it were injured after it had reached the period in 
its growth when it could be removed from the mother and 
live. In both cases it is alive, and in both cases there has oc-
curred an injury to a living human being for which the re-
sponsible party should be made liable. 834 
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Legal writers agree that the distinction of viability is an artificial 
one, and it would seem that the same holds true as to the distinction of 
being quick or recognizably a separate being. It is difficult to justify 
any such line when a causal relationship between exposure to radiation 
during any stage of pregnancy and an injury manifested after birth 
can be proved. In such cases as microcephalic idiocy, for example, the 
greatest danger from radiation arises during the first three months of 
pregnancy.335 Medical evidence makes a very strong case for ignoring 
the distinction, an artificial one at best.838 Nevertheless, the lawyer 
predicting his client's potential liability· must fake account of this dis-
tinction because it still may be· followed in many jurisdictions. 
While the reasons given for making the distinction between a viable 
and a non-viable foetus are usually stated in terms of whether or not 
there is a separate being, the real reason for this distinction until re-
cent years has been a fear that it is too difficult to prove that a woman 
is pregnant when the blow ·is struck unless the foetus has developed 
sufficiently to be viable. This, however, really goes to the difficultyof 
proof of causation, still another objection to allowing recovery. Today, 
however, proving the existence of an embryo should not prove much 
of an obstacle. With modern tests for pregnancy, it seems quite un-
realistic for a court to say there is no way of proving a separate entity 
that can be hurt until the child can be detected by the mother herself 
or until the child could live if separated from the mother. Even the 
assumption that a normal pregnancy lasts for 280 days after the last 
menstrual period is a more correct generalization than many assump-
tions upon which rules of l;:tw are based in other areas. 
As previously suggested, one of the most obvious cases for allowing 
8 Bf I d. at 438. 
835 Infra note 360. Denial of recovery in general criticized, see Prosser I74-75; Har-
per & James I028-3I. 
336 All cited supra note 324. See particularly 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (I950); so Mich. 
L. Rev. I66 (I9SI); Cason & Collins, supra note 324. See also Dunlap, "Medicolegal 
Aspects of Injuries from Exposure to X-Rays and Radioactive Substances," I I Mo. L. 
Rev. I37 (I946). 
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damages arises when radiation exposure occurs during the first two or 
three months of pregnancy.881 This indicates the unrealistic arbitrari-
ness of the distinction between the viable and the non-viable foetus. It 
is not meant to suggest, however, that under all circumstances the 
foetus should be treated as a separate entity for tort liability purposes. 
For example, as is suggested at the end of this section, particularly as 
to contributory negligence and assumption of risk, there may be occa-
sion for not treating the foetus as separate. Nevertheless, the argu-
ment against recovery based upon absence of separate identity is un-
realistic, and, · in addition, will involve the court in a very difficult 
proof problem in trying to determine when the embryo becomes viabl~. 
The possibility of applying contributory negligence or assumption 
o.f risk concepts is important in some cases because it makes unaccept.,-
able the argument given by practically every writer on the subject,888 
that the analogy from criminal law and property cases involving un-
born infants should be applied in tort recovery ·cases. In addition, the 
theories of recovery are different. So long as criminal law is based 
upon an odd mixture of "an eye for an eye" and "deterrence-by-
example," it has no justifiable application in connection with liability 
for negligence, which by definition involves unintentional injuries. If 
the theory of negligence recovery is one of compensation, then the 
policy decision should be directed to the question of whether or not 
this is the kind of injury for which compensation ought to be given 
and, if so, to what extent. 
In connection with proving causation, the speculative character of 
the actual conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presents some 
difficulties. We do not go so far as many writers have done and sug-
gest that there is no relationship between the difficulty of proof of 
causation and the granting of a right to damages. It seems best, how-
ever, to separate the two. There are instances in which the causal con-
nection will be easy enough to prove, some of which already have 
arisen in litigated cases.889 In others, present scientific evidence points 
to a very clear causal connection, as could be true in the case of ex-
posure to radiation during .the first few months of pregnancy.840 In 
such instances no court ought to lay down the broad proposition that 
the causal connection never is going to be sufficiently demonstrable to 
887 Infra note 300. 
B8S See articles listed supra note J24. See also text discussion infra at notes 392 ff. 
S89 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra note 319; Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320, 
206 N.W. 6so. (1925). 
uo Infra notes 300, 363. 
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justify a cause ot action. In addition, there is no reason to believe that 
the rapid progress of the last decade or two in scientific research will 
be slower in this area than in others. Particularly in radiation cases, 
surely the present drive for rapid development of atomic science will 
lead to much greater certainty in the area of causal relationships. The 
law must remain flexible in order to take account of such develop-
ments. If the facts of a particular case present too speculative a causal 
relationship to submit to the jury, the courts can always handle the 
problem by withholding the case and directing a verdict for the de-
fendant. Legislatures, if they so desired, could establish a higher stand-
ard of proof for such cases. 
One answer to the causation argument which ought to be deemed 
almost conclusive has never been mentioned. If the problem of proof 
is not too difficult to allow the criminal prosecution of a person for in-
juring an embryo (not viable), even for murder if the infant lives 
sometime after birth and then ·dies, then surely· the law should not 
hesitate to impose some degree of responsibility on the negligent per-
son who causes the same kind of injury. It would be an odd result if 
our traditional concern to protect the person accused of a serious 
crime, should be reversed in these cases and the greater protection be 
given to one charged only with damage liability. If causation cannot 
be proved in a tort liability case with sufficient certainty to allow a 
cause of action, surely this kind of speculation ought not to enter the 
picture wheri imposition of the death penalty is sought for murder in 
a criminal case. By the same token, if it is felt just to subject an ac-
cused to a criminal trial on the theory that causation can be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, surely we ought to go that far in civil 
liability cases. At least difficulty of proof should not be a deterrent. 
This is not meant to suggest that the social policy factors which deter-
mine whether to allow an action for invasion of another's interests 
are the same in each of the cases, but it is to suggest that the causation 
problem is no different. 841 
Perhaps in prenatal injury cases a higher burden of proof should be 
imposed, but recovery should not be denied altogether merely because 
proof of causation in some cases will be difficult. 
Another obstacle to recovery was suggested by the court in Allaire 
841 On difficulty of causation, see e.g., Amann v. Faidy, supra note 319; Valence v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra note 312; Durivage v. Tufts, supra note 312; 
White, supra note 324 at 402-403, suggesting no great increase of cases since allowing 
recovery. Contributory negligence defenses may call for a different result in some 
case, supra note J38. 
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v. St. Luke's Hospital/42 i.e., if recovery were allowed it would be 
unjust where the mother was contributorily negligent or had assumed 
the risk. This argument should not be used as a reason for denying 
recovery where there has been no negligence or assumption of risk by 
the mother and where the defendant's negligence clearly has been 
proven to be the cause of the injury to the embryo or foetus. If a line 
should be drawn to immunize the tortfeasor from liability where the 
mother is negligent, this is no reason to deny recovery in all cases. 
Often the courts which allow recovery in prenatal injury cases will 
"clinch". their argument as did the court in a recent Connecticut case 543 
by stating the general principle of the common law that there should 
be no wrong without a remedy and that natural justice demands that 
damages be allowed in these cases. This argument really goes to the 
basic policy question underlying all tort cases : Is this the kind of injury 
for which the law ought· to allow compensation.? These are not argu-
ments or reasons for granting recovery. They are merely statements of 
the basic policy issue of whether or not compensation is to be allowed. 
Later we suggest that possibly distinctions should be made and lines 
drawn depending on the type of injury and the surrounding circum-
stances.3H 
(b) Rights of Next of Kin Under Death Statutes 
The theory of some death statutes is to permit the cause of action to 
survive the death and allow damages to be recovered to the extent that 
the decedent would have been able to recover for injuries had he lived. 
These typically are called survival acts. Others, often called wrongful 
death acts, allow particular surviving relatives to recover damages 
caused to them by the death itself. It is clear, therefore, that if the 
particular jurisdiction follows the Massachusetts rule and does not 
allow a child to recover for prenatal injuries even when born alive, no 
action can be brought under the survival death statutes. The theory of 
the wrongful death act logically could still be applied to allow recovery 
but it seems most unlikely iri such jurisdictions and no cases have been 
found. On the other hand, if the child is born alive and then dies as a 
result of prenatal injuries inflicted by a negligent defendant, there 
8 42 Supf'a note 319. See also concurring opinion in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, supra 
note 333. 
845 Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., supra note 328. 
844 See suggestions infra iri text at section B4(3). 
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would be no difficulty under existing survival statutes in those juris-
dictions which allow recovery by a living child for prenatal injuries. 
If the injured child is stillborn, however, ·only a few jurisdictions 
have ruled specifically on the question of whether or not damages can 
be recovered under a wrongful death act.345 Some courts have refused 
to broaden the application of the wrongful death statute when the child 
is not born alive, although recovery would be allowed if the child lives 
for a short period after birth.846 Under the decided cases this is a 
distinction lawyers must take into account in advising their clients. 
Harper and James suggest that while this is an arbitrary line, it is per-
haps the fairest and most practical place to draw the line." 347 It is 
arguable that so drawing the line actually is attacking the validity of 
wrongful death statutes on the unstated premise that tort recovery 
ought to be for compensation and not for vengeance. It would seem 
that various philosophies of tort law get badly confused at this point 
and that perhaps we need a new approach, if necessary by statute, to 
answer the policy question as to what kind of prenatal injuries should 
be compensable and to what extent compensation should be taken from 
the wrongdoer. In formulating this policy it is advisable to take into 
account the rights of the parents as well. 
(c) Rights of Parents Other Than Under Death 
Statutes 
As suggested above, the first case in the common law countries deal-
ing with the problem of prenatal injuries was the Iowa case, Kansz v. 
Ryan, 848 which really involved the right of the parent to recover dam-
34~ Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and South Caro-
lina; infra Table of Cases at end of this section. For cases involving wrongful death 
actions generally, see 10 A.L.R.2d 639 ( 1950). Many courts have permitted recovery 
under such statutes where the child is born alive and then dies. See Table of Cases 
infra. 
346 Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); In re Logan's 
Estate, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Surr. Ct. 1956) (letters of administration refused); In re 
Scanelli, 2o8 Misc. 8o4, 142 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Surr. Ct. 1955) (letters of administration 
refused); Muschetti v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. 
Ct. 1955) ; In re Roberts' Estate, supra note 319 (letters of administration refused). 
See also West v. McCoy, 105 S.E.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. S.C. 1958), denying recovery and 
reserving question if born alive. Cf. Butler v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N.Y. 417, 38 N.E. 
454 (1894) (action for loss of services where injury caused miscarriage of non-viable 
foetus not maintainable because pecuniary loss is too remote and speculative). 
847 Harper & James 1031. 
348 Supra note 315. No English case has arisen. Salmond, Torts 389-90 (nth ed. 
Heuston 1953); Clerk & Lindsell, Torts 92 (uth ed. 1954) say damage action would 
not lie; see other foreign cases cited at ·234· "Injury to an Unborn Child," 83 Sol. J. 
185 (1939). 
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ages not for the child but for himself. The plaintiff's claim in that 
case as stated by the court was that the plaintiff was "deprived of off-
spring by defendant's act." The court said very distinctly that the 
father could not recover for injury to an offspring except for the pos-
sible loss of services, and this had not been requested. The court sug-
gested that a claim for loss of future services would probably be too 
remote and speculative. 
Again, in the Dietrich case 849 Holmes made the comment that, "as 
the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, 
any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all 
was recoverable by her .... " 850 This is only dictum, but it is a rather 
clear suggestion that there is nothing by way of theoretical obstacle to 
the mother's recovery, and that the only limitation would be one of 
remoteness. Later cases have dealt more specifically with the rights of 
parents. 
The Alabama court in Snow v. Allen 351 deait with two aspects of 
the recovery that a mother possibly may have if her child is killed 
because of prenatal injuries. The charge was made that the defendant 
doctor had crushed the sku]] of the infant while still inside the mother's 
womb, causing the infant to be stillborn or to die immediately upon 
birth. The defendant demurred to the complaint and the court said : 
As we see it, the defendant does not properly interpret the 
plaintiff's .complaint as regards the averments as to death of 
plaintiff's infant. As we construe the complaint, no recovery 
of damages is sought on account of the death of the child, 
but for the pain and anguish suffered by the mother on ac-
count of its death, occasioned by the negligence of the de-
fendant. If the mother was caused to suffer physical pain by 
reason of the kiUing of the unborn child, occasioned by the 
negligence of the defendant, no one, we assume, wiii argue 
that she could not recover in this action for such pain; and, 
likewise, if on account of the negligent destruction of the 
child, in its delivery, the mother also suffered distress of 
mind, a recovery could be had for such mental anguish. This 
is just what the plaintiff claims in the complaint with refer-
ence to the killing of her unborn child. 
* * * 
However, were we to accept the defendant's construction 
of the complaint, it would by no means foiiow that the com-
plaint was subject to any grounds of demurrer assigned 
849 Supra note JI4-
sso I d. at 17. 
as1227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933). 
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thereto. So long as the child is with the mother's womb it 
is a part of the mother, and for any injury to it, while yet un-
born, damages would be recoverable by the mother in a · 
proper case. [Citing Dietrich v. Northampton]. ... 
We are of the opinion that the mother, in an action against 
the attending physician, may recover, in one and the same 
action, damages for all injuries sustained by her, by reason 
of-proximate result of-the negligence of the physician 
in and about the parturition of the infant, including the 
death of the infant, before it is severed from the mother, 
provided, of course, such death was due to the negligence 
of the physician.8~ 2 
21i 
The court in this case seems to be saying that the mother can recover 
for her own mental anguish arising from the loss of a child and, in 
addition, can recover for damages to something that was a part of her 
prior to birth, the unborn child. 
In several cases actions for prenatal injuries have been brought by 
parents to recover for loss of services or for medical expenses, but the 
courts have denied recovery. They considered the action to be deriva-
tive of the child's right to sue and in these jurisdictions the child had 
no such right; therefore, the parents lost their claims. 353 For example, 
in Prescott v. Robinson,854 a pregnant woman was injured in a high-
way collision caused by the negligence of the defendant, and she later 
gave birth to a deformed child. The New Hampshire court, in affirm-
ing the trial court which had overruled defendant's demurrer to the 
complaint, said that it was perfectly natural for a pregnant woman 
after an injury to experience mental distress arising from the fear of 
an abnormal birth and that this fear was "proximately caused" by the 
defendant's negligence. The court then said: 
Her ability to be delivered of a· normal and healthy child was 
jeopardized, and her grief and apprehension before the birth 
on account of what the probable or not unreasonable effect 
would be upon the child is not a remote consequence of the 
alleged negligence of the defendant. It was her right to pro-
duce a healthy child; and if by the defendant's negligence 
her enjoyment of that right was diminished or violated, her 
mental distress for the unnatural result to be expected was 
352 I d. at 618-19. 
353 Stemmer v. Kline, supra note 318; Ryan v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 
supra note 318; Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., supra note 319; Rimpa v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., supra note 318. 
354 74 N.H. 400, 69 Atl. 522 (1908), approved later in Durivage v. Tufts, supra note 
312 at 268. 
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an element of damage for which she should be compensated, 
as well as her disappointment at the birth of a deformed child. 
[While the mother cannot recover for the injury to the 
child itself]. . . the mother's anxiety before the birth of the 
child, in view of the reasonable probability that the defend-
ant's act will cause her to produce an abnormal child, is pe-
culiarly an element of damage to her. 555 
The court also concluded, however, that: 
The fact that the plaintiff will undoubtedly suffer great 
disappointment during her lifetime, occasioned by her con-
tinual observation of her child's deformity and its probable 
suffering, though in some sense caused by the defendant's 
negligence, is a misfortune for which the law can afford no 
compensation in an action for negligence. . . . The de-
formity of a crippled child and its suffering may be an ever-
present cause of disappointment to its parents, and their lives 
may be made miserable thereby; but they can obtain no redress 
on that ground against the person whose negligence was the 
cause of the child's condition. 3~6 
The court felt that where the act causing the injury is merely a negli-
gent one, compensation for the lifetime of disappointment is too"re-
mote, secondary, and speculative." 357 The mother could recover for 
losses peculiar to herself, of course, but not for mental anguish after 
birth. 
In general, the right of the mother to sue for her mental anguish 
resulting from fear of an abnormal child is well recognized, including 
her physical and mental suffering resulting from the miscarriage it-
self. In cases which support the Ne~ Hampshire distinction, however, 
she may not recover for the death of the child or for her mental an-
guish because of the deformed nature of the child after birth, remote-
ness usually being given as the reason. 358 It also seems to be well recog-
355 /d. at 462. 
356 /d. at 464-65. 
357 /d. at 465. The same distinction is made in Gagnon v. Rhode Island Co., 40 R.I. 
473, 476, 101 At!. 104 (1917). 
358 Thomas v. Gates, Iz6 Cal. I, 58 Pac. 315 (1899); Powell v. Augusta & Summer-
ville R.R., 77 Ga. 192, 3 S.E. 757 ( 1886) ; Kansz v. Ryan, supra note 315 (suit by 
husband for deprivation of offspring; dicta to the effect that loss of future services is 
not a compensable element); Big Sandy R.R. v. Blankenship, 133 Ky. 438, II8 S.W. 
316 (1909); Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry., 197 Mass. 512; 83 N.E. 1091 (1go8); 
Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Con. Ry., 102. Mich. 624, 61 N.w: II (1894); Prescott v. 
Robinson, supra note 354; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9 S.W .. 
598 (1888); Webb v. Snow; 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d II4 (1942); Bovee v. Danville, 
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nized that neither parent may recover for loss of services or loss of 
prospective earnings of the child or for loss of companionship withthe 
child.8~9 
(d) Radiation Cases 
There are two decided cases in which prenatal injury was alleged t~ 
have resulted from the negligent use of radiation in the treatment of 
the pregnant mother. In Smith v. Luckhardt 860 the defendant doctors 
incorrectly diagnosed the condition of the plaintiff's mother as a 
tumor and administered six X-ray treatments of forty-five minutes 
each over a period of four months. The child was born permanently 
crippled and feeble-minded, developing to the mental age of two years 
although living to a chronological age of thirteen. The action was in-
stituted for the child shortly before his death. The Illinois Appellate 
Court dismissed the action on defendant's motion. It cited the Allaire 
case as binding authority that damages could not be recovered for pre-
- ·natal injuries, 361 although it recognized that there were very good 
arguments for allowing recovery in such cases. The Illinois Supreme 
Court has since joined the present majority of jurisdictions which 
allow recovery.862 
The other case is Stemmer v. Kline, decided in New Jersey in 
1942.868 Here again the plaintiff's mother was subjected to X-ray treat-
ment by defendant physician for a tumor which plaintiff alleged could 
have ·been identified as an embryo by a complete examination. The 
plaintiff was prematurely born and described as a microcephalic idiot 
who could not walk, talk, hear, or see. The jury found that this condi-
tion was caused by the X-ray treatments. On appeal the judgment for 
plaintiff was reversed, ten judges to five, although one of the majority 
agreed with the dissenting group that the cause of action should be al-
53 Vt. 183 (188o); Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 104 W.Va. 417, 
140 S.E. 340 (1927); Annot., 145 A.L.R. II04 (1943); Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 639, 640 
(1950). 
a59 Ibid. 
860 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N .E.2d 446 ( 1939). 
861 Supra note 321. 
362 Amann v. Faidy, supra note 319. The court said at 434: "In rejecting the con-
tention upon which the defendant now insists, this court pointed out more than a 
hundred years ago, 'that if we are to be restricted to the common law, as it was en-
acted at fourth James, rejecting all modifications and improvements which have since 
been made, by practice and statutes, except our own statutes, we will find that sys-
tem entirely inapplicable to our. present condition, for the simple reason that it is more 
than two hundred years behind the age.' Penny v. Little, 3 Scam. 301, 304." 
363 Supra note 318. 
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lowed for prenatal injuries but joined in the decision reversing the 
trial court because it admitted evidence which he felt was inadmissible 
under the New Jersey rules. The court also refused to allow the 
parents to recover for expenses they alleged were caused by the alleged 
malpractice because it was dependent on the claim of the injured party, 
the child; the child having no cause of action, the parents' cause must 
fail. 
There is no reason to believe that these results would be reached, 
however, in the seventeen jurisdictions which currently recognize a 
cause of action for prenatal injuries at least in the case of a viable 
foetus. Viability probably would not be a factor in the Luckhardt case 
because the treatments were given between the fourth and seventh 
month after conception and this is after the foetus usually is consid-
ered viable. It is not made clear in the Stemmer case just when the 
treatments took place, although the third and last one was given just 
six weeks prior to birth. Actually, the cases of microcephalic idiocy 
arising from radiation treatment to pregnant women are perfect ex-
amples of cases where the viability distinction is harsh and unrealistic. 
There is some persuasive evidence that sufficient radiation during the 
first two or three months of pregnancy may cause microcephalic 
idiocy.36* If this is so, it is the very case in which recovery should be 
allowed, if it is to be allowed in any case. 
With the rapid expansion in the use of radioactive materials and 
radiation machines for medical treatment and also for various indus-
trial uses, it is not difficult to predict that the number of radiation cases 
involving pregnant women will increase. The doctor will have to be 
careful not only in his use of X-ray treatments in the abdominal area, 
but also in his use of radioactive isotopes for diagnosis or treatment of 
other parts of the body. Such uses well may create hazards which will 
affect the pregnant woman since elimination of radioactive isostopes 
takes place primarily through the normal elimination channels, in close 
proximity to the developing embryo. In addition, there will be a prob-
lem in the case of women being employed in establishments where it 
is possible for them to receive, even on a temporary emergency basis, 
a considerable amount of radiation. While there may be no apparent 
harm to the mother, there may be injur,y of the embryo. The harm ap-
parently occurs if there is radiation at any time beginning immediately 
so• Conversations with very competent radiologists confirm this fact though none 
knew of an authoritative written collection of such cases. Specialists in gynecology 
now recognize the necessity. of minimizing exposure of pregnant women because of 
genetic damage as well as abortions. N.Y. Times, Oct. II, 1958, p. Cn, col. 2. 
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after conception. The administrative problem for employers desiring 
to make use of women in radiation establishments is obvious. Addi-· 
tiona! cases may arise from accidental exposure of visitors in places 
where radiation sources are present. When a nuclear accident dis-
charges radioactive material over a well-populated area it is very likely 
that some women in the area will be pregnant. If they later give birth 
to deformed children, they may be able to show sufficient causal con-
nection to establish that radiation was responsible. In the light of the 
clear trend of the cases toward a recognition of the right to recover 
fo~ prenatal injuries, not only where viable but also regardless of 
viability, it seems not unrealistic to predict that the viability line will 
be discarded, at least in cases where causation is clear. If damages for 
fear of giving birth to a deformed child are permitted, as in several 
of the cases set out above, this ·could become a very sizeable problem. 
( 2) Genetic Damage 
Up to the present time no cases have arisen involving a claim for 
genetic damage. By genetic damage we mean injury manifested in a 
descendant's abnormality but resulting from injury to the genes or 
chromosomes of a parent or a more remote ancestor who has been ex-
posed to radiation (or some other force) between the time of the ances-
tor's conception and the time when he ceases having children. Damage 
to the parent will be considered in the next section on "sterility." As 
pointed out later,865 any force which causes a mutation for practical 
purposes can be considered as injurious because almost all mutations 
are deleterious. Scientists seem to agree that exposure to radiation at 
any time from conception to birth of a child causes genetic damage. 
There also seems to be general agreement that no matter how small 
the dose of radiation the effect is a cumulative one, although there is 
some recent evidence to the effect that there may be less genetic damage 
if a given amount of radiation is spread over a longer period of time.366 
In the face of such unanimous opinion and in view of our ever in-
creasing knowledge of the cause and effect of genetic damage it would 
be carrying the concept of blindfolded justice too far if the law simply 
refused to recognize that a problem exists. If it should be decided, as a 
matter of social policy, that it is unwise to allow recovery for genetic 
damage, it ought to be a decision arrived at after full consideration of 
alf the factors involved, and not on the basis of an ostrich approach 
865 Infra discussion at notes 1072-79· See also Chapter I, supra. 
866 Infra discussion at notes 108o-84. 
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which assumes that if the problem is not recognized it does not exist. In 
the present state of development of knowledge about the cause and 
effect of genetic damage, the causation proof problems which the plain-
tiffs will face are great, but it is submitted that the question of whether 
or. not to allow genetic damage at all is the first question to be answered. 
There are two reasons why difficulty of proof is not a satisfactory rea-
son for refusing recovery generally for genetic damage caused by radia-
tion. First, even in the present state of knowledge and in view of the 
requirements of probability which the law currently employs in tort 
actions, there will be cases where it is perfectly conceivable that causa-
tion can be proved. This will be considered later in the section dealing 
with proof problems. 367 Secondly, genetics is a developing science. With 
the great impetus that has been given to research in this area by a recog-
nition of the dangers from radioactive fall-out, it would be most un-
fortunate if damage recovery concepts were frozen at the present state 
of scientific knowledge. While the proof problem as it relates to causa-
tion in radiation cases cannot be ignored in making this decision, any 
more than it can in connection with post-conception prenatal injuries, 
there would seem to be enough evidence already to warrant an assump-
tion that in some cases t.lte causation factor can be proved. If this is 
true then the law must face squarely the problem of whether or not to 
allow recovery for genetic damage resulting from negligent exposure to 
radiation. 
In States Now Denying Damages for Prenatal Injuries. From the 
above analysis of the present attitude of the various state courts on the 
general question of prenatal injury, it is clear that in most jurisdictions 
where that question has been answered negatively no recovery will be 
allowed for genetic damage unless legislation is enacted, or unless the 
courts regard the problem of genetic damage as calling for somewhat 
different analysis than has been applied heretofore. The answer in the 
eight jurisdictions which do not allow recovery for prenatal injuries 
under any circumstances is perfectly clear-there is no reason to believe 
that recovery will be allowed for genetic damage because proof prob-
lems certainly are more difficult than in post-conception cases.888 In 
the other four jurisdictions which incorrectly have been classified by 
judges and writers as states in which recovery is not allowed for pre-
natal injuries,369 the answer is not so clear. The cases decided so far in 
387 Infra discussion following note 1079· 
B8s See Table of Cases at end of this section. 
889 Nebraska, Oklahoma, $outh Carolina, Wisconsin. See Table of Cases at end of 
this section. 
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in these four jurisdictions involved situations where the injured foetus 
was not born alive or was not viable; therefore, these decisions give no 
answer as to what the courts would do if a c~se were presented where 
causation was shown, and a child, viable at time of injury, was born 
alive and lived for some time. For purposes of determining the possi-
bility of recovering genetic damages, we would classify these three 
jurisdictions with those jurisdictions in which the result is uncertain, 
although the chances for recovery in these states might be thought to 
be somewhat less than in states which actually have decided that pre-
natal injuries are recoverable in some circumstances. 
In States Now Allowing Recovery for Prenatal Injuries. Of the 
seventeen jurisdictions 870 in which recovery has been allowed for pre-
natal injuries, in predicting what may be done with genetic injuries, 
account must be taken of certain distinctions. The distinction as to 
whether the child is dead at birth or lives for a time thereafter would 
not seem to present any different problems when the injuries are genetic 
in character. This damage apparently either can. be of the kind that 
causes death of the foetus while still in the mother, or it can manifest 
itself in children born alive with some abnormality. Conceivably the 
mutation could be beneficial or at least not harmful, so that no damages 
should be awarded. We can see no tenable policy distinction to be 
drawn between pre-conception and post-conception prenatal injury cases 
so far as deciding whether recovery ought to be allowed for death of 
the foetus itself. Of the seventeen jurisdictions in which recovery has 
been allowed, only two have clearly held that viability of the foetus is 
not important.871 In most of the other jurisdictions where recovery has 
been allowed, either the facts of the cases or the language of the court 
makes it clear the court is allowing damages only when the foetus is 
viable.872 To the extent that this remains a requirement for prenatal in-
juries during the post-conception period it may be assumed that there 
can be no recovery for genetic damage because by definition this is 
damage that arises before conception. For the same reason a relaxation 
of the requirement to one that the child merely be "quick" in its 
mother 873 will not suffice to permit recovery in a genetic damage case. 
Effect of Separate Legal Entity Argument. Most of the argument in 
the cases and law review discussions on the question of recovery for 
87o See Table of Cases at end of this section. 
871 Discussion supra at notes 329-35. 
872 See cases listed in Table of Cases at end of this section permitting recovery. 
878 Supra note 333 and suggestion of concurring justice in Hornbuckle case, supra 
note 331. 
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prenatal injuries deals with the question as to when a child developing 
in its mother becomes a separate legal entity or "person" for purposes 
of tort liability. Practically all arguments by law review writers and 
those courts which have allowed recovery in recent years contrary to 
the earlier majority view have emphasized the fact that we now know 
that before birth and even before viability or quickness the embryo has 
an identity of its own which is, in some degree, separate from its 
mother's. To the extent that attention continues to be focused upon 
separate legal entity, there will be no right of recovery for genetic dam-
age. Even with our limited knowledge of the science of genetics, we 
know it is not until the chromosomes of the mother and father are 
joined in a fertilized egg that a particular set of genes from each forms 
what will ultimately become a child. If the irradiated person does not 
have children or if the mutated genes are not passed on to the offspring 
at the time of conception, there has been no really important damage 
to the descendant. It seems very certain, therefore, that conception is a 
crucial point in determining potential damage. It is not possible to argue 
realistically, therefore, that there is an entity before conception. Most 
courts, even in jurisdictions where recovery is allowed for prenatal in-
juries to viable children born alive, probably will hold that there is no 
tort because there is no "person." 
Scientifically this does not make sense, however, for if the geneticists 
are right (and they all agree), genetic damage can result from pre-
conception radiation of the parent, and the mutation that results may be 
passed on to the child and manifest itself as a disabling deformity or 
organic inadequacy many generations later. In some cases causal con-
nection can be ascertained on the basis of present scientific knowledge; 
in the future, as our knowledge of genetics increases, undoubtedly 
proof of causation will be possible in a greater number of cases. To the 
deformed child it certainly makes no difference whether his deformity 
was caused by radiation of his parent before conception or of his 
mother after conception. He lives with the deformity and should or 
should not be allowed recovery in a damage action on the social policy 
ground that we can or cannot afford to burden with such damage ac-
tions a growing industry so vital to our future, or can or cannot afford 
to let injured persons suffer uncompensated injuries. The decision 
should not be on the basis of whether irradiation occurred before or 
after conception. In asserting this we do not mean to imply that the 
proof of causation difficulty will be solved easily or that it will be solved 
at all in the great majority of cases. In those cases where causation 
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can be shown, however, it is important to answer the question, Should 
society allow recovery ? 
In those jurisdictions where the courts, in allowing prenatal injury 
recovery, clearly have taken note of new scientific developments estab-
lishing the separate identity of the embryo, they may follow scientific 
discoveries one step further and hold that so long as causation can be 
proved, compensation should be allowed, even though the radiation 
causing the abnormality occurred before conception. The growth of the 
law of prenatal injury has necessitated persuading the courts to accept 
scientific knowledge concerning both the identity of the embryo and 
the possibility of proving causation. 
The Social Policy Considerations. If the next step is taken, however, 
it should be done only after a full consideration of the social impact of 
allowing such recovery. Undoubtedly, courts when faced with problems 
of genetic damage may use the "proximate cause" formula to find that 
the defendant owes no duty to the unborn. It certainly cannot be a ques-
tion of foreseeability, because both as to post-conception and pre-con-
ception prenatal injuries from radiation, it is clear that irradiation of 
either parent in the pre-conception period and irradiation of the mother 
in the post-conception period foreseeably will cause damage to the po-
tential or actual embryo. Any limitation in the name of proximate 
cause, therefore, really will be a disguised policy judgment to the effect 
that negligent defendants should not be held responsible for this kind 
of injury. It is an arguable position but should be made openly and 
knowingly, not hidden behind the camouflage of proximate cause or a 
blanket rule against recovery merely because in many cases the proof 
problem will be difficult. 
Decisions Bearing on Genetic Da'I'J'W,ge. Only two cases have been 
found which seem to contain even the remotest implication concerning 
the allowance of genetic damage. One is the brief comment by Chief 
Justice Duckworth in his concurring opinion in the Hornbuckle case 
where he asserted that if a baby could sue for injury occurring im-
mediately after conception, as he felt the majority had ruled, "why not 
allow such suits for injuries before conception, even unto the third and 
fourth generations?" 314 His remark in this ease clearly indicates that he 
would not allow recovery for genetic damage; rather, he would draw 
the line at the time when the child becomes quick in its mother. 
The other case, Morgan v. United States,S76 is so remarkably analo-
874 Supra note 332. 
m 143 F. Supp. 58o (D.C. N.J. 1956). 
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gous to the genetic damage situation that it is most unfortunate it arose 
in a jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) in which no recovery is allowed for 
prenatal injuries under any circumstances. In this case the mother al-
leged that she was negligently given a blood transfusion "of an im-
proper or unsuitable type" while in defendant's army hospital in Febru-
ary, 1952. In June, 1955, the mother was delivered of a baby boy whose 
health allegedly was impaired because of the transfusion of improper 
blood two and a half years earlier. Causes of action were brought for 
damages to the mother, the child, and the husband and father. The 
court disposed of the mother's claims on the ground that the two year 
statute of limitations ran out in February, 1955; the action was not 
begun until January, 1956. The court's reason for dismissal of the 
action for damage to the child is not completely clear. It first seemed 
to state that the statute of limitations also called for the dismissal of 
the action for damages to the child as well. The court then said : 
When the tortious conduct occurred William Morgan had not 
yet been conceived. He was then neither a viable foetus nor 
en ventre sa mere. The alleged tort occurred in Pennsylvania. 
Whether a cause of action accrued to William Morgan is 
governed by the law of that State.876 
The court cited the Berlin v. /. C. Penney, Inc. case in which the Penn-
sylvania court denied recovery in a prenatal injury situation.371 Here 
the federal district court apparently rests its decision on the rule of no 
cause of action for prenatal injuries. The court concluded that because 
the claim of the father for injuries to the mother and to the child was 
derivative, it must fall with the first two causes of action. If this case 
had arisen in a jurisdiction where recovery is allowed for prenatal in-
juries, the court would have been forced to decide whether a cause of 
action for pre-conception injuries is to be permitted and a precedent for 
genetic damage cases might have been established. 
The blood transfusion case is very likely to be the forerunner of 
many cases that will be brought to the courts as the result of extensive 
use of radioactive materials. In several accidents workers have been 
exposed to sufficient radiation to increase substantially the risk of 
genetic mutation. 378 More significant in number, however, will be those 
878 Id. at s&t. 
8 77 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 ( 1940). . 
878 See description of accidents, infra Chapter IV. In addition, several persons un-
knowingly were exposed to significant quantities of radiation when a source was care-
lessly lost and it was some time before its loss was discovered. BNA, Atomic Industrial 
Rep. 4: 419, 4: 444 ( 1958). The exposures at the Y12 accident were 365, 339, 327, 270, 
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cases arising from the use of radioactive material or radiation sources 
for medical treatment,379 and from the discharge of a large quantity of 
radioactive material over a heavily popuiated area. If a substantial re-
actor burn-up should occur and radioactive material be dropped over a 
city, the possibility of claims by parents, either for the increased possi-
bility that their children will have deformities, or for deformities that 
actually show up in children later conceived, is not inconsequential and 
is a problem not to be dismissed lightly. 
(3) Some Suggestions Toward a Solution 
The proper solution of the problems that have been suggested in con-
nection with pre- and post-conception injuries from radiation is not 
easy to determine. A comprehensive attack on the problem should be 
carried out by a group of lawyers representing all types of interests in 
tort litigation, with the advice and consultation of scientists and other 
experts to check the validity of assumptions that lawyers too often 
blithely (or blindly) make. It may be that atomic energy will open up 
an opportunity to the legal profession to do a really imaginative and yet 
practical job in the handling of tort cases, something that will be better 
than our present hit and miss system with its fabulous recoveries in 
some cases and its niggardly awards in others, quite out of proportion 
to the relative suffering in the respective cases. Much of the present sys-
tem is good and must be retained, but some of it is bad, and atomic 
energy cases may present the legal profession with the opportunity to 
try some experiments that will have application in other cases as well. 
The following ideas and suggestions are presented as a starting point 
toward a proper solution. 
In making these suggestions it is assumed that causation can be 
proved with reasonable certainty, a problem to be considered later in 
the section on proo£.380 One other assumption is made, i.e., the injury 
results from action by the defendant which was not intended to bring 
harm to the persons injured, either as a typical intentional tort or in 
236 and 68 r. Health Physics, Vol. I, No. 2 at p. 208 (Sept. 1958). See general de-
scription of genetic damage, supra Chapter I. One study of exposure to radar beams 
in World War II concluded there was no hazard; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1958, p. 22, 
cols. 6, 7· 
379 Many of the malpractice cases involve X-rays, .and probably could have included 
such a damage claim. Specialists in gynecology as well as radiologists now. recognize 
the necessity of minimizing exposure of pregnant women. N.Y. Times, Oct. II, 1958, 
p. Cn, col. 2. Cf. Contrary statement reported N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1958 p. E9, col. 6. 
sso Infra discussion beginning at note 1072. 
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the sense of wanton disregard of consequences. These assumptions 
seem fair; for no matter what the system of compensation, the problem 
of proof of causation and the prevention of fraudulent or purely specu-
la~ive claims will always be present but are no more bothersome, m 
some cases at least, than in many other types of damage cases. 
(a) Post-Conception Injuries 
The common law cases are confusing and the results reached seem 
inadequate and based upon an uncritical analysis, not only of scientific 
knowledge but also of the underlying social policy considerations in-
volved. Too often the results indicate a failure to apply the compensa-
tion theory we assume in negligence cases generally. They also show a 
failure to distinguish sharply between the rights of the injured child, 
the next of kin under death statutes, and of parents for damages other 
than under the death statutes. 
( i) Recovery by Child 
If the child is born alive and lives at least until after the trial, recovery 
should be allowed. Damages should include the extra expenses which 
will be required because of theabnormality and for a period extending 
through the whole life expectancy of the child determined as of the 
time of trial, taking into account any shortening of the period because 
of the abnormality. The compensation theory logically (and correctly) 
does not permit recovery for the full life expectancy without taking into 
account the abnormality. Either as a separate item of damages or as an 
element of the extra expenses award, an amount should be included to 
provide for really adequate rehabilitation to the extent it is possible to 
correct the defect or provide some substitute for the ability impaired 
by the deformity. 
Determining whether to allow recovery for pain and suffering and 
mental anguish of the child and if so in what amount is somewhat more 
difficult. Undoubtedly an amount should be allowed to provide for good 
medical treatment including whatever is available to reduce pain and 
suffering as much as possible. In many cases, however, nothing should 
be awarded to the child for humiliation and similar mental anguish. The 
microcephalic idiot who has none of the normal senses cannot suffer this 
type of injury. In general, a mentally alert child with some other abnor-
mality probably does not suffer from humiliation and related feelings 
during the first few years. If the child lives long enough and is able to 
sense humiliation because of the deformity and the defect is such as to 
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cause the normal person humiliation, a good case can be made for al-
lowing something for mental anguish, but there is much to be said for 
applying here also the suggestion that recove~y for such damage~ be 
limited in amount.881 
In awarding damages to the child who lives, the concern about find-
ing a separate legal entity should be forgotten and the distinctions 
based on "viability" and "quick" should be eliminated. Except possibly 
for the difficulty of proving causation, there is no policy justification 
for such distinctions. if a child has to live with a deformity it matters 
not to him that it happened before or after he was quick or viable in 
his mother's womb, as the case may be in a particular jurisdiction. He 
is now an injured legal entity which should be sufficient. 
Even as to proof of causation, in the light of present medical knowl-
edge and techniques, the difficulty is not sufficiently greater in the one 
case than the other to justify basing a distinction upon this factor. 
Probably it is more difficult to determine whether the quick or viable 
condition exists than it is to determine whether the mother is pregnant. 
If it is felt that the difficulty of proof is such that the danger of spuri-
ous, fraudulent, or speculative claims is great; the legislature by enact-
ment or the judge by decision can control this by making the burden 
of proof somewhat higher, if this is felt to be necessary. Certainly, if 
the prosecution is allowed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt 
in such cases in criminal suits, there is little reason to deny the plaintiff 
at least the same opportunity in a tort action. 
Perhaps it is not amiss to re-emphasize our position that these dam-
ages should be awarded to the child and not to his parents. The neces-
sary accounting and trustee arrangements are available already by com-
mon law rule or by statutory provisions. 
If the child is stillborn or dies before trial, results under existing doc-
trines are quite unrealistic in some respects. If stillborn, surely the child 
gains nothing from an award for mental anguish or pain and suffering. 
Such an award cannot help the child, but only the survivors. The allow-
ance of damages in several jurisdictions 882 is unjustifiable under a com-
pensation theory. If the child is born alive but dies before trial, recovery 
for the child's mental anguish or pain and suffering, allowed in even 
881 Plant, "Damages for Pain and Suffering," 19 Ohio St. L. J. 200 (1958). The 
author of the comment in 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 538 (1955) suggests setting an arbitrary 
limit on recoveries under wrongful death statutes for death of children. 
882 Infra Table of Cases at end of this section. Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, and New Hampshire apparently permit such recovery even when the child 
is stillborn. 
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more jurisdictions,383 again is unjustifiable because survivors are the 
only beneficiaries. Any recovery by beneficiaries should be in their own 
right, not because of the suffering of the child now dead. 
To the extent that there were extra expenses incurred in delivering or 
caring for the child until its death, including those for medical treat-
ment to reduce pain and suffering and for rehabilitation efforts, if any, 
recovery should be allowed. Once the child dies such recovery cannot 
benefit him but these efforts in his behalf should be encouraged and 
those who have incurred the expenses should be recompensed by the 
wrongdoer. Whether the claim is in the name of the now dead child or 
by the parents, if they incurred the expenses as ordinarily would be the 
case, is not important ; the suggested limits on recovery are. 
(ii) Recovery by Next of Kin Under Death 
Statutes 
Application of survival and wrongful death statutes to prenatal in-
jury suits cannot be justified, except possibly in one situation. 
Survival statutes are based on the theory that the estate of the de-
ceased should be awarded the amount which the deceased could have 
recovered, had he lived. Perhaps recovery is justified in the case of 
property damage but not when the award is for pain and suffering or 
mental anguish. The deceased's suffering is not lessened by knowledge 
that some money will pass on through his estate, even assuming the 
deceased lives long enough to realize the significance of the possibility. 
If recovery is allowed under a survival act, the artificial argument about 
whether there is a separate legal entity who had a cause of action must 
be revived. It also may be necessary to make the artificial distinction 
between the case where the foetus dies before birth and that in which 
he survives birth, if only for an instant, since a cause of action can 
vest in an instant. 884 As applied in non-intentional tort cases, at least in 
the prenatal injury situation, the results reached under survival acts 
have more of an element of vengeance or at best of a windfall than of 
compensation. Nevertheless, applied with strict logic, recovery would 
be allowed if the death occurs in a jurisdiction which would allow re-
covery if the child survived the trial and if the child lived for at least a 
moment, or if the foetus is considered as legally alive even before 
birth.885 
ss8 Six states; see Table of Cases at end of this section. 
SS4 See Harper & James 1031. 
ssG Connecticut, Louisiana, ·and New Hampshire. -See Table of Cases at end of this 
section. 
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~Vrongful death statu.tes generally allow recovery to a specific and 
limited group of persons who ordinarily suffer financially from the 
death of a close relative such as a parent or child because they have been 
deprived of a source of financial support. The Delaware, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Hampshire courts 386 can assert a pos-
sibly tenable, theoretical justification for allowing recovery under a 
wrongful death statute. Practically speaking, however, recovery is not 
justified under these statutes either. Certainly no person really begins 
to depend on a conceived but unborn child, or even on one already de-
livered and living, until many years later when there is some indication 
of earning capacity and a desire to support relatives. If the child is 
handicapped, no such expectations of support should develop. There is 
no real likelihood of receiving financial support from even a healthy 
child these days when raising children ordinarily costs much more than 
they can earn until they are grown and away from home. The uncer-
tainties even then are great. This is considerably different from the po-
sition of a spouse or child or·even parent who actually has come to ex-
pect financial support from a grown father or mother, son or daughter. 
The only possible exception to the suggested denial of recovery under 
death statutes arises in the event a deformity or incapacity resulting 
from prenatal injuries manifests itself only after the child has grown 
and accepted support responsibility, and others have depended on such 
support. Perhaps in this case recovery under a wrongful death statute 
is justified, although the statute of limitations conceivably could make 
recovery impossible if the time of the original injury is used to deter-
mine when the cause of action arose. 
We submit that results under existing death statutes are unrealistic 
and that a new statute should be enacted to prevent their use in pre-
natal injury cases. A statute should be adopted fully protecting the in-
jured child, those who incur expenses to help him while living, and pos-
s·ibly those who, not knowing of the incapacity, reasonably have come 
to depend on the injured child for financial support where the manifes-
tation of the injury is long delayed. 
(iii) Rights of Parents 
So far as the mother's rights are concerned, the decisions seem fairly 
satisfactory insofar as they allow recovery for all of her own injuries 
resulting from the impact, including those arising from the birth and 
its aftereffects to the extent they are caused by defendant's negligent 
ass Supra note 382. 
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act. 881 If we could start anew we would have serious doubts as to the 
advisability of unlimited recovery for the mother's mental anguish dur-
ing pregnancy and after the impact for fear of having a deformed child, 
unless it manifests itself in some type of recognizable disability to con-
tinue normal activities. This problem, however, is not different from 
mental anguish recovery in other types of negligence actions and per-
haps all that can be hoped for is some kind of limitation on maximum 
recovery in such cases. 888 On the other hand, the arbitrary rule that 
there can be no recovery for the mental anguish which a mother suffers 
as she watches over and takes care of a deformed child probably is un-
fair. LOoking at the matter from the standpoint of compensation and 
rehabilitation, paying her a large sum of money just so she can buy a 
fur coat or a new house is not justified, but if her mental anguish seri-
ously interferes with carrying out her normal activities, something 
might be said for a type of recovery which is so controlled that it would 
have to be used for rehabilitation, including psychiatric treatment if 
necessary. 
To the extent that the parents are put to unusual expenses in caring 
for the abnormal child, they should be allowed to recover a compensa-
tory award, assuming that there is no duplicating award allowed to the 
child or his estate as suggested in discussing the rights of the child. 
The rights of the parents arising from the loss of the expected or al-
re~dy born child are discussed in the next section on sterility and related 
injuries. 
( iv) Conclusions 
The one fundamental principle to keep in mind is that while a full 
recovery should be allowed for all interests injured to the extent money 
damages can in some way make amends, duplicating recoveries should 
be prevented. It is important to keep separate the rights of the child 
while he is living, the rights of close relatives in certain exceptional 
cases, and the rights of parents in their own right but not that of the 
child; otherwise duplication is likely. Certainly there is a need for 
changes in survival and wrongful death statutes and development of a 
whole new approach to granting damages for prenatal injuries. 
(b) Pre-Conception Injuries 
If the science of genetics develops to the point where causation can 
be proved, logic would seem to call for recovery for pre-conception in-
887 See cases discussed supra note 358. 
888 Supra note 381. 
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juries on the same grounds suggested for post-conception injuries in 
radiation cases. The concept of a separate legal entity should not be an 
obstacle if compensation is accepted as the theory for tort recovery. So 
long as the defendant is protected against unreasonable claims by plac-
ing a substantial burden of proof upon the plaintiff, there is no reason 
to immunize the wrongdoing defendant from liability for actual injuries 
which result from his negligence. · 
There is one problem connected with genetic damage, however, which 
is much more serious than in the case involving post-conception prenatal 
injury. The injury from radiation to the embryo in the mother's womb 
will manifest itself within the lifetime of the child later born. This in 
itself is a long period of time and presents some serious problems under 
existing statutes of limitations. In the case of genetic damage, however, 
these problems are much more serious for such injuries transmit them-
selves through succeeding generations. Assuming that thirty years is 
the normal length of a generation in this country, it could easily be 150 
or 200 years before an injury manifested itself in the form of a muta-
tion. Such cases, however, do not present the problem in sharpest focus. 
At the end of so long a period no human defendant will be alive and 
under the laws of incorporation in most states even a corporate defend-
ant is likely to be legally dead. In addition, proving causation at this 
late date probably would be impossible for the plaintiff. The case most 
likely to arise, and the one which should be the basis for legal rules, in-
volves the birth of a child with manifestations of genetic mutation 
within the same or a second generation. This is not unlike post-concep-
tion injuries to an embryo which is later born and lives a relatively nor-
mal length of time. The period will be longer but not inordinately so. 
The rules suggested for application to prenatal injuries should be 
extended to cover genetic damage if the manifestations occur within 
the first or perhaps the second generation. 
(c) Common Problems 
The statute of limitations problems raised by these cases are common 
to many, if not to most, radiation injury situations. In most jurisdic-
tions it is necessary that a whole new scheme of limitations be developed 
to take care of radiation injury cases whether they be post or pre-con-
ception prenatal injuries, or other types of injuries such as leukemia, 
bone cancer, etc. Statutes usually require actions for negligence to be 
brought within a very short period, e.g., two or three years. If we treat 
the time of injurious impact as the time when the cause of action arises, 
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as seems to be indicated in the Morgan 889 and LaPorte 890 cases, 1t 1s 
clear that genetic damage cases cannot be brought within the statutory 
period. Most cases will involve radiation exposure more than two or 
three years before the deformity shows up. Even in post-conception pre-
natal injury cases many of the disabilities may not appear within the 
periods of limitation. An example of this would be the occurrence of 
leukemia which may not show up for several years after birth. 
In addition, it seems clear that there is room for substantial improve-
ment in the system of remedies and compensation in tort cases of the 
character here under consideration. Certainly the atomic energy or radi-
ation injury cases are going to strain our present system very greatly, 
especially if we are concerned with compensation and not vengeance. It 
is possible that we may need to adopt principles similar to the splitting 
of causes of action found in certain European countries, or we may 
need to adopt some kind of a "wait and see" doctrine for tort cases. 
Perhaps emphasis should be placed on paying the expenses of rehabilita-
tion and treatment rather than on mental anguish and pain and suffer-
ing awards. These suggestions apply generally to radiation cases and 
will also be discussed later.391 
One other troublesome problem common to both pre- and post-
conception prenatal injuries concerns contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk on the part of the parent. Prosser in his usual pithy 
way summarizes the possibility of imputing the negligence of the parent 
to the minor child in the following language : 
In 1858, in a still more unfortunate English case, it was 
held that a small child injured through the negligence of a 
railway company was barred from recovery by the contribu-
tory negligence of a grandmother who was in charge of the 
child at the time. This barbarous rule, which denies to the in-
nocent victim of the negligence of two parties recovery 
against either, and visits the sins of the fathers upon the 
children, was accepted in several American states, but is now 
overruled everywhere except in Maryland, Maine, and per-
haps Delaware. The "agency" of the parent to look after the 
child is of course the barest fiction, and the fear that the par-
ent may profit by his own negligence is now removed by the 
power of the court to put the proceeds in trust for the 
child.892 
889 Morgan v. United States, supra note 375. 
890 La Porte v. U.S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.C. N.]. 1935). 
891 See recommendations i1~fra following note I 123. 
892 Prosser 301. 
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Harper and James are not quite so disturbed but agree that the negli-
gence of the parent should not be imputed to the child.393 
References to the matter of the mother's negligence are found in a 
few of the prenatal injury cases. As pointed out before, the possibility 
of the child suing the mother for her negligence was used by the Illinois 
court in the Allaire case 394 as a reason for denying all recovery for 
such injuries. On the other hand, in Rainey v. H orn,395 the court 
pointed out that in Mississippi, as in most jurisdictions,396 a child can-
not sue its mother. Another reference is found in the Missouri case of 
Kirk v. Middlebrook,891 this time to a question involving assumption of 
risk. Both lawyers assumed that the right of action was in the mother 
and not the infant and the court apparently held that the mother could 
contract away damage rights arising from injury to the foetus. The 
language seems to suggest that if the action had been that of the child, 
the mother could not contract it away. These are all of the references 
to the question found in the cases. Prosser and Harper and James are 
not referring to prenatal injury cases in their comments on contributory 
negligence. Obviously significant differences exist between applying con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk doctrines to cases of in-
juries to living children and to cases of prenatal injury. 
The first distinction to note is that both the parents (particularly the 
mother) and the child may have claims. Surely so long as contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk doctrines are used in negligence 
cases generally, these should be defenses to any action by the parent for 
injuries to his interests as distinguished from those of the child. 
Whether such defenses arising from the actions of the negligent 
parent should be applied to defeat the child's own rights against third 
parties is a somewhat more difficult question to answer; but here again 
they probably should be applicable, in contrast to the result where a liv-
ing child is hurt. It does not seem as "barbarous" to apply the defenses 
to a child still in its mother's womb, or still to be conceived. Even if the 
injured foetus is born alive but dies within the first five or ten years of 
his life, recovery from a negligent defendant in effect will help the par-
ents themselves rather than the child for they will be caring for him 
during this period in almost all cases. Yet_ the condition was partly the 
893 Harper & James 127o-71. 
894 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra note 319. See concern suggested by writers 
in 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1154, 1157 (1954); Note, 35 Va. L. Rev. 618, 626 (1949). 
395 221 Miss. 269, 281, 72 So.2d 434 (1954). 
396 Prosser 675-76, although he disagrees with the rule. 
897 201 Mo. 245, 285-86, 100 S.W. 450 (1907). 
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result of their own contributory negligence. The unborn or unconceived 
child seems too closely connected with the parents to deny defendants 
the right to use contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a 
'defense, even if the child lives to a mature age with some serious 
deformity. 
This position is not inconsistent with the argument that the embryo 
or foetus is a separate entity and should be allowed to recover for pre-
natal injuries. Separate existence should not govern application of 
these defenses. The burden of extra expenses and rehabilitation in such 
cases should be born by the parents, so long as contributory negligence 
is used in negligence cases generally. 
In any event, assuming the parent is advised fully of the risks in-
volved, no rule should be adopted which will embarrass in any way the 
doctor or the expectant mother or potential parent in deciding to use 
radiation in the course of medical treatment of the parent, even though 
this admittedly creates a risk of injury to the embryo or foetus, either 
directly or because of mutated genes. 
TABLE OF CASES-PRENATAL INJURIES 
I. States Allowing Recovery Under Some Circumstances 
I. If Viable at Time of Injury and Born Alive 
CAUFORNIA: 
Myers v. Stevenson, I25 Cal. App.:zd 399, z,o P.:zd 885 (ISt Dist. I954) 
(Injuries during delivery and born alive; specifically provided for by amend-
ment to statute following Scott case). 
Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (3d Dist. 1939) 
(Injuries at birth and born alive; construing code provision as creating 
separate existence of foetus for personal injury as well as property rights). 
CONNECTICUT : 
Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, u8 A.2d 633 (Super. 
Ct. I955) (Child viable and lived for five days; wrongful death action). 
Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, III A.2d I4 
(Super. Ct. I955) (Viable at time of injury and born alive). 
But see: Sq11illo v. City of New Haven, I4 Conn. Supp. 500 (Super. Ct. 
I947) (Action not allowed); Marden v. Enterprise Industries, Inc. (unre-
ported) (Hartford Co. # 90013, I95I) (Action not allowed). 
DELAWARE: 
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., I2B A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct., I956) 
(Viable at time of injury and apparently killed before birth; administrator 
sued for damages). 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA : 
BonJJrest v. Kotz, .65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C., D.C. I946) (Injury at birth and 
born alive, the court emphasizing that child was viable). 
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GEORGIA: 
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Lilt.e Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) 
(Injury six weeks after conception and apparently born alive; concurring 
justice saying should have to prove that quick in mother). 
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 2o8 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 
(1951) (Injury three hours before birth, nothing being said about being born 
alive but language leans this way). 
ILLINOIS: 
Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, II4 N.E.2d 721 (1953) (Injuries while 
en ventre sa mere; controlled by Amann case). 
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, II4 N.E.2d 412 (1953) (Injury while m 
ventre sa mere and born alive court assumes; wrongful death action. Over-
rules Allaire case). 
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, rB4 Ill. ·359, 56 N.E. 638 ( 1900) (Action 
not permitted but overruled by Amann case). 
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. roo, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939) (Born 
microcephalic idiot as result of X-ray treatments of mother from third to 
seventh month of pregnancy; action not permitted on ground controlled by 
Allaire case). 
'KENTUCKY: 
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W .2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (Viable child 
injured and born dead; wrongful death action allowed). 
LouisiANA: 
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923) (Civil code read as 
allowing wrongful death action for viable foetus born alive). 
MARYLAND: 
Damasie'Wicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951) (Born alive 
and apparently not viable; test apparently is whether is quick). 
MINNESOTA: 
Verkmnes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (Injury at 
birth killed mother and foetus; wrongful death action allowed without men-
tion of living even for moment). 
Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320, 2o6 N.W. 650 (1925) (Allowing re-
covery without considering problem; injury _forty-eight hours before birth 
and born alive). 
MISSISSIPPI : 
Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954) (Injury during de-
livery and stillborn; wrongful death action allowed). 
MISSOURI: 
Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224. 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953) (Viable at time 
of injury and born alive ; wrongful death action allowed). 
Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. r26, 154 S.W. 71 (1913) (Action 
disallowed but overruled by Steggall case). 
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957) (Viable at time of 
injury and stillborn; wrongful death action permitted, provided on remand 
find that viable). 
Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 6g At!. 522 (r9o8) (Held mother had 
no cause of action for deformed child born alive; distinguished in Poliquin 
case). 
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Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947) (No cause of action 
for unborn because no medical testimony showing causation; distinguished 
in Poliquin case). 
NEw YoRK: 
Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953) (Injured 
during third month of pregnancy and born alive; carrying Woods v. Lancet 
to before viable). 
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349. 102 N.E.2d 69r (1951) (Injured in ninth 
month and born alive ; overruling Drobner case). 
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) (Action not allowed, 
overruled by Woods case). 
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 
(2d Dept. 1913) (Action not allowl!d but overruled too). 
Banas v. City of Syracuse, 204 Misc. 201, 125 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1953), 
aff'd, 282 App. Div. 826, 122 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Right to sue recognized but must 
be brought against municipality within prescribed time; regardless of excuse 
or inability, cannot be maintained otherwise). 
OHIO: 
Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 8o9 (1950) (Injured during 
eighth month and born alive; wrongful death action allowed). 
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. II4, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) 
( lnj ury in seventh month and born alive) . 
Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1943) (Action denied but 
surely overruled in Williams case). 
OREGON: 
Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955) (Viable at time 
of injury and born alive). 
CANADA: 
Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] · 4 D.L.R. 337 (Viable when in-
jured and born alive; based on civil code provision given broad interpretation). 
Smith v. Fox, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 785 (Action for prenatal injury will lie but 
must await birth of child, apparently alive). 
2. Not Viable but Born Alive 
GEORGIA: 
Hornbuckle case, supra (Very broad language covering any time after 
conception; child actually six weeks along) .. 
MARYLAND: 
Damasiewicz v. Gor.rt~-Ch, supra (Says viability bad test, but suggests when 
"comes alive" in mother, apparently meaning when "quick"). 
NEW YORK: 
Kelly v. Gregor·y, supra (Injury during third month, court saying separa-
bility begins at conception). 
3. Viable at Time of Injury but Born Dead 
DELAWARE: 
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., supra (Language indicates adminis-
trator of viable infant can sue if does not survive the accident). 
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KENTUCKY: 
Mitchell v. Couch, supra (Viable and born dead and wrongful death action 
allowed). 
MINNESOTA: 
Verkennes v. C orniea, supra (Viable and no mention of being alive after 
birth; wrongful death action allowed). 
MISSISSIPPI: 
Rainey v. Horn, supra (Death during delivery; wrongful death action 
allowed). 
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 
Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra (Viable and stillborn; wrongful death action 
allowed). 
II. No Recovery Allowed 
I. No Recovery in Any Case 
ALABAMA: 
Birmingham Baptist Hospita.l v. Branton, .2I8 Ala. 464, n8 So. 741 (I9z8) 
(No death act cause by father for child dying after birth from prenatal 
injuries, the damages to it,. if not too remote, being recoverable by mother). 
Stanford v. St. LO'Uis-San Francisco Ry., 2I4 Ala. 6n, 1o8 So. 566 (1926) 
(Lived for short time and action for damages denied to it, mother having 
right to any damages). 
Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 6IS, ISI So. 468 (1933) (Court said if complaint 
is interpreted as claiming damages for injury to viable foetus then this item 
is recoverable by mother, though court reads complaint as for mental anguish 
·for loss of child as well as injury to herself in delivery). 
MASSACHUSETTS: 
Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952) 
(Viable and hom alive). 
Bliss v. Passanesi, 3.26 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 2o6 (I950) (Viable and ap-
parently born alive but died soon thereafter). 
Dietrich v; Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (I884) (Court assumes that hom 
alive at fourth or fifth month of pregnancy and states that any damages to 
infant not too remote to be recovered at all can be recovered by mother). 
MICHIGAN: 
Newman v. City of Detroit, 28I Mich. 6o, 274 N.W. 710 (I937) (Viable 
and hom alive). 
NEW ]ERSEY: 
Stemmer v. Kline, I28 N.J.L. 455, z6 A.zd 489 (I942) (Viable and born 
alive, last X-ray treatment of mother only six months before birth). 
Ryan v. Public Seru. Co-ordinated Transp., I8 N.J. Misc. 429, I4 A.2d 52 
(Sup. Ct. I940) (Born alive, time of injury not stated). 
PENNSYLVANIA: 
Morgan v. United States, 143 F. Supp. sSo (D.C. N.J. I956) (Child not 
even conceived at time of blood transfusion and under Berlin case, infra, no 
recovery in Pennsylvania for prenatal injuries). 
Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, I6 A.zd 28 (I940) (Apparently born 
alive, no time of injury given). 
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Rimpa v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 37 Erie 267 (Pa. C.P. I9S2) (Viable and 
born alive; followed Berlin case. supra). 
Jacketti v. Pottstown Rapid Transit Co., 67 Montg. Co. L.R 37 (Pa. C.P. 
I9SO) (Apparently born alive but no time of injury given). 
Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (I924) (Action permitted for viable 
foetus born alive; presumably overruled by Berlin case, supra). 
Contra: Von Elbe v. St!ldebaker-Packard Corp., Io6 Pittsburgh Legal J. 
2I9 (I9S8) (Born alive and recovery allowed regardless of inability, although 
whether non-viable at time of injury not stated.) 
RHonE IsLAND: 
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. I6g, 49 Atl. 704 (I90I) (Viable and born alive) . 
. TEXAS: 
Magnolia C. C. B. Co. v. Jordan, I24 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (I93S) 
(Viable and born alive). 
Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S.W.2d 3SO (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 
(Controlled by Magnolia case, supra,· viable and born alive). 
IRELAND: 
Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. (lr.) 6g (I8gi) (At least quick 
and born alive; court deciding that no duty owed by carrier to unborn child 
since the agents did not know of existence of foetus ; a contract case so not 
deciding trespass case but difficulty of proof question noted by one judge). 
2. No Recovery If Stillborn, but Reserving Question If Born Alive 
NEBRASKA: 
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., ISS Neb. 17, so N.W.2d 229 (19SI) (Viable 
but stillborn). 
OKLAHOMA: 
Howell v. Rushing, 26I P.2d 2I7 (Okla. I9S3) (Simply following Drabbels 
case, supra, not Verkennes, supra; born dead). 
SOUTH CAROLINA: 
West v. McCoy, IOS S.E.2d 88 (Sup" Ct., S.C. I9S8) (Quick but not viable 
at time of injury and stillborn. Reserving question if viable and born alive). 
3. Recovery Denied If Not Viable, but Reserving Question If Viable When 
Injured 
WISCONSIN: 
Lipps v. Milwaukee E. Ry. & L. Co., I64 Wis. 272, IS9 N.W. 9I6 (I9I6) 
(Non-viable and court expressly reserves question where viable, suggesting 
there are "cogent reasons" for contrary rule in that case; born alive). 
II. Actions Under Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes 
I. Recovery Allowed Under One or Both When Born Alive 
CoNNECTICUT: 
Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra (Recovery under both). 
IlLINOIS: 
Aman.n v. Faidy, supra (Apparently wrongful death only). 
LoUISIANA: 
Cooper v. Blanck, supra (Recovery under both). 
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MISSOURI: 
Steggall v. Morris, supra (Apparently wrongful death only). 
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 
Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra (Seems to be survival action). 
OHIO: 
Jasinsky v. Potts, supra (Apparently wrongful death only). 
2. Recovery Permitted Even Though Stillborn 
DELAWARE: 
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Worgcm v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., (Language indicates administrator of 
viable infant can sue for damages even though stillborn). 
KENTUCKY: 
Mitchell v. Couch, supra (Wrongful death action permitted). 
MINNESOTA: 
Verkennes v. Cor11iea, supra (Wrongful death action permitted). 
MISSISSIPPI: 
Rainey v. Horn, supra (Death during delivery; wrongful death action 
allowed). 
NEw HAMPSHIRE: 
Poliquin v. MacDonald, supra (Viable and stillborn; wrongful death action 
permitted). 
3. No Recovery Permitted Only Because Stillborn, Otherwise Allowed 
CALIFORNIA : 
Norman v. Murphy, I24 Cal. App.2d 95, 268 P.2d I78 (I954) (Wrongful 
death action). 
NEw YoRK: 
In re Logarn's Estate, I56 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Surr. Ct. 1956). 
Muschetti v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. 
Ct. I955). 
In re Scanelli, 208 Misc. 8o4, 142 N.Y.S.:zd 4II (Surr. Ct. 1955). 
In re Roberts' Estate, I58 Misc. 6g8, 286 N.Y.S. 476 (Surr. Ct. 1936) 
(Decided before Woods v. Lancet, supra, but still followed as to stillborn in 
Logan's Estate, supra). 
4· No Recovery When Stillborn in Jurisdictions Where No Decisions on Rights 
If Born Alive 
NEBRASKA: 
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., supra (Viable but stillborn). 
OKLAHOMA: 
Howell v. Rtuhing, supra (Simply following Drabbels case, supra, not 
Verkennes case, st~Pra; born dead). 
SouTH CAROLINA: 
West v. McCoy, supra (Quick but not viable at time of injury but stillborn, 
expressly reserving question if viable and born alive). 
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c. Sterility and Related Injuries Involving Loss of Children 
The type of radiation injury most closely related to genetic damage is 
impairment of procreative function caused by irradiation of the repro-
ductive organs. Nevertheless, it is a quite separate injury for sterility 
injures the parent and not future generations. Exposure to radiation 
possibly will increase so greatly the chances of a deformed child being 
produced that the potential parent may decide as a matter of conscience 
to avoid propagating a line of defective descendants. He would feel 
deprived of procreation powers with the same effect as if he were ac--
tually sterile. In either case the question arises as to whether or not 
compensation should be awarded to a person who has been made sterile 
by radiation or as to whom the likelihood of genetic damage is so great 
that he should refrain from having children. The only actual case 
known to involve solely the claim of sterility caused by overexposure to 
radiation never was brought to court, for at about the time the suit was 
to be filed the claimant's wife became pregnant, and the cause of action 
vanished because of the legal presumption. In general it is believed that 
sufficient whole body radiation to render a person permanently sterile 
will prove fatal. Radiation limited to the area of the reproductive or-
gans might not prove fatal, yet might create permanent sterility. Tem-
porary sterility may occur but damages seem so unsubstantial that con-
sideration seems unwarranted. 
While no cases exactly in point have been found, the nearest analo-
gies indicate what the courts might do if sterility is proved to have been 
caused by radiation and to be of sufficient duration to constitute a seri-
ous impairment of the victim's power to propagate. The discussion is 
limited to the inability to have children and is not meant to include the 
separate problem of impotency.898 
( 1 ) Decided Sterility Cases 
Allowance of Damages for Sterility Caused by Ordinary Physical 
Injuries. There has been very little discussion of the problem of sterility 
which does not affect in any way the ability to have sexual intercourse 
but which does deprive the person, and his or her spouse in the ordinary 
case at least, of the ability to have children. One of the earliest cases 
found which deals directly with the question of whether the inability 
to have children is an element of damages in a tort action is Denver & 
sos See Annot., 23 A.L.R.zd 1378 (1952) on loss of consortium of husband or wife. 
Walker, The Law of Damag~s in Scotland 585-86 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Walker] 
doubts recovery should or would be allowed in Scotland or England. 
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Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris} where the plaintiff was injured by a gunshot 
of an employee of the railway in such circumstances that the attack 
was a tort. The court said : . · 
One of the consequences of the wound received by the 
plaintiff at the hands of the defendant's servants was the loss 
of the power to have offspring-a loss resulting directly and, 
proximately from the nature of the wound. Evidence of this 
fact was, therefore, admissible, although the declaration does 
not, in terms, specify such loss as one of the results of the 
wound. The court very properly instructed the jury that such 
impotency, if caused by the defendant's wrong, might be con-
sidered in estimating any compensatory damages to which 
the plaintiff might be found, under all the evidence, to be 
entitled. 399 
While the court here speaks in terms of impotency it is clear that it is 
referring also to the inability to have offspring as an element of dam-
age. It is also true that even if this were the kind of assault which jus-
tifies punitive as well as compensatory damages, the punitive were 
separated from the compensatory. The loss of the power of the plaintiff 
to have offspring was dealt with by the court as part of the compensa-
tory damages. Of course, the case involved what would be termed an 
intentional tort but the court did not mention this fact in discussing the 
question of whether or not the loss of the power to have offspring was 
an element in the damages to be allowed. 
An equally distinct statement of the opposite position is found in 
Landwehr v. Barbas} arising in New York in 1934. Factually the case 
is different, but the court considered the same problem. The per curiam 
majority opinion was as follows: 
The loss of opportunity of childbearing, due to physical in-
juries of a husband caused by the negligence of a third party, 
has never been recognized as giving a cause of action to a 
husband or wife against the wrongdoer. There are so many 
elements of doubt and conjecture in connection with the birth 
of children that it cannot be said that the wrong is the proxi-
mate cause of the loss. If the complaint be construed to mean 
that because of the injuries the husband has become sexually 
impotent, the wife has no cause of action. 400 
The dissent was a vigorous one and, after pointing out that the wife's 
action really was for the loss of consortium, continued: 
We have recognized the right of the wife to recover compen-
sation for the loss of her husband's attentions, caresses, af-
899 122 U.S. 597, 6o8, 7 S.Ct. 1286 (1887). 
400 270 N.Y.S. 534. 535 (1934). 
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fection, exclusiveness; then why not for the loss of her right 
to motherhood within her marriage contract? Surely this loss 
transcends all the others. For its loss through the tort of 
another, she is entitled to such compensation as the law can 
afford.401 
The dissenting judge does not state what the "law can afford." 
The only case found involving exposure to radiation which deals with 
the problem of sterility is McElroy v. Frost,402 discussed before. In that 
case the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $29,125 be-
cause the negligence of the doctor in treating his scrotum with X-rays 
resulted ·in atrophy of the testicles, extensive dermatitis, and a condition 
which ultimately would develop into a fatal cancer. In describing the 
injury the court stated that "the effect of the treatment on the plaintiff 
would be to render him sterile," but said nothing else about damages for 
sterility, though upholding the verdict. 
A large number of cases have dealt with the childbearing ability of 
women who have been in accidents resulting in injury to the pelvic 
region. While most of them do not speak in terms of sterility as such, 
the cases are analogous and pertinent to the extent that the damages 
allowed include an element for the loss of the ability to have children. 
An early Alabama case, Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Hill, contains 
an effective presentation of the argument in favor of allowing damage 
recovery for injury to a woman's ability to have children. The court 
said: 
The objection to the testimony of Dr. Drennen, to the ef-
fect that plaintiff's injuries were of such character as that 
child-bearing would be thereby rendered perilous to life, is 
untenable. It may be that she might never have married, even 
had she not been injured; or that, marrying, she might have 
had no desire to bear children ; or even that, desiring issue, she 
might not have had any, as is argued by counsel; but these 
considerations can exert no influence on the question. It is to 
be assumed that every physical endowment, function and ca-
pacity is of importance in the life of every man and woman, 
and that occasion will arise for the exercise of each and all of 
them. And to that extent to which any function is destroyed, 
or its discharge rendered painful or perilous by the wrongful 
infliction of personal injury, is the party complaining entitled 
to damages. We can, in other words, conceive of no physical 
injury, wrongfully inflicted, whether entailing pain only, or 
4ot !d. at 536. 
402 Supra note 148. 
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disfigurement, or incapacity, relative or absolute, to perform 
any of the functions of life, which may not be made the predi-
cate for compensation in damages.408 
245 
The injury to childbearing functions was only one element, there being 
other injuries as well as pain and suffering, but the court upheld a ver-
dict for $8,ooo. If the language of the court is to be taken literally and 
applied generally it, of course, would support an action for tortious in-
jury to either a man or woman which created an inability to have 
children. 
In a number of other cases the loss or impairment of the ability of an 
injured woman to have children has been an important element in the 
damages allowed; for example : (I) $20,000 was allowed to a twenty 
year old wife whose head was creased slightly by the defendant's negli-
gently fired bullet, resulting in shock, miscarriage, and later an opera-
tion causing sterility; 404 (2) also $7,500 to a thirty-five year old wife 
whose negligently caused miscarriage prevented her from conceiving 
thereafter without a serious surgical operation to which the court said 
the woman need not subject herself in order to reduce damages, the court 
saying, "That the loss of fecundity is a proper element of damage in a 
personal in jury case is undoubted. . . . " ; 405 ( 3) $9, I so awarded a wife 
injured so as to require a serious operation with inability to do house-
work, the court saying, "The loss of the power of child bearing is cer-
tainly an element of damage to be taken into consideration· by the jury, 
as much so as an injury to any other part of the human body, and the 
question as to whether or not the injury is the reasonable and probable 
consequence of the negligent act, is a question of fact for the jury"; 406 
(4) awards of $2,500 and $7,500 to husband and wife, respectively, 
where the wife's genital organs were injured by tortiously caused mis-
carriage, the sum later being reduced to $I,500 and $4,000, respec-
tively, because there was no evidence that the condition was permanent, 
the court clearly implying that if there were sufficient evidence the higher 
amounts would have been approved; 407 (5) $I7,500 for wife and 
$2,500 for husband mainly for sterility of wife caused by wrong 
blood check/08 and (6) $I5,ooo for the wife and $I2,500 for the hus-
403 Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514, 519, 9 So. 722 (1890). 
404 Empire Oil & Refining Co. v. Fields, 188 Okla. 666, 112 P.2d 395 (1940). 
405 Potts v. Guthrie, 282 Pa. 200, 203, 127 At!. 6os (1925). 
406 Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., 57 W.Va. 132, 14o-41, 49 S.E. 1030 (1905). 
407 Geller v. Riccuci, 10 N.J. Misc. 239, rs8 At!. 754 (1932). 
•o8 Berg v. N.Y. Society for Relief, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528, 550 (1954). 
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band where the baby was born dead from injuries caused by the defend-
ant's negligence, the court saying: 
There can be no doubt at all that there could be a recovery 
for a result of an accident which might cause sterility, or 
which might otherwise prevent parents from having children. 
If, as the result of actionable negligence, a husband or a wife 
should be so injured that either, in the future could not ex-
pect to produce children, surely this would be taken into con-
sideration as an item of damage. It necessarily follows, we 
think, that when parents are actually expecting the arrival of 
a child, and they are deprived of the fruition of that great ex-
pectation by the actionable negligence of someone else, they 
may recover from the tortfeasor as an item of damage for 
that particular loss. 409 · 
In another group of cases in which the ability to bear children was 
either impaired or made impossible, substantial recoveries up to as much 
as $85,000 were allowed, though in these cases the loss or impairment 
of the ability to bear children either was only mentioned or else the 
other damages were very serious,410 and probably would justify the 
total award without considering inability to have children. Such in-
ability was a major item of damages in the previous group of cases. 
On the basis of these cases which deal directly with the loss of ability 
to have children it seems clear that the majority of jurisdictions will 
allow recovery for sterility caused either to a man or a woman by ex-
posure to radiation if the exposure is the result of defendant's negli-
gence or if the doctrine of strict liability is applied to his operation. 
One should not draw a conclusion on this question, however, without 
taking into account an equally clear majority view on a closely related 
question which leads to the opposite conclusion. 
409 Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., so So.2d 847, 849-50 (La. App. 1951 ). 
4 10 Suburban Transit Corp. v. Malone, 156 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1946) (plaintiff, 32 
years old, was rendered incapable of bearing children in the ordinary manner and was 
awarded $33,125) ; Hider v. Gelbach, 135 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1943) (medical testi-
mony was in conflict as to whether plaintiff could safely bear children, but other in-
juries were present and a verdict of $14,000 was not excessive) ; Shriver v. Silva, 65 
Cal. App.zd 753, 151 P.2d 528 ( 1944) (3 year old plaintiff suffered, among other in-
juries, damage to pelvis impairing childbirth and $4,000 verdict was allowed to stand); 
Melton v. Fraering Brokerage Co., 31 So.2d 884 (La. App. 1947) (second and third 
degree burns made skin inelastic creating great difficulty in childbearing for unmarried 
18 year old plaintiff; $12,000 verdict for suffering, disfigurement, and disability not 
excessive); Duvall v. T. W. A., 98 Cal. App.2d 106, 219 P.2d 463 (1950) (childbirth 
would threaten wife's life; husband awarded damages). 
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( 2) Cases Denying Recovery for Mental Suffering 
from Loss of Child 
As pointed out in discussing the damages that parents could recover 
for injuries to the embryo_ or foetus resulting in stillbirth, it was stated 
that almost all cases denied recovery of damages for the mental anguish 
and grief that the parent suffered after the birth of the child, even 
though mental anguish of the mother during pregnancy after the injury 
from fear of death or deformity in the unborn child was a permissible 
item.411 The language in an early Texas case states the argument 
against recovery found in most of the cases : 
We do not think the death of the child before birth and the 
grief or sorrow occasioned thereby can be an element of dam-
ages in this character of suit. If it is made to appear from the 
testimony that Mrs. Cooper suffered more physical pain, 
mental anxiety and alarm on account of her own condition 
than she would have done if Dr. Keating had been in attend-
ance upon her, and the failure to secure his services is shown 
to be due to the want of proper care on the part of defendant's 
servants [the telegraph company], whose duty it was to de-
liver the message, a fair and reasonable compensation should 
be allowed for such increased pain and mental suffering; but 
the death of the child, the bereavement of the parents and 
their grief for its loss can not be considered as an element of 
damages. Such damages are too remote; they are the result 
of a secondary cause, and ought not to be allowed to enter 
into a verdict. This is not an action under the statute by the 
parents for the death of a child, and if it were, injury to the 
feelings of the parents could not be a basis of recovery by 
them.412 
The Michigan court in Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry. also 
concluded that the trial court was wrong in allowing the jury to con-
sider as an element of damages the loss of "the society, enjoyment, and 
prospective services of the child." 413 The court said that the jury should 
not attempt to compensate for the sorrow and grieving of the mother. 
An opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Butler v. Manlulttan 
Ry. reached a similar conclusion in the same year and stated the objec-
tions to allowing such damages in a manner that has caused its opinion 
to be quoted more frequently than any other. The trial court had per-
mitted the jury to consider damages resulting from depriving the plain-
411 Supra discussion in text at notes 351-58. 
412 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 7I Tex. 507. 51 I-!2, 9 s.w. 598 ( r888). 
413 ro2 Mich. 624, 629, 6r N.W. II (1894). 
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tiff of prospective offspring. The Court of Appeals held this to be er-
roneous: 
The difficulty of finding any safe basis upon which to estimate 
the pecuniary damages in such cases, has been frequently ad-
verted to by the courts. Whether the infant would have lived 
to an age capable of rendering service, and whether the con-
tinued life would be a pecuniary benefit or burden, and the 
numerous contingencies which may affect the value of the 
life make the ascertainment of such value by a jury, in a great 
degree, a matter of speculation and conjecture. But where the 
inquiry relates to the value of the life of a child cut off in in-
fancy, there are some material facts capable of proof, which 
may be placed before the jury and which afford some aid in 
estimating the pecuniary loss suffered by parents or other rela-
tives. The age and sex of the infant may be proved, its mental 
and physical condition, its bodily strength, and generally 
whether there was the apparent promise of a continued or use-
ful life, or the contrary. The speculation which, in the present 
case, the jury were permitted to make had not even these safe-
guards, slight as they are. They were allowed to estimate the 
pecuniary interest which a husband had in the chance that an 
embryo, not yet quickened into life, would become a living 
child. The sex could not be known, and if born alive, the in-
fant might have been destitute of some faculty, or so physi-
cally infirm as to have made it a helpless charge. There are no 
elements whatever upon which a jury could base any conclu-
sion that a pecuniary injury had been suffered by the plain-
tiff from the loss of the unborn child, and this inquiry should 
have been excluded from the consideration of the jury as too 
remote and speculative to form an element in the recovery. 
Where a wrong has been done from which pecuniary injury 
has resulted, or where injury is the natural or probable result 
of a wrong, the injured party is not remediless, although the 
extent of the injury is not capable of precise proof. The jury in 
such a case may fix the damages within reasonable limits, as 
best they may. Actions for defamation or involving recovery 
for pain or_ suffering are examples. But where damages 
claimed are neither the probable result of the wrong nor ca-
pable of proof, they cannot be awarded by the jury. It is not in 
the interest of justice to extend the field of speculation in jury 
trials beyond its present limits, and to sustain the ruling in 
this case- would go beyond what has been hitherto sanctioned 
by the courts. 414 
u• Butler v. Manhattan Ry-., 143 N.Y. 417, 421-22, 38 N.E. 454 (1894). 
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A Missouri appeals court in Finer v. Nichols stated the matter some-
what differently but also emphasized the speculative character of such 
damages. 
But though a recovery may be had by the mother to the extent 
mentioned, the loss of the offspring itself is not to be consid-
ered as an injury to her. As the basis of a recovery on the part 
of the parent for the death of a child by the negligent act of 
another is the value of the service of the child to the parent 
during minority, a recovery for the loss of a prospective off-
spring, it is said, would extend the field of damage into the 
realm of mere possibility. Of course, the loss of the antici-
pated society of the prospective child and mere matters of 
sentiment which attend such misfortunes are too remote for 
consideration by the courts as a basis for monetary compensa-
tion, though the law be humane in its policy and purpose.415 
While there are some cases which seem to indicate a contrary re-
sult,416 the cases generally still follow the views expressed in the ex-
cerpts just set out.411 Most of these cases, however, were decided before 
1940 and the law has been changing generally on the question of dam-
ages and particularly as to mental anguish. In 1955 the Washington 
Supreme Court upheld as not erroneous the instruction, "which in-
cluded, as a factor of damages, the continuing worry and anxiety of 
respondent wife up to the time of the trial." us contrary to the general 
rule that mental anguish of the mother because of the condition of the 
child after birth is not compensable, even though anxiety after injury 
but before birth is.419 McCormick states in his treatise 420 that the gen-
eral rule (in 1935) is to deny recovery for loss of the child's compan-
ionship or mental anguish suffered by the parent, though he indicates 
that Nebraska 421 and Wyoming 422 apparently make the "subtle refine-
ment" of allowing . only the "pecuniary loss" sustained by the parents 
41 5 Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 548-49, 138 S.W. 889 (19II). 
41 6 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d (La. App. 1923) and Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 
151 So. 468 (1933), supra Table of Cases after prenatal section. 
417 See cases collected 145 A.L.R. 1104, 11o6-09 (1943), and 10 A.L.R.2d 639, 640-41 
(1950). 4 Sutherland, Damages §1252 (4th ed. 1916). 
418 Fink v. Dixon, 46 Wash.2d 794, 799, 285 P.2d 557 (1955). 
419 See generally discussion of prenatal injury, suPra previous section. Allowing 
for anguish before birth, Meeks v. Zimmerman, 223 Ark. 503, 505, 266 S.W.zd 827 
(1954), and Champagne v. Hearty, 76 So.zd 453, 455 (La. App. 1954), but denying 
later anguish, Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant, 106 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ill. App. 1952). 
420 McCormick, Damages 352 ( 1935) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]. 
421 Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 231 N.W. 747 (1930). 
422 Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.zd 105 (1931). 
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because of loss of the child's companionship, not for mental anguish 
itself. 
\Vhen the courts hold, as almost all do, that the sorrow from loss of 
the prospective child is too remote they are holding that this is an item 
of damages for which our legal system, as a matter of policy, should 
not allow recovery. The nature of the loss, however, is exactly the same 
as in cases where a person loses the physical ability to procreate children 
(sterility), yet recovery is allowed in the latter situation. The fact that 
there has been other physical injury to the mother in the sterility cases 
is not a satisfactory distinction because typically there also is other 
physical" injury to the mother when a miscarriage results in loss of a 
prospective child. If in one case social policy calls for denying recovery 
to a parent who cannot have the child he had hoped for, it does in the 
other case also. Likewise if the policy dictates allowing recovery in one, 
it does in the other. 
(3) Claims Under Death Statutes for Grief, Loss of 
Society, and Comfort 
In analyzing the liability that would or should be imposed for sterility, 
account also must be taken of another line of cases dealing with a very 
closely related problem where considerably more authority can be found 
allowing recovery for loss of the child's society and companionship. 
These cases arise under death statutes of one kind or another where the 
decedent is not a minor. The great weight of authority apparently holds 
that, under death statutes, the sentimental value of the deceased to the 
next of kin, the grief or mental anguish of the statutory beneficiaries, 
or the loss of comfort, society, and protection are not proper items to be 
considered in assessing damages, twenty-seven state supreme courts 
having decided cases denying recovery for one or more of these 
items.428 At the same time, in Virginia, West Virginia, Louisiana, and 
Florida parents are allowed to recover for their mental pain and suf-
fering resulting from the death of the minor. In Florida recovery for 
such damages is specifically authorized by statute.m 
Most statutes say nothing about what losses caused by the death are 
compensable to next of kin, but most courts limit recovery to pecuniary 
423 Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 495-500 (1950) lists Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. 
4 24 See Annot., 14 A.L.R.zd 485, 496-97 ( 1950). 
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losses such as of prospective support. Loss of companionship-the only 
loss caused by sterility-is not compensable. The most significant cases 
under the various death statutes are those in several jurisdictions which 
have allowed the parents to recover for the loss of "comfort, society, 
and protection." Some of the very jurisdictions that do not allow re-
covery for sentimental value of the decedent to the next of kin, do allow 
it for "comfort, society, and protection." The cases, however, do not 
make it clear just what part protection plays in recovery or what the 
relationship is to the loss of services and other financial benefits that 
might be derived from a child. At least seven states have permitted re-
covery for loss of "comfort, society, and protection." 425 All of these 
cases are based upon the rights of beneficiaries under some type of death 
statute, typically wrongful death statutes patterned after the one 
adopted in England.426 The statutory language is such as to leave it to 
the court to decide what type of losses should be considered compen-
sable. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in the relatively recent 
case of Van Cleave v. Lynch 427 summarizes rather well the position 
taken by those courts which have allowed damages under wrongful 
death statutes. In approving an instruction of the trial court to the jury 
that "you should also take into consideration the financial loss to the 
plaintiff of the boy's comfort, society and companionship," the Supreme 
Court said: 
The theory that a parent should receive compensation only for 
actual loss of earnings of a child killed by the negligent acts 
of another, has not only been obliterated by time and social 
changes, but by sound reasoning. Since a right of action is 
granted for wrongful death, if mere earning capacity were the 
criterion for measuring the amount of recovery, then in the 
case of the wrongful death of a hopelessly crippled child 
·through the negligence of a defendant it could be claimed 
with some semblance of reason that no recovery at all should 
be allowed, because the parent bringing the suit would be bet-
ter off financially as a result of the death by being relieved of 
the obligation to support one who would always be finan-
cially dependent. While children still frequently contribute to 
the support of their families, their status in society cannot 
be measured merely in terms of what they are able to do for 
425 /d. at 498-500. California, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Utah, and 
Virginia. 
426 Lord Campbell's Act, Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Viet. c. 93· For a 
history of this type of statute see Prosser 709-10. 
427 109 Utah 149, 166 P.zd 244 (1946). 
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the financial aid of their parents. In many cases the cost of 
rearing children far exceeds all possible earning capacity. 
Nevertheless children are sought, not for their financial possi-
bilities, but for love, companionship and ha.ppiness which 
transcend all financial considerations. 
In the final analysis there is no actual quid pro quo for 
wrongful death. The loss of a loved one cannot be measured 
with any degree of exactness, although the right of action 
granted for wrongful death provides indemnity only in terms 
of money. While earning capacity in some cases might be an 
important element, it is not the only element; and as a relative 
matter, it may shrink in importance as the age of the person 
is considered either by reason of greatly advanced age or by 
childhood when earning capacity is absent. While the instruc-
tion given in this case relative to measure of damages is not 
a model instruction and does not entirely accord with our 
views, we conclude that there is· no reversible error!28 
The court in no ""·ay emphasizes the language "financial loss" found 
in the trial court's instruction so one is uncertain as to whether this is 
an attempt to attach a monetary value to the comfort, protection, and 
sense of security which parents might feel in contemplating the prospect 
of a child, once he is of age, taking care of them in their old age or in 
an emergency, or whether it is simply an attempt to equate in monetary 
terms the sentimental value of the companionship of the children.429 
One gets the feeling in reading the Utah opinion, however, that it is 
the latter that is being compensated. A $10,000 general and $345 
special damages award was upheld although the child was only six 
years old when killed. 
The jurisdiction in which there has been the greatest development in 
this type of recovery and the rules to govern it is California.m At-
tempts by the California court to place some limit on the recovery for 
this element of damages have not prevented substantial verdicts for 
this item alone. 431 
. Jurisdictions which do not allow recovery for prenatal injuries be-
cause there is no legally recognized injury of course cut off any rights 
4~8 /d. at 161-62. (Emphasis added.) 
429 Supra notes 421, 422. 
48° See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 499, 500 (I 950). 
481 Where deceased was- age 5, $I8,soo was awarded in Tyson v. Romey, 88 Cal. 
App.2d 752, 199 P.2d 721 ( 1948) ; awards of $5,000 each were made where deceased 
were 8 months and 6! years old, respectively, United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d 266, ·:z69 
(4th Cir. 1954); se~ also Wytupeck .v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 850, 136 A.2d 887 
(1957). Walker 582-85, .636, indicates only very moderate awards are given for very 
young children. See also id. at· 591-92. 
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of personal representatives under survival statutes. They also deny re-
covery to parents or other statutory beneficiaries under wrongful death 
statutes.482 The same is true in Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, 
where courts have held that there can be no recovery by parents under 
a wrongful death statute when the foetus is born dead.483 If recovery 
should be allowed in these three states when the injured foetus is born 
alive, perhaps a survival act suit would be permitted if the child died 
before trial. In those jurisdictions where a cause of action has been 
allowed under the wrongful death statute where the foetus was born 
dead, the only question raised was whether or not a cause of action ex-
isted, and no indication was given of what elements would enter into 
the recovery if causation were proved.434 No indication is given as to 
the permissibility of a survival action. 
Some obvious distinctions between the kinds of rights discussed 
above can be made. It seems quite unrealistic to expect any court to ex-
tend any concept of person under the wrongful death statutes to cover 
the genes in the potential mother or father and the organs in each which 
produce the gene-carrying material, so there can be no recovery in the 
name of the child not yet conceived. The theory of a survival type of 
death statute, that the wrongdoer pay the next of kin what he would 
have had to pay the deceased had he lived, is different from the right of 
the parents to recover for the mental anguish or perhaps more impor-
tantly the loss of society and companionship of the child. Nevertheless, 
in the usual case, the next of kin are going to be the parents or other 
very close relatives. Therefore, anything above the loss of prospective 
support from the child (which in the case of children under ten surely 
is minimal in the light of the cost of raising children under modern 
economic conditions) is really going to be granted on the basis of loss 
of society and companionship. 
If this is true, then the law ought not to reach a different result when 
the action is brought under a death statute than when it is brought by 
the parents themselves to recover for the sentimental loss of the society 
or companionship of the child. Recovery ought to be allowed or denied 
for this kind of sentimental loss on the basis of social policy, not on the 
4B2 See Table of Cases supra at end of prenatal injury section. Some courts clearly 
decided this since the actions were based on such statutes where the child died before 
suit was brought. Others denying an action to a surviving injured child surely would 
reach the same conclusion. 
433/bid. 
484 Minnesota, Mississippi, and Kentucky. See Table of Cases supra at end of pre-
natal injury section. For a general discussion of survival and wrongful death statutes 
and the theories underlying them see Prosser 705-19. 
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basis of whether or not we can find a separate legal entity in whose 
name the cause of action can be brought. When an older child dies, re-
covery may be premised on a real pecuniary loss in the form of expected 
financial help, but when a small child dies the recovery in reality is for 
sentimental loss. It is submitted that loss for sterility, aside from pain 
and suffering attendant on the physical injury causing sterility, in 
reality is for loss of a prospective child. 
(4) Some Suggestions for Revision of the Law of 
Damages 
As suggested before/35 the law of damages ansmg from death is 
badly in need of an over-all revision. The treatment of inability to have 
children and loss of children is simply another example of how artificial, 
if not downright absurd, distinctions have become in this area.436 If 
parents are permitted to recover for loss of society and companionship, 
as clearly they are in some of the cases discussed above, then recovery 
should be allowed when the capacity to have children has been impaired 
through the negligence of another. On the other hand, if recovery is 
to be denied in one case, so also should it be denied in the other. 
One obvious distinction can be made, of course; in cases of sterility 
there has been an actual impact on the body of the plaintiff parent, 
clearly physical in nature even if caused by radiation. This is not true, 
however, where the loss by way of sentimental value is because of the 
post-natal death of a child, or even while in the mother's womb so far 
as the father is concerned. This is also not true for the mother when 
the child is killed after birth. This distinction might be used by courts 
in loss of children actions, as it is in cases where mental anguish is 
allowed where there is physical impact on the plaintiff but not where this 
is absent. In sterility cases caused by radiation there will be impact, but 
this is not always true in other cases of inability to have children. In 
any event it would seem to be an artificial and unrealistic distinction. If 
anything, parental suffering from loss of society and companionship of 
an existing child is more realistic and provable than much of the mental 
anguish for which recovery is allowed in cases where there has been a 
slight impact.487 The pain and suffering and loss of society, companion-
ship, and comfort of the child is surely much less remote in these cir-
cumstances than in the case where a prospective parent has been made 
sterile. Yet, if anything, the existing cases would seem to allow recov-
4 35 See text discussion beginning at note 382. See also Prosser 719. 
436 See all of the distinctions in Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950). See Prosser 6g2-93· 
437 See discussion of psychological injuries infra at note 594· 
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ery for sterility but not for the loss of society, companionship, and 
comfort of the child. If one takes an over-all view of the damage prob-
lem, it would seem to make more sense if the law were just the opposite. 
One possible additional reason for allowing damages in sterility 
cases, which is not present where the loss is of a child actually conceived 
or already born, is the loss of capacity to reproduce. Even this distinc-
tion is not a tenable one in most cases. Where the parent is beyond the 
age of reproduction, which might be the case so far as the mother is 
concerned, the loss of the child is in effect deprivation of the right to 
have one's own children. In addition, it is arguable that so far as the 
companionship of children is concerned, the loss is exactly the same, if 
not more real, when it concerns a child already born rather than one 
possibly to be conceived in the future. The only additional damage to 
the plaintiff in the sterility case is the possibility that this will make the 
person undesirable as a potential mate in marriage. 438 The possibility 
of adoption may mitigate even this damage. It sometimes is difficult to 
arrange adoption legally, of course, but it also may be very difficult to 
conceive and give birth to a child, not to mention keeping him alive and 
healthy. Certainly, if any damages are to be allowed at all for sterility 
they ought to be limited to the factor of decrease in marriage potential 
and not for loss of potential companionship and comfort of children, 
unless the law also is ready to grant parents bereaved by the death of an 
existing child the same kind of recovery. 
Whether to allow recovery for loss of companionship of a child, ex-
isting or potential, raises a very serious social policy question of 
whether our society can afford to absorb the economic burden of a loss 
not only speculative but little assuaged by money. A new hat or a new 
car· seldom has any real effect on as serious an emotional shock as is 
involved in the loss of children. If recovery is to be allowed for this loss 
it ought to be allowed in all situations which actually raise the same 
considerations, and the suggestion of placing some kind of maximum 
limit, at a very low level, on this element of damages would not be 
amiss.439 The lawyer, in predicting what the courts and juries will do in 
actual cases, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the right to 
438 See Carter, "Assessment of Damages for Personal Injuries or Death in the Courts 
of Common-law Provinces,'' 32 Can. Bar Rev. 713, 725 (1954), pointing out when this 
is an allowable item. Such recovery has been allowed in Scotland, Walker 6o1, citing 
cases. Such damages were denied in City of Amarillo v. Rust, 45 S.W.2d 285, 290 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) on the particular facts, 12 year old girl and only scars, but 
there was a clear implication that damages might be awarded where impairment is 
clearer. 
439 See Plant, supra note 381. 
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have children of one's own blood is an interest highly regarded in our 
society and Joss of this interest constitutes an invasion of the body of 
the plaintiff parent or potential parent. It therefore would not be sur-
prising if courts and juries continued to allow the incapacity to have 
children, quite separate from the physical damage and pain and suffer-
ing involved in the accident causing sterility, as a recoverable item of 
damage in tort cases and at the same time continue to deny recovery 
to parents for their mental sufferings, including loss of companionship, 
where the tort has caused death of an already born child. It is sub-
mitted, however, that pecuniary recovery for the death of a child does 
not fit very comfortably into a compensatory theory of damages. 
There should be a considerable increase in such cases with the ex-
panded use of radiation. Exposure of potential parents undoubtedly 
will occur in such amounts that thereafter in all good conscience they 
ought to refrain from having children because of the real danger of 
genetic mutations. There is the additional possibility of sterility itself 
being caused directly by radiation. Here again radiation cases will give 
the law an opportunity to take a more comprehensive, over-all look at 
the varied and conflicting rules concerning damages which have de-
veloped in separate types of cases, all in splendid isolation from each 
other and without adequate realization on the part of the legal profes-
sion of the similarity, if not complete identity, of the social factors 
underlying the various situations. Perhaps the explanation for the lack 
of cases dealing with the separate problem of sterility is that lawyers 
have just assumed, as the Alabama court did,440 that since the power to 
have children is a normal attribute of human beings, any loss of this 
power is a compensable injury. This uncritical assumptive type of rea-
soning is at least partly responsible for the unsatisfactory state of pres-
ent rules as to damages. A beginning should be made in working out 
more logically consistent patterns of damage recovery than exist at 
present. The relationship between sterility, the rights of the parents for 
loss of children, and causes of action under the death statutes is. one of 
the areas where much more satisfactory analysis needs to be made of 
the underlying social policy questions involved in defining damages. It 
fits into the whole pattern of the growing trend of recovery, sometimes 
in very large amounts, for damages for mental disturbance. Any solu-
tions to problems here suggested should not be worked out in isolation 
from these other more general problems of mental disturbance. We 
make the above suggestions as a starting point toward such a study. 
440 Supra note 403. 
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d. Increased Susceptibility to Disease 
One of the attributes of a healthy human body is a considerable 
power to resist disease, though this ability differs among individuals 
and even within the same individual from time to time under varying 
circumstances. One of the possible results of overexposure to radiation 
is a reduction in the ability to resist diseases. 441 Actually, there are two 
aspects of increased susceptibility to disease, at least in radiation cases. 
One is the increased susceptibility to a specific disease such as leu-
kemia, cataract of the eye, or cancer of the bone. As to this type of in-
jury the normal rules of damages provide some answers which are 
sometimes adequate where the injury or disease appears within the 
statute of limitations and before trial. Very little has been said even in 
court opinions, however, about whether or not an increased risk that a 
specific injury will develop at a future date is a compensable item of 
damages. The question is, does a present predisposition to a particular 
disease or. injury warrant compensation, and if so to what extent? 
The second aspect is even more difficult to handle under existing 
cases; this is whether or not an increase in general susceptibility to all 
diseases is a compensable item of damages in a tort case. It may prove 
to be true that as a person accumulates radiation exposure he increases 
his susceptibility to disease generally by lowering his normal resistance. 
This latter aspect has escaped the· attention of legal writers and court 
opinions have ignored it almost as completely, probably because it is 
very unlikely in most cases. It will be present to some degree, however, in 
most cases involving overexposure to radiation. Some possibly analo-
gous cases and concepts give a little indication of what the courts will 
do with these two problems when they arise. As is so often the case in 
tori litigation, damage questions are lumped together into one over-all 
judgment. Even where individual items entering into the total judg-
ment are enumerated, there usually is no separate treatment by the 
court of whether the future possibilities are compensable because the 
court is satisfied that the existing injuries, where serious, justify the 
verdict and do not call for overruling the judgment' as excessive. 
( 1) Non-Radiation Cases 
(a) Cases Involving Recurrence of Existing Injury 
Some courts in non-radiation injury cases have considered the prob-
lem of a possible subsequent disease or injury not manifested at the 
Hl See discussion inff'a at notes IIoo-I 103. 
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time of the trial. For example, in Mooney v. McCarthy/42 while the 
court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff because of a problem con-
cerning apportionment between two defendants, it seems to have al-
lowed, as an item of damages, the possibility of a later recurrence of 
tuberculosis. The court said: 
The evidence regarding her injuries was such that defendant 
requested the court to charge the jury, in substance, that 
there was not sufficient evidence upon which they could find 
that there would be a recurrence of the tubercular trouble and, 
therefore, if their verdict was for plaintiff, they should not 
consider such condition as an element of damages, and to its 
failure so to do excepted. . . . 
[The doctor testified that] ... he had not yet "any posi-
tive opinion that it (the disease) has begun to be active, but 
more a very definite fear that it may begin" ; but he testified 
that such fear was based on his judgment and experience. He 
testified, too, on cross-examination, that he had no definite 
evidence that a pulmonary change had taken place, and that 
whether or not one would was entirely speculation. But in 
answer to the next question, which was : "Q. It is merely a 
matter of speculation, she may start getting better any time 
or start getting worse any time, that is about the way it is?" 
he modified his previous answer thus : "I would say more a 
matter of judgment than just a rank speculation." ... 
It thus appears that while some of the doctor's testimony, 
standing alone, supports defendant's claim, taken as a whole 
it does not. Although he did not state positively that it was 
his judgment that there would be a recurrence of the disease, 
the evidence clearly justified the inference that such was his 
belief .... Undoubtedly the verdict included damages for 
future disability due to a recurrence of the tubercular con-
dition.448 · 
Here the court approves as one item of damages susceptibility to a future 
specific disease. 
Again a lower California court in 1957 upheld a verdict of $2,500 for 
injuries in the nature of a severe sprain or strain of the muscles in the 
plaintiff's shoulder and neck sustained when she fell in defendant's 
building. The court included as one justification for affirmance the 
statement : " [ S] he would have intermittent episodes of muscle trouble 
for a long time with the probability of its being permanent." 444 Here 
again, as in the Mooney case, the expert testimony as to the likelihood 
442 107 Vt. 425, 181 Atl. 117 (1935). 
ua /d. at 428-29. . 
444 Handley v. Capital Co., 313 P.2d 918, 922 (Cal. App. 1957). 
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of future injury was based on a judgment concerning a physical con-
dition already existing and the possible future injury would be a con-
tinuation or recurrence of this same specific injury. 
In upholding a $2,500 verdict for the plaintiff the Nebraska court in 
another recent case said : 
There is evidence that plaintiff suffered a severe cerebral con-
cussion of the brain and that pain, suffering, and disability 
could normally first manifest itself within a period of years 
after the accident. There is evidence that plaintiff had an ab-
normal blinking or twitching of one eye, which the medical 
witnesses could not rule out as not being caused by the con-
cussion. The evidence shows that plaintiff not only might 
show manifestations of damage to his nervous system for a 
period of years in the future, but there was evidence that he in 
fact was manifesting such damage at the time of the trial.445 
This could be treated as allowing evidence of only increased future 
severity of a presently manifested injury. 
The Minnesota court in a very recent case also had occasion to con-
sider future injuries not yet manifested and upheld them as an item 
of damage in the following language : · 
While there was no testimony that she was permanently in-
jured, there was substantial opinion evidence to the effect 
that a disc injury such as she sustained would in all likelihood 
cause future difficulties and pain; and that, because of the 
weakened condition which usually remains in the area where 
such an injury occurs, there was a strong possibility of its 
recurrence here. . . . Based on such testimony, the trial 
court charged the jury that plaintiff might recover "for any 
future pain and suffering * * * which you have found is rea-
sonably certain she will endure in the future." While Dr. 
Gingold conceded that there was no present indication that 
plaintiff would suffer a recurrence of the disc injury, his 
opinion that there was a strong likelihood of recurrence, based 
upon the history of such cases generally, as well as his testi-
mony with reference to the present arthritic condition of 
plaintiff, would seem sufficient to justify the instruction com-
plained of. 
. . . While he stated on cross-examination that in any par-
ticular case, including plaintiff's, he could not say with positive 
certainty that there would be such a recurrence unless there 
was an opportunity for closer examination of the injury 
through surgery, nevertheless it is clear from the sum total 
445 Eden v. Klaas, 89 N.W.2d 74, 81 (Neb. 1958). 
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of his testimony that he was reasonably certain there would be 
a recurrence here. 446 
Here a rather specific future injury could be treated by the jury as one 
item of recovery. Again, the injury was a recurrent one, not a different 
one. The damages were awarded, however, for injuries that would 
manifest themselves later; recovery was allowed for likelihood or in-
creased susceptibility. 
(b) Cases Involving Injury of a Type Different 
from Current Injury 
In a Nebraska case, Schwarting v. Ogram,441 a $15,000 judgment 
was upheld as not excessive and one of the items of damages was a 
prediction of a future injury that had not yet become apparent but 
which might result from injuries to the head. The court did not discuss 
the question of the validity of including this future development but 
did point out in justifying the verdict: 
... [I]t was testified that, as a result of these conditions, 
traumatic epilepsy will develop, all as a result of this acci-
dent, and that this condition is permanent and cannot be 
cured ; that the trouble with her ear is due to a change in the 
brain tissues that has come from a contraction of the scar 
formed at the basal skull fracture. One physician testified that 
she is progressing towards traumatic insanity.448 
This is approval of a specific future injury, not increased susceptibility 
to diseases generally. The future injury was only one item of damages 
among several. 
In a case involving a severe burn to a metal worker through a fellow 
worker's negligence, the North Carolina court said: 
It is assigned as error that the court permitted the physician 
to state that the character of the plaintiff's wound was such 
that a sarcoma, or eating cancer, was liable to ensue. We rec-
ognize the general rule that an expert physician testifying to 
the consequences of a personal injury should be confined to 
probable consequences, but in this instance we do not think 
the physician indulged in pure speculation. . . . The word 
"liable" is defined as "exposed to a certain contingency more 
or less probable." ... The word was used by the witness in 
the sense of probable, and was doubtless so understood by 
the jury.449 
44e Derrick v. St. Paul City Ry., 89 N.W.2d 629, 633-34 (Minn. 1958). 
447 123 Neb. 76, 242 N.W. 273 (1932). 
us !d. at 87. 
449 Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 330, 74 S.E. 885 (1912). 
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Here a specific future disease was one of several items of damage, but 
the evidence was allowed and probably influenced the jury somewhat 
in determining the amount of the award. 
In both the Nebraska and North Carolina cases the holdings go fur-
ther than the previous ones in that the future injury was not just a 
recurrence of an existing injury but rather was of a new kind. 
( 2) Radiation Cases 
In two of the eases discussed in connection with breach of the stand-
ard of conduct the courts apparently included as an item of damage the 
future possibility of cancer occurring as the result of X-ray injury. In 
the case of Gross v. Robinson/50 the Missouri appeals court said that 
the testimony of the expert witness that an X-ray burn " ... would 
probably become malignant," was properly considered. Likewise in 
McElroy v. Frost 451 the supreme court approved evidence indicating 
that the X-ray burns of the plaintiff's testicles ultimately would develop 
into a cancer of a fatal type. 
One other case involving radiation burns has dealt with the possi-
bility of a future disease. In Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist 452 the 
California appellate court upheld the verdict of $10,250 for damages re-
sulting from X-ray burns caused by overexposure during dental X-ray 
photography. The defendant contended that the amount was excessive 
among other reasons because the evidence admitted as to the possibility 
of future development of cancer was wholly conjectural. The court said: 
While the actual condition of cancer may have been conjec-
tural and uncertain, the record contains positive evidence that 
a condition actually exists which makes this dread disease 
much more likely. We think this predisposition in itself is some 
damage, and when caused by the wrongful act of another it 
is an interference with the normal and natural conditions and 
rights of the other, which must be held to be a real and not a 
fanciful element of damage. The necessity of constantly 
watching and guarding against cancer, as testified to by the 
physician, is an obligation and a burden that the defendant 
had no right to inflict upon the plaintiff. m 
450 Supra note 159 at 121. 
451 Supra note 148. 
452 105 Cal. App. no; 286 Pac. 1048 (1930). 
4 53Jd. at us. (Emphasis added.) See also O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co., 
16 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1939), reversed on contributory negligence grounds, 24 N.Y.S.2d 268 
(1940), reversed and remanded for trial :z88 N.Y. 486 (1942). 
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This is the only radiation case found which seems clearly to have 
considered the justification for allowing recovery for predisposition 
only and then allowed recovery, because the courts in the Gross and 
McElroy cases merely mention the evidence of predisposition and ap-
prove its admission without discussion. In each case the amount 
awarded apparently was fully justified by other very serious injuries. 
In all three cases the future injury was a specific one, cancer, but 
in a real sense it was not a recurrence of an existing condition. On 
the other hand, it was a development from an existing compensable 
injury, the X-ray burn. 
In none of the cases discussed did the court consider how probable 
or certain a future injury must be to justify recovery. 
(3) The Standard of Proof Required to Prove Future 
Injury 
The doctor's testimony in the Coover case included the following 
answer to a question as to whether or not Mrs. Coover might be in 
danger of a cancerous growth: 
I do not say that she has a cancerous growth, she does not, 
but a cancer may develop on this area-it is common. . . . 
On this senile skin not infrequently develops new growths, 
little neoplasm, warty growths, and from these warty growths, 
the carcinoma develops; sometimes that is a year, sometimes 
it is two years-sometimes it is three or four years before 
they develop. 454 
The doctor was allowed to testify as to a condition that only ~'may 
develop" but the opinion does not indicate that the court was giving 
serious consideration to how probable the occurrence of the future 
injury must be. 
Two other cases involving future injuries give some indication of 
how certain proof of the future injury must be. One is Light v. Fore-
man, m decided rather recently in the sixth federal circuit. The court 
upheld a $sr,soo verdict against an objection that the plaintiff doctor 
had testified to the ~'loss of earning ability at some time in the future 
when appellee would become unable to continue his present employ-
ment because of injury to the first sacral nerve root, which would prob-
ably become worse over a period of years and cause complete inability 
to work." Against defendant's objection that such damages must be 
454 /d. at IIJ-14. (Emphasis added.) 
455 238 F.2d 817 (6th Cir_- 1956). 
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shown with "reasonable certainty" the court said that the witness's 
testimony could not be treated as a conjecture, and "The fact that it 
dealt with future probabilities does not make. it incompetent." 456 The 
court's ruling allows evidence of a specific future injury disability to 
be considered by the jury. 
The Louisiana appeal court in Guillory v. Lemoine apparently ap-
proved the lower court's allowing of about $2,500 of the verdict be-
cause of the severe fracture of the skull which umight [emphasis added] 
cause trouble in the future." The expenses had been $1,91 I and the 
award of $2,500 was considered sufficient by the trial court since it felt 
that "there is very little, if any, permanent disability." m Perhaps the 
court is approving reducing the amount of recovery proportionate to 
the degree of certainty that the injury will occur. 
A much less liberal attitude in a non-radiation case was expressed 
by the Vermont court in Howley v. Kantor/58 where the plaintiff's wit-
ness, a doctor, testified that an abnormal growth in plaintiff's left breast 
was caused by the blow and· stated that in his judgment, ·taking the 
situation as found on physical examination, it would "run about eighty 
per cent cancerous." The doctor also testified that "as it stands it may 
be one as well as the other," and "what it is at this stage is pure specu-
lation." The court held that it was erroneous to refuse the defendant's 
request to charge the jury that the evidence was not sufficient to justify 
a finding that cancer existed and that they should not consider it as an 
element of damages. 
To support such a claim, the evidence must be of such a char-
acter that the jury can find that there is a reasonable certainty 
or a reasonable probability that the apprehended future conse-
quences will ensue from the original injury. Consequences 
which are contingent, speculative, or merely possible are not 
entitled to consideration in ascertaining the damages. . . . 
The record before us does not disclose any opinion of the 
medical witness as to the probable future development and re-
sult of the plaintiff's breast condition. His answer, "run about 
eighty per cent. cancerous," does not have the effect claimed 
for it. The witness did not say that in his opinion the chances 
are eighty per cent. that the growth is cancerous, but, rather, 
as is clearly indicated, that from his experience and the history 
of other cases injury to the breast producing tumor developed 
about eighty per cent. cancerous.*fi9 
456 !d. at 818. The two cases cited for the latter proposition do not really support 
the conclusion. 
457 87 So.2d 798, 802 (La. App. 1956). 
458 105 Vt. 128, 163 Atl. 628 ( 1933). 
459 !d. at 133. 
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This clearly is denying recovery for the predisposition to cancer, con-
trary to the suggestion in the Coover case. It seems to be placing the 
emphasis upon whether or not the cancerous condition actually exists 
at the time of trial. 
The test apparently applied by the courts in these few decided cases 
is similar to that applied in determining whether to allow the jury to 
consider future pain and suffering as an element of damages for 
physical injury. There has been a considerable difference of opinion 
among courts in the United States as to whether, in considering future 
pain and suffering, the test should be one of "reasonable certainty" or 
"reasonable probability," there being a thousand opinions dealing with 
the point. 460 It surely is fair to question whether the difference between 
reasonably certain and reasonably probable has any significance for a 
jury, the distinction being rather subtle at best. The application of this 
same test in predicting future injuries (not pain and suffering) is well 
illustrated in a recent New Jersey opinion in Budden v. Goldstein.m 
The case involved a hernia, negligently caused by the defendant, and 
the expert testimony included speculation as to what possibly might 
happen when a person had a hernia, some of the possibilities, though 
not likely, being fairly serious. The court felt that the testimony allowed 
too much speculation. 
In the admeasurement of damages, it is well known that no 
recovery can be allowed for possible future consequences of an 
injury inflicted by a wrongdoer .... In order for suggested 
future results to be includible as an element of damage, it 
must appear that they are reasonably certain or reasonably 
probable to follow. . . . 
The A. L. R. annotation, supra, indicates that many of the 
authorities throughout the country use the expression "rea-
sonably certain" or "reasonable certainty" as the test and 
consider "reasonably probable" or "reasonable probability" 
inadequate and erroneous; others accept the latter statement. 
Our cases do not seem to have dealt specifically with the ques-
tion of whether the two have the same significance in relation 
to quantum of proof, and so may be used interchangeably. It 
seems to us that in a resolution of the conflicting interests in-
volved, reasonable probability is the just yardstick to be ap-
460 Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423 (1932), a long annotation listing at least 1,000 cases on 
the problem, not all of which have been read by the present authors. For a recent 
case on pain and suffering, see Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d 
56o (1951), where the court said it could award for such future pain and suffering "as 
may be established by the e~idence." (at 342). 
461 43 N.J. Super. 340, 128 A.2d 730 (1957). 
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plied. Basically, our view comes down to this: a consequence 
of an injury which is possible, which may possibly ensue, is 
a risk which the injured person must bear because the law 
cannot be administered so as to do reasonably efficient justice 
if conjecture and speculation are to be used as a measure of 
damages. On the other hand, a consequence which stands on 
the plane of reasonable probability, although it is not certain 
to occur, may be considered in the evaluation of the damage 
claim against the defendant. In this way, to the extent that 
men can achieve justice through general rules, a just balance 
of the warring interests is accomplished.m · 
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A similar result was reached in a recent Wisconsin case where the 
doctor testified, "All I can say is there is a possibility." The court 
said that to justify the assessment of damages for future permanent 
disability "it must appear that such continued disability is reasonably 
certain to result from the injury complained of." 463 
( 4) Conclusions 
(a) When a Specific Injury Is Feared 
Although few decisions have dealt specifically with predisposition 
caused by radiation, it may be predicted with some assurance that, 
where a specific type of injury such as leukemia, cataract, or bone can-
cer can be predicted as resulting from a specific exposure to radiation, 
there will be recovery, at least if there is expert testimony indicating 
either a reasonable certainty or a reasonable probability of occurrence. 
The existence of other present compensable injuries should not be re-
quired although none of the cases found involved only future injury. 
There would seem to be no justification for applying the stricter stand-
ard of proof that is generally applied to the mental disturbance or 
mental anguish cases where the courts have been so concerned with 
the possibility of fraudulent claims. If the future injury is of a physical 
rather than mental nature, and likelihood of occurrence is proved by 
competent medical testimony as to probability, the usual rule of "more 
probable than not," used in negligence cases as to present injuries, 
should apply. If reasonable probability, or perhaps the stricter test of 
reasonable certainty, indicates that something higher than eighty per 
cent certainty is demanded (as apparently required in Vermont),464 this 
puts an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff. Unless the law is to adopt 
462 /d. at 346-47. 
468 Kowalke v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins., 88 N.W.2d 747, 756 (Wis. 1958). 
464 See Howley v. Kantor, supra note 458. 
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some insurance scheme whereby the defendant is charged in accordance 
with the probability he has created, even if it is less than fifty per cent, 
as is suggested in the discussion of proof of causation, 465 then in the 
case of potential future injuries it might be better to adopt simply the 
preponderance of probability as the test. 
The one other possibility is to adopt the idea suggested in the Coover 
case, that damages could be awarded for an existing predisposition to 
a future injury, the assumption being that the amount of damages 
would be greater or less as the predisposition to the future disease or 
injury is greater or less. The difficulty with all of the existing tests is 
that they inevitably either lead to windfalls for those plaintiffs who 
are awarded damages but do not develop the injury or disease later on, 
or unfairly penalize other plaintiffs where the likelihood of future in-
juries is not great but the injury actually does develop. This is in-
herent in our present system of damages, where recovery is based on 
an ali-or-nothing philosophy, and a line must be drawn somewhere 
between one hundred per cent certainty and one chance in a billion. 
(b) When Future Injury Is Only Increased Sus-
ceptibility to Disease Generally 
All of the cases discussed above deal with the possibility of a specific 
injury occurring in the future. They in no way indicate whether re-
covery would or should be allowed where the possibility is not the de-
velopment of some specific injury or disease but is simply the reduction 
of the ability of the body to fight off diseases in general, whether it be 
the common cold, pneumonia, or any other disease, common or rare, 
communicable or not. The Coover case 466 is not authority for recovery 
for this item of damages. It dealt with the predisposition to a specific 
injury, i.e., development of cancer in the area which had suffered the 
X-ray burns. In addition, the likelihood of such development was 
great, according to the testimony, possibly even sufficient to satisfy the 
reasonably probable or reasonably certain rule. The language of the 
Nevada court in Murphy v. Southern Pacific Co!61 is probably in the 
same category as that found in the Coover case. The plaintiff's leg was 
hurt in a train accident and varicose veins later developed in his leg. 
The jury found that the varicose vein condition resulted from the leg 
465 Infra, recommendations discussion following note 1123. 
466 Supra note 452. 
467 31 Nev. 120, 101 Pac. j22 (1909). 
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bruises and awarded $7,500 damages. In upholding this verdict the 
court said: 
So, if a physical injury, the result of negligence, leaves the 
constitution of the injured person in a broken and shattered 
condition, creating an increased susceptibility to a particula:r 
disease, and that disease follows, although after a considerable 
lapse of time, and death results from it, the person or corpora-
tion inflicting the injury may be liable, if, in the opinion of the 
jury, the injury, and the sickness and debility following it, 
concurred in and contributed to the attack of the particular 
disease which finally carried the injured person off!68 
The court, however, here speaks of the "constitution" of the plaintiff, 
apparently referring to the general condition of health rather than a 
particular part of a body such as injured skin as in the Coover case. 
In allowing a $4,000 verdict to stand, the Arizona court in Cop-
pinger v. Broderick 469 held that future pain and suffering of the in-
jured person was a proper item of compensation and said: 
The apprehended future consequences of an injury, in other 
words, should be reasonably certain. They are seldom or 
never suspectible to anything like absolute accuracy of calcula-
tion. From their very nature, they must be measured by a 
rule more or less flexible. The injuries may be so serious as 
to indicate that the person injured will suffer pain the rest of 
his life, and yet the restorative processes of nature may in an 
unexpectedly short time heal the wounds. The injuries, on the 
contrary, may seem trivial, but progressively undermine the 
constitution of the injured person.m 
The court at the end of its opinion concluded that the jury's verdict 
was not excessive in the light of the evidence and said, "That her gen-
eral health was affected and that she will probably suffer. throughout 
her life as a result of the blow and shock seems evident." 471 Here again 
the court speaks of the "constitution" of the injured person and of her 
"general health." No reference is made at all to a specific injury that 
might result. 
A similar kind of reference to the general effect on health is found 
in Foster v. Donora Southern R. R.'112 where the federal district court 
found $25,000 not excessive since the residual pain would call for 
•as !d. at 126, quoting from I Thompson, Negligence §154 (1901). (Emphasis added.) 
469 37 Ariz. 473, 295 Pac. 78o (1931). 
470 !d. at 476. (Emphasis added.) 
411 /d. at 479-
m 144 F. Supp. 297 (D.C. Pa. 1956). 
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treatment over an extended period of time and there is evidence "suf-
ficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff's pain will continue for 
the remainder of his life, with a strong probability of his physical con-
dition deteriorating." 478 The court here again seems to be accepting 
deterioration in general physical condition as an item of damages which 
will support a very substantial verdict. 
The case of Caylor v. Virden,m decided by the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit perhaps is pertinent here. The plaintiff had been 
forgotten by the doctor and stayed under the treatment machine for 
three and one half hours instead of the fifteen minutes that should 
have been the maximum period. He got panicky and stumbled out of 
the room after falling off the table when no one answered his calls for 
help. The court concluded that the jury was· justified in saying that 
he may have received a physical injury while he was under the X-ray 
machine, not just mental anguish and shock. He had testified that 
"Everything made me nervous and I was just nervous and everything 
bothered me. I don't know how to explain how I knew I was nervous 
nor how the nervousness demonstrated itself." 475 The court considered 
this testimony sufficient to justify the denial of defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. In its opinion the court said: 
The mere fact that plaintiff may not have been able to ex-
plain the nature of his alleged injury is not, we think, proof 
that he suffered no physical injury. He was apparently a well, 
robust man when he was placed on the operating table with 
this X-ray machine trained on the growth on his cheek. 476 
In other words a general deterioration in health was sufficient to sup-
port a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Along the same line is language found in Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & 
Foundry Co., referred to above.477 This was a case in which the testi-
mony was to the effect that plaintiff's wound was such that a cancer 
was likely to ensue. The court also said : 
We think the evidence competent also as tending to prove 
acute mental suffering accompanying a physical injury. The 
liability to cancer must necessarily have a most depressing ef-
fect upon the injured person. Like the sword of Damocles, 
he knows not when it will fall. 478 
m /d. at 2g8. (Emphasis added.) 
4 7 4 217 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1955). 
475 /d. at 743· 
476 Ibid. 
477 Supra note 449· 
478 /d. at 331. 
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These cases do not specifically hold that increased susceptibility to 
disease is a recoverable item. They do, however, indicate recovery is 
permissible for the kind of mental suffering likely to accompany the 
possibility of a future injury when there has been overexposure to ra-
diation. 479 
Taken as a whole, the cases discussed indicate that evidence of in-
creased susceptibility to a specific disease (and perhaps to diseases gen-
erally) is at least admissible provided the necessary degree of certainty 
is shown. While none of them deal specifically with the question of a 
motion to strike such evidence, the opinions lead one to conclude that 
such a motion should be denied. The cases also fail to indicate whether 
a specific instruction to the jury permitting them to consider such an 
injury as a separate item of damages is permissible, but statements by 
the courts in many of the opinions makes it fairly clear that this is 
permissible. 
One general caution, however, should be kept in mind in considering 
these cases. Many hold th:_.tt such evidence does not invalidate a verdict 
of a substantial amount without holding specifically that it is permis-
sible to consider it anything but a make-weight in granting general 
damages. Nevertheless, the general tenor of many of the opinions is 
such as to indicate that a substantial award can be made for increased 
susceptibility as a separate item of damages at least if a specific future 
injury is shown. 
Until more is learned about the scientific aspects of the matter, it is 
impossible to predict what a court will do when presented with the claim 
of a person whose overexposure to radiation increases his chances of 
future disease. If such overexposure should mean that he will be twice 
as susceptible to <;ommon colds or other virus infections, or will be 
twice as susceptible to pneumonia or some other serious disease, should 
his present predisposition be a recoverable item of damages? If not, the 
future injury will likely not result until the statute of limitations pre-
cludes his right to sue the defendant,480 certainly a most unfair result 
from the plaintiff's standpoint. 
On the other hand, to allow full recovery for future injury when the 
chances are only fifty or seventy-five per cent is unfair to the defendant 
if the future injury actually does not arise. As to this problem, how-
ever, the radiation cases present nothing more unrealistic or unjust 
than those cases in which the future possibility of pain and suffering or 
479 See, e.g., the Benjamin .Zawacki case, infra Chapter V at section I 2 (7). 
480 Infra note 1038. 
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physical injury is allowed as a collateral item to damages for existing 
injuries. This again demonstrates that we need to re-evaluate our 
damage solutions in tort cases and develop a scheme which handles the 
probability question more adequately.481 
e. Shortened Life Span 
Another injury that can result from overexposure to radiation is a 
shortening of the life expectancy of the person so exposed, a type of 
injury closely related to decrease of resistance of disease. In many 
cases the contracting of a disease that a person otherwise might not 
have suffered may either cause death itself or sap some of the body's 
vital energy causing death at an earlier age than otherwise would be· the 
case. The radiation problem has somewhat different dimensions, how-
ever, for there is responsible scientific opinion to the effect that one al-
most can equate the number of days, weeks, or years that a man will 
lose from his normal life span to the amount of radiation exposure he 
has had.m It even is asserted by some that every exposure to radiation 
reduces the life span to some extent, and that its effect is cumulative so 
that if a person is exposed negligently to radiation he has enough re-
spectable scientific opinion at the present time to go to the jury on the 
question of whether he has lost a week, month, year, or decade from his 
life. When these cases are brought to court, will recovery be allowed 
for this type of injury? On this question there is more authority than 
for some of the other injuries previously discussed. 
In analyzing the problem account should be taken of several differ-
ent possibilities, although courts seldom have done so. A person may be 
exposed to sufficient radiation to cause death almost immediately, al-
though this is rather unlikely.483 More likely, in the case of exposure 
to a lethal dose of radiation, is death within a period of a few weeks 
during which time the prospective decedent, if told the facts, would be 
perfectly aware that he was going to die. In this case it would be almost 
inevitable that death would occur before trial to recover damages for 
the injuries. A case that will arise much more frequently is that in 
which the amount of irradiation is sufficient that experts could testify 
with some degree of certainty that the person exposed would live a 
shorter life by days, weeks, months, or years, depending upon the 
481 Infra reconunendations following note 1123. 
482 Infra discussion at notes 1085-93. 
488 Supra Chapter I at section C 4 A recent accident at Los Alamos caused the 
death of a worker in less than 48 hours. BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 5: 74 (1959). 
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amount of radiation received. In deciding what recovery to allow, if 
any, a court should take account of tl:ie possible distinction between (I) 
the economic loss in the form of lost wages which the injured would 
have received had he not been overexposed, and ( 2) the damages which 
he should be allowed because something of considerable value to him, 
i.e., his expectation of continued life, has been taken away. As to wages 
lost a difference should be made perhaps between recovery for (a) 
diminution in wages earned while he lives and (b) the wages lost for 
the period after his death but which he would have earned had his life 
not been shortened. One other most important set of distinctions must 
be kept in mind, i.e., the differences between the damages to be awarded 
to the injured party in his own right, those damages due his estate 
under the survival statute, and those to his beneficiaries in their own 
right under the typical wrongful death statute aimed at compensating 
persons who were dependent on and could reasonably expect to be sup-
ported by the injured party. Actually, the courts do not always seem to 
have kept these distinctions in mind. 
In the following analysis, however, unless the contrary is mentioned 
specifically, each case discussed deals with the element of shortened life 
span as separate from any other item of recovery, although this element 
may be awarded as only one item among many. Recovery in some cases 
may be allowed for shortened life span under a survival statute, but in 
each case it includes a separate item for shortened life unless otherwise 
indicated. Sometimes suit has been brought by the victim but he dies 
before trial, and sometimes death has occurred immediately after the 
accident but the victim is considered to have a cause of action which 
survives. In none of the cases cited as supporting recovery for shortened 
life span is recovery for this element made a substitute for lost wages 
or medical expenses during the period of survival or for pain and suffer-
ing during this period. Neither is recovery for losses by beneficiaries 
under wrongful death statutes affected by a shortened life span award, 
except where this is clearly indicated in a few cases. 
The most frequent shortening of life span injury arisirtg from over-
exposure to radiation is a reduction of a few months or years in the 
normal life span, e. g., the victim will now die at 65 instead of 67, as-
suming nothing else happens. The overexposure causes premature age-
ing. Most of the decided cases deal with situations in which the short-
ening is much greater than this but it is essential to analyze what the 
cases say about shortening of life as a separate item of recovery for it 
is a difference in degree only. 
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With the advent of extensive use of radiation it seems important to 
look at this subject and determine what relief should be afforded to 
various interested parties. It would seem that the difficulty will be par-
ticularly acute in radiation cases because the shortened life span may be 
the only item of compensable injury, thus differing from the usual 
personal injury action in which ordinarily there will be physical dam-
age of a nature sufficiently ascertainable to justify a substantial award 
quite aside from the loss of enjoyment of a full life. Particularly when 
the injury leads to the possibility of future pain and suffering, which 
is a compensable item in most jurisdictions,m the significance of al-
lowing recovery for the mere loss of life expectancy has not been too 
important. If such expectancy becomes . the only substantial item of 
damage, however, it will then become extremely important. While in 
some ways the subject involves metaphysics and religion more than it 
does the law, nevertheless, the legal question certainly will be raised 
more often in the United States than heretofore, and the law will have 
to make a decision as to whether or not to allow recovery for such an 
invasion of the human body. In any event here again is exemplified the 
great need for a thorough and comprehensive re-evaluation of our old 
concepts of damage recovery in tort eases. The confusion in results 
reached in the cases also exemplifies the great significance of really de-
termining what our theory of damage recovery is to be.485 
The subject has been one of fairly recent development and most of 
this development has taken place in England and Canada. For this rea-
son it seems important to observe what some of the Commonwealth 
countries have done with it before looking at the relatively few cases 
that have arisen in the United States. 
( 1 ) English Cases 
There is a considerable difference in theory between the English and 
Canadian approach to the matter of damages for shortened life span 
and that followed by the courts in the United States. Nevertheless, in 
terms of practical consequences in dollar awards in damage actions the 
difference in result may not be so great as the difference in theory would 
seem to indicate. 
The first English case squarely dealing with damages for reduced life 
484 Infra discussion beginning at note !)82. 
4 85 Jaffe, "Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance," 18 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 219, 221 (1953) says, "[T]he crucial controversy in personal injury 
torts today is not in the area· of liability but of damages." 
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expectancy is Flint v. Lovell 486 decided in 1935. The plaintiff, seventy 
years old, was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court found 
that for his age he was a man of vigor and vitality, with a life ex-
pectancy before the accident of seven or eight years, that he was in ex-
cellent health, yet that, as a result of the injuries, he probably would die 
within a year. The trial court was clear that the plaintiff had lost the 
prospect of an enjoyable, vigorous, and happy old age which medical 
testimony showed might have gone on for a number of years. £4,000 
damages were awarded for the loss of these years. On appeal to the 
Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Greer held that "under the rules as to 
measure of damage laid down in Hadley v. Baxencfule the plaintiff's 
claim to damages on the ground that his life would be shortened was 
one on which he is entitled to succeed." 487 Lord Justice Slesser also 
found no reason why the shortening of life should not be considered in 
the assessment of damages, but Lord Justice Roche felt that evidence 
of shortening of life should be permitted only for the purpose of show-
ing the seriousness of the injuries; consequently, the award of £4,000, 
he thought, was excessive and should have been limited to £3,000. 
Roche's view was never followed in England, but it bears a striking 
similarity to the American rule. As an interesting collateral fact, it may 
be noted that three years later, in another case,488 the House of ·Lords 
was informed that plaintiff Flint was still living, contrary to the pre-
diction of his expert medical witnesses. 
For a short time after Flint v. Lovel/ 489 was decided it was not clear 
whether recovery for shortened life span was dependent upon the in-
jured person being aware of the fact his life expectancy had been short-
ened and also upon his being alive at the date of the action. In Rose v. 
48.6 [ 1935] I K.B. 354 ( 1934). Smith, in his article, "Psychic Interest in Continua-
tion of One's Own Life: Legal Recognition and Protection,'' g8 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 781, 
790 (1950), asserts that the point was involved in an earlier case, Phillips v. London 
& South-Western R.R., 5 Q.B.D. 78 (1879). The trial court in the Phillips case at 
8o instructed the jury that "an active, energetic, healthy man is not to be struck down 
almost in the prime of life, and reduced to helplessness with every enjoyment of life 
destroyed and with the prospect of a speedy death, without the jury being entitled to 
take that into account, not excessively, not immoderately, not vindictively, but with 
the view of giving him a fair compensation for the pain, inconvenience and loss of 
enjoyment which he has sustained. Then, after you have considered what sum you 
think it is right to award on that ground, the next head which you have to consider 
is the amount of expense which he actually incurred." The Court of Appeal in dis-
cussing the instruction as a whole made no comment on these specific words, but the 
issue was not really raised by defendant's counsel. 
487 Flint v. Lovell, supra note 486 at 359· 
488 Infra note 490 at 854. 
489 Supra note 486. 
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Ford/90 however, the House of Lords rejected both requirements. A 
healthy twenty-three year old woman was seriously injured because of 
the defendant's negligence and died four days after the accident in spite 
of the amputation of one of her legs in an attempt to save her. During 
the four days she was either unconscious or in a coma which made it 
impossible for her to understand her condition. No objection was made 
to the awarding of £300 damages to the father and mother as statutory 
beneficiaries under the wrongful death act. In addition, however, as 
administrator the father claimed damages for pain and suffering, loss 
of the leg, and loss of normal life expectancy which he claimed were 
preserved by the survival statute. The trial court allowed £500 for pain 
and suffering and for loss of the leg but refused to award damages for 
shortened life expectancy on the ground that since she was not aware 
of her condition she could not have suffered mental anguish from con-
cern over an early demise. The Court of Appeal found that the pain and 
suffering and the loss of a leg warranted only nominal damages, £20 and 
£2, respectively, since she died so soon after the accident.491 Two of 
the three judges denied recovery for shortened life span, one on the 
ground that at common law there could be no damages for death and 
the other on the additional ground that where death ensues before ac-
tion is brought the civil damage remedy is merged in the felony charge. 
The three judges agreed that if damages were to be awarded for 
shortened life expectancy the amount should be £r,ooo. The basis for 
computing this amount was not stated. The House of Lords upheld the 
Court of Appeal as to the £22 awarded but held that £r,ooo should have 
been awarded for shortened life span . 
. Lord Atkin saw no justification for the argument that the action 
merged in the felony. 492 He further held that the right to recover for 
shortened life span did not depend either upon surviving until the date 
of the a:ction or upon awareness by the victim that she would die pre-
maturely. He felt that the loss was capable of being estimated in terms 
of nioney but expressly reserved opinion as to how it should be com-
puted, indicating that some troublesome questions were involved: 
Bow the dam.ages are to. be calculated is a question which this 
House has not to decide .... Whether the rich man's life 
has greater potentialities of pleasurable enjoyment than the 
poor man's, and what consideration should be given to physi-
cal weaknesses other than those caused by the accident and 
49o [1937] A.C. 8:z6. 
491 Rose v. Ford, [1936] 1 K.B. 90 (1935) .. 
492 Supra note 490 at 835. See also opinion of Lord Wright at 846. 
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not affecting the duration of life I prefer to consider when, 
if ever, the points are raised. 493 
275 
Lord Roche agreed with the others that the cause of action arose im-
mediately upon suffering the injury and the survival statute preserved 
this cause of action to the administrator of the estate of the deceased. 
He also recognized the difficulty of determining the amount of damages 
to award: 
I regard impaired health and vitality not merely as a cause of 
pain and suffering but as a loss of a good thing in itself. Loss 
of expectation of life is a form in which impaired health and 
vitality may express themselves as a result. In such a loss 
there is a loss of a temporal good, capable of evaluation in 
money though the evaluation is difficult. . . . 
Nevertheless, it is this question of the assessment of dam-
ages which gives me more anxiety than any other part of this 
case .... 494 
All of the Lords agreed that the loss of the leg and pain and suffering 
warranted only nominal damages since the loss lasted only two days. 
Otherwise, said Lord Wright, she would be getting double damages 
since recovery was permitted for loss of life expectancy. He was not 
concerned with the argument that such a reduction put the defendant 
"in the paradoxical position of being entitled to plead in mitigation of 
damage that he had not merely maimed but killed the plaintiff." 495 Ap-
parently the importance of this argument was nullified by granting dam-
ages for shortened life span. 
After this decision it was settled in England that there could be re-
covery for shortened life as a separate item of damages, at least when 
th~ injured party died before trial or could prove death was rather im-
minent. What remained to perplex the courts was the question of how 
much damages, i.e., what is the pecuniary value of lost years? One as-
pect of this matter was the significance of plaintiff's state of mind re-
garding his loss of years of life. In Roach v. Yates m the plaintiff, 
thirty-three years old, became a hopeless invalid and mentally unbal-
anced as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The 
trial judge recognized the applicability of Flint v. Lovell and Rose v. 
Ford but awarded only £2,200 general damages on the ground that if 
the plaintiff could sp~ak on the matter, he would prefer to have his life 
493 /d. at 834-35. 
494fd. at 859· 
495 I d. at 846. 
49 0 [1938] I K.B. 256 (1937). 
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shortened as much as possible. This was held to be error because a 
judge or jury may not consider the plaintiff's desire for life after the 
accident, but should consider only whether the length of life which he 
would have been entitled to anticipate had been diminished by the acci-
dent. Thus, the total award was increased to £6,542, of which £2,000 
was for futu.re nursing and similar expenses, and £542 was for lost 
wages and expenses to date of trial. The rest was for pain and suffer-
ing, loss of expectation of a happy life, and future lost earnings.m 
ln Morgan v. Scoulding,498 plaintiff's decedent, twenty-three years 
old, was killed instantly in an automobile accident and defendants 
argued that no action vested which could pass to the father under the 
wrongful death act or to the father as administrator under the survival 
act. £r,ooo was awarded for loss of life expectancy under the survival 
act, the court holding that the gist of the action was not the death but the 
negligence and injury which, as soon as it occurred, gave rise to a cause 
of action for shortened life span. In such a case, the court reasoned, the 
only real effect of the death was to enable the court to see clearly to 
what extent the life expectancy had been shortened. £300 was awarded 
also under the wrongful death act for loss of expected support. 
The House of Lords was finally called upon to consider the size of 
awards being granted by the lower courts for shortened life span. In 
Benham v. Gambling,499 it reduced the damages from £1,200 to £zoo 
for the loss of life expectancy of a two and a half year old child who 
died on the same day as the automobile accident that caused the injuries. 
The action was by the administrator under the survival act, no claim 
being made under the wrongful death act. The analysis of the problem 
made by Lord Simon who wrote the opinion for the House is worth set-
ting out at length : 
. . . The present appeal taises the problem of the assess-
ment of damage for "loss of expectation of life" before this 
House for the first time, and it is indeed the only issue with 
which we are now concerned. 
. . . Since the child was unconscious from the moment 
of the accident till his death, there could be no claim for pain 
and suffering, and the only question, apart from funeral ex-
penses, was that of damages arising from the diminution of 
the child's expectation of life.600 
In the first place, I am of the opinion that the right conclu-
m Id. at 264. 26';, 26g. 
m [1938] I K.B. 786 (1937). 
499 [1941] A.C. I57 (1940), 
GOOJd. at 162. 
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sion is not to be reached by applying what may be called the 
statistical or actuarial test. Figures calculated to represent the 
expectation of human life at various ages are averages ar-
rived at from a vast mass of vital statistics; the figure is not 
necessarily one which can be properly attributed to a given 
individual. And in any case the thing to be valued is not the 
prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a predomi-
nantly happy life. . . • 
The question thus resolves itself into that of fixing a reason-
. able figure to be paid by way of damages for the loss of a 
measure of prospective happiness. Such a problem might seem 
more s'uitable for discussion in an essay on Aristotelian ethics 
· than.in the judgment of a Court of law, but in view of the 
earlier authorities, we must do our best to contribute to its 
solution. The learned judge observed that the earlier decisions 
quoted to him assumed "that human life is, on the whole, 
good." I would rather say that, before damages are awarded 
in respect of the shortened life of a given individual under 
this head, it is necessary. for the Court to be satisfied that the 
circumstances of the individual life were calculated to lead, 
on balance, to a positive measure of happiness, of which the 
victim has been deprived by the defendant's negligence. If the 
character or habits of the individual were calculated to lead 
him to a future of unhappiness or despondency, that would 
be a circumstance justifying a smaller award .... [T]he 
test is not subjective and the right sum to award depends on 
an objective estimate of what kind of future on earth the vic-
tim might have enjoyed, whether he had justly estimated that 
future or not. Of course, no regard must be had to financial 
losses or gains during the period of which the victim has been 
deprived. The damages are in respect of loss of life, not of 
loss of future pecuniary prospects. 
The main reason, I think, why the appropriate figure of 
damages should be reduced in the case of a very young child 
is that there is necessarily so much uncertainty about the 
child's future that no confident estimate of prospective hap-
piness can be made. . . . I see no reason why the proper sum 
to be awarded would be greater because the social position or 
prospects of wordly possessions are greater in one case than 
another. Lawyers and judges may here join hands with mor-
alists and philosophers and declare that the degree of happi-
ness to be attained by a human being does not depend on 
wealth or status .. 
It remains to observe ... that, stripped of technicalities, 
the compensation is not being given to the person who was in-
jured at all, for the person who was injured is dead. The 
truth, of course, is that in putting a money value on the pro-
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spective balance of happiness in years that the deceased might 
otherwise have lived, the jury or judge of fact is attempting 
to equate incommensurables. Damages which would be proper 
for a disabling injury may well be much greater than for dep-
rivation of life. These considerations lead me to the conclu-
sion that in assessing damages under this head, whether in 
the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figures should 
be chosen .... 
. . . I believe that . . . the proper figure in this case would 
be 2ool., and that even this amount would be excessive if it 
were not that the circumstances of the infant were most fa-
vourable. In reaching this conclusion, we are in substance cor-
recting the methods of estimating this head of loss, whether 
in the case of children or adults, which have grown up in a 
series of earlier cases . . . and are approving a standard of 
measurement which, had it been applied in those cases, would 
have led, at any rate in many of them, to reduced awards. I 
trust that the views of this House, expressed in dealing with 
the present appeal, may help to set a lower standard of meas-
urement than has hitherto prevailed for what is in fact inca-
pable of being measured in coin of the realm with any ap-
proach to real accuracy. 501 
After Benham v. Gambling a marked reduction in the size of awards 
for loss of life expectancy was discernible. In one case involving two 
deceased sailors, one thirty-nine and the other nineteen and a half years 
old, awards of £350 and £500, respectively, were granted under a sur-
vival type of statute, the judge noting that the measure of damages 
should not "vary with the number of years of the allotted span which 
may be said to lie in front of the deceased persons." 502 By 1950 it could 
be said that "£500 is generally recognised as the maximum sum recov-
erable ... even allowing for the depreciation ... of the pound ster-
ling." 503 
In 1953, in Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors,504 £5oo was 
awarded a plaintiff who was thirty-five years 9ld at the time of the acci-
dent, thirty-seven at the date of the trial, and who had a life expectancy, 
as reported by a medical witness, of between six months and two years. 
501 I d. at 165-68. 
50 2 Bishop v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., [1950] 2 All E.R. 22, 25 (P. D. & A. Div.). 
The court held that if the difference in amounts were based on different life expec-
tancies the lower court was in error but assumed the lower court based it on other 
differences not described. An award was also made for each death under the wrongful 
death act. 
5o3 "Assessment of Damages in Fatal Accidents," 100 L. ]. 312 (n. s.) (1950). 
504 Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd., [1953] 1 All E.R. 395 (Q.B. Div.). 
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The court computed damages on the basis of an eighteen month expec-
tation. Plaintiff was permitted to recover wages lost for the time he 
would remain alive only and not for the period when it was expected 
that he would be dead. Loss of earnings after death, however, may "be 
considered under the item of damages for loss of expectation of life, in 
the sense that they are one of the elements which indicate that a person 
earning a reasonable livelihood is more likely to have an enjoyable 
life .... " 505 £soo was granted for shortened life expectancy in con-
sideration of plaintiff's age, prospects, and wages which showed that 
he would not have been forced to live in penury. In addition to this 
amount, however, £5,000 was allowed for past and prospective pain and 
suffering based on the eighteen months of life left. 
These cases make it clear that English courts recognize loss of nor-
mal life expectancy as a separate element or, as the English say, head of 
damage. Whether the injured party dies simultaneously with the injury, 
shortly thereafter, or is a living plaintiff expecting to die at an earlier 
than normal date, is immaterial. To avoid duplication of damages, how-
ever, he may not recover for pain and suffering or loss of wages for a 
period extending beyond his death, expected or actuaJ.5°6 For a time, 
substantial awards were granted tinder this item, but at a word from 
the House of Lords reductions followed. 
No adequate guide has been developed for the trial courts in Great 
Britain by which the loss may be translated into monetary terms. Ac-
tually little guidance can be afforded; and while the Benham case lists 
certain elements that may not properly be considered in evaluating lost 
years, no helpful indication is given as to what should be considered. 
Of course this is not a new problem confronting those who assess 
damages. The same criticism may be made of any award not based on 
compensation for pecuniary loss. Pain and suffering and psychic injury 
are analogous situations where "guesstimates'' are made. 
( 2) Canadian Cases 
In a 1937 case, Stebbe v. Laird/01 the court accepted without ques-
tion the proposition that damages· may be awarded for loss of expecta-
505 I d. at 402. 
· 506 This was made clear in Rose v. Ford, supra note 490; Roach v. Yates, supra 
note 496; and Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd., supra note 504-
507 [Ig,38] I W.W.R. I73 (K.B. Manitoba I937). In an earlier case $6oo was 
awarded for shortening life span of man destined to die of cancer anyway, but leg 
fracture cut off I to I! years. McGarry v. Canada West Coal Co., 2 Alberta 299 
(I!J09). Plaintiff lived through judgment but not appeal. Amount went to his estate. 
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tion of life. The case involved an eleven year old child who was injured 
by an automobile and died nine days later without regaining conscious-
ness. The administrator of her estate sued for damages under a survival 
statute. Because of the unconscious state of the child, no recovery was 
permitted for pain and suffering or injury to health. No claim was 
made for lost wages. The only element of damages, therefore, was· com-
pensation for shortened life. The court stated that nothing could be 
awarded for lost wages or inability to support dependents because those 
are items to be recovered under a wrongful death act not as a part of 
damages for shortened life span. To determine the quantum of dam-
ages, the court turned to the English decision of Rose v. Ford. 508 In its 
discussion of the difficulty of making an award, the Canadian court 
said: 
... [T]o fix a money value for years taken from another 
person's life cannot be done with any degree of accuracy. The 
factors which enter into making life worthwhile are so numer-
ous, so uncertain, and may vary so much from time to time, 
that the task is beyond the wit of man. Some may think that 
good health is important; yet many great and useful men have 
suffered physically a large part of their lives. Riches in them-
selves do not bring happiness; indeed .they often destroy the 
value of life. . . . I make these few observations merely for 
the purpose of showing the great difficulties in making 
an assessment in such a case as this. It is very largely con-
jecture and speculation. The one thing that is in some sense 
certain is the number of years by which the life has been cut 
short. This would seem to be the important factor. . . . 
The result of Rose v. Ford ... is that prima facie every 
life is of temporal value .... 
. . . If there is any distinction, it is that the child in this 
case had perhaps larger opportunities for a full, happy life, 
and was deprived of several more years of her life than Miss 
Rose was deprived of . 
. . . I am unable to see why the plaintiff should receive less 
than the plaintiff did in Rose v. Ford. 509 
The court granted $5,000 damages and placed emphasis on the number 
of years by which the life had been shortened. 
In the period before the English decision in Benham v. Gambling 510 
was handed down, $2,000 was granted the estate of deceased, a thirty 
year old deaf mute.m The recovery was for shortened life span and was 
5os Supra note 490· 
509 Supra note 507 at 185-86. 
510 Supra note 499. 
511 Riehl v. Condy, [1939) 1 W.W.R. 152 (C.A. Manitoba). 
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permitted under the survival statute. No recovery was allowed under 
the wrongful death statute for he supported no one. Some time later, 
and after the House of I:.ords had set the standard for computing dam-
ages in England, a smaller award of only $r,soo was granted under the 
survival act for pain and suffering and loss of life expectancy in accord-
ance with the principles laid down in Benham v. Gambling, taking into 
account the depreciation in value of money since that case was de-
cided.512 In addition, £6,000 was awarded to the wife under the wrong-
ful death act for her loss· of support. Deceased was sixty-six years old, 
slightly deaf and died sixty-six days after the accident. Apparently the 
court assumed that the principles of the English case should be followed 
in Canada. · 
The manner of applying the Benham case was treated by the Court of 
Appeal-for Manitoba, ho:wever, in Anderson v. Chasney. 513 Deceased, a 
five year old boy, died of suffocation caused by a sponge left in his 
nasal ·area after an adenoids operation. The action was brought by the 
administrator of the child's eState under the survival statute. Adamson, 
J. A., criticised Lord Simon's rejection of the use of the statistical 
method for estimating the prospective length of life. He felt that this 
method is better than guesswork and is the only one used by insurance 
companies and government agencies. He also asserted, contrary to Lord 
Simon, that it was not necessary to establish that the person was destined 
to have a happy and prosperous life, saying: · 
Happiness does not determine the value of a life. Happi-
ness is very largely a matter of disposition. There are many 
happy people whose expectancy of life is not of great value. 
Many people in mental institutions are said to be happy. 
Many people living busy, useful, valuable lives are not happy . 
. . . Ambition and work may make a life valuable and yet 
may not bring happiness. I reject the hedonistic philosophy of 
life as a standard by which to value a life.514 
Adamson proposed two measures that could serve as guides : the 
'·quality" of the life-whether to the deceased, his family, or society-
and the anticipated length of that life. In case of a child, the estimate, he 
realized, was more difficult because quality is less certain; therefore, one 
might use the expectancy of quality based on an average for the country 
in which he lived. He felt that : 
There is, too, a difference between the value of life in England 
and in Canada. In Canada we take it for granted-and I 
512 Pash v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [19491 1 W.W.R. 225 (K.B. Manitoba). 
618 [19491 2 W.W.R. 337 (C.A. Manitoba). 
514 /d. at 366-67. 
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think, properly-that an average child of five years has pros-
pects for a long, sa tis factory and valuable life. I am unable 
to value such a life at a mere £200, which is nothing more 
than nominal. 515 
In contrasting loss of limb with loss of life (Lord Simon having said 
that the former would demand greater compensation), Adamson 
pointed out : 
Presumably, if the boy were to have lost both legs, he 
[Lord Simon] would allow him substantial and reasonable 
compensation for being deprived of a full life. Yet when he 
loses his life, the compensation is to be something nominal ! I 
am unable to endorse the dictum that it is "cheaper to kill 
than to maim" to the extent of giving only nominal damages 
for killing. · 
In Benham v. Gambling, a most pessimistic view of the 
prospects and value of lives of English children has been 
taken. The values in Rose v. Ford are more in accordance 
with Canadian standards. We in Canada are, and can with 
justification be, optimistic both as to the length and quality of 
the life of a young person.ns 
In the case of children, the judge concludes, a good yardstick to use 
in computing damages for shortened life is the sum the parents have 
spent in rearing the child, which is roughly $I ,000 a year. He therefore 
would have awarded $5,000 for this element of damage, but a majority 
of the court thought that $3,000 was sufficient. Coyne, A. ]., agreed 
with Adamson that although the Benham judgment was entitled to re-
spect, it was inappropriate to Manitoba, was not binding, and should 
not be followed. 
According to these cases, appellate courts in England and Canada 
had approved two different tests for use in computing damages for loss 
of life expectancy. In England, the standard was the average happy life, 
with the admonition that the award must be moderate; in the province 
of Manitoba, usefulness, past history, and future prospects may be 
considered, with no restriction as to the maximum amount. 
The later case of Rodzinski v. Modern Dairies Ltd.511 involved in-
juries to a thirty-three year old married man, who had not been steadily 
employed and who had spent a great deal of time in prison on various 
charges. The injuries resulted in his becoming a paraplegic. The court 
stated that it concurred in the view of the Anderson case with reference 
515Jd. at 367. 
516 I d. at 369. 
517 [1949] 2 W.W.R. 456 (K.B. Manitoba). 
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to the statistical or actuarial method of estimating prospective length of 
life. 518 Since no evidence on this point had been presented, the court 
took judicial notice of the fact that a thirty-three year old man was 
likely to live twenty-five or thirty-five years longer. 
The principles in both cases, the court felt, justified taking into con-
sideration the circumstances of plaintiff's life up to the time of the ac-
cident. 
It is a fair assumption, I think, that he was living the kind 
life he wished to live, and that it was the kind of life that 
made him happy. But it was a life of crime and laziness. 
* * * * * 
I am satisfied that judging by his past life, which is all I 
have to go on, but taking into consideration the possibility-
remote, I fear, in this case--of a reformation, the quality and 
usefulness of his life based on the average for the country in 
which he lives was not such as to justify me in assessing dam-
ages under this head at .any substantial sum. I feel I cannot 
allow more than $1,000.519 
An additional $4,000 was awarded for lost earning power. Over 
$30,000 was granted for pain and suffering, past and prospective. The 
court apparently ignored the principles established in England and ad-
hered to those expressed in the Anderson case, although it was able to 
find other reasons for keeping the life expectancy award at a "mod-
erate" figure. 
The following year, in Maltais v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co./20 the 
court for the province of Alberta had to choose between the Benham 
and Anderson cases. The plaintiff's wife was killed instantly in a colli-
sion between a car and a train. She was forty-one, the mother of three 
boys, and helped with the farm chores. Damages were sought under 
both the wrongful death and survival acts. The Anderson case was fol-
lowed in determining damages under the survival act. The principles 
applicable in Manitoba were equally applicable in Alberta. The court 
repeated the argtiments and views presented in the Anderson decision 
and concluded that, in the absence of special circumstances, a useful and 
happy life of average duration would be assumed. Damages were fixed 
at $5,000 for loss of normal life expectancy. In addition, $2,500 was 
awarded under the wrongful death act to dependent husband and two 
children for losses to them resulting from the woman's death. 
518 I d. at 465. 
519 /d. at 466-67. 
520 [1950] 2 W.W.R. 145 (Sup. Ct. Alberta). 
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In 1953 the issue of computing damages for loss of life expectancy 
was presented squarely to the Canadian Supreme Court. The court fol-
lowed the English House of Lords. m The deceased, twenty-three years 
old, engaged to be married, and receiving a good salary, died shortly 
after an automobile accident but was in a coma during the intervening 
period. The trial judge awarded $10,000 for loss of life expectancy 
under the survival act, basing his judgment on the Maltais and Ander-
son cases. This award was reduced by the Court of Appeal to $7,500. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, that tribunal recognized that differ-
ences existed between England and Canada, but felt that "they may be 
taken irito account without departing from the ratio of the House of 
Lords decision( ... ) in Benham v. Gambling." 522 Apparently this court 
held the same. fears as to excessive damages as those which prompted 
the House of Lords to order moderate awards. A $7,500 judgment 
was permitted to stand but only because it had already been reduced and 
because appellate courts generally should not interfere too much with 
money judgments. It was stated expressly, however, that the trial 
court's award was too high. 
Fallowing the Supreme Court decision, there was a marked reduction 
in Canada in the amount of damages assessed, just as had been the case 
in England after the House of Lords pronouncement. In one case 523 
$2,500 each was granted for a husband and wife killed in an automobile 
accident, the decedents having been fifty-six and fifty-four years old, 
respectively. The awards were made to the administrator for each of 
them under the survival act. No claim was made under the wrongful 
death act. In another, 524 $2,500 was awarded under the survival act for 
shortened life span to the estate of an eighteen year old boy, fatally shot 
in a hunting accident. In this latter case, the court discussed the develop-
ment of the law in Canada relating to awards for shortened life span, 
and concluded that the principles enunciated by the House of Lords 
must be applied-i.e., the awards must be moderate. $4,000 was 
awarded under the wrongful death act to a surviving mother and sister 
as damages suffered because of loss of expected support. Her recovery 
under the wrongful death act was reduced by the amount of her re-
covery under the survival act. 
Today, no real distinction exists between the law of England and 
521 Bechthold v. Osbaldeston, [1953] 2 Can. Sup. Ct. 177. 
522 !d. at 18o. 
m Bryce v. Northland Greyhound, Inc., [1954] II W.W.R. (n. s.) 672 (Q.B. 
Manitoba). 
m Joyce v. Bartlett, [1954) 12 W.W.R. (n. s.) 665 (Q.B. Manitoba). 
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that of Canada. Both recognize as a separate item of damage the loss 
of life expectancy. Both award moderate amounts based on how happy 
the prospective life would have been. As a matter of fact, the basis 
seems not too important, as the amount of damages in all cases appar-
ently will be approximately the same, and all must be quite moderate. 
( 3) Other Commonwealth Cases 
Several Scottish cases have involved situations in which damages for 
shortened life span apparently were involved, but there is no actual 
holding either accepting or rejecting the English rule. As early as 1885, 
in M'Master v.-Caledonian Ry.,525 reference was made to this element 
of damages as possibly justifying an award for damages objected to by 
defendant as being excessive. A sixteen year old boy, employed as an 
ironworker, was injured and sued for damages, but he died before the 
trial. His father continued the action and the jury awarded £400. The 
defense claimed that since he had died the only award should be for his 
"losses" before death and an amount for pain and suffering while he 
survived~ The Lord President stated that he was not satisfied that this 
necessarily was the limit of damages. He stated that he did not mean to 
give any very decided opinion but that the death suggested various con-
siderations : 
If it had been foreseen that the man was to die very shortly 
after the occurrence of the injury, or very shortly after the 
time when the trial was to take place, there may be a question 
whether he would not have been entitled to damages for the 
shortening of his life. And so it may be a question whether 
his executor, as now representing him, is not entitled to dam-
ages for that very same thing, it being now ascertained be-
yond all dispute that his life was shortened in consequence of 
this injury. But I am rather disposed to think upon the whole 
that the jury were entitled in a great measure to take this mat-
ter into their own hands, and so long as they did not do any-
thing very extravagant that their verdict should stand .... 526 
All but one of the other Lords writing opinions agreed that the amount 
should not be reduced because of the intervening death. The other opin-
ions, however, seemed to be based on a- theory of survival of the action 
which the deceased himself would have had if he had not died, and 
525 [1885] 13 Sess. Cas. 252 (Scot. 1st Div.). Smith, supra note 486 at 791, cites 
M'Enaney v. Caledonian Ry., [1913] 2 Scots L.T.R. 293, as another example but the 
award seems to be based on pain and suffering, unless "patrimonial loss" is to be 
interpreted as meaning shortened life span. Walker 611, apparently so interprets it. 
526 I d. at 254. 
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perhaps were allowing a large verdict for pain and suffering and some 
lost wages, rather than for shortened life span. 
An earlier case nT perhaps indirectly recognizes such a cause of ac-
tion, but the clearest recognition of a separate right for shortening of 
life span seems to have been made by the Lord Ordinary in the Court 
of Sessions in Reid v. Lanarkshire Traction Co., decided in 1933, prior 
to the first English case.528 The Lord Ordinary said that if the decedent 
"had been pursuing the action he would have been entitled to put before 
a jury evidence to prove that the effect of the accident would inevitably 
be to shorten his expectancy of life, and the jury would be entitled in 
assessing damages to take that evidence into account," 629 indicating that 
the victim's mental anguish from anticipating the earlier death is the 
basis of compensation for shortened life span. The Court of Sessions 
found that the damages awarded to the executrix-were sufficient but that 
the theory of the Lord Ordinary was incorrect because there need not be 
proof of mental anguish or conscious suffering, although "the weight 
to be given to this element must be moderate." 580 In upholding the 
award of £300, Lord Sand indicated very clearly how difficult is the 
measurement of this item. 
. . . In China, I understand, it is possible to purchase a 
suicide for a comparatively modest sum. A man who is justly 
suspected of a capital offense will get another man who is en-
tirely innocent to commit suicide and leave a written confes-
sion. The suicide cannot enjoy the money himself, but it grat-
ifies him, (. . . ) to have the money to leave to his family. 
Now the thought occurs, if, instead of making a bargain of 
this kind, the one party mortally injures the other, why should 
he get off more cheaply? Why should the other not get as 
much for his life thus violently taken as he would have been 
willing voluntarily to accept ? 
On the other hand, I recognize that this reasoning is inap-
plicable to Europeans by any strict analogy. Damages cannot 
be assessed upon the basis of how much would this man have 
taken for his life. Still there is something in it which I confess 
puzzles me once it is conceded that a man is entitled to com-
pensation for the shortening of his life. But the matter is so 
hedged with metaphysics that, were I charging a jury, I think 
I should be disposed to be content to tell them that the short-
521 Neilson v. Rodger, [1853] 16 Sess. Cas. 325, 327-28 (Scot :zd Div.), where Jus-
tice Hope said a claim for shortened life is personal to the victim and does not pass to 
the executor of his estate after he dies. 
528 [1934] Sess. Cas. 79 (Scot, rst Div.), [1933] Scots L.T.R. r87. 
529 /d. at Sr. 
530 [1934] Scots L.T.R. 54. 56. 
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ening of life was an element which they were entitled to take 
into consideration in measuring the damage suffered by the 
deceased, and to leave it to them, without any strict analysis 
of the content of the idea, to assess the damages, contenting 
myself with warning them that the weight to be given to this 
element must be moderate, and that they must not consider 
what price the man would have put upon his life. 531 
287 
In a 1952 Scottish case,582 a child of three was very seriously in-
jured and her life expectancy was reduced to two or three years. The 
jury awarded £4,000 to cover all items of damages. The report does 
not indicate what weight the jury could give to the shortened life span 
but clearly refers to the fact of shortened life expectancy. It is possible 
to argue, as does one Scottish author, that "It is not apparent to what 
extent, if at all, loss of expectation of life affected the award. It [the 
court] may have diminished the sum which might otherwise have been 
awarded under other heads." 588 He concludes "It is not clear from any 
Scottish case whether this he~d of damages has yet been fully accepted 
in respect of a living pursuer." 584 · 
The Scottish author then generally discusses damages for shortened 
life. 
Consideration should not be given to the fact that the pursuer 
is prevented from earning wages over the period between the 
date of his death and the date to which he would reasonably 
have lived but for the accident, though such notional earnings 
are one of the minor elements indicating that a person earning 
was more likely to have an enjoyable life. Like pain and suf-
fering loss of expectation of life is independent of financial 
position and station in life and must be assessed without re-
gard to these factors. 
It should be observed that there will be over-compensation 
if damages are given both for loss of wages in respect of be-
ing prevented from working for the normal period of work-
ing life, and for loss of expectation of life. The two are in-
consistent. 585 
A modified use of shortened life span was also permitted in a 1948 
South African case.538 The plaintiff's counsel stated that while he 
claimed no specific sum for shortened life he did claim that the general 
581 I d. at 56. 
582 Fisher v. Mitchell, [1952] Scotts L.T.R. (Notes) 58. 
533 Walker 583. 
534 Ibid. 
535 I d. at 584. 
586 Goldie v. City Council of Johannesburg, [1948] 2 So. Afr. L.R. 913. 
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recovery, which includes pain and suffering, loss of health, and loss of 
amenities of life, should be increased because of the prospect of an ab-
normally early death. Ettlinger, A.]., held that this was proper, but in 
accordance with the English cases, the amount of general damages 
should not be "materially enhanced," because of shortened life span.537 
In addition to the increase in general damages permitted because of 
the shortened life span, a sum was awarded for lost wages during not 
only the period of life expectancy after the accident but also for wages 
that would have been earned during the full life expectancy before the 
accident shortened it. This is contrary to the limitation on recovery for 
wages i"mposed by the English court five years later in Ha.rris v. 
Bright's Asphalt Contractor's Ltd.588 The English court held that 
wages that would have been earned during the full life expectancy be-
fore the injury should not be included in determining damages. Ett-
linger, for the South African court, said: 
In so far as loss of future earnings is concerned, this would 
prima facie be the present value of the anticipated loss of 
earnings during the period of the prospective life the plain-
tiff would have had but for the wrongful act. This is what the 
plaintiff, or his estate, has lost and this is in my view the basis 
for computing what he should receive by way of compensa-
tion. In this regard I would refer to the decision in Roach v. 
Yates, ( 1936 1 K. B. 256) in which this view of the position 
seems to have been accepted. us 
The court did reduce the allowance for future earnings by the amount 
it would cost him to maintain himself,540 but any recovery for these lost 
wages is directly contrary to the English view and that expressed by 
the Scottish author. They take the position this amounts to double 
damages. 
(4) United States Cases 
Apparently the Connecticut Supreme Court in Murphy v. N. York 
& N. Haven R. R. m decided the first United States case dealing with 
this problem of shortened life expectancy as separate from claims of 
beneficiaries for economic loss caused by a wrongful death. The plain-
537 /d. at 923· 
538 Supra note 504-
539 Su.pra note 536 at 921. 
540 Approved 70 S.A.L.}. 399 (1953), except the writer would only allow what 
plaintiff would have saved-all of his spending, not just maintenance expenses, should 
be deducted. 
541 30 Conn. 184 (1861). 
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tiff was the administrator of the estate of a decedent, a six year old 
child, who was killed instantly when hit by a train negligently operated 
by an employee of the defendant. The court upheld the lower court 
judgment for the plaintiff (the amount of damages not being men-
tioned) against an argument that since the child was killed instantly 
there could be no cause of action because there could have been no in-
juries suffered by the deceased; there was no cause of action to survive. 
The court said : 
The intestate's right of personal security has been wrongfully 
invaded, and that is distinctly alleged as the cause of action. 
In both cases the law attaches an injury to such a wrongful 
act. 
But aside from this inference of law, it is alleged in the 
declaration that the blow was so violent as to produce the 
de'ath of the intestate. And is this no injury? If to take one's 
liberty or one's property without justification is an injury, 
how much more is the taking of human life? The elementary 
books, in speaking of absolute rights, classify them thus :-
Ist. The right of personal security; 2d. The right of personal 
liberty; and 3d. The right to acquire and enjoy property. If 
these rights are valued in this order of preference, then every 
man of common understanding would at once pronounce it 
absurd to hold it is no injury to a person to take his life, while 
it is to strike him a light blow. Such a distinction is not worth 
talking about, and has no foundation or existence in the law, 
as it has none in common sense. 542 
The court held under the Connecticut survival statute that the cause of 
action accrued to the administrator even though the death was instan-
taneous. The rationale of this decision apparently has been followed 
in subsequent Connecticut cases, including in one case the allowance of 
$6,000 where the decedent was killed instantly through the defendant's 
negligence, 543 and in another case, $3,500 when the injured party died, 
though the defendant claimed that it was unjust to allow recovery since 
the proceeds under the laws of inheritance would go to the husband and 
son "whose negligence was the sole cause of the injury." 544 This line 
of Connecticut cases apparently is unique in the United States and has 
been ignored both by courts and most commentators.545 
suI d. at 187-88. 
54s Mezzi v. Taylor, 99 Conn. 1, 120 At!. 871 (1923). The court said the cause of 
action is "after death with an enlarged right of recovery for ensuing death." (at 7). 
544 Davis v. Margolis, 1o8 Conn. 645, 649, 144 At!. 665 (1929). 
645 Smith, supra note 486, discusses the 1861 case but no mention is made of it in what 
little has been written on the subject in American sources: Annot., 97 A.L.R. 823 
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All of the decisions by other supreme courts in the United States 
hold that damages for shortened life span as a compensable injury in 
and of itself are not allowable although the estate may be allowed tore-
cover lost earnings during the full period of normal life expectancy. 
The line between proper and improper use of such evidence was drawn 
by an Illinois appellate court in Krakowski v. A., E. & C. R. R. The trial 
court allowed the plaintiff, who was injured in a train accident, to prove 
a shortened life span as well as loss of wages and pain and suffering. 
The appellate court in reversing held: 
By. the foregoing, it is clear that appellee is not entitled to 
recover any damages under the law for loss of any portion of 
his life, nor for any earnings he might be supposed to make, 
if living, in that part of his life lost by reason of his injuries. 
After reconsidering this case, however, we are convinced that 
appellee was entitled to the benefit of the evidence in question 
to show the extent of injury, his consequent disability to earn 
a living, if any, for the time he shall live, and his bodily and 
mental suffering, if any, which will result from such injuries. 
Other jurisdictions hold this to be the law and our Supreme 
Court seems to sanction the same doctrine, when there is evi-
dence, as in this case, that death is reasonably sure to follow 
as a result of such injuries.548 
Several cases have been decided by the Indiana court. In 1897 in 
Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker 641 an eighty-five year old plaintiff was in-
jured in a gas explosion in his home and the jury was instructed that 
it could include a sum for shortening of life expectancy. The Supreme 
Court of Indiana decided that the instruction was erroneous, holding 
that, while evidence of shortened life span might be used to determine 
the extent of the injury including the inability to earn a living and 
mental suffering, there could be no damages for the loss of life itself, 
since, "The value of human life cannot, as adjudged by the common 
law, be measured in money. It is, besides, inconceivable that one could 
thus be compensated for the loss or shortening of his own life." 548 The 
court disallowed the award of $4,600 and ordered a new trial. In two 
(1935); 131 A.L.R. 1351 (1941); Comment, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 967 (1939); Z2 U. of 
Chi. L. Rev. 505 (1955); Conway, "Damages for Shortened Life," 10 Ford. L. Rev. 
219 (1941); Hannigan, "Recent English Decisions in Damages for Injuries Ending 
in Premature Death," 18 B.U.L. Rev. 275 (1938). McCormick 339 mentions the 
survival statute in Connecticut as the sole remedy in death cases. 
546 167 Ill. App. 469, 472-73 (1912). Cf. T. W. & W. Ry. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19, 
23-24 (1870). 
547 146 Ind. 6oo, 45 N.E. 1049 (1897). 
548 I d. at 6og. 
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later cases 349 the same distinction between using such evidence to meas-
ure the extent of the injury and using it as a separate item for compen-
sation was followed. In a later case involvi~g a living plaintiff the 
Supreme Court followed the Richmond Gas Co. decision and added: 
It is true that a consideration of the nature and extent of the 
injuries may lead indirectly to some consideration of their 
probable effect, but the jury should not be told to award dam-
ages to an injured party for the years taken off his own life 
by his injury.660 
Nothing in the case indicates the other elements of damage claimed, 
except for nursing care. 
- In Maine the only authoritative decision was rendered by the federal 
courts in a case in which the victim received a skull fracture and was un-
conscious for about five days until his death. Under the survival statute 
his ~idow sought compensation for his estate for curtailment of his life 
expectancy, computed as thirteen years before the accident, alleging 
that he was deprived of the right and pleasure of growing old grace-
fully and enjoying the amenities of life. The wife already had recovered 
under the wrongful death statute for her loss of future support. The 
court held that, in the absence of any Maine decisions, the federal court 
could not create a new right since there were no American cases follow-
ing the English law on the subject. The court indicated its own attitude, 
however, when it said, "where the injured person never regains con-
sciousness, it seems a thin distinction to say that the executor cannot 
recover for the death, but. can recover for the shortening of the life 
expectancy. All one ever does in killing a person is to accelerate the 
moment of his death." 651 The court indicated, however, that recovery 
could be had for medical expenses and property damages. 
In 1953 a similar view was expressed by the federal court in Massa-
chusetts in O'Leary v. U.S. Lines Co.652 The case involved injury to 
a longshoreman on a vessel in Boston. He died before trial and the 
plaintiff brought an action under the wrongful death statute and also 
under the survival statute. The claim under the latter statute was for 
pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost time from work, and "gen-
eral damages" for "loss of the enjoyment of the amenities of life, ... 
649 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 165 Ind. 381, 74 N.E. 509 (1905) 
(injury to person still living at time of trial); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Hacker, 37 Ind. 
App. 194, 76 N.E. 770 (1906). 
550 Lake Erie & Western R.R. v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 483-84. 133 N.E. 732 (1922). 
651 Farrington v. Stoddard, IIS F.2d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1940). 
662 III F. Supp. 745 (D.C. Mass. 1953). 
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a material diminution of his normal life expectancy, ... [and] a 
shortening of his life." 558 The court, in denying recovery for the 
shortened life expectancy said that there was no Massachusetts decision 
allowing a claim for loss of expectancy as an item of damages distinct 
from mental anguish from fear of an early demise and there was no in-
dication that the state would adopt the English view. The court also 
gave three reasons why it believed that the Massachusetts courts would 
deny recovery: ( 1) another provision of the Massachusetts statute pre-
scribed that damages for the death of another should be assessed with 
reference to the degree of culpability, and that to allow recovery for loss 
of expectancy would be to base it upon the degree of damage rather 
than culpability; ( 2) the English rule had not proved entirely satis-
factory as indicated by the practice of allowing only small flat sums; 
and (3) 
... [T]he English rule is set in a context where duplication 
of damages is much less likely than it would be in Massachu-
setts. In England, survival damages, awarded, e.g., for short-
ening of life or pain and suffering, are deducted from recover-
ies of relatives under the English death act. . . . In this 
Commonwealth, however, survival damages, including suffer-
ing from the fear of loss of life, are in addition to damages 
recovered by relatives under the Massachusetts wrongful 
death statute. 55• 
Nevertheless, evidence of shortened life span is permissible for some 
purposes in Massachusetts. In Choicener v. Walters Amusement 
Agency 555 the court used the following language: 
He rules, in substance, that if they found on the medical testi-
mony that the accident shortened the life of the deceased and 
also found upon the facts and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom that he was aware or believed that the condi-
tion from which he suffered before the accident was aggra-
vated, intensified and increased, and that because of the 
collision death might be hastened, they could take into con-
sideration his apprehensions, fears and consequent mental suf-
fering so caused. 556 
553 /d. at 746. 
554 /d. at 747. 
555 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929). Cf. Fournier v. Zinn, 257 Mass. 575, 576, 
154 N.E. 268 (1926) (claim for personal injuries by living plaintiff-evidence of short-
ened life "was relevant"). 
556 !d. at 343· 
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The victim brought the cause of action for personal injuries but died 
before trial and his administratrix was substituted. No action was 
brought under the wrongful death statute. 
In 1943 the New Hampshire Supreme Court was faced with a 
case 557 in which the defendant utility company had trespassed upon the 
plaintiff's land before condemnation proceedings had been started. The 
plaintiff sought damages for trespass to real estate and for mental suf-
fering and the loss of health. He died during the pendency of the action 
and his executrix continued the action under the survival statute and 
added an item for the loss of his life. The court held that the decedent's 
loss of life entitled his estate under a survival statute to recover for his 
loss of earning capacity only, but that such had not been claimed in this 
case. 
Beyond that loss the law gives no recovery for causing 
death in an action brought before death. . . . In the nature 
of things one may not himself receive compensation for the 
wrongful loss of his right to live, and claim for the loss can-
not be an asset of his estate in any fair view of the compen-
satory principle of allowable elements of damages. While al-
lowance for bodily and mental suffering is granted as in 
justice imposed on a wrongdoer, the estimate must be within 
the bounds of justice. To allow for the enjoyment of con-
tinued life would mean an entrance into a boundless field of 
arbitrary assessment, for which no policy of the law ex-
ists. . . . It is sometimes said that a wrongdoer is better off 
in causing death than in causing severe and lasting injury 
without death. If this may be considered in the balance of ad-
justments in social relations, it does not serve to outweight 
the reasons which bar allowance for damage on this ac-
count.558 
Although the case did not involve a claim for damages for shortening 
the life on behalf of the deceased, an argument used by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in 1867 559 suggests an interesting argument that also 
could be made against allowing recovery for shortened life span. The 
court, not mentioning any of the other American cases, said: 
To the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking at human 
life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of 
compensating its loss in money is revolting, and it can only 
become reconciled to such an idea by the strong necessity 
which has grown out of the new modes of travel and business 
ssr Ham v. Interstate Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.zd I (1943). 
558 /d. at 275-76. 
m Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 18o (1867). 
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in modern times, by which great numbers are compelled to 
trust their lives to the skill and vigilance of the servants of 
corporations, and others in similar positions of responsibility 
-a state of things which seemed to call for a remedy which 
should make railroad corporations, steamboat managers, and 
parties to whom others are compelled to trust for safety, more 
sensible of their responsibilities, and more careful to secure a 
high degree of vigilance in protecting the lives entrusted to 
their care, and at the same time afford relief for cases of great 
individual hardship, which might otherwise be suffered by 
those dependent upon the person whose life may be lost .... 
And it will be fortunate in the future if it shall be found that 
habituating the public mind to the idea of pecuniary compen-
sation for human life has not tended to weaken its safe-
guards, and to render it less sacred in the popular estima-
tion.560 
The objection most commonly stated in the American cases, how-
ever, against allowing recovery for loss of expectancy is the great 
uncertainty of standards used in measuring the damages and the discre-
tion it gives the jury in tort cases. This attitude is forcefully, if some-
what extremely, stated by Conway in his article written in response to 
the English cases. He says : 
But now in England there is bestowed upon judges and ju-
rors an added foresight which approaches the supernatural. 
Necromancy and crystal-gazing seem to have been sanctioned 
in the law. Judges and jurors are to be veritable fortune-
tellers. They may forecast one's future state of happiness and, 
in addition, express its value in terms of cash, with the sole 
condition that they be not too liberal. 561 
Regardless of the reason given, it is clear from the above cases that, 
except for Connecticut, in those United States jurisdictions which have 
spoken there can be no recovery for shortened life span as a separate 
item of damages, although evidence of such shortening is admissible in 
some jurisdictions for proof of (I) the extent and seriousness of the 
injury, ( 2) inability or decreased ability to earn a living, and ( 3) bod-
ily and mental suffering, the latter presumably caused by the prospect 
of an earlier than normal demise. 
On the other hand, the general rule in the United States is that lost 
earning for the whole period of the injured person's normal life ex-
pectancy before the accident is recoverable apparently often without 
56o /d. at 191-92. 
561 Conway, supra note 545. at 228-29. 
NEGLIGENCE 295 
recognition that no living expenses will be incurred after death, but 
damages for pain and suffering are computed on the basis of the plain-
tiff's expected life span at the time of trial, after the injury. 562 
( 5) Some Suggestions Concerning Compensation for 
Shortened Life Span 
(a) Comparison of Results under British and 
American Views 
Actual results reached under the British and American views may 
not be nearly as far apart as the principles upon which recovery is al-
lowed would seem to indicate. A shortening of life expectancy under 
the British view is a separate item of damage apart from loss of wages 
and pain and suffering. The victim does not need to be conscious of his 
loss. In addition, though, there has been but little discussion of damages 
for loss of wages in the English opinions. Those discussions which have 
dealt directly with the subjeCt have awarded damages under this head 
only for the period of life that is to be expected after the injury, in 
other words, only for the shortened period of life.663 Recovery under a 
survival statute may reduce any recovery under the wrongful death 
562 The following are some of the cases supporting this view : Prairie Creek Coal 
Min. Co. v. Kittrell, 1o6 Ark. 138, 153 S.W. 89 (1912); Murphy v. National Ice 
Cream Co., 114 Cal. App. 482, 300 Pac. 91 (1931); T. W. & W. Ry. v. Baddeley, 
supra note 546; Hughes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 150 Iowa 232, ·129 N.W. 956 
(19II); Scott v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 16o Iowa 3o6, 141 N.W. 1005 (1913); 
Borough v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 191 Iowa 1216, 184 N.W. 320 ( 1921) ; Thordson 
v. McKeighan, 235 Iowa 409, 16 N.W.2d 6o7 (1944); Daniell v. Boston & Maine 
R.R., 184 Mass. 337, 68 N.E. 337 (1903) (slightly different rule for breach of con-
tract where damages awarded on.basis of how long plaintiff could have performed his 
duties in a thorough, honest, ·and businesslike manner and for this purpose evidence 
of probable length of life is admissible); Fournier v. Zinn, supra note 555; Choicener 
v. Walters Amusement Agency, 26g Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929) (jury could 
consider apprehensions, fears, and consequent mental suffering caused by earlier ex-
pectation of death); Howell v. Lansing City Elec. Ry., 136 Mich. 432, 99 N.W. 400 
(1904); Olivier v. Houghton St. Ry., 138 Mich. 242, 101 N.W. 530 (1904); Crecelius 
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944); West v. Boston & 
Maine R.R., 81 N.H. 522, 129 Atl. 768 (1925); Alberti v. N.Y., L.E. & W.R.R., 
II8 N.Y. 77, 23 N.E. 35 (1889); Magee v. City of Troy, 48 Hun. 383, I N.Y.S. 24 
(1888); Jones v. Eppler, 266 P.2d 451 (Okla. 1954); Maher v. Phila. Traction Co., 
181 Pa. 391, 37 Atl. 571 (1897); Richardson v. Spokane, 67 Wash. 621, 122 Pac. 330 
(1912). See Comment, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505 at 509-10 (1955), and McCormick 
341-43· 
568 Roach v. Yates supra note 496; Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd., 
supra note 504· The South Mrican court, however, allowed lost wages to be recovered 
for the full life expectancy without deduction of the amount it would be cut short by 
the injury. 
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statute.564 In the United States the courts have refused to allow short-
ened life span as a separate item of damage but they allow"compensation 
for lost earning capacity for the full life expectancy unaltered by the ac-
cident (apparently without deduction for maintenance expenses that 
wi.ll not be incurred because of the early demise), although again as in 
the English cases there has been little discussion of the problem. Ac-
tually, considering the flat, rather moderate sum established in England 
for measuring damages for the shortened life span it is very likely that 
the. injured Englishman recovers less in money award than does an 
American (unless he is retired), who theoretically is given no recovery 
for shortened life span. As suggested by one writer: 
Neither the English nor the American solution appears to 
be theoretically justifiable. The British courts may be correct 
in recognizing that there is a loss of years off the plaintiff's 
life which is not compensated for either by damages for eco-
nomic loss or for pain and suffering. However, there has been 
no good explanation put forth as to why this circumstance 
demands compensation. . . . 
If the American courts, on the other hand, are correct in 
rejecting loss of life expectancy as a separate item of dam-
ages, they appear inadvertently to overcompensate the plaintiff 
for his future economic loss. Recovery for wages lost during 
years which the plaintiff will not be alive ignores the simple 
fact which is recognized by our death and survival statutes : 
a dead person's maintenance involves no expense. To give a 
plaintiff full wage recovery is to give him (and indirectly his 
beneficiaries) a windfall. The plaintiff has not only been cut 
off from years of pleasure, but years of expense as well. This 
difference between a living and a dead plaintiff is readily 
recognized by those decisions which limit recovery for pain 
and suffering to those years the plaintiff will actually live. 565 
Undoubtedly there is a natural appeal in the British view which al-
lows some kind of compensation for death, the ultimate injury to a 
human being. 566 Certainly it is true that even American courts allow 
money awards to be made for other than economic and physical losses; 
e.g., recovery is allowed for mental suffering or anguish as well as for 
physical pain, and some courts allow recovery for a reduced ability to 
enjoy the niceties of life because of some physical injury. 567 In these 
564 Supra notes 498, 521. 
565 Comment, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505 at 510, 511 (1955). 
566 Smith, supra note 486 at 795-&!3. He makes an impassioned argument for recog-
nizing that death takes away the most precious thing we have. 
56 7 Ibid. But see denial in ·Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 
P.2d28 (1938). 
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cases, however, the award is made to a living person for his own bene-
fit and not to .. others after his death. Certainly_ the determination of the 
value of life to a man who has just lost it borders on the metaphysical. 
The difficulties involved in this metaphysical concept are stated so pun-
gently, if somewhat unfairly, by an editor of the Economist (London), 
that the statement bears repetition here. 
As the duty of valuing lives in this way will almost cer-
tainly present itself more and more often so long as the law 
remains in its present admirable state, we have in the hope of 
being helpful to His Majesty's Judges and to the juries on 
whom the work of valuation will fall, given serious consider-
ation to working out a "state of happiness" index number, 
which will be published as soon as certain minor difficulties 
have been overcome. In the meantime, we have drawn up a 
provisional schedule of life values according to occupations, 
on which the authorities may base themselves till the index 
number is ready. The judicial directions, fortunately, are 
clear and unambiguous.· We have to value life as a whole 
without taking into account wealth, social position, or earning 
capacity, but concentrating on the question of how far the 
life lost was a good thing, an amenity-how far the dead per-
son was likely, if he had lived, to pass his life in rest and quiet-
ness. Money and social position do not count, and to the legal 
personal representatives a dead tramp, if he was happy be-
fore he died, is a better investment than a wealthy but wor-
ried stockjobber. The issue, it will be seen, is simple, and it 
remains only to express the result in sterling, to which end we 
venture to submit to their Lordships for their future serious 
consideration a few valuations of dead folk according to their 
occupation and their respective enjoyment of rest and quiet-
ness:-
£ s. d. 
A High Court Judge .. 100,000 o o 
A Commissionaire. . 1 o,ooo o o 
A Ministry of Transport Official. . . . 10,000 o o 
An Editor of The Economist. . 10 o o 
A Motor Car Underwriter in the present 
condition of the law. . o o 10 
These figures can, of course, be taken only as a basis and 
will need to be weighted for individual cases in different ways. 
For example, in a British Court of Law regard must surely 
be had to the relations of this world and the next; and evi-
dence must be heard as to whether the deceased person was 
likely to find himself better or worse off after his decease. For 
if the continuance of life is only a postponement of a future 
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life, the value to himself of a man's life here must depend 
partly on what it is that is being postponed. If, therefore, we 
had evidence that a deceased civil servant had been a very good 
man, orthodox in his views and impeccable in his private life, 
we should be inclined to knock 50 per cent. off the valuation 
and give his legal representative £5,000 instead of £ro,ooo. 
And vice versa, if the plaintiff could prove the deceased to 
have been a very bad man we might raise the damages to 
£zo,ooo. A judgment from the House of Lords on this aspect 
of the law will be eagerly awaited. In the meantime, both the 
legal profession and the personal representatives of the de-
ceased persons may face the future in confident anticipation 
of a satisfactory harvest.Ges 
As the British courts themselves have recognized, it probably becomes 
even more difficult when a child, an unemployed person, a hopelessly 
insane, or an unconscious person is the one whose life expectancy has 
been shortened. 
One further consideration is important in comparing the British and 
American results. The distinction drawn by most American cases be-
tween denying recovery for shortened life span, but admitting it as 
evidence to show the extent and seriousness of the injury itself is of 
questionable practical significance. It does not escape the notice of the 
courts that evidence of shortened life span may affect the jury in un-
expected ways. It is certainly possible to argue that a plaintiff who in-
troduces such testimony may have reason to fear that a lower verdict 
will be reached because his period of pain and suffering will be dimin-
ished to the extent that his life expectancy has been shortened. One 
court held that the admission of such evidence, even though error, 
could not be prejudicial to the defendant. The court said: 
The reason why this is true is obvious. If it had any effect 
at all it would have been to reduce rather than increase the 
amount of plaintiff's recovery since while plaintiff was en-
titled to his pecuniary loss based on his life expectancy before 
the injury, the recovery for future mental and physical suf-
fering would depend upon expectancy in his injured condi-
tion.G69 
If this be an accurate estimate of the effect of such evidence a de-
fendant might even consider offering it to reduce the recovery for pain 
and suffering, which is generally assumed today to be the cause of the 
large amounts being awarded by juries. G70 Yet it is open to question 
568 Quoted from "Is Life a Boon?" 14 N.Z.L.J. 65 (1938). 
sau Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., supra note 562 at 402. 
s1o Plant, supra note 381. 
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that a defendant would be acting wisely in introducing such evidence. 
Although it may not be considered by the jury as a separate element of 
damage, surely such evidence might sway the sympathy of the jury and 
cause it to give a higher judgment on the other items. The technical 
rules of law included in instructions to juries are interesting to lawyers 
and much discussed in law school courses, but what happens when these 
instructions and the evidence are taken by the jury into the privacy of 
the jury room may be something quite different from the desires of the 
lawyers and judges.571 From the defendant's point of view, once evi-
dence of shortened life span is admitted, an instruction that it may not 
itself be the basis for an award as a separate item of damage would be 
no assurance that it would not have this effect as a practical matter. 
(b) Effect of Wrongful Death and Survival 
Statutes 
An additional difficulty is ereated by the existence of death statutes, 
both wrongful death and survival. All American jurisdictions have 
some type of statute creating a special cause of action for a wrongful 
death, usually in the form of the original English Lord Campbell's Act. 
The theory of these acts is to recognize that the death may have caused 
pecuniary losses to survivors closely related to the deceased, i.e., those 
who received financial support from him. Recovery usually is dependent 
upon a showing of some beneficiary of this class who actually has suf-
fered loss of support and, in theory, the amount of the recovery gen-
erally is unrelated to the injuries suffered by the deceased. 572 
The typical survival act is based upon a different policy. The common 
law rule was that the cause of action in tort died with either the plain-
tiff or defendant if death occurred before judgment. Survival acts have 
been adopted in every American jurisdiction to preserve at least some 
causes of action such as injury to personal or real property and even 
other non-personal injuries. About half of them also provide for sur-
vival of personal injury actions and these are the ones of concern in con-
sidering damages for shortened life span. 
The theory of recovery under this typical survival act is quite differ-
ent from that of the wrongful death statute. Recovery by the personal 
representative or administrator of deceased's estate is permitted to the 
extent that decedent would have had a cause of action. This is deriva-
571 See Kalvin, "The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award," 19 
Ohio St. L. J. 158 (1958). 
5 72 See Prosser 710, 713-16; Harper & James §§25.14 et seq. 
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tive action, dependent upon the rights of the deceased and the amount 
recovered becomes a part of his estate. 578 Recovery under such statutes 
would include damages for pain and suffering, medical expenses, and 
loss of earnings during the interval between injury and death. 
In some jurisdictions recovery can not be had under both statutes 
but in many jurisdictions which have both types of statutes, the theory 
of recovery under each being different, there are two causes of action 
and recovery under one does not preclude recovery under the other. In 
many cases this means that the same beneficiaries will recover under 
the wrongful death act and also under the survival statute since the 
persons who take the estate of the deceased often are the same close 
relatives protected by the wrongful death statute. The duplication is 
even more obvious in those jurisdictions which allow the estate to re-
cover under the survival statute for loss of earnings during the full life 
expectancy of the deceased without regard to the injury inflicted by the 
defendant, often as pointed out before, without deduction for the main-
tenance costs that the victim would have incurred and which, therefore, 
would have reduced the amourit left in his estate. 
The existence of both statutes in one jurisdiction has created real 
difficulties for the courts and the result has been something less than 
logical and just in many situations.m To apply the dictates of these 
statutes and the common law tort rules and to reconcile the results of 
cases in which the estate of the deceased is suing with those in which 
the beneficiaries under the wrongful death acts are seeking recovery, 
and both with the rights of the victim himself while he still lives, with-
out unduly modifying the "plain meaning" of the legislative language 
is too much to ask of any court. What is needed is a reconsideration of 
the whole matter. 
(c) A Suggested Reconsideration of the Rule of 
Damages 
Our first conclusion in reconsidering what rules should be applied 
to recovery for shortened life span is that there is little justification for 
becoming involved in a deep philosophical concern with man's psycho-
logical welfare (important as this is), at least so far as he might con-
template what he will be allowed to recover if he should be killed. The 
5 73 Prosser 7o8-1o. 
5 74 See objections and criticisms of Duffey, "The Maldistribution of Damages in 
Wrongful Death," 19 Ohio St. L. J. 264 (1958). See also Carter, supra note 438, par-
ticularly at 76o-61. 
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problem is one of deciding what kinds of interests should be recognized 
by a pecuniary award in an action arising from an unintentional tort. 
Lawyers and judges should not try to answer questions best left to 
theologians. 
A reconsideration of this area of the law of damages should take ac-
count of two basic factors: ( 1) the rights of a person while he is still 
living to recover for mental anguish suffered by him, including possibly 
his suffering as he contemplates a shortened life expectancy, but not 
for the death or shortened life itself; and (2) the rights, if any, of 
survivors who might have expected something from the deceased if he 
lived his normal number of years. Whatever the type of statute and 
whatever the form of action, these would seem to be the two potential 
elements of damages that should be considered. 
(i) Recovery When the Injured Party Dies 
Before Judgment 
In considering the rights of the injured party himself, it is important 
to draw a distinction between the case in which he dies instantly, never 
recovers consciousness, or dies relatively soon after the accident (prob-
ably within the period between the accident and trial), and the case in 
which there is no other injury except an ascertainable shortening of the 
life span with no real danger of death in the immediate future, as so 
often will be the situation in radiation exposure cases. 
When the injured party dies before judgment or settlement of the 
claim, it seems quite unrealistic under a survival statute to hold that the 
death itself is an item of damages, so far as the deceased is concerned, 
and survives under the statute. The injured person who dies can in no 
way enjoy such compensation, except possibly in the form of psycho-
logical satisfaction of being able to pass assets on after death. In the 
case of instantaneous death, or death before consciousness is regained, 
even this is non-existent, and the law ought to recognize that any such 
recovery is in effect simply a recovery for the beneficiaries or heirs and, 
in some states, cieditors.575 Notwithstanding possible theological as-
sertions of some religions to the contrary, it would seem best that the 
legal rules be based on the philosophy that "you cannot take it with 
you," at least as to assets of a pecuniary nature. This would not be in-
consistent with most western religions since they do not consider 
wordly goods of any particular value in any life hereafter. The law 
should not go further. If this view be accepted, the English rule allow-
575 McCormick 340. 
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ing an absolute right of recovery for loss of life expectancy even where 
the injured person dies instantly or is not aware of the shortened life 
span and therefore can suffer no mental pain and anguish as he con-
templates an earlier than normal demise is incorrect. 
(ii) Recovery When Injured Party Survives 
but Has Shortened Life Expectancy 
A different situation is presented, however, when the injured person 
survives the trial but has a shortened life expectancy. To the extent that 
the law recognizes that there should be recovery for injury to psycho-
logical interests of the injured party himself, and there is a considerable 
growth of legal recognition of this right in many areas, then the re-
covery ought to be adjusted to the particular case and applied only to 
allow compensation for the mental anguish suffered by the injured be-
cause of his concern about his shortened life span. If a money award is 
to be given for injury to such psychological interest, there ought to be 
both proof that the injury to this interest actually occurred, and also 
a reasonable relationship between the money awarded and that needed 
to purchase services or enjoyment having a reasonable relation to the 
value of the period cut off the man's life. Under this heading it might 
even be possible for such a person to recover enough to allow him, 
during his shortened life span, to take a trip toward which he had 
planned and saved. Though this example may be too extreme, this 
would be the kind of interest which, though psychological, ought to be 
recognized as sufficiently tangible for monetary compensation to be 
made. Probably much more realistic from the standpoint of helping 
the injured party would be a greater liberalization in the recovery al-
lowed for medical expenses so that a program of rehabilitation, includ-
ing mental therapy if needed, could be utilized fully to make the 
remaining years of life as enjoyable as is reasonably possible. This 
suggestion would reject the English practice and also would call for 
modification of the rigid American rule under which recovery has been 
denied in the jurisdictions which have passed upon the question. Com-
pensation would thus be allowed for the mental disturbance to the per-
son who knows his life span is being shortened. This would not extend 
the law substantially beyond present practices in cases in which the in-
jured person lives and makes a claim, not for shortened life span, but 
for a lessening of desirable enjoyable activities during his normal life 
span because of some physical injury. As pointed out before, this kind 
of right has already been recognized in many jurisdictions including 
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some which have denied recovery for shortened life span as such. 576 If 
psychological interests are recognized in these cases, so also should they 
be when shortened life span is involved. There is no reason, legal or 
moral, however, for carrying this item beyond the grave, the indignant 
rejection by the Connecticut court of such a barbaric distinction not-
withstanding. 577 The material aspects of the recovery certainly do not 
pass beyond the grave to the best of our knowledge but go to the sur-
viving kin or other beneficiaries. Since this is true, the award should be 
justified under the theory of our wrongful death acts. 
It is recognized that this suggestion seems to be in conflict with the 
theory of the typical survival statutes that whatever cause of action the 
victim had, his estate keeps after his death. The suggestion made would 
permit recovery for damages to the injured victim, including any men-
tal disturbance, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life gen-
erally, only if he survives judgment; if he does not, recovery would be 
denied to his esta:te. We do not mean to suggest that contracts and 
other property rights, including the right to recover for destruction' of 
property, should be wiped out upon the death of the injured party. 
These rights are capable of being measured in monetary terms and 
seem to be a legitimate part of the estate of the deceased, should he die 
before trial. Survival statutes are aimed at preserving this kind of right. 
It is submitted that there is no justification, however, for adding to the 
estate of the deceased an item for damage to his psychological interest, 
which so far as this world is concerned is now gone, and is rather un-
important in the next if we can believe the experts~ 
Any monetary awards that are given in such a case usually go to the 
survivors who would recover under a wrongful death statute. If death 
ensues before trial or settlement, recovery should be awarded only to 
the survivors protected by the death statutes for loss of expected sup-
port. The concern in cases awarding monetary compensation should be 
with the living and not with the dead. Any recovery for invasion of 
psychoiogical interests ought to be resolved between the defendant and 
the injured party and the amount keyed to compensating hiin, not 'the 
survivors. The logical time to determine this is at the time of the trial, 
which usually will be long· enough after the injury so that it will be 
known whether the injured party is going to live for a reasonable pe-
riod of time beyond the injury. In any event, in most cases it will make 
a clear-cut distinction between the amount to be awarded to the injured 
576 See cases like Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., supra note 567. 
ii1T Supra note 541. See also Prosser 709· 
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party for damage to his peace of mind, and the amount to be awarded 
to the persons who have lost expected financial support because of the 
death or serious shortening of life expectancy of the injured person. 
Their interests are of quite a different nature. 
In any event, if the victim survives judgment, having proved that he 
will die one, ten, fifteen, or twenty years prematurely, but a consider-
able period after the trial, his recovery should not include lost wages, 
expenses, or pain and suffering and mental anguish for the period be-
tween his expected premature death and the life span he would have en-
joyed but for the accident. In many cases of radiation exposure in which 
only a few years are cut off of life expectancy, there may be no decrease 
in earning capacity and no pain and suffering and probably not much, 
if any, mental anguish, premature death being so long delayed. The 
period cut off actually may be non-earning years, after retirement, un-
less retirement plans begin to take account of premature aging. Any 
award of damages to the surviving victim should take account of the 
mitigating factors. 
(iii) Recovery by Dependents for Lost Sup-
port 
Recovery by persons normally included as beneficiaries in wrongful 
death statutes should be determined on the basis of support they could 
have expected from the deceased had he lived his normal life. Under 
this approach, a determination must be made of what these beneficiaries 
would have received from the decedent had he lived, taking into ac-
count, of course, the maintenance costs of the decedent during the 
period of his normal life expectancy. It should take account of the fact 
that in most radiation cases only a few years should be taken off the 
end of the victim's life at a time when all of his dependents, except for 
his wife and perhaps other disabled relatives should have no longer 
expected any financial support. In such cases no recovery should be al-
lowed for dependents. It would be best to postpone such determination 
until the victim actually dies. 
(d) Advantages and Disadvantages of the Recom-
mendations 
The proposed separation of the damage rights of the injured party 
and of any dependents who lose financial support because of his actual 
or expected early demise should help make possible a fairer determina-
tion of how much damages to award to whom. The injured person, if 
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he lived until judgment or settlement, would recover the type of dam-
ages now allowed, such as for pain and suffering, medical expenses, 
lost wages (during his reduced life span only), etc., but all damages 
should be limited to what is suffered during the period he now is ex-
pected to live in his injured condition. If he dies before judgment, the 
length of his life is now definitely known instead of estimated and 
other than expenses actually incurred during his life, all recovery 
should be for lost support by dependents. The result would prevent re-
covery for shortened life span itself, contrary to the Connecticut and 
English Commonwealth view. It also would prevent recovery of lost 
wages for the full period of normal life expectancy allowed in some 
American jurisdictions which purport to deny recovery for shortened 
life span. 
On the other hand, it would permit a separate determination of the 
rights of surviving dependents whose recovery should then not be af-
fected in any way as to amount because the injured person also may have 
recovered. Realistic amounts should be awarded to such dependents. 
There is no reason to carry over into a determination of their needs 
the great uncertainties that are involved in deciding how much to allow 
the injured party for his pain and suffering and his mental anguish 
caused by contemplating an early demise. Any psychological interests of 
the injured victim which have been invaded should be measured by the 
time he actually lives or is expected to live. The needs of survivors have 
no logical policy relationship to this amount. Their recovery should be 
determined in accordance with their reasonable expectations of support 
after their benefactor's death. 
The result suggested probably could be achieved if courts were will-
ing to interpret somewhat more liberally common law and death stat-
ute damage rules but this perhaps would involve a certain amount of 
judicial legislation in some states. It would be better if a statute were 
enacted recognizing the interrelationship cif the rights of the injured 
victim, his estate, and his dependents as now protected under most 
wrongful death statutes. The result would be more consistent with the 
general theory of compensatory damages in unintentional tort cases 
where 1i fe span has been shortened by a defendant who fails to meet 
the required standard of conduct but who should not be punished so 
that others can receive a windfall. 
Administration of these suggestions will present some difficulties. 
Juries will have difficulty keeping separate the different items of dam-
ages but probably less difficulty than they now have when they are told 
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not to allow recovery for shortened life span, although they may con-
sider it in determining how seriously plaintiff has been hurt, and also 
are told to estimate his wages during his full life expectancy. The 
separation should help differentiate the various elements of damage on 
a more logical basis. It would permit findings of fact on specific items 
of damage. 
Another difficulty arises under our suggestions if the injured person 
lives until after judgment but his expectation of further life is very 
short. Under these circumstances should the dependent beneficiaries of 
a wrongful death statute be allowed to have a further cause of action? 
If so, when does it arise-at the same time as the injured party's right 
or only after he dies? A related difficulty arises if there is an ascer-
tainable shortening of life span but the victim is expected to live for as 
many as forty or fifty years. This is very likely to happen in radiation 
exposure cases. Who should be counted as beneficiaries and how much 
should they be allowed to expect from the victim had he lived? 
One writer has made the ingenious suggestion that the injured party 
should recover his own losses and also those of potential beneficiaries 
at his death, all in one action. 518 He would be allowed to recover the 
total amount on the theory that if he dies it then will be passed on to 
the persons he wanted to protect anyway. The alternative would be to 
allow a separate action for loss of expected support by the beneficiaries 
who could sue if he died. The writer objected to this alternative be-
cause "[t]his not only makes it impossible to ascertain the recipients, 
but also leaves the court without the base for calculating the re-
wards."" 519 His suggestion, however, involves the same difficulty he was 
trying to avoid. Determination of the beneficiaries and of the amount 
of support they could expect is just as difficult no matter who brings 
the cause of action. 
Our suggestion would be to adopt what might be described as a "wait 
and see" doctrine-allow the beneficiaries a separate cause of action 
under a wrongful death theory, to arise at the time the injured pla.in-
tiff dies, not before. Any statute of limitations problem could be 
handled simply by holding that the cause of action does not arise until 
the death occurs. Difficulties arise from the possibility of disappearance, 
death, or bankruptcy of the defendant, but these seem not nearly so 
objectionable as guessing who the beneficiaries will be, how long they 
will live, and how much support they would have received from the 
578 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512 ( 1955). 
579/bid. 
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deceased during the time of his normal life expectancy. Our suggestions 
involve the lesser evil. 
The most important difficulty arising if the action by death bene-
ficiaries is postponed until the actual death of the victim is that it may 
delay actions for many years, twenty or more being perfectly possible. 
This does create a very serious concern, not only as to whether or not 
the insurance coverage of a defendant will be continued for this period 
of time for the particular injury (or other funds if insurance does not 
cover the injury), but also as to preservation of the evidence surround-
ing the original injury. 
~· ·· Several possibilities for alleviating this problem to some extent can 
be suggested. One is to adopt an arbitrary period, for example ten years 
after the date of injury. If the injured person lives for ten years per-
haps it is fair to assume that the beneficiaries' pecuniary losses and ex-
pectations of support have been reduced to a sufficiently low order that 
the law should ignore them. This should take care of all but the most 
unusual case as to child beneficiaries but may not be satisfactory for 
spouses who are dependents. It may be a fair compromise even then, 
however, since in most states today they recover nothing under wrong-
ful death statutes if the decedent survives until after judgment in his 
own action for tort damages. 
· Another possible solution to the problem of a long delayed but accel-
erated death is to limit the recovery of death-act beneficiaries to those 
cases in which the deceased himself has recoverd damages from the 
defendant which would mean that the initial cause of action itself has 
been brought within the period of the statute of limitations, and that 
the basic facts of the defendant's liability for the accident would have 
been established. The fact that beneficiaries probably would not have 
participated in the original trial presents the matter of binding parties 
by a judgment in which they did not participate. The whole cause of 
action is such, however, that in a real sense it is dependent on the right 
of the injured party to recover if he survives. Only because of a statute 
especially concerned with such beneficiaries do they have any cause of 
action at all. It do~s not seem arbitrary, therefore, to condition the 
right to recover under the wrongful death act on establishment by the 
deceased himself of a right of recovery for his own injuries based on 
the defendant's negligence, even though the amount of damages is 
determined on a different basis in the two cases. The only difficulty 
with this suggestion will be when the only recoverable damage is short-
ened 1i fe span, and our recommendation is that the victim not be al-
lowed recovery for this item. In such case perhaps he or the beneficiaries 
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should be forced to sue soon after the exposure to establish the defend-
ant's liability. Under the usual statute of limitations this situation would 
arise under these suggestions only if the injured person lives longer 
than at least a year and more typically two or three years after the in-
jury occurred. 
A difficulty still exists if the defendant is willing to admit liability, 
at least in a compromise situation, and settles the claim with the in-
jured plaintiff. If the two causes of action, for the injured plaintiff 
and for the injured beneficiary, are separated as suggested here, there 
is the question of how to determine the amount of damages and the 
persons ·to whom recovery should go for the premature death with 
consequent loss to the group of beneficiaries protected by the wrongful 
death statute. Here again settlement of their rights and preservation of 
any award could be entrusted to the injured plaintiff on the assumption 
that he will make it available on his death anyway. Gso On the other 
hand, the rights of beneficiaries could be kept separate and recovery 
delayed until the injured party dies, again with an arbitrary time limita-
tion of a decade or so, if a longer period is administratively unsound or 
at least unsatisfactory to the insurance companies. One other possibility 
is to guess who the beneficiaries will be at the time the victim is ex-
pected to die and allow settlement with them, with appointment of a 
guardian for those not yet in existence or underage, if this seems neces-
sary. Our recommendation is that the settlement be with beneficiaries 
separately or with their guardians ad litem. 
If the two interests are separated, the rule that any action of bene-
ficiaries under wrongful death acts is lost if the injured plaintiff lives 
until he has recovered judgment would be changed. 581 
(e) Conclusions 
Shortening of life expectancy cases are certain to result from ex-
posure to radiation according to present scientific theory. Present dam-
age theories as applied to this subject must be re-evaluated. Under exist-
ing rules results often will be unjust because the cases are likely to be 
of the kind that gives the most trouble under existing law. The proper 
solution should be determined before too many cases arise. Lawyers 
and their clients should see that a comprehensive and fair statutory 
scheme is enacted. 
GSo This seems to be an assumption approved in a somewhat different way by the 
writer of the comment in 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512 (1955). 
581 See Annot., 39 A.L.R. 579 (1925); Annot., 99 A.L.R. 1091 (1935); 22 U. of Chi. 
L. Rev. 505, 513 (1955); and arguments pro and con in Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Cassin, I II Ga. 575, 36 S.E. 881 ( 1900). 
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f. Other Types of Damages 
In addition to the items of damages already discussed, certain others 
involving some psychological or emotional disturbance features may 
arise in radiation situations. They are sufficiently different from the 
most closely analogous problems arising in the usual tort case to warrant 
brief mention. 
( 1 ) Inability to Continue in Nuclear Work 
One of the situations that may arise is the exposure of an individual 
to the maximum permissible level of radiation beyond which there exists 
a serious risk of injury, although as yet there are no observable disabling 
physical manifestation!!. This most likely would happen in connection 
with employment in nuclear activities, and also could occur in other tort 
liability situations. For example, a nuclear physicist or engineer through 
the negligence. of a doctor might be exposed to sufficient radiation to 
make it unwise for him to continue to work in an environment where he 
is exposed regularly even to small doses of radiation, or where there is 
a chance of an accidental exposure of significant proportions. A similar 
problem could arise in connection with an accident which discharges 
radioactive material over a populated area and exposes to a fairly high 
level of radiation, a nuclear engineer, who at that time, is not engaged 
in his occupation. The amount of exposure could be such that there 
would be no present physical disability and hence no injury in the or-
dinary sense. Yet, if this person is to take normal advantage of his 
experience and training, he must work in situations where somewhat 
greater than normal risks of exposure to radiation are involved. If it is 
inadvisable for the worker to continue in his chosen field, can he re-
cover damages for the inability to do so, or can he recover for the 
necessity of changing occupations which may mean undertaking a long 
period of training in an educational institution and perhaps an addi-
tional substantial period for practical experience? 
It is generally agreed that in any suit for compensation for personal 
injury, one of the elements of damage is impairment of earning ca-
pacity.m There are many cases in which this item has been allowed,583 
582 Harper & James 1316 ff.; McCormick 299 ff. See also 15 Am. Jur., Damages 
§88 (1938). 
58s See, e.g., Birmingham Elec .. Co. v. Cochran, 242 Ala. 673, 8 So.2d 171 (1942); 
Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744 (1954); Moe v. Alsop, 189 Ore. 59, 
216 P.2d 686 (1950); Trombetta v. Champlain Valley Fruit Co., 117 Vt. 491, 94 A.2d 
797 (1953). Cases are usually found in West Digest System under key number Dam-
ages 38. 
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but the recent case involving Maureen Connolly, the famous young 
woman tennis champion, illustrates as well as any the willingness of 
courts to sustain a very substantial award by the jury for loss of earning 
capacity, in this case for $95,000. 58~ Her injury prevented her from 
continuing her tennis career from which she could expect, on the basis 
of actual offers for the coming year, anywhere from $30,000 to $75,000, 
if she would turn professional. While the award included present pain 
and suffering and possible future suffering from the loss of blood supply 
to her foot, it is clear that the major item of recovery was for the loss 
of expected earnings. In upholding the jury's verdict as not excessive, 
the court said : 
Loss of earning power is an element of general damages 
which can be inferred from the nature of the injury, without 
proof of actual earnings or income either before or after the 
injury, and damages in this respect are awarded for the loss of 
ability thereafter to earn money. 585 
Where there is a present observable injury to the plaintiff in cases of 
overexposure to radiation, it would seem clear that one of the items of 
damages which the jury could award would be lost earning capacity, if 
the radiation of the plaintiff actually makes it impossible for him to earn 
as much after the accident as before. This kind of situation would 
seem to be covered by the general rule, although the measurement of this 
item is difficult. 
In all of the cases decided up to the present time there has been an 
actual, present physical impairment which to some extent observably 
reduced the ability of the plaintiff to carry out with former ability the 
job he had been doing before the accident. No case has been found 
dealing with a situation in which recovery was allowed for lost earning 
capacity simply because it would not be wise 'from the standpoint of 
plaintiff's health to continue the work for which he had been trained. 
Under the language ordinarily used by the courts in defining the 
term "personal injury," it would not be difficult in radiation cases to 
find that a person who has been irradiated even to a small degree has 
received an "injury." An early Massachusetts opinion defines "injury" 
about as well as any: 
In common speech the word "injury," as applied to a personal 
injury to a human being, includes whatever lesion or change in 
any part of the system produces harm or pain or a lessened 
584 Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete Co., 49 Cal.2d 483, 319 P.2d 343 (1957). 
585 I d. at 489. 
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facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or capa-
bility. G86 
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This broad definition of injury literally covers a person who has been 
exposed to any significant amount of radiation, because present scien-
tific opinion holds that even small amounts of radiation either destroy 
body cells or at least reduce their ability to divide and replace them-
selves.587 This might serve as the necessary injury upon which to base 
the item of impaired earning capacity. 
The difficulty with accepting this analysis is that, in awarding dam-
ages for impairment of earning capacity resulting from "personal in-
jury," the statements of the courts have been made in cases in which 
there was an observable impairment of a physical function which itself 
created a physical disability to continue activities previously carried on 
by the plaintiff. From this it certainly could be argued that "personal 
injury". means that which is itself compensable in a tort action, aside 
from the lost earning capacity. Therefore, such cases are not direct sup-
port for recovery where there is no disability in the ordinary sense and 
where the only significant loss that can be measured in pecuniary terms 
is the lost earning capacity resulting from the necessity of changing pro-
fessions in order to avoid the health danger created by further exposure. 
The presence of an actual physical . impact and some impairment of 
bodily functions, however, will give a court the necessary foundation to 
support an action for lost earning capacity, if it feels some physical 
injury to the plaintiff is a necessary prerequisite to allowing such re-
covery. Actually the policy question is the same whether or not we find 
a presently observable change in bodily functions, so long as it is found 
that no further work in the nuclear energy area should be carried out by 
the· particular plaintiff. The question really is: As a matter of social 
policy, should recovery be allowed in such cases? So stated, it is difficult 
to justify denial. 
The only cases found which are in any way closely analogous to the 
situation here posed are the allergy cases arising in connection with 
workmen's compensation claims.588 In Arkansas Nat'l Bank of Hot 
Springs v. Colbert, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the commis-
sion's award for a "disability" arising from dermatitis caused by con-
tact with nickel and carbon, and also approved the modification of the 
award by the circuit court to make the disability a "permanent, total 
586 Burns's Case, 218 Mass. 8, 12, 105 N.E. 001 (1914), cited in 1 Larson, Work-
men's Compensation §42.11 (1952) as the best definition of "injury" found. 
587 Infra note 1090. 
588 See Larson, supra note 586 at §41.00. 
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disability." 589 The claimant had worked many years as a cashier for 
business houses and finally for the employer bank for whom she was 
working at the time the dermatitis became acute. The condition finally 
forced her to resign. The court found that the allergy was caused by 
"dust" coming from the nickels and from carbon paper and that this 
made it a disabling injury from an occupational disease within the terms 
of the workmen's compensation act. The court stated that the act should 
be liberally construed, provided compensation was to be paid to an 
employee actually disabled. The court upheld the finding of permanent 
disability even though the dermatitis seemed to clear up completely 
when the claimant stayed away from coins and carbon paper. Yet, when-
ever she returned to a setting where these were present the dermatitis 
reappeared. 
A similar result was reached in LeLenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., where 
a linotype operator developed dermatitis from an allergy to the antimony 
coming from the molten metal used in the linotype operation. Here 
again this allergic dermatitis was held to be an "occupational disease." 590 
This apparently is a usual result in compensation cases, though it must 
be remembered that frequently such awards are made on a more liberal 
basis than if similar questions are raised in ordinary tort cases.591 If the 
inability to continue work in a given profession is proved, however, there 
seems to be no reason why it should not be a compensable injury under 
tort rules as well. The effect on the worker will be the same in either 
case. 
The LeLenko case did not deal specifically with the problem of al-
ternatives open to the claimant to earn a living in some other occupation 
but the statement of facts is such as to permit this assumption. In the 
Colbert case the court was faced with a specific argument by the em-
ployer that since the claimant was "an unusually intelligent woman, with 
a pleasing personality, she should be able to secure remunerative em-
ployment in some other business or profession." 592 The court answered 
this argument by showing that there was no finding in the testimony 
that she could secure such employment, and that there were very few 
occupations open to women, especially of her age and training. It seems 
to be true that where compensation is claimed for loss of earning capacity 
in the ordinary tort case the defendant has the right to reduce the 
amount of the award by the amount that the plaintiff could reasonably or 
589 209 Ark. 1070, 193 S.W.zd 8o6 (1946). 
590 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.zd 253 (1942). 
591 Supra note 588. 
592 S11pra note 589 at 1074. 
NEGLIGENCE 313 
actually earn during a period of less than total disability and most juris-
dictions follow the same rule in workmen's compensation cases. 
The ordinary worker whose job does not .require any very special 
technical training or extensive education surely will be treated like the 
truck driver or seamstress whose foot injury made it difficult to con-
tinue the same occupation but does not really decrease substantially the 
ability to perform a similarly remunerative task.593 There will cir-
tainly be employment of this sort in atomic energy and under such cir-
cumstances this element of damages can be minimized. 
The problem may not be nearly so simple for an experienced nuclear 
engineer who has had as much as seven or more years of college training 
preparing him for his career. It may be that such a person could find 
an administrative position where his exposure to radiation would be 
nil and which would be just as remunerative. It is also possible that 
such a person could return to college and pursue another profession if 
he were willing to spend the necessary time and effort to earn a graduate 
degree. His age might seriously prejudice his chances to make aname 
for himself and to get an equally rewarding position. The only fair 
conclusion would seem to be, therefore, that such injuries be compen-
sated, even though no presently observable physical injury has mani-
fested itself. There is no reason, however, to go as far as the court did 
in the Colbert case in allowing this kind of injury to be treated as a total 
disability. Aside from the expense to society it would seem poor social 
policy to encourage a person so injured to remain idle instead of finding 
other types of employment. His age, training, and experience and the 
feasibility of shifting profession of course should be taken into account 
in determining if he will be able to find an equally remunerative job. 
The period of time required to prepare for a new occupation and the 
money lost while attaining an equal position should be included. 
Our conclusion, therefore, is that recovery for the type of injury here 
posed should be allowed even though there is no presently manifested 
injury. This assumes that there has been proof of the fact that the 
plaintiff has received exposure up to the point where it is not safe for 
him to continue in work where the risk of exposure to radiation is some-
what greater than normal. 
598 4 Restatement, Torts §924 (1939); McCormick 3o8, n. 40 and cases there cited. 
See Trombetta v. Champlain Valley Fruit Co., supra note 583, where a $so a week truck 
driver could not show loss of earning capacity from a $10 a week job he took, partly 
to satisfy his obligations to his father. For workmen's compensation rule see 2 Larson, 
supra note 586 at §§57.53, 57.61, 58.00. 
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( 2) Psychological In juries 
Because the general public's introduction to radiation injuries has 
been through atomic bombs, beginning with the destruction of Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima and continuing to the present concern about fall-out 
from the nuclear tests, atomic energy and radiation have a fearful con-
notation for most people. Added to this is the fact that the science is of 
relatively recent development and is mysterious to the layman because 
radiation cannot be felt, seen, heard, or tasted. This is the very situa-
tion where the psychological reaction of a person who has been or thinks 
he has been irradiated probably will assume rather great proportions. 
The whole problem of mental or emotional disturbance is one that has 
given the courts considerable concern and the movement certainly is in 
the direction of giving greater recognition to this type of injury as more 
is learned about the workings of the human mind. 
For the purpose of discussing radiation injury cases as they involve 
mental disturbance, the present state of the law can be fairly summarized 
as follows : 594 ( 1) Where there has been an actual physical impact on 
the plaintiff by a force set in motion by a negligent defendant (and the 
impact need not be at all substantial), 595 recovery may be allowed for 
mental disturbances, such as fright, pain, suffering, and similar types 
of mental anguish. 506 ( 2) While in some jurisdictions it is still neces-
sary to find a physical impact of some kind, 597 the trend in recent cases 
clearly is in the direction of allowing recovery for mental disturbance 
where there is no physical impact, so long as the mental disturbance 
manifests itself in some physically observable way, such as a traumatic 
neurosis. 5&8 (3) If the only psychological injury is one that could not 
594 See generally Prosser 176-82; Harper & James § 18.4, and articles listed by each. 
See particularly Smith & Solomon, "Traumatic Neuroses in Court," 30 Va. L. Rev. 78, 
164 ( 1943); Smith, "Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability 
for Psychic Stimuli," 30 Va. L.-Rev. 193 (1944). 
595 E.g., see Porter v. Del., Lack. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 Atl. 86o (1906) (dust 
in plaintiff's eyes). See cases collected in Smith & Solomon, supra note 594 at 164 and 
Appendix A at 159. See also Prosser 178-79, n. 7-12. 
596 Prosser 178; Harper & James 1032. See particularly, Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & 
Foundry Co., supra note 449, where the fear was danger of cancer; Kimbell v. Noel, 
228 S.W.2d g8o (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (same). 
597 Prosser 178-79; Harper & James 1032-34. See statement of the New York rule 
in Hugo v. Wade, 160 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1957). 
598 lbid.: e.g., Williams v. State, 126 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1953) alf'd 134 N.Y.S.2d 857 
(1954) (fright from threats of convict who escaped because of defendant's negligence); 
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957) (fear from possible im-
pact with defendant's truck, citing Prosser 178-79, Harper & James 1033-34); Sutton 
Motor Co. v. Crysel, 28g S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
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be reasonably foreseen if the plaintiff were a person of average consti-
tution, including average emotional stability~ the defendant has not 
breached the required standard of conduct and, therefore, is not negli-
gent and not liable. If the defendant, however, acted unreasonably with 
respect to the average person, he will then be liable for all of the results 
that flow from this action, even though the plaintiff can be shown to 
have been peculiarly vulnerable to this kind of psychological stimulus.Gss 
This is similar to the "thin skull" cases in which damage more severe 
than would have been expected results from defendant's negligence be-
cause the plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to injury from this kind of 
force. 600 Whether or not the defendant was negligent in the action 
from which psychological injury results is to be tested by a person of 
average constitution; 601 and in determining if the plaintiff's fears were 
reasonable under the circumstances, the test is what a reasonable layman 
in a similar situation would have thought and done, not what a scientist 
would know to be the actual danger.602 (4) Where the only result of 
defendant's negligence is mental disturbance without any accompanying 
physical symptoms, there is general agreement that recovery is not 
allowed.808 
Here again radiation exposure situations will call for a reexamination 
of the underlying assumptions of damag~s rules; for it is apparent that 
there has been a lack of clarity in analysis, certainly on the part of courts, 
and it would seem even on the part of legal writers. There has not been 
sufficient recognition of the real need. for relating and reconciling the 
rules controlling breach of the standard of conduct, those controlling the 
kind of recompensable injuries flowing from negligent actions, and those 
GDD Smith, supra note 594 at 256-61. The cases cited clearly support the conclusion 
drawn. 
600 2 Restatement, Torts §461 (1934); Smith, supra note 594. particularly at 26o, 
n. 200. See, e.g., Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W.2d 913 (1946); Nelson v. 
Black, 266 P.2d 817 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1954) ; Sterrett v. East Texas Motor Freight 
Lines, 150 Tex. 12, 236 S.W.2d 776 (1951); Oliver v. Yellow Cab Co., g8 F.zd 192 
(7th Cir. 1938); Offensend v. Atlantic Ref. Co., J22 Pa. 399, 185 At!. 745 (1936); 
dicta of Judge L. Hand in Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 8g F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1937): 
"We do not forget that if a victim is so susceptible that the tort starts up a disease, 
or exacerbates his suffering, as it would not have done in the case of a normal man, 
he may recover in full, no matter how unlikely the result." See also Coover v. Pain-
less Parker, Dentist, 105 Cal. App. IIO, 286 Pac. 1048 (1930) for item of nervousness 
from X-ray bums. 
eo1 Smith, supra note 594 at 259. 
6°2 I d. at 265. Cf. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 176 N.Y.S.zd 996, 152 N.E.zd 249 (1958), in 
which $5,000 was awarded for severe cancer-phobia because of the possibility of cancer 
developing. 
608 Prosser 18o; Harper & James 1031-1032; Smith, supra note 594 at 227-28. 
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which determine the persons protected when somewhat unusual results 
follow, particularly in psychological injury cases. 
Applying the above principles to radiation situations, even in those 
jurisdictions which require impact before there can be any recovery at 
all, it would not be difficult to show scientifically that irradiation has a 
physical impact on the exposed person.604 In those jurisdictions which 
do not require a physical impact the problem does not arise. If existing 
rules are applied with strict logic, whatever mental anguish would be 
suffered by an average layman when told that he had been irradiated 
would be a compensable injury even though in fact there was no basis 
in scientific knowledge for fearing a noticeable physical consequence 
from the amount of radiation received. Yet this would actually be quite 
like a case in which the only real impact on the victim is a psychological 
one, the very case in which under existing case law recovery would be 
denied. 
Moreover, if the scientific conclusion that impact from radiation 
causes some kind of physical injury is accepted, then, applying existing 
rules with strict logic, mental anguish would be compensable even if the 
victim exposed had an unreasonable fear of injury. The mental anguish 
is a permissible item of damages when there is impact and at least some 
physical injury. There would be a finding of breach of duty owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff which caused a physical injury, although 
not one the plaintiff would feel other than psychologically. 
If there is a purely psychological injury (in the sense that scientists 
feel there is no real risk from the small amount of radiation received) 
but some laymen reasonably might fear injury in spite of scientific 
opinion, the present writers feel that recovery should be denied so long 
as there are no real physical manifestations resulting from the fear itself. 
Even under existing rules, if there are actual physical manifestations of 
the fear such as some kind of traumatic neurosis, then the injury sud-
denly becomes more acceptable to the law and recovery may be allowed. 
Also, if there is actual physical impact, recovery is allowed for even un-
reasonable emotional reactions. On the other hand, if there is only a 
disturbance of mental tranquility, and we assume that a minor irradia-
tion is not an impact, then laymen who reasonably fear for their future 
health would not be allowed recovery. 
It is submitted that these conclusions amount to an illogical mixture 
of the "thin-skull" doctrine with psychological injury principles. It be-
comes somewhat ridiculous to use the average layman to determine 
whether or not the defendant was negligent, but any neurotic layman 
so• Infra note HJ9Q. 
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to test the extent of injuries. At least where radiation levels are low so 
that the impact really is only a psychological one, perhaps the standard 
used in determining negligence ought to be whether or not the defendant 
was negligent in the sense that the radiation released might cause a per-
son of average mental stability to have fear and concern for his future 
health. Liability for mental disturbance should not be determined by 
whether or not the defendant was negligent in the sense that he created 
an unreasonable risk of physical harm of a kind which did not actually 
result. The rule of recovery should not be changed when the damage 
question is reached. There should be no allowance for harm resulting 
from the fact that the exposed person is peculiarly neurotic. When 
courts assert that a negligent wrongdoer can be held liable for all of the 
injuries which are the proximate result of defendant's negligent action, 
using the "thin-skull" philosophy, they are assuming the answer to the 
question that should be faced and answered on the basis of social policy. 
A recent California appellate decision well illustrates the kind of re-
sults that can follow from mixing the "average person's reaction test" 
to determine breach of duty, and the "thin-skull liability for all conse-
quences test" to govern the extent of damages. In Nelson v. Black 606 
the plaintiff's neck was injured slightly when his truck was hit in the 
rear by defendant. The injury seemed quite minor at the time. Shortly 
after leaving the scene of the accident he noticed that his neck was hurt-
ing badly and went to his doctor. Over a period of months he had symp-
toms of serious pains and headaches that were hardly attributable to the 
initial jolt and injury to his neck. The jury found for the defendant, 
but the appellate court reversed, stating that under the evidence the plain-
tiff should recover since the defendant's medical expert testified that the 
pain and suffering were real, even though they were not caused by the 
injury itself but because of a psychoneurosis under which plaintiff was 
suffering at the time of the accident. The court said: 
It is admitted that the collision actually occurred and even if 
plaintiff suffered no actual physical injury as a result of the 
collision the effect on his nervous system testified to by de-
fendant's only witness on the subject was none the less com-
pensable. 606 
In so holding, the court very clearly was assuming that the only reason 
for the suffering and pain was the "pre-existing quality of the emotional 
605 Supra note 6oo. See also as possibly involving such neurotic injuries, Flood v. 
Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940), apparently applying the "thin skull" doctrine 
whether the preexisting condition is "physical or nervous." 
606 Nelson v. Black, supra note 6oo at 819. 
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stability of his personality." The court then stated the usual rule that 
the tortfeasor must take the person whom he injures as he finds him and 
even if this includes susceptibility to greater than normal damage the 
defendant still is not exonerated. The court said that in California this 
ru.le applied even in cases where the susceptibility was caused by mental 
instability. 
A similar case is Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry.601 in which the plaintiff 
suffered a miscarriage allegedly from fright resulting when the car on 
which she was riding seemed about to collide with another cable car, 
although it did not actually do so. The court said that so long as there 
was a physical manifestation of admittedly only mental shock (no 
impact) there still could be recovery. 
In such a case, though there comes, as an intermediate cause 
between the negligence and injury, a condition or operation of 
mind on the part of the injured passenger, negligence is never-
theless the proximate cause of the injury. 608 
Although proximate cause often is referred to as the reason for deci-
sion in these cases, it really is little more than a conclusion that social 
policy dictates that this particular type of injury should or should not 
be compensable. The policy question should be faced squarely and a de-
cision made as to whether or not this kind of recovery should be allowed. 
It was reasonable in Nelson v. Black to expect or foresee an injury to 
the plaintiff's neck if his car was bumped sharply from the rear. It is 
not reasonable to foresee that a particular plaintiff will be a psychoneu-
rotic person who from such a slight impact will suffer unusually severe 
reactions. One wonders whether it is socially justifiable to conclude 
under these circumstances, because an unusual risk of one kind is fore-
seeable, that another kind of damage should be compensable. In this 
sense the Nelson case differs from the Purcell case, because many per-
sons on the cable car undoubtedly had real fear of impact, although 
actually none took place. The fear undoubtedly would be normal to any 
person, not just to an especially neurotic one. Therefore it might be 
said that it was reasonably foreseeable that there would be a psycho-
logical shock from the impending accident. Even in the Purcell case 
the application of the "thin-skull" rule where the only impact is a mental 
one seems somewhat questionable, since it can be argued that the only 
reason there was any damage was because of the special condition of 
one of the passengers. In one sense it is always foreseeable that anybody 
607 48 Minn. 134, so N.W. 1034 (1892). 
aos !d. at 139. 
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who comes within the line of force negligently set in motion by the de-
fendant may have some special condition which will make the injuries 
particularly damaging. Whether or not to allow recovery for the par-
ticular injuries as a matter of social policy cannot be answered by this 
kind of foreseeability because the result is always foreseeable by hind-
sight, and in most cases can be foreseen ahead of time if a person is 
imaginative enough and thinks of enough possibilities. 
In analyzing the policy question involved in radiation cases in which 
mental disturbance occurs several different situations must be considered. 
First, some cases will involve actual physical injuries of a compensable 
character resulting from the physical impact of the radiation. Other 
cases will arise in which a physical symptom manifests itself and is very 
real to the victim but has not been caused by the physical impact of radia-
tion and is rather the result of the psychological reaction of the victim. 
Still others will occur in which the only manifestation is mental anxiety 
and loss of general peace of mind. The latter can arise both when there 
is other physical injury and when there is none. One must remember also 
that the uninformed average person as well as the seriously neurotic may 
experience a psychological reaction leading to real physical symptoms in 
situations in which a scientist would feel that there was no danger of 
actual physical injury from radiation exposure. It also is true that pre-
venting fraudulent claims for psychological injuries is not easy. The 
decision as to whether or not to allow recovery in any case, however, 
should turn on the question of what damages society should charge to a 
person who has acted negligently in some respect and who is handling a 
substance of great social value but which presents some risks of injury. 
If actual recoverable physical injury results from irradiation, the 
Nelson case rule would permit full recovery for all physical manifesta-
tions of psychological origin no matter how neurotic and unreasonable 
the disturbance was. This is an unwarranted extension of the "thin-
skull" cases and should not be carried over into the psychological reac-
tion cases. Such claims in radiation cases are likely to arise and recovery 
should be permitted only if a person of normal emotional stability would 
have suffered the injury. 
If a person using a radiation source is negligent, he should be held 
accountable for any physical injury it causes, even to the person unusu-
ally sensitive to radiation. This is the "thin-skull" situation. It is sub-
mitted that this result should not be applied where the only injury is 
because of purely psychological reactions. The courts could hold, though 
they should not, that there has been physical impact which killed a few 
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cells; they should treat them as purely psychological injury cases. If so, 
the person who is unusually neurotic will not be allowed to recover under 
existing case law. 
The most difficult case of all is that in which the layman of normal 
emotional stability would suffer anxiety if he reasonably feared he had 
been exposed to radiation and its serious consequences, even though the 
nuclear expert would feel confident that the person should not be con-
cerned. Under the Purcell case, recovery for any physical symptoms 
would be permitted. Applied to the case of an accident in which many 
persons are seriously exposed and many others just slightly, and it is 
impossible for the public to know who was exposed to what extent, a 
tremendous number of claims could arise. If recovery for psychological 
injuries is permitted, this would prejudice the possibility of compensat-
ing fully those with actual physical injuries who also have a claim 
against available funds. Allowing recoveries for purely psychological 
injury to all persons frightened in this situation seems doubtful social 
policy. 
If some radiation in excess of permitted levels is released but not 
enough to result in physical harm so long as it is not repeated, it may 
be questionable policy to allow recovery for all who as a part of the unin-
formed public reasonably fear some physical result. The standard of 
conduct required of the non-negligent operator is purposely set very 
low so that an accumulation over a period of years will not cause injury. 
It may be negligent to release any more than this amount but if it hap-
pens only once no real harm can result. Perhaps recovery should be 
denied for even physical symptoms resulting from the public's unin-
formed psychological reaction to news that excess radiation has been 
released. The alternative is to be sure the public does not know of the 
incident but this is worse social policy because it may prevent a person 
with a legitimate claim for a physical injury from knowing that a par-
ticular source of radiation may be responsible. So long as the exposure 
was not intentionally caused, even though the defendant has been neg-
ligent, it seems questionable social policy to allow recovery to a large 
number of persons or to a single person simply because he fears injury 
rather than actually experiencing it, real though his symptoms may be 
to him. 
(3) Lost Business Profits and Proximity of Atomic In-
stallation 
Most of the lost busiQess profits cases that will arise because of release 
of nuclear radiation should create no unique problems for the courts. 
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The problems in this area are not easily resolved and the answers are 
not clear for all cases, but there is adequate analysis available.609 For 
the most part atomic energy cases will fit into the present pattern of rules 
concerning damages. 
In general the courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for lost 
profits where a business is interfered with and is damaged solely because 
of the negligence of the defendant rather than because of intentional 
action on his part. On the other hand, as discussed above, if persons have 
been injured physically, loss of earning capacity is a compensable 
item; 610 and when personal property or realty has been damaged so as 
to prevent its use in carrying on business operations, a recovery for the 
lost value of the use of the property is permitted, at least to the extent 
of normal profits, although a particularly profitable arrangement may 
not be compensated. 611 
Many cases can be found in which a general statement is made to the 
effect that a destruction or interruption of a business, or an injury to a 
business operation, caused by' the wrongful act of another is a proper 
element of damage.612 The cases do not depend on whether the action 
was in tort or contract, but nearly all involve what might be called in-
tentional interference, although there are a few in which the loss was 
caused by negligence. The proof of the amount of profits lost, whether 
past or anticipated, is not always easy and the burden of proof, of course, 
is on the plaintiff.618 Some courts hold that anticipated profits are suf-
ficiently certain to permit recovery only if they are derived from an 
established business, not a new one.614 Most of the cases involved losses 
because of physical injury, and where the operation of an atomic energy 
facility actually causes damage to the property of the business by radio-
active fall-out, there is no reason to apply any different rule than in 
other kinds of cases. The results should be the same. 
One somewhat unique situation may arise, however, from the use of 
60 9 See discussions in McCormick §§28-30; Prosser §1o6, particularly at 732-3S; 
Harper & James §§6.10, 6.11, 2S-3· 
61o See discussion of lost earning capacity, supra note s82 ff. 
611 See discussions cited supra note 6og. 
612 See, e.g., Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 P.2d 734 (1948); Yates v. Kuhl, 130 
Cal. App.2d S36, 279 P.2d S63 (I9SS); Bashore v. Publix Shirt Corp., 370 Pa. 142, 
87 A.2d 468 (I9S2); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 
194 Va. 872, 7S S.E.2d 694 (I9S3). See also IS Am. Jur., Damages §§133-34. 
618 Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, i29 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954). See 
also McCormick §29. 
614 McCracken v. Stewart, 170 Kan. 129, 223 P.2d 963 (19SO); Evergreen Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Milstead, 2o6 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (19SS); Truscott v. Peterson, 78 
N.D. 498. so N.W.2d 24S (19SI). 
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radioactive materials involving lost business profits. Will recovery be 
permitted for damages to plaintiff's business if they result solely from 
the psychological effect of the presence of the nuclear activity? Very few 
cases and little discussion of this type of injury is to be found and the 
answer to the question is not at all clear. Yet, at least until the general 
public learns more about nuclear installations and radiation hazards, 
such situations are likely to arise frequently in the vicinity of large 
atomic energy facilities. 
Even though there has been no accident or release of radioactive ma-
terial affecting surrounding property, the mere presence of a reactor or 
similar installation may depress land value, whether the land is used for 
business or residential purposes, in the surrounding area. It is possible 
that patrons of a business may cease to deal with the plaintiff because 
of the fear generated by his proximity to the reactor. This could involve 
reducing the ability of the employer to hire employees to work so close 
to a reactor, or it could involve a loss of patronage of the general public 
as might be the case with resort hotels, schools, and mercantile establish-
ments so dependent upon the patronage of the public for success. It is 
quite possible that public apprehension alone, even though it has no 
scientific basis, may be enough to damage seriously the plaintiff's busi-
ness operations. Should the school or the resort owner be allowed to 
prove that the public, whether ill-advised or not, stayed away because 
of the presence of the reactor? 
Cases in which the interference with a business results from libel or 
slander which destroys the confidence of the public are not directly ap-
plicable because such statements are made knowingly, usually with the 
express purpose of injuring the plaintiff's business-i.e., they are in-
tentional torts. In the case of the reactor or other atomic energy facility, 
not only would there be little likelihood of proving an intent to injure 
the plaintiff's business but the operations probably would be licensed and 
therefore approved by the AEC, such approval being granted only after 
a finding that public health and safety are not substantially endangered. 
The only cases that seem at all analogous are those involving the 
maintenance of a nuisance. Whether a nuisance is the kind of wrong 
for which damages for interference with business profits would be per-
missible is not easy to answer. The general subject of nuisance has been 
thoroughly discussed by text writers. 615 A determination usually is 
based on a balancing of "the gravity of the harm against the utility of 
61~ Prosser ch. 14 ; Harper & James §§ 1.23-1.30. See also discussion infra Chap-
ter IV on strict liability. 
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the defendant's activity in the light of the suitability of the area for the 
respective competing uses." 616 There also are_ cases in which "conduct 
producing apprehension or fear of physical danger may, if the fear is 
extreme, be sufficiently annoying to amount to a nuisance, as the storing 
of powder or high explosives in large quantities in a thickly populated 
portion of a city, or the maintenance of a hospital for persons afflicted 
with contagious diseases in a residential section." 617 
The types of cases coming closest to the matter here under considera-
tion are those supporting the statement by Prosser to the effect that 
"Fears and feelings common to most of the community are to be con-
sidered; and the dread of contagion from a pesthouse, common to or-
dinary citizens, may make it a nuisance, although there is no founda-
tion in scientific fact." 618 The hospital cases supporting this statement 
are as close as analogy to the reactor situation as can be found. In each 
situation there is apprehension, although an apparently unreasonable 
one from a scientific standpoint, that hann will result from the kind of 
activity being carried on nearby. Fear of harm from bacteria in the 
hospital cases produces a psychological effect similar to the concern 
about harm from radiation in the case of reactors; both are little under-
stood by the general public. 
In Stotler v. Rochelle, typical of these cases, the court said: 
The question is not whether the establishment of the hospital 
would place the occupants of the adjacent dwellings in actual 
danger of infection, but whether they would have reasonable 
ground to fear such a result, and whether, in view of the gen-
eral dread inspired by the disease, the reasonable enjoyment of 
their property would not be materially interfered with by the 
bringing together of a considerable number of cancer patients 
in this place. 619 
The fear in this case was caused by the presence of cancer patients. As 
Prosser points out in his discussion,620 there are decisions to the con-
trary where an injunction against the alleged nuisance was refused 
616 Harper & James 74. 
617 ld. at 77· 
618 Prosser 396-97. The undertaking establishment cases are not the same for it is 
not fear of physical danger but generally depressed feelings from closeness to death 
which is complained of in those cases. See 39 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1955). Radioactive 
wastes stored in a Pennsylvania community caused enough public concern, apparently 
unjustifiably, that they were removed. BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 4: 322, 4: 382 
(1958). 
619 83 Kan. 86, 91, 109 Pac. 788 (1910). Similar statements are found in the cases 
cited by Prosser 397, n. 78. 
620 Prosser 397· 
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when there was no showing that there was an actual existing danger.621 
It is interesting to note that the decisions denying relief are the most 
recent of all those found, and none even dealing with this type of prob-
lem have been found since 1926. This may result from a change in the 
general attitude of the public toward hospitals and a better realization 
of the lack of actual danger involved. Or it rna)' be a recognition that 
the balance of interest clearly is in favor of the maintenance of such in-
stitutions. The difficulty with these cases as analogy for our problem is 
that they all involve equitable relief rather than damages. 
The assessment of damages if a nuisance should be declared is some-
what complicated, but there would seem to be no reason to expect the 
courts to measure the damages in any unique way in atomic energy 
cases.622 Of all the cases that have been examined dealing with the 
problem of damages for nuisance, only one has been found dealing 
squarely with the problem of the loss of business profits caused by a 
nuisance--Johnson Oil Refining Co. of Illinois v. Elledge.628 In that 
case the court allowed the plaintiff to recover the profits from his filling 
station operations lost through the defendant's maintenance of a nui-
sance in the form of coke dust which settled on the plaintiff's property. 
In several other cases the courts have either stated or clearly implied 
that the loss of business profits was permissible, but in each case the 
courts have found that the evidence of the loss was insufficient to 
maintain plaintiff's burden of proof.62• 
The facts of Central Georgia Power Co. v. Pope 625 come as close as 
any to our suggested case of loss of business because of the mere prox-
imity of a reactor. The defendant had built a dam and it was alleged that 
mosquit.oes bred in the backed-up water, driving most of the people from 
the surrounding area. The plaintiff was a store owner who alleged that 
his very profitable business was almost ruined because his customers 
were gone. While there is a dictum in the official headnotes that lost 
business profits might be_ recovered if a nuisance kept customers from 
a21 Board of Health v. North American Home, 77 N.J. Eq. 464, 78 At!. 677 (1910); 
Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. ~. 248 Pac. 225 (1926). 
6 22 See discussion in McCormick §127. For much less complete discussions, see Pros-
ser 416-17; Harper & James 91-92. 
628 175 Okla. 496, 53 P.2d 543 (1936). 
624 Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App.2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 (1951); 
Bollinger v. American Asphalt Roof Corp., 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S.W.2d 544 (1929); 
Harriu v. Great Neck Motors, 143 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1955), a/f'd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 568 
( 1956) ; Shreveport Laundries v. Red Iron Drilling Co., 192 So. 895 (La. App. 1939). 
626 141 Ga. 186, 8o S.E. 642 ( 1913). 
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ingress to plaintiff's place of business,628 the court denied the claim in 
this case because the defendant's wrongful act affected the customers, if 
anyone, and not the plaintiff businessman. The court said that, in 
actions based upon negligence only, injuries or death of one with whom 
a plaintiff is doing business is not a recoverable damage to plaintiff. 
It is not pretended that the defendant killed some of the plain-
tiff's customers, and made others sick, for the purpose of de-
stroying his business. The damages sought to be recovered on 
this account are too remote. If the plaintiff could recover on 
this basis, it is not readily perceived why a merchant might not 
bring an action against a railroad company for loss of custom 
arising from the death of a good customer caused by its negli-
gence; or why, if one person should create a nuisance in a 
neighborhood, which should cause one of the residents to move 
to another place, every merchant with whom such person 
dealt before his removal could not recover because his patron-
age had been lost after his change of residence. It will be 
readily seen that such claims for damages might be extended 
into almost limitless ramifications. They do not fall within the 
rules in cases where property has been physically injured, or 
there has been some interference with an easement or right 
connected with or appurtenant thereto. 621 
The court then distinguished the case in which, by a nuisance, plaintiff's 
place of business itself is rendered so unhealthy or unpleasant as to 
drive away the customers. In many ways the reactor also involves a 
neighborhood nuisance situation which keeps customers away, not be-
cause of any physical deterioration of the plaintiff's property but because 
of a psychological fear of the neighborhood generally. So interpreted, 
the Central Georgia Power Co. case stands for no recovery in our psy-
chological nuisance situation-the injury, if any, is to the customers, 
not to the businessman, or atleast his injuries are too remote. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the psychological nuisance 
really is not too unlike the coke dust and other cases in which there is a 
physical interference with the plaintiff's property, in which case there can 
be recovery of business profits if the losses are properly proved. He 
could argue that his own property really has become psychologically un-
pleasant for customers, not just the neighborhood: .If recovery were 
allowed for this psychological nuisance, the reactor owner would have 
to compensate all established businesses and all homeowners or others 
6 26 This is the only authority cited by Prosser 417, n. 91, for recovery of lost profits 
of an established business, though this statement of the court is apparently dictum. 
627 Supra note 625 at 18g-90. (Emphasis added.) 
326 TORT LIABILITY 
with property within a radius limited only by the psychological lines 
drawn by the imagination of the general public. 
No doubt the effect upon the federal reactor program of a state court 
holding the reactor operator liable for such psychological nuisance dam-
ages would be significantly burdensome. This raises the question of the 
effect on state law of the fact that large atomic energy installations are 
licensed by the federal government. Are such damages thereby pre-
cluded? 
(a) Effect of Licensing-Constitutional Questions 
Since all the uses of radiation sources which will create a serious possi-
bility of radiation injury (such as reactor operators, fuel core fabri-
cators, companies processing radioisotopes or handling the disposal of 
radioactive waste material), are now federally licensed and will be so 
licensed for the foreseeable future, it is important to consider the effect 
of this program on the possibilities of bringing nuisance suits against 
such operations. Treatise writers seem to agree 628 that so long as the 
licensee acts within the terms of the license and does not act negligently 
or in disregard of the rights of others, his activity cannot be abated on 
the ground· that it is a public nuisance. Prosser and also Harper and 
James; however, state that constitutional principles place a limit on the 
extent to which legislative authority can immunize the licensee from 
damage actions by surrounding property owners. They agree in dis-
tinguishing between "minor" and "major" 629 or "small" and "great" 630 
private nuisances. The cases cited in the two treatises to support their 
conclusions are in point, but not only are all of the cases rather old, 631 a 
fact which makes them particularly unreliable authority in constitutional 
law matters, but also the terms "minor-major" and "small-great" are not 
very helpful, even if they can lle considered as accurately descriptive. 
Actually the problem is one of a balancing of interests, in which case the 
distinction is not between how great or small is the inconvenience to sur-
rounding landowners, but rather it becomes a matter of determining how 
much of an inconvenience it is balanced against the general desirability 
of allowing or encouraging the particular activity. Certainly many sub-
stantial inconveniences have been held to be non-recoverable because the 
activity was licensed. 
The cases that have arisen so far have involved situations in which 
628 Prosser 421; Harper & James 87-88. 
629 Prosser 421. 
630 Harper & James 87. 
631 All before 1904 except for one in 1914. Supra note 628. 
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the licensing authority has been a part of the same government, whether 
state or federal, whose courts have tried the damage actions arising out 
of the licensed activity. This will differ from atomic energy operations 
which are likely to present the problem of psychological nuisance merely 
from the existence of the reactor, fuel core fabricating plant, or dis-
posal operation. In the atomic energy area only the federal government 
issues the licenses, but, for the most part, it will be in the state courts 
that the damage actions will be brought. This, therefore, raises the 
question whether the federal government, by licensing an activity that 
would otherwise be considered a nuisance under state law, can immunize 
the licensee from an action to abate either a public or a private nuisance 
or prevent a damage action for the nuisance created. There is also the 
further question whether, assuming the federal power, the Congress in 
setting up the Atomic Energy Commission with its regulatory power 
and in providing for government indemnity for legal liability imposed 
upon licensees, intended to preclude either injunctions against operating 
or damage recovery for losses occasioned by psychological nuisance. If 
Congress has attempted to preclude such actions and has the power to 
do so, state law on this question is unimportant. Actually no state ~t 
the present time has a real licensing program for major installations,832 
but regulatory programs are being developed and the problem will be-
come important. 
( i) The Power of Congress 
The general power of Congress to regulate practically all aspects of 
atomic energy operations and to supersede state regulation seems clear.633 
But this does not answer the question whether such power extends to 
the· point of withdrawing the cause of action that otherwise would exist 
in the state courts against the operation of a nuisance. The question 
whether Congress has the power to preclude an injunction or a damage 
action in the state court must itself be divided into two questions : Can 
the federal government encroach upon the power of the state in this con-
nection, and can the federal government encroach upon the· rights of 
individuals not to be deprived of their liberty or property without due 
process? It is also important to recognize that a different answer might 
be given in the case of damages from that given when an injunction is 
sought. 
632 See infra Part III, Chapter V, on state regulation and also federal pre-emption. 
683 See Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private 
Atomic Energy Activities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954). 
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Interference with State Power. No cases have been found dealing 
with the right of Congress to interfere with the exercise of state power 
so far as federally licensed nuisances are concerned, but surely Congress 
may do so. Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden,634 where the court invali-
dated state laws granting a steamship monopoly in New York waters, 
the court has consistently held that where Congress itself has power 
delegated to it by the Federal Constitution it may supersede state power 
in the area even without any expression of congressional intent. 635 This 
is true even when state regulations admittedly are justified, such as in 
the field of public health and safety, which traditionally is thought to 
be primarily the concern of the states.636 That such federal pre-emption 
precludes the power of state courts to enjoin action which is illegal 
under state law is made clear by such cases as Amalgamated Ass'n of 
Street, Elect. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board, 637 in which the court held that, in the 
light of the federal statute, a Wisconsin injunction against a peaceful 
strike for higher wages was not valid. The court also has held that a 
state may not revoke an interstate carrier's license even though the 
licensee was using the state highways repeatedly in violation of the state 
load limit regulation. 638 So long as Congress is acting within the scope 
of one of its delegated powers, it does not make any difference that it 
has an effect on a relationship, such as even marriage, which is peculiarly 
a state matter.639 The state power to regulate can be superseded by 
congressional act. 
A most recent example of this power to supersede the jurisdiction of 
the state, or one of its political subdivisions, is City of Chicago v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry.640 in which the court held that the city could not 
force a transportation company carrying passengers between railroad 
stations in Chicago to get a state license to operate, since the activity 
was within the power of the national government even though the op-
634 9 Wheat. I (1824). 
685 See many of the cases discussed infra Part III, Chapter V, Section E on federal 
pre-emption. 
636 See e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 13S U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681 (189o) (liquor); Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 32S U.S. 761, 6s S.Ct. ISIS (I94S) (railroad train lengths); 
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct. 29S (I9SI) (milk). See other 
cases cited in discussion of federal pre-emption question, infra Part Ill, Chapter V, 
notes 3I4-S3· 
637 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 3S9 (19SI). See also Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & 
Helpers Local Union #776, 346 U.S. 48s, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). 
638 Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 7S S.Ct. 191 (I9S4). 
639 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct. 13 (1946). 
640 3S7 U.S. 77, 78 S.Ct. 1063 (19S8). 
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erations of the company took place solely within the boundaries of the 
city. The court said: 
We are fully aware that use of local streets is involved, but 
no one suggests that Congress cannot require the City to per-
mit interstate commerce to pass over those streets. Of course 
the City retains considerable authority to regulate how trans-
fer vehicles shall be operated. It could hardly be denied, for 
example, that sach vehicles must obey traffic signals, speed lim-
its and other general safety regulations. Similarly the City 
may require registration of these vehicles and exact reasonable 
fees for their use of the local streets ... [but] the City has 
no power to decide whether the Transfer can operate a motor 
vehicle service between terminals for the railroads because this 
service is an integral part of interstate transportation au-
thorized and subject to regulation under the Interstate Com-
merce Act. . . . [The] company was not obligated to apply 
for a certificate of convenience and necessity and submit to the 
administrative procedures incident thereto before bringing this 
action. 641 · 
One week following the decision in the Chicago case the Supreme 
Court decided that the state of Washington could not raise constitutional 
objections to participation by contract by the city of Tacoma in a fed-
eral power project, except in a manner provided by federal statute, even 
though the state court had held that the city had no authority under 
state law to make such a contract with the federal government against 
the wishes of the state.642 A lower federal court liad held that a federal 
statute could give such authority to the city us and the Supreme Court 
had denied review by w~it of certiorari.6" The Supreme Court said the 
dec.ision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was not subject to col-
lateral attack since the federal statute dictated how objections were to 
be raised. 
On the same date that the Supreme Court decided the Tacoma case, 
it handed down a decision in a case arising out of a reclamation project 
being carried out in California jointly by the state and federal govern-
ments. The court held that the federal government, in the spending of 
federal money and in releasing the water collected by the use of federal 
money, could distribute the water in such a way as to ignore the vested 
rights, under California law, of landowners to use water for irrigation 
641 I d. at 88-89. 
642 City of Tacoma v. Taxpayer of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 78 S.Ct. 1209 (1958). 
643 Washington v. Federal Power Comm., 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953). 
644 347 u.s. 9J6, 74 S.Ct. 626 (1953). 
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purposes. 645 These cases show that within its delegated powers Congress 
is supreme and supersedes state regulatory power. 
There seems little question, then, but that Congress has the power, 
under commerce, war, or disposal of property powers, to supersede state 
la~s to the extent deemed appropriate by Congress and to control the 
conditions under which licensees may operate in the atomic energy area. 
Less clear is the power of Congress to wipe out the interest, contract or 
property, of private individuals which have been affected by the exist-
ence or the operation of the facility. 
Interference with Private Property Interests. The Supreme Court 
has dealt with two situations which are fairly analogous to the problem 
created by the atomic installation. Both of them involved the operation 
of a railroad and consequent injury to private persons in the neighbor-
hood. In the first case, Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Fifth Baptist 
Church,646 the railroad company had been authorized by Congress to 
build the line together with the necessary buildings such as roundhouses. 
A roundhouse was erected very close to the plaintiff church, which 
brought an action asking damages for the discomfort occasioned by the 
operations. The court held that, because of the legislative grant of au-
thority, any incidental inconvenience which unavoidably followed the 
use of the street by the trains did not give a cause of action, even though 
the noise and disturbance attending their use were bothersome. Such 
incidental discomforts to which all members of the public in the vicinity 
are subject must be endured for the general good. At the same time, 
after stating that the railroad company had been unreasonable in the 
selection of its site for the roundhouse, the court held that the defendant 
must respond in damages for the special injuries inflicted on the plaintiff 
by the roundhouse operations. 
It admits indeed of grave doubt whether Congress could au-
thorize the company to occupy and use any premises within the 
city limits, in a way which would subject others to physical dis-
comfort and annoyance in the quiet use and enjoyment of their 
property, and at the same time exempt the company from the 
liability to suit for damages or compensation, to which indi-
viduals acting without such authority would be subject under 
like circumstances. Without expressing any opinion on this 
point, it is sufficient to observe that such authority would not 
justify an invasion of others' property, to an extent which 
would amount to an entire deprivation of its use and enjoy-
ment, without compensation to the owner. Nor could such au-
645 Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 78 S.Ct. 1174 (1958). 
646 loB u.s. 317, 2 S.Ct. 719 (188J). 
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thority be invoked to justify acts, creating physical discomfort 
and annoyance to others in the use and enjoyment of their 
property, to a less extent than entire deprivation, if different 
places from those occupied could be used by the corporation 
for its purposes, without causing such discomfort and annoy-
~~ . 
The acts that a legislature may authorize, which, without 
such authorization, would constitute nuisances, are those 
which affect public highways or public streams, or matters in 
which the public has an interest and over which the public has 
control. The legislative authorization exempts only from lia-
bility to suits, civil or criminal, at the instance of the State; it 
does not affect any claim of a private citizen for damages for 
any special inconvenience and discomfort not experienced by 
the public at large. 847 
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In 1914 the Supreme Court decided Richards v. Washington Ter-
minal C o.648 involving an almost identical situation except that the 
damages were claimed for diminution of property value of surrounding 
property caused by the gases and smoke discharged from a long tunnel 
within the city limits. The court here drew a distinction between the 
gases and smoke necessarily incident to the usual running of the trains 
and those collected from the whole length of the tunnel and discharged 
at one spot in such a manner as to peculiarly affect the plaintiff's prop-
erty. The court said : · 
We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under 
state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that 
while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a 
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a 
private nuisance of such a ·character as to amount in effect 
to a taking of private property for public use. . . . 
But the question remains, in cases of the class now before 
us, What is to be deemed a private nuisance such as amounts 
to a taking of property? And by a great and preponderant 
weight of judicial authority, in those States whose constitu-
tions contain a prohibition of the taking of private property 
for public use without compensation, substantially in the form 
employed in the Fifth Amendment, it has become established 
that railroads constructed and operated for the public use, al-
though with private capital and for private gain, are not sub-
ject to actions in behalf of neighboring property awners for 
the ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the rail-
road, in the absence of negligence. Such roads are treated as 
847 ld. at 331-32. 
848 233 U.S. 546, 34 S.Ct. 654 ( 1914). 
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public highways, and the proprietors as public servants, with 
the exemption normally enjoyed by such servants from liability 
to private suit, so far as concerns the incidental damages accru-
ing to owners of non-adjacent land through the proper and 
skillful management and operation of the railways. Any 
diminution of the value of property not directly invaded nor 
peculiarly affected, but sharing in the common burden of inci-
dental damages arising from the legalized nuisance, is held not 
to be a "taking" within the constitutional provision. The im-
munity is limited to such damages as naturally and unavoid-
ably result from the proper conduct of the road and are shared 
generally by property owners whose lands lie within range of 
the inconveniences necessarily incident to proximity of a rail-
road. It includes the noises and vibrations incident to the run-
ning of trains, the necessary emission of smoke and sparks 
from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable 
from the normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad. 649 
The court proceeded to emphasize that normally such incidental in-
conveniences as are really necessary are protected by the legislative 
authority. The court then said: 
The present case, in the single particular already alluded to 
-that is to say, with respect to so much of the damage as is 
attributable to the gases and smoke emitted from the locomo-
tive engines while in the tunnel, and forced out of it by the 
fanning system therein installed,· and issuing from the portal 
located near to plaintiff's property in such manner as to ma-
terially contribute to render his property less habitable than 
otherwise it would be, and to depreciate it in value; and this 
without, so far as appears, any real necessity existing for such 
damage-is, in our opinion, within the reason and authority 
of the decision just cited. . . . The case shows that Congress 
has authorized, and in effect commanded, defendant to con-
struct its tunnel with a portal located in the midst of an in-
habited portion of the city. The authority, no doubt, includes 
the use of steam locomotive engines in the tunnel, with the in-
evitable concomitants of foul gases and smoke emitted from 
the engines. No question is made but that it includes the instal-
lation and operation of a fanning system for ridding the 
tunnel of this source of discomfort to those operating the 
trains and traveling upon them. All this being granted, the 
special and peculiar damage to the plaintiff as a property owner 
in close proximity to the portal is the necessary consequence, 
unless at least it be feasible to install ventilating shafts or 
other devices for preventing the outpouring of gases and 
6 49 !d. at 553-54. (Emphasis added.) 
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smoke from the entire length of the tunnel at a single point 
upon the surface, as at present. Construing the acts of Con-
gress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, they do not au-
thorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial 
a burden upon plaintiff's property without compensation to 
him. If the damage is not preventable by the employment at 
reasonable expense of devices such as have been suggested, 
then plaintiff's property is "necessary for the purposes contem-
plated," and may be acquired by purchase or condemnation 
(32 Stat. 909, 916, c. 856, § 9), and pending its acquisition 
defendant is responsible. If the damage is readily preventible, 
the statute furnishes no excuse, and defendant's responsibility 
follows on general principles.660 
333 
The court then remanded the case to the lower court to solve what it 
admitted to be a difficult problem of distinguishing between that part 
of the smoke which was attributable to the gases and smoke necessarily 
arising from train operations from the gases and smoke issuing from 
the tunnel. 
Applying the rationale of these cases, one might surmise that if the 
reactor operator, for example, should, through negligence or even with-
out negligence, emit more radioactive material into the air or into a 
stream than was permitted under the federal license there would be a 
cause of action in favor of an injured party. On the other hand, any 
damages that might result from material discharged within the limits 
set in the license might be called necessarily incident to. the normal 
operation of the facility as licensed by the government. The curtailment 
or destruction of the business of a resort hotel, housing development, 
school or similar institution because of the purely psychological nui-
sance created by public fear of a nearby reactor or other atomic energy 
facility would seem to be the very kind of damages necessarily incident 
to the existence of the reactor. The Atomic Energy Commission spe-
cifically finds as to each major installation that the site, as well as the 
operation, will not constitute an unreasonable hazard to the public health 
and safety. 
It is not accurate to describe this as a minor or small loss so far as 
the plaintiff is concerned. Nevertheless, balancing this admittedly sig-
nificant loss against the needs of the country for these operations in 
developing atomic energy, it would seem unwise to allow damage ac-
tions which would be a continuing burden on the operation of the nu-
clear installation. This is true when the AEC has found the operation to 
be a safe one. 
660 I d. at 556-57. 
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The fact that the Baltimore & Potomac and Richards cases involve 
nuisances not within a state but within the District of Columbia (fed-
erally owned territory) does not affect the application of the principles 
to cases arising out of reactors situated in states. So far as its effect on 
individuals is concerned, the constitutional limitation upon the legis-
lative authority to permit a "nuisance" is the same. It is derived from 
the Due Process Clause. Since the cited cases are rather old and involve 
operations of a public utility which was a very necessary part of our 
economic life, the question naturally arises as to whether the same 
reasoning would be followed today, not only when the facility is owned 
and operated by a public utility (although it be an electric utility instead 
of a railroad) , but also in cases involving research or other industrial 
reactors or other large plants not related to a public utility. Several 
research reactors are already being operated privately in this country, 
by both universities and industrial concerns. 
No subsequent cases have been found dealing with the problem of 
governmental authorization of what would otherwise be a nuisance. The 
attitude of the present Supreme Court must be derived from other types 
of cases which seem to involve similar policy questions, cases in which 
the rights of private individuals are interfered with by the government 
in such a manner as to deprive the person of something of value, 
whether it be vested or not, by way of a regulation which results in giv-
ing some other private person a consequent advantage, such as by the 
avoidance of a contract or other legal liability. Since there is no specific 
constitutional provision against federal impairment of contract rights 
such protection depends upon the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause protecting liberty and property. Cases in which federal statutes 
actually have taken away a contract right of some pecuniary value are 
useful analogies that should be considered along with those cases in-
volving the taking of property rights in the traditional sense. 
Under War Po·wer. Some of the cases in which there has been the 
clearest invasion of a significant pecuniary interest have arisen out of 
the activities of the government during World War II in the exercise 
of the war power. The setting of maximum prices on commodities,651 
and on rents, 652 which in each case rolled the prices back from the levels 
651 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. 64 S.Ct. 66o (1944). ·See Aidlin, "The 
Constitutionality of the 1942 Price Control Act," 30 Cal. L. Rev. 648 (1942); Cren-
shaw, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Rent Control," 5 Ala. Law. 442 ( 1944) ; Taft, 
"Rationing as a Proper Wartime Governmental Function," 31 Cal. L. Rev. 270 (1943); 
Merrill, "The War Power as the Basis for a National Agricultural Program," 17 
Neb. L. Bull. 23 (1938); Note, 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414 (1944). 
65 2 Bowles v. Willinghan, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944). 
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at the time when the regulations were promulgated, undoubtedly had a 
substantial pecuniary impact on many individuals, not only prospec-
tively but retroactively as well, since they controlled all goods sold and 
all rental of property after the effective date of the regulation even 
though the goods or the rental property had been acquired prior to the 
passage of the act. The over-all reciprocity of advantage involved in 
such price control regulations perhaps reduces somewhat the amount of 
the taking, just as does the reciprocity of advantage in the zoning 
cases. Another kind of war regulation which may come somewhat 
closer to an actual taking without any real reciprocity of advantage, 
except the general and remote one of lower taxes, arose out of the Re-
negotiation Act which provided for recapture by the government of 
"excessive profits." The court gave a very short answer to the argument 
that renegotiating of profits was a taking of property contrary to the 
Fifth Amendment. It said "Not only was it 'necessary and proper' for 
Congress to provide for such production [of war material] in the suc-
cessful conduct of the war, but it was well within the outer limits of the 
constitutional discretion of Congress and the President to do so under 
the terms of the Renegotiation Act." 668 The court held that the provi-
sions of the act were applicable to .even subcontractors who had no 
direct relations with the federal government; their contracts also were 
made subject to recapture of "excessive profits." 
Perhaps the clearest case of all in which the government regulations 
for practical purposes destroyed, for the time being at least, something 
of considerable economic value to the plaintiffs is United States v. Cen-
tral Eureka Mining Co.6u The government regulations resulted in ac-
tual closing of the gold mines during the period of the war. It was 
claimed that while the government did not actually take possession of 
any of the gold, it in effect had completely destroyed the plaintiff's 
economic rights to the gold by preventing all mining of it. While the 
lower federal court felt that this very clearly was a taking, since it 
amounted to a complete destruction of the plaintiff's right, the Supreme 
Court reversed on the ground that any restrictions were temporary in 
nature and there had been no actual taking of the property.655 Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan dissented on the ground that the property had been taken 
temporarily. 606 
653 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 76S, 68 S.Ct. 1294 (1948). 
654 3S7 U.S. ISS, 78 S.Ct. 1097 (I9S8). 
655 I d. at 168-6g. 
656 I d. at 179. 
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In each of these cases arising out of wartime regulations very sub-
stantial pecuniary loss had been suffered by the plaintiff, but recovery 
of damages was denied. Certainly in many of the cases, particularly in 
the gold mine cases, there was as much, if not more, "taking" than 
would be involved in the loss of patronage by a business due to a reac-
tor's psychological nuisance effect. Undoubtedly the most profitable use 
of property surrounding a proposed reactor in many cases would be the 
existing one and this use would be damaged by the psychological nui-
sance. Yet the land undoubtedly could be used for other purposes of a 
profitable nature, and it would seem to be no more of a taking than 
those involved in the cases cited above. 
The difficulty with using the war cases, however, is that they are an 
exercise of the war power. As stated by the court in the Lichter case: 
In total war it is necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of 
his property and profits with at least the same fortitude as 
that with which a drafted soldier makes his traditional sacri-
fices of comfort, security and life itsel£.657 
As the court put it in the Eureka Mining Co. case: 
In the context of war, we have been reluctant to find that de-
gree of regulation which, without saying so, requires com-
pensation to be paid for resulting losses of income. . . . The 
reasons are plain. War, particularly in modern times, de-
mands the strict regulation of nearly all resources. It makes 
demands which otherwise would be insufferable. But wartime 
economic restrictions, temporary in character, are insignificant 
when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life 
and freedom of action which war traditionally demands.658 
Under Commerce Power. Cases arising under the commerce power 
of Congress are not subject to the same justification of wartime neces-
sity. Many examples exist of exercise of the commerce power by Con-
gress in a manner that substantially affects the contract or property 
rights of individual persons. The regulation of maximum hours and 
minimum wages to be paid persons producing goods for interstate com-
merce,6~9 and the control of the uses to which a farmer can put grain 
raised on his own land, even to the point of denying him the right to 
use it to feed his own livestock,660 are examples of very substantial 
encroachments upon the liberty and property of individual persons, and 
6~7 Supra note 653 a,t 754. 
658 Supra note 654 at 168. (Emphasis added.) 
659 United States v. Darby,. 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451 ( 1941). 
6&0 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942). 
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· the court has upheld such invasions of pecuniary interest as necessary to 
the control of the national economy. Compensation need not be paid 
for such invasions. The attitude of the Supreme Court toward regula-
tions based upon the commerce power of Congress is exemplified by 
the following statements from the opinion in North American Co. v. 
S. E. C.,661 where the Court upheld a decree under the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935,662 even though it forced the breaking 
up of property holdings of a company acquired over a long period of 
years. 
This broad commerce clause does not operate so as to render 
the nation powerless to defend itself against economic forces 
that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the national 
economy. Rather it is an affirmative power commensurate 
with the national needs. It is unrestricted by contrary state 
laws or private contracts. And in using this great power, 
Congress is not bound by technical legal conceptions. Com-
merce itself is an intensely practical matter .... To deal 
with it effectively, Congress must be able to act in terms of eco-
nomic and financial realities. The commerce clause gives it 
authority to act. 668 
Another situation in which there is a real, though perhaps minor, 
taking of property justified under the commerce power is found in the 
union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act. They provide that to 
keep employment each employee must join the union and pay dues. The 
power of Congress to impose such a requirement was questioned in 
Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson. 664 Even though such provisions 
were apparently contrary to the state constitution, the Court held that 
whether union shops were good or bad was a policy question with 
which the courts should not interfere; its determination was for 
Congress. 
Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, has the 
final say on policy issues. If it acts unwisely, the electorate 
can make a change. The task of the judiciary ends once it 
appears that the legislative measure adopted is relevant or ap-
propriate to the constitutional power which Congress exer-
cises. The ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labor-
management relations are numerous and complex. They may 
well vary from age to age and from industry to industry. 
What would be needful one decade might be anathema the 
661327 U.S. 686, 66 S.Ct. 785 (1946). 
662 49 Stat. 8o3, 15 U.S.C.A. §79 (1951). 
66s Supra note 661 at 705. 
66• 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714 (1956). 
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next. The decision rests with the policy makers, not with the 
· judiciary. 66~ 
The Court held that the requirement of financial support by all the 
workers of the collective bargaining agency was within the commerce 
power of Congress. 
The Commerce Clause case that comes as close as any to holding that 
very real and substantial pecuniary rights can be prejudiced or taken 
away in the interests of the national economic policy arose out of the 
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act which Congress passed to take away the extra 
pay to which the workers would have been entitled for time spent walk-
ing from the gate to the work bench under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act as it had been interpreted in a previous Supreme Court decision. 
The workers claimed that their rights had vested and were protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari, 666 after the circuit court held that there was no viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause. The Circuit Court used the following 
language: 
Plaintiff could not expect that their status or rights would 
. remain unchanged through changing. circumstances and con-
ditions. They could reasonably anticipate changes in the law. 
The proposition that their rights granted by the Congress 
under the commerce clause could not be taken away by con-
gressional legislation under the same clause, is self-contra-
dictory. Rights secured even by private contract may be 
abrogated by subsequent legislation when authorized by con-
stitutional provisions. 667 
After holding that the law was not invalidated by being in some re-
spects retroactive since it was only a civil case, the court stated that 
the validity of the policy was for Congress to decide so long as Con-
gress was not "arbitrary, unreasonable_ or .capricious." 668 
The fact that the cause of action involved rights arising from a 
statute certainly was emphasized by the court as justifying congressional 
666 I d. at 234. 
6 66 Fisch v. Gener:d Motors Corp., 335 U.S. !)02, 69 S.Ct. 405 (1949). 
667 Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1948). 
668 !d. at 272. See comments on statute in Barnett, "The Portal-to-Portal Act of 
1947: Direct and Indirect Impairment of Vested Rights," 27 Ore. L. Rev. 274 ( 1948) ; 
Brown, "Vested Rights and the· Portal-to-Portal Act," 46 Mich. L. Rev. 723 (1948); 
Cotter, "Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation-the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,'' 
34 Va. L. Rev. 26 (1948); Smethurst & Haslam, "'Portal-to-Portal' and Other Retro-
active Liabilities,'' 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 131 (1947); Weinberg & Simon, "The Con-
stitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 in the Light of the Decisions Affect-
ing Retroactive Legislation in the Supreme Court," 22 Temp. L. Q. 369 (1949); 
Comment, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1010 (1947). 
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interference. Yet there should be no distinction between a legal right 
created by statute, where there is no reservation of a right to change 
an interest vesting under the statute, and rights created by common law 
decisions. There is no reason for one who may have relied upon a stat-
utory right to anticipate its modification any more readily than he 
would expect common law rules governing contracts,· property or tort 
rights to be changed by court decision or by statute. The basic question 
would seem to be whether the legislature, in carrying out some impor-
tant national or state legislative policy within its general powers, can af-
fect existing rights to the point of reducing pecuniary values if it seems 
appropriate and desirable. It is not a case of the government appropriat-
ing interests for its own use·, as in condemnation cases, but rather of 
regulating the national economy and, where necessary, infringing upon 
private contract or property rights which incidentally are in conflict 
with the national policy. There seems little constitutio~al justification 
for drawing a line between cutting off a cause of action, such as for 
psychological nuisance damages in the case of an atomic reactor or dis-
posal plant, and telling a worker that wages he was entitled to under a 
prior statute are now being taken away. It is a degree question: balanc-
ing the private interests against the necessity for the national policy. 
The one would seem to be no more capricious or arbitrary jhan the 
other. ·· 
The case that illustrates more dramatically than any other the extent 
of the congressional discretion pursup.nt to a delegated power to super-
sede the rights of private individuals, and to alter them significantly 
from the standpoint of pecuniary values, is Norman v. B. & 0. Ry.,669 
the famous "gold clauses" case. In establishing fiscal policy during the 
"Hoover-Roosevelt" depression of the 1930's, Congress provided 
that gold clauses in contracts stipulating payment in gold dollars of a 
certain number of grains of gold were invalid and not to be enforced. 
It was argued that this clearly was a takiJ:lg of prop~rty in. violation of 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. In meeting this ~rgun-tent, 
the court said : 
This argument is in the· teeth of another established· principle. 
Contracts, however expressed, cannot fetter the constitutional 
669 294 U.S. 24o, 55 S.Ct. 407 (1935). Cf. Louisviile Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford, :;ro5 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854 (1935) (invalidating first Frazier-Lemke Act which 
delayed foreclosure); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934) (in-
validating impairment of the government's own insurance contract, but suggesting that 
the government could withdraw consent to suit); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 
330, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935) (could not impair gold clause contracts but no damage found 
and Congress withdrew coruierit to be. -sued) .. 
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authority of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of 
property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which 
lies within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital 
infirmity. Parties cannot remove their trans.actions from the 
reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts 
about them .... 
This principle has familiar illustration in the exercise of the 
power to regulate commerce. If shippers and carriers stipulate 
for specified rates, although the rates may be lawful when the 
contracts are made, if Congress through the Interstate Com-
merce Commis~ion exercises its authority and prescribes dif-
ferent rates, the latter control and override inconsistent stipu-
lations in contracts previously made. This is so, even if the 
contract be a charter granted by a State and limiting rates, or 
a contract between municipalities and carriers.670 
The Court then proceeded to say that: 
The principle is not limited to the incidental effect of the 
exercise by the Congress of its constitutional authority. There 
is no constitutional ground for denying to the Congress the 
power expressly to prohibit and invalidate contracts although 
previously made, and valid when made, when they interfere 
with the carrying out of the policy it is free to adopt.671 
The Court concluded that "If the gold clauses now before us interfere 
with the policy of the Congress in the exercise of that authority they 
cannot stand." 672 
Again in this case a very substantial pecuniary interest was wiped out 
by federal legislation. In making it applicable to existing contracts, in-
terests of individuals of substantial proportions literally were being 
destroyed. It is submitted that the interest wiped out in these cases is 
every bit as substantial as injury to surrounding landowners and 
businesses resulting from the psychological nuisance of nuclear opera-
tions. 
There are many other illustrations. Pecuniary expectations may be 
adversely affected when a suit barred by a statute of limitations is rein-
stated by repealing the statute, yet the court always has held this to be 
within the legislative power, not a taking without due process.678 An 
exercise of the power of government to carry out economic policies that 
have a substantial pecuniary impact upon mortgages was held valid in the 
67o Norman v. B. & 0. Ry., supra note 669 at 307-oS. 
671 /d. at 309-10. 
672 /d. at 311. 
673 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209 (1885). Approved and applied to 
state action, Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137 (1945). 
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cases upholding state mortgage moratorium laws.m Municipal zoning 
ordinances have been sustained although they substantially alter eco-
nomic interests of landowners who do not conform to the use limita-
tions imposed in their area.675 Interests having substantial pecuniary 
value may be impaired by municipal or state regulation in the interests 
of public health and welfare, as is illustrated by the case involving the 
prohibition of the operation of a brick kiln once the city grew out 
around the kiln, even though it had been in operation long before the 
area became populated, 676 and by the case in which a state regulation 
prohibited the use of a distilling plant manufacturing intoxicating 
liquor, although the plant had been in operation for a considerable pe-
riod of time before the adoption of the prohibition law,677 or also in 
the case involving a state law which required the removal of orna-
mental red cedar trees without compensation so as to preserve the 
neighboring apple orchards attacked by parasitic fungus. 678 
In each of these cases there was a very substantial impairment of 
financial values, although imposed by states instead of by the federal 
government. In finding that such impairment did not violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the court used reasoning 
to support the use of the general police power of the states which would 
also justify regulations by Congress under one of its delegated powers. 
The reasoning equally supports the use of the commerce, war, or prop-
erty powers of Congress to regulate and adjust economic interests 
arising out of the operation of atomic energy facilities. · In all such 
cases it is a question of balancing the amount of the impairment against 
the necessity for regulation, with a decision by the legislature that cer-
tain interests must give way even though no compensation is provided. 
Reciprocity of advantage is often used as one justification for the 
exercise of government power in zoning cases. It is important to note 
that there is some reciprocity to the owners of land and businesses in 
the vicinity of a reactor in the provisions of the federal indemnity act 
which provide a very large fund to compensate for physical injury to 
person and property by reactor incidents. The availability of such a 
m Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231 (1934). Cf. 
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 52 S.Ct. 435 (1932). 
m Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926). See 
also Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 S.Ct. 190 (1917) (billboards prohibited). 
See discussion of constitutional problem in city planning in Johnson, "Constitutional 
Law and Community Planning," 20 L. & Contemp. Prob. 199 (1955). 
676 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394. 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915). 
m Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273 (1887). 
678 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 ( 1928). 
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fund would seem to be a reasonable reciprocal advantage justifying the 
taking away of any cause of action for a psychological nuisance dam-
age, assuming that Congress intended to preclude such recoveries in 
the case of reactor whose operation and location had been specifically 
approved by the AEC. 
Under Condemnation Power-What Is a "Taking"? Some light also 
may be shed on the power of Congress to preclude psychological nui-
sance damage actions by cases concerning the federal government's 
power to condemn property. Such cases at first glance might seem in-
applicable to the possible reactor nuisance since they deal with the ques-
tion of· for what property interests must the government pay fair 
compensation when the government itself takes property. They do not 
deal. with private persons infringing the property rights of others. 
Nevertheless, they are valuable analogies in two respects; first, many 
reactors are going to be built by public utilities which either use or have 
eminent domain power, and second, they give some indication of the 
interference with property deemed sufficient to require payment of fair 
compensation. To the extent that property interests are considered com-
pensably impaired by less than a complete taking, this conclusion would 
seem to be based upon the same reasoning involved in deciding whether 
a government in effect has permitted a private taking by regulating the 
contract or tort rights of parties in such a way as to permit similar im-
pairments. 
We· are concerned. especially with the court's attitude concerning the 
kind of peripheral or incidental damages deemed compensable as part 
of the taking. For example, United States v. Causby 619 concerned regu-
lar, although not constant, flights of government aircraft at low alti-
tudes over plaintiff's chicken farm so that the chickens killed themselves 
by flying into fences, and his home became an uncomfortable place in 
which to live. The court readily recognized this as a taking even though 
there was no actual, permanent, continuous occupancy of the property 
by government agents. The court held that not only was there a taking 
when the plaintiff's property was made completely uninhabitable, but a 
taking resulted when the government's use of the air space immediately 
above the land seriously limited "the utility of the land and caused a 
diminution in its value." 680 The Court said that the flying of airplanes 
in this 'manner was like firing guns over a man's property, which had 
been held to be .a taking .in an earlier case. 6~1 The facts in United States 
679 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct., 1062 _(1946). 
68o I d. at 262. 
681 Portsmouth Harbor r..ru;d & Hotel Co. v. United States, 26o U.S, 327, 43 S.Ct. 
135 (1922). 
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v. Causby, however, differ from the psychological nuisance situation 
posed, because there was an actual invasion directly over plaintiff's 
property by a physical object put in motion by the government. 
Where the government has taken less than the entire fee, such as 
taking a leasehold interest for less than its full period, a taking occurs 
for which "consequential damages" will be allowed for such expenses as 
moving costs and losses from destruction of fixtures,682 or for the 
going-concern value of business trade routes taken over for less than 
the full term of years.683 Where the entire fee is taken, however, moving 
expenses and other such incidental damages are not awarded. While 
these cases indicate a liberal attitude in determining the value of what is 
taken, they do not deal with damage to nearby lands and businesses 
and hence do not control the question of the psychological damage 
caused by a nuclear plant. 
There is, however, a series of cases which comes much closer to the 
psychological nuisance case. They involve the awarding of damages to 
a landowner whose land has been taken in pai:t, not only for what might 
be thought to be the proportionate market value of the part taken but 
also for the diminution in the value of the rest of the land resulting 
from the taking of only a part of it. One of the earlier cases allowing 
this type of award is United States v. Welch,m where Justice Holmes, 
in one of his deceptively lucid short opinions which does little more than 
indicate the conclusion, found that the plaintiff was damaged not only 
to the extent of the land taken but also because of the diminution in 
value of farm land when his only access to a county road was cut off 
by the strip condemned. The court said that the practical destruction 
of the right of way amounted to a taking. 
Even more illuminating is a seri~s of circuit court opinions beginning 
with West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United Sta.tes.685 The court 
there stated that when only part of a unitary tract of land is taken just 
compensation must include damages for diminution of the value of the 
remaining land.686 The court's allowance of still a third item of dam-
ages has even greater significance for our psychological nuisance case. 
The. court said : 
A part of the land acquired and held by the company as a site 
for plant expansion was taken for use by the government as 
a place for storing large quantities of highly inflammable and 
682 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357 (1945). 
683 Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6g S.Ct. 1434 (1949). 
684 217 U.S. 333, 30 S.Ct. 527 (1910). 
685 200 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1952). 
686 ld. at 104. 
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explosive gasoline; and the company was damaged not merely 
by the loss of the land taken but also by the depreciation that 
resulted in the value of the remainder of the land by reason 
of the proposed use. It was entitled to be awarded such sum 
as would put it in as good position pecuniarily as it would 
have been in if its property had not been taken. [Citation 
omitted] A land owner, a part of whose land is taken for the 
storage of large quantities of gasoline, is certainly not placed 
in such position unless he receives compensation for the dam-
age done to the remainder of the land left on his hands as well 
as the value of the part taken.887 
This is ·fairly analogous to our psychological nuisance case, and the 
court held that it was a proper item for compensation. The West Vir-
ginia Pulp decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Wateree Power Co.,688 where the taking of 
about one-third of a total tract resulted in an award of severance dam-
ages because the acres taken bordered a river and cut off access to 
the river from the remaining property. Apparently there was no claim 
that the government's intended use of the condemned property would 
further depress the value of the remaining tract. 
On the other hand, in Boyd v. United States 889 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was faced with a claim for damages for the taking of 
fifteen acres of plaintiff's farm to become part of a s,ooo-acre govern-
ment airbase. The plaintiff apparently complained of the depreciation 
of the remainder of his eighty-two acre farm from the operation of an 
airbase so close to it. The court approved the trial court's refusal of 
evidence to prove this kind of consequential damage. It said that none 
of the acres taken from the plaintiff were to be used for a purpose dif-
ferent from the use of other lands to which it was to be joined. The 
evidence could not be used to prove damages by way of depreciation of 
the rest of plaintiff's farm. 690 The court seems to indicate that the dam-
ages for depreciation or" the remaining property because of the particu-
lar use to which the government is to put the condemned property can 
be claimed only whe':l it is the use of the property taken from the plain-
tiff that cau~es a depreciation and not when it is the use made of land 
taken from others. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with a re-
687 I d. at 103. 
688 220 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1955). 
689 222 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955). 
690 /d. at 496. 
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lated but somewhat different problem in Nunnally v. United States.691 
Here the plaintiff complained that his vacation retreat island had ceased 
to be "a relaxing place to go" because the government had acquired 
land dose to the plaintiff's island in order to carry on proving ground 
activities, including airplane drops of bombs for test purposes. The trial 
court found that the plaintiff's property had been decreased in value 
about $1,500 but held there was no compensable taking. The plaintiff 
claimed that his property was invaded by the noise and shock of test 
explosions and by the flight of aircraft over the island. The court said 
this was not like the Portsmouth Harbor case 692 where the shells were 
fired over the plaintiff's land but rather it was a case where there were 
damages but not taking; here the damages were consequential only: 
The damages alleged in that case were not consequential ; 
they were the product of a direct in·msion of claimant's do-
main. But damages which are the incidental result of lawful 
governmental action, without any direct invasion of private 
property, are consequential; they do not constitute a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
Plaintiff has suffered no peculiar d~mage. His annoyance is of 
the same type to which everyone living in the vicinity is sub-
jected in varying degrees. There is, at most, a "sharing in the 
common burden of incidental damages". Richards v. Wash-
ington Terminal Co . ... If it should be held that the facts 
in the present case constitute a taking, any reduction in the 
value of property attributable to a federal activity might be 
urged as a valid claim against the United States. The distinc-
tion between a "damage" and a "taking", so carefully pre-
served by the courts, would be obliterated. 698 
Something fairly close to the psychological nuisance situation arose 
in United States v. 329.05 Acres of Land.694 In this case the lands of 
four different owners were taken by the government for the creation of 
an ammunition storage depot. Some of the land of each owner was 
taken in fee and some by way of a safety easement. The question before 
the court was the compensation to be paid to each. The depot itself was 
located on the land of only one of the four seeking compensation. The 
lands of the others were taken for the purpose of building access roads 
and creating safety easements restricting the use of the property so that 
residences and other activities bringing together large groups of people 
691 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956). 
692 Supra note 681. 
693 Supra note 691 at 524. (Emphasis added.) 
694 156 F. Supp. 67 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1957). 
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could be prohibited. None of the buffer zones had been put to other 
use by the government. The lands taken were not being used currently 
and they were somewhat swampy in character, yet apparently a residen-
tial subdivision was a likely possibility several years in the future. The 
court, following the Boyd case, held that, when only part of the land 
was taken, any diminution or impairment of the remainder of the land 
caused by the use of the land taken by the government was compen-
sable, but that severance damages may not include damages to any 
owner if the damage resulted from the use to which the government 
put the lands which were in the same project but which were obtained 
from others. Thus, only the one owner properly could claim severance 
damages to his remainder land resulting from the fact that the govern-
ment was constructing an ammunition depot. 695 
The allowance of severance damages to the extent that the physical 
severance itself actually causes the value of the remainder land to di-
minish, such as can happen when access to a waterway is cut off by the 
parcel taken, seems quite properly awarded as part of the compensation 
for the taking. This is an effect of the taking that happens only to the 
owner whose access to a waterway for example has been cut off. On the 
other hand the distinction made between the recovery for what we have 
termed psychological nuisance affects all adjoining land, whether it is 
remainder land of the owner part of whose land has been taken or ad-
joining land belonging to another. As to psychological nuisance damage 
the distinction is utterly ridiculous. The use the government is planning 
to make of the part condemned has no more effect on the remainder 
land than it does on adjoining land owned by others. The use of the 
condemned land as an ammunition depot or air base is just as . detri-
mental to adjoining land as it is to remainder land. 
Nevertheless, the distinction suggested by the federal cases seems to 
be followed by state courts as well,696 whether it be the state itself or a 
public utility with a power of eminent domain that is taking the land. 
While some state constitutions now provide for award of damages in-
cident to a taking of land,691 thus avoiding the narrow construction of 
a compensable taking under the old rule, generally the courts keep the 
distinction between effects of physical severance and psychological nui-
sance effects. There may be an historical explanation for the rule, but 
it does not make sense from a policy standpoint. Nevertheless, this 
695 !d. at 7o-71. Citing also Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 45 S.Ct. II5 
.(1924) (nitrate plant). 
696 See cases collected in Annot., 170 A.L.R. 721 (1947) and 6 A.L.R.2d II97 (1949). 
697 See states listed in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., mpra note 648 at 554· 
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seems to be the law. What result would be reached if this doctrine were 
applied to the nuclear psychological nuisance case ? 
If the government (and probably the same is true of a public utility 
exercising the eminent domain power) condemns less than a whole 
unit of land, the owner can recover for diminution in value of the re-
mainder arising from the psychological nuisance effect of the use made 
of the condemned part. The neighboring land owned by others, which 
would be just as diminished in value because of the psychological nui-
sance, has suffered no compensable loss. 
When the eminent domain power is not involved, such as when an 
.atomic installation is operated by a purely .Private concern for a non-
governmental purpose, it would seem that the same basic constitutional 
considerations should govern. If the government need not compensate 
for psychological nuisance damage to adjoining land, surely the gov-
ernment may adopt a rule that psychological nuisance damages from 
private plants shall not be recoverable. The preservation of the public 
pocketbook perhaps is not so important a factor in the case of a private 
concern not carrying on a public utility function. On the other hand, if 
the government decides that a national need exists for development of 
nuclear energy for commercial and war purposes and that protection 
should be given against recovery for psychological nuisance damage, it 
still is carrying out a general governmental policy and ought to be gov-
erned by the same policy considerations. In fact, as indicated by the 
"gold clauses" cases,608 usually- the court will hold the government it-
self to a higher standard under due process than if rights between 
private parties only are involved. 
Conclusions as to Congress' Power to Immunize. Undoubtedly Con-
gress can supers~de any power of the states so far as controlling tort 
liability of large nuclear installations is concerned. The Fifth Amend-
ment, however, does provide some protection against an arbitrary inter-
ference by the federal government with private property rights. If sub-
stantial quantities of radioactive material are allowed to fall-out on 
private property so that it could be asserted that special damages have 
resulted to th~ plaintiff's land, there is authority in older cases that the 
government cannot immunize the wrongdoer from liability. In the light 
of more recent cases decided in connection with somewhat different 
kinds of situations but involving the same policy considerations, it 
·seems rather clear that maximum recovery can be limited as provided 
698 Supra note 669. Compare ~orinan v. B. & 0. Ry., supra note 669. with Lynch 
v. United States, Su.pra note 669. · 
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for in the federal indemnity statute. As to small amounts of fall-out, 
even under the old cases Congress seems to have the power to provide 
for no recovery at all, because this would seem to be not special dam-
ages but simply the damages necessarily incidental to the operation, like 
normal smoke and noise from operation of a railroad. Congress clearly 
can immunize the operator from liability for damages from the psycho-
logical nuisance created by the mere existence of the reactor in the 
neighborhood. The balancing by Congress of the needs of landowners 
subjected to psychological nuisance damage and of society for rapid 
development of the nuclear industry surely would not be upset by the 
Supreme Court. It is better policy to refuse to give psychological dam-
ages the status of a constitutional right and instead leave it to the leg-
islature to balance the interests and decide whether this kind of dam-
ages should be allowed, and if so, to what extent and with what 
limitations. It is doubtful that the United States Supreme Court would 
say that such a law denying a cause of action for psychological damages 
is beyond the commerce and war powers of the federal government. 
(ii) The Intent of Congress 
Even after it is found that the federal government has the constitu-
tional power to give such immunity from psychological nuisance dam-
age actions, it still must be determined whether Congress intended to 
preclude such actions. Since there is nothing specific on the matter in 
either the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or the 1957 indemnity amend-
ment, the question becomes one of implied pre-emption of the field. 
Detailed discussions of the pre-emption question as it relates to state 
power to license and regulate atomic energy entrepreneurs coming 
under the federal act is found elsewhere. 699 Likewise, the problem of the 
impact of possible federal pre-emption on damage remedies generally 
is treated later. 700 These discussions need not be repeated, but applica-
tion of the conclusions drawn can profitably be made here. The specific 
question is whether the federal program precludes a state from enjoin-
ing the operation of an atomic energy facility or awarding damages 
to private persons for the psychological nuisance created by the mere 
presence of the facility. 
When the Atomic Energy Commission in a quasi-judicial proceeding 
authorized by statute makes a decision in a specific case that a licensee 
699 Infra Part III, Chapter V, Section E on federal pre-emption. 
100 !d., discussion following note 275. See also infra, Part I, Chapter III, discussion 
at notes 1273-78. 
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may operate in a certain way in a particular place, this is almost sure to 
be held to pre-empt the. field and prevent the states from requiring 
licenses or imposing other pre-operational regulations upon such activi-
ties.701 This is particularly true when the federal statute and the agency 
created by it have provided for health and safety matters comprehen-
sively and in great detail.702 It seems fair to conclude that the Congress 
wanted the kind of flexibility in setting and enforcing safety designs 
and standards "which centralized administration makes possible so as 
to encourage experimentation and variation on the part of licensees in 
the hope of obtaining both greater economy and safety. This does not 
appear to be the time, for example, for the state to specify the precise 
amount, design, and type of shielding material that is necessary to 
operate a nuclear reactor or other atomic energy device and it is doubt-
ful that Congress intended the almost inevitable frustration of its poli-
cies by such state licensing specifications." 708 It is also true that, "Not 
only does the Commission study the proposed atomic installation itself 
and the radiation safety precautions within it, but it also gives due con-
sideration to all the local geographic (i.e., population density, etc.), 
geologic, and meteorologic features as well. In short, when the license 
is issued, the Commission, pursuant to congressional directive, has de-
termined that the particular licensee is qualified to construct and operate 
a particular atomic energy installation at a specified location, for speci-
fied purposes, and in a specified manner." 104 
As to pre-operation activities of the licensee, our conclusion is, "In 
the light of the above considerations, it seems reasonably safe to assume 
that the Supreme Court will hold that Congress has prevented any state 
or local government from requiring a person, who is licensed or other-
wise authorized by the Commission, to obtain prior state or local per-
mission to operate if the granting or denying of that permission is pred-
icated upon an independent analysis of standards of radiation health 
and safety." 705 It also seems reasonable to conclude that "Local zoning 
ordinances which clearly discriminate against atomic energy uses and 
facilities, merely because they constitute radiation hazards deemed un-
desirable by the community, will probably suffer the same fate as state 
licensing requirements." 708 It also seems clear that any action which 
TOllnft'a Part III, Chapter V, Section Eon federal pre-emption. 
T02Id., see discussion in text at notes 389-423, and seven reasons listed in text be-
tween notes 423-43. 
Tos I d. at text at note 439· 
1o•ld. at text at note 441. 
705 I d. at text at note 450. 
Toe I d. at text at note 453· 
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imposes a heavier burden on Atomic Energy Commission licensees also 
will be held to be pre-empted by federal action because the additional 
cost of meeting higher state standards undoubtedly would tend to dis-
courage developments which Congress has indicated it wants to sup-
po.rt, 707 even though it may be possible for the states to help en force 
standards and regulations laid down by the AEC.708 It must be re-
membered that the state can intervene in a proceeding to determine 
whether a license ought to be granted or not. 709 Except where there is 
an immediate, significant threat to public health and safety, there is a 
route through the Atomic Energy Commission to ask for modification, 
suspension, or revocation of licenses. With this channel open, it seems 
very unlikely that the state will be allowed in a non-emergency case to 
use any of its own enforcement procedures.710 
In the light of these conclusions, any attempt by the state to enjoin 
activities specifically licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission, 
merely because of the psychological nuisance they may create in the 
public mind would surely be as invalid as would a state licensing sys-
tem. The effect of an injunction, whether based upon private or public 
nuisance, would seem to run counter to the very policy arguments that 
dictate a preclusion of state licensing. The psychological nuisance arises 
out of the mere existence of the reactor which is in complete compliance 
with the federal regulations. Since the existence of this kind of facility, 
operating in this way, in this place, has been approved specifically by 
the federal agency, the state has no power to enjoin any activity, even 
if it considers it a nuisance, public or private. There is not even the 
possible justification for state action to meet an emergency health haz-
ard in this case. 
Where there is provision in the federal statute for all interested 
parties to participate in an administrative hearing and also provision for 
judicial review, the scope of federal pre-emption is made dramatically 
clear in the very recent Supreme Court decision, City of Tacoma v. 
Taxpayers of Tacoma. 711 The case involved the right of the city of 
Tacoma to enter into a contract with the federal government under the 
Federal Power Act. The construction of a dam made it necessary to 
condemn a fish hatchery owned by the state of Washington. The court 
denied the right of the state to object to one of its own municipalities, 
101 I d. at text at note 464. 
7os I d. at text at note 472. 
To9Jd. at text at note 400. Sec. 189 of 1957 Act is discussed at notes 458-6o. 
110 /d. at text at note 477· 
711 Supra note 642. 
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the city of Tacoma, entering into a contract with the federal govern-
ment in such a way as to condemn state property against the state's de-
sires. The court held that since there was provision in the federal act 
for any interested party to participate in the Federal Power Commis-
sion hearing, the state should have asserted its rights before the Com-
mission. In connection with the powers of Congress to limit the action 
that a state could take as to its own municipality, the Supreme Court 
said, that there was no question but that Congress had power to set the 
conditions and procedures for review and the courts in which it was 
to take place. 112 The court said : 
Hence, upon judicial review of the Commission's order, all 
objections to the order, to the license it directs to be issued, 
and to the legal competence of the licensee to execute its 
terms, must be made in the Court of Appeals or not at all. For 
Congress, acting within its powers, has declared that the 
Court of Appeals shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" to re-
view such orders, and that its judgment "shall be final," sub-
ject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification; 
Such statutory finality need not be labeled res judicata, estop-
pel, collateral estoppel, waiver or the like either by Congress 
or the courts. 718 
Provisions for · intervention in Commission proceedings and the 
power of judicial review found in the federal act referred to in the City 
of Tacoma case are quite similar to Section 189 of the 1954 Atomic 
Energy Act, which specifically provides for a hearing "upon the request 
of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding." m 
Subsection b provides for judicial review of the final order in such a 
proceeding under the terms of applicable federal statutes regulating 
federal administrative procedure. 115 When a state or private individual 
believes that the location of the proposed reactor or other atomic facility 
is unwise or illegal, it would seem that the proper remedy is to petition 
the Atomic Energy Commission to be permitted to participate in the 
hearing determining whether or not the license should be granted. Any 
later action in state ~ourts seeking to enjoin the establishment or opera-
tion of the reactor in accordance with the terms of the federal license 
seems to be precluded by the federal act. 
The question remains as to whether or not the right of a private 
person to sue for. damages because of the psychological nuisance also 
112 ld. at 336. 
118 ld. at 336-37. 
714 Sec. 189;1 of 1954 Act. 
1111 Sec. xf!!)b of 1954 Act. 
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has been pre-empted. As pointed out later,716 it is clear that there has 
been no federal pre-emption generally of the power to award damages 
arising out of nuclear incidents. From this it certainly could be argued 
that private suits for damages from the psychological nuisance effect 
are permissible, even though the injunction action would not be. Yet 
because of the peculiar character of the psychological nuisance damages, 
it is possible that this particular type of damage will be considered pre-
cluded for the same reasons as those establishing the invalidity of an 
injunction abating the nuisance. 
In the field of labor law the Supreme Court has held that a state court 
may. award damages resulting from illegal activities which are clearly 
an unfair labor practice. within the meaning of the federal statute. 
There was no pre-emption of this portion of the field. The Court said in 
the Russell case 711 that the primary purpose of the federal agency was 
to prevent unfair labor practices and that any award remedy was purely 
at the discretion of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court 
was very careful to point out, however,718 that there was no conflict in 
this instance between the state's power to entertain ·a damage suit and 
the power of the federal agency. This emphasis upon allowing· only 
such state action as is obviously consistent with the congr'essim1al pol-
icy, indicates the basic reason for this writer's conclusion tha:t in the 
atomic reactor situation, an action solely for psychological nuisance 
damages should not be permitted, for in this instance it would amount 
to state action, clearly in conflict with a federal action. To awar:d dam-
ages merely for the existence of the reactor or other similar. type of 
atomic energy facility, when there has been no physical harm of any 
kind, in effect would frustrate the decision of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission that this type of activity, at this location does not present any 
unreasonable danger to public health and safety, and is in furtherance 
of the federal program to promote and develop atomic energy by private 
enterprise. It is submitted that to' allow damages, even in a private 
action, for psychological nuisance would be in direct conflict with the 
federal determination and therefore with federal policy. 
The provisions of the indemnity insurance amendment in 1957 119 
actually suggest that, at least so far as the indemnity program is con-
116 Infra note 1273. 
117 United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932 (1958), dis-
cussed fully infra, Part III, Chapter V at note 311. 
11s Infra Part III, Chapter V at note 313. 
119 Insurance amendment, 85-256, 85th Cong., H.R. 7383 (1957), discussed in detail 
infra text following note 1265. 
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cerned, a distinction should be drawn between what might be considered 
injuries resulting from an actual "nuclear incident" by way of physical 
damages and the apprehensions and fears involved in a psychological 
nuisance damage case. In defining "nuclear incident" the act provides 
that the term "means any occurence within the United States causing 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to prop-
erty, or for loss of use of property arising out of or resulting from 
radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous property or source, 
special nuclear, or byproduct materials." 720 This language indicates 
that Congress was concerned with a specific discharge of radioactive 
material in such a way as to have an impact on persons or property, 
perhaps including in this kind of physical damage any psychological 
consequences of such actual impact. It also must be remembered that 
the federal act specifically modifies state law by immunizing the licensee 
who is indemnified from any liability in excess of $soo,ooo,ooo, plus 
any amount of financial protection required of the licensee.121 There is 
nothing in the act or in its legislative history to indicate that anything 
other than damages resulting from actual discharge of radiation or 
radioactive material was meant to be covered. While the statutory pro-
vision is not specified on the question of damages for psychological 
nuisance, it would seem to be much more consistent with the over-all 
purpose and policy of the federal provisions to conclude that the allow-
ance of such damages, just as in the case of an injunction to abate a 
licensed activity, would be inconsistent with the federal program to 
provide for the public health and safety and to promote the develop-
ment of atomic energy as fast as is safely possible. Yet the conclusion 
obviously is not as clear as one could wish, because the federal act 
leaves the determination of general liability que~tions to the states. 
To dispose of the uncertainty C ongres_s should enact a statute to make 
it clear that purely psychological nuisance damages cannot be recovered 
where a reactor is duly licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission and 
is placed in a permissible location under local zoning laws which do 
not discriminate against reactors as such. At the same time Congress 
must clearly recognize the right of all possibly affected parties to par-
ticipate in the AEC hearing held on the granting of the license to op-
erate the reactor. If only small quantities which are within permissible 
levels established by federal regulation are discharged, perhaps Con-
gress should also make it clear that no recovery may be had for conse-
720 I d. at sec. 30. 
721 I d. at sec. 4e. 
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quent mJuries. On the other hand perhaps this should be left to the 
normal rules relating to compliance with administrative regulation as 
proof of non-negligence. 722 
(b) Effect of Licensing-Results under State Law 
Since state law might be applied in the psychological nuisance dam-
age case (e.g., if the courts find no pre-emption by the federal govern-
ment), it is important to determine the results which might be antici-
pated. An even more important reason, perhaps, is that the states surely 
will enter into the licensing of atomic energy activities in the future as 
the operations become a normal business activity and Congress perhaps 
returns more regulatory power to the states. What effect will state 
licensing have on a determination of whether to treat the installation 
as a nuisance? 
The question is not free from difficulty; broad statements frequently 
are made by courts which do not take account of important distinctions 
affecting the result. The first of these distinctions is one between ac-
tions to enjoin the licensed activity and actions for damages. It fre-
quently has been held that an activity which is conducted strictly in ac-
cordance with legislative authority cannot be enjoined as a nuisance.723 
This rule seems to hold, however, only in situations where there appears 
to be no other reasonable way to conduct the activity in accordance with 
the license or other legislative authority. Where possible, the license 
usually is interpreted to allow the conduct of the activity only in a 
manner which does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of other 
property owners. Courts, therefore, have issued injunctions against 
such activities as blasting rocks so as to throw stones upon the lands 
of others,724 shining bright lights onto adjoining land from a city base-
ball park, 725 and the operation of a city pesthouse in a residential area 726 
despite the existence of a license or legislative authority for this kind 
of activity generally. It is likely, therefore, that if a state licensing 
agency specifically approves a site for an atomic agency installation, the 
activity will be deemed non-abatable since any diminution in surround-
722 See discussion of these rules generally, supra at Section B2b. 
728 Fricke v. City of Guntersville, 251 Ala. 63, 36 So.2d 321 (1948) (city drainage 
ditch in alley blocked access to plaintiff's lot, was claimed to be "dangerous"; injunc-
tion denied) ; Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 ( 1925) (injunc-
tion denied against licensed oil refinery which generated offensive odors, fires, and 
explosions). 
7 24 Hakkila v. Old Colony Broken Stone & Concrete Co., 264 Mass. 447, 162 N.E. 
895 (1928). 
725 Downey v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 18g, 65 So.2d 825 (1953). 
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ing property values surely will be deemed an unavoidable consequence 
of its normal, non-negligent operation. Such a specific license is not 
just a general permit to carry on a specific type of activity somewhere 
at the owner's option. 
On the question whether or not the existence of legislative authority 
precludes a finding that an activity is a nuisance for the purpose of 
awarding damages, the courts take positions which, at first glance, ap-
pear to be conflicting. On the one hand, there are courts which have 
indicated that if an activity is conducted strictly in accordance with 
legislative authority, and the injury which results from the activity is a 
necessary result of its normal, non-negligent operation, then the ac-
tivity cannot be found to be a nuisance.127 On the other hand, there are 
some courts which state broadly that "the full extent of legislative 
power to legalize and shield a nuisance is to exempt it from public prose-
cution," 728 and therefore the rights of private individuals to seek dam-
ages for authorized nuisances remain unimpaired.729 A closer examina-
tion of these two positions indicates, however, that there is little more 
than a verbal difference between them. In the courts which adhere to 
the doctrine that an authorized activity cannot be a nuisance, it still is 
recognized that the legislative immunity does not extend to activities 
which too seriously encroach upon the property rights of private indi-
viduals to the point where it may be said that their property is being 
"taken." The United States Supreme Court has stated, as well as any 
court, the general approach used by all courts : 
We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under 
state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that 
726 Baltimore City v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352, 39 Atl. 1081 (1898). 
727 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (cofferdam obstructed plain-
tiff's warehouse docks); Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.W.2d 241 
( 1942) (city dumping sewage into river so as cause offensive odors). The latter case 
involved a state statute, N.D. Comp. Laws 1913, §7231, which stated that "Nothing 
which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a 
nuisance." Other states have also enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., People v. City 
of Reedley, 66 Cal. App. 409, 226 Pac. 4o8 (1924) discussing the effect of a similar 
California statute. 
728 Sadlier v.·City of New York, 81 N.Y.S. 3o8, 310 (1903) (slush falling on plain-
tiff's property from Brooklyn Bridge). 
729 Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Ore. 182, 229 P.2d 255 ( 1951). In holding that the 
city was liable for flooding plaintiff's land, the court made it clear that authorized acts 
can still be considered a nuisance. The court observed, at 197, "We need not con-
sider whether the trespass in the case at bar was a mere nuisance or was of such a 
magnitude as to amount to a taking of the property in the sense forbidden by the con-
stitution. . .. In either event, it would appear that the municipality is liable to respond 
in damages." 
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while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a 
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for 
a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect 
to a taking of private property for public use. . . . 780 
It therefore is held that where there is a substantial interference with 
property rights, the injured party may recover damages despite the 
existence of legislative authority.781 
It is clear, then, that the courts must struggle with the "vexed ques-
tion of what sort of nuisance may amount to a taking of property." 782 
The difficulty of such a question is demonstrated by the variety of 
semantic formulas which have been employed in attempts to answer it. 
Some courts and text writers have suggested that legislatures may au-
thorize "small" or "minor" nuisances without compensation, but not 
"great" ones. 788 In at least one case a distinction was drawn between 
"direct" injuries, which were deemed compensable, and merely "con-
sequential" injuries, which were not.m The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has attempted to clarify the problem with this statement: 
It is now the law of this State that acts done in the proper 
exercise of governmental authority which impair the use of 
nearby private property do not constitute a taking of property 
within the meaning of the Constitution, unless there is ( 1) an 
encroachment upon or physical invasion of the property, or 
( 2) a substantial obstruction of access, or ( 3) a deprivation 
and not merely a diminution of light and air.785 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Sullivan v. Common-
wealth, 736 pointed out a distinction between acts which demonstrate 
"premeditation and intention of continuance" .of interference with prop-
erty rights, and acts which merely incidentally interfere with such 
rights. The court held that physical injury to plaintiff's property was 
merely an unintended side effect of blasting operations carried on in the 
construction of an aqueduct, and therefore was not compensable as 
78o Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., supra note 648 at 553· 
781/bid.; United States v. Causby, supra note 679-
782 Bacon v. City of Boston, 154 Mass. 100, 102 (1891) (city held to have unneces-
sarily damaged plaintiff by its manner of operating sewer system). 
788 Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239. 243 (1883) (ringing loud mill bell, under legisla-
.tive authority, held a "slight" interference, and not compensable as a taking). See 
Prosser 421, and discussion supra at text at notes 629-32. 
734 Sadlier v. City of New York, supra note 728. 
786 Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 610, 619, 81 A.2d 57 (1951) 
(flights in glide path of city airport held not a sufficient interference to constitute a 
taking). · 
736 335 Mass. 619,142 N.E.2d 347 (1957). 
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a "taking" of property. The court contrasted this with cases involving 
deliberate firings of gun batteries over plaintiff's land,131 or repeated 
flying of military aircraft at a low level, 738 in which a "taking" had 
been found. 
Perhaps one of the most significant efforts to draw the line between 
what does and does not constitute a compensable "taking" was that 
made by the United States Supreme Court in Richards v. Washington 
Terminal Co./89 previously discussed. This was the case in which the 
plaintiff complained of diminution in the value of his property both 
from the normal operation of the railroad, which caused noise, vibra-
tion, and dust to invade his residence, and from the location near his 
property of an outlet for a ventilating system which collected gases and 
smoke from a tunnel and forced them out by means of a fan. The court 
denied recovery for injury caused by the normal operation of the rail-
road, but held that the damage caused by the location of the ventilation 
outlet near plaintiff's property was a "direct and peculiar and substan-
tial" injury which constituted a "taking'' of plaintiff's property. This 
statement of the rule has been quoted frequently by state courts. 
The Maryland court placed the problem in better perspective when it 
suggested simply that the question of what constitutes a "taking" is a 
''question of degree." ao Yet under any of the tests suggested it is to 
be doubted that a court would impose liability if the presence of a re-
actor should cause a drop in property values or a loss of business solely 
because of fear or apprehension arising from the installation. In states 
where courts have made it clear that only physical interference of some 
kind will constitute a "taking," such as in Maryland,741 this seems un-
787 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, supra note 681. 
788 United States v. Causby, supra note 679. . 
789 Supra note 648. 
740 Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, supra note 735 at 618. 
741 /d. at 619. The U. S. Supreme Court has also indicated that only a physical in-
vasion of some sort will constitute a "taking." In Transportation Co. v. Chicago, supra 
note 727, the city, to facilitate the building of a tunnel, had erected a temporary coffer-
dam which obstructed the docks in front of plaintiff's warehouse. The Court stated at 
li42: "But acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not di-
rectly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its 
use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision. . . . The extremest qualification of the doctrine is to be found, perhaps, in 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, and in Eaton v. Boston, Concord, & 
Montreal Railroad Co., 51 N.H. 504· In those cases it was held that permanent flood-
ing of private property may be regarded as a 'taking.' In those cases there was physi-
cal invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his posses-
sion. But in the present case there was no such invasion. No entry was made upon 
plaintiff's lot. All that was done was to render for a time its use more inconvenient." 
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questionably the result. Also under the reasoning of the United States 
Supreme Court in the Richards case, 742 it could be asserted that the 
injuries caused by fear were of the kind that "naturally and unavoidably 
result from the proper conduct" 743 of the reactor, and as such are not 
compensable. In that case there was also a physical invasion of plaintiff's 
property, while there is none from a purely psychological nuisance. 
Moreover, the nature of the license for the atomic energy activity, or 
the legislative authorization of it, may have significance, in any future 
cases involving claims based on a theory of nuisance. Where a legisla-
ture or licensing agency approves a specific site for the activity, it would 
appear that any diminution in the values of property surrounding that 
site is a necessary incidental effect of the normal operation of the ac-
tivity; but where only a general license is issued and the choice of site 
left to the licensee, a court might find that the choice of location, because 
of the character of the surrounding property, constituted an unreason-
able exercise of the authority granted under the license. It is to be 
remembered that the legislative immunity enjoyed by the licensee will 
extend only to those injuries which necessarily result from the au-
thorized activity, and the scope of the license will be strictly construed.744 
The Minnesota Supreme Court put it this way. 
If the legislature expressly authorizes an act which must in-
evitably result in public injury, what would otherwise be a 
nuisance may be said to be legalized; but if they authorize an 
erection which does not necessarily produce such a result, but 
such result flows from the manner of the construction or op-
eration, the legislative license is no defense. In order to justify 
a nuisance by legislative authority, it must be the natural and 
probable result of the act authorized, so that it may fairly be 
said to be covered by the legislation conferring the power.745 
Thus it is frequently held that while a defendant may be operating 
under a general license or legislative authority, this does not authorize 
him to conduct the activity in a place or in a manner which unreasonably 
interferes with the property rights of others. 746 The application of 
742 Supra note 648. 
748 Supra note 649. 
744 Messer v. City of Dickinson, supra note 727 at 577. 
745 Pine City v. Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 345-46, 44 N.W. 197 (18go) (village atlowed 
to abate injurious operation of a dam as a public nuisance, although construction of 
the dam was authorized by legislature). 
746 Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, supra note 646 (locating 
and operating a railroad engine house near a church held an unreasonable exercise of 
railroad's authority, and damages awarded) ; Bacon v. City of Boston, supra note 732; 
Hakkila v. Old Colony Broken Stone & Concrete Co., supra note 724; Messer v. City 
of Dickinson, supra note 727. 
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this principle may become important in the future if the licensing of 
atomic energy installations, particularly those that are relatively less 
hazardous, becomes more general than at present. 
It also may make a difference whether the legislative sanction is in 
a form which expresses positive governmental encouragement of the 
activity or merely constitutes a permit allowing an activity to be carried 
on. A court may be less disposed to find that legislative immunity exists 
if the activity is operating under the latter type of permit, since this 
form of licensing is merely a control device and does not include any 
expression of the desirability of the activity from a public point of 
view. A distinction of this kind was recognized in an Alabama case, City 
of Bessemer v. Abott.a7 The plaintiff sought damages against the d.ty 
for maintaining a nuisance in the form of a garbage incinerator which 
had been erected and operated under a state statute expressly empower-
ing municipalities to establish such facilities. The Alabama court held 
that the city would be liable only if it were negligent in operating the 
incinerator. The plaintiff reli'ed on an earlier case in which it had been 
held that the city was liable for the maintenance of a public privy despite 
statutory authority. The court in distinguishing that case stated : 
But there was no question presented in that case as to the au-
thority of a municipal corporation, under a general statute, to 
do an act in the exercise of its police power for the conserva-
tion of the public health and welfare. On the contrary, the au-
thority granted by the Vernon charter was effective merely to 
permit the town to do, as a private corporate act, what any in-
dividual could do, and of course to do it in the same way and 
subject to the same restraints and penalties. Under that au-
thority the town had no more right to maintain privies in 
modes and places that would render them nuisances than any 
individual had.as 
Although this is a distinction not frequently articulated by the courts, 
under the reasoning of cases like the Bessemer case,749 atomic energy 
installations having a quasi-public character may come under the head-
ing of acts to be encouraged in the interest of public welfare, and there-
fore would enjoy legislative immunity. On the other hand, if the atomic 
energy activity is operating under a mere legalizing permit, the courts 
may be more willing to rule that the license does not preclude liability for 
damages on a theory of nuisance. In cases involving claims against the 
747 212 Ala. 472, 103 So. 446 (1925). 
748 !d. at 473· 
749 S~a note 745. 
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owners of funeral homes, for example, it has been held that the existence 
of a permit being an expression of municipal thought and opinion, may 
be properly considered on the question of nuisance, but it is not con-
clusive. 7~0 
The time may come when the use of atomic energy may be so com-
mon that it will no longer enjoy its favored status. Someday it will be 
put to use in the ordinary processes of purely private industry having no 
official relationship to the general public interest. In that event, the fact 
that a permit is obtained apparently would not preclude a court from 
finding the activity a nuisance and awarding damages under proper cir-
cumstances. At the present time, however, both federal and state legis-
lation clearly is directed toward encouraging research and development 
in the new atomic industry, and therefore licenses are likely to enjoy 
full legislative immunity from actions based on nuisance theories. 
S· Proof Problems-Causation and Damages 
a. The General Interrelationship 
The unusual characteristics of radiation, particularly its impercepti-
bility through ordinary human senses and the cumulative character of 
the effects of exposure, create some unique and difficult problems in 
proving both causation-in-fact and damages in tort actions. Although 
these are two different elements of the negligence action and raise some-
what different questions, the proof aspects are in many respects com-
mon and the most nearly unique. Therefore, it seems best to deal with 
the problems of proof together. 
In discussing causation at this point we are talking about that aspect 
usually called causation-in-fact. This differs from that part of causa-
tion so often treated under the title of proximate cause. Proximate cause 
and its effect on limiting the liability of those whose radiation in fact 
causes injury to others have been discussed previously in connection with 
the duty element. Here attention is centered on the proof problems that 
will arise in establishing the fact that radiation from a particular de-
fendant's operations caused a specific damage to a particular person. 
The complications arising out of radiation incidents seem to develop 
principally from three factors unique to atomic energy: (I) Multiple 
causation problems are created by the fact that radiation comes from 
750 Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W.2d 726 (1950). Sometimes in-
junctions have been granted also despite a general permit. Gunderson v. Anderson, 
190 Minn. 245, 2SI N.W. SIS (1933). For other cases in which injunction has been 
granted despite permits or zoning ordinances, see 39 A.L.R.2d ro26 (19SS). 
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many sources, such as natural background radiation from many types 
of materials including even the bricks of the houses in which we live 
and the buildings in which we work, fallout from bomb tests, and 
medical uses of radiation in addition to whatever radiation may be re-
leased by atomic energy entrepreneurs in the course of their operations. 
( 2) Many, if not most, of the injurious effects that are caused by radia-
tion result from the total amount of exposure received by the injured 
person and not just the amount received by him at a particular time from 
a particular source (although there are certain injuries believed by some 
experts to result only in case the individual exposures exceed certain 
threshold levels). ( 3) The inability to state accurately and specifically 
that a given injury will be or has been caused by a specific amount of 
radiation received at a specific time, means that in many cases plaintiffs 
will be forced to depend upon statistics showing that exposure to radia-
tion will increase by some more or less accurately determined percentage 
the likelihood of a certain injury occurring. -
Although the causation ahd damage questions, particularly as to 
proof, which are created by these characteristics of radiation are not 
completely unique in tort cases, similar situations are very few in num-
ber, and courts have not had occasion to work out theories and principles 
for determining liability. Yet_ the problems will arise inevitably and 
with much greater frequency as the uses of radiation increase from 
year to year. Here again it seems that the advent of atomic energy will 
cause the legal profession to re-evaluate its tort concepts,- particularly 
as they relate to causation-in-fact and the extent of damage. 
b. Multiple Defendants 
( 1 ) General Considerations 
Partly a Duty Matter. The problem of remoteness or foreseeability 
today generally is considered as a part of the duty question and this 
also is the manner in which we have treated the subject. It also would 
have been possible to have treated the question of the liability of mul-
tiple defendants as a part of duty under such headings as joint tort-
feasors, proximate cause, joint enterprise, master-servant, or concert 
of action. Yet the difficult and unique aspects of the multiple defendant 
matter in the radiation cases would seem to arise out of the same char-
acteristics that give rise to the proof problem generally. Therefore, the 
problem can be seen in better perspective if multiple defendants are 
now treated in the context of the proof questions that will arise. Never-
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theless, the subject of multiple defendants is discussed prior to dealing 
with proof problems generally because duty considerations are just as 
important as those of proof of causation. On the other hand, when 
considering cases involving single defendants, proof of causation be-
comes of dominant importance. This indicates the desirability of first 
discussing multiple defendants and thereafter the non-multiple situa-
tions. 
It is true, of course, that some multiple defendant cases are solved by 
cause-in-fact principles. The rule usually applied to determine whether 
a known force is the cause-in-fact of a specific injury to a particular 
person is known as the "but for" rule. In explaining this rule Prosser 
says: 
The defendant's conduct is not a cause cif the event, if the 
event would have occurred without it. At most this must be 
a rule of exclusion: if the event would not have occurred 
"but for" the defendant's negligence, it still does not follow 
that there is liability, since consideration other than causation, 
which remained to be discussed, may prevent it.7 15'1 
This test will take care of most cases including a good many of those 
involving multiple defendants. There are certain kinds of cases, how-
ever, which have caused the courts to develop a supplementary concept 
usually known as the "substantial factor" rule. As Prosser says m 
discussing causation-in-fact: 
Such a test is clearly an improvement over the "but for" 
rule. It disposes of the cases mentioned above, and likewise 
of the difficulties presented by the type of case where a 
similar, but not identical result would have followed without 
the defendant's act. But in the great majority of cases, it 
amounts to the same thing. Except as indicated, no case has 
been found where the defendant's act could be called a substan-
tial factor when the event would have occurred without it; nor 
will cases very often arise where it would not be such a factor 
when it was so indispensable a cause that without it the result 
would not have followed. 752 
Whether the test be the "but for" rule or the "substantial factor" 
concept, the cases involving multiple defendants often create very diffi-
cult problems. Except for the discussion by Prosser 753 and Harper and 
James m in their recent treatises, there is surprisingly little written 
discussion of the subject with the exception of the application of the res 
751 Prosser 220. 
75 2 !d. at 221. 
7 53 !d. at 224-41. 
7H Harper & James 1121-JI, 694-714. 
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ipsa loquitur doctrine, to be discussed later. 755 The expanded use of 
atomic energy should give rise to a considerable increase in cases of 
this nature. 
, Some examples of situations that very likely will arise when the use 
of atomic energy becomes more common will help focus attention on 
legal problems that need analysis. 
As to reactors the following situations very possibly will arise : 
( 1) Two reactors, owned by different companies, may be so located 
that the prevailing winds could have carried the materials discharged 
into the air or into a stream from either one or both and caused the 
injury to the person or property of the plaintiff some distance downwind 
or downriver. Distinctions should be recognized between cases where: 
(a) neither reactor contributed enough to cause damage, but the cumu-
lative effect of both does cause damage; (b) the amount discharged by 
each was sufficient in and of itself to have caused the damage; (c) there 
is no evidence as to which one discharged the radioactive material, each 
claiming it is not from its operation and the plaintiff is not able to prove 
from which it came. Whether the applicable legal principles are to be 
strict liability concepts or those of liability for negligence the courts 
must be prepared to deal with cases involving these difficulties. 
( 2) The same situation except that instead of two reactors there are 
three or more such reactors. 
( 3) The bulk wastes from two or more reactors are turned over 
to a common disposal agent (owned either privately or by the govern-
ment), who then negligently disposes of such combined waste so as to 
cause the plaintiff injury. Assume that vicarious liability will be im-
posed upon the owner of the waste products but it will.be impossible to 
identify the source of the particular material causing the damage, be-
cause the wastes are mixed and not labeled; i.e., they are fungible. 
( 4) There are two or more reactors, and a person lives in the vicinity 
of one for a time, then moves to the vicinity of another, and perhaps still 
another. He is able to show that the cumulative irradiation has caused 
personal injury although the individual contributions of any one of the 
sources would not have been sufficient to have done so. 
( 5) The waste or the discharge from one or several reactors is not 
enough in itself to cause any damage for which compensation could be 
recovered, although the discharge was negligent or absolute liability 
rules will be applied. Yet the plaintiff may suffer a radiation injury be-
cause of peculiar susceptibility. The same could happen if plaintiff sub-
sequently needs medical treatment requiring use of radiation and either 
1ss Infra text discussion beginning at note 1146. 
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did not know of his prior exposure from the reactor or forgot to inform 
his doctor of previous exposures, or the doctor may have decided under 
the circumstances that the risk of additional diagnostic or therapeutic 
radiation ought to be taken, even though the cumulative dose might be 
enough to cause injury to the plaintiff. 
Similar situations can arise in connection with the disposal or use of 
radioactive isotopes for either medical or industrial purposes. For 
example: 
( 1) Two or more industrial, medical, or research users of radioactive 
isotopes discharge their sewage into the city system and the city sewage 
plant bacterial process is harmed, or a city employee is injured by radia-
tion, or someone downstream from the sewage disposal plant is injured 
by the radiation, and (a) it takes the contributions of all to cause the 
damage, although no individual user was negligent in the amount dis-
charged in the individual case, or (b) one user must have been negligent 
because the amount of radiation received exceeds what would have been 
received if all had released only the proper amount, but it is impossible 
to tell which one was guilty, or (c) it is possible to tell which one was 
negligent but his discharge alone would not have caused injury unless 
added to that of the others who were not negligent. 
( 2) The total amount of all contributors is not enough to cause 
injury but, because of the peculiar susceptibility or the necessity for 
later medical treatment with large amounts of radiation, the particular 
plaintiff is injured because of the total cumulative dose received, includ-
ing that contributed by the waste disposal operations of the industrial, 
medical, and research uses. 
(3) A person receives enough radiation to cause injury, including 
radiation from a particular defendant who is responsible for a part of 
the exposure; (a) where the other exposure alone was enough to cause 
the injury as was the amount received from the defendant and it is 
impossible to tell which exposure actually caused the injury, or (b) the 
exposure caused by the defendant is not enough in itself to cause injury 
but when added to that already received by the plaintiff in medical 
treatment, either carefully or negligently administered by a doctor, 
causes an injury, or (c) exposure caused by the defendant is not enough 
in itself to cause injury but does contribute to the total dose received by 
the plaintiff from other sources, and the total dose is sufficient to cause 
injury. 
(4) Plaintiff's injury would occur only by accumulating several 
exposures, such as from his job which involves the handling of radio-
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isotopes, fallout from government bomb tests/56 and fallout from the 
operation of a reactor or as a result of exposure from a highway acci-
dent involving waste products, and finally later medical treatment by 
radiation. 
Many other variations can be imagined but these are allustrative of 
the kinds of cases that very well could happen as the use of atomic 
energy becomes more widespread. They present causation-in-fact and 
damage problems that courts will have to answer. 
In dealing with multiple causation cases a part of the difficulty arises 
from questions of joinder, interpretation of verdicts, and the enforce-
ment of judgments. These elements cannot always be separated com-
pletely from the substantive question as to who is liable and to what 
extent. For example, there may be a question of whether in a particular 
jurisdiction the plaintiff will be permitted under the procedural rules to 
join as defendants all persons thought to have caused harm, but the 
modern trend of procedural rules is such that this is becoming less of a 
problem. Certainly the multiple causation cases can be handled best 
when all potential defendants are present at the same time. Joining all 
of the defendants does not need to affect the burden of proof placed on 
the plaintiff to show causation and damages for each of the defendants 
separately, although it is true that where the court has all the defendants 
present it might be more willing to shift the burden, as some of the cases 
to be discussed illustrate. In any event, the procedural problems of 
joinder of parties, the nature of the verdict that should be rendered, 
and the impact of contribution and release of joint tortfeasors should 
present no different questions merely because the cases arise out of the 
use of atomic energy. While many issues in these areas are difficult and 
uncertain, there seem to be no problems peculiar to the atomic energy 
situations. 767 
( 2) Cumulative or Concurrent Causation Only-The 
negligence of each is a necessary link in the causal 
chain, or the negligence of each is sufficient to cause 
the total injury suffered and which actually caused 
injury cannot be determined. 
The first problem to be considered arises when several defendants 
have released radioactive material under such circumstances that each 
may be held liable for the total injury since the radioactivity released 
756 See study of fall-out reported in N.Y. Times, July 5, 1958, p. 5, col. 1. The 
AEC reported that only one person in the region of the 1957 Nevada tests received 
anything approaching the 3·9 roentgen aggregate set as the safety limit. 
767 Harper & James 695-97, 709; Prosser 233-51; 41 A.LR. 1223 (1926); 47 
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by each was sufficient by itself to cause the harm without the contribu-
tion of the other defendants. This is a situation that could arise when 
two or more reactor operations or the use of isotopes by two or more 
persons result in radioactive material being deposited on plaintiff's prop-
erty where the plaintiff himself is exposed and the exposure from each 
source is simultaneous either because the discharges were simultaneous 
or by the time the plaintiff is exposed the two sources are merged. This 
could easily happen from a discharge of radioactive materials into the 
air or a stream or into disposal grounds. In this kind of case the courts 
and the legal commentators agree that the full amount of damages can 
be charged to one or to all of the wrongdoing defendants. 
The analysis of this type of case usually starts with the Massachusetts 
case, Coley v. Hooener/58 where the two defendants simultaneously rode 
their motorcycles past a horse, frightening it and causing injury to the 
rider. Many other examples can be given, such as the case of A stabbing 
C and B hitting C with a rock simultaneously, either blow being suf-
ficient to kill C and he later dies; or the case of two fires being started 
independently, converging and destroying the plaintiff's house. Similar 
situations have arisen in connection with automobile accidents as is 
exemplified by a recent Kentucky case, Byee v. Shanks. The two de-
fendants negligently raced their cars down the highway. The plaintiff 
was injured when they crashed into each other, the plaintiff being a 
. passenger in one of the cars but personal_ly free from contributory 
negligence. Approving an earlier leading Minnesota case the Kentucky 
court said: 
... [W]here two or more persons are unlawfully and negli-
gently racing automobiles on a public highway in concert, all 
are liable in damages to a guest in one of the racing cars who 
was injured thereby, when the guest protests to the driver, has 
no control over the driver, and was not engaged in a joint en-
terprise with the driver. The Minnesota opinion reflects sound 
legal and humanitarian principles which are applicable to the 
factual situation of the case at bar.m 
The "but for" rule often does not explain holding both defendants liable 
under these circumstances (though it would in ~he racing car case) and 
these situations have given rise to the "substantial factor" rule. 760 
A.L.R.2d 8o3 (1956); 56 A.L.R.2d 239, 271 (1957); McCoid, "Negligence Actions 
Against Multiple Defendants," 7 Stan. L. Rev. 480 (1955). 
758 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 6g (1902); Harper & James 702, 1122; Prosser 22(}-21. 
Burnham v. Butler, 31 N.Y. 4Bo (1865) (two sleighs rather than two motorcycles). 
759 Bybee v. Shanks, 253 S.W.2d 257, 26o (Ky. 1952). See also Harper & James 
693, ns. 9-10. 
760 Prosser 221. 
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It always seems to be assumed, of course, that if the force that actu-
ally caused the injury can be identified and separated from a similar 
force created by another negligent defendant, only the defendant whose 
force actually caused the injury will be held liable. As an illustrative 
example, suppose A and B each sell a rope to a person, bent on hanging 
himself, under such circumstances that they are negligent in so doing.761 
If the person hangs himself with the rope of either A or B, the other 
is not liable. On the other hand, if the two pieces of rope were tied 
together, both A and B would be liable for the death. Used as an analogy 
and applied to the radiation situation, we could assume, as an example, 
that two radioactive cobalt 6o sources used in the same area were negli-
gently shielded so that either could have injured the plaintiff, but it can 
be proved that he was exposed only to one. On the reasoning usually 
applied, there would be liability resting on only one defendant. So too, 
if the person irradiated is exposed to both sources of cobalt 6o and re-
ceives damaging radiation from each, there would seem to be no question 
about holding the owners of both sources equally and totally liable for 
the total damage. 
The much more difficult question is one that arises when it is impossi-
ble to tell whether A's piece of rope or B's was used, but it is clear that 
only one was used. This raises questions to be discussed later in con-
nection with the unknown wrongdoer. 
Generally it is assumed that if the injury resulting from the contribu-
tions of both defendants is a single injury, it is an indivisible one and 
there can be no apportionment In such situations it is clear that each 
made a suostantial contribution to the ultimate injury even though the 
injury itself may not be divisible. Is there any reason, however, why 
the. recovery for the single injury could not be divided between the 
wrongdoers in proportion to the amount of radiation contributed by each 
if this can be .proved? One answer may be that each defendant who sub-
stantially contributes toward the final result should as a matter of good 
social policy be fully liable to the deceased or injured party, assuming 
the contribution of the other party was reasonably foreseeable. Then 
there could be some kind of contribution between joint tortfeasors along 
the lines of the apportionment suggested. 
On the other hand, perhaps the radiation case is one in which we 
should not treat the harm as indivisible even though it is the total and 
ultimate harm of death, but should treat it like certain other cases of 
761 Carpenter, "Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause," 20 Cal. L. Rev. 
229.396 (1932); Prosser 221. See also Haley v. Calef, 28 R.I. 332, 67 At!. 323 (1907). 
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subsequent, as distinguished from concurrent, negligent action, e.g., 
the case in which one driver negligently injures the pedestrian who then 
is injured further by another driver, or the case in which a driver neg-
ligently injures a person and then a doctor negligently increases the 
damages. 762 In these cases the second person is held liable only for the 
contribution he makes in terms of additional damage, if this can be 
separated. In the radiation case where there is a cumulat~ve effect, if it 
can be proved that a certain number of units of exposure caused a cer-
tain injury and the radiation emitted by two different sources was in a 
ratio of I :3, the damages caused by the total radiation could be divided 
between the two defendants in a I :3 ratio, although the injury itself 
is not separate and could not be attributed to one or the other exposure. 
This would be feasible and would seem to be good policy. 
A closely related question is that which arises when there is a differ-
ence in time between the forces negligently set in motion by the differ-
ent defendants. vVhen each of the defendants' actions makes a signifi-
cant contribution to the final result, the general rule seems to be to 
impose liability on each of them as being concurrent causes of injury. 
There are many examples of this kind of liability, the most numerous 
of which are the automobile cases in which action of two or more neg-
ligent defendants, perhaps somewhat separated in time, occurs to 
create the final injury to the plaintiff. In these cases the imposition of 
liability on all defendants jointly and without apportionment generally 
is approved by legal writers. 763 The question most likely to give diffi-
culty in this situation is that of determining whether it took the con-
tribution of all the defendants to cause the final injury. This often re-
solves itself into a proximate cause question of whether or not to hold 
the particular defendant liable for his contribution. In such cases, of 
course, the question of "the comparison and determination of alleged 
plural or concurrent causes falls within the province of the jury. . . . 
Where there is a factual dispute as to the events and circumstances 
which caused the injuries, proximate cause is a jury question." 764 
A typical example of this kind of relationship in a radiation case 
762 Harper. & James n24 and cases cited. 
763 See cases cited 26 A.L.R.2d 167 (1952); 55 A.L.R.2d 13, 155, 201 (1957); and 
discussion and cases in Prosser 222-26 and Harper & James 705-o6. See Roush v. 
Johnson, 139 W.Va. 6o7, 633, So S.E.zd 857 (1954) for treatment of contributory negli-
gence. 
764 Melone v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 18 N.J. 163, 175, 113 A.2d 13 
(1955). See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Coxwell, 93 Ga. App. 159, 91 S.E.2d 135 
(1955), a car and railroad collision case. A very interesting case is Ristan v. Frantzen, 
26 N.J. Super. 225, 97 A.zd i26 (1953). 
NEGLIGENCE 369 
would be that of a supplier negligently assembling a fuel core and the 
reactor operator also being negligent in not finding the defect, all re-
sulting in a discharge of radioactive material following this combined 
negligence of the two parties. Under these circumstances it would seem 
perfectly clear that the law would hold each party, the supplier and the 
operator, individually liable for the total amount of damage caused to 
others. 
While there are some cases to the contrary, it seems almost equally 
clear that where the concurrent causes are the result of the negligence 
of one party but not of the other (as when one source is derived from 
nature or from an innocent person) , the negligent party is liable in full 
for the jointly caused injury.765 A good example of this is the case of 
Smith v. Bonner/66 in which the plaintiff was killed while driving along 
the highway where he was hit by a tree which .was blown over from the 
defendant's property, partly because of the unprecedented violence of 
the storm and partly because the defendant was negligent in not pro-
viding adequate support around the roots of the tree when he filled in 
an old cesspool. 
There are many situations involving radiation sources which could 
be controlled by this general rule. An example might be the occurrence 
of an unprecedented earthquake combining with the negligent construc-
tion of a reactor to release radioactive material and cause injury to third 
parties. Even though the earthquake was unprecedented so long as the 
material would not have been released except for the negligence of the 
operator, the cases would seem to indicate that the operator will be held 
liable for the total resultant injury. Similar situations could arise from 
the discharge of radioactive material into streams, the disposal of radio-
active material, or the transportation of such material where an un~ 
precedented natural cause combines with the negligence of the owner 
to cause injury. 
There is one other closely related situation which well might occur 
in the radiation injury cases in connection with which a somewhat dif-
ferent problem in apportionment arises. Illustrations include the case 
in which a boy falls from a bridge trestle under circumstances in which 
death is almost certain, yet on the way down he is electrocuted by de-
fendant's wires which are negligently uninsulated; or the case in which 
the plaintiff is killed by the defendant's negligence, yet he has a reduced 
life expectancy because of some previous accident or some existing 
785 Harper & James 7o6, n. So. 
78&63 Mont. 571, :zo8 Pac. 6o3 (1922). 
370 TORT LIABILITY 
disease; or the case in which a house is destroyed which already is al-
most sure to be destroyed by another fire, or by the pounding sea; or 
where the defendant blocks the plaintiff's barge in a canal where there 
already is a landslide which also blocks the way. Under such circum-
stances there is a question of what is the value of the thing destroyed 
by the defendant at the time he destroyed it. These problems seem to 
have been seriously discussed first by Chief Justice Peaslee of New 
Hampshire. 767 Prosser's analysis, by which he would reduce the value 
of the thing injured by the defendant's action where the other danger 
is so imminent that a reasonable man would take it into account, seems 
much sounder than the suggestion of Harper and James that the 
wrongdoer be held completely liable.768 Even if we admit that the "ob-
jective of tort law is compensating accident victims" and that this is 
the proper one to be stressed, there still remains the question of whether 
the defendant in the case, society as a whole, or the plaintiff (or his 
own insurance carrier) should bear the loss. 
(3) Cumulative or Concurrent Contribution to Amount 
of Injury--The extent of plaintiff's injury results 
from the accumulation of injurious impact from 
several sources, usually there being no causal con-
nection between the sources but there being a con-
tribution by each to the total single compensable 
injury 
The multiple causation problems that are most nearly analogous to 
the situations likely to arise in connection with radiation damage, and 
matters that will give the most difficulty, particularly as to proof, are 
those arising from injuries resulting to the plaintiff as a consequence not 
of any one defendant's contribution, but from the contribution of several, 
but no contribution is enough to allow imposition of liability even though 
each was negligent in allowing the force to be set in motion. The sug-
gested problem is one in which each of the defendants, if treated sepa-
rately, would be considered as having committed no tort, even though 
767 Peaslee, "Multiple Causation and Damage," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1127 (1934). See 
also Carpenter, "Concurrent Causation," 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 941 (1935); Prosser 
231; Harper & James JI22, n. 5. 
768 Prosser 231-32; Harper & James 1123. One need not accept the full implications 
of Prosser's suggestion that if A kills B right after C has poisoned B so he will die 
shortly, then the rule of reducing damages charged to A does not apply. What if A 
acts only negligently or under rules of absolute liability? Maybe it would be better 
simply to hold C liable even if someone got to B first so long as C's action was reason-
ably certain to cause death soon. 
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each breached his duty to use due care in handling some force that af-
fects the plaintiff at least slightly. In analyzing this problem it is most 
important that one always keep in mind a general rule concerning the 
proof of causation that the plaintiff must present. The considerations 
involved .in proving ca':lsation and damages in radiation cases are dis-
cussed later/" but the· generally accepted statement of the degree of 
proof required of the plaintiff is set forth by Prosser as follows : 
He must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis 
for the conclusion that it is more likely tha.n not that the con-
duct of the defendant was a substantial factor in the result. 
A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when 
the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or 
where the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes 
the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. no 
The author points out that ordinary experience must be used to de-
termine whether under the circumstances a given action could produce 
a particular result, and that circumstantial evidence may be used to infer 
the causal connection. This "more probable than not" test results in real 
difficulty in cases of injuries suffered only because of contributions of 
several persons. The corollary of the "more probable than not" test is 
that "Where the facts prov-en show that there are several possible causes 
of an injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not respon-
sible, and it is just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the 
result of one cause as the other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery since 
he has failed to prove that the negligence of the defendant caused the 
injury." 771 What is probable or not in many cases is a question on which 
reasonable men may well differ. Problems of this type inevitably will 
arise from the use of radiation sources, if for no other reason than be-
cause the effects of radiation are cumulative. Difficulty of proof also 
will arise in this area because of the inability of human beings to sense 
the presence of radiation and because radiation in some instances will 
emanate from certain sources for great lengths of time through many 
trans formations in form and over long distances~ 
Another very closely related problem is that which arises when it is 
. known that a particular kind of action or energy hascaused injury but 
it is not easy to determine which of several possible defendants or po-
tential defendants are responsible for setting·the force in motion. Here 
7&9 /nfra discussion beginning just after note 106o. 
110 Prosser 222. [Emphasis added.] 
771 Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938), cited 
by Harper & James IIII, n; 7· . 
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again the nature of radiation and radioactive sources is such as to make 
this kind of problem particularly acute in cases that seem inevitable as 
we make increasing use of atomic energy. 
(a) Liability for Another's Negligence Assessed 
Because of a Legally Imposed Status Rela-
tionship 
If one assumes that cause-in-fact can be proved (an assumption that 
is difficult to support in radiation cases as will be indicated later), 772 
and further assumes that the defendants who have set the force in 
motion can be identified, there are some cases about which the answer 
seems quite clear and all the writers agree. 773 In general they fall into 
three categories. 
(i) Concert of Action 
When the parties act "in concert," all of the defendants so acting 
clearly will be held liable for all the injury. The clearest example of this 
type of joint liability arises out of situations where several persons are 
acting together in a manner that may be in violation of both a criminal 
statute and also the tort rules of due care. These are cases where there 
is a known and intentional common pursuit of a common end, whether 
or not it be in the form of a formal joint enterprise, such as one of 
three deputy sheriffs firing the gun that injured the plaintiff. The court 
held that: 
It is immaterial which one of the three officers fired the shot 
that produced the wound. They were all engaged upon a com-
mon enterprise or adventure which contemplated the halting 
of the buggy and its occupants. They were present, encourag-
ing, aiding, and abetting this enterprise, and they were all 
equally responsible with whichever one of them actually fired 
the shot that produced the wound. m 
Similar concert of action, and therefore total liability on the part of 
each defendant, has been imposed in cases where innocent bystanders 
have been injured as the result of fights engaged in by defendants. The 
Tennessee court in one of these cases said: 
The rule is well settled that where two or more persons en-
gage in an unlawful act and one of them commits a serious, 
772 Infra discussion beginning just after note 106o. 
11a Prosser 224 ; Harper & James 1122-24. 
114 Mangino v. Todd, 19 Ala. App. 486, 491, g8 So. 323 (1923). See Moore v. Foster, 
182 Miss. 15, 18o So. 73 ( 1938) for an almost identical situation. 
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civil injury upon a person not engaged therein, all are equally 
liable for damages to the injured party. 715 
373 
Again, in a case of several defendants taking action, which together 
constitute a nuisance, such as polluting a stream, with full knowledge 
on the part of at least two of the defendants of the independent acts of 
others, courts have held that there was concert of action as to those 
who acted with knowledge: 
Where all have knowledge of the independent acts that create 
the result and continue the independent acts with knowledge, 
this ipso facto creates a concert of action and makes a com-
mon design or purpose. Any other position, from the facts 
and circumstances of the case, would make plaintiffs practi-
cally remediless, although there is a nuisance which all jointly 
concurred in and contributed to, that is alleged made the plain-
tiff's land valueless, and but for such joinder the injury would 
not have occurred. 778 
Other cases which may stretch the concert of action concept too far, 
are those in which persons hunting together are held jointly and fully 
liable for the injuries caused when plaintiff is hit by the bullet negli-
gently fired by one of them. Several such cases speak in terms of concert 
of action, but it would seem that this is a concert of action for a differ-
ent purpose. The common goal was not that of injuring the plaintiff or 
capturing him. Where officers assault a potential prisoner, or several 
p·ersons participate in a fight likely to injure bystanders, there is a real 
concert of action case.m A detailed consideration of the wrongly 
labeled concert cases involving one of several negligent parties causing 
unintended injury is found later in this chapter.178 
Except where there is an actual joint enterprise of some kind, the 
application of these concert of action cases to atomic energy situations 
will not be called for with any frequency. This type of case arises much 
more often where there is an intentional tort, or at least an intentional 
m Blalock v. Temple, 38 Tenn. App. 463, 468, 276 S.W.2d 493 (1955). 
778 Moses v. Town of Morganton, 192 N.C. 102, 100, 133 S.E. 421 (1!)26). The 
same rationale seems to have been the basis for liability in City of Skiatook v. Carroll, 
163 Okla. 149. 21 P.2d 498 (1933), and Comar Oil Co. v. Sipe, 133 Okla. 222, 271 Pac. 
1010 (1928), although they can be treated as concurrent nuisance cases, discussed infra 
in text at note 784 ff. 
777 Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 100 N.W. 1120 (1go6); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 
852, no So. 666 (1!)26); Kuhn v. Bader, 8g Ohio App. 203, 101 N.E.2d 322 (1951). 
See also Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d nog (1932). Similar ideas have been 
applied in cases where dogs of several owners caused damage. See e.g., Stephens v. 
Schadler, 182 Ky. 833, 207 S.W. 704 (1919); Arneil v. Paterson, [1931] A. C. 56o. 
778 Infra note 881 ff. 
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wrongful act of some kind, a situation not very likely to happen in the 
atomic energy area. 
( ii) Vicarious Liability 
Much more important in atomic energy cases is the type of liability 
that is imposed under the vicarious liability doctrines. J n !he light of 
the possibility of saying that radioactive material creates an "unusual" 
hazard, this concept is particularly important to the atomic energy 
entrepreneur. Under the cases discussed previously,179 it is clear that 
there are any number of situations in which the owner or user of radio-
active material will be held vicariously liable for the actions of inde-
pendent contractors, although a very good case can be made for not 
imposing it in cases involving independent contractors engaged in 
transportation and disposal operations. 
An equally clear case of each defendant being held liable for the 
whole damage (at least so far as the plaintiff is concerned), is that in 
which the law imposes vicarious liability on one party for the acts of 
another. A typical example is the liability of a master for the acts of his 
servant carried out pursuant to the employment, or the liability of a 
principal for the acts of his agent carried out within the scope of the 
agency.780 A similar result has been reached in a case involving the per-
son in charge of a city dump. He did nothing to prevent other defend-
ants from causing a nuisance to the injury of the plaintiff through their 
use of the dump and the kind of material they were allowed to deposit 
there. In an action against the city and the other persons involved, the 
court held the city liable even though it in no way approved the action 
of the other defendants. 181 
(iii) Common Duty 
Another category of cases in which all defendants are held equally 
liable for the whole damage arises when a common duty imposed by 
law upon two or more persons is not carried out, and someone is in-
jured.182 This rule often is applied if both the landlord and a tenant are 
responsible for proper maintenance of a building or two persons are 
responsible for the proper maintenance of a party-wall. Both are held 
liable when the wall falls whether because of the negligence of one or 
779 Supra discussion at note 20'J ff. 
780 Prosser 225; Harper & James 699-700. 
781 Cases collected Annot., .52 A.L.R.2d I I34, I I42 ( I957). 
782 Prosser 225-26; Harper & James 6gg. 
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the other, or both. This type of case is not so likely to arise in the atomic 
energy area but one possibility might be if two corporations jointly 
form a third corporation to carry out research in atomic energy prob-
lems. If the third company is held liable on the basis of negligence or 
absolute liability for injuries caused to others, it is possible that the 
courts would pierce the corporate veil and hold both of the parent cor-
porations liable. Again, a common duty may be found if two industrial 
concerns using radioactive isotopes have a common storage vault for 
such materials as cannot be discharged into the sewage system, and 
through the fault of one or the other the storage vault leaks and causes 
damage to a third party. In many ways this kind of activity is really a 
case of joint-enterprise. 
(b) Cumulative Contributions from Several N egli-
gent Sources Legally Unrelated Except Each 
Contributes to the Total Single Injury 
The cases which will cause real difficulty, however, are those in which 
the injury results from the contributions of several persons, each of 
whom is negligent and no one of whom contributes enough to cause the 
whole injury, and common duty or vicarious liability rules just dis-
cussed are not applicable. · 
In analyzing these cases several distinctions must be kept in mind. 
The first is between those cases in which it is possible to make at least 
some rough apportionment of the relative contribution of the individual 
parties, and those cases in which it is practically impossible to do so. 
Another distinction is between those cases in which all of the contrib-
uting parties are negligent, where no one of the contributing parties is 
negligent, where some but not all of them are negligent, and the case 
where the negligent actions of one or more defendants combine with 
forces occurring naturally; the combination causing the damage. Like-
wise important is the distinction between the case where it is dear that 
cause-in-fact has been proved as to all of the persons joined in the ac-
tion and those cases where it is perfectly clear that all of the defendants 
did not participate and the real question is which one caused the harm, 
it being possible that any one of them might have but only one of them 
did do so. 
Another consideration· of importance in analyzing the cases in this 
area is that joinder of all potential defendants for purposes of trial 
does not lead necessarily to the imposition of joint liability on all de-
fendants for all of the damages with total liability imposed on all. Ir. 
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attempting to determine what the liability may be for the cases that are 
bound to arise in connection with the use of radiation sources, it seems 
wise to analyze carefully the most nearly analogous cases. In analyzing 
the cases the distinctions and considerations suggested above should be 
kept in mind. 
( i) Cases to Be Distinguished 
In addition to the distinctions between cases which involve cumula-
tive or concurrent contribution to the amount of injury, all of which are 
here discussed, it is important to distinguish certain groups of cases en-
tirely. The kind of case of concern here should be sharply distinguished 
from that involving the independent but concurring acts of two or more 
defendants which create a situation causing injury to the plaintiff, but 
where the injury itself comes at the end of a chain of events rather than 
resulting from an accumulation of injuries inflicted by the defendants 
quite independently of each other. 
The case of Ristan v. Fra.nfzen183 exemplifies the distinction that 
should be kept in mind. In this case the first defendant negligently 
struck the plaintiff's car and, while causing no serious injury to it or 
the occupants, put the car in such a position on the highway that the 
second defendant negligently ran into the car, causing very serious in-
jury to its occupants. The first defendant was liable for the whole 
damage because his negligence put the plaintiffs in such a position that 
foreseeably they would be seriously hurt by somebody else, such as the 
second defendant. Because there was no recoverable injury from the 
first blow by the first defendant, however, the second defendant also is 
liable for the total damages inflicted because his negligent act caused the 
total recoverable damages, even though the injury would not have oc-
curred if it had not been for the negligence of the first defendant. These 
are concurrent contributors but each is clearly liable for the total dam-
age independently of whether or not the other person was guilty of neg-
ligence. The case differs from the cumulative contribution cases in which 
there is an accumulation of negligent actions of all defendants each 
contributing to the total. It would be closer if the plaintiff were hurt · 
seriously from the first collision, then were also hurt seriously from the 
second collision, and died as a consequence of the combined injuries, 
although neither one alone would have been sufficient to kill him. It is 
the cumulative contribution to the amount of injury type of situation 
with which we are concerned here, where the injurious impacts of sev-
7sa Supra note 764- The cises set out in Harper & James 7o6, n. 8o do not. 
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era] defendants, each negligent, combine to cause the total injury. In 
considering the decisions that have been made in this area it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the several distinctions suggested above. 
(ii) Cumulative or Concurrent Nuisance 
Cases Involving Negligence 
By far the greatest number of cases bearing on the cumulative con-
tribution to the amount of injury question have arisen in the area of 
nuisance, usually arising out of the actions of two or more defendants 
resulting in pollution of streams or air, (sometimes by causing noise), 
or the flooding of another's property. These cases are of especial sig-
nificance to the atomic energy entrepreneur in relation to his potential 
liability problems. The leading cases in those jurisdictions which have 
faced the problems deserve careful study. 
Roughly the cases can be divided into two categories : ( 1 ) Cases in 
which the courts have held t.hat each defendant, though negligent, is 
liable for only his own acts and may not be held liable without independ-
ent proof that more probably than not his actions caused a specific part 
of the damages. In most cases, this means that it is improper to join 
several defendants in one action, although as was pointed out previously, 
joinder is not necessarily to be precluded merely because ultimately the 
plaintiff will have to prove that more probably than not the defendants 
individually contributed a specific proportion of the damages. ( 2) Cases 
in which joinder has been permitted and joint liability for damages has 
been assessed, or the court has ordered a shifting of the burden of 
proof so that each defendant is· forced to show the extent of his own 
contribution to the total damages to preclude being held liable for the 
whole. The cases involve claims for damages, not for injunctive relief. 
This point has not always been made clear in analyzing the problem. 
Defendants Held Individually Liable Only. In two early cases the 
California court adopted the view that unity of action is present when 
an injury results from combined acts, no one of which itself would 
cause any damage. Under these circumstances the California court held 
the defendants to have acted jointly and to be jointly liable for the dam-
ages. In one case m tailings from several mining operations in the can-
yon above plaintiff's land were discharged by the defendants into the 
waterway and polluted the water that passed the plaintiff's land. In the 
other case 78~ the defendants each diverted some water from a stream so 
as to deprive plaintiff of water to which he was entitled. 
184 Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal. 166 (1867). 
7UHillman v. Newington, 57 Cal. s6 (188o). 
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In a later case, Miller v. Highland Ditch Co.,786 however, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court changed its position and held that an action 
could not be maintained jointly against defendants if each had acted 
separately, and that it did not become a joint tort merely because the 
consequences united with consequences caused by other defendants. In 
this case water from the ditches of the several defendants, each operat-
ing independently, combined and injured the plaintiff's land. A similar 
result was reached in a later case by the California Appeals Court where 
cement dust from the defendant's operations united with that from 
another cement company and caused injury to the trees and orange 
crops of the plaintiff.187 The court stated that each tort feasor could be 
held liable only for such proportion of the total damages as resulted 
from the dust from his own plant. Recognizing the difficulty of appor-
tioning the damages, however, the court stated that the trier of facts 
could estimate such damages with a "liberal han4." The problem of 
joinder of parties did not arise because only one defendant was involved 
in this particular action. It seems not unlikely that if the plaintiff had 
tried to join both tortfeasors, a motion for a misjoinder would have 
been sustained. 
The Colorado court seems to have adopted the same view in Ryan 
Gtdch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz. 188 While the court did not make it clear 
that the damage would not have occurred without the water from both 
dams which broke as the result of a very heavy rain and caused the 
damage to the plaintiff's land below the" dam, the co~rt takes a position 
which seems to be quite consistent with that of the later California 
opinion. The court said : 
We, are, therefore, asked, if we hold on this review that the 
defendants cannot be held jointly liable, to affirm this judg-
ment as to the lower reservoir owner and then let the two de-
fendants hereafter settle this between themselves, which one, 
if either, is wholly liable, or what proportion each shall pay of · 
the judgment thus entered by us against the one defendant. 
We do not think this should be done, even if we had the power 
to do it. The difficulty that the plaintiff will necessarily en-
counter, if he brings a separate action against either defend-
ant, in showing what his contribution was to the single injury, 
is no reason why this court in a joint action against them, 
where the evidence does not show a joint liability, should hold 
786 87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 ( 1898). 
787 Calif. Orange Co. v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., so Cal. App. 522, 195 Pac. 
694 (1920). 
788 77 Colo. 6o, 234 Pac. 1059 (1925). 
NEGLIGENCE 
either defendant liable for the entire injury to which he is 
only one separate contributor, nor is it any reason why we 
should permit a joint action to be maintained against both 
when there was no concurrence, either in time or place, 
of their distinct and separate acts. There is always dif-
ficulty upon the part of a jury in estimating the amount of 
damages in such cases, but this has never been understood to 
be a reason for a court arbitrarily to say that defendants, 
whose wholly distinct and separate acts have caused a single 
injury, may be joined in one action for the benefit of the 
plaintiff and to save him the labor of showing in a separate 
action against either tort-feasor what damage was occasioned 
by him.788 
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In Connecticut there is one case involving stream pollution by several 
upper riparian owners which contains dictum to the effect that each de-
fendant in a joint tortfeasor situation is responsible only for his own 
wrongs.180 
Again, in Florida a case involved two separate mining companies as 
defendants. The waste from their separate plants united to pollute the 
stream, making it unusable for the plaintiff's purposes in operating his 
cattle farm. A trial court charge to the jury that defendants could be 
held joint tortfeasors was reversed on appeal on the ground that to be 
joint tortfeasors there must be. a concert of action which cannot be 
found merely from the fact that consequences of separate acts unite to 
form one injury. 181 
A case arose in Georgia in which it was alleged that the airplanes of 
several companies in using the runways of the city airport for landing 
and taking off were causing such a nuisance to the plaintiff that he was 
seriously damaged. The court said that "Since the petition does not 
allege a concert of action in operating on the runway so as to injure the 
plaintiff and does not allege a conspiracy to so operate it, and does not 
allege any fact which would make each defendant liable for the acts of 
the others, the action against the defendants jointly will not lie." 792 
Three years later the Supreme Court of Georgia cited this case with 
approval in denying the plaintiff a joint cause of action against several 
defendants whose action together brought about the ponding of waters 
on the plaintiff's lot, causing her damage.793 The court did go ahead to 
T89Jd. at 69-70. 
790 Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 428, 76 Atl. 986 (1910). 
791 Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913). 
792 City of Atlanta v. Cherry, 84 Ga. App. 728, 733, 67 S.E.2d 317 (1951). 
1us Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206, 207, 84 S.E.2d 568 (1954). 
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say, however, than an injunction action against a continuing tort could 
be brought against all of the defendants and held that, 
The court, having jurisdiction for the purpose of giving in-
junctive relief, could under the well-established law of this 
State retain it as to damages in order to do complete justice 
between the parties. Code §37-105. The court, upon proper 
determination of the damages caused by each of th~ .:!::fend-
ants, could render judgment against them for the proportion-
ate parts of the damage done. 7u 
It is held, apparently, that it is possible to join the defendants in equity, 
although the court does not indicate whether or not it is possible to 
shift the burden of proving what each defendant contributed. 
A case arising in Idaho 795 involved a situation in which water from 
the canal of the defendant combined with water from other sources to 
flow on the plaintiff's land and ruin his hay. The courts held that each 
independent tortfeasor is liable for that proportion of the injury which 
he contributed. The court suggested that "exact and definite measure-
ments" of the contribution of each defendant was not essential but 
"some evidence in that respect is essential." 798 In this case the suit was 
against only one defendant, there having been no attempt to join all of 
them, but the court did state that recovery could be obtained against 
each independent tortfeasor severally. 
A similar result was reached by the Iowa court in Bowman v. Hum-
phrey,791 which involved the pollution of a waterway by the defendant's 
creamery to the alleged detriment of the plaintiff. Defendant attempted 
to show that its own pollution was negligible and that somebody else 
upstream was causing the pollution by dumping dead animals into the 
water. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was liable 
for the whole damage. The supreme court reversed on the ground that 
when a defendant has acted separately and without the knowledge of 
another's activity, only the pollution that could be proved to be the 
direct and proximate result of his own action can be used to assess 
damages. The fact that the proof problem would be difficult did not af-
fect the rule in Iowa. 
In neither Idaho nor Iowa do the cases actually hold that if all of the 
794 !d. at 208. 
795 Woodland v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irr. Co., 26 Idaho 789, 146 Pac. IIo6 (1915). 
796 /d. at 791. 
797124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904). An earlier case involving smoke, soot, and 
gas also held the injuries must be separated; Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 
79, 4B N.W. 1000 (18g1). See also Tackaberry v. Sioux City Service Co., 154 Iowa 
358, 132 N.W. 945 (1912). 
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defendants were joined in one action the burden of proof would still 
be on the plaintiff to show the separate contribution of each separate 
defendant but the two opinions suggest that this would be the rule. 
In an early Kentucky case, 798 the plaintiff sued for damages to his land 
alleged to have been rn.used by the defendant's ditches and culverts 
which turned surface waters onto the plaintiff's property. The defend-
ant argued that the county contributed to the injury, but the trial court 
refused to admit this evidence on the ground that it was not sufficient 
to establish a defense. This ruling was affirmed on appeal, the court 
taking the position that even if the county wrongfully contributed to 
the final injury, the two wrongdoers were joir,.t tortfeasors, subject to 
suit jointly or separately. The court said that the action was to recover 
damages for the injury, not for the failure of the separate defendants 
to act with due care. In a later opinion,799 however, the Kentuc~y Su-
preme Court held that tortfeasors acting independently were not jointly 
liable and could not be joined in one action. The suit was for damages 
against several oil companies· which had permitted crude oil and other 
harmful liquids to be put in such a position on the bank of the creek 
that the rains carried it into the stream and onto plaintiff's land. 
Joint action was not permitted in a Minnesota case involving the 
waste matter from a canning company and a city operated septic tank 
combining in a stream and causing a nuisance with damage to the plain-
tiff's farm which was downstream.800 The court did not even consider 
the possibility of joining the parties to try common issues, but separated 
them for trial of the damage question. 
The Mississippi court was faced with the problem in Masonite Corp. 
v. Burnham.801 In that case the defendant company had emptied its ref-
use matter into the waters of a creek into which the city also emptied 
its sewage. The polluted water damaged the plaintiff. The court, citing 
many of the cases which we feel should be distinguished,802 held that 
the trial court should have instructed the jury that the appellant "would 
only be liable for its contribution to the pollution of the stream and the 
damages resulting therefrom, and not for the independent acts of others 
798 Campbell Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Maxfield, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 11!)8, 91 S.W. 1135 
( 1!)06). 
799 Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co., 198 Ky. 135, 248 S.W. Z27 (1923). The same idea 
was applied in a case involving joint fraud, Evola Realty Co. v. Westfield, 251 S.W.2d 
2!}8, 301 (Ky. 1952). 
8oo Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933), following dicta 
in Sloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179, 36 N.W. 451 (1888). 
801 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933). 
802 See discussion supra at note 782. 
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contributing to such pollution and the damages resulting therefrom." 803 
The only case directly in point in Missouri is a decision by a Missouri 
appellate court in a case where the injuries complained of were caused 
by the depositing through sewer pipes into a waterway of large quan-
tities of manure, soot, garbage, decayed animals, etc., by individual de-
fendants who had received permission to do so from the city. The court 
denied a joint action on the ground that they were liable onty in separate 
actions for the particular injuries caused by each defendant separately. 
The court reasoned that "Were the rule otherwise a person, who illegally 
throws some putrid matter into a highway, might be held legally respon-
sible for the injuries caused by pestilence that depopulates a city, simply. 
because others, by similar illegal acts added to his own, created the nui-
sance which bred the pestilence." 804 In dictum in a recent case involving 
a situation where the real issue was which of two possible sources of the 
injurious force was the one which actually set it in motion, the court 
used some langttage which might indicate a contrary view.805 
The Supreme Court in Montana has had two occasions to rule on the 
problem. In the earlier case 806 the court refused to impose liability for 
the entire damages on one of several companies where refuse from sev-
eral mining and smelting plants, including defendant's, had polluted a 
waterway which had deposited the refuse on plaintiff's land. In a later 
case 807 several defendants individually had diverted water in such a way 
as to prevent the plaintiff from using the water for irrigation purposes. 
The court held in each case that there could be no joint liability and that 
a joint action could not be brought, whether or not damages were ap-
portioned among all defendants. In another case a federal court sitting 
in Montana refused to allow damages against any of the defendants in 
a suit to enjoin multiple defendants, even though an injunction action 
was proper and a restraining order would be issued against all of the 
defendants. 808 
8oa Supra note Sox at 854-
804 Martinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70,· 78 (188g). 
805 Schoening v. Claus, 363 Mo. II9, 124, 249 S.W.2d 361 (1952), mentioned infra at 
note 88o. Since it arose in a hunting accident situation it is very doubtful that it would 
be carried over into the nuisance type of case, however. The court did say, "[l]f the 
two Claus brothers acting together negligently injured plaintiff, then each would be 
liable. The evidence did not justify such an instruction. If some shot fired from each 
gun struck plaintiff, then each would be liable. However, if plaintiff's injuries were 
the result of the shot fired by Elmer, Erwin would not be liable." 
8 06 Watson v. Colusa-Parrot M. & S. Co., 31 Mont. 513, 79 Pac. 14 (1904). 
807 Howell v. Bent, 48 Mont. 268, 137 Pac. 49 (1913). 
8os Norton v. Colusa-Parrot M. & S. Co., 167 F. 202 (C.C.D. Mont. rgo8). 
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A Nevada court in an early decision 809 also held that there was a 
misjoinder of parties when the defendants independently through their 
separate ditches wrongfully sent waste water flowing into the drain 
ditch of the plaintiff, although an injunction would have been per-
missible. 
The plaintiff in a New York case sought damages for injury to her 
property caused by the defendant and other hotel owners through the 
disposal of sewage into a stream. The language of the New York Court 
of Appeals has been quoted often by courts ·in other jurisdictions. 
The right of action arises from the discharge into the stream, 
and the nuisance is only a consequence of the act. The liability 
commences with the act of the defendant upon his own prem-
ises, and this act was separate and independent of and with-
out regard to the act of others. The defendant's act, being sev-
eral when it was committed, cannot be made joint because of 
the consequences which followed in connection with others 
who had done the same or a similar act. It is true, that it is 
difficult to separate the injury; but that furnishes no reason 
why one tortfeasor should be liable for the act of others who 
have no association and do not act in concert with him. If the 
law was otherwise, the one who did the least might be made 
liable for the damages of others far exceeding the amount for 
which he really was chargeable, without any means to enforce 
contribution or to adjust the amount among the different 
parties. So also proof of an act committed by one person 
would entitle the plaintiff to recover for all the damages sus-
tained by the acts of others, who severally and independently 
may have contributed to the injury. Such a rule cannot be up-
held upon any sound principle of law. The fact that it is dif-
ficult to separate the injury done by each one from the others 
furnishes no reason for holding that one tortfeasor should be 
liable for the acts of others with whom he is not acting in 
concert. 810 
The court did not even consider the possibility of shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant to show his contributed share. Neither did it 
consider the advantages of a joint cause of action uniting all of the de-
fendants in one proceeding, and either trying the common questions to-
gether and separating the damage question or shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant on damages. The case was decided at a time 
when liberal rules of joinder were not generally accepted. 
· A lower court in New York in another case cited the Court of Ap-
8os Blaisdell v. Stephens, 14 Nev. 17 (1879). 
810 Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N.Y. 51, 53-54, 33 Am. Rep. 566 ( 1879). 
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peals' opinion as justification for allowing an injunction against mul-
tiple defendants whose individual small contributions to the pollution 
of the stream together caused damage to the plaintiff.811 
Since only the defendant railroad was sued in the action, the North 
Dakota case of Bmtlger v. Northern Pac. Ry.812 is not really authority 
for the proposition that several defendants cannot be joined in one 
action. The court held, however, that the defendant railroad could be 
held liable only for the damages caused by its own embankment, and 
not for the additional damages caused by other sources which together 
with the defendant's contribution caused waters to flood plaintiff's 
property. 
The same rule was applied by the Ohio court in a case in which the 
lower court had held the city liable for all of the damages caused by the 
pollution of a stream which the city alleged was also partly caused by 
other riparian owners. The Ohio Supreme Court, reversing the trial 
court, held that the recovery must be limited to the injuries occasioned 
solely by the acts of the city, regardless of how difficult it would be to 
determine the part of the damages so occasioned. 818 
The early Pennsylvania case of Little Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. 
Richard's Adm'r.814 is certainly one of the leading cases for this point 
of view. It often is cited by courts in other jurisdictions. In this case 
the plaintiff's dam gradually was filled with coal-dirt discharged from 
the coal mining operations of the several defendants. The instruction of 
the trial court that each was liable for the whole damage was held er-
roneous. As in the New York case, the Pennsylvania court held that 
the deposit of the coal-dirt in the dam's basin was only the cause of the 
injury but that the tort itself which gives rise to the cause of action was 
the act of throwing the coal-dirt into the stream. Since each act was 
wholly separate and independent of the acts of other defendants the 
torts were several when committed. Nevertheless, the court said that, 
because of the difficulty of proof, the jury should be permitted to meas-
ure the injury caused by each with a "liberal hand." 816 The joinder of 
several defendants who acted independently is possible in Pennsylvania, 
however, in an equity injunction action, but the court says nothing 
about whether this means each defendant would be liable for all, or 
811 Warren v. Parkhurst, 46 Misc. 466, 92 N.Y.S. 725 (1904). 
812 41 N.D. 316, 171 N.W. 632 (1918). 
8lS City of Mansfield v. Brister, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907). 
814 57 Pa. 142 ( 1868). 
S15Jd. at 147; approved inGallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509,22 Atl. 970 (18g1). 
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merely that damages can be apportioned among the defendants in such 
a suit.816 
A somewhat different kind of concurrent nuisance arose in a Tennes-
see case decided in 1903. The defendants were separate and independent 
corporations engaged in the mining and smelting of copper. The opera-
tions of each caused the emission of noxious, foul, and poisonous smoke 
and gases, which drifted onto the plaintiff's premises. The defendant's 
demurrer for misjoinder was sustained, and the ruling was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court, the court holding that the plaintiff must proceed 
in separate actions for the damages caused by each wrongdoer sepa-
rately, since otherwise one who contributed only a slight amount to 
the injury would be held liable for the damages of all. The court was 
not unaware of the difficulty of proof but at least made some attempt to 
indicate to the trial court how this might be handled and how to appor-
tion the damages. 
That a plaintiff may be. embarrassed in proving the wrong 
done him by one person is no reason why he should recover 
his damages from another, who did not cause them, merely 
because he did the plaintiff a similar injury. [The court sug-
gested that, to measure the damages of each, proof could be 
made of the extent and capacity of the plants, tonnage of ore, 
time each has been in operation, proximity from plaintiff's 
land, condition of the air currents, together with other facts 
and circumstances to show the amount contributed by each.] 817 
While we are not now called upon to pass upon this ques-
tion, we think that, where defendants are guilty of wrongs 
necessitating the action, juries should not be held to too great 
nicety and accuracy of judgment in ascertaining the damages 
to be assessed against each of the tortfeasors; and this court 
would be slow to interfere with verdicts supposed to be ex-
cessive. 818 • 
The court, however, did insist on separate actions. 
Only one of several who independently contributed to plaintiff's injury 
was sued by the plaintiff in the Virginia case of Pulaski Coal Co. v. 
Gibboney Sand Bar Co. 819 The deposit of slack, slate and mine refuse 
by several companies acting independently caused injury to plaintiff's 
816 Gray v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 286 Pa. II, 132 Atl. 820 ( 11}26), dis-
cussed infra at note 8,34. 
817 Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., III Tenn. 430, 442, 78 S.W. 93 (1903). 
818/d. at 455. In accord, Madison v. Copper Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904). 
Injunction suit distinguished in Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 179 F. 245, 255 
(C.C.S.D. Tenn. 1910). 
819 noVa. 444. 66 S.E. 73 (1909). 
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sand bar when the refuse was washed downstream. The court held 
that each must be held separately for a proportionate injury caused by 
his own negligence. The damages contributed by the one being sued 
had to be proved by the plaintiff, the court said. 
Another case that was decided in Virginia in 1946 presents a variation 
of the problem not found in any of the cases discussed so far. The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for the pollution of the plaintiff's well by 
water and minerals running from the defendant's mine. The defense 
was that the plaintiff by his own activities had eontributed substantially 
to the pollution. The plaintiff introduced no evidence as to how much 
of a contribution was made by the defendant, and the court held that 
this, therefore, called for dismissal of the action, since the damage 
done by the defendant must be proved by the plaintiff.820 
In the first case arising in West Virginia-, 821 the court held that the 
one defendant against whom the action was brought was liable for the 
entire damage even though several coal mines had contributed by de-
positing refuse in the stream running by plaintiff's land. The court 
reasoned that otherwise the plaintiff would be denied relief because he 
would not be able to prove the proportion of the share of each tort-
feasor's act to the total injury. Yet later, in Farley v. Crystal Coal & 
Coke Co.,822 the court expressly overruled the previous decision, and 
held that there was no joint liability if there was no concert of action, 
even though the contributions of the six coal mining companies had 
united to pollute the river and cause damage to the plaintiff's farm. 
In a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals (Ninth 
Circuit) arising in Arizona, the court stated that the damages caused 
by separate smelting companies to the plaintiff's adjoining farm land 
sh9uld be measured separately, and that each should be liable only for 
whatever damage was done by its own smelter. 823 In this case the lower 
court had consolidated two cases against two separate defendants 
and apparently they were tried by one jury, but separate verdicts were 
given. The defendant who appealed had not introduced any evidence 
but had objected to the verdict for the plaintiff. The court stated that 
the evidence was convincing to the effect that the smoke and fumes from 
the two smelters intermingled and caused the damages, and then pro-
ceeded to say "how could plaintiffs, farmers, be reasonably expected 
to say with anything like precision what the contents of the smoke 
8 20 Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946). 
821 Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co., 6o W.Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (19(16). 
822 85 W.Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920). 
8 23 United Verde Copper Co. v. Jordan, 14 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1926). 
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were, or what proportion of damage was done by smoke from one 
smelter as distinguished from the other?" 824 The court then stated 
that the theory of the plaintiffs was one of separate damages and ap-
parently assumed that the jury's verdict against this one defendant was 
based upon a separation of the damages caused by the two companies, 
in spite of the apparent lack of evidence to separate the damages. 
Injunction Against Concurrent Nuisance. While almost all jurisdic-
tions, as indicated above, deny any kind of joint recovery in a damage 
action at law where the nuisance is the result of contributions of inde-
pendent persons acting without concert, nevertheless, in a proper case it 
is the rule in every jurisdiction that an action in equity to enjoin the 
continuance of the nuisance is pe~missible and in this proceeding all 
of the contributors can be made parties. An injunction against nuisance 
is an equitable action, and to avoid multifarious suits the equity court 
will allow the joinder of all parties and enjoin each of them from mak-
ing further contributions to the nuisance. The cases supporting this 
proposition are legion, many· of them in the very jurisdictions which 
deny joint recovery by way of damage award.m 
Equitable Relief by Way of Damage Award. There are a few cases 
in which courts, after joinder of multiple defendants for purposes of an 
injunction, have allowed an award of damages in the same equitable ac-
tion, even in jurisdictions where a joinder of parties defendant in a 
law acti()n for damages would not be permissible. Typical of these is 
Vaughn v. Burnette, decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1954.828 
The court held that an injunction against all of the independent con-
current defendants could be had, and-
The court, having jurisdiction for the purpose of giving in-
junctive relief, could urider the well-established law of this 
824 Ibid. 
825 Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., (Calif.) .mjwa note 786; People v. City of Los 
Angeles, 83 Cal. App.2d 627, I89 P.2d 489 (I!)48); City of Atlanta v. Cherry, (Ga.) 
.mjwa note 792; Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297 (I88S) (paper companies 
polluting water); Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Met. I (I88I) (pollution of water by 
slaughterhouses, soap company and brewery causing sickening odor affecting flour mill 
operations); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Zeitler, I8o Md. 395, 24 A.2d 788 (I~) 
(paper companies polluting water); Johnson v. City of Fairmont, swjwa note Boo; State 
v. Dearing, 244 Mo. 25, I48 S.W. 6I8 (I9I2) (mining refuse discharged into stream); 
Blaisdell v. Stephens, .mjwa note Bog; Warren v. Parkhurst, .mjwa note 8n, approved 
I86 N.Y. 45, 78 N.E. 579 (I90()); City of Mansfield v. Brister, st~jwa note 8I3; Madi-
son v. Copper Co., supra note 818. See cases (including English) collected 45 A.L.R.2d 
1285 (I9S6) and 4 Restatement, Torts §882, comment b. In Morgan v. City of Dan-
bury, 67 Conn. 484, 35 At!. 499 (1896) an injunction was permitted against the same 
defendant for two separate nuisances, filling up pond and polluting air and water. 
828 Supra note 793. 
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State retain it as to damages in order to do complete justice 
between the parties. Code §37-105. The court, upon proper 
determination of the damages caused by each of the defend-
ants, could render judgment against them for their proportion-
ate parts of the damage done.827 
The court in no way indicates that there would be any shifting of the 
burden of proof to the multiple defendants or that there would be an 
imposition of joint liability on each of them for the total damage. 
The Nebraska court faced a similar problem in Brchan v. Crete Mills, 
decided in 1952.828 Here it was charged that the separate dams and 
dikes of two defendants, acting independently in the construction of the 
structures, together caused the river to back up in such a way as to create 
a nuisance, flooding plaintiffs' lands. In addition to an injunction 
against the maintenance of the dams and dikes, the plaintiffs asked for 
money damages caused by three previous floods. After the court decided 
that this was a proper case for joining the parties to enjoin the continu-
ance of the nuisance, the court said, concerning the right to recover 
damages: 
Some cases hold to the proposition that the collection of dam-
ages was not an actionable matter, and that an adequate 
remedy at law exists for the collection of damages. They 
further held that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on 
the question of damages. 829 
It appears from the foregoing-cited Nebraska cases that 
this jurisdiction has given approval to the proposition in a suit 
to enjoin a nuisance, damages suffered by the plaintiff on ac-
count of such nuisance may be included in the equitable action. 
This being an action in equity, the main relief sought is the 
abatement of the nuisance. The only damages that could be 
recovered would be the damages occurring as the result of the 
nuisance, if such be proven. This is based on the following 
rule: "It is a well-settled principle of equity jurisprudence 
that, where a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction of a 
cause for any purpose, it will retain it for all, and will proceed 
to a final determination of the case, adjudicate all matters 
in issue, and thus avoid unnecessary litigation." 830 
Since the question arose on a demurrer by the defendant, the court did 
not answer the question of how the damages should be apportioned, if 
they were to be apportioned, or if the two defendants were to be held 
jointly liable for the total damage. 
827 ld. at 2o8. [Emphasis added.] 
828 ISS Neb. sos, 52 N.W.2d 333 (I9S2). 
829 !d. at SIS. 
8ao /d. at 516. 
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To like effect, the lower court in New York, in Warren v. Park-
hurst/31 in considering the objection of the defendant that money 
damages could not be awarded in a suit to enjoin a nuisance, said: 
All the defendants may be enjoined, and, if the question of 
damages is urged, a reference may be had to determine 
what damage has been caused by each defendant. This power 
of a court of equity to grant exact justice and proper relief for 
or against each defendant relieves such an action of any pos-
sible hardship.882 
The Court of Appeals in New York upheld the decision of the lower 
court, apparently even as to the right to award damages, although the 
language is not clear on this point. The court said that the complaint 
stated a cause of action and was not objectionable "on the ground of 
multifariousness. Whether it would be good if the plaintiff sought 
only to recover·damages at law, it is not necessary now to decide." 888 
There is no indication in either New York opinion as to whether it 
would be possible to assess joint liability against all of the defendants 
for the total damage, but one gets the impression from reading the 
cases that the damages would be separated. 
The same problem arose in Penn.~yt-z,anw in the case of Gray v. Phila. 
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., the court saying: 
Assuming that each and all of the present defendants could 
claim a jury trial on the question of damages (a matter whiCh 
the chancellor will have little difficulty in deciding when called 
upon to do so), [ ?] , and that they prefer to face the antago-
nistic sympathy of a jury, rather than the judgment of a court 
not so influenced, still no difficulty would result; for, in the 
interest of the public generally, the issues thus raised can be 
combined for the purposes oftrial on this point, so long as it 
can be done without injustice to the defendants; and, so far 
as we now see, all such issues could be wisely tried together. 
Moreover, the convenience of the remedy in chancery is not 
the only basis of equitable relief in the present case. Equity is 
the special forum for obtaining an injunction, which may be 
granted to prevent actual or threatened trespasses or nuisances 
of a continuing and permanent character . . . and, when once 
the jurisdiction has thus attached, equity will itself proceed 
to round out the whole circle of controversy, by deciding every 
other contention connected with the subject-matter of the suit, 
881 Supra note Bn. 
882 I d. at 728. 
833 Supra note 825 at 49· 
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including the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled 
because of injuries theretofore sustained .... 88~ 
The decision of the Wisconsin court in 11t/itchell Realty Co. v. West 
Allis, 835 has been cited frequently. The corporate defendants' opera-
tions discharged chemicals and vegetable ingredients from their in-
dustrial operations into the stream and contributed to its pollution, to 
the injury of the plaintiff. The action was brought against the city 
and seven corporate defendants for injuries caused to the plaintiff's 
property by the discharge of sewage through the City sewage system 
and thence to a· stream running through the plaintiff's land. The lower 
court allowed damages· to the plaintiff in its suit against the city, the 
other individual defendants having been separated from the action 
against the city; Separate ·actions had been begun against each of them. 
The lower court aiso went on· the assumption that the total amount of 
damages resulting from the pollution could be charged to the city, 
which then could obtain reimbursement from the other defendants. The 
Supreme Court said : 
It is our view, therefore, that the action as originally begun 
was maintainable, and that the order of the lower court in 
striking out the allegations as to damages with respect to the 
private corporations charged was erroneous. Had the action 
proceeded, the plaintiffs could have obtained their equitable 
remedy for the abatement of the nuisance, and, upon the de-
termination of the court of the proportionate share of the dam-
age caused by each· of the defendants, were entitled to judg-
ment for such amounts, thus disposing of the entire litigation 
in one action. To accomplish such a result is one of the princi-
pal functions of a court of equity.836 
The court went on to hold, however, that the whole damage could not 
be assessed against one defendant but would have to be apportioned 
among the wrongdoers. 
Cases Permitting Joinder and Joint Liability. In a few cases courts 
have imposed total liability upon each of the defendants whose actions 
contributed in some part to the total injury which caused the plaintiff's 
damage. An action was brought in Indiana to recover damages for 
injuries resulting from the pollution of waterways from paper factories 
of several defendants. The defendants were held jointly liable and the 
court drew a rather unusual distinction. The court held that if the 
acts had amounted only to a private nuisance the defendants would be 
834 Supra note 816 at 16. 
83 ~ 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W: 390 (1924). 
836 I d. at 370. 
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liable individually only for the consequences of their own acts, but that, 
since a public right had been violated, each must answer for the wrongs 
of the others jointly or severally, as the plaintiff elects.837 No other case 
has been found in which the court drew a line between public and private 
nuisances for purposes of finding joint liability for damage. The distinc-
tion between these two kinds of nuisance would seem to have nothing 
to do with the question of whether persons, not acting in concert with 
each other but whose separate actions concurred and caused a total 
injury, should be held jointly liable. 
In Arnold v. C. Hoffman &Son Milling Co.,888 the Kansas court held 
that the defendants, one of whom had constructed a bridge and the 
other a dam, which together caused an overflow of water on the plain-
tiff's land, could not object by demurrer to being sued jointly and 
severally under the alleged facts. The defendants would be jointly liable 
if it were found that their acts operated jointly and contemporaneously 
to produce the overflow. A similar result was reached in a later case 
involving injury to the plaintiff's land caused by pollution of a creek by 
the city which discharged sewage and an oil company which discharged 
refuse into the creek. 889 
The opinion in a recent North Carolina case gave the same kind 
of answer when one defendant was sued for damages to land from the 
depositing of silt from mining operations in a stream flowing through 
the plaintiff's property. The defendant filed a cross claim against ad-
ditional defendants seeking to enforce its right of contribution, in the 
event it was found liable. The court stated : 
If the independent wrongful acts of two or more persons unite 
in producing a single indivisible injury, the parties are joint 
tortfeasors within the. meaning of the law, and the injured 
party may sue only one or all of the tortfeasors, as he may 
elect .••. 
When the aggrieved party elects to sue only one, or less 
than all of the tortfeasors, the original defendant or defend-
ants may have ·the others made additional defendants (under 
the applicable statute) for the purpose of enforcing contribu-
tions .... 840 
887 West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N.E. 879 (1~). 
888 86 Kan. 12, 119 Pac. 373 (1911). 
889 McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913). See also 
Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F.2d 364 (8th .Cir. 1931}, cert. den. 284 U.S. 677, 
52 S.Ct. 131 (1931). 
8•o Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17, 22, 92 S.E.2d 429 (1956). See also 
McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950); Stowe v. City of Gastonia, 
231 N.C. 157, 56 S.E.2d 413 (1949); Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 
S.E. 79 (1929). . 
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Three cases have arisen in Oklahoma and the court has held each 
time that each of several persons acting independently, whose actions 
combined to produce a single injury, would be held jointly liable for 
the total damages. In one case 841 livestock water was polluted by 
several defendants who permitted oil and salt water to run into creeks 
on plaintiff's land. In a later case 842 a city was sued for its operation 
of a septic tank and disposal plant which caused obnoxious odors and 
deposited refuse on the plaintiff's land. The city claimed that others, 
including slaughterhouses and a cotton gin, contributed to the injuries, 
but the court held the city liable for the total amount on the ground 
that this defense was immaterial. In a later case a federal court held 
the defendant oil companies jointly liable for the damage to the plain-
tiff's property arising out of the separate drilling operations of the 
companies. 843 In reaching its decision in this last case, the court con-
sidered it to be an application of the rationale used in an earlier case 
in which crude oil that had flowed into a creek from several defendants' 
operations and ignited had then burned the plaintiff's barn. These 
cases can perhaps be distinguished along lines suggested later 844 on the 
ground that possibly the oil from any one of the defendants would 
have been sufficient to have ignited and caused the total injury. If so this 
would not be a case of each of the defendants making a small contribu-
tion to the extent of the injury, but rather they happened to be concur-
rent causes of one single indivisible injury, the burning of the barn. 
A fairly recent Texas case, Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Dis-
posal Co.,S45 contains as strong an expression as any for holding each 
of the contributors of injurious material liable for the whole. The court 
stated that requiring the plaintiff to assume the burden of proving the 
contribution of each separate wrongdoer with sufficient certainty under 
existing rules of damages would deny the plaintiff an effective remedy 
under prior rulings in Texas. The court then said: 
In other words, our courts seem to have embraced the philoso-
phy, inherent in this class of decisions, that it is better that 
the injured party lose all of his damages than that any of 
several wrongdoers should pay more of the damages than he 
individually and separately caused. If such has been the law, 
from the standpoint of justice it should not have been; if it is 
841Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137,5 P.2d 389 (1931). 
842 Town of Sentinel v. Riley, 171 Okla. 533, 43 P.2d 742 (1935). 
843 British-American Oil Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P.:zd 530 (1942). 
8H Northup v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 Pac. 266 (1918), the distinction that should 
be made is discussed in the t.ext infra at note 858. 
845 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952). 
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the law now, it will not be hereafter. The case of Sun Oil 
Company v. Robicheaux is overruled. Where the tortious acts 
of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible in-
jury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be ap-
portioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrong-
doers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally 
liable for the entire damages and the injured party may pro-
ceed to judgment against any one separately or against all in 
one suit. If fewer than the whole number of wrongdoers are 
joined as defendants to plaintiff's suit, those joined may by 
proper cross action under the governing rules bring in those 
omitted. To permit the joinder as defendants of such wrong-
doers without at the same time imposing joint liability upon 
them would not relieve the inequities of the situation nor cure 
the ills of the plaintiff. Simple procedural joinder of the 
defendants would put the plaintiff in no better position to pro-
duce the required proof of the portion of the injury attrib-
utable to each of the defendants. In most such cases, under 
the decisions heretofore cited, he would still be the victim of an 
instructed verdict. It would be of no comfort or advantage 
to the plaintiff that the instructed verdict relieved all of the 
defendants of liability in one suit and at one time_rather than 
in separate suits and one at a time. 846 
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A rather odd result was reached in a very early Vermont case.841 
Here two separate dams caused water to overflow on the plaintiff's 
land but one of the defendants removed his dam immediately upon hear-
ing of the injury to the plaintiff's land. The jury found this defendant 
not guilty and the other guilty. The one found guilty appealed on the 
ground that there was a misjoinder in the trespass action. The court 
said the joinder was proper on the theory that if the plaintiff had brought 
an action against either one separately, the defendant would have argued 
that his dam caused no injury at all. The court concluded that it is pos-
sible to join both defendants and permit the jury to decide where the 
blame should be placed. The case, therefore, really is not a holding 
that there can be joint liability. In a much later case,S48 however, the 
Vermont court held defendants jointly and severally liable where the 
dam of one and the piers of the other together raised the water level 
and caused it to flow onto the highway. 
A case arose in Washington involving the pollution of a river by 
sewage of a city and waste from the defendant's slaughterhouse.849 The 
846 /d. at 256. 
847 Wright v. Cooper, I Tyler 425 (Vt. 18o2). 
848 Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp., r_r; Vt. 336, 123 Atl. 192 (1924). 
849 Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wash.2d 453, II7 P.2d 221 (1941). 
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court did not allow imposition of joint liability because it felt it was 
unjust to hold one responsible for the entire injurious effects of acts 
committed by all, but it did allow joinder of parties in one suit to de-
termine more accurately the rights and duties of all. It held that there 
was no misjoinder. This seems to reverse an earlier Washington de-
cision in which one defendant was held liable for the whole injury in a 
concurrent causation situation.850 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a case 
arising in Louisiana adopted the joint liability for the total injury view. 
Louisiana follows this· rule. If, therefore, on a new trial, 
plaintiffs can introduce evidence sufficient to show that the 
defendants, or any of them, were negligent and, though acting 
separately, their negligence combined to produce the pollution 
damage, plaintiff may recover for the whole damage against 
one or all of those contributing. 851 
The recent decision by the English House of Lords in Bonnington 
Castings, Ltd. v. Wardlaw 852 indicates that the English rule in this 
kind of case is analyzed in simple terms of "material contribution," the 
only requirement being that the part contributed by each defendant 
being sued make a material contribution. If it does, then total liability 
is imposed upon each. At least it was so held in the case of an occupa-
tional disease, silicosis. This analysis does not seem to be dependent 
upon the fact that the case involved the breach of a statutory duty or 
liability to an employee, since the question is one of causation. 
Results in Cumulative Contribution Radiation Cases Under Existing 
Doctrines. The results which courts would reach under existing rules 
in several of the multiple defendants situations have been indicated 
already, including, ( 1) when the negligence of each of two or more 
defendants has furnished a link in the chain of causation resulting in 
a single injurious incident, ( 2) when two or more independent sources 
negligently operated have exposed the plaintiff and each contribution 
was sufficient to cause the total injury but which actually caused the 
injury cannot be determined, and (3) when several sources each make a 
cumulative contribution to the amount of injury but total liability may 
be imposed upon one or more of the defendants because of legally im-
posed responsibility for the acts of another such as in concert of action, 
vicarious liability, and common duty situations. 
850 Johnson v. Irvine Lumber Co., 75 Wash. 539. 135 Pac. 217 (1913), where de-
fendant's log jam and the acts of others combined to cause injury. 
851 Phillips Petroleum Co .. v. Hardee, 18g F.2d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 1951). 
852 [1956] I All. E.R. 615. Commented on in 106 L. J. 387 (1956). 
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In addition, the results which courts will reach under existing rules in 
other situations will be discussed in the next two subsections. Negligent 
Unknown Wrongdoer deals with those situations in which less than all 
of the potential defendants are responsible for the injury (in the sense 
that some simply could not have made any contribution), but it is impos-
sible or at least extremely difficult for the plaintiff to identify the re-
sponsible party or parties. Cumulative Effect from Non-Negligent 
Source is concerned with cases in which the manner of operation, includ-
ing the amount of radiation, is in compliance with the standard of 
conduct required of the reasonable man under the circumstances. 
The cumulative or concurrent nuisance cases possibly give us answers 
to the radiation situations in which several legally unrelated defendants 
each has been negligent and each has made the· total injury greater than 
it would have been without his contribution. Whether the sources of 
radiation be reactors, industrial and research isotopes, or waste products 
being disposed of, two types of cumulative contribution cases may arise: 
(I) when each negligently releases radiation but the amount is below 
the threshold level which causes observable injury so that without the 
contribution of others no tort liability would have been imposed; and 
( 2) when each negligently releases sufficient radiation to cause re-
coverable injury to the plaintiff without the contribution of the others 
but the injury caused by each is now combined in one total injury. Many 
of the nuisance cases appear to involve the latter situation, but the- facts 
of others would seem to be similar to those in the first group. Unfortu-
nately the courts have not been concerned with such a distinction so 
the facts are not stated in a manner that would reveal which is involved. 
Under existing rules evolved from the nuisance cases this could cause 
a difference in result which would seem unjustifiable. 
The clear majority of jurisdictions in the United- States holds that 
there can be no joint liability in the cumulative-contribution-to-amount-
of-injury case; and many of these do not allow even a joinder of de-
fendants in the same cause of action, nor do they permit a shifting to 
the defendants of the burden of proving proportionate contribution. 
In such states the injured plaintiff must sue each one separately and 
prove the amount of damage caused by each. To the extent that the 
contribution of any one of the defendants is not sufficient to cause any 
recoverable harm this would seem to lead to a result denying recovery 
at least for this amount of the injury. In many cases, particularly of 
radiation exposure, this could mean no recovery at all. A good example 
would be genetic damage since the increase in incidence of mutations 
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apparently is directly proportional to the amount received. Using the 
more probable than not test, if the increase in chances of a mutation is 
allocated to each defendant, the contribution of no one defendant is 
likely to be sufficient to make the chances of mutation more than fifty 
per cent. Therefore, recovery could be had from no defendant. Theo-
retically, when each source contributed enough to cause recoverable 
injury, plaintiff can get full compensation if he can find and recover 
from all of the defendants. This would seem to be the case with such 
radiation injuries as shortened life span in which there apparently is a 
linear and cumulative effect from all radiation. In some jurisdictions 853 
joinder inay be permitted and the jury allowed to apportion the damages 
with a liberal hand so far as proof of relative contribution is concerned. 
In those eight jurisdictions which not only have allowed joinder of all 
defendants but also have imposed joint liability on all defendants for 
the total damages, the plaintiff will not only avoid the very difficult prob-
lem of proving how much each defendant contributed but also will get a 
windfall in two senses. Joint liability as imposed by the courts in these 
jurisdictions means that each defendant is liable not only for his own 
contribution, but also in a real sense is a surety for all other defendants 
in the event they cannot be found or are unable to contribute their share 
of the damages. In addition, the effect of joint liability could be to 
make the defendant or defendants who were negligent and successfully 
sued by the plaintiff liable not only for their own contributions but also 
for any contribution made by any other source of radiation which con-
tributed to the total injury, including natural background radiation and 
that from non-negligent sources, such as those used in medical treat-
ment. It can be argued that imposing total liability in such situations 
is like the "thin-skull" cases, or those in which the first negligent person 
who injures the plaintiff is liable for the negligence of a doctor who 
treats plaintiff for his initial injuries, or even some of the concurrent 
causation cases in which it took both a dam built by one defendant and 
a railroad embankment built by another to cause plaintiff's land to be 
overflowed. 854 Even if this explanation be accepted, it should not be 
used to justify the imposition of suretyship liability upon one collectible 
defendant when it is clear that each defendant caused some separable 
part of the total injury. 
Surely better solutions can be worked out and the responsibility for 
doing so rests primarily with lawyers. We make the following sug-
gestions as a start toward better solutions. 
853 E.g., California. See case cited supra note 787. 
854 Arnold v. C. Hoffman & Son Milling Co., supra note 838. 
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Cumulative or Concurrent Causation and Cumulati'l/e or Concurrent 
Contribution to Amount of Injury Distinguished. The importance of 
distinguishing between the two types of cases is so great that restate-
ment of the distinction is justified. It would seem better social policy to 
apply different recovery rules in each type, or at least not to carry over 
into the cumulative contribution cases the doctrine of total liability that 
has been applied in cumulative causation cases, as a few courts have 
done. 
The cases pertinent to this subsection (S b (3) (b) (ii)) all involve 
situations in which the forces set in motion by more than one source 
(human or otherwise) not only combine to injure the plaintiff but also 
each force itself makes some contribution toward increasing the dam-
ages; they are not just an essential causative link in creating the accident 
which caused plaintiff's injury. 
An example of a case in which there clearly is cumulative or con-
current causation but not cumulative contribution to the amount of the 
damages is McKay & Roche v. Southern Bell Tel. Co.8n In this case the 
injury to the plaintiff's horse and property resulted when a telephone 
wire negligently maintained by one defendant, fell across a trolley wire, 
negligently maintained by another defendant, thereby becoming charged 
with electricity and causing injury when it fell to the ground. Here it 
took the concurrent forces of two wrongdoers to cause the final injury, 
but the injury itself was no different in extent or kind because there were 
two wrongdoers. Other examples of this type of case are the car col-
lision cases in which both drivers are negligent and an innocent third 
party is hurt, referred to in section 5 b ( 2). 818 These are cases of true 
joint tortfeasors. 
Neither are the true cumulative contribution cases considered in this 
subsection (5 b (3) (b) (ii)) quite like those where two causes, equally 
capable of causing the total injury, happen concurrently and in fact cause 
one injury, such as in the two motorcycles case or the two fires case, 
hitherto mentioned in section 5b(2) and similar situations.m While 
the facts are not always clear, some of the concurrent nuisance cases 
may really be cumulative or concurrent causation situations rather than 
cumulative contribution ones. 818 · They should be distinguished, there-
855 III Ala. 337, 19 So. 695 (18g6). Daggett v. Keshner, 149 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1950), 
seems to be of this category, though the facts are very fuzzy. See also Roush v. 
Johnson, supra note 763. 
8ae Supra notes 763-64. . 
817 Supra note 758. 
818 Supra note 844. 
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fore, even if the courts do not do so, from the case in which there is 
true cumulative contribution to the amount of injury. 809 
A few of the cumulative contribution situations analyzed in section 
5 b (3) (b) ( ii) perhaps do fall just in between the cumulative causation 
cases and those in which it is the injury itself to which each of several 
defendants contributes, not to the causation of the situation or accident 
from which the plaintiff is hurt. In a few of the cases where the plain-
tiff's land has been flooded because of obstructions placed there by two 
or more defendants and where it took the effect of both obstructions 
to cause the flooding, we have cumulative forces that could be said to be 
either uniting in causation or in contribution to the damages resulting.860 
In many of these cases the facts do not make it clear whether it took 
both or several obstructions to cause any damage, or only that each of 
the obstructions made some contribution to the total damages. If the 
latter is the case then they should be treated as cases in which there is a 
cumulative contribution to the damage only, while if the former is the 
case, they should be treated as cases of cumulative causation. 
The Correct ( ?) Solutions. While the view denying imposition of 
joint liability clearly is the weight of authority even today, many 
authorities have condemned the res~lt. Some of them go all the way in 
support of the rationale of the Texas court in the Landers Ca.se.861 Wig-
more would adopt the following rule : 
Wherever two or more persons by culpable acts, whether con-
certed or not, cause a single general harm, not obviously as-
signable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the injured 
party may recover from each for the whole. In short, wher-
ever there is any doubt at all as to how much each caused, take 
the burden of proof off the innocent sufferer; make any one 
of them pay for the whole, and then let them do their own 
figuring among themselves as to what is the share of blame 
for each. 862 
Such reasoning would seem to go too far and is not necessary to protect 
the innocent plaintiff. 
850 Supra note 843-
860 E.g., Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry., supra note 812; Brchan v. Crete Mills, supra 
note 828; Arnold v. C. Hoffman & Son Milling Co., supra note 838; Wright v. Cooper, 
supra note 847; Town of Sharon v. Anahama Realty Corp., supra note 848; and per-
haps Johnson v. Irvine Lumber Co., supra note 850; Howell v. Bent, supra note 8o7. 
See also Tackaberry v. Sioux City Service Co., supra note 797. 
8 61 Supra note 845. 
862 Wigmore, "Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent 
Party Suffer Without Redr~ss," 17 Ill. L. Rev. 458, 459 (1923). Harper & James 
NEGLIGENCE 399 
A much more desirable result would seem to be a simple shifting of 
the burden of proof from the plaintiff, once he has shown damages and 
that each of the defendants contributed toward that damage, requiring 
each defendant to assume the obligation of showing his contributive 
share by producing proof to limit his liability to something less than the 
whole damage.863 As Prosser points out,864 the difficulty of proof neces-
sary to make a proper apportionment probably has been overstated. The 
difficulties may have been caused by lack of imagination or diligence of 
counsel in defending the accused. Actually a combination of solutions 
might prove to be best. In any event it seems clear that a joinder of all 
possible defendants is eminently desirable, and under liberal joinder 
rules now in effect in many jurisdictions this will be possible. 865 
It has been suggested 886 that if there is no proof of apportionment 
the damages be divided equally between the persons who contributed to 
the damage. When all of the defendants can be brought together in one 
suit, the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants seems entirely 
satisfactory, allowing each to limit his liability, with the over-all re-
quirement that the total damages should be fully compensated by the 
contributions of all defendants when added together. On the other 
hand, if it is not possible to join all of the defendants in one cause of 
action even under liberal joinder rules (e.g., if the action is brought in a 
state court and one or more of the defendants is out of the jurisdiction, 
as well may be the case where radioactive substances are involved), then 
one gets into difficulty unless the arbitrary rule of complete joint liabil-
ity is accepted, or, alternatively, the arbitrary rule of equal liability is 
used. Yet complete joint liability is unjustified if there really is no 
concert of action either by reason of relationship or because of knowl-
edge of the existence of the other contributing factor. While the de-
fendant may be a wrongdoer legally, this does not necessarily mean that 
he is to be punished rather than merely forced to compensate for his 
seem to accept this result as sound without considering shifting the burden of proof but 
not creating joint liability per se; Harper & James 708-og. But cf. language at Har-
per & James 113o-31. 
863 This seems to be essentially the suggestion of Prosser 229. And see the sugges-
tions in Carpenter, "Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause," 20 Cal. L. 
Rev. 396, 4o6 (1932); Jackson, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," 17 Tex. L. Rev. 
399 (1939). 
864 Prosser 229, taken from Prosser, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," 25 Cal. L. 
Rev. 413, 439, 443 (1937). 
885 See Prosser, "Joint Torts and Several Liability," supra note 864 at 443 and Pros-
ser 236-37. 
866 Prosser 229, n. 88. 
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own wrongdoing. The law is trying to distribute losses so as to reach 
a fair result. The Harper and James general philosophy, i.e., when in 
doubt always compensate the innocent injured party, does not necessarily 
always produce real justice. There would seem to be no justification for 
holding any single defendant who happens to be sued by the plaintiff, 
but whose contribution is only a minor one although an ascertainable 
part of the whole, liable for all of the damages,. and then in addition 
place on him the burden of assuring reimbursement from the other 
defendants. Assuming that there is some way of apportioning, which 
will be the case in most situations, and especially in radiation cases, then 
there seems to be no reason to shift the burden of finding the other 
wrongdoer to the one who happens to be served with process, just to 
compensate the plaintiff. If our theory is to be one of social insurance 
which will assure recovery to the damaged party in every case, then we 
ought to impose a general social insurance scheme. We should not pick 
out a party to bear the social insurance policy losses merely because he 
happens by coincidence to damage the plaintiff in the same or similar 
manner as one or more other persons, where the consequence of the 
wrongdoing is to add to the total injury, part of which was contributed 
by others. The coincidence is no justification for imposing the total 
liability of compensating the injured party on one person who happens 
to be available for suit. Not only are the cases which go "whole hog" 
to joint liability illogical, but also, strangely enough, unjust. 
In determining to which cases real joint liability for total damages 
should be applied, it seems fairer and more realistic to distinguish be-
tween the cumulative causation and cumulative contribution cases, rather 
than between divisible and indivisible damages situations.867 It is one 
thing to say that it is impossible to measure the separate contribution 
made by each of several causal links in the chain leading to a single in-
jury. It is quite another to say that every person who contributes some-
thing to the total amount of injury should be held liable for the total 
damages. Even in cases of cumulative causation in which joint liability 
is imposed, the effect of the trend allowing contribution between joint 
tortfeasors is to permit apportionment. 
At least as to radiation cases (and others too, probably) involving 
cumulative contribution to injury and not to causation it is best to make 
each defendant liable only for the part he contributed, otherwise every 
negligent user becomes a potential insurer for the wrongs of all users 
of radiation who cause the plaintiff some radiation harm. In addition, 
867 !d. at 226-31. Harper & James 695, 699, 7o6-o9. 
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the negligent user who discharges only a small amount also would be-
come liable for all injuries caused by non-negligent sources such as 
background and medical therapy sources, if his contribution added some-
thing to the total injury. This would include all other users and sources 
everywhere, often over a long period of time (at least the statute of 
limitations period), so long as the plaintiff was exposed to their radia-
tion source before or after exposure to the particular defendant's source. 
Surely the defendant at least should be permitted to prove how much he 
did not contribute and avoid becoming a surety for injury caused by 
all other radiation sources who cannot be joined in the same action or 
are not liable at all. 
The cumulative nature of radiation effects makes existing niles· in-
adequate. This points up sharply the need for a wholly new scheme for 
solving the radiation damage problem, perhaps along the lines suggested 
later. 
(iii) , Other Concurrent Contribution Cases In-
volving Negligence 
Defamation. When two or more persons utter the identical slander 
against the same plaintiff, absent any conspiracy, the courts practically 
unanimously hold that there can be no joint liability.868 If no distinction 
is to be drawn between physical injuries and injuries to a person's 
reputation, these cases are additional authority against imposing joint 
liability. Moreover, if anything, the problem of separating the damages 
in such cases would seem. to be even more difficult than in the case of 
physical injuries, such as those resulting from the accumulation of 
refuse or the cumulative effect of doses of radiation from separate 
sources which concurrently contribute to a total injury. Nevertheless, 
it would seem that the trend, though a minority as yet, toward joinder 
of multiple defendants, and possibly to a shifting of the burden of 
proof, or even to imposition of joint liability on all defendants in physi-
cal injury cases, undoubtedly will be even more persuasive in radiation 
cases than in defamation cases. Thus it may be that the nuisance cases 
will lead to a liberalization of the defamation rule. 
Mental Disturbance. The facts in Industrial Finance Service Co. v. 
Riley, decided by a Texas appellate court,889 illustrate the variety of situ-
868 In a recent A.L.R. annotation over fifty cases are listed which apparently hold 
that there can be no joint liability; there are only three cases, one being a slander of 
title case, in which there is language indicating the possibility of joint liability. 26 
A.L.R.2d 1031 (1952). 
869 Industrial Finance Service Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
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ations in which concurrent contribution can arise in mental disturbance 
situations. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, in financial difficulty, bor-
rowed from seventeen different loan companies. When they failed to 
make payments, the companies and their collection agencies sought to 
make collections. Their efforts were found to be unreasonable and to be 
made with malice and disregard for the health and welfare of the plain-
tiffs. There would seem to be no question that the constant calling day 
and night and the visiting at places of employment to demand payment 
caused mental shock and psychosomatic symptoms. Although there was 
no showing of any concert of action between the several companies 
as to their collection efforts, the court said, citing the Landers case 870 as 
authority: 
As we have already stated, under the evidence in this case it 
was impossible to ascertain the amount of damages caused by 
any one loan company separately from the entire damage 
caused by all the loan companies considered as joint tort-
feasors. It was therefore proper for appellees to prove their 
entire damages, which entire damages they were entitled to 
recover from any one or more of the joint tort-feasors. 871 
Because of the cumulative nature of ra<;liation effects, the apportion-
ment problem in radiation cases may not always be as difficult as was the 
proof problem in this case, but it is not hard to predict that in Texas, 
at least, the courts are very likely to impose joint liability on all defend-
ants who are cumulative or concurrent contributors in a radiation in-
jury situation. 
Defamation and mental disturbance cases present situations in which 
the argument of indivisible harm is· most clearly applicable. To judge 
and apportion human emotional reactions, whether as a target of a 
slanderous remark, or as a victim of mental torture, would seem to be 
much more difficult than to judge the cumulative effect of doses of radia-
tion, even though it probably is true that the final injury results from a 
combination of all forces brought to bear on the situation. The con-
tribution of an individual user in the radiation case, however, would 
seem to be more nearly mathematically apportionable. The relative con-
tributions of radiation are even more measurable than the contributions 
of concurrent contributors in many of the more conventional pollution 
cases, whether of the air or water. 
Workmen's Compensation Analogies. Probably the situations most 
sro Supra note 845. 
871 Industrial Finance Se~ice Co. v. Riley, supra note 86g at 504-
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nearly analogous to our radiation problem have occurred in the work-
men's compensation area, particularly in cases involving occupational 
diseases such as silicosis. While negligence rules are not imposed in this 
type of situation, at least where the occupational disease is covered by the 
workmen's compensation scheme, the question of proving causation is 
still present. These cases should not be ignored iri analyzing the radia-
tion cases. 
Where the statute does not provide otherwise, some jurisdictions 
adopt the rule that the employee, at his option, may recover an award 
for the entire disability against any one or more of the successive em-
ployers or insurance carriers. While it is necessary to· show that each 
employment under which claim is made against the employer contributed 
to the disability, it is not necessary to show that it is the sole cause of 
disability. Typically the employers held liable in these jurisdictions have 
a right to get an apportioned recovery from other contributors in a 
separate action which in no way delays the employee's compensation.872 
8 72 Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal.2d 79, 172 P.2d 884 
(1946) (applicant contracted silicosis while with employer who was covered during the 
period of employment by various insurance· carriers ; held, an award for the entire 
disability may be made against one insurer for a period when it was not acting as 
such); Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 133 Conn. 78, 48 A.2d 369 (1946) (death 
due to silicosis and both employers held liable); White v. Taylor, 5 So.2d 337 (La. 
App. 1941) (deceased hurt his back when a wheelbarrow of brick fell on him and two 
days later, when working for a subcontractor, attempted to lift heavy objects and suf-
fered back pains; held, the combination of the two accidents totally disabled the em-
ployee and the two insurers can be held jointly liable); Marsolek v. Miller Waste 
Mills, 244 Minn. 55, 6g N.W.2d 617 (1955) (while in three different employments, 
employee sustained injuries from accidents, each of which was superimposed on the 
preceding one; held, full compensation may be ·had from the last employer, who has 
a right to have the court apportion the award among the previous employers) ; Dick-
erson v. Essex County, 2 App. Div.2d 516, 157 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1956) (while in employ 
of county, deceased fell and injured his leg; because of weakened condition he fell again 
and re-injured it; in subsequent employment he again fell, was injured and died; held, 
the chain reaction all proxiinately resulted from the first accident, therefore the first 
employer is liable, but the current employer is also liable for injuries sustained in the 
course of the employment ; as between the employers, the apportionment of the award 
is for the Board to decide); Esmond Mills, Inc. v. American Woolen Co., 76 R.I. 214. 
68 A.2d 920 (1949) (employee contracted dermatitis under one employer and then 
became totally disabled while working for another; held, for the employee's benefit, 
the act permits him speedy recovery and allows him to collect the total compensation 
from the one for whom he was working when he became disabled, and such employer 
could then have the right to ask for apportionment from the former employers) ; 
Gosselin v. Parker. Brass Foundry, II9 A.2d 18g (R.I. 1955) (deceased contracted 
silicosis prior to working for respondent but died of it during such employment; held, 
nothing in. the act requires the employee to prove the dis~se was contracted while 
working for the last employer; it is sufficient to establish a causal connection between 
the employee's disability from the disease and his employment in work of the same 
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In other states, usually by virtue of a statutory provision, recovery is 
granted in full against the last employer in whose employment some 
contribution was made to the disease or injury.873 It is clear that cases 
in general follow the rule of imposing complete liability on either the 
most available employer defendant, or upon one or all of them at the 
choice of the employee. 
Whether the analogy of the workmen's compensation cases can be 
carried over into the public liability situation is highly questionable, 
nature as that in which the disease was contracted; court cites the Esmond Mills case, 
supra, approvingly). In these cases, it should be noted that the question of contribu-
tion among employers or carriers did not really concern the injured employee. In any 
event, he was allowed to recover the entire amount to which he was entitled from at 
least one of his employers. Other states, usually by virtue of a statutory provision, 
grant recovery in full against the last employer, under whose employment contribution 
to the disease or injury was made. 
B7S Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. den., 350 U.S. 
913, 76 S.Ct. 1g6 (1955) (occupational disease complained of was loss of hearing; 
employee had several employers and employers had several insurance carriers dur-
ing the course of the contracting and aggravation of the disease; held, under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, for its proper and speedy administration, it was 
the intent that the employer during the last employment in which the employee was 
exposed should be liable for the full amount of the award; by the same token, the last 
carrier who insured the liable employer during the employee's employment should bear 
responsibility for the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the liable employer) ; 
Mundy v. McLean, 72 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1954) (plasterer developed dermatitis while 
working for appellant; he left this job and took another one with no ill effects; then 
he left and worked for a third employer when his condition became worse and he was 
cautioned not to return to his trade; held, suit against the original employer will not 
lie by virtue of the act's provision which says that the employer in whose employment 
the employee was last exposed to the disease shall alone be liable without right of 
contribution from any prior employer); Central Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 374 
Ill. 300, 29 N.E.zd 5II (1940) (the case itself is not applicable to the present discus-
sion but it mentions the Illinois statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939 c. 48, §172.25, which pro-
vides that liability be fixed, in cases of silicosis or asbestosis, on the last employer in 
whose employment the employee was last exposed during a period of sixty days or 
more after the effective date of the act; and exposure of less than sixty days shall not 
be deemed a last exposure); Walsh v. Kotler, 43 N.J. Super. 139, 127 A.2d go8 (1956) 
(a roofer worked forty years as such and for the past ten years for respondent; in the 
last two years his hands began contracting and it was diagnosed as Dupuytrens 
Contracture ; respondent claimed his employment did not contribute to the disease since 
once it begins it will progress of its own accord; held, the last employer is liable re-
gardless of when the disease is contracted, as long as the last employment exposed the 
employee ; as to this causal question, the burden is on the employer to show that his 
employment added nothing to the severity of the disease or its acceleration); Stewart 
v. Duncan, 239 N.C. 640, 8o S.E.2d 764 (1954) (employee, a coal miner all his life, 
contracted silicosis at an undetermined date and became disabled while in employ of 
appellant; held, G. S. 97-57 is applicable and provides that the employer in whose em-
ployment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease, and 
the insurance carrier at that time, shall be liable; the exposure is deemed injurious if 
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since the workmen's compensation approach really is a social insurance 
program which as yet has not been adopted in the area of public liability 
generally. The principles are readily applicable only where there are 
statutory provisions and administrative procedures by which the liability 
award can be determined. Without statutory assistance, it would be 
unrealistic to try to carry these theories into the usual tort liability 
cases. From the standpoint of radiation injuries in workmen's compen-
sation situations themselves, assuming that radiation injuries are 
covered, there would seem to be nothing unusual or unique about such 
injuries that would call for any different rule than that applied in other 
cases.874 
(c) Alternative Liability-Specific 'Wrongdoer who 
caused injury unknown although an identifiable 
group which includes the wrongdoer can be 
found 
Atomic energy cases not infrequently should present courts with a 
type of problem often described as one involving alternative liability, 
or as we prefer, one involving an unknown-wrongdoer. The term 
unknown-wrongdoer is used because, while it can be determined that 
one or more of a limited and identifiable group of defendants set in 
motion the force that irradiated the plaintiff, it also is clear that only 
one or at least less than all of the group were responsible for the radia-
tion which actually did harm the plaintiff. In this sense the wrongdoer 
is unknown and unless the plaintiff can ·prove which one or ones "more 
probably than not" 875 caused his injuries, he will not recover under the 
the employee was exposed for as much as thirty working days within seven consecu-
tive calendar months, in cases of silicosis and asbestosis ; the plain language of the 
statute dispels any possibility of contribution among successive employers or carriers) ; 
Karoly v. Jeddo-Highland Coal Co., 166 Pa. Super. 571, 73 A.2d 214 (1950) (em-
ployee had silicosis; held, the employee's last exposure fixes liability on the employer 
and carrier at that time) ; Leva v. Caron Granite Co., 124 A.2d 534 (R.I. 1956) 
(stonecutter worked for previous employer, who was not covered by workmen's com-
pensation, for thirteen years, after which he worked on a temporary basis for respond-
ent for about seven weeks ; he became disabled from silicosis though it was clear he 
did not contract it while with respondent; held, all the act requires is that the disease 
was due to the nature of the employment, regardless of when it was contracted; there-
fore the last employer is liable); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Godbey, 192 Va. 845, 66 
S.E.2d 859 (1951) (coal miner disabled from silicosis; Va. Code 1950 §65-47, states 
that the employer in whose employment he was last injuriously exposed and the carrier 
at that time is liable, without a right of contribution from any prior employer or 
carrier). 
su Infra Part II on workmen's compensation. 
875 Supra note 770. See discussion of res ipsa loquitur, infra text at notes 1173 ff_ 
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traditional rules of tort liability which require him to prove by the pre-
ponderance of evidence that a specific and identifiable defendant or de-
fendants caused his injury. It is assumed that the plaintiff can prove 
that each of the defendants owed a duty not to irradiate him and that 
on:e or more of them, but less than all, is liable to the plaintiff for the 
injury suffered if the specific cause can be shown. The plaintiff, how-
ever, may not be able to pinpoint which of the group actually cGJU~Sed the 
harm. The only issue is that of causation, not duty, breach, or damages. 
As already suggested, under traditional rules the plaintiff loses be-
cause he has not proved causation. The result, at least in some cases, 
certainly is not fair to the plaintiff and there is a very small gro~p of 
recent cases which may be indicative of a new approach to the problem. 
As yet they do not represent the majority view and perhaps are not 
even indicative of a trend. The impact of these cases, however, if ap-
plied to radiation situations is so startling, and so unjust in many cases 
if traditional tort liability rules are applied, that they must be noted. 
It should be emphasized that this causation question is presented re-
gardless of whether rules of negligence, perhaps supplemented by the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or those of absolute liability are applied. 
While it has not always been done, again it is important to distin-
guish certain types of cases already discussed above, which are not 
directly analogous, but rather involve problems of multiple causation,876 
contribution to damage, 877 vicarious liability, 878 and equal concurrent 
876 Also to be distinguished from the true unknown-wrongdoer cases are those in 
which the concurrent negligence of two different defendants each contributes to cause 
the injury of the plaintiff, the injury resulting from a single impact. Saisa v. Lilja, 76 
F.2d 38o (1st Cir. 1935) (two racing cars, and jury found both caused injury though 
only one hit pedestrian); Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912) (clear 
contribution of racing car drivers). 
877 Micelli v. Hirsch, 83 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio App. 1948), is a good example of an 
often miscited case. There the decedent was struck by a car driven by one defendant 
and was run over by the car of another defendant. J cinder of the two defendants was 
allowed since the court considered the injury indivisible. There was no question but 
that each was negligent and, more important, that each did damage to the decedent. 
The only question was one of dividing the damages and the joint liability imposed upon 
each is similar to the results of stream pollution cases or car collision cases in which 
the negligence of each of two different persons concurs so as to inflict one injury upon 
the plaintiff, and the courts make the concurrent defendants separate the amount each 
contributed to the total damages. This is not a case of an unknown wrongdoer, but 
rather a case of unknown extent of damages. Actually, some of the hog, dog, and 
cattle cases really fit into this category, since it is known whose animals participated 
in the damage but it is not known just which animals did how much of the damage. 
Anderson v. Halverson, 126 Iowa 125, 101 N.W. 781 (1904) (had to prove separate 
damages, however); Worcester County v. Ashworth, 160 Mass. 186, 35 N.E. 773 
(1893) (interpreting statute); S. S. Nohre v. Wright, 98 Minn .. 477, 108 N.W. 865 
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causation. 879 Once these groups are distinguished, as they should be, 
the number of cases dealing with the question of the true unknown-
wrongdoer, as here defined, is small indeed. Because in some of these 
distinguishable cases the rule of liability has developed because of the 
difficult proof problems, there is some tendency to use them as authority 
in the unknown-wrongdoer situation. This is not good analysis· and 
(19()6) (damages must be separated); Miller v. Prough, 203 Mo. App. 413, 221 S.W. 
159 (1920) (to plaintiff's advantage to claim separate liability); Kerr v. O'Connor, 
63 Pa. 341 (186g) (statute interpreted as imposing liability for all damages on all dog 
owners); Nelson v. Nugent, 106 Wis. 477, 82 N.W. 287 (1900) (same); Remele v. 
Donahue, 54 Vt. 555 (1882) (same); McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St. 333 (1873) 
(same); Stine v. McShane, 55 N.D. 745, 214 N.W. go6 (1927) (no joint liability and 
joint liability statute not effective yet); Hill v. Chappel Bros. of Montana, Inc., 93 
Mont. 92, 18 P.2d uo6 (1932) (horses, and jury allowed to estimate as best they 
could); Wood v. Snider, 187 N.Y. 28, 36, 79 N.E. 858 (1907) (liability on basis of 
ratio of each defendant's cattle) ; Pacific Livestock Co. v. Murray, 45 Ore. 103, 76 
Pac. 1079 (1904) (separate liability but defendant offered to show others contributed); 
King v. Ruth, 136 Miss. 377, 101 So. 500 (1924) (separate damages between hogs). 
878 Also to be distinguished from· the true unknown-wrongdoer situation are those 
cases involving application of the rules of vicarious liability, whether it be in terms of 
master-servant, [Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal.2d 654, 66o, 226 P.2d 574 (1951)]; or some 
concept of concert of action, artificial though this is in some of the cases, [Reyher v. 
Mayne, supra note 777...:._hunting group and particular defendant known but all liable ; 
Ushirohira v. Stuckey, 52 Cal. App. 526, 199 Pac. 339 (1921)-joint maintenance of 
herd of cattle; Stephens v. Schadler, supra note 777-one defendant harbored both his 
own and others' dogs but the court did emphasize proof problem in imposing joint lia-
bility; Kuhn v. Bader, supra note 777-gun injury from one of hunting group; Oliver v. 
Miles, .supra note 777; Benson v. Ross, supra note 777; and see cases set out .supra 
note 877; Queen v. Salmon, 6 Q.B.D. 79 (188o)---criminal liability for all in target 
practice activity; State v. Newberg, 129 Ore. 564. 278 Pac. 568 (1929)---criminallia-
bi!ity for both hunters in group shooting regardless of whose shot killed]; or liability 
of landowner or primary contractor for accidents occurring during construction work on 
the premises, [see cases discussed supra in text at notes 220-291. Liability may not 
be imposed, of course; Wolf v. American Tract Society, 164 N.Y. 30, 58 N.E. 31 
( 1900)--brick fell where nineteen independent contractors were using 250 men] ; or 
liability of a manufacturer for products sold without the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine, [see infra Chapter V on product liability and discussion of res ipsa 
loquitu-r in text following note 122; see .e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 
1041 (1954); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949); Loch 
v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Nichols v. Todd, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 
317 (1953)]; or some kind of special relationship in the nature of joint enterprise 
such as -may be the explanation of some injury-to-surgical-patient cases [Prosser, "Res 
Ipsa Loquitur in California," 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183, 223 (1949), suggests this analysis 
for the famous case of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P .2d 687 ( 1944) ; see 
also Oldis v. La Societe Francaise, 130 Cal. App.2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (1944); Cavero 
v. Franklin General Benevolent Society, 36 Cal.2d 301, 223 P.2d 471 (1950); Meyer 
v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 61 So.2d 901 (La. App. 1952)-finding no negli-
gence, however; Duprey v. Shane, 39 Ca1.2d 781,249 P.2d 8 (1952)], 
819 In the same general category to be distinguished are the cases in which two 
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makes for poor justice so long as the existing system of tort recovery 
is used. At least the distinctions should be recognized, even if it should 
be concluded that they are distinctions without a difference in some 
cases. 
This particular causation difficulty could occur with considerable fre-
quency in atomic energy cases. One example, already mentioned at the 
beginning of the discussion of multiple causes, would be if some person 
downwind from two reactors which could discharge identical radio-
active material were injured by radiation which could only have come 
from one or the other of the reactors, but he has no way of proving 
from which reactor it came. A similar legal problem could arise if there 
were a limited number of industrial users of isotopes discharging radio-
active material into some central place such as the sewage system. If 
a sewage plant employee is injured or if there is injury to the sewage 
plant itself because of the presence of excessive amounts of radioactive 
material resulting from an accidental discharge from one of the users, 
how can it be determined which of the potential defendants is to be held 
liable, assuming it is clear that only one discharged the excessive 
amount? It also is possible that both users of radioactive material were 
negligent in that they breached the standard of conduct required under 
the circumstances or else discharged radioactive material under circum-
stances calling for absolute liability but it is impossible to determine 
from whose plant the particular material which injured the plaintiff 
came. This could happen if plaintiff could not pinpoint the exact time 
of his exposure but he could show that it was from one or the other of 
the defendants' materials or operations. Should traditional rules be ap-
plied and the plaintiff denied recovery? 880 Should the burden of proof 
forces, equally capable of doing the total damage, act so nearly simultaneously that it 
is i~possible to tell whether one or the other ·or both caused the injury. Corey v. 
Havener, supra note 758. See also Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 App. Div. 91, 42 N.Y.S. 
1031 (1896) (same except sleighs instead of motorcycles); and probably concurrent 
causation or at least concurrent contribution to total injury in Finnegan v. Royal Realty 
Co., 35 Cal.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950). 
880 Anderson v. Halverson, supra note 877, applied this rule in a dog-killing-sheep 
case. Stine v. McShane, supra note 877 (same). Cf. language of court in Stephens v. 
Schadler, supra note 777 at 837. Common law concept applied in Schoening v. Oaus, 
supra note 8os (hunting accident) ; Haley v. Calef, supra note 761 (two towns re-
sponsible for bridge and injured plaintiff could join but must show which town responsi-
ble for part of bridge where hurt) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nail, 178 Ky. 33, 
1g8 S.W. 745 (1917) (not known whether plumber or gas company employees left 
hole in closet uncovered); Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co., 124 Minn. 
117, 144 N.W. 450 (1913) (not known which two companies responsible for goods 
lost); Hartzell v. Bank of Murray, 211 Ky. 263, 277 S.W. 270 (1925) (not known 
whether bank or bank cashier liable for loss of note-but why not master-servant lia-
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be shifted to each defendant to prove his innocence? Or, are we to im-
pose joint liability for the total injuries upon each defendant, even 
though it is clear that only one caused the plain~iff harm ? 
In answering this question two general categories of cases can be 
identified, each involving what we have termed unknown-wrongdoers. 
First, there are cases in which it can be shown that each of the defend-
ants was negligent in that he owed a duty to the plaintiff and did not 
live up to the standard of conduct expected of the reasonably prudent 
man under the circumstances, but there is only one injury and only the 
force placed in motion by one defendant could have caused the injury. 
Second, there are cases such that clearly only one, or at least less than 
all of the possible defendants were negligent in the sense that they 
breached the standard of conduct required, but the plaintiff can not 
prove which defendant set the force in motion. 
( i) ~ll Potential Defendants. Negligent 
Many cases establish and support the general common law rule 
denying recovery where all of the multiple defendants clearly are negli-
gent but which one caused the injury is unknown, even though the re-
sult is that tqe plaintiff's injuries will be uncompensated.881 There are 
a few cases pointing in the other direction, however. It might be argued 
that some of the hogs, dogs, and cattle cases 882 really are examples of 
liability imposed upon a person whose responsibility for the injury has 
not been proved. This would not seem to be a correct analysis, except 
for· the very unlikely case. It is possible that a particular defendant's 
hog, dog, or steer, while part of a damage-feasant group actually did 
bility?); Ogleship Sureties v. The State, 73 Tex. 658, 11 s.w: 873 (1889) (not known 
in which term sheriff's defalcations occurred); Cohn-Baer-Myers & Aronson Co. v. 
Realty Transfer Co., 102 N.Y.S. 122 (1907) (cannot plead alternative rights against 
two separate defendants for failure to obtain title to land); Wolf v. American Tract 
Society, mpra note 878 (brick fell where nineteen independent contractors working); 
and cases discussed in McCoid, "Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants," 7 
Stan. L. Rev. 48o, 501-03 (1955). See also discussions, often criticizing common law 
rule: Carpenter, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in CaJifomia," 10 So. Cal. L. 
Rev. 166 (1937); James, "Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res 
Ipsa Loquitur),'' 37 Va. L. Rev. 179 (1951); Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-
fornia,'' 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183 (1949). Cf. Seavey, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in 
Naufragio," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950); Prosser 222. The effect in such cases of 
a recent Arkansas statute allowing tolling the statute of limitations period against un-
known wrongdoers is uncertain but presents some interesting and difficult questions. 
Infra note 1371. 
8S1 See cases cited supra note 88o. 
882 Supra note 877. 
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none itself, but this is a most unlikely situation, and practically all of 
the cases find or assume that each of the animals caused some damage. 
The only real difficulty is in determining the amount that each did. 
Therefore, this is not a case of unknown-wrongdoers in our sense. A 
truly analogous situation would arise if several dogs, owned by differ-
ent persons, were negligently allowed to run free, and less than all of 
them attacked a flock of sheep, it being perfectly clear that one or more 
of the dogs (but which is not known) did not participate. If we held 
all of the dog owners liable for all of the damages under these circum-
stances we would have a real unknown-wrongdoing dog case. 
Cases that come much closer are those involving hunting accidents in 
which one or more of the group are negligent in using the weapons, but 
the injury obviously comes from only one gun;883 In all such cases, the 
courts, except for a recent California decision, have found concert of 
action among the hunting party as a reason for imposing joint liability. 
This really is an application of vicarious liability rules. If the situation 
instead of involving two members of the same hunting party, in-
volved two hunters acting without knowledge of the existence of the 
other, this would present the true case of the unknown-wrongdoer, to 
which the usual rule of vicarious liability for concert of action could 
not be applied. 
The California court in Summers v. Tice 884 faced up to the proof 
problem without relying on the concept of concert of action in a case in 
which two hunters in the same party negligently discharged their guns 
in such a manner that a pellet from one of them put out 'the plaintiff's 
eye. The trial court, after assuming both defendants were negligent, 
and finding that there was no way to determine from which of the guns 
the shot came, imposed joint liability, reasoning as follows : 
When we consider the relative position of the parties and 
the results that would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the 
injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement that the 
burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants be-
comes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent 
toward plaintiff. They brought about a situation where 
the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it 
should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The 
injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfair 
position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm. If 
one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is remediless. 
Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer evi-
888 Supra note 777 and note 878. 
884 33 Cal. 2d 8o, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
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dence to determine which one caused the injury. This reason-
ing has recently found favor in this court. In a quite analo-
gous situation this court held a patient injured while uncon-
scious on an operating table in a hospital could hold all or any 
of the persons who had any connection with the operation 
even though he could not select the particular acts by the par-
ticular person which led to his disability (Ybarra v. Span-
gard, 25 Cal. 2d 486 [ 154 P. 2d 687, 162 ALR 1258].) 
There the court was considering whether the patient could 
avail himself of res ipsa loquitur, rather than where the bur-
den of proof lay, yet the effect of the decision is that plaintiff 
has made out a case when he has produced evidence which 
gives rise to an, inference of negligence which was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. It is up to the defendants to explain 
the cause of the injury.885 
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Prosser feels that the result is "a very desirable solution where negli-
gence on·t:he part of both .is clear artd it is only the alternative causation 
which is in doubt." 886 It certainly is not "more probable than not" that 
both caused the injury; in fact it ·is one hundred per cent certain that 
this is ·not the case. On the other hand it is equally probable (rather 
than more probable) that either did it. Therefore; the violation of the 
usual rule is only in terms of a fraction of a per cent. Harper and 
James also approve the result. 887 ·.· 
'A remarkable sequel to Summers v. Tice arose in Canada in 1957.888 
Here again an innocent third party was struck by a single rifle bullet 
fired by one of a group of boys, ·au of whom were under fourteen years 
of age. The defendants were two merchants, each of whom had sold 
the boys a box of cartridges, and the court held that each of them was 
negligent in making the sale to boys of this age. The damaging bullet 
was the very last cartridge fired when the boys came back to town after 
having used all the other cartridges from both· boxes out in the country. 
The court held both defendants to have been at fault and liable for the 
total damages. It rejected the argument that only the seller of the last 
cartridge could be held liable because this placed on the plaintiff "the 
burden of identifying the one who sold the shelt' that was last fired; a 
burden which needless to say, was not discharged." 889 This case makes 
ss5 I~. at 86-87. 
sse Prosser 231. . 
·ssT Harper & James II15. The result does spread the loss rather than leave the plain-
tiff uncompensated. 
sss Saint-Pierre v. McCarthy, [1957] Que. B.R. 421 (Q.B.), approved in 4 McGill 
L. J. 2g8 (.1958). 
ss9 I d. at 422. 
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it clear that concert of action is not required, a possible alternative ex-
planation for the result in Summers v. Tice. The Canadian case is even 
more remarkable because of the causation reasoning used by the court. 
Instead of adopting the rationale of Summers v. Tice, shifting the bur-
de"n of proof to the defendants each to exculpate himself if he could 
prove his force did not do any harm, the Canadian court worked out a 
theory whereby it concluded that each was not only negligent in selling 
the shells, but also was a cause-in-fact of the injurious last shot. The 
argument of the court is remarkable enough to set out in full. 
The sale of the cartridges must be regarded as one act, for 
though two separate sales were made it took both to put the 
boys in the position to do the damage. Had one box only been 
sold then, on the facts as they came to pass, the accident could 
not have happened since all of the cartridges in the one box 
would have been fired outside of the village. But-again on 
the facts as we know them-since two boxes were sold it be-
came possible for the boys to exhaust their interest in the 
country and yet have cartridges in their possession when they 
returned to the village. In consequence it required both sales 
to make the accident possible and for this reason the relation-
ship for cause and effect is established. 890 
One wonders if the court would apply this reasoning if it could have 
been proved whose bullet caused the injury. If so this reasoning is not 
too far removed from the argument that the driver of a car who breaks 
the speed limit and gets to his destination in time for lightning to strike 
his guest as he steps from the car is liable for the death of the guest 
because, "but for" his breaking the speed law, the guest would not have 
been where the lightning struck. In fairness, however, the Canadian 
case is not quite the same because the injury that did occur was the 
very thing which could have been anticipated by a careful person and 
the foreseeability of which made the selling of the shells negligent. 
Nevertheless, this kind of "but for" reasoning cannot be recommended 
for other cases. 
Undoubtedly radiation cases will arise to which this reasoning could 
be applied. Two manufacturers of an industrial device utilizing radia-
tion might furnish identical items to the same user and someone is found 
to have been injuriously irradiated from this type of source because the 
devices were made negligently. The evidence of exposure might be such 
that it is clear the person received radiation from only one source but 
890 I d. at 423· This is like saying that the man who loaned them the car negligently 
is liable because without it they could not have been where plaintiff was. 
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it is impossible to tell now which source was responsible because records 
were not kept of when the various sources were used at particular places 
in the plant or operations of the user. 
The validity of the Summers v. Tice solution of shifting the burden 
of proof to multiple defendants should be tested by altering the facts 
sli'ghtly. What if, instead of two negligent persons, there were three or 
ten? Here the probabilities are not even equal ; for each wrongdoer 
there is either a one-in-three or one-in-ten chance that he is responsible 
for the injury. At what point does the probability become de minimus? 
In a sense, this criticism can be made of the holding in another Cali-
fornia case, Ybarra v. Spangard,891 in which an unconscious surgical 
patient apparently was negligently injured by some one of the number 
of persons who handled him while he was unconscious, but it was rather 
clear that less than all of them were directly responsible. 
To impose joint liability on all who have been negligent and who pos-
sibly have caused the plaintiff's injury actually goes beyond even abso-
lute liability concepts. While negligence need not be shown if an activity 
is ultra-hazardous, the causal connection with the defendant's action 
must. In effect the reasoning of the California and Canadian cases turns 
the fault doctrine around. Instead of holding defendants liable only if 
fault can be shown, it is making any person who has breached the re-
quired standard of conduct responsible for any injury which his action 
might just possibly have caused unless he can prove absence of causal 
connection. While Harper and James object to the use of the traditional 
fault doctrine to excuse liability, there is no indication that they also 
would do away with proof of causation.892 It is true, however, that the 
reasoning of these few cases compensates the plaintiff more often and 
spreads the risk. 
If the reasoning of the Canadian court is accepted at face value, the 
result would be to impose liability on all negligent persons for all harm 
that results not only from their own negligence but also from that of all 
persons similarly situated who have been negligent. If liability is to be 
imposed simply for increasing the risk that somebody will be injured 
by negligently setting some harmful force in motion, traditional tort 
liability procedures should be abandoned. Our system of total liability 
or none in each individual case as to each defendant will not work fairly 
if such reasoning is used. 
If the Summers v. Tice reasoning is to be used in radiation injury 
891 Supra note 878. Discussed infra in text at notes u8o ff. 
892 Note discussion in Harper & James 1116, n. 24· 
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cases, a different system of compensating plaintiffs and assessing liabil-
ity on defendants should be adopted, one developed on a much more 
statistically accurate basis. Use should be made of some kind of insur-
ance fund to which all persons who might be negligent or who have 
been negligent in dealing with harmful radioactive material should con-
tribute in accordance with the increase in the risk of harm caused by a 
particular defendant. Injured parties who could not identify the specific 
source of their injury would then sue this fund. Perhaps something like 
the. unsatisfied judgment fund schemes for covering injuries from 
automobile accidents in hit-and-run cases can be used,8911 or perhaps all 
radiation injuries could be compensated under a fund similar to that 
suggested below for future injuries,894 or other fund schemes suggested 
by others. 895 
Such a plan would provide a more scientifically accurate basis for 
spreading· the risks than would the rationale of Sttmmers v. Tice when 
it is carried over into the situation in which there are more than two 
defendants, even though all have been negligent in some manner in 
releasing radiation that may possibly have hurt the plaintiff. Certainly 
the reasoning of the Canadian court as to causation should not be used. 
If we are to impose monetary responsibility for all negligence, even 
though actual damages have not been proved, it would seem preferable 
to make some kind of administrative evaluation of the potential loss 
that might be created by each mistake and force a contribution to some 
fund from which injured plaintiffs could recover. Traditional rules are 
unsatisfactory in the multiple defendants case because plaintiffs remain 
uncompensated when they would recover except for failure to prove 
which defendant was the cause. Nevertheless, using the reasoning of 
these few recent cases also leads to unrealistic results. 
Courts also should avoid too broad application of 'the justification 
suggested for the Ybarra type case (unconscious patient injured by one 
of several defendants), that the actions constituted something of a 
joint enterprise of all participating persons. If liability is imposed on 
all, each one is forced to take the utmost precautions to see that no in-
jury is inflicted upon the patient during the time he is unconscious. 
Caution also should be used in applying the theory that joint liability is 
sos See Elder, "The Unsatisfied Judgment Fund and the Irresponsible Motorist," 
Current Trends in State Legislation 1953-54 at 45 (U. of Mich. Law School, 1954). 
894 A "contingent injury fund" is discussed inf,.a in text following note 1123. 
895 Summer Institute, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy, U. of Mich. 
Law School (1956), position of minority at 36. Switzerland and West Germany have 
fund plans under consideration. 
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justified as a method of forcing people who probably know what hap-
pened to inform O!l each other. These justifications should not be ap-
plied under existing tort rules in situations in which there are several 
wrongdoers who are acting quite independently of each other and have 
no control over their co-defendants or, perhaps better, their co-potential 
defendants; they have no power of selection or rejection and no way of 
taking extra precautions to protect themselves against the results of the 
negligence of another. 
(ii) Only One Defendant Negligent 
If the law is to be accommodated to the plaintiff's difficulty in prov-
ing causation in unknown-wrongdoer cases, then the ultimate develop-
ment would be the result reached by an appellate court in California 
recently, in Litzmann v. Humboldt County. 896 This is the case in which 
the plaintiff's small boy was seriously injured when he ignited an aerial 
bomb which he found lying ip the fairgrounds. The court held that the 
plaintiff had a right to jury instruction to the effect that if he proved 
that one or the other of two defendants was negligent in dropping the 
aerial. bomb, then he was not required to prove which defendant had 
been negligent. The appellate court held that this was a correct instruc-
tion. 
This is exactly the kind of situation which may arise in the atomic 
energy area. For example, there could be three, five, or ten reactors so 
located that the radioactive material which caused the plaintiff's injuries 
could have come from any one of them. If circumstantial evidence 
clearly supports an inference of negligent emission, perhaps via res ipsa 
loquitur,897 then a parallel case is presented, and the plaintiff, by anal-
ogy to Litzmann, would not be obliged to prove which of the reactor 
operators was the guilty party. 
While this is not quite the same thing as absolute liability because it 
assumes that one of the parties was negligent, nevertheless, so far as the 
innocent accused are concerned it is worse. Even strict liability is de-
pendent on proof of causal connection. Currently our theory of negli-
gence liability is aimed at allocating the losses that occur on a basis of 
culpability and not upon a doctrine of "compensate every plaintiff who 
can show an injury." Accordingly, the use of the plaintiff's difficulty 
as an excuse for placing the burden of proof on a potential defendant 
898 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. App. 1954). The case was settled while an appeal was pend-
ing before the California Supreme Court, Note, 28 So. Cal. L. Rev. 429 (1955). 
897 See discussion of res ipsa loquitur, infra at notes 1146 ff. 
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to free himself from liability is to make the incidence of loss from neg-
ligent injuries depend upon the laws of chance in a peculiarly unscien-
tific and unjust manner. 
In practical effect it means that whether or not one is to be charged 
with a loss depends on the purely fortuitous circumstance of whether 
somebody else engaged in a similar activity happens to have caused in-
jury. This is going even further than absolute liability because in abso-
lute liability cases it is essential that cause-in-fact be proved. The prin-
ciple is really no different than saying that one whose dog was running 
loose at the time that some person was bitten by a dog, assuming that 
it was at night and the dog could not be identified, is to be held liable 
for some or all of the loss if it was at all possible that his dog was in 
the vicinity at the time. It would be the same as holding, in the case in-
volving the theater patron whose eye was put out by a spit ball projected 
by some member of the audience, 898 that the plaintiff could hold each 
spitball-shooter-carrying member of the audience liable unless he could 
prove that he did not do it. This negative usually can be established only 
by finding the one who did do it, a task as difficult for the innocent de-
fendants as it is for the plaintiff. Or perhaps liability could be limited 
to those who sat within spit ball range of the plaintiff. 
A similar case could be one holding two contractors liable for a fall-
ing brick which injured the plaintiff even though their only relationship · 
was that they happened to be working on different but adjoining build-
ings at the same time. 899 If we are to spread tort risks on a broader basis 
than is now the case where proof of cause-in-fact is usually insisted 
upon, this objective should be accomplished by some kind of more 
scientifically justifiable scheme. 
This should be true even if absolute liability rules are adopted for 
some aspects of atomic energy operations. Some writers at least 900 
would not approve of the solution which renders all liable even though 
some, or all but one, are innocent. Surely making two or four or nine 
innocent parties stand the loss caused by one wrong-doing party would 
carry the compensation principle too far, at least as applied to the radia-
tion injury cases. The Litzmamz rationale, particularly if it were carried 
beyond the case of two well-identified potential wrongdoers, is com-
898 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952). 
8 99 This is also similar to Wolf v. American Tract Society, supra note 878, (a brick 
fell where 19 independent contractors were working) if a brick fell from between two 
adjoining buildings. 
900 Prosser 231; Seavey, supra note 88o at 648. Harper & James 1116, do not take 
a position on this kind of case: 
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pletely unjustified and unrealistic. When one takes into account the 
great time and space intervals that can intervene between a discharge of 
radioactive material and its reaching a place of rest where injury is in-
flicted, almost any user of radioactive material in the county, at least of 
the kind found to have caused the injury, might possibly have been re-
sponsible. Surely joint liability should not be imposed under our 
present tort system. To do so truly would be to impose absolute liability 
on atomic energy operations with a vengeance and without the require-
ment that has always been applied in the past,. i.e., that cause-in-fact 
must be shown. For whatever comfort it is to potential defendants, 
most of the courts do not approve the Litzmann rationale, although 
most of the cases were decided prior to Litzmann. 901 
(iii) Effect of Common Insurance Carrier 
One fact which will almost inevitably be· present in many atomic 
energy cases might justify application of the Tice, Ybarra, and even 
the Litzmann solutions. If in this type of unknown-wrongdoer case 
every one of the potential wrongdoers were insured by the same insur-
ance carrier against the kind of loss which occurred, then a good case 
could be made for recovery, at least to the extent that there was iden-
tical coverage up to the limit of the lowest policy. If the insurance com-
pany covered all of the defendants, it would be perfectly clear that if 
any one of them were found liable the insurance company should pay. 
To decide in such circumstances that recovery will be allowed where 
there is an insurance policy, while it would not be allowed against the 
same defendant if there were rione, violates our traditional rules con-
cerning the liability of insurance companies when policies are written 
on an indemnity basis only. The result, however, does seem to make 
good sense, by compensating innocent plaintiffs· without imposing lia-
bility on someone who should not be required to pay. 
This suggestion has peculiar applicability to the area of radiation in-
juries, at least to the extent that the user of radiation is licensed by 
the federal government and is required to furnish financial protection 902 
which ordinarily will be in the form of an insurance policy taken out 
from one of two carriers of such insurance. One of them is relatively 
so much smaller than the other 803 that it is very likely in many situa-
tions one insurance carrier will have insured all potential defendants, 
901 See cases set out supra note 88o, some of which involve only one wrongdoer. 
902 See insurance discussion infra beginning at note 1265. 
ooa See discussion infra at notes 1347-48. 
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at least in the reactor field. In the event of a major reactor disaster in 
which the damages run over sixty million dollars, and clearly in the 
case of an accident involving a much smaller total, where the govern-
ment's responsibility to take over liability will come in at a much lower 
figure, there is then absolute identity of the insurance carrier in effect, 
though not technically, since the federal government's liability is only 
that of an indemnitor, not as an insurer. The same result should be 
reached because the government actually is indemnifying all of the po-
tential wrongdoers above the limits of financial protection set by the 
AEC. Insurance companies surely will try to find a way out of the 
dilemma created by this suggestion, but until they do the solution is 
attractive. 
In such states as Louisiana and Wisconsin· in which the insurance 
carrier can be sued directly there would seem to be no difficulty in hold-
ing that even the Litzmann reasoning applies if all of the multiple de-
fendants are covered by the same insurance company. In other states a 
court might change the common law rule and hold that recovery will 
be allowed if the court finds that one carrier covers the liability of all 
defendants, but deny recovery otherwise. If an insurance policy is more 
than an indemnification agreement and imposes direct responsibility on 
the carrier if the defendant does not pay, as is the case with much of 
automobile collision insurance today, is there any reason why the court 
should not determine this and impose liability as a matter of common 
law rule? This does not need to violate the usual "hope" that juries 
will not be allowed to know an insurance carrier is involved when they 
make their fact determinations. Nevertheless, enactment of a statute 
undoubtedly would be the better procedure for achieving this result. 
(d) Cumulative Effecf from Innocent Sources 
In one other situation, which creates more difficulty than any other, 
the solution surely should not be joint liability, if liability is to be im-
posed at all. Except for those involving unknown wrongdoers, there 
was, in the cases discussed so far, concurrent contribution toward the 
amount of damage inflicted by persons at least some and usually all of 
whom were wrongdoers in the sense that they breached the standard of · 
conduct requi~ed of the reasonably prudent man. Actual(y the facts in 
many of the cases seem to indicate that the defendants must have acted 
with knowledge of the existence of the contribution of other persons, 
and so might even be considered as acting in concert with each other. 
Many of the cases arising in connection with cumulative impacts of ra-
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diation may involve' situations where the contributions of the other 
persons to the total injury are not known. Nevertheless, where all jxrlr-
ties breach the standard of conduct required by law, shifting the burden 
of proofdoes not seem to be too much of a burden to place upon them. 
If the amount of radiation released by one or more of the concurrent 
causal factors is so small that the discharge can be considered innocent 
because there has been no breach of the required standard of conduct, 
the court faces a real difficulty. Prosser,904 in commenting on the ·situa-
tion where the contribution of two or more parties, standing alone, 
would not even be a breach of the standard of conduct, states that: 
Where, as in the usual case, such liability must be based 
upon negligence or intent rather than on any ultra-hazardous 
activity, it would seem that there can be no tortious conduct 
uriless the individual knows, or is at least negligent in failing 
to discover, that his conduct may concur with that of others to 
cause damage. And liability need not necessarily be entire, 
for there is no reason w,hy damages may not be apportioned 
here, to the same extent as in any other case. 805 
This situation could easily arise where radiation is the cause of the in-
jury. Persons using a radioactive source may have complied with statu.;. 
tory or administrative limits for discharge of radioactive material, and 
may have acted as a reasonably prudent man would have in the light of 
present knowledge and the circumstances, and yet, through an unusual 
set of circumstances several discharges from such sources might cause 
damage or unite with radioactive material negligently released and 
cause· damage. Should the innocent contributor be held liable for all or 
a part of the damage caused? Surely there is no excuse in this situation 
for holding him jointly liable for the whole and thereby shifting to 
him the burden of finding the evidence for the plaintiffs. If the Texas 
liability rules 906 are· not applied, as surely they should not be in many 
atomic energy activities where the quantity of radiation is at a very low 
level; it seems ·difficult to· justify imposing any liability. It is even inore 
difficult to justify complete liability such as that imposed in the case of 
true joint tortfeasors. 
Once the concurrent ·contribution injury is discovered there would 
seem to be no real obstacle to an injunction suit to abate what very 
likely is a nuisance, and even compliance with official regulations might 
not justify the kind of taking of property that would be involved in this 
eo4 Prosser 2J2. 
eoD ld. at 233· 
eoe See discussion supra note 845. 
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situation.907 As to damage recovery, this may be the very case in which 
social policy limitations·on imposing liability should be brought to bear 
to relieve the "innocent wrongdoer" from liability because, by hypothe-
sis, in this last situation, the defendant had no reason to suspect that 
there would be other contributions added to his minor one resulting in 
an injury. The question in tort case really is not always how can we 
compensate the innocent plaintiff but who should bear the losses that. 
do arise out of normal activities in today's complicated, highly indus-
trialized life. Perhaps this is the case where the plaintiff must take out 
insuran!=e to protect himself rather .than seek compensation from a per-
son who has acted prudently. The situation that can arise in the radia-
tion field, at least in some cases, would be analogous to a suit against an 
individual homeowner whose heating system emits into the air in a large 
city some unburned particles of coal, gas, or oil contributing to the pol-
lution of the air over the whole city, or against the drivers of thousands 
of cars who do the same thing through the discharge of unburned par-
ticles· through exhaust pipes. In this situation it would seem a little un-
realistic to say that if we can prove any one car driver or any one 
householder contributed some small part to the total pollution he should 
be liable for the whole. This is utterly ridiculous, if it is not unjust. In 
the case where there are only a few contributors it still is unjust. Per-
haps the atomic energy situation may present the very kind of case sug-
gested in the English opinion in Blair v. Deakin,· 908 one person might 
put something into a stream which in and of itself was not dangerous 
but when combined with another equally innocuous substance put in the 
stream by another person creates a dangerous condition. Injunction in 
such situations would seem perfectly justified, but to impose liability 
for all foreseeable damages because it is now found that such chemicals 
when combined will create a dangerous substance comes close to abso-
lute liability. Any imposition of liability for the injuries caused in situ-
ations where the individual's contribution is not enough in itself to be 
considered tortious and where he has no basis in terms of knowledg~ or 
reasonable grounds to believe that others are contributing a substance 
which will cause harm when. combined with his is in effect to impose 
strict liability without admitting it. It is doubtful if damages which 
result from many of the situations that will arise in connection with 
radiation sources where the contributions of many people are very small 
is really any more dangerous to a city, to a country or to the world than 
907 Compare psychological nuisance case and see cases there discussed, supra notes 
628-722. 
908 [1887] 57 L.T.R. (n. s.) 522, 525. 
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a discharge into the air of carbon dioxide, an inevitable result of our 
modern industrialized, technological life. Once we find the evil exists 
something should be done, but it would not seem that the tort system, 
devised to solve damage questions between individuals or small groups 
of individuals, is the vehicle by which such problems can be solved. Com-
pensating the plaintiff is not the only aim of the tort system. As sug-
gested before, the aim really is to decide who should bear the loss which 
seems inevitable in our kind of complicated society. There are methods 
other than always imposing liability on the defendant, even admitting 
that in a particular case the defendant's actions have caused some harm. 
A fire insurance type of policy (or medical insurance, or life insurance) 
carried by the potential victim may be the better way for some cases, par-
ticularly where the contributions are in and of themselves innocent, if 
we want normal growth of atomic energy, which is so important to us 
in the long run. In any event, as long as existing damage rules are used, 
there is no justification for making the innocent contributor actually 
jointly liable in the sense of being held responsible to the plaintiff for 
his total injuries to which many others contributed. Surely at most he 
should be held responsible only for his own contributive share. 
c. Proof of Cause and Damage Generally 
Criticism of the common law system of handling the losses that occur 
as the result of what might broadly be called accidents (as <f.istinguished 
from intentional torts) has been increasing both in amount and vigor 
in recent years. Many respected legal scholars have advocated a sweep-
ing examination of present tort rules, and many, of course, attack the 
very basic concept of fault that underlies so much of our tort law to-
day.909 Many of them argue for strict liability or something approaching 
it in many more situations, and they urge that this be combined with 
some sort of shifting the burden of losses to the industrial community, 
or in appropriate areas by requiring insurance coverage, such as in the 
case of automobile accidents. While such drastic changes are not im-
minent, it certainly is possible that there will be a continued move in 
this direction and possibly even an acceleration. Whether the rule of 
909 Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault (1951); Harper & James Introduction & 
Ch. XI; Green, "The Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law-Risk Sharing," 
47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 751 (1953); James, "Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Prob-
1~ of Alternative Remedies," Z, N.Y.U.L. Rev. 537 (1952); Leftar, "Negligence in 
Name Only," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564 (1952); Freezer, "A Circle Tour Through Negli-
gence," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 647 (1952); Ehrenzweig, "A Psychoanalysis of Negligence," 
47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 855 (1953). 
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absolute liability be applied across the board, or a scheme of insurance 
or governmental funds is adopted supported by assessments of the 
workmen's compensation type or by general taxes, the injured party 
who seeks compensation still will face the same problem that he faces 
under the present tort rules in the usual situation where the claim is 
against a single alleged wrongdoer defendant. The plaintiff who sues 
the industrial producer or operator, or the individual wrongdoer or his 
insurance company, or the federal or state government fund set up to 
award compensation in accident cases, will have to prove that his dis-
ability was caused by the accident. The plaintiff will have to show ( 1) 
that he has been "injured," and (2) that his injury was "caused" by a 
force for which he has a claim against an individual wrongdoer under 
our present system, or against an insurance company, a fund, or some 
other social group in the event our system of loss distribution should 
be changed to make this possible. 
Very likely our present system wili continue to be the law for many 
years to come, although minor changes undoubtedly will be made. Even 
if it has been proved that a duty was owed to an injured party by a de-
fendant who did not meet the standard of conduct expected of a reason-
ably prudent man under the circumstances, or if the accused is to be 
held to strict liability and the type of injury for which the plaintiff is 
seeking compensation is recognized as compensable, the plaintiff still 
must show that he received such an injury and that it was caused by the 
force set in motion by .the alleged wrongdoer. Whether he represents 
the plaintiff or the defendant, the lawyer handling radiation cases will 
find some of his most difficult problems in this area of proof. Many 
radiation cases will arise in which proof of cause and damages will be 
relatively simple and certainly solvable in accordance with existing com-
monly recognized principles. Likewise, in the cases where the proof 
problems are considerably more complex and subtle, it seems clear that 
answers will be found, if only by leaving the doubtful cases to the jury. 
The great majority will fall in this category. It is in the area of proof 
that our present tort rules and theoretical analysis of them have been 
most inadequate. The appellate opinions and the legal writers have con-
cerned themselves for the most part with the problems of substantive 
law by which we determine who is liable to whom for what kind of in-
jury. The proof problems usually are buried in trial records, and even 
the rules of evidence seldom get down to the level of concrete types of 
proof that are available and might or should be used to prove specific 
fact questions. Here a~in the radiation cases, which are bound to arise 
in increasing numbers in the next twenty years, very likely will show, 
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sometimes dramatically, the inadequacy of our present analysis of the 
problems of proof. It. is still too early in the· study of the relationship 
between scientific technology and legal problems, and certainly it is 
beyond the scope of a general treatise, to answer in detail the many 
scientific-legal proof problems that inevitably will arise. Some lines of 
attack under existing rules can be indicated, however, and attention can 
be focused much more sharply on some of the inadequacies of existing 
concepts of proof, particularly as applied in tort cases. 
A study of the problems that seem inevitable in radiation cases con-
vinces one that here again is evidence of the fact that policies underly-
ing the legal rules of proof and probability may be somewhat different 
from those assumed by scientists when, in their scientific activities, 
they are concerned with proof. The present concern of the legal profes-
sion as to the proper use and control of expert testimony is perhaps 
evidence of an awakening legal recognition of the problem. In any 
event it seems clear that lawyers must concern themselves much more 
with the premises and techniques of the scientists if they are to handle 
adequately the proof problems that are to be an inevitable part of radia-
tion litiga~ion. Atomic energy cases seem destined to increase the need 
of mutual understanding between the lawyer and certain other profes-
sions and sciences such as physicists, engineers, and biologists, to name 
merely the most obvious and most inclusive categories. Radiation cases 
bid well to. force lawyers to recognize :r:nuch more sharply the areas of 
specialty among experts and to use those who may not have a license 
but who nevertheless know scientific principles essential to the case. In 
looking at the proof problems it seems convenient to separate those in-
volved in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and treat them as a separate 
group. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine cannot be completely separated 
from duty and particularly breach concepts but most commentators 
treat the doctrine primarily as one of proof, and this seems wise. It will 
aid clarity of analysis, nevertheless, if the res ipsa loquitur problem is 
treated separately. 
( 1) Proof of Radiation Injuries and the Law of Prob-
abilities 
As indicated previously, scientists generally agree that exposure to 
radiation can cause many personal injuries. In analyzing the problem 
of tort liability, however, the question is not what can be caused by ex-
posure to radiation, but, rather, whether a particular injury was caused 
by such an exposure; or, stated otherwise, is a given exposure to radia-
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tion the cause-in-fact of the injury. With few if any exceptions, present 
scientific knowledge indicates that there is nothing qualitatively unique 
about injurious radiation from the standpoint of its observable physi-
ological and pathological effects. Numerous other forces can be causes 
or causal factors with respect to seemingly identical injury manifes-
tations. Added to this problem of multiple possible causes of the same 
injury is the inconvenient fact that science has no very precise way of 
determining which was the actual medical cause-much less the legal 
cause. The lawyer finds himself confronted, therefore, with possibili-
ties and probabilities. The legal result to be reached is far from certain 
in many, if not most, cases. 
The question then becomes one of availability of acceptable evidence· 
to prove or disprove that a particular cancer or cataract or genetic in-
jury was caused or influenced in some harmful fashion by the negli-
gently occasioned exposure to radiation. 
In answering this question it is important to recognize that the causa-
tion-in-fact question is double-barreled. First, there is the·question of 
whether the negligent act or omission of the defendant actually caused 
the plaintiff to be irradiated, and, second, assuming there was a radia-
tion "impact" upon the body of the plaintiff or decedent, did this par-
ticular exposure in fact cause or aggravate the apparent injury. As~ 
suming that the radiation "impact" is not in itself a compensable injury, 
both of these issues of causation must be resolved against the defendant 
before liability attaches, regardless of whether absolute liability, negli-
gence, or workmen's compensation rules are used. Different types of 
phenomena may be needed to provide the answers to "prove" these two 
causation questions. If those needed to show "impact" are somewhat 
esoteric, those bearing on the second question are almost occult. The 
proof must embrace a substantial portion of the fields of scientific 
knowledge about matter and energy. 
For the most part this study is limited to biological questions of 
causation-from impact to injurious consequence; however, it is not 
possible to disregard entirely non-biological considerations or matters 
of social policy. One cannot avoid the feeling that in many cases, 
rightly or wrongly, the plaintiff's burden of showing biological causa-
tion is made easier if the proof of causation as to impact is quite per-
suasive and not just barely "more probable than not." While the burden 
of proof may not shift, seemingly it becomes somewhat less onerous to 
prove biological injury if the impact is clearly established. It is not 
surprising to find juries influenced in this fashion, but it is a little dis-
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appointing to discover the same effect upon some of the courts. Some 
of the cases containing implications of this attitude are discussed below. 
(a) Some General Considerations as to Proof of 
Biological Cause 
For our purposes biological injury can be deemed to be the terminal 
result of a totality of causes. Some may be more immediate than others, 
but each is essential, qualitatively, quantitatively, and chronologically, 
to the result. These causes form a reticulated pattern of antecedent 
events and processes made up of increments of matter and of energy 
which culminate in an observable or predictable injury. In its broadest 
sense, and probably in the scientific sense as well, the determination of 
causation embraces this entire dynamic structure, or, to be charitable, 
it would if we could make it so. 
One of the aims and techniques of science is to find or at least to 
iiiuminate the causal facts. The method of science is essentially one of 
filling in the gaps between existing observational data with a postulate 
or theory, and then testing the theory. The law has taken too little cog-
nizance of this method. The scientific investigator is confronted with a 
biological condition which he rarely can observe either on the level at 
which it actually develops or as a dynamic process-limitations on aided 
and unaided perception being what they are. Nevertheless, through ex-
periment and what observational situations he can contrive the investi-
gator is gradually able to isolate various external influences and obtain 
more or less incomplete cross-sectional views at various stages in the 
pattern. As soon as a consistent, or perhaps one should say readable, 
pattern begins to unfold, the scientist wiii commence to put together 
these observable influences with a theory that assigns cause and effect 
roles to each factor. A causal theory usually consists of numerous sub-
theories which seek to explain what happens between observed and par-
tially known consecutive steps in. the pltenomena. 
The scientist has learned to live with the frustration that comes from 
realizing that a given theory of causation is only one of the many pos-
sible theories to explain a particular disease or injury, and that no two 
situations are ever precisely the same. To each injurious result there are 
a number of causal routes, some occurring with greater frequency than 
others, but none revealing their real origins or their true nature to the 
casual eye, and few even to the trained one. The scientist is a humble 
man in his field, but, unfortunately, not enough judges and attorneys 
and even jurors are equally so when they enter the same field. Con-
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cerned with the assigning of legal responsibility, they too often borrow 
from science with little understanding and apply the borrowed knowl-
edge with only a modicum of caution. The plaintiff, having been in-
jured, looks for one or more causal theories that include as a necessary 
influence an event like the impact or trauma ascribable to the negligence 
of the defendant. His attorney then directs his proof only to those 
events which justify the application of those theories rather than some 
other. He states, for example, that the plaintiff's health was excellent 
before the impact, that the impact left a pronounced bruise, and that six 
months later a cancer was discovered at the precise point of impact. 
The plaintiff obtains the services of one or more physicians who take 
the stand and testify to the existence of a causal theory that cancer can 
be caused and aggravated by a. single trauma. Perhaps these experts 
will state that the plaintiff's injury could have been caused by the trauma, 
but, with becoming caution, they may be unwilling to state that in 
their opinion the cancer probably was caused by the impact. These 
physicians have been entirely honest, for, while the single trauma theory 
of cancer causation has little currency, today,910 it was looked upon with 
greater favor at an earlier time and still has not been explained away 
entirely. 
. At this point.the defendant presents his evidence, but what evidence 
does he have? All of the evidence is inside the plaintiff or in his past. 
The defendant offers alternative theories of cancer causation, but these 
remain hypothetical without evidence of specific events to which they 
can be tied, and problematical even with such evidence. Even assuming 
that there were pre-impact manifestations of cancer or that other exter-
nal influences impinged, the plaintiff is under no obligation to volunteer 
this information nor do the discovery procedures give the defendant 
much assistance. On cross-examination the plaintiff's experts may be 
made to admit that the defendant's theories of ca.usation have wider 
acceptance in the medical field, but without some kind of circumstantial 
evidence to show that basis exists in the instant case for applying one 
of the alternative theories, little is going to help the defendant, short of 
judicial notice that the plaintiff's theory of causation is too tenuous. 
Thus the fact of causation has been "proved," for legal purposes at 
least. 
On appeal from the judgment attacking the sufficiency of the evidence 
as inadequate to justify the jury's finding of causation, the defendant is 
910 Small, "Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Con-
cept of Causation," 31 Tex. L."Rev. 630 (1953). 
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worse off than at the trial. On such an appeal the court will look only 
at the plaintiff's evidence, and this in its best possible light. In addition 
the plaintiff can cite in his brief numerous cases involving cancer caused 
or aggravated by a single trauma: a metastatic cancer in the tibia caused 
by a sidewalk fall; 911 breast cancer caused by an exploding hot water 
heater; 912 cancer caused by an automobile accident,913 or by an umbrella 
handle, 914 or a railroad seat; 915 an eye cancer caused by a blow with a 
fist; 916 a foot cancer caused by a fall in a hole; 917 death froin jaw can-
cer caused by false teeth worn for .three months; 918 or cancer of the 
womb caused by a miscarriage two days after a railroad accident, with 
death four months after the accident; 919 or a death "caused" by cancer 
in the sacral area induced by a fall from a streetcar twenty months 
earlier, where an autopsy revealed that the victim also was suffering 
from tuberculosis, Bright's disease, acute and chronic cystitis, acute and 
chronic prostatitis with abscess formation and chronic selenitis; 920 or 
dormant cancer ot the larynx triggered by sinog.921. 
Thus does the law rush iri where science fears to tread, "proving" 
cause--in-fact with one theory of causation out of many (and that 
theory of questionable "irtue)' allowing a minimum of circu~stantiai 
evidence to indicate a circumstantial theory of causation, and saying, 
that in the absence of affirmative proof to the contrary, the impact and 
the injury, plus a few facts, such as prior good health, speak for them-
selves on the issue of causation if the jury wants to accept them. This 
is virtually proof by default. Is it any wonder that "the doctor is 
shocked by judicial treatment of cause in tort ... [and] dumbfounded 
when introduced to the workmen's compensation and occupational dis-
ease cases"? 922 Perhaps the doctor himself is to blame in part because 
he has failed to realize the social purpose for using a scientific theory 
to prove in a court before a jury what "caused'' an injury. 
Juries are always suspected of assuming that a wealthy, corporate 
911 Shaw v. Owl Drug Co., 4 Cal. App.zd 191, 40 P.2d 588 (193S). 
912 Vitale v. Duerbeck, 338 Mo. ss6, 92 S.W.2d 691 (1936). 
918 Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. s69, 41 A.zd 337 (194S). 
914 Louisville Ry. v. Steubing's Admr., 143 Ky. 364, 136 S.W. 634 ( 1911). 
915 Shaw y, Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry., 173 Ill. App. 107 (1912). 
916 Harris v. Hindman, 130 Ore. IS, 278 Pac. 954 ( 1929). 
917 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Thompson, 211 F. 889 (4th Cir. 1914). 
918 Coddaire v. Sibley, ~o Mass. 41, 169 N.E. 797 (1930). 
919 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Kemp's Admr., 149 Ky. 344, 149 S.W. 83s (1912). 
920 Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 14S La. 8os, 83 So. 19 (1919). 
921 Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 122' Cal. App.zd 361, z6s P.zd 86 ( 19S3). 
o22 Small, supra note 910 at 641. 
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defendant clearly has done something "wrong," and the "pathetic" 
plaintiff has to be taken care of by someone. In fairness, it must be 
recognized, however, that the laws of probabilities surely support the 
conclusion that many injuries go uncompensated because there· are 
"more probable" explanations for the injury which actually was caused 
as hypothesized by that "tenuous" or "too speculative" theory. If the 
fifty-fifty chance is where the line is drawn, as many deserving plaintiffs 
lose as undeserving win. The most euphemistic way to state the end re-
sult is that "rough" justice is reached. Even this is true only if we ac-
cept the concept that two wrongs average out to make a right. There 
should be a better way, but first some examples of how the present sys-
tem works. 
(b) The Legal Standard Required to Prove Cause-
in-Fact 
As set out previously in the discussion of multiple causation cases, 
causation is often arrived at by applying the "but for" test or preferably 
the "substantial factor" test.923 That these formulas are helpful always 
in deciding concrete cases is at least questionable. Yet even assuming 
the validity of such tests, the underlying question still remains, did the 
radiation in the case under consideration amount to a "substantial 
factor" or, "but for" the radiation, would the injury not have oc-
curred ? In the ordinary case the plaintiff must prove that more prob-
ably than not the radiation was a substantial causal factor inducing the 
injury. 92' In terms of probability, when reduced to percentages, this 
would seem to mean that the chances must be at least fifty per cent plus 
that the radiation caused the injury and that the chances of all other 
possible causes together actually having caused the injury are slightly 
less than fifty per cent. 
A few cases to the contrary notwithstanding, as pointed out in the 
multiple causation discussion, the majority of judicial opinions have 
stated or implied that they are following the "more probable than not" 
standard. 926 How the legal fact finding process really works perhaps 
never will be known. Certainly the reading of appellate court opinions 
cannot begin to furnish the answer, if for no other reason than that an 
infinitesimally small portion of the litigated cases get to the appellate 
courts. In addition, lawyers who try cases in the lower courts fre-
923 Supra notes 751-53. See also Harper & James §20.2. 
9 24 SuPra note 770. 
92& Cases cited supra note 88o. 
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quently are unable to recognize their cases as they are described in ap-
pellate court opinions. 
A real understanding of how the fact finding system works in the law 
would require a complete study; not only of how juries react, but also 
how trial judges and plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys think in such 
situations. In addition, a factual study would need to be made of the 
kinds of evidence used in thousands of trials, and, once the evidence 
was collected, the necessary analysis to make sense from the material 
would require a statistician and an IBM machine to aid all the other 
experts. 
Realizing these limitations, however, the lawyer must take account 
of the rules and concepts laid down by the appellate courts which have 
more or less effect on the actual trial of cases and, therefore, even the 
settlement of cases. Also, even though the appellate approach to the 
proof problem cannot be described adequately in the generalities dic-
tated by the format of legal treatises, such generalizations can be help-
ful to the lawyer who is seeking the cases from which he must distill the 
approach of the appellate courts. 
Certain generalizations that can be made are summarized briefly be-
low. In addition, attached as an appendix· at the end of this section are 
briefs of a group of representative cases which have dealt, in one way 
or another, with the standards of probability. The cases thus briefed 
support the following general propositions. When a case is mentioned 
in the text or footnotes of this section by name only, it can: be found in 
its alphabetical location in the Table of Cases-Problems of Proof . 
. If one accepts the frequency with which a problem appears in appel-
late opinions as an indication of its importance, one would have to con-
clude that the instruction given by the court to the jury prior to· its 
reaching a verdict is of key significance. Again accepting numbers as 
the proper criterion in determining the weight of authority, the instruc-
tion to the jury in most cases is to the effect that the evidence must 
show that it is "reasonably certain" or "reasonably probable," both that 
defendant's negligence caused a harmful force to affect the plaintiff and 
that the harmful force caused the injury that has been alleged. Many 
cases deal specifically with the second causation question, namely, did 
the defendant's force cause the biological result observed in the 
plaintiff? 928 
928 See the Boland, Charlton, Cohenour, Menarde, Ramberg, Vaccaro, and Walker 
cases as throwing some light on this test, infra Table of Cases at end of this section: 
"Reasonably" is not always tacked on "probable." Sometimes "certainty" ( ? ) is re-
quired, Menarde case; and see also DiFazio v. J. G. Brill Co., 133 Pa. Super. 576, 
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There are cases, however, in which words on their face indicating a 
somewhat lower standard than "reasonably certain" or "probable'' have, 
been used by appellate courts or have been approved by such courts in 
reviewing the standards set by trial courts. Such words as "possible," 
"likely," "could," and "liable," have been used or approved by appellate 
courts. 927 
Discussed in a number of appellate court decisions 928 has been the 
question of the effect of other possible causes on the plaintiff's proof-
the question of whether the plaintiff must produce evidence explaining 
away other possible causes or whether, on the contrary, the defendant 
has the ·burden of showing the probability of suggested alternative 
causes. If by "reasonably certain" or "probable" one means "more 
probably than not," then by hypothesis the other possible causes added 
together do not weigh as heavily as did the force set in motion by the 
defendant. By the same token, if an alternative cause suggested by the 
defendant is more likely to have been the cause than any other, then by 
hypothesis the plaintiff has not proven causation with reasonable cer-
tainty or probability. It therefore would· seem more accurate to consider 
the question of other possible caus.es as simply a ramification of the 
reasonably probable rule. 
3 A.zd 216 (1938); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Landes, zsz F.zd 751, 753 {5th Cir. 
1958) ; Kowalke v. Farmers Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 3 Wis.zd 38g, 88 N.W.zd 747 
(1958); Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.zd &47 (1947); Howley v. Kantor, 105 
Vt. 1z8, 133, 163 Atl. 6z8 (1933). See also cases cited Harper & James 1117, n. JZ. 
See also discussion of cases infra noteS 984 ff. 
927 Alley, Bearman, Boland, Cohenour, Louisville, Vaccaro, Walker, and Wood 
cases, see Table of Cases at end of this section. See also Bogany v. Consolidated 
Underwriters, 252 F.2d 764, 767 (sth Cir. 1958). See also cases cited Harper & James 
1118, n. 33· 
· 928 Bucher, Charlton, Cohenour, Combrooks, Ingersoll, Magazine, Ramberg, Vac-
caro, Walker, and Wood cases, see Table of Cases at end of this section. 
TABLE OF CASES-PROBLEMS OF PROOF 
The cases here briefed are representative of the thousands that could be cited dealing 
with the proof concepts discussed in the preceding section and in the ones to follow. 
They are arranged olphabeticaliy to facilitate reference to them if the reader wants to 
check the authority for numerous· statements made in the accompanying text discussions. 
The same case often supports more than one proposition and they are not arranged by 
particular subject matters as such. Each contains a detailed statement of facts and 
quotations from the opinion of the court bearing on the important holdings or implica-
tions of the case. 
Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. J27, 74 S.E. 885 (1912). Plaintiff 
was injured when a defective core for molding pipe caused molten metal to flow onto 
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plaintiff and seriously burn him. The negligence charged against the employer ·was 
that it had hired an incompetent core-maker and kept him on the job notwithstanding 
that it knew him to be such. The jury found that the company was negligent and that 
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. A verdict of $6,ooo damages was 
returned. 
Defendant contended that the court should not have permitted a physician to state 
"that the character of the plaintiff's wound was such that a sarcoma, or eating cancer, 
was liable to ensue." The court said the rule was that such testimony should be con-
fined to probable consequences, "but in this instance we do not think the physician 
indulged in pure speculation .... The word 'liable' is defined as 'exposed to a certain 
contingency more or less probable.' Webster's Dictionary. The word was used by the 
witness iri the sense of probable, and was doubtless so understood by the jury." (P. 330) 
As to mental anguish the court said : "We think the evidence competent also as 
tending to prove acute mental suffering accompanying a physical injury. The liability 
to cancer must necessarily have a most depressing effect upon the injured person. Like 
the sword of Damocles, he knows not when it will fall." (P. 33I) 
Ayers v. Hoage (Deputy Commissioner), 63 F.2d 364 (I933). Plaintiff (appellant) 
was employed by Langmead's Arm Chair Lunch in the District of Columbia from 
I925 to I9JI when he was found to be suffering from tuberculosis. During employ-
ment plaintiff lived in the same house with a tubercular sister. 
Plaintiff filed a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, which 
was rejected by defendant on the ground that: (I) Plaintiff failed to establish either 
an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of ·employment or that he was 
suffering from occupational disease or infection that arose naturally out of such em-
ployment; (2) it was not shown that there was aggravation, activation, or acceleration 
of a pre-existing condition due to employment. 
· Plaintiff worked long hours and ate at irregular times. He was employed sometimes 
as a bus boy, short order cook, and counterman. He contracted a cold of unknown 
origin in January 193I. He usually work~d twelve hours a day. In the middle of 
January a sewer trap in the lunchroom overflowed for about one week and plaintiff 
got his feet wet. Plaintiff testified that he contracted tuberculosis or the cold because 
of his employment. Expert testimony was given as follows : 
(I) Dr. Walters-plaintiff's family physician. A bad cold will act as an accelerant. 
Many other predisposing factors will do this also: long hours, continual exposure to 
draughts, irregular meals'. It is possible to contract the disease from dishes, silverware, 
etc., or from plaintiff's sister. Did not testify that plaintiff contracted tuberculosis at 
the lunchroom. · . 
(2) Dr. Tewksbury-tuberculosis specialist, twenty years, 40,000 cases. Possible to 
carry tuberculosis bacilli and the infection for many years. Sputum test neg;itiv_e is 
not conclusive (Dr. Walters had obtained negative n;sults in I928). Twelve hours 
of work a day would not cause tuberculosis nor cause it to flare up, nor would a cold 
do so, nor standing in water. Could come in contact with the bacilli anywhere any 
time; many infected people were wandering about. It is not probable that cold lowered 
resistance to the spread of tuberculosis . . . though possible. Tuberculosis is not" a 
disease peculiar to restaurant workers ; very few cases seen involving restaurant 
workers. The percentage of cases among restaurant workers is about average; the 
same as clerks in the government departments ; danger of coming in contact with 
bacil!i is just as great on the outside as inside. No way of prO'Ving definitely where 
the i11dividual gets the disease. 
(3) Dr. Avery-In I928 took a negative sputum test of plaintiff. Plaintiff's tonsils 
then badly infected (should have been removed). Sputum test is not a positive sign. 
Any exposure may accelerate the condition of tuberculosis; anything causing an un-
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usual strain on the resistance would have a tendency to aggravate. (Dr. Avery was a 
general practitioner and surgeon.) 
Decision: Decree dismissing plaintiff's bill affirmed. 
An injury "arises out of" the employment within the meaning of the Compensation 
Act when it occurs in the course of the employment and as the result of a risk 
involved in or incidental to the employment or to the conditions under which it is 
required to be performed. The mere fact that the injury is contemporaneous or co-
incident with the employment is not a sufficient basis for an award. 
The question the court must answer is : "Was the employment a proximate cause 
of the disablement, or was the injured condition merely contemporaneous or coincident 
with the employment?" (P. 365) 
It conclusively appeared that tuberculosis is not peculiar to restaurant workers, and 
that the disease may be contracted in any place frequented by the public. To hold 
that there. was a causal connection between the disease and the employment would be 
to indulge in conjecture. 
Bearman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 186 F.2d 662 (1oth Cir. 1951). Action 
on a life insurance policy which insured against loss of life resulting directly from 
bodily injuries and independently of all other causes. Immediately before the final 
illness the insured was struck on the back by an apparently unknown object. He died 
six weeks later. Prior to the injury he was in apparent good health. 
An autopsy revealed atherosclerosis of the left coronary artery and a thrombus com-
pletely occluding that artery. Three experts testified that this was probably a long stand-
ing disease, that in their opinion there was no relation between the disease and the acci-
dent, and that there was no causal connection between the injury and the atherosclerosis, 
the rupture of the atheromatous abscess, the thrombosis, or the coronary occlusion. 
They also testified that trauma or strain may produce a coronary occlusion and that 
the injury might have contributed to the death. Judgment for defendant was affirmed. 
Whether there was causal connection between the accident and resulting 
injury and the atherosclerosis, the rupture of the atheromatous abscess, the 
thrombosis, or the coronary occlusion presented a question for solution not 
within the competency of laymen, and a question with respect to which, only 
a medical expert with training, skill, and experience could form a considered 
judgment and express an intelligent opinion. Indeed, it perhaps would require 
a medical expert trained and experienced in a specialised field. 
The great weight of authority supports the rule that medical expert testi-
mony to be sufficient to take the case to the jury must be to the effect that the 
accident or injury Probably caused the Insured's death; and that testimony to 
the effect that a causal connection between the accident or injury and Insured's 
ensuing death was possible, such as testimony that the accident or injury 
"might have," or "may have," or "could have" caused the death of Insured, 
is insufficient to take the case to the jury, because such testimony leaves the 
issue in the field of conjecture and permits the jury to speculate or guess as 
to the cause of death. (P. 665) (Emphasis added.) 
Boland v. Vanderbilt, 140 Conn. 520, 102 A.2d 362 (1953). The plaintiff was injured 
in an automobile accident in which the jury found the defendant negligent. Plaintiff 
claimed to have sustained (1) strains, bruises, and contusions, and (2) that he suffered 
a cerebral thrombosis seventeen days after the accident. 
Trial of the case came some two and one half years after the accident. At this time 
plaintiff's left arm was almost completely paralyzed, he walked with ·great difficulty, 
he suffered constant buzzing in his head, headaches, and dizzy spells. He had to be 
driven about to do his work and was earning less than formerly. Judgment for plain-
tiff affirmed. 
The defendant claimed there was no evidence to support an award for future perma-
nent injury, pain, and sufferiitg. The court pointed out that plaintiff was healthy before 
the injury and that his injuries were readily apparent. "Speaking broadly, the jury 
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had the opportunity to appraise his condition and the probable future consequences 
of it." (P. 523) The court distinguished this case from another in which the injuries 
were "of such a nature that the extent and probable duration of future disability by 
reason of it could not have been ascertained by the jury without the aid of testimony 
upon that element of damage [a knee injury]." 
The defendant also maintained that plaintiff failed to establish any causal relation 
between the accident and the cerebral thrombosis. The court said "The occurrence of 
a post-traumatic cerebral accident or thrombosis is recognized by medical science. 
There is a likely connection between the plaintiff's cerebral thrombosis and the auto-
mobile accident .... " (P. 525) 
To be entitled to damages a plaintiff must establish a causal relation between 
the injury and the physical condition which he claims resulted from it ... . 
This causal connection must rest upon more than surmise or conjecture ... . 
A trier is not concerned with possibilities but with reasonable probabilities . 
. . . The causal relation between an injury and its later physical effects may 
be established by the direct opinion of a physician, by his deduction by the 
process of eliminating causes other than the traumatic agency, or by his 
opinion based upon a hypothetical question. . . . 
The medical witness here testified, in answer to a hypothetical question, that there 
was a "likely connection." The court found this to mean "[o]f such a nature or so 
circumstanced as to render something probable ... (a]ppearing like truth; seeming 
to justify belief .... " (Emphasis added.) (P. 525) 
Bucher v. Wisccm.sin Central Ry., 139 Wis. 597, 120 N.W. 518 (1909). Plaintiff 
was injured on September 26, 1!)06, while standing on the step of an engine cab, lean-
ing out to catch a signal from a conductor. His head struck a standpipe along the 
right-of-way as the train moved past at ten to fifteen miles per hour. Plaintiff was 
examined the same day by a physician employed by defendant. There was a contusion 
and small swelling on the back of his head and a contusion on his right hip and right 
shoulder. He made no complaint about his ear, _but complained of pain in his left 
testicle. The doctor examined and found a small chronic varicocele. Plaintiff testified 
that he was in sound health before the accident, that he was in bed about a week after 
it, that he went to work (for another employer) in November an4 worked until the 
middle of Jaunary. In February plaintiff called on Dr. Corbitt when he was suffering 
from an acute attack of grippe. He also complained of pain in his head, dizziness, 
loss of sleep, numbness in the arms, impotency, and tenderness in the upper and lower 
parts of his spine. 
Dr. Corbitt testified that the nerve controlling erection was contained in the sacro 
pleris, and that plaintiff was tender in that region, that the brain, spinal cord, and the 
penval nerves all take part in the phenomenon of erection, that he believed from an 
examination of the plaintiff and the injury that there was sufficient injury to either 
the brain or the spinal cord from the blow on the back of the head to cause permanent 
impotency. 
Dr. Brazeau (specialist in eye, ear, nose, and throat) examined plaintiff and found 
him to be suffering from suppuration of the middle ear. He cautiously stated that this 
condition might have been caused by the accident. An osteopath testified that the 
accident as described could have caused the injuries complained of .... The jury 
found for plaintiff ($4,ooo1. 
In reversing and remanding, the court pointed to the period of apparent good health 
of about five months following the accident and before the attack of grippe, and that 
the opinions regarding impotency were given by men who saw plaintiff after the 
attack of grippe. The court said : 
The verdict of a jury founded upon facts is entitled to great weight, and is 
almost conclusive upon this court if supported by any evidence. But the verdict 
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of a jury founded only upon the opinion of experts concerning the cause of a 
condition, which condition is itself established by the opinion of experts, has 
no such weight. (P. 6o6) 
Opinions of medical men may be rejected as an insufficient basis for a finding 
of fact by a jury where the court is convinced that reasonable certainty is 
outside of the possibilities of the situation. (P. 007) 
The court further pointed out that one physician found plaintiff to be suffering from 
grippe and having a suppurated ear, with some indications of varicocele and fever five 
months after the accident, and that this physician was of the opinion that plaintiff's 
sexual impotence was not due to any of these causes, but rather to the accidental 
injury. It was pointed out that he did not see plaintiff until five months after the 
accident, nor see the actual wounds or injuries, nor was there any evidence that they 
were described to him. The court pointed out that the physician who examined the 
plaintiff immediately after the accident found a chronic varicocele, and that "Dr. Allen 
McLane Hamilton, in his work entitled 'Legal Medicine,' expresses the opinion that 
varicocele except in its earlier stages finally results in the production of both impotence 
and sterility." (P. 009) Apparently another treatise informed the court that grippe 
could cause impotence. 
In discussing the character of such an injury as impotence the court said: 
It is very easy to exaggerate before a jury the cause, effect, or probable 
permanency of such a condition as impotence. The same is true with regard 
to nervous disorders. Both are easy to feign, hard to disprove, exaggerated by 
auto-suggestion, and it is comparatively easy for an expert to have an opinion 
tracing either to a particular physical injury instead of to a disease, a mental 
condition, or a general impairment of health. If loss of sexual power is to 
be thrown into the scale as an item for which the plaintiff is entitled to be 
compensated in a personal injury case, common sense informs us that in prac-
tically all cases of severe injury, pain, suffering, or sickness there must be 
and ordinarily is during such period of stress a suspension of the sexual func-
tions .. -.. The consequence of considering this as an additional or independent 
item of damages must be that every sick or injured man may assert his sexual 
impotence as a ground for recovery additional to pain. sickness, or suffering, 
and thus duplicate damages. Cases may no doubt occur of direct injury to 
the generative organs in which some such ground of damages would not be a 
matter of mere conjecture, and what is here said has no reference to such 
cases. ( P. 6og) 
The court then found that Dr. Corbitt, under the circumstances detailed, and five 
months after the injury, had no certain or satisfactory data upon which to base his 
opinion that the impotency of the plaintiff, if it existed, was caused by the accident. 
The court discounted the testimony of the osteopaths entirely. 
In concluding, the court stated: 
The testimony of experts is proverbially unreliable at best, even when the 
experts are learned and competent, because bias is almost unavoidable on 
account of our mode of selecting experts, and bias requires small basis upon 
which to ground an opinion. But where this unreliability is accentuated by 
a showing that the expert has little or no data upon which to base the 
opinion ... , and the subject upon which he expresses an opinion is one 
recognized by the approved learning of the times to be of great doubt and 
difficulty, or where the alleged expert demonstrates his lack of knowledge by 
his testimony, [as the osteopaths apparently did] such. testimony will not be 
sufficient to support a verdict which to this court seems unjust or excessive. 
(Pp. 611-12) 
Charlton Bros. v. Garrettson, r88 Md. 85, 51 A.2d 642 (1947). Following an 
operation for bilateral hernia, and about two weeks after returning to work, the 
plaintiff, in a collision between the streetcar of one defendant and the truck and 
trailer of the other, was thrown forward and struck in the region of the groin by the 
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frame of the seat ahead of him. Plaintiff claimed it caused "terrible pain." Following 
the incident the plaintiff was in the care of Dr. Wilkerson, who performed the hernia 
operation. The doctor testified that in his belief the accident produced a recurrent 
hernia. He further testified that the only curative treatment is another operation, that 
there was no "more than a fifty-fifty chance" of cure, that ten per cent of the hernias 
operated on recur without accident, but that this particular type of hernia is a direct 
hernia, i.e., one that must be acquired, and ordinarily is due to some abdominal trauma. 
(An indirect hernia is one for which all the elements necessary for it to occur are 
present at birth.) 
The defendant claimed reversible error in the court's charge to the jury to the effect 
that it might consider whether the injuries would be permanent, and in overruling 
objections to Dr. Wilkerson's testimony as to causal connection, as to the chance of 
cure, and as to a "direct hernia." Apparently the doctor did not hear the testimony in 
the case. Judgment for plaintiff approved . 
. . . It was not necessary for him (the doctor) to hear the testimony. [Since 
he had unusually extensive, firsthand acquaintance with the plaintiff's condi-
tion.] (P. 93) 
The law requires proof of probable, not merely possible, facts, including 
causal relations. Reasoning post hoc, propter hoc is a recognized logical 
fallacy, a non sequitur. But sequence of events, plus proof of possible causal 
relation, may amount to proof of probable causal relations, in the absence of 
evidence of any other equally probable cause. [Italics by court.] ... We are 
not required or permitted to assume that the collision and the new hernia 
were a mere coincidence and that the hernia would have recurred if there had 
been no collision. 
There is also evidence of permanent injury. Plaintiff is [Italics by court.] 
permanently injured, unless he is cured by a formidable operation, which offers 
a so per cent chance of cure. Before the collision· his condition involved a 
10 per cent risk of recurrence. His present condition, if [Italics by court.] 
he undergoes another operation, involves a so per cent risk of recurrence. 
This increase in hazard is itself a permanent injury. Expert testimony hardly 
seems necessary to show that such an operation would ·leave plaintiff in a 
permanently weaker condition. (P. 94) (Emphasis added.) 
Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okla. 668, 240 P.2d 91, (19SI). Plaintiff alleged serious 
injuries as a result of an automobile accident caused by defendant. Following the 
accident, the plaintiff got out of the car and walked around, and gave no indication 
of injury whatsoever. He told a highway patrolman that he "was fortunate because 
he had a weak back and was not even hurt." Plaintiff had been injured in a similar 
accident twelve years previously. He also had been in an accident the previous year, 
but claimed he had suffered no permanent injuries as a result of either event. He had 
been a frequent visitor to doctors both before and after the accident, but he did not 
complain to any of them of having received an injury in this accident. Examination 
showed that at some time two of his vertebrae had become compressed. 
This action was commenced thirteen months after the accident. The only medical 
witness called by the plaintiff was one who examined him two years after the accident 
for purposes of testifying. This witness testified that the accident could have caused 
the condition in plaintiff's back. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Did the plaintiff establish by expert testimony that the plaintiff's injuries were 
a result of the accident . . . ? The answer to this question necessitates the 
consideration of two points, the first being: Did Dr. Rice testify with sufficient 
definiteness that plaintiff's injuries were the result of the accident ... ? and 
second: Were the other accidents in which plaintiff was involved properly 
eliminated as possible causes of his alleged injuries? We think the answe~; is 
"No." (P. 670) 
The plaintiff must show that the accident probably did cause the injuries. 
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[T]he authorities clearly hold that medical testimony as to the possibility 
of a causal relation between a given accident or injury and the subsequent 
impaired physical condition of the person injured is not sufficient, standing 
alone, to establish such a relation. (P. 670) 
The court also pointed out that Dr. Rice testified on cross-examination that plain-
tiff's injuries could have been caused at another time than the date of the accident. 
"We think that until the plaintiff has eliminated other possible causes of his injuries 
as being the sufficient cause, he should not recover." (P. 671) 
Cole v. Simpson, 299 Mich. 589, 1 N.W.2d 2 (1941). Plaintiff claimed to have been 
injured when she was dragged by a bus from which she was alighting. No one saw 
the accident and there was considerable doubt whether the accident ever occurred. 
The only outward evidences of injury were a few abrasions and bruises on her left 
leg and hand and on her face. Five months after the accident the plaintiff complained 
of pain iri her back. Ten months after the accident X-rays disclosed that she was 
suffering from duodenitis and colitis, the latter in ulcerated form. Her main com-
plaint is that the accident caused frequent, irregular, and very prolonged and painful 
menses. 
There was medical testimony that duodenitis and ulcerated colitis, because of the 
advanced stage disclosed by X-rays, must have developed before the alleged accident. 
There was evidence that the menstrual difficulty was caused by this diseased condition; 
however, one of the plaintiff's medical experts, when asked whether he had any opinion 
based upon reasonable medical certainty whether or not the findings he had ~nade (a 
considerable period after the injury) "could have been caused by a fall or being 
dragged," answered, "Why it was possible, yes." He further stated that the possi-
bility was "very great," "So per cent possible." Another medical witness for the 
plaintiff (the doctor who had been treating her) felt that the menstrual injury, 
duodenitis and ulcerated colitis were the result of a previous accident. ] udgment for 
the plaintiff reversed on other grounds. (On subsequent discovery the defendant 
showed that plaintiff was a professional in personal injury actions.) 
We agree that this testimony has very little probative value ; that medicine 
is not such an exact science that the cause of disease can always be determined 
and it Inay be said that in most instances there is a possibility that any un-
toward condition may cause a more serious one. However, there was no error 
in admitting the testimony. In Htmter v. Village of Ithaca, 141 Mich. 539, 
we held that it was not improper to ask a witness whether an injury "could 
cause" a condition rather than whether such an injury would be likely to cause 
such result. We held that the objection went to the weight of the question 
rather than to its admissibility. The weight of authority sustains this ruling. 
(Pp. 595-6) 
Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 64 N.E.2d 436 (1945). The plaintiff testified that 
she was three months pregnant at the time of the automobile collision for which the 
defendant was responsible. She further testified that the force of the collision threw 
her against the steering wheel, that she experienced pain and nausea, that she was 
obliged to stay in bed after the accident for a week, and that on the nil_tth day after 
the accident she suffered a miscarriage. She introduced no medical evidence on her 
behalf. 
The defendant called as a witness a doctor, who had examined the plaintiff about 
six months after the accident. He testified thit there was grave doubt that she had 
suffered a miscarriage, and that, if she did, it was not as a result of the accident. On 
appeal the defendant contended that the jury could not, unassisted by expert medical 
testimony, find that the plaintiff suffered a miscarriage or that such a miscarriage was 
causally related to the accident. 
The court held that the plaintiff's own testimony as to her pregnancy and that she 
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suffered a miscarriage was sufficient evidence for the issue of the injury to go to the 
jury. With respect to the issue of causal connection the court stated: 
The testimony of an expert that such causal connection exists, or probably 
exists, has been held sufficient .... (E]xpert testimony that merely shows 
"that such (causal) relation is possible, conceivable or reasonable, without 
more, leaves the issue trembling in the balance." But there is no rule o{ law 
that this relation must be proved only by expert testimony .... Expert testi-
mony that an accident would be an adequate cause of subsequent disease has 
been held "sufficient, taken in connection with the plaintiff's testimony that his 
health was good before the accident." . . . 
We think, although with some hesitation, that the plaintiff's testimony with 
respect to the accident and the condition of her health afterwards, in conjunc-
tion with the testimony of the defendant's doctor to the effect that a mis-
carriage might be produced by "some injury, (or by) the striking of the 
abdomen," was enough to support a finding that the plaintiff's miscarriage 
was causally related to the accident." (Pp. 19-20) 
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. 
Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc., 282 N.Y. 217, 26 N.E.2d 25 (1940). 
The plaintiff sought damages for loss of the sight of his left eye, alleged to have 
resulted from the negligent operation of an electric vibrator by a barber employed by 
the defendant. The electric vibrator came in contact with the left side of the plaintiff's 
face on January 9, 1934. The plaintiff testified that there was an unpleasant jarring 
sensation; however, he sensed no further discomfort until the afternoon of the same 
day when he became aware of a dimness of vision which gradually became more 
pronounced. By January 15 the sight of the plaintiff's left eye was reduced to ten 
per cent of normal. Medical examination revealed that the retina had been torn. Prior 
to application of the vibrator, the left eye had been moderately nearsighted. Both 
before and after the injury the eye was entirely free from disease or infection. 
Plaintiff's experts testified that the most common causes of a retinal detachment 
are trauma, jarring, or body strain. The plaintiff testified that he had undergone no 
unusual exertion nor sustained any blow. These experts testified that the detachment 
of the retina is not accompanied by pain, and that the vibration would have been a 
competent producing cause of the injury. Even the defendant's experts (barbers) 
testified that the vibrator should never be applied to the face. 
The plaintiff was given judgment and the defendant prosecuted the appeal on the 
ground of a failure to show cause-in-fact. He supported the assertion by citing the 
experts' testimony to the effect that the injury might have been caused by a jolt or 
jarring sustained on a subway train, a taxicab, or a bus, in which vehicles the plain-
tiff had admitted riding on the gth of January. The defendant offered no proof of 
such incidents. With respect to these contentions of the defendant,- the court stated : 
But the significant fact is that the record contains no proof that plaintiff had 
been jarred or jolted at any time and, to the contrary, the plaintiff denied such 
an occurrence. 
It is not enough that the defendant, in an effort to break the chain of causa-
tion, should prove that plaintiff's injury might [Italics by court.] have resulted 
from other possible causes, nor is it required of the plaintiff that he eliminate 
by his proof all other possible causes." . . . It is enough that he shows facts 
and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation 
of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred." (P. 223) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The judgment for the plaintiff was a(Jirmed. 
Fidelity & Ca.rualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Accident Commission, 84 Cal. 
App. so6, 258 P. 6g8 (1927). Proceeding in certiorari to review an order of the 
Commission awarding compensation for the death of an employee of Balfour, Guthrie 
& Co. Deceased was sent by his employer from San Francisco to Valparaiso, Chile, 
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to attend a nitrate conference. On the return trip he stopped at Arequipa, Peru, 
pursuant to his employers' orders to visit company customers. There he contracted 
typhoid fever and died. Due to unsanitary conditions, typhoid in both Chile and Peru, 
while not epidemic, was prevalent and a constant source of danger. At least one of 
the deceased's superiors was familiar with the health conditions in both countries, and 
had warned deceased to this effect advising him concerning the precautions to be 
taken. The Commission found deceased sustained injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment. Judgment was for plaintiff. 
This court was without power to determine weight to be given the evidence ... 
or which of two opposing inferences should be drawn therefrom. Claimant was not 
required to show proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence 
need merely be reasonably sufficient to support the award. 
The distinguishing feature between this and prior cases where an award is denied 
is that here at least one of the employers was aware of the greater prevalence of the 
disease in the places to which the deceased was sent. " ... [A]nd we are unable to 
say that the conclusion of the Commission that the employee was subjected to an 
exposure in excess of the commonalty was not reasonabiy supported." (P. 510) 
"Commonalty" means the great body of citizens, the mass of people . 
. . . [A]n employee who contracts a contagious or infectious disease has the 
burden of showing affirmatively that he was subjected to an exposure in 
excess of that of the commonalty and in the absence of such showing his 
illness or death cannot be said to have been proximately caused by an injury 
arising out of his employment ... the question is one of fact for the Com-
mission, and its finding thereon if reasonably supported cannot be disturbed. 
(P. soB) 
Furthermore, the evidence sufficiently shows that the inhabitants of these 
localities, while not immune from the disease, were less subject to infection 
therefrom than foreigners. . . . (P. 510) 
Harris v. Hindman, 130 Ore. 15, .278 P. 954 (1929). The defendant hit the plaintiff 
in the eye with his fist. The abrasion which resulted did not heal. Subsequent exam-
ination revealed the presence of a cancerous growth, for which the plaintiff sought 
damages. 
In appealing from the judgment for the plaintiff the defendant contended that the 
opinions of the plaintiff's five medical experts rose no higher than inference in the 
scale of evidence. In affirming the judgment and disposing of the defendant's conten-
tions, the court quoted from Chamberlayne on Evidence (§r8n): 
"The necessity for receiving the reasoning of skilled witnesses is self-
evident .... [T]he skilled witness, as an observer, is permitted to state facts 
perceived by him with the same admixture of reasoning which is allowed the 
ordinary percipient. The presence, on his part, of a new element, that of 
special knowledge, has several marked effects, in an administrative point of 
view. Among these, it may be noted in the first place, that the large number 
of data, professional reading, past observations, and the like, us~ally broadens 
the basis of the reasoning of the skilled witness to such an extent as to make 
his mental deduction from his observations resemble, not so much an inference, 
as a conclusion." (P. 18) (Emphasis added.) 
Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128, 163 At!. 628 (1932). The plaintiff was struck and 
injured by the defendant's automobile while she was crossing the street. It was not 
questioned that the evidence reasonably justified a finding by the jury that negligence 
of the defendant proximately caused the accident. The real issue (for our purposes) 
was with respect to expert testimony. 
An expert testified that a growth on the plaintiff's left breast was caused by trauma. 
Apparently it was conceded that the accident was the cause of the growth. The expert 
further testified that such growths may be either simple tumors, which easily are 
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removed and cured, or may be malignant or cancerous growths, that to determine 
their character it is necessary to remove and examine them microscopically. With 
respect to the type of growth the witness testified that they "run about eighty per cent 
cancerous." No evidence ·or testimony was offered as to the character of the plaintiff's 
growth; the witness was unwilling to state whether it was a simple or a cancerous 
growth. The trial court left it to the jury to decide, and the jury apparently found 
that the growth was a cancer or could become a cancer. The defendant took exception 
to the 'failure of the trial court to charge the jury that the evidence was not sufficient 
to justify a finding that there was a cancerous growth and that it was not to consider 
such a condition as an element of damages. 
In reversing and remanding a judgment for the plaintiff, the court stated: 
Competent expert medical testimony was essential to lay a foundation for 
this claim made by the plaintiff .... To support such a claim, the evidence 
must be of such a character that the jury can find that there is a reasonable 
certainty or a reasonable probability that the apprehended future consequences 
will ensue from the original injury. Consequences which are contingent, specu-
lative, or merely possible are not entitled to consideration in ascertaining the 
damages. (P. 133) (Emphasis added.) 
In considering the expert testimony and establishing its legal effect, the court went 
on to state: 
The record before us does not disclose any opinion of the medical witness 
as to the probable future development a:nd result of the plaintiff's breast condi-
tion. His answer, "run about eighty per cent cancerous," does not have the 
effect claimed for it. The witness did not say that in his opinion the chances 
are eighty per cent that the growth is Cancerous, but, rather, as is clearly 
indicated, that from his experience and the history of other cases injury to 
the breast producing tumor developed about eighty per cent cancerous. 
(P. 133) 
This testimony and the inferences to be drawn from it were held to be too conjectural 
and speculative to furnish a basis for the assessment of future damages. · 
Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938). In this 
case there was clear evidence that the basement stairs in a house owned and leased 
by the defendant were defective. The defects had been pointed out to the defendant, 
but they had not been remedied. The decedent, a lessee of the house, who weighed 
214 pounds and was carrying a 32-pound package was discovered by the plaintiff, his 
wife, at the bottom of the stairs. A piece of the tread of the second stair from the 
bottom was broken off. Inspection showed it to have happened at an old crack. Shortly 
after the accident the decedent said to his wife, "Something brqke, . . . Something 
gave away in here," (pointing to his chest). He died several months later as a result 
of injuries sustained in the fall. There was evidence indicating that decedent had been 
suffering from a heart disease at the time of the accident. Neither was the body of 
the decedent much bruised, nor the package he was carrying greatly damaged. 
The defendant contended that the decedent fainted or lost his footing on the stair 
as a result of his physical condition. He claimed that this must have happened at or 
near the top of the stairs and that the package broke the stair as it fell. 
The trial court submitted to the jury the question as to which inference should be 
drawn. The jury found for the plaintiff. The appellate division reversed and dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show a causal con-
nection between the defect and the injury. 
In reversing the decision of the appellate division, the court of appeals pointed out 
that the defendant's inference was possible but unlikely since neither the package nor 
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the decedent were shown to have been bruised sufficiently to warrant the inference 
that they had fallen from very far up the stairway. The court went on to state that 
Where the facts proven show that there are several possible causes of an 
injury, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, and it is 
just as reasonable and probable that the injury was the result of one cause as 
the other, plaintiff cannot have a recovery, since he has failed to prove that 
the negligence of the defendant caused the injury .... This does not mean 
that the plaintiff must eliminate every other possible cause .... The existence 
of remote possibilities that factors other than the negligence of the defendant 
may have caused the accident, does not require a holding that plaintiff has 
failed to make out a prima facie [Italics by court.] case. It is enough that he 
show facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the 
.causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred. (P. 7) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Applying this rule to the facts in issue the court further stated that 
In the case at bar the natural and reasonable inference is that the plaintiff 
was descending the stairway with the box, when the defective tread broke 
under his foot and caused him to fall. There was evidence that the decedent 
suffered from heart disease, and the jury might have reached the conclusion 
that he fell because of heart attack or dizziness. The question was one for the 
jury and .the complaint should not have been dismissed. (Pp. 8-9) 
Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1938). Plaintiff was 
injured while opening a door in defendant's hotel when a broken piece of transom 
glass fell upon his head. The wound in the temple did not heal. About two years 
after the accident it was found that at the point where the injury occurred a skin 
cancer had developed. The jury awarded a $20,000 verdict. 
The only two medical experts testified that there is no causal connection whatever 
between trauma and cancer, and went on to observe that if there were such a con-
nection nearly every person of mature age would be suffering from cancer. 
In affirming as to liability but reversing and remanding as to the amount of dam-
ages, the court stated: 
And the medical testimony is conclusive on both judge and jury in this 
case. That testimony . is undisputed that after long and anxious years of re-
search the exact cause of cancer remains unknown-there is no dependably 
known origin to which it can be definitely traced or ascribed. If, then, the 
cause be unknown to all those who have devoted their lives to a study of the 
subject, it is wholly beyond the range of the common experience and observa-
tion of judges and jurors, and in such a case medical testimony when un-
disputed, as here, must be accepted and acted upon in the same manner as is 
other undisputed evidence. . . • 
In all other than the exceptional cases now to be mentioned, the testimony 
of medical experts, or other experts, is advisory only; but we repeat that 
where the issue is one which lies wholly beyond the range of the experience 
or observation of laymen and of which they can have appreciable knowledge, 
courts and juries must of necessity depend upon and accept the undisputed 
testimony of reputable specialists, else there would be no substantial foundation 
upon which to rest a oonclusion. (Pp. 498-9) (Emphasis added.) 
Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A.2d 337 (1945). The plaintiff was injured in 
an automobile accident on December 24, 1942. She sustained a bad bruise over her 
left breast. On February 13, 1943, a cystic mastitis was discovered at the precise point 
of injury. Apparently none of the medical experts were willing to state that the 
mastitis had been either caused or aggravated by the injury with reasonable certainty. 
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court stated: 
Only the medical testimony is printed. It is highly technical. The jury could 
reasonably have found that the cause of cancer is unknown; that the prepon-
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derance of medical opinion today is to the effect that cancer rarely if ever 
results from a single trauma; but that the exceptional circumstances surround-
ing this case, particularly the period that elapsed. between the date of the 
trauma and the appearance of the cancer, and the fact that the cancer was 
located at the precise point of injury, justified the conclusion that there was a 
causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and her cancer. (P. 570) 
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Louisville Ry. v. Philippina Steubing's Admr., 143 Ky. 364, 136 S.W. 634 (19ll). 
The decedent fell from defendant's streetcar by reason of the negligence of the defend-
ant's employee. In doing so the handle of her umbrella bruised her chest. Within 
six months after the accident a tumor developed on her breast at the point where she 
had been bruised by the umbrella. This tumor further developed into cancer which 
caused her death. The judgment was for the plaintiff. 
On appeal the defendant insisted that all the evidence as to the cancer should have 
been excluded from the jury, as it was not shown that this was the direct and 
proximate result of the injury. 
In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff the court pointed to evidence showing 
that the decedent was a strong healthy woman before the accident and that she suf-
fered constant pain following it. The court also adverted to testimony of physicians 
introduced by the plaintiff "to the effect that fifteen per cent of the cases of cancer 
of the breast may be traced back to a traumatic injury." While these physicians 
admitted that the cause of cancer was unknown, they gave it as their opinion that in 
a glandular structure like the breast, where the circulation is very extensive, there 
are what are called embryonic cells, and a bruise would start an embryonic cell to 
growing and developing into a growth different from the original material. These 
experts also testified that falling from a streetcar and having an umbrella punched 
into her chest, would be sufficient or probable cause for the condition in which they 
found the decedent, that the injury might not cause the· cancer, but might bring about 
a condition which would cause it although a cancer otherwise would not have existed, 
that any chronic inflammatory condition in the breast was liable to bring about such 
a condition, and that a large percentage of the tumors of the breast in women at some 
time took on malignancy. The court held that this was sufficient evidence for the 
issue of causation to go to the jury. 
Magazine v. Shull, n6 Ind. App. 79, 6o N.E.2d 6n (1945). This was a claim 
under workmen's compensation statutes. On March 13, 1942, the claimant, while push-
ing a motor block up an inclined ramp to a truck bed, experienced a sharp and severe 
pain in the region of his stomach. ·He became dizzy and cold and was compelled to 
rest~ Later, he collapsed in his employer's office. That same day he had two rectal 
hemorrhages, and during the following week he had recurrent spells of nausea and 
pain. On March 21, he had several hemorrhages, both oral and rectal. On March 24, 
after being taken to the hospital, claimant awakened totally and permanently blinded 
by bilateral optical atrophy. Prior to this time claimant had had no trouble with his 
eyes; however, he apparently had an incipiept stomach ulcer. 
A medical expert stated, "It is known on good authority that one single hemor-
rhage or repeated hemorrhages may exsanguinate the retinas and thereby produce 
death of the retinas followed by optic atrophy. That condition is rare but there are 
cases reported of such a happening." (P. 84) In response to the question, "Would 
you say, doctor, that the result might have occurred in this case?" (Emphasis added.) 
the witness replied, "Yes, it just easily could have happened." This was all the 
medical testimony favorable to claimant. Nothing was said as to what caused the 
hemorrhage. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
It is true that in many jurisdictions courts attach little evidentiary value to 
statements of medical experts which are doubtful and equivocal and hold that 
the evidence must establish a probability, not a mere possibility, of causal 
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connection between an injury and disability. In this state, however, it is settled 
law that the opinions of mediCal experts using words such as "might," "could," 
"likely," "possible," "may have," etc., in testifying concerning the causal con-
nection between accident and disability, if coupled with other credible evidence 
of a non-medical character, is substantial evidence and sufficient to sustain an 
award .... In our opinion the chain of events in close sequence, such as the 
accident itself followed by pain, dizziness, chill and hemorrhages, at frequent 
intervals over a period of I I days, together with the fact that the appellee 
previously had had good eyesight and no hemorrhages, is sufficient, under the 
rule above announced, to render Dr. Alvis' testimony substantial in character 
and of such probative value as the Industrial Board saw fit to give it. (P. 87) 
(Emphasis added.) · 
McAllister v. United States, 207 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. I953). Libellant, a second 
assistant engineer, employed by the United States on· a government owned vessel, 
operated by the War Shipping Administration, brought an action contending that the 
respondent had been negligent in creating conditions cqnducive to the transmission of 
polio and that the libellant contracted polio as a result of this negligence. 
The vessel arrived in Shanghai from New York on September 26, I945, where she 
stayed until November 1. Notice was posted and announcements were made by the 
master as to the existence of a polio epidemic in the area ; all members of the crew 
were warned to avoid contact with the Chinese and to exercise care in eating and 
drinking while ashore. 
On November I the vessel went to Hong Kong, returning to Shanghai on Novem-
ber II. During this second stay at Shanghai Nationalist Army trucks were loaded on 
board the vessel with the aid of Chinese coolies; also Chinese soldiers and mechanics 
were taken on board. While a deck toilet was provided for them, no provision was 
made to keep the Chinese from using the crew's·toilet facilities. The Chinese in fact 
did use these facilities as well as a common drinking fountain on deck. On one occasion 
libellant was required to flush the deck latrine. Judgment for libellant reversed. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, 348 U.S. I9, 75 S. Ct. 6 (I954), judgment was reversed, 
the court saying : 
On evidence showing these facts, including the opinion of the experts, we 
think there was substantial evidence from which the District Court [no jury] 
could and did find that respondent was negligent in permitting these Chinese, · 
from the infested area of Shanghai,.to have the run of the ship and use of its 
facilities, and in furnishing the crude and exposed latrine provided on the deck 
of the ship, by reason whereof the petitioner contracted polio. . . 
Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese were the carriers 
of the polio virus and that they communicated it to. the petitioner. But upon 
balance of the probabilities it seems a reasonable ·inference for the District 
Court to make from the facts proved, supported as they were by the best judg-
ment medical experts have upon the subject today,. that petitiqner was con-
taminated by the Chinese who came aboard the ship November II, 1945, at 
Shanghai. (P. 22) (Emphasis added.) · · · 
Menarde v. Philadelphia. Trans. Co., 376 Pa. 497, I03 A.2d 68I (I954). Plaintiff 
was injured on May 16th whiie alighting from defendant's streetcar.· T~t evening she 
noticed a discoloration on. her right breast. Over the period of the next two and a half 
months the discoloration disappear~; h6wever, by the. end of July plaintiff detected a 
lump at the exact spot where there had been discoloration. Plaintiff was referred to 
a cancer specialist wbo recommended removal of the. entire breast. This operation 
was perlormed. Plaintiff's. regular physician testified in very unequivocal terms that 
in his opinion the cancer was the direct result of plaintiff's injury. This witness refused 
to even concede that the cancer possibly could be caused by anything else. The cancer 
specialist, who performed the operation, testified that the trauma sustained by plaintiff 
caused the cancer, although in somewhat less emphatic terms. Judgment for plaintiff 
·affirmed. · 
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... [T]he expert has to testify, not that the condition of claimant might 
have, or even probably did, come from the accident, but that in his professional 
opinion the result in question came from the cause alleged. A less direct 
expression of opinion falls below the required standard of proof and does not 
constitute legally competent evidence. (P. 501) (Emphasis added.) 
Where, as here, a person who has enjoyed prior good health sustains an 
injury to a particular member and some three months thereafter a malignant 
nodule appears in precisely the same location as the bruise, and two doctors 
conclude that the cancer resulted from the trauma, causal connection between 
the accident and the disease is sufficiently established .... (P. · 503) 
... Since their statements [those of plaintiff's two experts] exhibit no abso-
lute contradiction respecting the fundamental issue, it was legally competent 
evidence and was properly submitted to the jury. (P. 503) 
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Payne v. Charndler, 41 Ga. App. 385, 153 S.E. g6 (1930). In this case the court 
pointed out that the mere fact that one event chronologically follows another is alone 
insufficient to establish a causal relationship between them. In a remarkably elliptical 
opinion the court merely stated : . 
. . . Evidence that a woman suffered a pain in her heart and other physical 
ailments after having swallowed a liquid, the nature and character of which 
does not appear except that it was suitable for use as a hypodermic by a 
dentist while operating in a person's mouth and possessed a bitter and dis-
agreeable taste, is, in the absence of evidence as to any facts tending to show 
a causal relation between the woman's physical condition and the swallowing 
of the liquid, insufficient to authorize an inference of fact that her condition 
was caused by the swallowing and the ill tasting effects of the liquid. (P. 386) 
Ramberg v. Morgan, 209 Iowa 474, 218 N.W. 492 (1928). In this case plaintiff's 
intestate was struck by an automobile. He was brought by the driver of the auto-
mobile to the police station. In response to a call, the doctor, an assistant police 
surgeon, arrived at the station. about an hour after the acCident. He found decedent 
on the floor of a cell in an unconscious condition. The doctor examined decedent. 
He diagnosed the case as intoxication, stating that he found no evidence of head 
injury. He left decedent, still unconscious, lying on the floor of the cell, and did not 
see him again. Decedent remained unconscious· for six hours; thirty-one hours later 
he was taken home in a stupor, complaining of .an "awful headache." His condition 
became worse, and he died four days after the accident. 
Autopsy revealed a fracture of the sutures of the parietal and occipital bones near 
the base of the skull and indicated that decedent had died as a result of anemia of the 
brain, or medullary edema, due to pressure of fluid inside the skull. 
I~ bringing action against the doctor for negligence, the plaintiff did not plead that 
the doctor's omission caused, aggravated, or accelerated. the death, but apparently 
alleged that in all probability the decedent's life could have been saved had defendant 
exercised reasonable care and skill, and that this omission was the efficient and 
proximate cause of the death. · 
All the medical experts who testified suggested but one proper course of procedure 
when confronted with a situation such as this. Apparently there was ample variance 
between such a procedure and the doctor's examination. The supreme court held that 
the trial court was justifiedin overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict and 
submitting the issue of breach of the standard of care to the jury. 
The principal issue on appeal was that· involving cause-in-fact. The . court pointed 
out that: · 
The only recognized standard in such cases is essentially within the domain of 
expert testimony .... Nor is the value of expert opinion to be determined 
by col!llting noses, as in this case two physicians were called by the plaintiff, 
and three by the defendant, to testify on the proximate cause .of death .. 
But, if plaintiff's own medical experts are in doubt, and could not, on the 
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hypothetical question put to them, state with any reasonable certainty that the 
death of decedent was aggravated or accelerated by the negligence of the 
defendant, how could a court or jury determine such proposition? (Pp. 481-82) 
By way of establishing the general rule the court stated : 
. There must be causal connection between death of plaintiff's intestate and the 
negligence of the defendant, as alleged. There must be something more than 
a showing that the evidence is consistent with plaintiff's theory of the cause of 
death. The evidence must be such as to make that theory reasonably probable 
-not merely possible-and more probable than any other hypothesis based on 
such evidence. (P. 482) 
The court stated that "it was necessary for the jury to find, upon proper evidence, 
that the death of the decedent would not have occurred on January 25, 1g26 (the 
4th day), . but for the alleged negligence charged against the defendant." ( P. 483) 
All of defendant's experts testified that the head injury was the cause of death; plain-
tiff's witnesses testified that "the cause of death ... was problematic"; that they did 
not know whether anything the doctor did or failed to do, caused the death, or that 
decedent would have lived if he had received other treatment. One of plaintiff's 
witnesses, in response to a hypothetical question containing the conditions and pro-
cedures of the doctor's examination and asking if they "probably accelerated his . 
(decedent's) death, answered, "I would have to answer, in any o11e case, I don't know 
as I could say. I would say in a series of cases that this sort of treatment would 
probably accelerate or possibly cause some of them to die sooner." (P. 485) (Em-
phasis added.) 
In discussing the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses the court stated: 
It may be stated further that both of these experts, in answering the hypo-
thetical question, stated that a person receiving a traumatic injury who lived 
48 hours or more had a. better chance of life, but admitted that the law of 
probability as applied to any particular individual in a class is "a mere guess." 
Dr. Carney testified: • 
"There may be ninety-nine out of a hundred who receive a certain injury 
that are going to die, and one may recover ; but nothing in those statistics 
enables one to tell which one is going to be the fortunate one. I believe that 
this man did have a severe brain injury, and a severe brain injury causes death 
at times, in the face of the exercise of highest degree of skill and care." 
It is sufficient to say that a physician, called as an expert, does not make 
a prognosis on statistics, because no two cases are alike; and plaintiff's experts 
could not say that, in any particular case, the fact that the patient lived 44 
or 48 hours after the shock proved that he was not going to die. Damages 
may not be predicated on statistics of the character offered in the instant case. 
( P. 486) (Emphasis added.) 
The court held that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that 
causation was not shown should have been sustained and reversed a judgment for the 
pla4ltiff. 
Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 145 La. 8os, 83 So. 19 (1919). The 
plaintiff was injured by a fall from a railway car of the defendant. At the time of his 
death he was afBicted with both a cancer and tuberculosi~. Autopsy revealed the cause· 
of the death to be cancer. In disposing of this case in the plaintiff's favor the court said: 
Their [the medical experts] testimony is to the effect that tuberculosis was 
not the cause of Mr. Thompson's death; and that the real cause of his death 
was a malignant tumor, or cancer, which had resulted from a trauma or blow 
apparently inflicted about the time of the accident to him, as before. described. 
They say, in effect, that such a malignant tumor as Mr. Thompson had results 
from a blow, as a. rule, and that it generally attains its full growth and does 
its deadly work within 12 to 18 months' time; in just about the time between 
the day of, the accident to Mr. Thompson and the day of his death. (P. 813) 
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Travelers Insurance Co. v. Donovan, 125 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1954). Action by 
an insurer to set aside an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act (33 U.S.C.A. 
901 et seq.) made by the .defendant as deputy commissioner. The claimant (to whom 
the award was made) was employed by the American Red Cross in Washington, D. C., 
and later assigned to duty in Kyoto, Japan. While at Kyoto she contracted tuberculosis. 
Under the stipulated facts: 
(a) Kyoto 
(b) Washington, D. C. 
1951-incidence of TB 
1952-incidence of TB 
1951-incidence of TB 





The Act provides : "Presumptions-In any proceeding for enforcement of a claim 
for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial 
evidence to the contrary-(a) That the claim comes within the provision of this 
chapter." (33 USCA 920) Claimant did not have tuberculosis when she went to 
Japan. The question presented was whether it was reasonable for the defendant to 
reach the conclusion that the claimant's tuberculosis was contracted not only during 
the employment but out of the employment, because there was an aggravated risk as 
a result of being sent to work in an area with a comparatively high incidence rate? 
Judgment for claimant. 
To a certain extent it must be realized that the inference drawn by the 
Deputy Commissioner results from the weighing of probabilities. It may well 
be that in an action for damages governed by the principles of the common 
law the cau.sal relationship between the employment and the tuberculosis could 
not be deemed to have been sufficiently established. Different principles govern 
claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act, however. It is for the Com-
missioner to draw inferences from the evidence, and here the facts are stipu-
lated and not in dispute. 
The court is of the opinion that the inference drawn by the Deputy Com-
misioner is not so unreasonable and is not so lacking in being founded on 
substantial evidence as to justify any interference on the part of the court. 
(Pp. 62-63) (Emphasis added.) 
On appeal (221 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1955)) the insurer claimed that the award was 
void because it was based on speculation and conjecture and was not substantiated by 
the facts. The court held that the sole fact of the higher incidence of tuberculosis in 
Kyoto than in the District of Columbia "cannot support the inference drawn by 
defendant that claimant sustained such an occupational disease or infection as arose 
naturally out of her employment." Judgment for claimant was affirmed. The employ-
ment sent the claimant to Japan. The statute created a presumption for the benefit of 
the claimant. Absent substantial evidence to the contrary, a disability occurring in the 
course of employment must be presumed to have arisen therefrom. The court of 
appeals admitted that it is conceivable that the incidence of the disease in both places 
was so minimal as to require the conclusion that the 5-fold ratio was itself de minimis. 
But since the insurer offered no proof to that effect, the court could derive no such 
conclusion from its inspection of the record. The court concluded that it was entirely 
reasonable to infer, under all the circumstances, that the plaintiff contracted the disease 
by her contacts with the population of that country, infected as it was to a higher 
degree than that of the District of Columbia. 
Voccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. E.D. Pa. 1955). Plaintiff 
sustained injuries as a result of defendant's negligence when he was struck under the 
armpit by a heavy wire cable. The injuries were alleged to consist of a wrenching 
and stretching of the muscles and ligaments of the shoulder and an aggravation of a 
pre-existing chronic inflammation inside the shoulder joint. The plaintiff also alleged 
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that the injury aggravated a pre-existing heart condition. The jury gave a verdict 
of $25,000, which the defendant claimed to be grossly excessive in that there was no 
sufficient showing of causal connection between the accident and the heart condition. 
An expert witness testified: 
... "Well, I believe that this strain of the accident, and what trauma he 
received during the accident, most likely contributed to a myocardial infarct. 
"I think it is impossible to state positively the extent to which the accident 
contributed towards Dr. Vaccaro's present condition .... I came to the con-
clusion that the myocardial infarct, ... was probably or, possibly-/ think 
possibly-was due to the emotional upset and trauma produced by the accident." 
Q. " ... [I]sn't it true that the myocardial infarction that we are discussing 
·now is a frequent and common complication of the hypertensive and arterial 
sclerotic heart condition, with added emphysema, that Dr. Vaccaro suffered 
from,· which has no connection with the accident?" A. "That is correct." 
Q. "So that is the reason ... that you use the word 'possibly' in your opinion 
concerning the causal connection?" A. ·"That is right. I wish I could use the 
word 'probably' for Dr. Vaccaro's benefit." (P. 13) (Emphasis added.) 
The court remanded the case for a new trial, feeling the judgment to be grossly 
excessive. 
"In order to link [the] impaired physical condition to the defendant's con-
duct, the plaintiff was forced to depend on expert medical testimony because 
scientific knowledge was required for the elucidation of the question. * * * 
Moreover the expert has to testify, not that the condition of claimant might 
ha.ve, or even probably did, come from the accident, but tha.t in his professional 
opinion the result in question came from the cause alleged. A less direct 
expression of opinion falls below the required standard of proof and does not 
constitute legally competent evidence." (P. 14) (Emphasis added.) 
Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Seru. Co., 362 Mo. 648, 243 S.W.2d 92 (1951). When 
four weeks pregnant, the plaintiff was injured in a collision, for which the defendant 
was responsible. For a number of years prior to the accident she had suffered rheu-
matic heart disease with mitral stenosis, which was permanent and progressive. The 
baby was delivered uneventfully and in a healthy condition. 
The verdict for plaintiff was attacked on the ground that the court permitted the 
jury to award damages for permanent injuries when there was no substantial evidence 
of any permanent injury being proximately caused by the accident. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed upon remittitur of $4,000 of a $14.000 award. 
An expert who examined plaintiff one year after the accident testified that where 
an aggravated heart disease of this type and extent is aggravated by any cause, the 
combination would make it worse; that he could not tell how much the accident had 
shortened plaintiff's life; that plaintiff would require treatment for the rest of her life; 
that pregnancy and childbirth throw a burden on the heart. Another expert testified 
that plaintiff's rheumatic heart disease, mitral stenosis and congestive heart failure 
were permanent and apt to . shorten her life; that it was unusual for a woman of 
plaintiff's age (37) to have so severe a condition; that congestive heart failure does 
result from mitral stenosis, but many who have mitral stenosis do not have congestive 
heart fail~re; that plaintiff's early heart failure was a result of mitnil stenosis but 
that the accident might have been the precipitating event; that where mitral stenosis 
exists, heart failure could and probably would result at any time; that any sudden 
and unexpected occurrence may precipitate congestive heart failure; that plaintiff's 
pregnancy possibly speeded up the development of congestive heart failure but that 
ordinarily where congestive heart failure occurs from pregnancy alone it does not 
occur until the 6th or 7th month, while the diagnosis of plaintiff's congestive condition 
was made in the 4th month of her pregnancy; that plaintiff's condition has become 
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progressively worse since before the accident; and that plaintiff's life expectancy was 
two years. He also said, "I feel that it [the accident] has probably speeded up the 
course of her development of congestive heart failure."· (Emphasis added.) Prior to 
the accident plaintiff was able to do her housework. Since the accident she was not 
able to do so. The court said : 
... [W]e are not overlooking the facts: that plaintiff's doctors testified that 
mitral stenosis would probably cause congestive heart failure independent of 
any aggravation suffered at the time of the accident; that one of plaintiff's 
doctors testified that the aggravation caused by the accident would last not 
more than 8 months. . . . ; that the accident might have caused congestive 
heart failure; that plaintiff's pregnancy possibly speeded up the development 
of congestive heart failure; that any shock might cause congestive heart fail-
ure; that mitral stenosis probably would result in congestive heart failure 
without the intervention of an accident or other shock. (P. 656) 
We think there was an expert opinion sufficiently definite to constitute sub-
stantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that the accident 
hastened the development of congestive heart failure. When the entire testi-
mony of Dr. Stubbs is considered, and when his various "might", "may", 
"could", "would", "possibly", and "probably" statements are analyzed with 
reference to the manner in which they relate to each other and to his total 
testimony, we believe that Dr. Stubbs did give his expert opinion that the 
accident ... hastened, or caused sooner than would otherwise have been 
the case, congestive heart failure. (P. 656) 
It will be noted that this statement came after the doctor had testified to the 
possibilities and probabilities of other causes. Dr. Stubbs conceded that 
whether the accident ... hastened or speede~ up congestive heart failure was 
necessarily somewhat speculative; he conceded that plaintiff's pregnancy 
possibly speeded up the development of congestive heart failure; he stated that 
the accident might have been the thing that precipitated the congestive heart 
failure; he conceded that mitral stenosis could or would have caused it inde-
pendent of any accident or other shock ; but after conceding all this, the doctor 
then, based upon his examination and upon the facts related to him, was of 
the opinion that the aggravation caused by the accident in turn brought on 
congestive heart failure sooner than such condition would have resulted but 
for the accident .... Where, as here, it may be determined from the testimony 
that the doctor was expressing his expert opinion as to the cause of a condi-
tion, the form of language used will not deprive the statement of its evi-
dentiary value. (P. 657) 
. It is well established that before recovery may be h~d for permanent injuries, 
the permanency of the injuries must be shown with reasonable certainty and 
likewise that the causation of such permanent injuries must be shown with 
reasonable certainty; and when evidence goes only to the extent of showing 
that a certain condition might or could have been caused by one of two causes 
for only one of which defendant is liable, such is not a substantial showing of 
which of the causes produced the condition and furnishes no basis from which 
a jury may reasonably find the cause. (P. 658). 
Williams v. Reading Co., 175 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1949). The plaintiff's decedent was 
last seen, apparently asleep, in the car of the defendant's local train pulling out of 
station X, where he should have alighted. The next terminal was Y, and as the train 
was pulling away from it a trainman announced that Z terminal was next. It was 
shown that as the train left Y terminal, and when it reached Z terminal, the doors on 
the right side of the train were open. Before the train reached Z terminal, it made a 
stop at an intermediate crossing, A, to allow a train bound in .. the opposite direction to 
cross ahead of it and proceed upon a tr;1ck immediately to the right of the track upon 
which the decedent's train was traveling. It was dark at the time that the decedent 
was last seen, and still dark when he was found the next morning, lying alongside 
the tracks at a point near the intermediate stop of the previous evening. It was stipu-
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lated that the decedent had suffered a fractured skull. The defendant offered no 
evidence. 
Under Pennsylvania law the plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of having exer-
cised due care. Also it had been decided by the supreme court of that state that if a 
train, after the announcement of the next stop, stops short of or beyond that station, 
and no warning of the fact is given to the passengers, such omission is a negligent 
act on the part of the carrier. 
The lower court rendered a verdict non obstante veredicto in favor of the defend-
ant, saying that the evidence was too inconclusive to show causation since decedent 
could have left the train at either terminal Y or Z and have been walking along the 
tracks when struck by a train, or that voluntarily or involuntarily he might have fallen 
from the train while in motion, as a result of pure accident or illness. No evidence 
was adduced to substantiate any of these alternative theories. 
In reversing and remanding with directions to enter a judgment for the plaintiff 
on the jury verdict, the court pointed out that the plaintiff's proof, considered in the 
best light, need not eliminate every possible cause other than the one on which he 
relies, but only such causes, if any, as fairly arise from· the evidence. Moreover, the 
court stated that the presumption of due care remains in the case where there is no 
evidence offered by either side to offset it. For this reason the court felt that the jury 
was justified in finding that decedent did not leave the train while in motion and that 
he did not leave at either terminal Y or Z and walk along the tracks at night. There-
fore, the court felt that the jury might find that the plaintiff's decedent left the train 
as a result of the clearly negligent act of the defendant, and that as a result of his 
having done so, he was struck and killed by the southbound train on the adjacent track. 
Wood v. Joyce Co., 228 App. Div. 729, 239 N. Y. Supp. IIO (1930). While in the 
employ of the defendant, the claimant fell from a stepladder. He continued his work 
as a carpenter during the rest of the day and for three weeks thereafter. Then, while 
at work, he suddenly became blind in his right eye. A medical examination disclosed 
a detached retina. The eye had been bloodshot after the accident and there had been 
some pain and blurring of vision. The defendant employer appealed from an award 
granted to the claimant. 
In reversing and setting aside the award, the court pointed out that identification of 
the blindness with the earlier accident must depend upon medical testimony. While 
some of the experts had eliminated practically every other cause, except the accident, 
all of them hesitated to express a definite opinion that the origin of the detached 
retina was the accident. They merely said it was "possible." The court held that in 
the absence of other evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion, this was not sufficient. 
(c) Kinds of Evidence Used 
( i) Circumstantial 
Because so many factors ordinarily enter into the determination of the 
causes of a particular physical ailment, it is not surprising that use of 
circumstantial evidence is so prominent in cases involving personal in-
juries. While it is impossible to catalogue the kinds of circumstantial 
evidence that have been accepted as helping to prove causation, there are 
some that stand out, particularly those dealing with the development 
of cancer after a trauma. Apparently good health prior to impact not 
only is properly admitted to show causation but it seems to be fairly 
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persuasive.929 On the other hand, lack of prior good health does not seem 
to show lack of causation.980 Another type of circumstantial evidence 
of considerable effectiveness in many cases is the near coincidence of the 
time of impact and the appearance of physical symptoms in the plain-
tiff's case, and in medical experience generally in such cases.931 The 
coincidence of the injury manifesting itself at the exact point of impact 
of the force set in motion by the defendant also has been given con-
siderable weight in several cases.932 
(ii) Expert Testimony 
As indicated previously _in discussing the malpractice cases involving 
radiation injuries,933 the language in the opinions is not consistent as to 
whether in areas involving scientific information it is necessary for the 
plaintiff to produce expert witnesses if he is to recover. It seems a fair 
generalization, however, that there are many cases in which the evidence 
so obviously points to causation from the force put in motion by the 
defendant that even a lay jury can rationally conclude without expert 
testimony that causation has been proved. But, once the evidence gets 
into the doubtful area, where it is of a technical or scientific nature, a 
plaintiff would be foolhardy to pass up the privilege of using expert 
witnesses. Certainly in radiation cases many questions of causation will 
necessarily involve evidence which only specially trained people can give 
and interpret. Cases dealing with biological causation in personal injury 
situations seem to bear this out.93' Even in those jurisdictions in which 
cases are found saying that expert testimony is not necessary it is per-
fectly clear in general that it is admissible.985 Whether the testimony 
929 See the Comeau, Combrooks, and Menarde cases, Stt/Wa Table of Cases at end 
of previous section. 
930 See the Thompson, Ingersoll, Magazine, Vaccaro, and Walker cases, mpra Table 
of Cases at end of previous section. Chronological coincidence rejected in suit for 
damage to sheep from A-bomb test; Bulloch v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. 
Utah, 1956). 
931 See the Charlton, Cornbrooks, Lee, Louisville, McAllister, Menarde, Payne, 
Thompson, Walker, and Wood cases, mpra Table of Cases at end of previous section. 
932 See the Charlton, Lee, Louisville, Menarde cases, S14Jwa Table of Cases at end of 
previous section. 
933 Supra discussion at notes 186 ff. 
934 See the Bearman, Comeau, Harris, Kramer, Vaccaro, and Wood cases, S'Upra 
Table of Cases at end of previous section. See also Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor 
Institute, 102 Cal. App.2d 293, 227 P.2d 473 (1951); Goodwin v. Misticos, 207 Miss. 
361, 42 So.2d 397 (1949). · 
9SG See the Cole and Menarde cases, mpra Table of Cases at end of previous section. 
See also Stanley Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 304, 108 A.2d 616 (1954). 
Cf. Bucher case, mpra Table of Cases at end of previous section, opinion at 6n-12: 
"The testimony of experts •.. which to this court seems unjust or excessive." 
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given in the particular case by the expert witnesses is sufficient to support 
the claims of the plaintiff or defendant is a question that ordinarily is 
left to the jury, although occasionally an appellate court will rule that 
the evidence was too speculative and tenuous to justify the jury's 
finding. 986 
(iii) The Use of Statistics, Scientific Treatises, 
and Other Scientific Data 
There are many cases in which the use of statistics, treatises, and sci-
entific data, which for the most part come clearly within the definition 
of hearsay evidence, has nevertheless been permitted. In such cases it 
frequently has happened that the validity of such evidence either has not 
been argued or the question has been ignored by the appellate court. 987 
There is considerable disagreement among the courts, however, as to 
whether it is proper to use such testimony. It is inevitable that the use 
of such material, with or without the use of experts to explain it, will 
become so important in radiation cases that its availability under the 
legal rules of hearsay and the limitations on the use of such material can-
not be ignored. 
The principal objection to the use of medical treatises and statistics 
to prove the likelihood of future injury is that it violates the hearsay 
rule. Where the fact to be proved with reasonable certainty is the future 
manifestation of an injurious impact, and statistical evidence is intro-
duced to show that under similar circumstances the condition ultimately 
has occurred in a certain number of cases out of the total number of 
cases investigated, the defendant can argue that the evidence is hearsay, 
except in the rare instance in which the witness giving the testimony 
personally has investigated all of the cases. The argument is that the 
witness is unable to testify from personal knowledge as to both the ac-
curacy of the statistics generally and as to the accuracy of the diagnosis 
of the individual cases specifically. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
the use of such evidence deprives the opposing party of his right and 
opportunity to cross-examine so as to test the validity of such statistics. 
Wigmore, in addition to the above stated argument against the admis-
sion of learned treatises on medicine as evidence, has pointed out several 
other arguments which have been asserted from time to time with some 
988 See the Bearman, Bucher, Comeau, and Kramer cases, s11pra Table of Cases at 
end of previous section. 
9 8 7 See the Boland, Bucher, Harris, Louisville, and Ramberg cases, supra Table of 
Cases at end of previous section. 
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success: (I) That "science is shifting," that experiment and discovery 
continually are altering scientific theories and. rendering them obsolete, 
that there is no general agreement among scientists, and that testimony 
characterized by such instability and uncertainty is untrustworthy; ( 2) 
that there is danger of confusing the jury by reading technical passages 
to them without explanatory comment; (3) that passages may be used 
unfairly by quoting them out of context; and ( 4) that the truths of 
medicine are to be sought chiefly in the personal experience of physi-
cians.938 Wigmore's answer to these four objections is summary to 
the point of being contemptuous. Both the danger of confusing the jury 
and quoting out of context can be remedied easily by the use of expert 
witnesses and the alertness of opposite counsel. The fourth objection is 
simply ridiculous, for it does not conform to the facts of the twentieth 
century. As to the first of the four objections, if the proponent is en.; 
tirely consistent he would have to insist that the witness stand be denied 
to all scientific experts except the most up-to-date researchers, and even 
such opinions would be suspeCt since they might become obsolete tomor-
row, In addition, science seldom refutes itself and the fact that it is an 
evolutionary discipline, constantly improving its methods of observation 
and the abstractions drawn from them, does not mean that it is "uncer-' 
tain.'' If this is uncertainty, then the law itself is chaos. 
In any event, such evidence generally is admissible, as it should be. 939 
ssBWigmore, Evidence §169o (3d ed. 1940). 
939 /d. at §66sb, where the author says: "The data of every science are enormous in 
scope and variety. No one professional man can know from personal observation more 
than a minute fraction of the data which he must every day treat as working truths. 
Hence a reliance on the reported data of fellow-scientists, learned by perusing their 
reports in books and journals. The law must and does accept this kind of knowledge 
from scientific men. On the one hand, a mere layman, who comes to court and alleges 
a fact which he has learned only by reading a medical or a mathematical book, cannot 
be heard. But, on the other hand, to reject a professional physician or mathematician 
because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known to him only upon the 
authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of professional work and 
to insist on finical and impossible standards. 
"Yet it is not easy to express in usable form that element of professional competency 
which distinguishes the latter case from the former. In general, the considerations 
which define the latter are (a) a professional experience, giving the witness a knowl-
edge of the trustworthy authorities and the proper source of information, (b) an ex-
tent of personal observation in the general subject, enabling him to estimate the 
general plausibility, or probability of soundness, of the views expressed, (c) the impos-
sibility of obtaining information on the particular technical detail except through re-
ported data in part or entirely. The true solution must be to trust the discretion of the 
trial judge, exercised in the light of the nature of the subject and of the witness' equip-
ments. The decisions show in general a liberal attitude in receiving technical testimony 
based on professional reading." 
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Courts frequently have accepted such evidence indirectly through an 
expert's testimony; for example, when the expert witness admitted that 
his knowledge that formaldehyde in milk was injurious was acquired, 
not from experiments, but wholly from reading, study, and conversa-
tions with other physicians, 9' 0 when two physicians in a criminal case 
admitted they derived their knowledge on the subject of poisons solely 
from medical books,u1 when a professor of geology based his testimony 
on "what I have read and the information I gathered from discussions 
with numerous geologists, and from my own observations," 9 ' 2 when a 
professor of science (mathematics and philosophy) used U. S. Coast 
and Geodetic Survey Maps in his calculations,948 when a professor of 
In a subsequent passage Wigmore goes on to say, in §687: "To deny the competency 
of a physician who does not know his facts from persotlal observation alone is to re-
ject medical testimony almost in its entirety. To allow any physician to testify who 
claims to know solely by personal experience is to appropriate the witness-stand to 
impostors. Medical science is a mass of transmitted and collated data from numerous 
quarters; the generalizations which are the result of one man's personal observation 
exclusively are the least acceptable of all. The law must recognize the methods of 
medical science. It cannot stultify itself by establishing, for judicial inquiries, a rule 
never considered necessary by the medical profession itself. It is enough for a physician, 
testifying as to medical fact, that he is by training and occupation a physician; whether 
his source of information for that particular fact is in part or entirety the hearsay of 
his fellow-practitioners and investigators, is immaterial." 
9 ' 0 Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 62 N.E. 40 ( 1901), where the court said, at 528: 
"Courts have never undertaken to set up a standard of scientific knowledge by which 
competency of a witness may be determined, and have not gone to the extent of hold-
ing that a scientific witness can only testify from facts learned by him from personal 
demonstration. The general rule, in such cases, in this State at least, seems to be that 
where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, ob-
servation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his 
opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify, leaving to the trial court, in the exer-
cise of a sound discretion, the right to say when such knowledge is shown, and to the 
jury the right to say what the opinion is worth; ... " · 
941 Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40, 39 S.E. 897 (1901), where the court makes the 
following distinction, at 43 : "Books of science and art are not admissible in evidence 
to prove the opinions of experts therein expressed. . . . But, notwithstanding the in-
admissibility of the books, the opinions contained therein may come to the jury through 
the mouth of an expert witness." 
9 ' 2 Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). 
9'3 Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 
181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943). The court said, at 298-99: "It is a familiar rule of 
evidence that a witness, in order to qualify as an expert, should have such special 
knowledge of the subject on which he is to testify that he can give the jury assistance 
in solving a problem for which their equipment of average knowledge is inadequate. 
... It is not a ground for excluding the testimony of an expert that he bases his state-
ments in whole or in part upon what he has read, provided that his reading can be as-
sumed to constitute part of his general knowledge adequate to enable him to form a 
reasonable opinion of his own .... The knowledge of an expert in any science or art 
would be extremely limited if it extended no further than inferences from happenings 
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mechanical and aeronautical engineering admitted that his calculations 
of the train's speed were based on experiments on similar train brakes 
and coefficients of friction, wind, and grade resistance to be found in 
handbooks on the subject,944 and when a medical expert, who had made 
a blood test on the defendant and qualified as an expert in matters of 
blood tests and intoxication, in testifying as to a drunkometer test, stated 
this his conclusions were "accepted by physiologists." 94~ 
There is a striking similarity between cases involving the use of 
statistics to relate the alcoholic content of the blood to nervous response 
and cases involving future probability of injury from known dosages 
of radiation. The similarity becomes even closer when, as in the Toms 
case,948 statistics are offered which correlate the intake of liquor with 
the blood alcoholic content, which, in turn, is correlated with the degree 
of intoxication. Assuming, for example, that similar statistics could 
be obtained that correlate radiation dosage with the extent of ioniza-
tion in the cell, and this latter figure to such pathological effects as 
leukemia or cancer, there does not appear to be any reason why they 
would not be just as acceptable. to prove the ultimate fact as are the 
statistics in the drunkometer cases. The one is no more hearsay than the 
other. The "necessity" for admitting such evidence is just as great in 
the irradiation cases as in the intoxication cases, and there is no greater 
"circumstantial probability of trustworthiness" in the latter than in the 
former. It is even doubtful if individual variation is any greater in the 
one than the other, and in the Toms case the court said : · 
... [T]he competency of such evidence is not at all impaired 
because some persons yield more readily than other [ s] to the 
deleterious effects of intoxicants. That fact may lessen the 
weight of the expert testimony with the jury, but it cannot be 
employed to exclude it.9" 
within his own experience. His testimony is admitted because it is based on his special 
knowledge derived not only from his own experience, but also from the experiments 
and reasoning of others, communicated by personal association or through books or 
other sources. . . . His testimony was ad,missible, even though no maps or other records 
of the Geodetic Survey were produced at the trial." 
&44 Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214. 123 P.2d 224 (1942), 
where the court said, at 223: "His technical knowledge in respect to the subject was 
reasonably calculated to enable him to give a considered appraisal to the values estab-
lished by other recognized experts by actual experiments in answering the questions 
propounded. 'The judgment of a skilled witness testifying as an expert may be based, 
in part at least, upon the results of experiments made by himself or others.' " 
94~ State v~ Haner, 231 Iowa 348, 349, 1 N.W.zd 91 (1941). See also State v. Wer-
ling, 234 Iowa II09, 12 N.W.2d 318 (1944); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 
909 (1950); Toms v. State, 239 P.2d 812 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952). 
946 Supra note 945· 
947 ld. at 819-20. 
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Actually in a number of cases discussed subsequently in the section on 
future injuries, 948 the physician's prognosis of future injury was based 
largely upon the histories of similar injuries. In the Alberti case,949 
the court allowed testimony of a physician as to the resulting life ex- . 
pectancy of the injured plaintiff, when the physician stated that he could 
only estimate the probable length of this period from histories of similar 
cases. In the Cordiner case,950 both the physician and the court referred 
to similar cases as being the basis of a prognosis as to future injury. 
The physician testifying in the Riggs case 951 referred to the experience 
of the profession when he said, "It is very frequent that we even find 
epilepsy; traumatic epilepsy, as we call it, following a severe brain in-
jury." The expert in the Coover case 952 testified that "our medical 
literature is full of cases of cancer-carcinoma, that have developed 
upon a senile skin following an X-ray burn." Some of the cases dealing 
with the meaning of reasonable certainty, discussed below, include 
references to statistics known to a professional group. 
On the other hand, the problem of direct admission of scientific source 
material as evidence (e.g., statistics) presents greater difficulty than does 
its indirect admission through an expert's testimony. In discussing the 
subject of "learned treatises" as an exception to the hearsay rule, Wig-
more has stated that they have obtained complete recognition on common 
law principles in only two jurisdictions-Alabama and Iowa. 958 Initial 
statutory efforts to admit such evidence in some seven or eight states 
met with hostile judicial attitudes, but the recent and more carefully 
drafted enactments of Massachusetts, Nevada, and Pennsylvania appear 
to preclude too much judicial obstruction.9 H Wigmore feels that, in 
the discretion of the court, published scientific opinions of recognized 
authorities should be admissible.955 As he points out: 
It has long been unquestioned that standard tables of mortality 
(used in computing annuities, life-insurance sums, dower, and 
damages for loss of 1i fe), and almanacs are admissible in evi-
dence. The occasional controversy has arisen, not over the 
present principle, but over the question how far the probability 
of life-expectation in the average should be taken by the jury 
to measure the probability for a particular decedent. 
948 Infra discussion beginning at note g81. 
949 Infra note 995· 
950 Infra note 1015. 
951 Infra note 1020. 
052 Supra note 452· 
95s Wigmore, Evidence §1693 (3d ed. 1940). 
954 Ibid. 
9ss !tJ. at §§r6gr-g2. 
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It is doubtful whether a general rule in favor of standard 
tables of scientific calculations of all sorts can be regarded as 
established; but rulings tending in that direction are found. 
These almanacs and mortality tables have been explained 
to be admissible because they are founded on "certain and 
constant data" and deal with the "exact sciences." But the 
notion that every collection of figures savors of the exact sci-
ences is sufficiently discredited at the present day. In fact, 
some of these particular tables have been among the least trust-
worthy of scientific efforts. . . . The simple fact is that the 
admission of a certain class of statistics was demanded by · 
custom and practical convenience, and the judicial mind re-
lented. Thus, a system of mere probabilities and working 
averages is not found wanting in qualities entitling it to be 
placed before the jury; while the substance of other collections 
of data, possessing at least equal inductive value, made with 
equal or greater thoroughness, sifted, arranged, and stated by 
trained observers, is by the same discriminating authority 
relegated to the limbo of hearsay and other judicial abomina-
tions. The error has lain, not in looking too leniently upon 
mortality tables, but in a misconception of the true qualities of 
other scientific work. 956 
As an early Iowa court put it : 
... [A]n appeal to medical authorities has been disallowed 
by some of the courts in this country; though physicians, 
when testifying, are permitted to refer to medical authors, and 
to quote their opinions from memory. Being permitted to 
refer to and quote authors, we can see no good reason why 
they may not read the views and opinions of distinguished 
authors. The opinions of an author, as contained in his works, 
we regard as better evidence than the mere statement of his 
opinions by a witness, who testifies as to his recollection of 
them from former reading. Is not the latter secondary to the 
former? On the whole, we think it the safest rule to admit 
standard medical books as evidence of the author's opinions 
upon questions of medical skill or pract.ice, involved in a 
triaP51 · 
455 
Perhaps in the ordinary situation, it does not make too much dif-
ference whether or not the contents of "learned treatises" on science 
are directly admissible as evidence, so long as the courts either let a 
qualified expert testify as to their substance or allow him to express 
opinions based on principles and probabilities that are necessarily hear-
say knowledge. In general, the expert should be adquate to this task, 
956 !d. at §1698. 
957 Bowman v. Woods, 1 G. Greene 441, 445 (Iowa 1848). 
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especially when he has been forewarned by counsel as to the course of 
questioning. Accurate and exhaustive scientific statistics, however, do 
not lend themselves to this sort of treatment. No expert can be expected 
to memorize the statistics of life expectancy or a table of logarithms, 
or coefficients of friction, to mention only a few, and the courts, where 
the admission of such evidence is "demanded by custom and practical 
convenience," have relented. Perhaps the real reason behind this judicial 
inertia is not really an objection to hearsay evidence, but because of a 
judicial reluctance to clutter up the trial with a lot of material that the 
court feels can be more expeditiously presented as oral testimony. As 
soon as· there is something positive to be gained by the direct admis-
sion of medical and scientific statistics generally rather than by having 
an expert paraphrase them, the courts perhaps will disregard the hear-
say prohibition. That point will be reached when it becomes apparent 
that the statistics themselves are too complex to quote or paraphrase 
from memory, and, what is more important, when it becomes apparent 
that what a physician takes as being probable from the statistics and how 
the law uses "probable" may be quite different. 
(d) Use of Statistics in Personal Injury Cases 
Assuming the admissibility of properly authenticated scientific data 
of a statistical nature, what use has actually been made in litigated cases 
of such material? It is admissible in most jurisdictions, as indicated 
above, at least where such information is presented as the personal 
knowledge of an expert witness. It might have been expected, therefore, 
that there would be a considerable body of legal literature analyzing the 
probative value of such material to prove causation and extent of injury, 
or at least that there would be a considerable number of cases illustrating 
the use of such material. Yet a search of the digests, annotations, and 
periodical indexes proves singularly unrewarding, and a reading of 
those cases in which statistical evidence surely should have been used 
does not prove to be much more helpful. In personal injury cases and in 
the face of a clear attack on its probative value, generally the only time 
in which statistical data is used as such is in connection with the 
measurement of average life span to determine the length of continued 
pain and suffering or to measure the future earnings of a disabled 
plaintiff. Many of the cases discussed or cited above in the study of 
shortened life span 958 either expressly approved the use of such ma-
terial or by clear implication accepted the validity of statistical proof. 
958 Supra discussion at notes 482 ff. 
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Some of the cases even recognized clearly the need to relate all such 
statistical data to the particular fact situation rather than blindly accept 
the statistical average. There are a few cases in which the court clearly 
was aware of the statistical character of the evidence, but, in most in-
stances, the significance of this type of evidence or an appreciation of 
the value and the danger in its use has escaped recognition. Venturing 
a statistical guess where no statistics are. available, it is probable that 
in many, if not most, cases where legal as well as scientific conclusions 
are drawn, there is an underlying statistical basis used, albeit unknow-
ingly, because so many of our conclusions really are based upon proba-
bilities. The difficulty is that our probability assumptions are arrived 
at most unscientifically. 
A postulation of general legal rules is based, in a very fundamental 
way, on the use of a statistical type of data. Unfortunately, the law is in 
the habit of making such assumptions as to the validity of generalities 
by induction from groups of particulars assumed to be understood 
correctly, instead of doing s'o only after testing them for statistical 
validity. Whether or not lawyers recognize it, most of our legal observa-
tions and generalizations, as is true of observations and generalizations 
for other purposes, in reality are probable only, not certain. A doctor, 
for example, is seldom if ever able to observe the course of a certain 
physical phenomenon in a particular individual in its_cellular, molecular, 
or, in connection with radiation injuries, in the atomic or sub-atomic 
level at which nuclear energy operates; his understanding of the basic 
particulars of the condition is far from complete, and yet a prognosis in 
terms of probability, though not in terms of certainty, can be made by 
the doctor and is used by him, success fully in most cases, in taking medi-
cal· action. In making ~uch decisions, however, he must compare his 
observation and analysis of the various phenomena in the particular 
patient and reach his prediction on the basis of what his science teaches 
him has happened or is true in other similar situations. Most of his 
techniques of observation, experimentation, and isolation of factors 
in any complex phenomenon are essentially macroscopic, or, at best, 
microscopic. By comparing observations of enough similar situations, 
the doctor and the scientist as well make their evaluations and decide 
on courses of action on the basis of probabilities. The law must, or at 
least should, do likewise, because human affairs cannot wait for cer-
tainty. Lawyers should recognize, however, that the probabilities im-
plicit and fundamental in the affairs of men are, or at least should be, 
based upon an empirical foundation of statistics. Unfortunately the law 
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has tended to ignore the fact that its Aristotelian, two-valued concept of 
either right or wrong really is based on probability and, therefore, upon 
a little articulated and less understood statistical foundation. 
If the above thesis is correct, as we believe it to be, probably most of 
our cases involving personal injuries make use, although unknowingly, 
of statistical types of evidence. Usually the character of the evidence 
underlying the basic assumptions is obscured by the fact that it is the 
opinion of a living, speaking witness, or by "everyone knows" assump-
tiol)s on the part of the jury or the judge without any reasonable testing 
of the statistical validity of the assumptions made. In just a very few 
cases it is perfectly clear that statistical data in the raw form, with 
little or no help from an expert's statement to the effect that he is 
expressing his own personal opinion, has been used to justify proof of 
injury and causation. Most of the cases cited in the last section dealing 
with the use of circumstantial evidence, particularly those in which 
similarity of lapse of time between the impact and injury in the particu-
lar case and in similar cases was used as proof of causation,959 actually 
were using probabilities based on observation of similar situations, but 
the courts seem quite unaware of the fact that such conclusions were 
based on statistical probabilities. In those, cases in which the statements 
from medical texts and treatises have been admitted, again use is being 
made of statistically supported conclusions or statements. 960 
The most flagrant examples of drawing legally significant conclusions 
on the basis of assumed knowledge are the res ipsa loquitur cases. 961 
The assumptions in these cases usually are made without any attempt 
to test the validity of the statistical foundations supporting the probabili-
ties on which the use of res ipsa loquitur is justified. There are, of 
course, many other examples where a statistical type of evidence is used, 
such as in the determination of market value of listed stocks and bonds, 
or in cases where valuation is established by evidence which really is the 
composite of opinions of a large number of people or of numerous 
transactions. 962 Our concern is rather with the use of statistical evidence 
to prove causation, the extent of injury, or the biological processes in-
volved. Only a handful of cases have been found in this area which face 
squarely the issue of the validity of such statistical data. 
969 Supra note 931. 
96° Supra note 937· See also Bowman v. Woods·, supra note 957· 
961 Infra notes II46 ff. See also Malone, "Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact," 9 Stan. 
L. Rev. 6o, 61-64 (1956). 
962 Wigmore, Evidence §1704 (3d ed. 1940) ; an early example is Sisson v. Cleve-
land & Toledo R.R., 14 Mich. 489, 497 (1866) (newspaper market reports permitted). 
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One other type of case which often involves the use of material based 
on statistical information and the conclusions to be derived therefrom, 
is that in which standards formulated by national groups or by ad-
ministrative or statutory rules are used to prove either negligence or 
lack of negligence.963 A clear example of this use involving what 
basically is a conclusion as to probabilities grounded on a foundation of 
statistics, is Rakowski v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 964 In the construc-
tion and operation of X-ray fluoroscopic machines the setting up of safe 
limits for exposure of operators unquestionably is based on much 
clinical data from which statistical judgments are formed, even though 
the court actually does not look at the question of how the code standards 
are established. Such evidence was used in this case to show a lack of 
negligence rather than to prove causation of physical injury from ir-
radiation. 
Again, Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. J. H. Mohlman Co.966 is a 
case in which the court accepted what clearly was a conclusion based 
upon empirical data from ~hich the crushing strengths of different 
kinds of timber. were reached inductively. The question in the case 
turned upon whether the .building fell because of weakened timbers and 
before the fire or whether it fell as a result of the fire and so was covered 
by the insurance policy. The court permitted the introduction of reports 
from the United States Department of Agriculture, prepared by the 
Chief of the Division of Forestry, showing the results of two thousand 
tests of the crushing strength of timber. The report was stated to be 
by a recognized authority in the engineering profession. Also a table 
was introduced from an engineering treatise giving the crushing 
strength of timber. Similar tables from a third volume also were pre-
sented. The court said, in overruling objections to the use of this 
material: 
Under the rule contended for, that valuable information would 
be available for the use of a court of justice so long as the 
men who made the tests and prepared the tabulations were 
living and producible, but after their death or disappearance 
the information they had gathered would be lost to the court, 
although available for every one else in the community, and 
relied upon by engineers and builders whenever a new struc-
ture is in process of erection. Upon the precise point here pre-
sented the diligence of counsel has not succeeded in discovering 
9sa Supra discussion at notes 77 ff. 
964 Supra note 175. 
965 83 F. 8n (2d Cir. 1897). 
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a single authority. We feel, therefore, no hesitancy in so 
modifying the general rule as to hold that, where the sci-
entific work containing them is concededly recognized as a 
standard authority by the profession, statistics of mechanical 
experiments and tabulations of the results thereof may be read 
in evidence by an expert witness in support of his professional 
opinion, when such statistics and tabulations are generally re-
lied upon by experts in the particular field of the mechanic arts 
with which such statistics and tabulations are concerned.966 
The evidence apparently had been inserted to support the proposition 
in the complaint that the fire rather than failure of timbers had caused 
the fall, and the circuit court upheld judgment for the plaintiff. 
A considerably more hostile view was expressed by the Alabama 
court in Franklin v. State. 961 The case was a prosecution for bastardy 
and the jury had found the defendant to be the father. The use of sta-
tistical tables was put in issue by the defendant's objections to the trial 
court's refusal to allow counsel for defendant to use tables in cross-ex-
amining a physician who had been a state witness. The nature of the 
tables was not described other than they came from a volume on "clini-
cal obstetrics." The court· said : 
Relevant extracts from medical treatises are not in themselves 
self-proving but are admissible when recognized and approved 
by the medical profession as standard. . . . The volume in 
question was not shown to be a standard work or recognized 
authority on the subject at issue, and in the rejection by the 
court of the table there was no error.968 
While the court denied the use of such material because it was not a 
recognized work, it rather clearly assumed that tables from authorita-
tive works would be permitted. It is not possible from this opinion to 
tell whether the tables were to be used as proof or disproof of causation. 
The only cases found dealing directly with cause-in-fact of biological 
injury supported solely by evidence of probability based clearly and 
squarely on statistical data involve workmen's compensation situations. 
If these cases should be followed in ordinary tort situations (and on 
the cause-in-fact issue there should be no difference between workmen's 
compensation and ordinary torts), a whole new area of proof will be 
opened up applicable in the radiation cases as more scientific evidence 
is collected from experiments as to the causal relationship, in terms of 
probability, between amount of exposure and incidence of injury. 
966 ld. at 821-22. 
967 29 Ala. App. 3o6, 197 So. 55 (1940). 
968 I d. at Jo8. 
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In 1933 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Ayers 
v. H oage 969 decided a case arising under the Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The plaintiff claimed that he incurred tuberculosis 
"arising out of" his employment in a restaurant. The deputy com-
missioner denied recovery and the court sustained him. While there 
was no reference to statistical data as such, the court leaned very heavily 
on the testimony of two doctors, one of whom was an expert in tu-
berculosis cases, to the effect that tuberculosis could spread in many 
ways and "that he had not found that tuberculosis was a disease pe-
culiarly common to restaurant workers or to people waiting on tables; 
on the contrary, he had had only a few cases of people engaged in res-
taurant work. .. that there is no way of proving definitely where an 
individual contracts tuberculosis." 970 
The court made no reference to a decision by a California appellate 
court six years earlier. The California case, Fidelity & Casualty Co. of 
New York v. Industrial Accident Commission,911 was for compensation 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of claimant's 
husband from typhoid fever while on a trip to Chile. On his return 
by way of Peru, he took . sick and died. When they sent the em· 
ployee into the area, the employers were aware of the unsanitary condi-
tions and the resultant greater incidence of typhoid in both of these 
countries. In reviewing the compensation awards, the appellate court 
concluded that it could not say the commission's award was "not rea· 
sonably supported." 972 The court held that the commission reasonably 
could conclude from the evidence that the risk of contracting the disease 
was enough greater in these other countries that the disease was "proxi-
mately caused by the employment." Here the court very clearly was 
supporting a conclusion that exposure to an increased incidence situa-
tion as a result of employment can be used to meet the causation re-
quirement of "arising out of the employment." 
Of perhaps greater significance for our purpose is the case of MeAl· 
lister v. United States,918 decided in 1953. Under the Admiralty Act 
recovery could be had only on proof of negligence. In overruling the 
$8o,ooo award of the lower court for the injuries resulting from polio-
myelitis, the court of appeals assumed that negligence had been shown 
in not keeping the Chinese laborers more adequately segregated from 
969 63 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1933). 
970 I d. at 365. 
9n 84 Cal. App. 5o6, 258 Pac. 698 (1927). 
972 I d. at 510. 
97s 2CY7 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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the crew's facilities in the light of the known epidemic of polio among 
the Chinese workers. Nevertheless, the court reversed, saying: 
... [T]he proof here that the libellant contracted polio from 
the Chinese is far from satisfactory. The incubation period of 
poliomyelitis is not certain, as the libellant's medical witness 
admitted. Estimates, as shown by the record, range from a 
few days to 30 or 35 days. Thus the libellant might have be-
come infected while on shore leave in Shanghai before No-
vember I. Moreover, he might have become infected by flies 
or by members of the crew who were carriers of the disease. 
Under these circumstances to hold the respondent liable for 
injuries suffered by the libellant seems to be wholly specula-
tive as the infection might well have arisen from various 
causes unrelated to the respondent's action. It is impossible to 
prove that letting Chinese come on board, assuming that con-
duct was negligent, was the proximate cause of libellant's 
disease. Since either of the several inferences was permissible, 
the party having the burden of proof must lose. 974 
On review by the United States Supreme Court the trial court's judg-
ment was reinstated. The court concluded on the causation question : 
Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese 
were the carriers of the polio virus and that they communi-
cated it to the petitioner. But upon balance of the probabili-
ties it seems a reasonable inference for the District Court to 
make from the facts proved, supported as they were by the 
best judgment medical experts have upon the subject today, 
that petitioner was contaminated by the Chinese who came 
aboard the ship November II, 1945, at Shanghai. Certainly 
we cannot say on review that a judgment which was based 
upon such evidence is clearly erroneous. 976 
There is one difficulty with using these cases to support the proposition 
that incidence figures themselves will be sufficient to support a cause-in-
fact finding. In each of the cases, in the light of medical knowledge as 
to the incubation period from the time of exposure to the onset of such 
diseases as typhoid fever and poliomyelitis, it generally would be ac-
cepted that the sickness resulted from an exposure within short period 
of time before the illness manifested itself. In each case where recovery 
was allowed on the basis of the existence of an epidemic it would seem 
that the exposure in a particular place, though not from a particular 
source, was the cause-in-fact of the illness. The real question was one of 
proximate cause, a legal conclusion to be reached only if one can say 
974 /d. at 954-SS· 
975 McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 22-23, 75 S.Ct. 6 (1954). 
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that the fact the employment carried the person into the surroundings 
meant that the disease arose out of the employment. The cases suggest, 
of course, that exposure in a situation where there is a significant in-
crease in the incidence of a disease can be considered a proximate cause 
if the defendant owes some duty to the plaintiff to save him from such 
exposure. The cases also suggest that it will be, or at least can be, found 
that a disease that might come from many sources can be considered 
as coming from the more likely source, i.e., contact with groups in 
which the incidence of the disease is much higher and therefore the 
probabilities of catching the disease are considerably greater. 
Perhaps even more significant for radiation cases is Travelers Insur-
ance Co. v. Donova1i.916 The only evidence submitted to prove that 
plaintiff contracted tuberculosis in the course of employment under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act was that the incidence of tuberculosis 
was greater in Kyoto, Japan, where she contracted tuberculosis, than it 
was in this country, or at least in Washington, D. C., where she had 
been working before being assigned to Japan. The figures stipulated 
were that the incidence in Kyoto was five times that in Washington, 
D. C., being roughly a thousand cases instead of two hundred cases per 
100,000 of population. Both the district court and the court of appeals 
upheld the compensation awarded by the defendant commissioner. Each 
court cited the statutory presumption that claims come within the pro-
visions of the act and recognized· the same result might not be reached 
under common law rules. In upholding the award the circuit court said : 
The carrier has brought forward no sub~tantial evidence 
opposed to the presumption, along the lines of which we spoke 
m Robinson. On the contrary, the agreed statement shows that 
the risk of contracting tuberculosis in Japan was some five 
times greater than in the District of Columbia. It is conceiv-
able that the incidence of the disease in both places was so 
minimal as to require the conclusion that the five-fold ratio 
was itself de minimis. But the carrier offered no proof to that 
effect, and we certainly cannot derive any such conclusion 
from our own inspection of the record.977 
While the burden of proof applied by the courts in a workmen's com-
pensation case may be somewhat different than that used in the usual 
tort case, it is extremely significant that the court found the award to 
be supported solely on the basis of the evidence of increased incidence. 
This case is more significant than the others because it is well known 
976 125 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1954), 221 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
977 ld. at 888-89. 
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that tuberculosis bacilli can lie dormant in the body for a long period 
of time and become active under any number of circumstances. The 
court apparently accepted the increased incidence of tuberculosis in 
Japan as sufficient evidence that tuberculosis in this particular case arose 
out of exposure in Japan itself, rather than because of some internal 
change in the plaintiff causing dormant tuberculosis to flair up, although 
admittedly the court did not deal specifically with this assumption as 
such. 
A very recent case in which the type of statistical evidence here dis-
cussed obviously was used appropriately enough involves injury to 
sheep from radioactive fallout as a result of bomb tests at the Nevada 
proving ground. The plaintiff claimed that some of his sheep were in-
jured from the radioactive fallout but the district court denied recovery 
in Bulloch v. United States. 918 The court concluded that the expert 
witnesses for the defendant were some of the "best informed experts 
in the country," and that their judgment that no radiation damage could 
possibly have been caused by the fallout was sufficient to deny recovery. 
It is apparent that the evidence of the government witnesses and their 
conclusions were based upon scientific tests and statistical data derived 
from them. The court said : 
Plaintiffs argued that there were differences in the sheep 
involved in controlled experiments and the Bulloch sheep, and 
that by reason of these differences a finding that radio-
activity was the cause of plaintiff's damage would be possible. 
But the experts maintained their opinions to the contrary for 
the most part with these differences in mind. It does not lie 
with the Court to question the great weight of the testimony 
that these differences were not determinative, in the absence 
of at least some evidence that they were. Moreover, if I 
could entertain a contrary view on this phase of the evidence, 
I would be confronted with the positive testimony from those 
best in a position to know that the maximum amount of 
radioactive fallout in any area in which the sheep could have 
been, would have caused no damage.979 
The court indicated that it was odd that none of the other animals or 
persons in the same camp were injured and also indicated that there 
was evidence that radioactivity in the area after the test shot was not 
above normal background radiation levels. Nevertheless, the most im-
portant evidence was that of experts, clearly based on empirical data 
from experiments conducted on similar animals. While the court did 
978 Supra note 930. 
97& I d. at 827-28. 
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not discuss the admissibility of such evidence or the validity of the tech-
niques by which the conclusions of the government witnesses were 
reached, this is one case in which such evidence actually was used by a 
court for the purpose of proving cause-in-fact or a lack of causal rela-
tionship. 
The use of this kind of statistical data in determining whether the 
requirement of "more probable than not" has been satisfied is tremen-
dously significant for the radiation injury case. Many of the types of 
diseases or injuries which are caused by radiation are also caused by 
other sources or forces, and the testimony of scientists and experts 
ordinarily will be to the effect that exposure to a certain amount of 
radiation, at least for many types of injuries, will increase only the risk 
that an injury will result. If the risk is increased sufficiently, then it 
would be scientifically sound to say that the damage that subsequently 
appears was more probably caused by the radiation than by some other 
possible explanation. Likewise, in the case of future injuries, and the 
present prediction of their likelihood, the use of incidence figures based 
upon the statistical calculations of past experience in similar situations 
will become tremendously significant if we appreciate the possibilities 
that follow from acceptance of some of the scientific theories and postu-
lates supported by respected scientists and scholars. These are set out 
later in the chapter, as are our conclusions as to the significance of such 
information when combined with the rules of probability and the types 
of evidence that can be used to prove probability.980 
(2) Future Injury-Standard of Certainty and Statis-
tical Proof 
The prior discussion of the standard of probability and the use of 
statistical evidence to prove causation perhaps will be brought into 
sharpest focus by looking at a problem that seems likely to occur very 
frequently in radiation cases; namely, whether or not to award damages 
for future injuries not yet manifesting themselves. Here again is an 
area of tort law in which radiation cases will cause the courts to ana-
lyze more carefully a problem which up to now has been simply an in-
cidental one. A detailed study of future injuries is warranted from this 
standpoint alone, but it is also significant in appraising the inadequacies 
of our legal principles concerning damages generally in tort cases. 
The very fact that many, if not most, of the physical symptoms re-
sulting from overexposure to radiation manifest themselves only after a 
sso Infra discussion after note 1061. 
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period of delay makes the consideration of future injuries perhaps the 
most important of all. Not only may the effects be delayed but in many 
situations whether or not an injury actually will arise is a matter of 
probability, not certainty. With the increased use of statistical data to 
articulate these probabilities, the legal profession will be forced to ana-
lyze more closely the validity of assumptions as to scientific facts and 
the legal policy decisions based thereon, which may have been made 
in previous cases where such questions were for the most part only 
peripheral. 
If a person has been irradiated negligently and some form of com-
pensable injury soon follows, there may well be a reasonable probability 
that other compensable consequences of the same negligent act will be-
come manifest at a later time. In such case the injured party is con-
fronted with the principle which allows but a single recovery for each 
wrongful act. Except in the case of continuing nuisance and continuing 
trespass, the common law system typically provides a single lump sum 
judgment in the accident case. Few, if any, states will allow the plain-
tiff to "split" his cause of action so as to sue separately for injuries ap-
pearing at different times, if occasioned by the same negligent act. All 
damages, future as well as past, must be taken into account at the time 
of triaJ.981 This principle has been well established and the applicable 
rules have been worked out with some precision, as will be pointed out 
below. 
A difficult legal dilemma arises, however, when an individual is neg-
ligently exposed to radiation and no relatively immediate injury mani-
fests itself, although there exists a reasonable probability that injury 
will develop in the future. One well might ask why the injured person 
cannot wait until the injury manifests itself before seeking damages. 
Certainly this would seem to be the most logical method of disposing 
of the matter. Unfortunately, however, some of the possible biological 
effects of irradiation may be considerably delayed, and this period of 
delay may exceed the period of the statute of limitations on such a cause 
of action. In addition, the injured person also faces the possibility that 
the negligent actor, or his estate, may no longer exist when the injury 
actually manifests itself. The question then is whether or not a negli-
gently exposed person can obtain recovery before the injury becomes 
tangible, visible, or disabling. Both of the problems suggested, i.e., split-
ting the cause of action and present proof of future injuries, are con-
cerned with future damages; however, the latter is legally somewhat 
more perplexing. 
os1 Harper & James §25.2. 
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(a) Future Injury Preceded by Compensable In-
JUry 
The primary notion of compensation is that of repairing the plain-
tiff's injury or of making him as nearly whole as may be done by an 
award of money; in other words, as nearly as possible placing the plain-
tiff in the same position he would have enjoyed had the defendant's 
wrongful act or omission not injured him. 982 Even if the injury exists 
at present in observable, disabling, and compensable form, its conver-
sion into a pecuniary award is a highly speculative process. Unfortu-
nately, in the absence of legislation, this situation is one which the 
courts cannot avoid yet it does not follow that they must accept undue 
speculation with respect to the existence of the injury for which com-
pensation is sought. Under negligence and strict liability rules, whether 
derived from statutory or common law sources, actual injury is a pre-
requisite to the plaintiff's right of action. 983 The question then arises 
as to what is meant by "actu~l" injury or damage. The term suggests 
two elements : that the symptoms indicate an existing compensable 
injury as opposed to an injury yet to manifest itself in compensable 
form, and that its existence be proved with reasonably certainty. These 
two elements comprise a part of what has often been referred to mis-
leadingly as the "rule of certainty." 
The certainty rule, in its most important aspect, is a standard 
. requiring a reasonable degree of persuasiveness in the proof 
of the fact and of the amount of the damage. Through its 
use, the trial judge is enabled to insist that the jury must have 
factual data-something more than guesswork-to guide 
them in fixing the award.984 
While the courts in practice have discarded any notion of absolute 
certainty if they ever really entertained it, this does not mean that there 
are no applicable standards. Such a standard is established in what ap-
pears to be a leading case in this area, Strohm v. The N. Y., L. E .. & 
W.- R. R.985 In this case the plaintiff's expert witness, a physician, per-
sonally had examined the plaintiff some time subsequent to the injury. 
During the course of the examination, the physician received from the 
plaintiff a description of his symptoms following the accident. In re-
sponse to a hypothetical question embodying the plaintiff's apparent 
982 I d. at §25.1. 
98s Ibid. 
D84 McConnick §26. (Emphasis added.) 
985 g6 N.Y. 305 (1884). 
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condition and symptoms, this witness stated at the trial that possibly 
epilepsy, meningitis, or traumatic dementia was indicated for the future. 
He could not determine which of the three. As to the permanence of the 
existing injury, the witness stated that it was very likely to be perma-
nent. He elaborated this by saying, "I mean that the boy will always 
have some remnants of this injury, some reminder of it, great or small, 
that is certain; how much he will retain I cannot tell, but I think it very 
likely he will retain." 986 
In reversing the decision and remanding the case the court held that 
it was error for the trial court to permit the jury, in estimating the 
damages, to include compensation for the mere hazard of the future 
injuries to which the expert testified. By way of establishing the rule as 
to future injury and the rule as to the admissibility of opinion evidence 
on this matter, the court said: 
Future consequences, which are reasonably to be expected to 
follow an injury, may be given in evidence for the pur-
pose of enhancing the damages to be awarded. But to entitle 
such apprehended consequences to be considered by the jury, 
they must be such as in the ordinary course of nature are rea-
sonably certain to ensue. Consequences which are contingent, 
speculative, or merely possible, are not proper to be considered 
in ascertaining the damages. It is not enough that the injuries 
received may develop into more serious conditions than those 
which are visible at the time of the injury, nor even that they 
are likely to develop. To entitle a plaintiff to recover present 
damages for apprehended future consequences, there must be 
such a degree of probability of their occurring, as amounts to a 
reasonable certainty that they will result from the original 
injury.887 
A few years later, the same court, in Tozer v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.,988 
again had occasion to rule on this point. In this case the infant plaintiff 
was injured in a collision between the defendant's train and a wagon 
in which the plaintiff was riding. Medical testimony was admitted at the 
trial over the defendant's objection. This testimony concerned the 
consequences which might result from the injury, and what results 
might be expected in the future. The medical witness testified that there 
was a possibility that some disease of the brain might set ~n, even after 
the lapse of a year, and cause the death of the person who had sustained 
such an injury although he had apparently recovered. Experts also testi-
986/d. at Jo6-7. 
987 ld. at 3o6. (Emphasis added.) 
988 105 N.Y. 617, II N.E. 369 (1887). 
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fied that a person who had sustained such an injury to the brain might, 
and frequently did, become insane, that there was no limit to the period 
of time within which such a result might occur, and that cases were 
recorded where such consequences followed an apparently complete 
recovery. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and granting a new 
trial, the court said: 
This case falls within our decision in Strohm v. N.Y., L.E. & 
W.R.R. Co. . .. The testimony which was received, under 
exception, as to the ulterior consequences which might ensue or 
be apprehended from the injuries received by the plaintiff, was 
quite as objectionable as that for the reception of which the 
judgment in the case cited was reversed.989 
The doctrine was further refined, and a distinction was pointed out, 
in tlie case of Griswold v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R. 990 In this case the de-
fendant, relying upon the Strohm case, appealed from an order affirming 
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. At the trial, the counsel for the 
plaintiff, after proving an ex'isting injury which the plaintiff suffered 
from the negligence of the defendant, was allowed to inquire of a 
medical witness having knowledge of the plaintiff's condition as to the 
probability of her recovery. Defendant's objection to this kind of evi-
dence was overruled. The judgment in the plaintiff's favor was affirmed. 
Adverting to the Strohm and Tozer cases, and quoting from the case 
of Turner v. City of Newburgh,981 the court stated that these decisions 
" ... simply preclude the giving of evidence of future conse-
quences which are contingent, spe.culative and merely possible 
as the basis of ascertaining damages, ... [T]hey in nowise 
conflict with the rule allowing evidence of physicians as to a 
plaintiff's present condition of bodily suffering or injuries, 
of their permanence and as to their cause." 992 
The court then pointed out a distinction by stating : 
There is an obvious difference between an opinion as to the 
pen'nanence of a disease or injury already existing, capable of 
being examined and studied, and one as to the merely possible 
outbreak of new diseases or sufferings having their cause in 
the original injury. In the former case that disease or injury 
and its symptoms are present and existing, their indications 
are more or less plain and obvious, and from their severity or 
slightness a recovery may reasonably be expected or the con-
9ss Ibid. 
s9o us N.Y. 61, 21 N.E. 726 (1889). 
99t 109 N.Y. 301, 309. t6 N.E. 344 (1889). 
992 Su{wa note 990 at 63. 
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trary; while an opinion that some new and different complica-
tion will arise is merely a double speculation--one that it may 
possibly occur, and the other that if it does it will be a product 
of the original injury instead of some other new and, perhaps, 
unknown cause. 993 
Further clarity, both with respect to the standard of certainty and as 
to what testimony is admissible, was furnished by the court when it 
said: 
Medicine is very far from being an exact science. At best its 
diagnosis is little more than a guess enlightened by e%perience. 
The chances of recovery in a given case are more or less af-
fected by unknown causes and unexpected contingencies; and 
the wisest physician can do no more than form an opinion 
based upon a reasonable probability .... [B]ut necessarily 
the opinion must rest upon a balance of probabilities, inclin-
ing the medical judgment one way or the other, and the 
opinion given is none the worse because it expresses, and does 
not conceal, that it rests upon a reasonable probability strong 
enough to justify the formation of an opinion.99" 
In Alberti v. N.Y., L.E. & W.R.R./95 a case involving future conse-
quences of an existing injury, medical witnesses were permitted to 
testify as to their opinion regarding the future consequences of the 
injury. The witnesses gave their opinion that the plaintiff would never 
be any better and that he would never be able to straighten his legs. A 
witness also was asked to state the length of time that the plaintiff might 
live in the natural and ordinary course of events. He answered that he 
could give only the probability of this period from the histories of 
other similar cases. The court held that this testimony was admissible 
under the rule of the Strohm case, so long as he answered in terms of 
reasonable probability. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. It 
is not clear from the opinion whether or not the damages contained 
an element for shortened life span. 
In another case in which the facts are not pertinent here and in which 
the statements are largely dictum but nevertheless useful, the appellate 
division tried to cast further light upon the doctrine of the Strohm case. 
In Clegg v. Metropolitan St. Ry. the court said: 
The evidence that was condemned in the Strohm Case as 
speculative and hypothetical related to the possible develop-
ment in the plaintiff of diseases which were nonexistent at the 
993 I d. at 64. 
oo4 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
m 118 N.Y. 77,23 N.E. 35 (1889). 
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time of the trial. . . . The condemnation of such proof is a 
very different thing from saying that evidence cannot properly 
be received as to the probable effects of a present condi-
tion .... [T]he judgment of medical experts as to the 
probable consequences of an injury comes within the rule of 
reasonable certainty.996 
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Finally, in the case of Cross v. City of Syracuse 997 the court of ap-
peals again tried to clarify the "reasonable certainty" rule of the Strohm 
case, and, in doing so, appears to have given it a somewhat different 
twist. In this case a physician was asked the following question: 
Assuming Miss Cross had not had any pain in her left side 
previous to the time of this accident and that on March 2d she 
was walking north on Butternut Street and stepped into a 
hole with her left foot and fell on her left side, and that she 
was black and blue on the left side, her hip, side and shoulder 
were black and blue, and that since that time she experienced 
severe pain in that left side, are you able to state with reason-
able certainty in the ordinary course of nature, how long those 
severe pains will continue in her left side? 998 
The question was objected to and the objection was overruled. The 
further question then was asked : "First answer . . . whether you can 
answer that with reasonable certainty." The physician answered, "I can 
hardly answer that question that way; I would say yes, however." 
With respect to this question and answer, the defendant's brief on 
appeal put forth the following proposition to show error in the trial: 
"It is elementary that the proper question in a case of this 
character to ask a medical expert is, whether he is able to 
testify with reasonable certainty, upon the subject. If such a 
question is answered in the negative, the expert should not be 
permitted to testify further on that subject. If the answer 
is in the affirmative, he is permitted to testify, if the question 
is material, proper, based upon the evidence in the case, and is 
a proper subject of expert testimony." 999 
In affirming the judgment of the trial court for the plaintiff, the 
court of appeals pointed- out that the defendant's proposition was based 
on a misapprehension which appeared to be quite general in the pro-
fession as to what was decided by the court in the Strohm case. By way 
of elaboration of this misapprehension, the court stated: 
The prevalent mistake in regard to that decision [in the 
Strohm case] is the supposition that it forbade the introduc-
996 1 App. Div. 207, 21o-II, 37 N.Y.S. 130, 132-33 (1896). 
997 200 N.Y. 393, 94 N.E. 184 (1911). 
998 I d. at 395· 
999 I d. at 396· 
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tion of any opinion evidence as to the probable consequences 
of an existing condition due to injury unless the opinion could 
be pronounced with reasonable certainty. The Strohm case 
in fact laid down no such rule. . . . [T]he Strohm case ap-
plies only to the development of diseased conditions appre-
hended in the future but not present at the time of the inquiry. 
There is no intimation in that case that opinion evidence is not 
properly receivable as to the probable effects or duration of an 
existing condition. There are many subsequent cases which 
show that this court did not intend to hold that expert testi-
mony was inadmissible as to the consequences likely to flow 
from the present condition of an injured person.1000 
This series of New York cases has been frequently cited and followed by 
the courts of other states. 
In analyzing the position of the New York court it first should be 
noted that the courts have distinguished, at least for purposes of expert 
opinion and hypothetical questions, between the future consequences of 
a present injury, existing at the time of trial, and a future injury arising 
out of a present condition but where there is no observable injury of 
this type at the time of trial. While the distinction is somewhat tenuous 
(and perhaps scientifically questionable), it would appear that duration 
and permanency, future likelihood of incapacity, possibility of recovery, 
and other such effects of an existing injury which are considered to ensue 
"in the ordinary course of nature," can be shown by opinion and hypo-
thetical testimony of expert witnesses. Furthermore, the Cross case in-
dicates that a physician may give opinion testimony or answer hypotheti-
cal questions even though the prognosis is not based on a reasonable 
certainty or probability that the described results will follow. In that 
case the court definitely ruled that the physician could answer a hypo-
thetical question concerning the future duration of the plaintiff's pains 
from an existing injury, even though he apparently admitted that he 
could not do so with reasonable certainty. 
On the other hand, future injury arising out of a present condition, 
whether or not that condition is an injury in itself, apparently would 
embrace those injuries which are different from the original condition 
or injury and do not exist at the time of the trial. As to such injuries, 
the rule is that the expert cannot testify at all unless he first can state 
that the probability of their occurrence is so great as to amount to a 
reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury.1001 
10oo !d. at 396-97· 
10o1 See the discussion in Richardson, Evidence §529 (7th ed. 1948). 
NEGLIGENCE 473 
Although this distinction is exceedingly important for trial purposes, 
it probably does not alter the fundamental rule of certainty as to dam-
ages. That is to say, in theory, it does not lighten the plaintiff's burden 
of proof with respect to that category of injury which has been char-
acterized as being "in the ordinary course of nature," while maintaining 
it with respect to future, new, and different injuries. It would appear 
that the court with respect to both types must instruct the jury that they 
can award damages only for those injuries which they find, from the 
evidence, are "reasonably certain" to ensue as a consequence of the de-
fendant's wrongful act or omission. The distinction seems to be con-
cerned only with the evidentiary rules of admissibility; where the in-
jury presently exists, the plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence, in 
the form of expert opinion and answers to hypothetical questions, based 
on less than reasonable certainty that the possible consequences of the 
existing injury will ensue. This does not mean, however, that the jury 
can award damages, after all of the evidence is in, on less than reason-
~ble certainty that such a consequence will ultimately result. 
Why is the distinction observed? There appear to be several reasons 
why the New York courts make this distinction. The principal reason 
is implied by language from the Griswold case.1002 There the court 
refers to the "obvious difference" between an objective and a sub-
jective condition. It points out that the former is observable, while the 
latter is not. The o~jective condition is observable by the physician and 
the jtwy in many cases. These very appearances are additional evi-
dence as to the dimensions of the injury; in theory anyway, the jury 
has something else to consider in addition to the description and the 
tentative, yet admissible, prognosis of the physician. This is not the case 
if the plaintiff claims damages for a future injury not yet manifested. 
In such case there is usually nothing in the plaintiff's physical condition 
which permits the jury to observe either the existing or future dimen-
sions of the injury, and there is some question, at least in the mind 
of the court, as to whether the physician is in any better position to ob-
serve them. Thus it would seem that the courts are crediting the 
jurors with some prognostic abilities regarding objective, external dis-
orders, and their duration or permanence, but they are unwilling to do so 
with regard to future, different, and unobservable disorders. 
Another reason for the distinction is suggested by the language of the 
Griswold case when the court referred to opinion testimony of experts 
regarding "some new and different complication'' as being a "double 
1002 Supra note 990· 
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speculation." In that statement the court expresses its concern with 
whether the complication will exist in fact in the future and with 
whether it fairly can be attributed to the existing, present condition 
caused by the defendant's negligent act or omission. With respect to 
the duration or permanence of an existing injury, there is little or no 
question of causation, assuming causation has been shown with respect 
to the injury itself; however, proof of causation with respect to an 
existing condition does not establish the second causal relationship; i.e., 
therelationship between an existing condition and a future injury. 
The case of Cogswell v. Frazier 1003 illustrates the attitude of the 
Maryland court toward inconclusive testimony regarding permanency 
of an existing injury. In this case the plaintiff had sustained a com-
minuted fracture of the left tibia and fibula (the two bones of the lower 
leg. The accident occurred in March of 1943, at which time a physician, 
who was the only expert called at the trial, operated on the leg. In Janu-
ary of 1944, when the case came to trial, no union of the bones had 
occurred. The physician stated that further treatment was possible, 
but that if union did not occur within one or two months (from the date 
of testifying), it probably would not take place at all. In answer to a 
question regarding permanency of the injuries, the doctor stated: 
"Since I have stated that the medical case is not finished, you 
understand, I say that this injury which he -has sustained and 
the marks thereof will be permanent. The scar and the in-
jury to the bone will always be able to be seen. I can't state 
whether he will go on and heal his bones and be able to walk 
without his brace at this time. I simply say that his injury 
is permanent but that the final effects, at this time, are not 
possible to be stated." 1004 
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff that awarded damages for 
permanent injury, the court stated: 
In view of the full testimony which the doctor had previously 
given as to nature of this particular injury, the questions asked 
him as to the extent and probable effects of it were natural and 
and logical ones to follow, and were relevant and admissible 
under the accepted rules of evidence. The opinions sought of 
him, and given, were entirely within the professional knowl-
edge which he acquired as the attending physician and as medi-
cal expert .... 
Moreover, his answers to these questions were as clear and 
as definite as could reasonably have been expected of any 
1003 183 Md. 654, 39 A.zd 815 (1944). 
t004 fd. at 662-3. 
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witness, and the jury was entitled to have the benefit of them-
especially as this was the only witness called upon to furnish 
the medical testimony which was an integral part of the 
case.1ooG 
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With reference to this case it should be noted that the physician stated 
with certainty that the scar and bone deformity were permanent, but 
that he could not state with reasonable certainty whether the injury was 
permanently crippling. 
A somewh;~.t more restrictive rule is illustrated by the case of Steven-
son v. Penn. Sports & Enterprises. 1006 In this case the attending physi-
cian testified that at the time of his last examination the plaintiff ~ad a 
partial disability of twenty per cent. He further testified that the condi-
tion of the plaintiff's injured heel was "possibly permanent," although 
it might gradually improve. The testimony of another medical witness 
was similarly uncertain as to prognosis. In affirming a reasonable award 
for the plaintiff, including elements of future damages, the court said: 
The problem here involved is one of prognosis on which a 
doctor cannot be required to express his opinion with the same 
definiteness required in a causation question. In many cases 
of personal injury the honest opinion of a doctor may well 
be that a plaintiff will "gradually improve" or that the injury 
may "possibly be permanent or may possibly get better within 
a year." This uncertainty of honest medical opinion should 
not be the basis for any finding by the jury of permanent 
[Emphasis by court.] injury but is sufficient, on the other 
hand, for the jury to find some future disability.1007 
Thus, the equivocal prognosis of an expert with respect to the perma-
nency of an injury is admissible in Pennsylvania, but, by itself, will not 
support a jury finding of permanency. 
Central Truckaway System v. Harrigan 1008 indicates that the New 
York admissibility distinction as to opinion evidence is not followed 
everywhere, and that such testimony is always admissible in some states 
even though the opinion relates to a future injury as distinguished from 
a future consequence of a present injury. In this case the plaintiff was 
injured in an automobile accident occasioned by the negligence of the 
defendant. An expert witness was questioned as to the permanency 
of the injuries and the likelihood that the plaintiff would develop 
traumatic arthritis in his spinal column. While the court reversed and 
1003 Jd. at 66J. 
1°06 372 Pa. 157, 93 A.2d 236 (1952). 
1001 /d. at 165. (Emphasis added.) 
1oo8 79 Ga. App. 117, 53 S.E.2d 186 (1949). 
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remanded a judgment in the plaintiff's favor on other grounds, in re-
sponse to the defendant's contention that the evidence or opinion con-
cerning permanency and future injury should not have been admitted, 
it said: 
The testimony appears to be the professional opinion of the 
doctor. It is therefore not subject to the objection that it 
constitutes speculation on his part rather than a statement of 
his professional opinion. The doctor in the instant case had 
attended this plaintiff and was in position to be thoroughly 
familiar with his· injuries. He was competent to give his 
opinion as to their permanency. A part of this opinion appears 
to have been based on the likelihood of the development of 
traumatic arthritis in some of the cervical vertebrae of the 
plaintiff. The evidence was admissible for this purpose .... 
"The opinion of experts, on any question of science, skill, 
trade, or like questions shall always be admissible ; and such 
opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other wit-
nesses." The weight and credit to be given the testimony of 
such experts is for the jury.1009 · 
Wigmore takes a rather strong stand on the question of opinion testi-
mony of physicians. As he points out, testimony as to the condition of 
health concerns the "internal actuality," as distinguished from external, 
corporeal appearances. This distinction, he has stated, is important 
for it affects the qualifications of the witness who will usually be re-
quired to be a medical expert.1010 In discussing the opinion rule with 
respect to questions of probability and possibility, capacity and tendency, 
cause and effect, he further states : 
... [T]he reason why the Opinion rule is urged against 
them is in general that the thing to which the witness testifies 
is not anything which he has observed, but is a quantity which 
lies in estimate only and is the result of a balancing of concrete 
data. 
This is no sufficient reason for excluding such statements 
from qualified witnesses; because it must almost always be 
impossible for a witness to reproduce in words absolutely all 
the detailed data which enter into his estimate, and there can be 
no danger in receiving such an estimate from him. . . . 
It should be added that Courts sometimes misapply the 
Opinion rule to enforce the doctrine of Torts that a recovery 
for future personal injuries must include only the certain or 
fairly probable, but not the merely possible, consequences; so 
10o9 /d. at IZ'J. (Emphasis added.) 
1010 Wigmore, Evidence §19?5 (3d ed. 1940). 
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that the judge instead of covering the subject by an instruction 
to the jury as to the measure of recovery, excludes from evi-
dence a physician's opinion expressed in ·terms of possibility 
only. This attempt to control the course of expert testimony 
is of course unreasonable in itsel£.1011 
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Judging by the above statement, it would seem that Wigmore cer-
tainly would approve of the court's attitude in the Central Truckaway 
case, 1012 and that he would disapprove of the distinction reached in the 
New York decisions. Is his criticism justified? Is this attempt to 
control the course of expert testimony really unreasonable? 
·.Several factors combine here to make this control by the courts en-
tirely reasonable under our present system of compensation. Everyone 
would agree that no person should be compelled to pay compensation 
when his act or omission has not or will not produce injury, even though 
that act or omission could have produced injury. While it is somewhat 
risky to speak in terms of universals, it does not seem too much to state 
that the burden of showing a compensable injury is always on the person 
claiming to be injured. There is no doctrine, analogous to that of 
res ipsa loquitur which raises a presumption of physical or psychological 
injury or shifts the burden as to this issue. Accepting this as the 
standard attitude and considering the sympathetic attitude of juries 
toward plaintiffs generally, when opposed by large corporations in gen-
eral and insurance companies in particular, as well as the extreme com-
plexity of the medical features, it certainly does not seem unreasonable 
to require experts to preface their prognostic opinions with the state-
ment that they are based upon the same standard of reasonable certainty 
or probability as is required of the plaintiff, unless it is made clear that 
the award should be reduced as the degree of probability becomes 
smaller. In most cases of future injury this expression of opinion is 
the only evidence as to the occurrence of the injury which the jury has 
to assist them. The danger that they will accept the ominous, though re-
mote, prophecies of the plaintiff's experts as sufficient is too great to 
justify such inconclusive testimony. Even assuming that neither the 
trial nor the appellate courts will allow the jury to find future injury 
upon the assertion that it is merely possible, such· testimony is a waste 
of time. What is needed here is some clarification on the part of the 
courts (or possibly by legislatures) as to what is meant by reasonable 
certainty or probability. This would serve for the edification of both 
1011 I d. at §1976. 
1012 Supra note 1008. 
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the expert and the jury, and it should not be a liberalized rule of evi-
dence that would allow the expert to discuss every remote contingency, 
unless we change our rules of compensation. 
One other justification can be given for the New York distinction 
concerning the degree of certainty required to make expert opinion 
testimony admissible. This admissibility rule reflects a recognized 
modification of the general rule of certainty. This modifying doctrine 
is illustrated by a part of the opinion in Story Parchment Co. v. Pater-
son Parchment Paper Co. 
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the 
damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage, ... 
and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof 
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained 
some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable 
the jury to fix the amount.1013 
While this case involved a Sherman Anti-Trust Act cause of action, it 
still is generally applicable throughout both the tort and the contract 
areas of law.1014 It does not seem unreasonable to require the plaintiff 
to show either the present existence or the likelihood of future existence 
of the injury with substantial certainty; however, having proved this 
fact and that the injury was caused by the wrongful act or omission of 
the defendant, and recognizing the inherent lack of precision in deter-
mining the dimensions of the injury and converting them into a money 
value, it may not be unreasonable to allow the plaintiff to offer, and the 
jury to consider, the best evidence available as to the extent of the in-
juries. This does not solve the problem where there is conflict between 
witnesses as to the degree of certainty. 
The case of Cordiner v. Los Angeles Traction Co.1015 offers a good 
illustration of an intelligent discrimination between the fact of future 
injury and its extent. The plaintiff was injured in a collision between 
the streetcars of the defendant street railway companies. On appeal 
the defendants conceded the plaintiff's right to recover, but contended 
that the amount of recovery should be limited to loss that the plaintiff 
was "reasonably certain" to sustain. Pursuant to this attack, the de-
fendants pointed specifically to the testimony of certain experts who 
were allowed to testify as to the future results of the plaintiff's injury. 
The evidence showed that as a result of the collision the plaintiff had 
1o1a 282 U.S. 555, 562, 51 S.Ct. 248 (1930), quoted by McCormick §27, p. 102. 
1014 Harper & James §25.3, n. 15. 
1o16 5 Cal. App. 400, 91 Pic. 436 ( 1907). 
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suffered a fracture at the base of the brain. A Dr. Dukeman, in re-
sponse to a question as to whether there woul~ be any danger of a re-
lapse at any time in the future, stated: 
"There is some danger . . . . [he further elaborated by say-
ing] I should look for more serious and fatal results from a 
fracture at the base of the brain than at any other place. I 
should look for this after apparent recovery, apparent re-
covery so far as anybody can tell; I would always look for 
something .... In the majority of cases I would look for 
future trouble. I can't tell what will happen in this case. My 
experience and knowledge as a physician has taught me that in 
a majority of cases of this kind, where there has been, to even 
the eye of a doctor, a complete recovery, ... various symp-
toms, would happen. I should look for convulsions in the 
majority of cases of that kind where there had been a complete 
recovery, to the eye even of a doctor." 1016 
Another expert, Dr. Brainard, also in response to a question con-
cerning the condition of the plaintiff after an apparent recovery, an-
swered, "'[A]nd we might expect from the injury the symptoms that 
rise frequently from a case of suffering from a fracture at the base 
of the brain. There is danger of convulsions or epilepsy, danger of 
mental deterioration, danger of paralysis.' " 1011 
With respect to this evidence, and in affirming the judgment of the 
lower court for the plaintiff, which contained elements of future dam-
ages, the court said : 
The evidence here tended, in an appreciable degree, to prove 
the ultimate fact; that is, the reasonable certainty that future 
evil consequences would result from the injury, and was 
properly admitted for the consideration of the jury-it being 
its function, upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, 
to determine its sufficiency as proof of the ultimate fact. 
. . . Testimony of duly qualified experts which shows that in 
a majority of cases where the injury ... results in future 
epilepsy, paralysis, or mental deterioration, tends to prove 
the reasonable certainty that such consequences will follow 
in any given case of like injury.1018 
Observe that Dr. Dukeman's testimony concerned three facts: ( 1) 
'the present existence of a potentially injurious condition in the plain-
tiff's brain, ( 2) the future probability that injurious consequences 
1o16 /d. at 403. (Emphasis added.) 
1011 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
101s /d. at 404-5. (Emphasis added.) 
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would follow (based on the "statistics" of similar injuries), and (3) 
the type of injury which could be occasioned by such a condition. As 
to the first two facts, the doctor's certainty was expressed with as much 
precision as is generally possible. He was certain of the present exist-
ence of a potentially injurious condition, even though there had been an 
apparent recovery, and he stated that "in a majority of cases of this 
kind" injurious consequences would follow. Notice that neither doctor 
could predict with any kind of certainty, however, the precise character 
or type of future injury which would follow. A!s to the future existence 
of injurious consequences the experts were reasonably certain; but, as 
to the type and extent of the injury, they were not certain. The opinions 
as to all three facts were admissible, and were sufficient to support an 
award for future damages. It is submitted that, in many situations, a 
physician will be able to predict future injury generally, but will not be 
able to identify and name the precise result. As will be shown, this is 
particularly true in radiation exposure cases. Assuming that the plain-
tiff should be able to collect now for future injury (a different system 
really should be worked out), 1019 there does not appear to be any logical 
reason why he should be prevented from recovering by the lack of a 
name for the ultimate injury. Injury, and the science which is concerned 
with it, is not tied to nomenclature, and insofar as is possible, the law 
should be equally unrestricted. 
While the above attitude illustrates a commendable one on the part of 
the California courts, their more recent decisions indicate that they are 
carrying this lenient attitude as to the admissibility of expert opinion 
to rather extreme lengths with regard to future, new, and different 
injuries. Often it seems that the courts now believe that a jury has sub-
stantial prognostic faculties of its own and needs no expert opinion as to 
"certainty" of future, new, and different injuries. Any expert opinions 
on such injuries are admissible, so it would appear. In Riggs v. Gasser 
Motors the plaintiff had suffered a severe concussion of the brain. With 
respect to future injury, an expert witness was allowed to state: 
My opinion of the outcome of the injury is this-it is very 
likely that in the end the result will be some permanent dam-
age. It is very frequent [Emphasis added.] that we even find 
epilepsy, traumatic epilepsy, as we call it, following a severe 
brain injury. If the fracture of the skull is severe enough-if 
the injury is severe enough-we might get that as a result, but 
nobody knows, except for time, and time will only tell what 
1o19 Infra recommendations discussion following note 1123. 
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will come here. No doctor could say ·with reasonable certainty 
[Emphasis added.] that the results I have described would not 
follow.1020 · 
481 
On appeal from a $20,000 judgment in plaintiff's favor, the defendant 
claimed that the award was excessive, and that the testimony as to the 
brain injury was too speculative. Notice that the physician did not 
say that epilepsy was reasonably certain, but rather, that no doctor 
would say with reasonable certainty that it would not occur. The court 
affirmed the judgment, saying, "That question we think is as much 
within the judgment of the jury as within the province of any court, 
and unless we can say, with reasonable certainty, that such injuries 
will not affect the future of the plaintiff, we are at a loss to say that 
the damages awarded are the result of either passion or prejudice." 1021 
This begins to look as if the burden of proof as to the possibility of 
future injury can be shifted to the defendant in California. 
In Bauman v. San Francisco 1022 the defendant city appealed from a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and from an order granting plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial upon the issue of damages alone. At the trial 
a physician, who had operated on the plaintiff following the injury, 
was asked to give his prognosis. He stated that, "The prognosis in 
this case is good, providing the particular patient does not develop epi-
leptic seizures." When asked if such result was "probable," the trial 
judge ruled that the doctor could not answer unless he would state that 
epileptic seizures were "reasonably certain" to occur. The doctor stated 
that he could not state whether or not this patient was "reasonably cer-
tain" to have such seizures and added that, "I would not say it was rea-
sonably certain." The court then ruled that his testimony be stricken 
from the record. 
In affirming the order granting the plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
on the issue of damages, the court said, with respect to the stricken 
testimony: 
The law does not require a doctor to state that future re-
sults are "reasonably certain" to occur before his testimony is 
admissible. Before the jury may allow a recovery for future 
consequences the evidence must show with reasonable cer-
tainty that such consequences will follow, and the jury should 
be so instructed. The testimony referred to above would not, 
standing alone, support an award for damages for future 
102022 Cal. App.2d 636,643,72 P.2d 172 (1937). 
1021Jd. at 645 (Emphasis added.) 
1022 42 Cal. App..2d 144. 108 P.2d g8g (1940). 
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consequences. But that does not mean that such evidence was 
not admissible. The ultimate fact to be determined by the jury 
is whether it is reasonably certain that future evil consequences 
will flow from the injury. Any evidence reasonably tending 
in an appreciable degree to prove that fact is admissible. 
Its sufficiency to prove that fact is largely for the jury.1023 
What other evidence is there as to the incidence of future injury be-
sides the prognosis of experts, at least where there is no conflict between 
the experts? The California courts do not indicate how the jury can 
find a result to be reasonably certain to follow when the physicians 
themselves are only willing to say that it is possible, unless this is im-
plied in the following statement, quoted from the C ordiner case : 
Testimony of duly qualified experts which shows that in a 
majority of cases where the injury consists of a fracture at the 
base of the brain, such injury results in future epilepsy, 
paralysis, or mental deterioration, tends to prove the reason-
able certainty that such consequences will follow in any given 
case of like injury.1024 
By this the court may be recognizing a distinction between what a 
physician is willing to state will occur with reasonable certainty and 
what the professional statistics disclose has actually happened in a ma-
jority of cases of similar injuries. If in a majority of cases epilepsy, 
paralysis, or mental deterioration has followed fractures at the base 
of the brain, then perhaps the jury is justified in finding such results 
reasonably certain to occur in the particular case, even though the 
attending physician is unwilling to so state with respect to the par-
ticular patient. This may be a semantic difficulty in equating legal and 
scientific degrees of certainty. The doctor might have answered af-
firmatively if asked if it were more probable than not that injury would 
result. 
An interesting device is used in the C ordiner case, and in three others 
considered below, which may become highly significant with respect to 
radiation injuries, especially since it seems to enable the plaintiff to 
partially avoid the restrictive attitude of many of the courts toward 
contingent and speculative evidence. This is the technique of empha-
sizing and seeking recovery for a present condition which, although it 
is not presently incapacitating or otherwise injurious, was caused by 
the defendant's wrongful act or omission and has the predictable, po-
tential effect of making the plaintiff substantially more susceptible to 
102a I d. at 163. 
1024 Supra note 1015 at 404-5. (Emphasis added.) 
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particular or general injuries in the future. While in the Cordiner 
case the emphasis was on the future consequences themselves, in the 
testimony of Dr. Dukeman there was an u~mistakable allusion to a 
present condition, a dangerous, yet unknown pathological condition, 
which remained "in the majority of cases" even after an apparent re-
cdvery. The question is, will the courts regard this condition in itself a 
compensable, presently existing injury when it has been wrongfully 
inflicted? 
-Crank v. Forty-Second St., M.H. & St. N.A. Ry.1025 appears to 
indicate that the technique may be successful. In this case the plaintiff 
was injured while riding upon the defendant's streetcar. The nature of 
the injuries was not specified. On appeal the defendant conceded . the 
proof of causation and negligence, but claimed that the award was 
excessive, charging error in the trial judge's instruction to the jury to 
the effect that, upon the subject of the permanency of the injuries, they 
might take into consideration the plaintiff's increased general suscepti-
bility to disease. There was evidence that the plaintiff required medical 
attention for a considerable period of time and that the injury was 
permanent and would affect her during the remainder of her life. A 
physician testified that if she was sick from other causes, the result of 
this injury always would complicate other illnesses. The court stated 
that this evidence furnished grounds for the consideration by the jury 
of the results of the injury and affirmed for the plaintiff. The standard 
imposed was that of "reasonable certainty that they [the results] will be 
permanent." In concluding, the court pointed out that : 
It is true, it may be, that the plaintiff will never suffer from 
any other illness; but where the injury is of such a character 
as renders her less able to contend against the ordinary ills 
which flesh is heir to it does not seem to be at all speculative 
to allow the jury to take such a state of affairs into considera-
tion in making compensation to the plaintiff for the injuries 
suffered.1028 
The court seemed to be entirely unconcerned with whether the plain-
tiff would ever actually suffer from this existing condition. The condi-
tion in itself did not incapacitate her, at least in the sense for which 
recovery was allowed, and the plaintiff was not required to show with 
reasonable certainty or probability that she would be in such position 
in the future as to make the condition actually harmfuP027 
1o25 6 N.Y.S. 229 (188g), aff'd without opinion, 127 N.Y. 648, 27 N.E. 856 (1891). 
1o2a I d. at 230. 
1027 See discussion supra at notes 452 ff. 
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The case of Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, discussed previ-
ously,1028 warrants further consideration here. This was an action for 
damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of 
ov.erexposure in the taking of dental X-ray photographs by the de-
fendant. The defendant appealed from a verdict in the plaintiff's favor 
for $ro,250 on the ground that the amount, in view of the injuries 
sustained, was excessive. Specifically, the defendant argued that the 
evidence as to the possibility of cancer was wholly conjectural and un-
certain and that that element rightfully could not be considered by the 
jury. After quoting from the record the testimony concerning the 
plaintiff;s present condition and describing her skin, the court set forth 
the foiiowing portion of the record : 
"A. ... The light (x-ray) has destroyed these hair follicles 
-you have a skin that is not functioning and our medical 
literature is fuii of cases of cancer--carcinoma that have de-
veloped upon a senile skin following an X-ray burn. 
"Q. You give your professional opinion to the effect that 
Mrs. Coover at this time might be in danger of a cancerous 
growth? A. I do not say that she has a cancerous growth, 
she has not, but a cancer may develop on this area-it is 
common." 
* * * * * 
"A. ... That [the scars on plaintiff's face] will be perma-
nent, and there may possibly be some further changes in the 
skin. On this senile skin not infr~uently develops new 
growths, little neoplasm, warty growths, and from these warty 
growths, the carcinoma develops ; sometimes that is a year, 
sometimes it is two years-sometimes it is three or four years 
before they develop." 
[The physician also testified that over the area affected the 
plaintiff had a skin that is predisposed to cancer, that she had 
some disturbance of the sensory nerves of her face.] 
"Q. In the event the sensory nerves have been destroyed, in 
this portion of the face that is burned or impaired, what 
would be the natural consequence of such a condition, in other 
words, what effect would that have on Mrs. Coover? A. The 
most important sequela from a dermatological standpoint is 
the possibility of carcinoma--of a cancer." 
"Q. It may happen that she can go on through life without 
that occurring, I suppose? A. It is possible, but we do find 
many times, carcinoma developing upon the scars of X-ray 
burns, in all of our literature they speak of that as very, 
very likely sequela, it is the thing to be guarded against and 
to be watched." 1029 
102s Supra note 452. 
1029 Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, supra note 452 at 113-14. (Emphasis addeo 
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The trial court instructed the jury that they were to consider as elements 
of damage only such physical injury as they found the plaintiff was 
reasonably certain to suffer in the near future. In affirming the judg-
ment for the plaintiff the court said: 
If we assume that respondent's skin condition was con-
sidered by the jury it by no means follows that this was im-
proper. While the actual condition of cancer may have been 
conjectural and uncertain, the record contains positive evi-
dence that a condition actually exists which makes this dread 
disease much more likely. We think this j»"edisposition in it-
self is some damage, and when caused by the wrongful act of 
another it is an interference with the normal and natural con-
ditions and rights of the other, which must be held to be a real 
and not a fanciful element of damage. The necessity of con-
stantly watching and guarding against cancer, as testified to 
by the physician, is an obligation and a burden that the de-
fendant had no right to inflict upon the plaintiff.1030 
In Leenders v. California Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp.1031 the 
plaintiff's eye had been injured as a result of the defendant's negligence. 
A physician testified that the tear duct did not carry off the water from 
the plaintiff's eye, and that such a condition would result in an abnormal 
accumulation of bacteria and that, in the event of the eye being scratched 
in the future, the presence of these germs might cause an infection or 
an ulcer which could impair the patient to a great extent or even result 
in the loss of the eyeball. On appeal the defendant attacked this testi-
mony as speculative. In affirming the lower court's judgment for the 
plaintiff, the court said: 
The fact that plaintiff had been physically impaired so as to 
increase the possibility of future infection in the eye was a 
proper matter to be considered by the jury in determining the 
extent of his present and permanent injury. The jury could 
not properly award him damages on such evidence on the 
theory that such infection with its attendant results was rea-
sonably certain to occur, It could take into consideration 
the actual impairment of his eye which permanently decreased 
his resistance to infection with all the results that might 
be attendant thereon. The size of the verdict does not indicate 
that the jury awarded damages on the theory that it regarded 
the future impairment of plaintiff's eyesight or the loss of his 
eyeball as reasonably certain.1082 
The opinion did not disclose the size of the judgment. 
1oao I d. at us. (Emphasis added.) 
1031 59 Cal. App.2d 752, 139 P.2d 987 (1943). 
10a2Jd. at 759. (Emphasis added.) 
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The' ramifications of these cases have great significance for radiation 
exposure claims. It is accepted that when a person is irradiated, there 
is definite "impact," whether by matter or energy is immaterial. The 
probability of collision between the cell matter of his body and the 
alpha or beta particles, neutrons, or the gamma ray photons is so great 
as to be almost wo% certain. If there are collisions, it must necessarily 
follow that some change in the body cells has taken place, some in-
crement of ionization. Scientists, and certainly geneticists, inform 
us that the effects of these changes on healthy cells are nearly always 
deleterious and permanent. In the words of the geneticists: "Any radi-
ation is· genetically undesirable, since any . radiation induces harmful 
mutations." 1033 Furthermore, there is substantial opinion among sci-
entists that any amount of radiation is pathologically undesirable.1034 
It is not surprising that the court in the Coover case was impressed and 
persuaded by such an argument, that they found this a condition and a 
"burden that the defendant had no right to inflict upon the plaintiff." 1086 
The most startling feature Of the doctrl.ne in radiation cases is that 
if the plaintiff can prove the existing, irradiated condition with rea-
sonable certainty-and he should riot have too much difficulty in this 
connection-the probabilities of some existing effect are overwhelming, 
and if this condition in itself is "some damage," then both the possibility 
of future injurious results and the character of those results go to the 
amount or extent of the injury. Under the New York admissibility rule, 
opinions of experts on these latter facts can be stated with less than 
reasonable certainty. In fact, this is what happened in each of these 
cases. In none of them did the experts predict, with reasonable cer-
tainty, that the actual, incapacitating results would follow from the 
existing condition. 
Consider, also, the impact of this doctrine on claims for psychological 
injury. The existing condition theory can be highly advantageous to a 
plaintiff alleging such injuries, for it gives him real, objective justifica-
tion upon which to predicate his neurosis~his apprehensive suffering 
with regard to an untimely and painful demise. There is at least an 
implication in the Coover case that the injury for which the court al-
.lowed recovery had such a subjective element. The court said, "The 
necessity of constantly ·watching and guarding against cancer . . . is 
an obligation and a burden that the defendant had no right to inflict 
upon the plaintiff." 1036 
108a Infra notes H>72-79· 
1ou Pollard, "Fall-Out Fever," 200 Atlantic Monthly 27-32 ( I957). 
1035 Supra note 452 at I IS. . 
1036 Ibid. 
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One further observation should be noted. In. both the Coover and 
Leenders cases, the courts do not treat_ the "predisposition" or existing 
condition and the ultimate, future injury as the same thing. The court, 
in the Coover case, refers to the predisposition, for which recovery is 
allowed,- as "some damage." Apparently, in theory at least, the measure 
of recovery for the predisposition would not be the same as it would be 
were the cancer fully developed. If the courts are willing to regard the 
predisposition as a compensable injury in itself, however, and if they 
allow opinion testimony of the possible consequences of the condition, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that the jury will award damages on the 
ba'sis of the gloomiest and most pessimistic prognosis. It is one thing 
to distinguish between the two with respect to the question of existence 
and quite another for the jury to distinguish between them when con-
~idering the monetary dimensions of the injury. 
(b) Future Injury Not Preceded by Compensable 
Injury· 
Thus far the cases have been concerned with the future consequences 
of existing injuries which may follow a past or existing compensable 
injury-past or existing as of the date the cause of action is brought. 
But what of future injuries which are not preceded by any compensable 
injury or incapacitating condition that has been reasonably contempor-
aneous with the negligent act or omission? Briefly stated, the plaintiff 
in such a case, due to the negligent act or omission of the defendant, 
will suffer injury at a future date. The first question is, When does 
the cause of action accrue? The second question is, Assuming that the 
cause of action accrues at the date of the negligent act or omission (if 
it does arise at this tinie the statute of limitations, except possibly for a 
recent Arkansas enactment, will preclude recovery for many inju-
ries) / 087 how does the plaintiff prove the future injury for purposes of 
obtaining damages? 
Cases· concerning this question are very difficult to find. In most 
instances injuries to persons have been more or less immediately ob-
servable. There is usually little time interval between impact and initial 
toarLa Porte v. U. S. Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.C. N.J. 1935). Injuries 
may be delayed as much as 35 years; see report in N.Y. Times, May 27, 1958, p. 21, 
col. 4· The Arkansas enactment, described infra note 1371, might be interpreted to per-
mit tolling the statutory period on the theory that it is not known whether the poten-
tial defendant is a wrongdoer until the victim's symptoms appear in the future. This 
would be an unfortunate application when no provisions are made for the problems 
raised by long-delayed injuries. 
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effect. While there have been numerous instances in which plaintiffs 
have anticipated future injuries and claimed damages for them, this 
practically always has been in connection with allegations of and claims 
for existing injuries.1038 A situation in which a person will not suffer 
reeognizable and compensable injury for a considerable period after 
the negligent act or omission which is its cause, and in which there is no 
interim indication of the condition, has been comparatively rare in the 
pre-atomic era. Even where such a situation is possible, the fact that 
the person who will ultimately suffer injury is not sufficiently aware 
of his condition means that he will not bring suit against the person 
responsible. No cases involving this exact situation have been found . 
. Inasmuch as the cases offer so very little direct light on this question, 
attention should be focused on the cases where, ·by reason of a statute of 
limitations, the principal question has been whether the plaintiff has 
been too late in bringing his action. Even these cases shed little light 
upon when the plaintiff could have brought the action. 
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.1039 is one case in which 
the court gave particular consideration to when the plaintiff could have 
brought his action. In this case the complaint alleged that, while in the 
employ of the defendant, the plaintiff inhaled foreign substances in the 
form of dust, and, as a result, contracted a disease of the lungs known 
as pneumoconiosis, or silicosis. In separate and distinct causes of ac-
tion the complaint alleged first that the plaintiff's exposure constituted 
a breach of a common law duty which the employer owed to the em-
ployee, and, second, that there was a breach of a similar duty imposed 
by statute; The periods of limitation with respect to the breach of 
these duties were three and six years respectively. The plaintiff brought 
suit shortly after he became incapacitated and his affliction was identi-
fied as silicosis. This time was more than three years after the last 
exposure to the dust but less than six years. The New York Civil Prac-
tice Act, §49, required that "An action to recover damages for a per-
sonal injury resulting from negligence" must be commenced within 
three years after the cause of action has accrued. The defendant main-
tained that the duty owed to the plaintiff was negligently breached, that 
the plaintiff had only a single cause of action for damages for such 
personal injury, and that, therefore, the action was barred by the three-
year statute of limitations. The plaintiff claimed that his cause of action 
1038 See cases discussed under increased susceptibility to disease, supra text at notes 
441 ff. 
1039 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936). 
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accrued, not at the time he inhaled the dust, but at the time when the 
dust, so inhaled, resulted in a disease of the lungs. 
With respect to these contentions, the court conceded that a cause 
of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion pro-
duce injury, but, by way of explanation, it pointed out that this does 
not mean that the cause of action accrues only when the injured person 
knows or should know that the injury has occurred. In answer to the 
question as to when the injury has occurred, the court said: 
The injury occurs when there is a wrongful invasion of per-
sonal or property rights and then the cause of action accrues. 
Except in cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides 
otherwise, the statutory period of limitations begins to run 
from the time when liability for wrong has arisen even though 
the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the 
wrong or injury.10• 0 
In the following statement the court indicated that the magnitude of 
the in jury at its inception has no bearing on when it occurred : 
Consequential damages may flow later from an injury too 
slight to be noticed at the time it is inflicted. No new cause 
of action accrues when such consequential damages arise.10u 
Applying these rules to the case before the court, Justice Lehman 
said: 
The injury to the plaintiff was complete when the· alleged 
negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff to inhale the 
deleterious dust. For that injury, including all resulting 
damages the defendant was then liable. The disease of the 
lungs was a consequence of that injury. Its result might 
be delayed or, perhaps, even by good fortune averted; never-
theless, the disease resulted naturally, if not inevitably, from 
a condition created in the plaintiff's body through· the defend-
ant's alleged wrong.10u 
With respect to the question as to when the plaintiff could have brought 
his action and what damages he could have collected, the court went on 
to state: 
It cannot be doubted that the plaintiff might have begun an 
action against the defendant immediately after he inhaled the 
dust which caused the disease. No successful challenge could 
have been interposed on the ground that the action was pre-
lOfO Jd. at JOO. 
lOU Ibid. 
to•z I d. at JOI. 
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. matur~ly brought because at the time it was commenced no 
serious damage to the plaintiff had yet developed. In that ac-
tion the plaintiff could recover all damages which he could 
show had resulted or would result therefrom.1048 
The court concluded that any cause of action of the plaintiff which 
rpust be commenced within three years after it accrued was barred 
for the above reasons. Nevertheless, it went on to impose liability on 
the defendant by finding that he had failed to provide the safeguards 
required by statute, that the statutory duty was imposed upon employers 
for the benefit of that group of persons of which the plaintiff was a 
member, and that the statute of limitations upon recovery for injuries 
arising out of the breach of such a statutory duty was six years. 
Whether the court actually would allow recovery before the disease 
or injury has manifested itself in some form is not made clear, but it 
does appear that the ruling of the court in the Schmidt case, with respect 
to when the period of limitation begins to run, represents the majority 
rule in negligence actions.1044 If the period of limitation has begun to 
run it is because a cause of action has accrued. Therefore, the Schmidt 
holding implies that damages for future consequences should be re-
coverable if proper proof is made. One writer takes rather strong 
exception to this majority rule. He states that "by no system of law 
giving weight to practical considerations could a cause of action accrue 
in respect of any mere act or neglect exposing one to disease, prior to 
the time when, if at all, a disease actually results-save for special cir-
cumstances, as of fright or apprehension." 1045 
Several courts have evolved a theory, however, whereby the con-
tinuing negligence is regarded as a single wrong against which the 
limitation period commences to run, only from the time of cessation 
of the wrong, or cessation of the inhalation of the dust, gas, or fumes 
or exposure to deleterious substances. In instances of disease contracted 
by employees outside of the workmen's compensation laws, some courts 
have established that the limitation period runs from the termination 
of the employment.1046 
The United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson 1041 did not 
follow the majority view . .In this case the plaintiff, a former fireman 
on defendant's steam locomotive, filed suit in a Missouri court under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover for injuries. He al-
1o4s Ibid. 
1oH See cases collected in Annot., II A.L.R.2d 2'17, 283-89 (1950). 
1046 I d. at 279 . 
. 1046 I d. at 289-95. 
1041 337 U.S. 163, 6g S.Ct. 1018 (1949). 
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leged that after thirty years of service he had been forced to cease work 
because of silicosis occasioned by continuous. inhalation of silica dust 
which arose from sand ~mitted in excessive amounts by the locomotives' 
poorly adjusted sanding apparatus. Urie filed suit on November 25, 
1941. Under the terms of the then prevailing three-year statute of 
limitations, the court could not entertain the claim if Urie's cause of 
action accrued before. November 25, 1938. Urie became too ill to work 
in May of 1940, and his condition was diagnosed as silicosis a week or 
so later. The defendant contended that Urie, having been exposed to 
silica dust since approximately· 1910, unwittingly must have contracted 
silicosis before 1938, and hence that his cause of action accrued more 
than three years before the action was brought. Alternatively, the de-
fendant also argued that each inhalation of silica dust was a separate 
tort giving rise to a fresh cause of action, and that Urie, therefore, was 
limited to a claim for inhalations after Noyember 25, 1938. 
The court, in ruling in the plaintiff's favor, rejected "such mechanical 
analysis of the 'accrual' of the petitioner's injury-whether breath by 
breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the disease," 1048 
stating that it would only serve to thwart the congressional purpose 
'under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. While the court simply 
could have ruled that the limitation period commenced to run on the 
date of termination of employment, as has been done in a number of 
of cases between employer and employee, it said that since the record 
contained no suggestion that Urie should have known he had silicosis 
earlier than May of 1940: 
. . . "It follows that no specific date of contact with the 
substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inas-
much as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the 
product of a period of time rather than a point of time; con-
sequently the afflicted employeee can be held to be 'injured' 
only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance 
manifest themselves." 1049 
The statement is itself a quotation from the case of Associated Indem. 
Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission.1050 
One other case dealing with silicosis should be noted. In Henson v. 
Dept. of Labor & Industries the court, quoting from Reed & Emerson, 
The Relation Between Injury and Disease, at 183, stated: 
"Silica dust inflicts injury to the lungs, not because of the 
physical properties of the individual particles, as the hard, 
1048 /d. at 169. 
1049 I d. at 170. 
1oso 124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075 (1932). 
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sharp particles of quartz and carborundum; but its danger lies 
purely in its poisonous chemical action. Because of this, it 
causes tiny areas of necrosis in the walls of the lymph spaces 
of the alveoli in which it is deposited, at which necrotic points, 
by ways of healing, there develops fibrosis and a proliferation 
of the surrounding epithelial cells, the latter explaining the 
nodule formation. 
"Silicosis is a progressive disease, the lung changes con-
tinuing to develop for one or two years after complete re-
moval of the individual from the silica hazard, this advance 
probably due to the continued chemical action of the silica 
stored in the lung tissues." 1061 
This court also pointed out that : 
It is evident, as shown by the authority just quoted, that, 
in most if not all cases, the symptoms of the disease do not 
manifest themselves until after a long period of exposure to 
silica dust and that an individual may not become aware of 
any disability until long after he has ceased work.1052 
From this it would appear that silicosis is one of the types of injury 
most closely analogous to those frequently caused by irradiation. 
Aside from the fact that in the Urie case the plaintiff was bringing an 
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which the Supreme 
Court has often construed at least "liberally," 1058 the principal distinc-
tion between this and the Schmidt case appears to be the manner in 
which the two courts look at the injury. Notice that in both cases the 
courts were concerned with "injury" and not with "disability," and 
that both courts were concerned with when the injury occurred, for this 
is when the cause of action is said to accrue and when the limitation 
period commences to run. In the Schmidt case the New York court 
takes a very mechanical position; the injury occurs when there is an 
"invasion" of the plaintiff's body by the substances whose chemical ac-
tivities cause the fibrosis and epithelial cell proliferation which consti-
tute the disease itself. As in the Crank 105• and Coover 1055 cases, dis-
cussed in the foregoing section, the incipient or initial condition caused 
by the defendant's wrongful act is the "injury," and the silicosis itself is 
regarded as "consequential damages" for which "no new cause of action 
accrues." Medically speaking, this view of the New York and the Cali-
1051 15 Wash.:zd 384. 386-87, 130 P.2d 885 (1942). 
1052 !d. at 387. 
1058 See Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77, 76 S.Ct. 131 (1955). 
1054. Supra note 1025. 
1055 Supra note 1028. 
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fornia courts probably is the correct one. The initial "invasion" or "im-
pact''-the inhalation of the deleterious dust or exposure to radiation 
-constitutes the injury, and all conditions and consequences which 
follow naturally therefrom, irrespective of what additional causes 
may concur, are simply new increments of the initial injury. In essence, 
the situation is really no different from that in the cases discussed in the 
previous section. For example, in the Cordiner case 1066 the plaintiff 
had made an apparent recovery at the time of trial; in so far as the 
present was concerned he probably had merely a potentially dangerous 
condition, which, at the time was not incapacitating. The only differ-
ence between this situation and that of Schmidt before he developed 
silicosis, is that Cordiner had suffered past injuries which were them-
selves compensable. Since there is no qualitative difference between 
their conditions with respect to future damages, there is no logical 
reason why the one should be able to collect for future damages because 
he has suffered past damages while the other should not be able to re-
cover for future damages be·cause he has not suffered past damages. 
Any such distinction is scientifically untenable and should be so re-
garded legally as well. So long as the legislative policy is to bar claims 
of a certain age, the courts must allow recovery for future damages 
that are reasonably certain to ensue regardless of whether there is past 
or present damage. 
In the Urie case the court expressly rejected any "mechanical analysis 
of the 'accrual' of petitioner's injury." The court, however~ did not say 
that petitioner could not bring an action until he was incapacitated, it 
used the word "manifest." It would seem that Urle was injured and a 
cause of action accrued "when the accumulated effects of the deleterious 
substance" manifested themselves to him. Depending upon his knowl-
edge, the period of limitation could have begun running at any time be-
tween the date when his lungs contained a sufficient quantity of the sil-
ica dust to give rise to the disease and the time when he was hospitalized 
with silicosis. This imparts a subjective quality to injury and does not 
impose the objective criterion of present disability; future disabilty is 
still sufficient to warrant recovery if properly proved. The decision in 
this case is predicated on notions of "fairness" and congressional policy, 
and not upon any substantially different attitude toward when an injury 
occurs or what constitutes a compensable injury. 
Admittedly the Schmidt and similar cases are not directly concerned 
with the problem under consideration and so are not too persuasive 
1ose Supra note 1015. 
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authority for the proposition that an action can be brought for future 
damages before any disability or other compensable circumstance or 
condition has arisen. Nevertheless, if cases containing such an implica-
tion are rare, cases stating the converse are even rarer, at least none 
have been found. This fact, plus the fact that the courts have repeatedly 
allowed damages for future consequences in connection with past and 
existing damage, should give some weight to the conclusion. Where 
such a cause of action is asserted, it will not fail, or at least should not, 
because of any absolute prohibition against the claim but rather be-
cause the prognosis in the particular case does not meet the standard of 
reasonable certainty. 
Although distinctions could be suggested, an analogy can be drawn 
to certain allergy cases.1057 These cases indicate that for purposes of an 
award under workmen's compensation laws, an occupationally derived 
allergy may be regarded as a "disability" regardless of the fact that 
upon separation from the irritant, ·the condition disappears. In Arkan-
sas Nat'l Bank of Hot Springs v. Colberf/058 for example, the court 
sustained an award of the workmen's compensation commission for 
total and permanent disability. Claimant-appellee, a sixty year old 
woman, was compelled to give up her employment as a bank cashier 
when it was discovered that her dermatitis was caused by an allergy to 
nickel and carbon, substances she came in contact with in the form of 
coins and carbon paper. Under the Arkansas statute-"The following 
diseases only shall be deemed to be occupational diseases. . . . Derma-
titis, that is, inflammation of the skin due to oils, cutting compounds, 
or lubricants, dust, liquids, fumes, gases or vapors." 1059 The court, ap-
plying the general rule of liberal interpretation of such a statute, found 
that the claimant. was allergic to the "dust" from coins and carbon 
paper. Although at the time the award was given the claimant's derma-
titis had cleared up entirely, an allergist testified that it would return if 
contact with the substances was resumed~ 
Surely a better system can be found to take care of such cases so as 
to avoid the "either-you-recover-or-you-don't" aspect of our two-value 
system. A suggested solution that takes greater cognizance of the statis-
tical probahilities is suggested later. 1060 
"'"" ( ulleckd 111 4 N C.t. A 3d 559 f tQSS l under the heading "Compensability of 
allergy w1thout present disabling manifestation.'' 
1058 20Q Ark 1070. 193 S.W.zd 8o6 f 1946) 
1059 Ark Acts of 1939, No. 319, §14(7). 
toao Infra recommendations discussion following note 1123. 
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(3) Application of Proof Rules and Present Scientific 
Opinion 
If the rules of proof described above are to be followed in radiation 
injury cases, what results might be reached based upon present opinions 
of responsible scientific persons? The postulation of some of the re-
sults should bring into focus much more sharply the inadequacies of 
the proof concepts and standards now applied by our courts. Some of 
the results may be startling to say the least. A warning is necessary 
therefore, lest the discussion that follows be misunderstood. The same 
warning will be repeated at the end to emphasize the purpose of the 
discussion and to place it in proper perspective, taking account of the 
limitations that are inherent in the information available. 
First, it should be remembered that our knowledge of the biological 
effects of radiation is still quite inadequate. The expert opinions used 
in the examples below are in many cases tentative and admittedly less 
than certain. Likewise, in rnany cases there is responsible scientific 
opinion to the contrary. In each case, however, the opinion expressed 
is that of a responsible, respected scientist who is speaking without re-
gard to legal concepts, particularly without reference to those involved 
in tort litigation. In each case the eminence of the expert is such that, 
to the extent expert witnesses are permitted to testify, his testimony 
would be submitted to the jury and whatever our differences of opinion 
as to what is the best policy, the jury under our present system would 
be permitted to decide which of the opposing views was to be accepted 
as "true." As pointed out previously, therefore, while the results are 
startling in some cases, it is submitted that each of the postulates could 
actually lead to the result suggested on the basis of existing rules of 
proof. · 
. Before plaintiffs' lawyers make too much of the examples to be dis-
cussed, it should be· indicated that to use present scientific information 
in the manner allowed by the jurisdiction most liberal in its admission, 
and under our present rules, would be quite premature and lead to 
a:bsurd results. Our thesis in· fact is that as yet scientists do not know 
enoug}:l about the biological effects of radiation to place too much de-
pendence upon their conclusions, arrived at for scientific and not legal 
purposes, except in the most obvious cases, until more is known about 
these effects. It is our view that such scientific information should be 
admitted in evidence in actual litigation only if we change our present 
system of trying and proving the damage and causation elements in 
tort cases. Since in most cases the understanding of the lawyer, and 
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even more certainly that of the jury, as to the validity and weaknesses 
of scientific evidence is so inadequate, and since the likelihood of serious 
injustice is so great, it seems most unwise to allow the laymen on juries 
to evaluate scientific opinion of the kind now finding its way into print. 
Our thesis is that radiation cases will show how completely inade-
quate is our present system of proving causation and damages, and this 
is particularly so in the kind of cases likely to arise in the event of over-
exposure to radiation. They clearly should not be used to award dam-
ages or to assign causality for future injuries. We suggest there is a 
better way to do it. 
Our tentative conclusions probably will not be acceptable initially to 
either plaintiffs' or defendants' lawyers. On reflection, however, both 
groups may ~orne to feel there is merit in the suggestions. In any event 
the possibilities in radiation cases, if present rules are used, should be 
set forth, even though the results themselves may be too startling 
to be accepted as a method of measuring and allocating the losses that · 
seem inevitable as we expand the use of atomic energy sources. We be-
lieve that the case is clear for initiating a combined scientific-legal study 
of the proper legal use of the most valid, presently accepted scientific 
information. In this way the proof problems as to causation and dam-
ages can be identified and dealt with intelligently on same other basis 
than the happenstance of an isolated case and the information available 
to the lawyers who happen to be trying it. This well may be an area in 
which there must be legislation if we are to arrive at anything like a 
just scheme for taking care of radiation injuries through the litigation 
process. 
(a) Specific Types of Radiation Injuries 
( i) Leukemia 
Leukemia is the injury about which we have the most scientific data 
bearing upon the certainty of causal relationship. There is responsible 
scientific opinion as follows : (I) Radiation "will produce an increased 
incidence of leukemia. At present the rate of leukemia for the few most 
heavily exposed survivors at Hiroshima is about 1.3 per cent. Radiol-
ogists, some of whom have received chronic irradiation on the order of 
I,ooo r. have 7 to IO times as much leukemia as has the general popula-
tion."1061 (2) The ratio of observed cases of leukemia among the sur-
10a1 Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. g81 [hereinafter cited as Radiation 
Hearings]. See also figures at g86 on English study, indicating increase of from 4.1 
per 10,000 persons irradiated· to 17.6 per 10,ooo. Also at 988, 916, 1791. 
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vivors at Hiroshima in the zone where supposedly fifty rems exposure 
was received was 2.6 times greater than should have occurred normally 
during the period observed.1062 ( 3) " [ T] he data obtained from surveys 
of exposed human populations indicate that there is a clear association 
between leukemia and previous radiation exposure." 1063 ( 4) Of the 
survivors at Hiroshima, in the region estimated to have received only 
twenty-five rems (with a maximum possible dose of 100 rems), ten 
persons died of leukemia, four of whom would have been expected 
to die on the basis of spontaneous incidents.1064 (5) Out of a group of 
1,400 children treated with from 100 to 300 units of radiation, seven 
developed leukemia where only one would have been expected from the 
natural incidence of leukemia.1065 (6) "[R]adiation induction of leu-
kemia is proportional to the radiation exposure and . . . for whole-
body radiation exposure the number would be entirely consistent with 
an estimation that 50 r. doubles the chance of development of leuke-
mia." 1066 (7) Two hundred roentgens exposure to children has been 
found to induce cancer in later life. It also has been found that exposure 
to as little as three to five roentgens during the last two months before 
birth has caused cancer a few years later .1067 ( 8) "The laboratory evi-
dence for the leukemogenic action of ionizing radiations is overwhelm-
ing, the Hiroshima-Nagasaki experience dramatic, and the evidence 
for an increase in carcinoma of the thyroid after therapeutic irradiation 
of supposed enlargement of the thymus highly suggestive. More dis-
turbing than all this, however, is an English publication . . . indicat-
ing that the fetuses of women subjected to x-ray pelvimetry during 
pregnancy develop leukemia and malignancy during childhood twice as 
frequently as do non-irradiated .... Of course, it is total body radiation 
that the fetuses receive, but the dose probably does not exceed 2,500 mr. 
[2.5 rems]." 1068 (9) No one has yet been able to demonstrate an in-
creased incidence of leukemia or other cancer of the person living in a 
brick house in Denver who is exposed to 4·5 rems in a thirty year period 
as against 3 rems for a person living in a frame house at sea level, nor 
among the inhabitants of Travancore, India, where the thirty year 
1o62 /d. at 989. table 1. But note limitations on accuracy. See also pp. 1554, 1624-
1068 /d. at 992. Compare scepticism as to such conclusions at 906-<>7, 909· 
1064 /d. at 957· 
1085 I d. at 9s8. 
1068 I d. at I132. (Emphasis added.) See also 1791. 
1067 /d. at 1264- Effect from fall-out alone enough to double rate of leukemia in 
some places; 1292. 
1o6s Hodges, "Health Hazards in the Diagnostic Use of X-Ray," 166 ].A.M.A. 577, 
578-79 ( 1958). He warns our proof is not very accurate. (Emphasis added.) 
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accumulation may be as high as fifty rems.1069 ( 10) Natural back-
ground radiation may be responsible for ten to twenty per cent of the 
observed leukemia/070 (which might be taken to mean that a dose of 
less than t'l.oenty rems would cause a doubling of the leukemia rate.) 
(I. I) "The evidence is increasingly in" the direction that there is no 
threshold for either the somatic or genetic effects of radiation.1011 
Assuming for purposes of analysis the accuracy and relevancy of 
these statements (which actually should not be done in our opinion at 
the present time, if present rules are followed), observe the case that 
could be made for a plaintiff. If as little as 2.5 rems exposure of a foetus 
and from 25 to so rems exposure of an adult doubles the incidence of 
leukemia, then a person so exposed could claim (ignoring the statute of 
limitations problem) that if he should develop leukemia at a later date 
the chances are better than fifty-fifty that his leukemia resulted from 
the radiation exposure, rather than from all other causes together. 
Therefore "more probably than not" his leukemia was caused by the 
radiation to which he was exposed. It is submitted that prognostica-
tions of this kind are every bit as good as, if not better than, the opinion 
of just any doctor or even an expert in the field, offered in the form of 
testimony, that "more probably than not" or that "there is a reason-
able probability" that the injury resulted from a particular exposure. 
Yet this is the conclusion to which the present tort rules concerning 
proof of causation and damages would lead us if applied logically to 
radiation cases on the basis of present scientific information. 
(ii) Pre-Birth Injuries-Genetic Damage 
The following statements have been made by responsible persons : 
( 1) "Radiation, whether acute or chronic, has a definitely damaging 
hereditary effect, because, in contrast to most cells of our bodies, there 
is no threshold for damage to the hereditary material and there is no 
recovery from injury in them." 1072 (2) "While the majority of these 
genes [mutated genes] may have no recognizable effects for a number 
1oa9 I d. at 581-82. See also Burnet, "Where Is Science Taking Us?" 41 Sat. Rev. 
38-39 (Aug. 2, 1958). 
1010 Nee!, "The Delayed Effects of Ionizing Radiation," 166 ].A.M.A. goB, 912 
(1958). 
1o11 I d. at 914. 
1o12 Radiation Hearings g81. See also gg8, 917. See also excerpts from U.N. Com-
mission's Report on Effects of Nuclear Radiation, reported N.Y. Times, Aug. II, 1958, 
p. 8, cols. r-8. Cf. statement reported in N.Y Times, Aug. 16, 1958, p. 3, col. 4, that 
chronic doses have less genetic effect than acute doses. See also more extended re-
port in N V Times Feh X, IQStJ. p 32, cols. 3-8. 
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of generations, practically all are potentially bound to result eventually 
in undesirable conditions." 1078 (3) Thirty to eighty roentgens are esti-
mated to be the doubling dose for mutation.1014 (4) "[M]utations pro-
duced by radiation are probably as a class much worse in nature than 
those which arise spontaneously~" 1075 ( 5) Minor mutations are as im-
portant in the long run if not more so than gross mutations and the 
mutations are directly proportional to the radiation dose except for 
very high levels of radiation.1076 (6) There is no threshold level of ra.., 
diation below which radiation damage does not occur.1011 (7) There 
is no recovery with a time lapse so far as genetic damage is con-
cerned.1018 (8) "Man may prove to be unusually vulnerable to all ion.., 
izing radiations including continuous exposure to low levels, on account 
of his known sensitivity to radiation, his long life, and the long interval 
between conception and the end of the period of reproduction." 1079 
Here again if we accept the validity of such scientific opinion, at 
least to the point of admitting it for consideration, a jury would be 
justified in finding that exposure to radiation of an amount which al-
ready has happened in a number of cases has the effect of doubling the 
mutation rate. If the jury should then find that the deformity in the 
child is a result of a gene mutation and that the defendant exposed 
either one of the parents before conception, or the mother while carry-
ing the child, to something less than 100 rems the chances are more 
likely than not that the mutation is the result of radiation rather than 
some other natural cause. It is perfectly clear that a certain number 
of such malformations would occur even without the particular radia-
tion exposure that resulted from defendant's negligence or the opera-
tion of an ultra-hazardous source, but if one relies upon probabilities, 
such evidence would justify a jury's reaching the conclusion that "more 
probably than not" it came from defendant's source. 
One cannot help but ask whether this is the kind of evidence that can . . 
101s Radiation Hearings 79CJ. 
1o74 /d. at 917, 1017-18, 1003. See also Neel, supra note 1070 at 912; Hodges, supra 
note Jo68 at 579-Bo. May be as low as ten roentgens; Radiation Hearings 1033, 1036. 
1on R~diation Hearings 1032. · . · 
1o1e /d. at IOIJ. See also 1757; Neel, supra note 1070 at 909, 914. But see doubts 
indicated in Radiation Hearings 1755, and statement of Dr. Warren of UCLA, reported 
N.Y. Times, April 21, 1958, p. 25,-col. I. 
1011 Radiation Hearings· 1090. At least the burden of proof is ·on one who argues 
that there is threshold; Nee!, supra, note 1079 at 909·. 
101s Radiation Hearings 1095. . 
1079 Excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear Radiation, 
~pra .note i072 a~ col. 4· · 
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be intelligently considered by a jury or even by lawyers in the present 
state of scientific knowledge. To make the case turn on whether the 
percentage is forty-nine or fifty-one, illustrates the unfairness, in an 
individual case, of our system of awarding damages on the basis of 
probability. It is true that the defendant can introduce expert testimony 
casting doubt on the validity of the statements made by the plaintiff's 
scientists, but this may not have the desired effect on the jury which 
probably will be permitted to decide the question if there is a conflict 
between the scientists or experts. 
In such cases, defendant can find such statements as (I) "The radia-
tion dose necessary to double the mutation rate appears to be about so 
roentgens. It should be clearly understood that this is an estimate, and 
competent geneticists have submitted proposals from S to I so roent-
gens." 1080 ( 2) "With respect to the genetic effects which have been ex-
tensively studied by biologists, there are sufficient uncertainties even in 
these data so that it is not possible to accept them as entirely unassail-
able. These include the fact that data at low levels do not exist, that 
data are confined at present to Drosophila and to a few small mammals 
such as mice, that the mutation rate due to ultraviolet radiation appears 
to be nonlinear, and there is reason to believe that some of the energy 
transfer with ionizing radiation is in part of the same character as that 
with ultraviolet radiation. Man has existed since time immemorial in a 
sea of radiation where fairly large differences because of altitude and 
special geographic places also are present. It is difficult to reconcile 
some of the conjectures to be made at very low levels with the 
natural radiation doses to which man has already been sub-
jected." 1081 (3) "It is our contention ... that available data . . . 
are so inadequate that semi-quantitative treatments are ill advised since, 
except to the relatively few who have made a detailed study of the prob-
lem, they impart an error of mathematical exactitude and scientific ac-
curacy to an area where the errors ·are sometimes large and often in-
determinate. There is doubt concerning the advisability of calculations 
which have the appearance of mathematical exactitude to persons not 
thoroughly indoctrinated in genetics and unfamiliar with the shaky 
basis of the primary examinations (but) exposures to radiation of all 
types should undoubtedly be minimized until we have a clear idea of 
just ho~ harmful these efie~ts are." 1082 (4) It is extremely difficult to 
1o8o Radiation Hearings 910. (Emphasis added.) 
1081 Ibid. See .also 178o, 1785-91. See also Hodges, su.pra note 1o68 at 581-82. 
1 082 Nee!; "Effect of Exposure to Atomic Bomb on Pregnancy Termination in 
Hiroshima ·and Nag:isaki," Wash. D.C., Nat. Res. Council, National Academy of 
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measure the dosage to the gonads or reproductive organs to the point 
of being almost speculative.10Bs ( 5) "In ordinary circumstances only a 
small fraction, perhaps one or two per cent, of the hereditary abnor-
malities which appear in a generation can be attributed to fresh gene 
mutations. For the offspring of any given parents the risk from in-
creasing the mutation rate is very slight." lOBi 
The question is again presented, should juries be allowed to "play" 
with this kind of material, which even the scientists are accused of mis-
handling? 
(iii) Shortened Life Span 
That radiation exposure will shorten the life span of the exposed per-
son seems to be generally agreed upon by scientists. Certainly a plain-
tiff can find not only ample expert testimony to support this general 
conclusion but also he will find a considerable body of expert opinion 
which will reduce into disarmingly certain estimates the correlation be-
tween exposure dosage and the length of shortening. One finds such 
statements as : ( 1) "Human beings are too variable in their responses 
to radiation and in their state of health to permit any direct correlation, 
but it is probable that an acute dose of about 300 r. or repeated small 
doses totaling 2 to 3 times that would produce up to 5 years shortening 
of life span." 10B5 ( 2) " [I] t may be shown that an appreciable shorten-
ing of the lifespan occurs in mice and rats exposed daily to doses of 
X-rays in the neighborhood of 0.1 r. Whether this extrapolation is jus-
tified or not cannot be decided at the present time. Experimental data 
on lifespan obtained with other laboratory animals are quite frag-
mentary and extrapolation to low daily doses is even more uncertain. 
No· quantitative information is available in the case of man. Because 
the possibility of a shortening of the lifespan in man by small daily 
doses cannot be excluded, the available experimental data may be as-
sumed to indicate the desirability of lowering the permissible daily dose 
for lifetime exposure of the whole body to penetrating radiation." 10B6 
Sciences, publication 461 (1956) at 205. (Emphasis added.) In the same vein is 
Wright, "Discussion on Population Genetics and Radiation," 35 ]. Cell. & Comp. 
Physiol. 187-204 (June, supp. 1) (1950) [quoted by Hodges, supra note 1068 at 58o]. 
See also Neel, supra note 1070 at 913. 
lOBs Hodges, supra note 1o68 at sSo-82. See also Neel, .Nf!ra note 1070 at 913; Radi-
ation Hearings 1785-91. 
lOBi Radiation Hearings 16o3. See also 178g. 
10B5 /d. at g8r. (Emphasis added.) 1,000 r. to radiologists has lowered life span five 
years; 814 
1osa /d. at 8oo. 
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( 3) " [ M] ost mutations in man would produce various body impair-
ments leading to increased susceptibility to disease, lower life ex-
pectancy, increased embryonic death rate and similar things." 1087 (4) 
"[T] here is growing reason in infer that this shortening of life and the 
other long delayed damage done to an exposed individual have their 
basis in damage done to the genetic material-the chromosomes and 
their contained ·genes-{)f the body's ordinary cells, those of the blood, 
skin, glands, and so forth, similar to the damage done in his reproduc-
tive cells that is passed on to later generations." 1088 ( 5) Any damage to 
the chromosomes or the genes results in a decreased resistance to dis-
ease and the consequent shortening of the life span no matter how 
small the dose. 1089 ( 6) "It is almost certainly through the individual 
cell deaths and impairments that minute doses of radiation, long con-
tinued or repeated, exert their action in shortening the life-span of the 
exposed individual. This effect, first analyzed by Boche and then by 
Sacher, had been calculated to cause a reduction in length of life in the 
order of several days for every roentgen unit received by the body as a 
whole during a person's lifetime." 1090 (7) Assuming a loss of ten days 
for each roentgen of exposure, 400 r. would shorten a human life by 
eleven years.1091 (8) There is no threshold effect so far as shortening of 
life span from radiation is concerned, it being proportional to the 
dose.1092 
If these facts, or rather opinions are accepted, they lead inevitably to 
the conclusion that exposure to radiation, even at a very low level, re-
duces the life of an exposed man to some measurable degree. The 
opinions even have considerable significance in connection with proving 
certainty of damages to the genes which unite and become the embryo, 
later born as a child. Accepting the usual rules of evidence expressed 
in terms of probability, a tenable argument can be made that exposure 
of the parents would create a very good chance that the life expectancy 
of the child, later conceived and born, has been reduced. Considering 
the accidents that already have happened, as in the recent incident in the 
Oak Ridge Laboratory where a workman was found to have received 
1o81 Id. at 1012. 
1088 !d. at 1052. 
1o8o I d. at 1054-
1090 !d. at 1o67. (Emphasis added.) See also 1093 (five to thirty-five days for each 
unit of radiation received by the father). 
1091/d. at 1094. See also 1103 (I! years per 100 r.); 1122-24. 
t092Jd. at 1110, 1118. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1957, p. 35, col. 1. (One to 
fifteen days per r.) 
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320 rems full body exposure,1093 how many cases for damages for a 
shortened life span are actually possible at the present time, not to men-
tion the future, assuming the law permits recovery? Argument can be 
made to the contrary, of course, as in the case of incidence of leukemia 
and genetic damage. Yet the statements of experts to the effect that 
shortened life span probably results from irradiation are certainly suf-
ficient to go to the jury, and in fact there seems to be general agree-
ment that there is some shortening of the life span, the question being 
only as to amount. 
There are statements to the contrary, such as: (I) The difference 
in life span found between the normal white male population and radiol-
ogists in America can be explained on differences in age composition of 
the two groups, rather than on the basis of exposure to ionizing radia-
tion.1094 (2) "From the point of view of the span of life, I feel for 
projections to low levels this falls in exactly the same kind of category. 
We cannot determine what~ happening at very low levels." 1095 (3) 
"All data presented at the present time are either presumptive or specu-
lative for very low doses. They rest in hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical aspect of dose effects at high levels. I believe there is suf-
ficient uncertainty so that it would be unwise, and in fact nonscientific, 
to make conclusive decisions on the basis of these extrapolations." 1098 
(4) There has been no reliable evidence yet of a shortening of life span 
in people living in Denver or more importantly in Trayancore, In-
dia,1097 and studies in the United Kingdom have failed to demonstrate 
a shortened life span effect.1098 
The defendants also can point out that there are many other factors 
which cause an equal or in some cases greater shortening of life span 
than exposure to high amounts of radiation. For example, it is esti-
mated that life expectancy is reduced five years for living in the city 
instead of the country, three and one half years for being twenty-five 
per cent overweight, and seven years for smoking one pack of cigarettes 
1ous See articles in N.Y. Times, June 17, 1958, p. 23. col. 2; June 20, 1958, p. 11, 
col. 1; June 28, 1958, p. 2, col. 5; July 4. 1958, p. 28, col. 7; Aug. I, 1958, p. 42, col. 7; 
and Sept. 9, 1958, p. 24, col. 4. See also discussion of shortened life, supra notes 482 ff. 
1094 Seltser & Sartwell, "Ionizing Radiation and Longevity of Physicians," 166 
].A.M.A. 585, 587 (1958). 
1095 Radiation Hearings go6. (Emphasis added.) 
1098 I d. at 910. (Emphasis added.) 
1097 Hodges, supra note 1o68 at 581-82. 
to9s Excerpt from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear. Radiation, 
supra note 1072 at col. ~· 
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a day.1099 Even assuming that recovery should be allowed for shorten-
ing of life span, how can it be determined whether the shortening of 
the life span is caused by one factor or another? On the other hand, 
every factor has its own effect independently of the others. When 
scientists differ as to the quantitative effect of exposure on length of 
life, the case typically is taken to a jury in our tort system, on the as-
sumption that it can resolve the conflict which experts cannot. 
(iv) Increased Susceptibility to Disease 
Most ·scientists agree that exposure to radiation increases the suscep-
tibility to disease or other bodily injury from a later force other than 
radiation. We find responsible scientific opinion to support the follow-
ing: ( 1) Studies of patients who have received radioactive material in 
the course of medical treatment have been found to have much more 
fragile skeletal systems in which the bones break much more easily than 
would otherwise be the case.1100 ( 2) Exposure from ingested radium 
may be much worse for older people because the body is not able to 
repair damage as well.1101 (3) "[S]ubclinical changes may cause a re-
duction in the reserve function of organs. This may go undetected in 
most instances. The combined effects, however, of an intercurrent disease 
and the reduced function from the effects of radiation may cause more 
severe effects than either the disease or the radiation separately." 1102 
(4) Most of the testimony of the geneticists indicates that one very 
likely effect of the exposure of genes before conception is that the re-
sultant child will have a lower resistance to disease.1103 
The general agreement among most scientists that exposure to radia-
tion does lower resistance to disease again leaves to the jury the duty 
of determining not only which scientific conclusions as to the degree of 
increased susceptibility to accept but also the monetary value of such 
increase. It may be one thing for a jury to determine the value of such 
a loss, but it is quite another for it to determine the meaning of the data 
which scientists use to draw their conclusions that there is a certain in-
crease in susceptibility. 
1 099 See table set out in Radiation Hearings 1107. Some authorities doubt that muta-
tions are mechanisms for causing radiation aging. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 4, 
col. 6. 
11oo Radiation Hearings 1153-54. See also 1167-68. 
1101 l d. at 1 173. 
1102 Ibid. 
1103 Supra notes 1072-79. 
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( v) General Somatic Effects 
Related more or less directly to the specific diseases just listed is the 
effect of radiation on the general physical well being of the irradiated 
person. Again there seems to be general agreement that there is some 
such effect, although it is not easily measured. Among the types of in-
jury mentioned in this category are lowered growth rate among exposed 
children, 1104 damage to the blood producing bone marrow 1105 by doses 
as low as one roentgen per week, 1106 a change in the normal ratio in the 
sexes of newborn children, 1107 damage to the ability of body cells to 
divide and replace old cells/108 premature aging, 1109 and lowering of the 
intelligence quotient of children whose parents' genes have been ex-
posed.1110 One estimate has been offered to the effect that exposure to 
two roentgens a year of the population generally would cancel all the 
gains made in general health level and life span by modern medical 
science.1111 
It should be remembered, of course, that such effects can be shown 
only by the use of statistics. Conclusions apply tg averages, and there is 
a statistical risk only for a specific person. At the present time there 
seems to be no way of knowing whether the injury will be suffered by a 
specific individual, or even whether an injury manifesting itself in a spe-
cific person came from a particular source, such as radiation. If one 
uses probabilities as the test, however, such lack of preciseness for in-
dividual cases does not refute the validity of the assertion that the in-
jury was caused more probably by radiation than by all other sources. 
Here again we see the effect of our accepted system involving either 
full recovery or no recovery at all. 
(b) Other Legally Significant Scientific "Facts" 
There are certain other responsible scientific opinions (not facts) 
which will have significance in the handling of the legal problems aris-
11o4 Radiation Hearings II36. 
11o5Jd. at ust. 
1106/d. at IS6o. 
1101 Id. at 178o. 
110SJd. at 10,52-53. II04-
110DJd. at nos-o6, II22. Cf. opinion reported in N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 4. 
col. 6. 
1110 Excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects of Nuclear Radiation, supra 
note 1072 at col. I. Damage to the brain may result from small doses of radiation, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1958, p. 4. col. s. 
1111 Radiation Hearings Il2I. 
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ing in radiation cases. Any lawyer, in dealing with the kind of evidence 
which inevitably seems part of a radiation case that is well-handled, 
should be aware of these as well. In the first place, there is a consider-
able difference of opinion of experts as to whether experiments con-
ducted with relatively high doses of radiation can be extrapolated on a 
linear basis to low doses. 1112 This in turn is closely related to the ques-
tion whether there is a threshold level below which radiation does not 
cause injury, or at least does not cause irreparable injury.1118 It also 
should be recognized that much of the contemporary scientific opinion 
is supported by experiments on other organisms, such as fruit flies and, 
in a few cases, mice. Doubt exists as to what extent the experience 
with these other organisms can be extrapolated and used in predicting 
the effect on man.1114 There has been very little experience in exposure 
of human beings in sufficient numbers to give a statistically sound basis 
for conclusions.1115 
It must be remembered always that opinion as to the correlation be-
tween exposure and present or potential future diseases or injuries is 
statistical in nature and that as yet there is no way of tying down a 
particular injury to a particular exposure, or to radiation exposure as 
against other forces, natural or human.1116 Equally important, because 
it may be a contributing or even a sole cause of certain injuries, is the 
background radiation to which all people are subjected at all times, not 
only from cosmic rays but also from surrounding material including 
the earth upon which we live.1117 The fact that the manifestations of 
exposure may be delayed for considerable periods of time, up to at 
least thirty-five years/118 is also significant, particularly for purposes of 
the statute of limitations question. In considering the legal significance 
of radiation dosage standards that have been established by one or 
another group (private or official), it also must be remembered that 
the standards set have been merely estimates on the basis of the best 
1 112 /d. at 902-03, 906-<>7, 909, 910. 
1 113 /d. at III3, II I6, II38, II4I; excerpts from U.N. Commission's Report on Effects 
of Nuclear Radiation, supra note 1072 at col. 6. 
1114 Radiation Hearings Io¢, II44, I8o8. 
1115 /d. at 8<>7, 945, 957, 958, 963, 965-66, 968, g8I, 986, IllS, II22, I264, 1554, 1624, 
178o. See also Hodges, supra note 1068 at 578-79. 
1110 Hodges, supra note 1068; Radiation Hearings I 106; N eel, supra note 1070 at 913. 
1 117 Hodges, supra note 1068 at 581-82; Radiation Hearings I292, 1429. Brazil nuts 
and cereal are reported to have higher concentrations of radiation than other foods. 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1958, p. 45, col. I. 
1118 N.Y. Times, May 27, I958, p. 2I, col. 4; Radiation Hearings 1168, II71, I557-S8, 
1560. 
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existing knowled~e.1119 They represent, at best, a balancing of interests, 
recognizing that some damages may result, but that the advantages out-
weigh the disadvantages, although always with the basic premise that 
it is better to err on the side of safety. On the other hand, experience 
over the last ten years has indicated that our earlier estimates of safe 
levels probably were too high. 
(c) Conclusions 
As indicated at the beginning, the foregoing is not an exhaustive col-
lection of all the scientific information that is available to a lawyer try-
ing a radiation case. The information here referred to, however, par-
ticularly that collected in the congressional hearings, literally is a gold 
mine of such information, and undoubtedly is the most extensive col-
lection of the most authoritative opinions to be found anywhere deal-
ing with the problems of radiation injury. If the law continues to 
insist upon the tort liability concepts that "you either recover total dam-
ages or you recover nothing at all," and uses the weight of probabilities 
to determine whether there is to be recovery or no recovery, the lines 
drawn are arbitrary in the extreme, particularly as to future injuries 
not yet manifested. · 
The results that may be reached under our present system can be al-
most ridiculous in atomic energy situations. If a person has been ex-
posed to radiation to the extent that the best scientific opinion would 
indicate that his chances are sixty to forty of developing cancer or some 
other radiation injury, then it is perfectly clear, in the long run, that 
many of those who recover damages will never actually suffer the in-
jury. The closer the percentage is to fifty per cent the more will be 
compensated unjustifiably, and the closer it is to a hundred per cent the 
more will recover justifiably. It is equally a hardship to the plaintiff 
who actually suffers injury in cases where the law of probabilities comes 
out at something below fifty per cent. He may be able to show only 
that the probabilities are one out of three that an injury will occur. It 
is possible that he will be the one who was damaged. It actually can be 
said under these circumstances that only at the extremes, perhaps be-
tween ninety and one hundred per cent and between ten and zero per 
cent, is an)rthing like "substantial" justice done. 
While the system in the long run may work out favorably in terms 
of the law of averages for society as a whole, this is purely coincidental 
1110 Radiation Hearings 8o8, Su, 831-32; N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1957, p. 6, col. 4; Dec. 
·n, 1957, p. 14, col. 6. · · 
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and has nothing to do with justice between the individual parties. A 
defendant who has to pay damages to a person who proves a fifty-five 
per cent probability but who does not develop the injury later has been 
forced to pay without good cause. Likewise, a plaintiff who could show 
only a forty-five per cent chance that he will be injured in the future 
as a result of present exposure, but develops the injury later, surely 
feels no better merely because others who proved a fifty-five per cent 
chance may have recovered unjustifiably. The results have little to do 
with compensation in any true sense of the word. Even as to present, 
as distinguished from future, injuries, the chances that factors other 
than radiation are the real cause of the condition are very great and the 
results are almost as capricious. The difficulty is that there is no way of 
knowing whether the particular plaintiff or the particular defendant has 
been treated fairly in the specific case. It will be purely happenstance. 
By taking just one extreme although not impossible example, it can 
be shown how completely unrealistic and arbitrary the results will be 
if present tort rules are applied. While the chances of a major reactor 
burn-up are extremely slight and the possibility that significant amounts 
of radioactive material will be discharged over heavily populated areas 
is even less, there is no responsible scientist who will give assurance that 
it can never happen. The insistence of business interests that the fed-
eral government adopt the indemnity program evidences the fact that 
industry believes such a disaster could take place and it is willing to pay 
very high premiums for insurance coverage up to the point where the 
federal government will take over liability. What are the legal conse-
quences under existing rules, assuming the "impossible" becomes a 
reality? They are ridiculous! Even if this kind of major accident never 
occurs its possibility serves to dramatize the results we will get in minor 
accidents. It is a matter of statistical incidence whether the number 
exposed be large or small; the large number just makes the application 
of the law of averages in a particular case more dramatic, not any less 
accurate. 
The number of persons and the extent of exposure in the event of a 
major reactor burn-up with a resultant discharge of radioactive mate-
rial under circumstances which carry it over a city in concentrated form 
has been the subject of two scientific studies.1120 Laying aside the most 
unlikely case of 100 per cent discharge, where literally scores of thou-
1120 Gomberg, Bassett & Velez, Report on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding 
Population of an Assumed Release of Fission Products into the Atmosphere from 
3oo-Megawatt Nuclear Reactor Located at Lagoona Beach, Michigan, Eng. Res. Inst., 
University of Michigan (1957). 
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sands conceivably might be killed and many more exposed to 300, 100, 
so, or 25 rems, what would happen if it were assumed that only twenty-
five per cent of the accumulated fission products were discharged over 
a large city? Even with this amount large numbers would be exposed 
to whole body irradiation of 100, so, and 25 rems, and untold numbers 
to S rems. Using the estimates of biological effect set out above,1121 the 
legal results in damage cases will have only a lottery-like chance of 
being just, even under present statutes of limitations. If these were 
changed (as they ought to be) to take care of the long-delayed injuries 
known to result from radiation, the results could be fantastic! 
Fifty-five rads is a general average of the estimates scientists have 
made as to what constitutes a doubling dose for mutations in human 
beings. By hypothesis this means that twice as many mutated genes 
have been created and therefore the chances are just as good, or better 
if more than this amount of radiation was received by the parents of 
a mutation-deformed child, that the mutated gene was caused by the 
particular radiation exposure rather than by all other causes added to-
gether. This is inevitable unless the defendant can show something in 
the individual case that increased the chance of a mutation from these 
parents above the normal expectancy. But this means that every single 
genetic deformity in like fashion can be "legally proved" to have come 
from this one exposure, unless the defendant can show a greater than 
normal chance of mutation for a particular couple. Yet, scientifically 
only half or a little more than half of them are attributable to the radia-
tion exposure from the reactor accident. Legally all are so attributable. 
Every baby, born within the period of the statute of limitations after the 
exposure of his parents to fifty-five rads or more, and whose deformity 
is the result of a mutation can show "more probably than not" that his 
deformity was "caused" by the particular exposure. 
Every case of leukemia that occurs within the succeeding decade or 
so in children who were conceived but not yet born at the time of the 
exposure of the mother to more than 2.s rems can also be "proved" 
legally to have been "caused" by this exposure. The same case can be 
made, of course, against any person who negligently exposes an expect-
ant mother to a dose which results in the embryo's or foetus' receiving 
as little as 2.s rems, and this could happen under any number of quite 
possible, in fact likely, circumstances. 
Not so absurd but equally stunning will be the liability for shortened 
life span resulting from the incident. Present scientific opinion sup-
1121 Scientific information cited supra notes 1061-I 119. 
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ports the proposition that every irradiated person loses something from 
his life span, one estimate placing it at ten days for each roentgen. 
Every person who receives 200 units of radiation can claim a loss of 
2,000 days, or five and one half years, those who receive 100 can 
"prove" loss of almost three years, those who receive fifty can claim 
one and one-half years, and those who receive twenty-five can assert a 
claim for two-thirds of a year. In the case of shortened life span this is 
actually an effect on each person, and individual differences in suscepti-
bility to radiation exposure certainly are no greater, if as great, as the 
variation present in most cases where life expectancy is determined by 
life insurance tables. 
The amounts claimed for shortened life span and even increased sus-
ceptibility to disease will be striking if all are asserted, and there is at 
least some fairness in allowing such claims to each person so exposed. 
The claims for mutation-caused deformities, leukemia, and many other 
similar injuries whose incidence is substantially increased by radiation 
exposure, are truly fantastic. Nevertheless, they are recoverable under 
our present theories of proving causation and damages. Moreover, this 
is true in all jurisdictions, not just the most liberal, if recovery is al-
lowable whenever it is "more probable than not" that a particular source 
is the cause of an injury: 
Other equally objectionable results will be reached from the plain-
tiff'_s standpoint. These can be demonstrated dramatically by reference 
to possible future injuries, rather than existing injuries as in the im-
mediately preceding examples. Taking figures from the English study 
of irradiated children who developed leukemia, let us assume that 
28,ooo children are exposed to enough radiation to cause seven instead 
of one out of 1,400 to develop leukemia sometime in the future, mostly 
after the statute of limitations has run. Even though the incidence in 
leukemia has been increased seven-fold, for each child exposed the 
chances are nevertheless only seven out of 1,400, considerably less than 
a fifty-one per cent likelihood, not "more probably than not," far less 
than "reasonable certainty." Yet, if the scientific studies are accurate, 
the defendant's negligence has "caused" 140 cases of leukemia that will 
show up sometime. . 
The doubling dose for mutations, possibly not so high as for leu-
kemia in adults, certainly could be received by m~ny thousands of per-
sons should there be discharge of radioactive fission products over a 
city as a result of a major reactor burn-up. Assuming that fifty-five 
rems is the doubling dose, perhaps 50,000 would receive this amount. 
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The incidence of genetic mutation from all causes is low so that doub-
ling the number still does not come close to a fifty-one per cent chance 
that a radiation-induced mutation will result· in a particular case. In 
fact, it would mean only an increased incidence of about one or two 
per cent in the first generation, hence, no recovery for this kind of 
future possibility. Again, however, it is assumed by geneticists that, if 
a large group of people is exposed, a fair number of mutations actually 
will show up in children born not only in the next generation but for 
many succeeding generations as well. 
These examples should suffice to show that the unfairness of our 
present damage concepts cuts both ways-for and against plaintiffs 
and defendants as a group. From this it can be argued that in the over-
all picture the system works satisfactorily. But this is so only in the 
same sense that a lottery is fair-it has nothing whatsoever to do with 
whether a particular plaintiff will suffer injury and so should or should 
not recover. The defendant's obligation to compensate will be deter-
mined "correctly" only by c(jincidence. 
While certainly this same problem is found in many tort cases, par-
ticularly in connection with proof of causation, it is peculiarly pressing 
in the radiation cases. A better system can be worked out, one having a 
more realistic relationship to the real probabilities, to the benefit of both 
plaintiffs and defendants, even though it may involve difficulties in ad-
ministration. Since one of the peculiar characteristics of overexposure 
to radiation is that only the statistical chances that damage will result 
are increased, we have a perfect opportunity for experimenting with a 
different system of proving causation and awarding damages to a pos-
sibly injured party. The use of statistics and probabilities involves in-
accuracies, of course, but for all of its inaccuracy it comes much closer 
to both reality and justice than the present system. A system can be 
worked out that will not make too many changes in the present manner 
of handling tort cases so far as concerns proof of duty, breach, and even 
. the evaluation (in money terms) of the injury received, and which still 
will preserve most of the traditional roles of judge, jury, and lawyers. 
( 4) Some Recommendations 
While absolute "truth" and "certainty," are unattainable legal goals, 
this is no justification for judicial nihilism. Despite their elusive char-
acter, the law should not be content with anything less than a reasonable 
approximation of practical justice. The results reached by applying 
present theories of proof are remarkably close to those obtained in a 
lottery. 
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(a) Inadequacies in the Present System 
The best that can be said for the present situation is that it tends to 
allow, in the aggregate, the successful assertion of more claims for 
future injury that ultimately may develop. In individual cases, how-
ever, justice often depends on luck. Many tragically injured persons 
will be denied recovery because the probabilities are a little less than 
fifty per cent. On the other side of fifty per cent, many will receive 
"windfalls" for injuries that never develop. In such cases the award is 
bound to be too much when no injury results and too little when it 
does. None will receive compensation at the time when it is actually 
needed, and, from the standpoint of the state, there is little assurance 
that even the fully compensated individual will not become a burden to 
society when the injury actually does develop. 
Likewise, the technique of seeking recovery for an existing predis-
position or predilection toward future injury which is not a present 
disability, is an unsatisfactory solution to the problem. An award whose 
amount is reduced in proportion to the degree of probability, as sug-
gested by one or two cases discussed in connection with increased sus-
ceptibility to disease, will never be adequate in cases where the condition 
does become an actual disability. Nevertheless, the proportionate award 
idea suggests a solution to the problem of future injury. As presently 
used, however, this method is little better than the more generally ac-
cepted solution because no recovery is needed if no injury results, and 
total recovery is needed if the injury does develop. 
As pointed out previously, the rule against splitting a cause of action 
and the statute of limitations concept are the principal legal obstacles to 
a more adequate approach to the problem of future injury. As to split-
ting a cause of action the plaintiff's natural desire is to recover as much 
as he can immediately, perhaps while he can still find a solvent defend-
ant. If he has to wait, he may recover nothing because the injury does 
not develop. The defendant also has a natural desire to have his lia-
bility determined as soon as possible and therefore he favors a short 
statute of limitations. 
The principal argument favoring a "wait-and-see" doctrine for re-
covery of damages for future injury is a resultant greater degree of 
certainty, and, thereby, a fairer treatment of both the plaintiff and the 
defendant. In addition, society's interests are better served by a system 
that makes compensation available when the injury actually becomes 
disabling. At least in the field of radiation injuries an attempt should 
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be made to modify the present system enough to see that these advan-
tages are achieved. 
The changes recommended could be limited to avoid affecting re-
covery for past or existing injury. Clearly they should not affect the 
size of the recovery for an existing fully manifested injury or the 
"guesstimate" as to the value of a fully manifested impairment. The 
changes should affect the recovery only for those injuries which may 
possibly arise in the future, both those which may follow an existing 
manifestation of injury and those which are not preceded by any dis-
abling or otherwise observable condition. 
The future injuries dealt with here presuppose knowledge on the 
part of the victim that he has been irradiated. There scarcely can be 
any problem of anticipatory recovery for future injury when the in-
jured person is not even aware of his exposure. It seems reasonable to 
expect that the vast majority of irradiation injuries are going to be suf-
fered by persons connected with the nuclear industry. Most of these 
persons, through the use of film badges, monitoring, and other detec-
tion devices,1122 will know, within limits, when they have been exposed 
and the magnitude of the exposure.1123 The only other sizable group 
will include those involved in a disaster of some proportions so that 
publicity will follow and exposed persons will be duly advised of their 
exposures. It is reasonable to say that science can now predict, to some 
extent, and will later be able to do so with even more precision, both 
the probability of future injury and the eXtent of the injury should it 
develop. Since we are dealing with a reasonably measurable quantity, 
the injury usually being statistically fairly well correlated with the 
amount of exposure, future radiation injury cases lend themselves to 
even greater accuracy of prediction than is to be found in the ordinary 
case of future injury, where there are no quantitatively determinable, 
causative factors. 
(b) Suggestions for Modification of Our Present 
Rules 
The:: changes here recommended represent an attempt to obtain 
greater certainty while preserving the desirable features of the present 
system. They are made with full recognition of the policy considera-
1122 Hutton, "Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation Injury," 46 Geo. L. J, 52 
(1957). 
u2a The authors have been told that there may have been an error in monitoring 
devices in the plant Y-12 .accident at Oak Ridge, the error perhaps off by a factor of 
10. Discussed supra at note 1093· 
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tions which militate against a "wait-and-see" approach. A mmtmum 
of change is desirable for several reasons. We are as yet somewhat un-
certain, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as to the nature of radia-
tion injury. Also it is recognized that we are dealing with legislative, 
judicial, professional, and business attitudes that are conservative and 
inclined to regard the existing order as somewhat sacrosanct. 
The basic concept is a simple one. We would deny any right to re-
cover at the time of exposure for any injury that will occur, if at all, 
only in the future. We would allow, or even require, however, that the 
plaintiff bring an action at once to establish the duty owed to him by 
the defendant, the breach of the required standard of conduct, and the 
fact of the plaintiff's exposure to radiation. The present statutes of 
limitations could remain applicable to this part of the proceeding, at 
least where the possibilities of exposure are presently known. In addi-
tion, the plaintiff should have the burden of proving ( 1) the percentage 
probability of occurrence of a future, disabling injury and ( 2) the 
probable monetary dimensions of that injury, should it develop. Should 
a duty be found to exist and should the defendant be found negligent 
and to have irradiated the plaintiff, there would then be a determination 
of the percentage of probability of future injury and the amount of 
probable damages. For purposes of these preliminary determinations 
all reliable medical statistics in both oral and published form should be 
freely admissible. 
Departure from the present system would come at the point of judg-
ment. No award for future injury should be paid to the plaintiff at this 
time, except, possibly, the amount necessary for minimum attorney's 
fees. Instead, the defendant should be ordered to pay into a fund or to 
obtain insurance coverage to protect the plaintiff for as long as there 
is real danger that the injury will develop, payment to be made only if 
the injury actually develops. The amount which would be made avail-
able by the particular defendant for the future contingency would be 
measured by the total damages predicted by the trier of fact multiplied 
by the percentage probability of the injury's occurrence. For example, 
if it is determined that the plaintiff, as a result of the exposure has a 
twenty-five per cent chance of developing cancer, and that, should such 
injury develop, his damages will be $20,000, the defendant, at the time 
of the first proceeding, need only contribute $5,000. 
The suggested result is far from certain justice in view of the uncer-
tainty of the base for our statistical calculations, but it is far more 
nearly accurate and therefore fairer than our existing system because 
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it is based on the injury actually manifested. Admittedly, the defendant 
has had to pay something upon some claims that may never be justified 
and upon some claims that he would not have been required to pay at 
all under the present system, but, if the number of cases is large 
enough, he is no worse off than before, since he will never pay the full 
amount of the future damages. Those contributions to what might be 
called the "contingent injury fund" by other defendants, for injuries 
that never develop, will be used to meet the cost of those that do and for 
which full contribution has not been made. From the standpoint of the 
plaintiff, the suggested system is far more certain. He will be able to re-
cover damages for any negligent exposure to radiation which gives 
rise to a probability of future injury when that injury does develop. 
This feature would provide compensation for many who previously 
could not have recovered because the probabilities were less than fifty 
per cent, and would deny recovery where subsequent events disclosed 
that there should not have been any recovery even though the probabil-
ities of occurrence were mort! than fifty per cent. There is also the ad-
vantage that this system provides for compensation at the time when it 
is needed-at the time when the injured person becomes disabled, a 
burden on his family or society. 
Upon compliance with the order of the court, and payment for any 
existing damages the plaintiff has shown, the defendant should be 
absolved from further liability for injury arising out of the negligent 
exposure in question. Thereafter, the plaintiff will have to seek recovery 
from the fund at such time as the predicted injury actually develops. 
Should the injury never develop, the plaintiff should not recover any-
thing. In the event the injury occurs, the plaintiff can then proceed 
directly against the fund for an amount no greater than that determined 
by the trier of fact in the first proceeding-$zo,ooo in the above ex-
ample. In recovering from this third party or fund, the plaintiff would 
have to prove the fact ofhis injury, the dimensions of the injury, and 
the fact that the injury was caused by the negligent exposure which was 
proved in the earlier action. All issues of law and fact, decided in the 
first proceedings, as to duty, breach, and exposure, would be res judicata 
at this later determination. The earlier determination of damages 
should be res judicata as to the maximum limit of the award, to give 
some certainty to the .base upon which all statistical calculations must 
be made. 
Let us consider these suggestions in light of the arguments pointed 
out earlier for and against a delayed recovery for future injury. Stat-
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utes of limitations are enacted to prevent the assertion of stale claims 
with the consequent opportunity for plaintiffs to wait until the tactically 
opportune moment when witnesses for the defense may no longer be 
available, although plaintiffs may well have preserved their own evi-
dence. The suggested system will not disturb this desirable goal. Only 
those issues of fact determined at the initial trial require witnesses with 
first-hand knowledge of the circumstances of the injury, and the ordi-
nary period of limitation can be applied to this proceeding. The issues 
of fact determined at the second proceeding require, for the most part, 
expert witnesses whose ability to testify will be little affected by lapse 
of time; in fact their testimony will be improved because the symptoms 
will have manifested themselves. 
In addition, the suggested system will enable the plaintiff to establish 
a source from which he may be certain to recover later. The plaintiff 
need not run the risk of subsequent bankruptcy or disappearance or hid-
ing of assets by the wrongdoer; such actions will not affect the plain-
tiff's ability to recover. This seems only fair if the plaintiff is to be 
denied present recovery. At the same time the defendant's liability will 
be established and fixed within a reasonable time, and he will be ab-
solved of further liability. The burden of waiting for future uncer-
tainties will be shifted to insurance companies or to a fund, and there 
will be no present and highly contingent liability for uncertain future 
injuries. 
The suggested modifications are intended to preserve the incentive to 
maintain the highest standards of care and safety. Atomic energy 
users, whether strictly liable or liable only for negligence, who are 
responsible for the greatest number of possible injuries will be required 
to contribute the largest amount. Admittedly, even this system does 
not maintain exact correspondence between those who actually cause 
injury and those who have to pay, but the approximation is as close as 
other considerations permit and probably closer than under workmen's 
compensation programs. The resemblance of the present tort recovery 
to a lottery draw would be obviated. 
(c) Administration of the "Contingent Injury 
Fund" 
Obviously the most difficult question that arises in connection with 
the suggested scheme is that concerning the nature of the fund or other 
source out of which damages ultimately will be paid-How and by 
whom is it to be handled? Whether the fund is to be administered by 
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a government agency or by private insurance carriers, a larger amount 
of money must be provided than ultimately will be available to claim-
ants. The costs of administration alone, not to mention the profit mar-
gins that insurers would require, are going to make inroads on each 
dollar contributed by the defendants. For this reason there will be a 
degree of probability above which it will be less expensive for the de-
fendant simply to pay the plaintiff immediately and directly. If, for ex-
ample, the defendant has to pay one dollar to provide ninety cents of 
compensation (the remaining ten cents going into overhead), he is just 
as well off if he pays immediately when the probability is greater than 
ninety per cent. This of course assumes that the ten cents administra-
tion cost should be paid by the defendant. For this reason, direct pay-
ment to the plaintiff should be made optional in cases involving more 
than a certain percentage of probability. It also may be fair to provide 
that if the probabilities are less than ten per cent or perhaps five per 
cent, plaintiff should be obliged to take his chances; i.e., no recovery 
should be allowed. 
The principal requirement to assure success of the "contingent injury 
fund" is that it accumulate a sufficiently large number of proportional 
contributions to permit application of the theory of pn:~bability. The 
fund itself will represent the accumulation of all sizes of contributions 
for all degrees of probability of future injury. Its effectiveness will de-
pend in large measure upon the number and variety of claims it repre-
sents. Thus, the least effective method would be found ·in a system 
wherein each defendant obtained insurance from carriers acting indi-
vidually and with no pooling of risk between them. Conversely, the 
most effective method so far as statistical probability is concerned 
would be a single, nationwide pool or fund, either governmentally or 
privately administered. Self insurance would seem unworkable. 
If a government administered fund were used, it probably should 
cover the risks arising in more than one state. It could be administered 
by the federal government and the amount contributed in each case still 
could be determined by state law and trials in state or federal courts in 
the same way as is now the case with tort actions. The judgments, 
however, would be paid into the federal fund rather than to the plain-
tiff and later the fund would pay full damages to a plaintiff who later 
contracts the disease. The fact determination that the disease exists at 
that time could be made by an appropriate state or federal court, or per-
haps by an administrative board. 
Perhaps a nationwide fund could be created by interstate compact if 
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a large enough number of states would agree, rather than have the fund 
administered by the federal government. 
A third alternative, of course, would be for Congress to create the 
fund and lay down the rules to govern liability and recoverable damages 
for all radiation injuries, superseding all state laws perhaps. The "con-
tingent injury fund" could function, however, without accepting this 
degree of interference with traditional state control of tort law. 
The theory suggested could be adopted so as to make use of private 
insurance carriers and avoid a government administered fund, whether 
federal or interstate. This plan might even make it possible to avoid 
jury determination of the percentage of risk created by defendant's 
radiation source, a determination not wisely left to a lay jury. Once 
liability and the amount of recovery were found, the defendant might 
then provide an insurance policy for the full amount, payable if and 
when the possible future injury occurs. The insurance company would 
charge a premium based upon an expert judgment of the probabilities, 
and if enough radiation risks were pooled by private insurance com-
panies and the statistics were valid, the premiums should cover the total 
that would be claimed by all plaintiffs who actually suffer the injury in 
the future. The effect on such premiums of interest earned before pay-
ment to the victim is required and of death of some victims by other 
non-radiation causes could be worked out by the insurance companies, 
and the premiums charged defendants adjusted accordingly. 
In any event, once defendant makes his contribution to the "con-
tingent injury fund," or takes out an appropriate insurance policy if 
this plan is used, his liability ceases completely. Thereafter the victim, 
if and when the disease occurs, looks to the fund created by the con-
tributions of many defendants on behalf of many plaintiffs. If the in-
jury does not materialize or if plaintiff dies of other causes first, the 
·amount contributed for him helps defray the awards to other plaintiffs 
who do suffer the injury. 
If the federal indemnity fund described in the last section of this 
chapter has to be used because claims from a large reactor accident ex-
haust private insurance coverage, the federal government contributions 
for future injuries should be made to the contingent injury fund or be 
used to take out a paid up insurance policy for each plaintiff who proves 
his case. 
Some Experience in Administering Injury Funds. It is not meant 
to suggest that a workmen's compensation plan of recovery for each 
injury regardless of tort rules of liability should be adopted and based 
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on a fixed schedule of awards for each type of injury. Nevertheless, 
workmen's compensation plans involve some administrative problems 
not too dissimilar to some posed by our "contingent injury fund." It 
is worthwhile, therefore, to look at the financing and experience rating 
aspects of workmen's compensation plans. 
In all state and territorial jurisdictions, except Louisiana, employers 
to whom the workmen's compensation laws are applicable are required 
to give assurance of their abi\ity to meet their compensation obligations. 
This may be done by insurance with a private carrier (in all but eight 
jurisdictions), or with a state fund (in nineteen jurisdictions), or by 
furnishing proof of ability to carry one's own risk, called "self-insur-
ance" (seven states excepted) .112• 
Private insurance is written by casualty companies of three types : 
stock companies, which are generally non-participating corporate enter-
prises in which profits are paid to stockholders and policy holders do not 
directly participate; mutual companies in which the policy holders are 
shareholders automatically, and generally they divide the profits as divi-
dends; and reciprocals, which generally are unincorporated groups of 
employers organized to sell insurance to each other. The reciprocals do 
less than two per cent of the total private compensation business. In 1951, 
as indicated by net premiums written, private carriers did about 8o.6 
per cent of the compensation ·business, state funds covering the re-
mainder. These figures have been relatively constant since 1917, with 
the state funds gaining a little during the depression period and losing 
again during times of greater prosperity. The only really significant 
proportional change is that which has taken place between the stock 
and the mutuals, the latter having gained appreciably at the expense of 
the former-from 12.4 per cent of the total in 1917 to 30 per cent in 
1951. Stock company carriers have generally recruited from the rela-
tively smaller and middle-sized risks, doing business through brokers 
operating on a commission, selling a more expensive type of insurance, 
but giving greater service. The mutuals have tended to attract the larger 
firms and higher grade risks, escaping some of the overhead inherent 
in the large sales organizations of the stocks. There is a noticeable 
tendency for each type to adopt the competitively advantageous fea-
tures of the other, so the differences between them are disappearing. 
On the basis of premiums, state funds account for 19.4 per cent of 
the compensation business. These funds are of two types: exclusives 
1124 The statements here made are based on Chapter 4. Somers & Somers, Workmen's 
Compensation ( 1954). 
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(in eight states), and competitives (in eleven). The latter are in com-
petition with the various forms of private carriers but the statutes set-
ting up such funds compel acceptance of every grade of risk, so they 
tend to cover the highest risks where they are in competition with pri-
vate carriers. 
On the basis of benefits paid in 1952, private carriers accounted for 
62.3 per cent, state funds 24.5 per cent, and self-insurers 13.2 per cent. 
Mutual, stock, exclusive state fund, and competitive state fund car-
riers are to be found among the ten largest carriers in the country. 
The subject of rate making is far too complicated to allow elabora-
tion here; however, some consideration must be given to it, for its very 
complexity reveals a significant problem or weakness in the suggested 
"contingent injury fund" scheme to cover radiation injuries. Essen-
tially, rate making, whether by state insurance supervisors, individual 
carriers, or the National Council on Compensation Insurance, is a 
statistical study in which optimum probability determinations are the 
goal. Periodically the various classes of risk, by industry and occupa-
tion, are assigned a compensation rate per payroll unit (e.g., $roo), 
which is determined from recent past experience with the class. This 
"manual classification gross rate" contains two elements : "pure pre-
mium" and "expense loading." Pure premium is that portion of the rate 
to be used to pay claims, and includes reserves for future benefit pay-
ments. It may be adjusted up or down periodically, depending on class 
experience- and educated guesses. Expense loading is the portion of 
the rate set aside to defray anticipated underwriting expenses or over-
heac.l. These expense loadings have been state approved and are uniform 
for all private carriers. Traditionally they have stood at or above forty 
per cent of the total rate, with acquisition costs, brokers' commissions 
( 17.5% ) , general administration expenses ( 7. 7% ) , and claims adjust-
ment (8.2%) comprising the major portion. Generally they have re-
flected the higher costs of the stock carriers. While in recent years both 
stock and mutual carriers have managed to reduce their actual expense 
ratios, established expense loadings have remained constant or even in-
creased slightly. The periodic revisions of these "gross rates" mainly 
have been changes in the "pure premium" figure and not the "expense 
loading." Needless to say, this feature of the rates has occasioned con-
siderable criticism from both employers and labor, and is one of the 
principal arguments favoring the state fund. 
"Merit rating" has been proposed as a solution to many of the inequi-
ties of the "gross manual rating," and is being adopted widely. This 
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type of rating is intended to distinguish between individual employers 
within the same industrial classification so that the rates imposed upon 
each will reflect that employer's accident record with respect to the aver-
age. There are three main types of merit rating with an indication of 
an emerging fourth type: schedule rating, prospective experience rat-
ing, retrospective rating, and interstate experience rating. Schedule rat-
ing was an early attempt to predicate the individual employer's burden 
upon the safety installations in his plant. It is of no practical signifi-
cance today. Prospective experience rating is based on the actual acci-
dent experience of the individual employer over the past one to three 
year period. It attempts to reward the employer with a relatively good 
safety record, and is both simple and expedient to administer. Unfor-
tunately, it has not affected the "expense loading" and has proved im-
practical with respect to low-risk, small employers. Retrospective rating, 
which was originally intended to help the stocks recapture from the 
mutuals who paid dividends to policy holders, uses only the employer's 
current policy year experience. He is rated tentatively, at the beginning 
of the year, by the prospective method. At the end of the policy year 
a final audit is made of his accident costs, and his final premium is 
established. This type of rating has also been used to reduce the car-
rier's expense loading, primarily by striking at brokers' commissions, 
which have been reduced to as low as six per cent in some cases. This 
type of rating has been available only to employers paying fairly sub-
stantial premiums (e.g., about $5,000 in New York), but has repre-
sented a large saving to them. It is criticized as being discriminatory 
with respect to small employers and as not being in harmony with the 
concept of a workmen's compensation program. The fourth and most 
recent development with regard to individual risk rating is interstate 
experience rating for employers in interstate operations. 
Most of the state funds, whether exclusive or competitive, set their 
rates in a fashion substantially similar to the method described for pri-
vate carriers. They often utilize the manual gross rates set by the pri-
vate rating organizations. The competitives may be found giving ad-
vance discounts or dividends or both to employers on an individual 
basis, and also they may charge above the manual rates for the un-
dc;!sirable risks which they must accept. The really significant difference 
between the private carriers and the state funds is to be found in their 
expense ratios. "Over the years competitive funds have devoted, on the 
average, about 14 per cent of premiums to expenses, exclusives about 
6 per cent," as opposed to 29 per cent for the stocks and 16 per cent for 
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the mutuals.1125 In connection with these comparisons it must be remem-
bered that the competitives tend to get the worst risks and the exclusives 
get all grades of risk. The Ontario fund, which is an exclusive and 
must pay all the costs of administration, adjudication, etc., has paid 
eighty-nine cents in benefits for every dollar of receipts. No part of the 
Ontario workmen's compensation program is supported by taxes. Of 
the eleven cents per dollar that goes for expenses, 2.5 cents goes for 
safety and mine-rescue work.1126 
Two features of these workmen's compensation rates are significant 
in a consideration of our "contingent injury fund." The first of these 
is the fact that the carriers themselves, whether private or public, who 
are liable for the benefits the law requires, are the determiners of the 
probability of injury. Their techniques for doing so are exceedingly 
complex and intricate. It is extremely doubtful if any jury or adminis-
trative tribunal could do the job with equal accuracy. It is obvious that 
no carrier is going to accept a judicially determined probability of 
future injury as a basis for insuring against the risk of liability; it 
would be financial suicide for it to do so. Before accepting a proportion-
ate contribution from a defendant, and agreeing to accept the possible 
future liability, the fund administrator will have to make an indepen-
dent determination of probability, and charge accordingly. From the 
standpoint of the private insurer, at least, a determination of probability 
by the trier of fact in a judicial proceeding is somewhat superfluous, 
although it might be mentioned that both jury and insurer will be in-
clined to err in the same direction-i.e., toward greater probability. 
The second feature of the workmen's compensation rates that reveals 
a substantial problem in connection with the suggested "contingent in-
jury fund" is the high cost of the insurance. The high level of ex-
pense ratio, especially that of the stock companies, may be prohibitive. 
Perhaps private insurance is out of the question, but our system of jus-
tice should not be absolutely bound to existing insurance programs. 
(d) Some Not Dissimilar Experience in New York 
An experiment tried in New York presents a very interesting analogy 
to our suggestion. In 1933 the New-York legislature amended its work-
men's compensation law to include a "fund for reopened cases." 1127 The 
purpose of this fund is to establish a method by which risk of claims 
1125 I d. at 125-26. 
1126/d at 314-
112164 N.Y Consol. Laws Ann. (McKinney 1946) §25-a. 
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recurring beyond the statutory period shall be borne by all employers 
and carriers,1128 and to insure in proper cases the benefits of the work-
men's compensation law to injured workmen regardless of prior denials 
and time limitations. It also serves to cushion the burden on the em-
ployer and carrier by relieving them from a continuing liability.1129 
Under New York law a person whose case is closed may come back later 
and state that he is still disabled or that his condition has worsened 
and that he can no longer work, in which case his right to additional 
compensation can be reopened if he presents medical proof of his condi-
tion and of the fact that it was caused by an industrial accident or oc-
cupational disease. The fund was created as a result of a recognition 
that there were numerous cases of industrial injury and disease which 
were arising, returning, or worsening after an award of compensation. 
Under existing law the courts had held that, when a case was closed, 
as to the type of injury, it could not be reopened upon this issue after 
three years from the date of injury. If the injury had been classified, 
for example, as "temporary· partial disability," such a finding could 
not be disturbed after three years, no matter what tragic developments 
might ensue. In a remarkable illustration of industry responsibility, 
employers and insurance carriers withdrew their objections to allowing 
the Commission to reopen cases even after an unlimited number of 
years-provided they got some relief in return. 
As a result of these conditions, the law was amended to provide that 
in a reopened case, if the award was made more than severi years from 
the date of accident and more than three years from the date of the last 
payment of compensation, the award ~ould not run against the em-
ployer or his insurance carrier directly, but would run against the "fund 
for reopened cases." This fund, in effect, became a reinsurer of all em-
ployers and private carriers for "stale" cases. 
Initially, it was thought that there would be comparatively few cases 
requiring compensation seven years after the date of accident and more 
than three years after the date of the last compensation payment. 
Therefore, only $250,000 was set aside to initiate the fund, and it was 
further provided that in the case of an industrial death, where the de-
ceased had no dependents to whom compensation was due, the employer 
or carrier would pay $r,ooo into this fund. These funds soon were 
found to be insufficient, so the act was amended to require a $r,soo 
contribution for eacl) "no dependency" case. The amendment also 
112s Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382, 87 N.E.2d 419 (1949). 
1120 Watkins v. Cornwall Press, Inc., z;o App. Div. 615, 63 N.Y. Supp.2d 23 (1946). 
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authorized the chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board to 
examine the fund periodically and calculate its liabilities. If the fund 
does not exceed those liabilities by $250,000 he is authorized to make 
assessments against all private insurance carriers, including self-insured 
employers, to make up the deficit. 
Because of the understandable popularity of this fund, two subse-
quent modifications were found necessary. The first of these was a 
rather generous statute of limitations. Under the present law, no case 
may be reopened and charged against the fund more than eighteen 
years after the date of accident or more than eight years after the last 
payment of compensation, whichever may be the longer. It also was 
found necessary to provide for a defense for the fund. A Special Fund 
Conservation Committee was created with five members, one from the 
stock companies, one from the mutual companies, one from the State 
Insurance Fund, one from the Compensation Insurance Rating Board, 
and one self-insurer. In any reopened case the chairman of this com-
mittee is authorized to designate the employer or insurance company 
that was primarily responsible for the compensation to act as defender 
of the fund and represent it with respect to the particular claim. . 
Apparently, the New York "reopened case fund" is unique among 
the workmen's compensation laws of the United States. The similari-
ties between it and our "contingent injury fund" recommendations for 
radiation injuries are clear. Each is intended to meet the same prob-
lem-the problem of delayed injury. The fund provides one source 
from which recovery for delayed injury is made available. It should be 
noted that in New York employers and private carriers were willing 
to accept the right of the employee to have his case reopened and the 
injury reclassified, for purposes of additional compensation, if their 
direct liability was cut off at a reasonable time, even though as a group 
they paid in any event. The private insurance companies apparently had 
no desire to insure indefinitely and they did not object to a state admin-
istered fund. The method of financing this fund is especially signifi-
cant. The requirement of contributions up to $1,500 from carriers and 
insurers who are liable for ~·no dependency death" cases, is essentially 
arbitrary from the "fault" standpoint, but it is expedient and it can 
hardly be termed "unjust." Notice that the "reopened case fund" was 
faced with the same problem that confronts the "contingent injury 
fund," i.e., the problem of lack of correspondence between predicted 
liabilities and reserves and actual liabilities and payments. If anything, 
the New York fund encounters a larger problem, for no attempt is made 
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to predicate individual contributions upon the probability of injury for 
which the individual may be responsible. This problem has been re-
solved by authorizing the Board to levy assessments upon all carriers 
to make up the deficit. If employers and private carriers will accept this 
arrangement, there is no reason why they should not be equally willing to 
accept liability to the proposed "contingent injury fund" for radiation 
injuries. In connection with this latter fund, problems of solvency of 
the fund can be resolved in the same way. Thus, the individual found 
to have been negligent could be required to make a present contribution 
to a national, public fund. The amount would be determined by the 
monetary dimensions of the possible future injury, multiplied by the 
percentage probability of its occurrence. This contribution could be 
augmented by a pro-rata payment for the expense of administration 
of the fund. Furthermore, any deficits that arise in the fund as a result 
of inaccurate predictions by the triers of fact at the initial trial could 
be made up by the use of assessments against all users of nuclear energy 
sources. These assessments could be made proportionate to the amount 
of radiation (both as to intensity and quantity of source) used by the 
different operators. 
There are some very vital distinctions between the New York "re-
opened case fund" and our "contingent injury fund." The New York 
scheme takes care of future injuries only where there is present injury 
for which recovery can be had within the time and coverage limitations 
of the regular workmen's compensation provisions. Our ·fund would 
be available to those whose only injury is possible future damage and 
defendants would contribute to the fund every time they are legally 
responsible for exposure which may ca~se future harm. This should 
be fairer, not only to the injured but also to the members of the defen-
dant's group as well, because each will contribute an amount based on 
his own fault or liability and in proportion to the amount his activities 
increase the possibility for future recovery against the fund. This pre-
serves much more realistically the concept of individual responsibility 
for harm caused by a particular activity and also takes care of what in 
radiation cases may prove to. be a very large group of plaintiffs who can 
show no present compensable symptoms but of whom a statistically 
predictable number will suffer serious injury. 
The fairness of the "contingent injury fund" is only as great as the 
degree of validity of the statistical evidence used. They are not com-
pletely reliable by any means, but the results from their use will be in-
finitely more "just" than those reached in ordinary tort cases today. 
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Many of those within the "more probably than not " group will die long 
before a feared injury manifests itself and from completely unrelated 
causes. This will be a "saving" to the "contingent injury fund" which 
can be passed on to those other plaintiffs who actually suffer the future 
injury feared and deserve fully adequate financial help. 
The "contingent injury fund" concept has another important advan-
tage in multiple wrongdoer or causation cases. Advantage can be taken 
of the merits of contribution between joint tortfeasor ideas in normal 
tort cases and of last-employer concepts found in some workmen's 
compensation plans. In radiation injury cases the "amount of damage" 
caused by each source can be approximated much more closely than in 
the usual accident case for the reason that the damage done, particularly 
as to future injury, correlates rather closely with the amount of radia-
tion received, although it may be difficult sometimes to determine this 
amount. By making each source, if there is legal liability for radiation 
from that source, contribute its share to a common fund there will be 
no need to hold each fully liable and subsequently make the one against 
whom a judgment is entered find and recover from the others legally 
liable. 
The multiple causation situation suggests one of the most important 
possible inequities and perhaps the greatest difficulties inherent in the 
"contingent injury fund" plan. Since most of the injuries which ra-
diation can cause also may arise from other forces for which the partic-
ular defendant may not be responsible, what assurance can be given that 
a future injury that manifests itself will not have been caused by some 
source which has made. no contribution to the fund; e.g., cosmic rays, 
other background radiation, or radiation properly used in medical treat-
ment? The short answer is that such assurance cannot be given. This 
does not justify rejection of the plan, however, because the same objec-
tion is even greater as applied to present tort liability rules. The same 
multiple causation possibilities exist whichever damage system is used, 
and the "contingent injury fund" idea lends itself much more readily 
and justly to a solution than does our present rigid two-value scheme 
of "recovery in full or no recovery at all." Possible shortages in the 
fund when the injury is attributable to causes making no contribution 
could be avoided in one of three ways: (I) the number of exposed 
persons who die for other reasons before the future injury manifests 
itself may be sufficient to offset those injuries actually caused by other 
forces, somewhat as in the New York "reopened case fund"; or (2) the 
government can make a lump-sum contribution annually representing 
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the statistically estimated contribution of such non-liable sources ; or 
( 3) the plaintiff will be allowed to recover only such proportion of the 
total damages as is represented by the contribution to his injury by con-
tributing sources, the remainder to be taken care of by his own re-
sources, which in many cases today might include his own medical, 
hospitalization, and loss-of-income insurance. Each of these solutions 
within the "contingent injury fund" scheme is much more acceptable 
than our present system of making the result depend upon "more prob-
ably than not" which gives a black-or-white result depending on 
whether the particular case falls on one side of fifty per cent or the 
other. Under our present system, by hypothesis, in cases in which the 
probability falls between twenty-five and seventy-five per cent, the 
result reached in the particular case is "more probably than not" wrong! 
(e) Concepts of the Civil Law Concerning Prin-
ciples of Damages 1130 
The problems involved in awarding damages are universal. Accord-
ingly, advantage should be taken of experience under other systems of 
law. The civil law has taken a somewhat more realistic approach than 
that followed in the common law countries. 
Specific Performance. In France the principle of specific perform-
ance allows for reparation of losses caused by tortious interference with 
property. The remedy is strictly within the discretion of the judiciary, 
but where the interests of justice are best served, and a lessening of 
burdens of evaluation may result, a court may order the "restitution" 
to the victims of a lost, destroyed, or damaged item, the substitute to be 
equivalent in quality, quantity, or general serviceability and value. The 
court may permit the defendant to choose between giving the plaintiff a 
like item or paying a certain sum. An impartial officer of the court 
will decide whether the object delivered by defendant to plaintiff sub-
stantially corresponds to the lost, damaged, or destroyed article. A 
court may also insist on specific "restitution'' as the only just remedy, 
and effective enforcement is generally assured by a judicial device called 
"astreinte," which corresponds roughly to a pecuniary penalty which in-
creases as the defendant delays performance. For example, in a case 
in which the defendant tortiously had cut and harvested the plaintiff's 
1180 This section is based on research in the original language done by Rinaldo L. 
Bianchi, ].D., Mich. 1955. Mr. Bianchi served on the staff of The University of Michi-
gan Law School from February 1955 to June 1957. He is currently with the firm of 
Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. 
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hay, the court ordered that an equivalent amount be delivered by the 
defendant.1131 The same kind of automobile wheels has been ordered 
delivered to the plaintiff,1132 as have tires,1188 and where the defendant 
accidentally destroyed the plaintiff's truck, the court ordered him to 
obtain and deliver to the plaintiff a truck of the same quality and 
make.m4 The judge is free to choose between a money judgment and 
specific performance. As for the availability of the concept of specific 
performance in tort cases, an eminent French author has remarked 
that, since the remedy is used in contract cases, there is even more reason 
(a plus forte raison) that the court should have similar powers in tort 
cases.1135 This might be a very appropriate remedy where personal 
property has been contaminated by radioactive material and can be re-
placed with something quite similar thus eliminating any concern about 
the salvage value in determining damages. 
Money Judgments. Other types of damage that do not lend them-
selves to specific restitution, such as personal injuries, are subject to 
the unlimited power of the courts in matters of remedy. A judge, in 
his discretion and depending on the circumstances of the case, can set 
the date and the place of payment of a judgment of indemnity. He 
can decide whether the judgment should be in the form of one lump 
sum, or in installments, or as an annuity. The requests of the parties 
are not binding on the court.1186 The only limitation on the powers of 
the courts in the choice of remedies is the prohibition against judg-
ments that encroach on the freedom of the defendant or upon his civil 
rights. 
Provisional Decrees; The discretionary powers of the courts in 
France are broad enough to include all possible claims within the cause 
of action together with the power to render a provisional decree de-
signed to allow reopening for later discovered damages. Periodic re-
visions of a judgment may also be ordered to diminish or terminate as 
well as to increase the installments of an annuity granted to a plaintiff, 
according to whether his condition has improved, disappeared, or 
deteriorated. 
It is remarkable that no article of the French Code directs the courts 
1131 Verdot v. Fusis, Besam,;on App., Dec. 4, 1946, Gaz. Pal. 1947, 1, 20. 
1132 Soc. aut., du Centre Gatty v. Dymerias, Lyon App., July 30, 1946, D. 1947, 377. 
1133 Etabl. Compte et Dupriet v. Malaval, Tr. Com. Seine, June 23, I947, Gaz. Pal. 
1947, 2, I95· 
1134 S.N.C.F v. Guillou, Caen App., March 2, I943, Sem. Jurid. I944, II 2657. 
11 ' 5 Savatier. 2 Traite de Ia Responsabilite Civile 17I, n. 5 (I94I). 
usa S.N .( F v Ulma, Paris App., March 1, 1945, Gaz. Pal. I945. I, ISS 
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to follow such procedures. The system has developed by case law from 
the implications of a single word in Article 1382 which states the 
general theory of tort liability based on fault. The article merely states 
that the defendant who is found liable must make reparation. From 
that point it has become a matter of judicial development, subject to 
limitations of personal freedom, to decide the techniques best suited 
to the particular case. The French Court of Cassation repeatedly 
has affirmed that the courts are free to choose the mode of compensa· 
tion in tort cases according to their own judgment, taking into con-
sideration all of the circumstances of the cases.1137 
An annuity, in personal injury cases, may often correspond more 
accurately to the extent of the defendant's damages than will a final 
lump sum which must be adjusted to take into account the permanency 
of the particular loss. In addition, as previously noted, judging the 
possibility of future new injuries or the aggravation of a present injury 
is guesswork at best. Atomic energy injuries probably will present this 
dilemma in many cases. Should there be a major radiation disaster, a 
defendant may be better able to stand the imposition of smaller periodic 
payments over a period of years than a huge lump sum if, as expected, 
the federal indemnity program is dropped in the future. The French 
experience at least shows that delay in determining the exact nature 
and extent of future damages can be administered. 
Another French technique throws light on the feasibility of our 
suggested "contingent injury fund." It is a process of distribution of 
the damages according to the respective liability of the parties. In 
Correia v. Lucet 1188 the plaintiff was found one-fourth responsible for 
an accident and the defendant three-fourths. An impartial expert estab-
lished that plaintiff had suffered a two months' total disability and a 
continuing twenty per cent disability, which condition, however, could 
improve in time. The trial court granted an award of three-quarters 
of the medical expenses, plus the cost of plaintiff's bicycle which was 
damaged, and two months' salary. The "moral damages" (pretium 
118 7 Cie des Forges de Chatillon-Commentry v. Auclert, Req. May 2I, I928, D.H. 
Ig28, 366, Gaz. Pal. I928, 2, 3S4 (Damages to land from exploration and mining opera-
tions subject to probable increase in time. The judge was allowed to assess the extent 
of existing damage and wait to determine later damage); Schmitt et at. v. Adret, Cass. 
Ch. Criminelle, Feb. 2S, I928, D.H. tg28, 239. S. Ig28, I, IS3, Gaz. Pal. Ig28, 1, SIS 
(Court allowed to order defendant to purchase a temporary annuity for plaintiff in 
bodily injury case) ; Veuve Deglaire v. Hubert, Req. July 11, I938, Gaz. Pal. I938, 2, 67I 
(Court could award a lump sum or installments at its discretion). See also C. c. 
dame M, Req. Feb. s, I940, Gaz. Pal. I940, I, 47I. 
1188 Angers, April 2, I93S. Gaz. Pal. I93S. 2, 36. 
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doloris), based upon aesthetic prejudice from disfiguration, plus the 
twenty per cent continuing disability were assessed at a yearly pension 
of I,OOO francs, account being taken of the victim's station in life. The 
appellate court affirmed the judgment saying, however, that the de-
fendant was entitled to request that the judgment include a reservation 
of his right to petition at a later date for a reduction or discontinuance 
of the installments if the plaintiff's condition should improve or be 
cured. The civil law does not use the concept of contributory negligence 
but instead uses a system of apportionment based upon relative "con-
tributory causation." 
Again, in Cugno v. Parzy 1139 the victim of a car accident suffered 
brain injuries accompanied by diminution of mental powers, muscular 
atrophy of the left arm, and other injuries of the left hand. The court 
decided that since these conditions might improve in the future, a final 
judgment would not be in character with the nature of the injury. An 
annuity was granted, made subject to periodic revision every two years 
depending upon whether the plaintiff's condition improved, deteriorated, 
or remained the same. 
Similarly, in Abram v. Petit 1140 the victim of a motor car accident 
was left with a nervous disorder persisting after his other wounds had 
healed. An expert witness declared that the condition was curable and 
that it might disappear leaving no traces. The court ruled that it would 
be unjust to award a final sum. An annuity was granted, made sub-
ject to revision every two years, and subject to discontinuance if the 
plaintiff's condition should be cured. 
The procedural difficulties that these techniques would encounter 
under the common law are overcome rather nimbly by the French 
courts. It is the theory of the French doctrine that a judgment passes 
only upon the damages actually submitted to the court at the time of 
trial and not on "new damages" stemming from the same cause. To 
be sure, a court can make an express, final 'decision that all possible 
claims from a cause are merged in the judgment, but, short of that, 
"new damages" give rise to a new cause of action. It is not always 
easy to decide when "new damages" exist which were not present and 
claimable in the first instance; but, for example, the loss of a second 
eye after the judge has passed on the loss of the first one is "new 
damage." 1141 
11s9 Riom, Feb. 8, 1939, D.H. 1939, 269. 
1140 Dijon, May 5, 1933, D.H. 1933, Gaz. Pal. 1933, 2, 314. 
1141 Teissere v. de Gasquet, Aix App. April 2, 1870, D. 1871, 2, 241. 
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The courts have also shown a tendency to regard an injury which 
was not definable nor perceivable at the time of the first judgment as 
"new damage," sufficient to support an action for supplemental in-
demnity. In Corne v. Pozzi 1142 the initial judgment rendered in 1946 
granted the plaintiff a lump sum of 125,000 francs. A few years later 
he petitioned for a re-examination. As to an objection of res judicata 
the court said that the aggravation of an injury suffered in an accident 
in itself is a new cause of action for damages, distinguishable from 
the cause of action first litigated, and supplemental damages may be 
requested. Experts must be called, of course, to testify as to whether 
the aggravation is a direct consequence of the accident, and to deter-
mine its extent . 
. Again, in Canac v. Abline 1148 the argument of res judicata was 
rejected in a case involving subsequent aggravation of damages, even 
though there was no reservation of the right to reopen the original 
judgment. The French courts have gone so far as to say that res 
judicata is always subject to 'an exception, even in cases where the in-
juries constitute only an aggravation of a condition existing prior to the 
the first judgment at which time they were either unpredictable as to 
their future extent or not perceivable by normal means of investiga"7 
tion.11u 
The right to revision of judgments and awards is by no means auto-
matic in French law. The courts are merely empowered to use sound 
judgment to achieve equitable disposition of particular· cases; they 
actually make rather sparing use of this prerogative. Generally a 
party cannot reopen a case if the first court purported to adjudicate the 
entire damages in a lump sum and made no reservation as to the re-
opening of judgment. This is so in most cases even if a party has ex-
pressly reserved the right to open the case and the court recorded this 
reservation in the judgment. The appellate courts generally oppose the 
tendency of trial courts to award indemnities subject to future modi-
fications based solely on a rise in the cost of living. In general it is 
said that variations in the cost of living are not attributable to the tort 
and thus should not be taken into account in a· judgment awarding 
future compensation. 
1142 Paris, Dec. 8, 1949, D.1950, J.C.P. 1950, 2, 5459· 
1H8 Grenoble, Jan. 20, 1936, 154. 
11u (Ex Parte) Blandin, Conseil d'Etat, July I, 1949, Gaz. Pal. 1949, 2, 305, in 
which the plaintiff was given a supplemental income to compensate for the devalua-
tion of the currency at the time of the second trial in a case arising out of government 
liability for injuries caused by an army vehicle. 
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(f) Conclusions 
If the French can administer their provisional judgment system 
there would seem to be no real, insurmountable obstacle to administer-
ing the "contingent injury fund" plan which actually should be much 
more satisfactory from the defendant's point of view since, if he is 
successful, he will be discharged at the first trial. Plaintiffs should 
gain because they do not have to pursue a defendant who perhaps at a 
later date may be bankrupt or who may have disappeared. Also, pro-
vision would be made for the case where there is as yet no observable 
injury to be compensated. The necessity of enormous awards, in-
creasingly frequent in recent common law decisions, may in part be 
due to the "now or never" approach to tort liability. In the case of 
radiation injuries, results in keeping with this liberal trend under the 
present system may even lead to an impossible situation.1146 It is time 
we changed our damage rules as well as. re-evaluated our concepts con-
cerning proof of both causation and damages. 
The suggested "contingent injury fund" might seem to do harm 
to interests of lawyers handling tort cases, yet even here it should call 
only for an adjustment of their way of handling fees and planning in-
come. There should be no reduction in total income over a period of 
years. Perhaps the greater degree of certainty of outcome would make 
it possible even to increase total professional incomes because the cases 
could be handled more expeditiously. 
In any event it seems that a fairer system between the important 
parties in tort actions, the plaintiff and defendant, can be worked out, 
and this is the most significant consideration, a concept which the 
profession will surely applaud. 
If the suggested plan proves to be adequate for future injuries, there 
is every reason to believe it also might be made applicable to present 
injuries where there is less than real certainty that a particular force 
or cause is responsible for a specific injury. If it works, this should 
do much to increase the lay public's respect for law as a means of 
achieving justice in tort cases, something the public and non-legal ex-
perts often doubt, and rightfully so in many cases. 
1145 See text supra at notes II20-2I for a discussion of possibilities should there be 
a major reactor incident and the "more probable than not" rule applied. 
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6. Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur Concepts 
a. In General 
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Assuming that negligence rather than strict liability rules are ap-
plied in radiation cases, (and surely this should be true in a large per-
centage of the cases) the plaintiff may seek to invoke the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. If so, his burden of proving the defendant's negli-
gence and that it caused his injury will be made easier. 
Without help from this doctrine it may prove to be extremely difficult 
to establish by direct evid~nce that a particular radiation accident was 
the result of negligence. The plaintiff may find himself totally unable 
to pinpoint precise negligent acts or omissions, probably because of (I) 
ignorance on both his part a~d the defendant's as to exactly what hap-
pened, or ( 2) death of potential witnesses and destruction of material 
physical evidence, or possibly (3) assertion of government secrecy 
restrictions. Therefore, whil~ he stands an excellent chance of recovery 
once his case is placed in the hands of a sympathetic jury, the plaintiff 
in these three situations may lose on defendant's motion to dismiss . 
. Res ipsa loquitur, literally translated, means "the thing speaks for 
itself." In terms of legal practice, the phrase connotes a method of 
proof by circumstantial evidence. In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff is 
given the advantage of an inference that the defendant was negligent 
and thereby he escapes a nonsuit. Res ipsa loquitur, however, can be 
used only in restricted circumstances. To speak for itself, an accident 
must be one that normally does not occur without negligence, and it 
must arise from a force or instrumentality "controlled" (in a loose 
sense) by the defendant.m6 Establishing these conditions precedent to 
the application of res ipsa loquitur may frequently be almost as diffi-
cult as establishing negligence directly; but, in the usual case, the 
plaintiff's burden on the negligence issue is substantially lessened by 
resort to the doctrine, and at least a psychological obligation is placed 
on defendant to offer rebutting evidence.11n Hence the doctrine is 
extremely popular with plaintiffs' attorneys. 
There is no logical reason why res ipsa loquitur should not be ap-
plied in radiation injury situations, and a number of writers have 
1H6 See Prosser. 199-211. Additional conditions, that plaintiff eliminate the possi-
bility of his own contributing conduct as the responsible cause and that the evidence be 
more accessible to defendant than to plaintiff, are also frequently listed. Ibid. 
1H7 See the discussion of the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in the text ac-
companying notes 1197-1204 infra. 
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noted its possible application to such cases.1148 Seldom, however, has 
more than a superficial treatment been given to the doctrine's possibili-
ties in this context,1149 and for this reason, a relatively extensive discus-
sion of res ipsa loquitur is warranted here. 
( 1 ) Development 
In the past quarter-century, practically all of our leading tort authori-
ties have attempted definitive examinations of res ipsa loquitur. 1150 In 
spite of or perhaps because of this, confusion reigns to a considerable 
extent, at least as to the refinements of the doctrine. General unanimity 
among commentators and courts exists, however, on many of the major 
principles. 
There is wide concurrence, in the first place, that res ipsa loquitur 
is an evidentiary rule which, at least in its original state, was based on 
common sense.11n Early English jurists recognized that in some in-
stances, circumstantial evidence on the issue of negligence might be 
such that a jury reasonably could exclude every hypothesis other than 
that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. 
Plaintiff was allowed in these cases to use res ipsa loquitur as a form 
of circumstantial evidence. This proved, of course, to be of great 
assistance to him. 
One of the early statements, defining the cases in which res ipsa 
loquitur would be permitted, is found in Scott v. London & St. Kathe-
rine Docks Co. The court said: 
But where the thing is shewn to be under the management 
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such 
1148 See e.g., Dunlap, "Medicolegal Aspects of Injuries from Exposure to X-Rays 
and Radioactive Substances," (footnotes by Smith) II Mo. L. Rev. 137, 150, n. 25 
(1946); Hiestand, "Compensation for Injury to Life or Property," Lectures on 
Atomic Energy Industrial and Legal Problems (Univ. of Mich.) 216, 223 (1952); 
Seavey, "Torts and Atoms," 46 Calif. L. Rev. 3, 13 (1958). 
1149 Becker & Huard, "Tort Liability and The Atomic Energy Industry," 44 Geo. 
L. ]. 58 (1955); Cable & Early, "Torts and the Atom: the Problem of Insurance," 45 
Ky. L. ]. 3, 17-20 (1956); Hutton, "Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation In-
jury," 46 Geo. L. ]. 52, 64-69 (1957); Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Actionable Radi-
ation Injury," 25·Tenn. L. Rev. 327 (1958). All of these articles, in greater but mostly 
lesser degree, consider the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to the industry. 
1150 Malone, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference--A Discussion of the 
Louisiana Casest 4 La. L. Rev. 70 (1941); Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-
fornia," · 37 Calif. L. Rev. 183 (1949) ; Seavey, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in 
Naufragio," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950); Prosser 199-217; Harper & James §§19.5-
19.12. 
uu See e.g., Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note 1150 at 184-85. 
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that as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if 
those who have the management use proper care, it affords 
reasonable evidence, in the absence of ·explanation by the 
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.1152 
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Use of the doctrine was limited, therefore, to instances where the rea-
sonable inference to be drawn from the facts adduced by the plaintiff 
was that the defendant, or someone for whose acts he was legally re-
sponsible, had been negligent in causing plaintiff's injury. 
In the years that followed the Scott decision, this original "pure" 
statement of res ipsa loquitur became clouded by judicial efforts to 
identify the doctrine with responsibilities of carriers, since most of 
the cases in which it was applied involved railroads or other common 
carriers.1153 It remained for Dean Wigmore to clear the air in this 
country with a careful definition of the situations in which the rule 
should be applied : 
( 1) The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance 
no injurious operation is to be expected unless from a care-
less construction, inspection, or user ; ( 2) Both inspection 
and user must have been at the time of the injury in the con-
trol of the party charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or 
condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary 
action at the time by the party injured.1154 
The fifty-odd years that have passed since Wigmore's statement 
first appeared have witnessed relatively unanimous judicial acceptance 
of his formula in determining when to apply res ipsa loquitur. Never-
theless, it is no more than a guidepost. The three conditions precedent 
to application have been gradually both eroded and expanded, and today, 
whlle commentators' catchphrases bear remarkable similarity to Wig-
more's, the doctrine must be. examined in _greater detail if its con-
temporary nature and extent are to be pictured accurately. 
In examining the conditions, however, it is important to keep in 
mind one traditional limitation on its use. Res ipsa loquitur traditionally 
is said to deal only with the question of proof of breach of duty in a 
negligence action. It has no application to actions based on intentional 
wrongdoings or to actions based on some form of strict liability. The 
doctrine is thought not to apply to any issue in a negligence action other 
1152 3 H. & C. 596, 6o1, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865). 
u5s See Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note nso at 185-89 and 
cases cited therein. 
1154 4 Wigmore, Evidence §2509 (1st ed. 1905). 
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than breach of duty, although some of the cases are beginning to cor-
rupt the doctrine's purity in this latter regard.1155 
There are two principal aspects of the res ipsa loquitur conditions. 
The first deals with the probability that the accident would not have 
happened without negligence; this is strictly a matter of the nature, 
scope, and breach of a particular duty to use care. We ask whether this 
kind of accident normally would happen without negligence; if not, the 
accident speaks for itself. This is the first condition precedent to the 
use of res ipsa loquitur. 
The second aspect involves the second and third condi~ions precedent 
to application-i.e., connecting defendant with responsibility for this 
particular accident and discounting plaintiff's responsibility. These 
inquiries must range beyond a strict duty analysis; indeed, the question 
becomes specifically one of causation-in-fact. Generally, on these issues 
the question is whether defendant most probably is the person to be 
held accountable for the accident, and this involves examination of the 
various other possible causes. 
Thus, in a sense, this second aspect of the res ipsa loquitur pre-
requisites is really an inquiry as to cause-in-fact: Did defendant's ac-
tion cause the injury? Typically, res ipsa loquitur, however, applies 
only to that part of the cause-in-fact question dealing with whether it 
was a particular defendant who set the injurious force in motion, but 
not whether a given type of force did in fact cause the particular injury 
which plaintiff suffered. 
The difference between these two quite separate aspects of res ipsa 
loquitur has not always been kept in mind. The doctrine that the acci-
dent speaks for itself can be applied only when both are satisfied, and 
they· call for fundamentally different evaluations of the facts. The 
reader should keep this in mind in analyzing each of the three conditions 
precedent. 
(2) Prerequisites for Applying 
(a) Nature of the Accident 
Prosser rephrases Wigmore's first condition m these terms: 
The requirement that the occurrence be one which ordi-
narily does not happen without negligence is of course only 
another way of stating a principle of circumstantial evidence, 
that the accident must be such that in the light of ordinary 
''"" See text following not!' 1 189 infra 
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experience it gives rise to an inference that some one has 
been negligent.1156 
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At the extremes the appropriateness or inappropriateness of res ipsa 
!oquitur under this definition is frequently obvious. If a boiler ex-
plodes,1157 or impurities are found in a food product,1158 there is a rather 
strong tendency to infer that someone has acted negligently. If, on the 
other hand, a car skids/159 or a person falls alighting from a public 
conveyance,1160 it is eminently possible-absent contrary evidence-to 
conclude that no one has been negligent. Nevertheless, in many in-
stances, the decision whether res ipsa loquitur is appropriate is of the 
"hairline" variety, ultimately turning on the subjective process of 
weighing the various possible causes of the accident. While there is 
considerable disagreement on the matter,1161 it is perhaps fair for our 
purposes to generalize that courts will deem this first condition satisfied 
if it appears "more probable than not" that someone's negligence was a 
proximate cause of the accid~nt.1162 
In most instances involving ordinary accidents, the layman is fully 
qualified to decide this question of probability. Cases often arise, how-
ever, in which expert testimony would appear valuable in determining 
whether the incident is one in which negligence ordinarily would be 
involved. Because of an early conception that an accident could not 
speak for itself before a jury unless a layman were fully qualified to 
weigh the probabilities, some courts have excluded expert testimony on 
this issue.1168 The commentators generally agree today, however, that 
experts should be permitted to give opinion testimony on the negligence 
probability issue in appropriate cases,1184 and there is a growing trend 
in this direction.1186 Expert testimony has been permitted in a variety 
1158 Prosser 202. 
un Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N.W. 123 (1921). 
1158 Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal.2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938). Cf. Ash 
v. Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 86, 120 N.E. 396 (1918). 
1159 Lithgow v.-Lithgow, 334 Pa. 262, 5 A.2d 573 (1939). 
1160Greeley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 18o Md. 10,22 A.2d 46o (I94I). 
1161 See e.g., Jaffe, "Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated," I Buff. L. Rev. I (1951). 
1162 Prosser, "Res Ipsa.Loquitur in California," supra note II50 at I94- See discus-
sion generally of test of probability, supra notes 923 ff. 
1168 For a modem reflection of this view, see Costa v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, 247 P.2d 2I (Cal. App. 1952), modified u6 Cal. App.2d 445, 254 P .2d 85 (I953). 
1164 See Morris, "Res Ipsa LoqUitur ·in Texas," 26 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 76I (I948); 
Harper & James §I9.6. 
1165 See the supplementary opinion of the California appellate court modifying Costa 
v. Regents of University of California, cited at note II63 supra. For a careful study of 
res ipsa loquitur cases in which expert testimony has been admitted, see Note, Io6 U. 
Pa-. L. Rev. 73I (I958). 
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of cases, particularly those involving complex or dangerous instrumen-
talities, both for the purpose of invoking res ipsa loquitur and for show-
ing it inapplicable.1166 
In addition to expert testimony, the question of probability un-
doubtedly is further affected by a considerable number of peripheral 
factors not involving the immediate circumstances of the accident. The 
safety record of an industry, for example, for certain types of operations 
can be of considerable importance. This is evident when one considers 
that, while in the early cases the courts held res ipsa loquitur inapplicable 
to aircraft accidents, there is today a growing acceptance of the con-
clusion that this type of incident is appropriate for imposition of the 
doctrine.1167 
Another contributing factor affecting the balancing process may be the 
relationship of defendant and plaintiff. Once defendants in litigated 
cases begin to be held liable in certain fact situations, "the inference of 
negligence becomes all the easier to draw. As the precautions that de-
fendant must take to avoid injury increase there is a proportionate in-
crease in the number of available hypotheses involving carelessness." 1168 
Thus in situations involving the carrier and his passenger,1169 or the 
conduct of hazardous activities 1170 by the defendant, res ipsa loquitur 
is more likely to be applied than in typical negligence situations. 
In the final analysis, these latter tendencies represent no more than 
specialized manifestations of basic policy decisions. It is inevitable 
in any subjective process that fundamental conceptions of policy will 
affect a court's decision, and the application of res ipsa loquitur is no 
exception. Thus if the nature of a person's activity is such that society 
demands that he assume an insurer's responsibility, res ipsa loquitu·r 
116 6 See cases cited in Note, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 736-37 (1958). See also dis-
cussion .of X-ray cases in which res ipsa loquitur has been at issue, text accompanying 
notes 1213-1245 infra. 
116 7 See McLarty, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation," 37 Va. L. 
Rev. 55 (1951); Goldin, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law," 18 So. 
Cal. L. Rev. 15 (1944); Note, 1o6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 739-740 (1958). 
1168 Malone, supra note 1150 at 78. "It should be noted that this reasoning applies 
not only where there is a relationship which calls for great care, but whenever the 
dangerous nature of the defendant's conduct calls for commensurately great precautions. 
This does not mean (logically) that an inference of negligence may be drawn in all 
cases calling for great care, but that it may be more easily drawn from facts that other-
wise might be regarded as equivocal." Harper & James 1084. 
1169 E.g;, Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 137 Cal. 28o, 70 Pac. 169 ( 1902). 
1170 E.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, 287 Fed. 797 (3d Cir. 1923) ; Cratty v. 
Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955). See, however, the discussion 
of the explosives cases in text. accompanying note 1258 infra. 
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becomes the "poor cousin" of liability without fault. A court unwilling 
to accept and apply the latter doctrine can often accomplish the same 
end result by easing the plaintiff's evidentiary burden with res ipsa 
loquitur.1111 Conversely, when the defendant is engaged in an activity 
which, although it is potentially dangerous, society desires to foster, 
considerably less judicial enthusiasm for application of res ipsa loquitur 
should be encountered.1172 
(b) "Control" by the Defendant 
It would be erroneous to read literally Wigmore's second condition, 
that the instrument be in defendant's control at the time of injury. 
Myriad cases have presented fact situations in the past fifty years which 
do not involve exclusive physical control by defendant, but the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur nevertheless is considered appropriate. The most 
famous of these are the "exploding bottle" cases in which the defen-
dant normally relinquishes physical control long before the accident 
takes place. Indeed, the plaintiff himself usually has exclusive physical 
control at the time of injury. In these and similar cases, the concept of 
physical control at the time of accident ceases to effectuate its original 
purpose, and it generally is held sufficient that the defendant, or one 
for whose acts the defendant is legally responsible, had dominion over 
the instrumentality at the time when, more probably than not, the neg-
ligent act took place.1118 Other difficult cases are solved mer~ly by requir-
ing that the defendant have the "right to control" as opposed to actual 
1111 "In a system where the adoption of an agnostic position will deny recovery to 
the accident victim (who has the burden of proof) the practical impact and importance 
of res ipsa loquitur has probably consisted in its tendency · to invite or encourage the 
asstimption of broad and doubtful postulates favorable to liability in many situations 
where the courts would otherwise be understandably reluctant to adopt them, at least 
without the aid of expert opinion. If the foregoing· is true, the persistence and expan-
sion of the 'doctrine' -in spite of trenchant and penetrating logical criticism-may well 
be attributable to the strong general trend towards strict liability and social insurance-
a trend which is corroding a system of liability nominally based on fault. This would 
also ·account for the greater readiness to invoke the doctrine in certain kinds of situa-
tions, and within certain relationships, where the pull towards absolute liability. has been 
particularly strong, or where the accident victim's burden of proof has been particu-
larly forbidding." Harper & James 1079-81. 
1172 For this reason, a number of courts have declined to apply the doctrine to mal-
practice actions. See Note, "The California Malpractice Controversy," 9 Stan. L. Rev. 
731, 737 et seq. (1957). 
1178 E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 
(1944); Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 
(1952); Weidert v. Monahan Post Legionnaire Club, 243 Iowa 643, 51 N.W.2d 400 
(1952). 
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physical control,1174 or by stating that defendant's duty to control is 
non-delegable in law.1175 Prosser has termed the control concept as 
"pernicious and misleading" and suggests that the second condition pre-
cedent to application of res ipsa loquitur be phrased that "the apparent 
cause of the accident must be such that the defendant would be respon-
sible for any negligence connected with it." 1176 This latter suggestion 
is broadly accepted by the commentators and the tendencies may be in 
this direction. The courts, however, generally display greater conserv-
atism, and it is seldom, in a res ipsa. loquitur opinion, that the control 
theory in some form is not at least mentioned by name. 
A further aspect of the second condition, tacit in what already has 
been said, is the requirement of exclusivity. The control or right to 
control the harmful instrumentality by the defendant must be such that 
other causes may reasonably be discounted. These other causes need 
not be eliminated, but "their likelihood must be so reduced that the 
greater probability lies at defendant's door." 1177 
As was the case with the first condition, this process involves a bal-
ancing of probabilities. Here, however, the court deals in terms of 
probable causation-in-fact, whereas for the first condition, an entirely 
different evaluation-probability of negligence-was required. The 
general judicial approach to the causation question, nevertheless, should 
not diverge substantially from that indicated previously, and we may 
equally expect courts to bring similar policy considerations into play 
when the strict logic of res ipsa loquitur fails in a particularly appealing 
case. 
The principal area in which such considerations have arisen is that 
involving multiple defendants. The plaintiff often may find it impos-
sible to narrow the reasonable hypothetical causes of an accident to an 
instrumentality in the exclusive care of one person. At first glance, 
logically res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied, since the probabilities do 
not point toward the defendant. If, however, the plaintiff has dis-
counted all causes but two or three, each independent of the others but 
all in some way within the defendant's legal responsibility, there is no 
1174 E.g., Crump v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 313 Ill. App. 151, 39 N.E.2d 411 
(1942); Robinson v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N.Y. Supp.2d 42 
(1945); Hogland v. Klein, 49 Wash.2d 216, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956). 
1175 E.g., Motor Sales & Service, Inc. v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 15 La. App. 353, 
131 So. 623 (1930). See cases cited in Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," 
supra note 1150 at 199-200. 
1176 Prosser 206. 
• 177 Harper & James 1086. 
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reason for refusing res ipsa loquitur. 1118 True, causation is not proved 
precisely, even by probabilities, but the question is of no importance 
when the defendant is responsible for all the probable causes. Similarly, 
where there are several defendants operating in a joint enterprise, so 
that each is legally responsible for the others' negligent acts, the courts 
are willing to apply the doctrine to defendants as a group.1179 
The difficult case, and the one evoking the most discussion, involves 
multiple defendants who operate independently. Even if the plaintiff is 
injured under circumstances making it probable that negligence was the 
cause of the accident, there may be more than one possible source of the 
negligence and more than one defendant possibly responsible for several 
sources. It may be that the plaintiff will be unable to give circumstantial 
proof indicating that the injury resulted "more probably" from any 
single defendant's negligence. For this failure to pin exclusive respon-
sibility on one defendant in a case where the enterprise is not joint, is 
the plaintiff to be denied the use of res ipsa loquitur? Again, logically 
the answer must be in the affirmative, since application of res ipsa lo-
quitur is predicated on the assumption that at least it is more probable 
than not that the defendant was responsible. When the plaintiff fails 
to sustain this logical burden, he should not be allowed the use of res 
ipsa loquitur.:_in the traditional view. In several decisions, however, 
this logic has been overlooked in judicial response to certain funda-
mental conceptions of social policy, and res ipsa loquitur has been ex-
tended beyond the original and logical limits, implied by "the situation 
speaks for itself." 
The most significant of these cases is the. California decision of 
Ybarra v. S pangard.1180 During an operation for removal of an appen-
1178 "There are, indeed, cases in which a showing that every instrumentality to 
which a given injury could with reasonable probability be attributed was under a 
defendant's management has been accepted by the courts as, for practical purposes, 
the equivalent of a showing that the defendant controlled the particular instrumentality 
that did cause it." Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Co., 26 Cal. App.2d 664, 687, 8o P.2d 
185 (1938). See also Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895). 
1179 The famous case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d So, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), is illus-
trative of this point. In that case, plaintiff was on a hunting expedition with the two 
defendants. Plaintiff was shot in the eye with a single shotgun pellet after defendants 
had fired at a quail almost simultaneOusly. ··The court approved a trial court finding 
that "defendants were jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause 
of the injury or to that legal effect." Id. at 84. Without mentioning res ipsa loquitur, 
the court held that the circumstances of the injury required "that the burden of proof 
... be shifted to defendants .... They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward 
plaintiff." Id. at 86. The court cited Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 
687 (1944) as authority. Cf. Cook v. Lewis, (Canada) [I952] I D.L.R. I. 
u8o Supra note I 179. 
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dix, the plaintiff received an injury to his shoulder. The precise cause 
of the injury was unknown, but apparently it resulted from an external 
trauma occurring while the plaintiff was under anesthesia. The plain-
tiff brought suit against the hospital and all of the persons who had 
been present at his operation. He sought to apply res ipsa loquitur 
against each of them. The court held that the doctrine applied, stating: 
The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the 
various agencies or instrumentalities which might have 
harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant or 
of his employees or temporary servants. This, we think, 
places upon them the burden of initial explanation. Plaintiff 
was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing 
surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unrea-
sonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as 
the person who did the alleged negligent act. 
The other aspect of the case which defendants so strongly 
emphasize is that plaintiff has not identified the instrumen-
tality any more than he has the particular guilty defendant. 
Here, again, there is a misconception which, if carried to the 
extreme for which defendants contend, would unreasonably 
limit the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule. It should 
be enough that the plaintiff can show any injury resulting 
from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in 
the hospital; this is as clear a case of identification of the in-
strumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make.1181 
While there is some indication in this language that the court's hold~ 
ing may have rested on a theory of mutual legal responsibility among 
defendants, the court purportedly goes on to apply res ipsa loquitur 
without reliance on this theory. In essence, the justification is merely 
that under the circumstances it would be "manifestly unreasonable" to 
call upon the plaintiff to identify the instrumentality or the person con-
trolling it. The circumstances appearing significant to the court were 
( 1) that the defendants had rendered the plaintiff unconscious for the 
purpose of performing an operation, (2) each had a duty of care to-
ward plaintiff, and (3) each of them at one time or another had con-
trol of instrumentalities that could have caused the injury. Thus, the 
court reasoned, the defendants-rather than the unconscious plain-
tiff-were in a much better position to pinpoint the negligence and 
should be required to do so. 
The Ybarra decision naturally has evoked considerable comment and 
1181 ld. at 492-93. 
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some criticism.1182 Seavey, the principal critic, argues that it is error 
to "impose liability upon all the members of the group where it is evi-
dent that the harm was not the result of group action and that most of 
the members of the group were innocent of wrongdoing." 1183 This ar-
gument has considerable force if we assume that none of the defendants 
except the negligent party knows how plaintiff was injured, since the 
chances are that all defendants will be found liable by the jury. If, on 
the other hand, we assume that the defendants have knowledge as to 
the particular act of negligence, but are withholding it out of a sense 
of mutual protectiveness, Seavey's suggestion loses some of its vitality. 
The court could use Ybarra reasoning only to force out of defendants 
an explanation for the accident, ~n a situation in which very likely they 
all do know what happened. It need not hold innocent defendants liable, 
unless they refuse to testify as to ·what they know and did. If every 
defendant testified he was not responsible, all might still be held liable 
under the Ybarra rationale. 
Prosser, while not specifically approving the result in Ybarra, justi-
fies it on the ground of a '·'special responsibility for the plaintiff's 
safety undertaken by everyone concerned." 1184 He visualizes other situ-
ations in which courts might reach similar results because of the spe-
cial relationship between the defendants and the plaintiff. 
. A second rationalization is possible. The court may have felt that 
while the relationship inter se of defendants was not sufficiently strong 
that the application of res ipsa loquitur could be based on· a theory of 
joint venture, neither were the acts so completely separate that the court 
should not attach some group responsibility to their conduct. All of the 
participants in the operation, together with the hospital, could be said 
to have entered consciously on a course of conduct which included co-
operation and mutual reliance in handling plaintiff. This conscious 
unity of purpose thus might have been, at least for the California court, 
a sufficiently strong substitute for exclusivity that the second condition 
could be said to be reasonably satisfied. It may be one way of forcing 
each of the group in effect to assume responsibility for the actions of 
all, and therefore force them to check on each other. 
. 1182 Commenting on the decision, see e.g., Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," 
supra note II50 at 223 et seq.; Harper & James 1091; McCoid, "Negligence Actions 
against Multiple Defendants," 7 Stan. L. Rev. 48o (1955). For a criticism, see Seavey, 
supra note II50. 
118s Seavey, supra note 1150 at 648. 
1184 Prosser 2o8. See also Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note 
1150 at 224-
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If either this explanation or Prosser's analysis is accepted, we tran-
scend traditional res ipsa loquitur concepts. The doctrine's prerequisite 
of causal probability in fact is left unsatisfied, since the plaintiff has 
shown only that (most probably) one of several persons, not acting in 
legal concert, acted negligently. He does not show which one. Theories 
of "special responsibility" or "moral interrelationship" on the defend-
ants' part do not fill this logical vacuum, they merely circumvent it. 
Rather than attempting to fulfill the traditional conditions precedent to 
res. ipsa loquitur, these theories proceed fundamentally on a different 
social policy. At most, this is "quasi" res ipsa loquitur, by which a con-
venient evidentiary tool is wielded liberally to effectuate an overriding 
conception of just result. 
As Seavey points out, all of the defendants in Ybarra were probably 
insured.1185 If we take this one step further and assume that all were 
insured by the same company, 1186 the Ybarra result becomes irresistible. 
In practical effect, when this is the case, the situation is no different as 
to ultimate liability (of the insurer) than if one defendant were respon-
sible for several negligent forces. Although the plaintiff cannot pre-
cisely denominate the offending force, the courts need not be troubled, 
since the defendant (or the insurer) is going to be liable in any event. 
Reasoning such as this becomes another rationalization for Ybarra, if 
we can assume coverage for all by a single insurer, something that 
should be proved, not assumed. 
Harper and James pass off the result as a manifestation of the gen-
eral trend toward strict liability and social insurance.1187 It is clear, 
however, that there may be many occasions on which a court would 
be willing to shift the burden of explanation to the defendant, yet re-
fuse to impose strict liability. A traditional argument underlying impo-
sition of res ipsa loquitur has been that the defendant has superior 
knowledge of the precise facts of the accident and that use of the doc-
trine will force these facts out.1188 Ybarra, certainly is a case of this 
1185 Seavey, suPra note ~ 150 at 648, n. 15. 
1186 Hospitals normally obtain insurance for their "employees," which could often· 
mean that all the persons present at an operation were covered by the same policy. See 
generally, McGibony, Principles of Hospital Administration 207 (1952); Hines, "Hos-
pital Malpractice Liability Insurance," 34 Chi. B. Rec. 135 (1952). 
1187 "This is no retreat from individualizing the finding and treatment of fault, but 
rather a retreat from insistence upon fault (in accident law) and from the fiction that 
damage claims are paid Out of the pockets of individual wrongdoers. It is simply a 
recognition both of the fact and the desirability of spreading accident losses according 
to the principles of insurance." Harper & James ro89. 
1188 The superior knowledge of defendant has frequently been listed as a prerequisite 
for application of us ipsa loquitur. While courts and commentators roundly discount 
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nature--one feels (and the court felt) a spontaneous urge to call upon 
the defendants to explain. This is different from holding the defend-
ants strictly liable as a group. It is to be admitted that often, when 
only one defendant is involved, imposition of res ipsa loquitur has the 
same effect as applying strict liability. When there are multiple defend-
ants, however, acceptance of the doctrine frequently may mean only 
that the defendants will be forced to introduce evidence against one 
another, particularly when they are insured by different companies. 
This evidence may be sufficiently strong that the logical exclusivity re-
quirement eventually will be satisfied in reverse, viz., causation is estab-
lished after, not before, res ipsa loquitur is applied. 
Ideally, faced with a situation like Ybarra where it is obvious that 
someone has been negligent, the court would like to see liability im-
posed on that one person and no others. Since plaintiff's evidence does 
not reveal that person's identity, the court must choose between two 
alternatives : ( 1) deny application of res ipsa loquitur and in effect non-
suit plaintiff; or ( 2) apply the doctrine and wait for defendants to 
fight out the causation issue. Choice of the latter alternative, of course, 
creates the risk that innocent defendants may be as ignorant of the pre-
cise facts as the plaintiff and thus ultimately may be held liable despite 
their innocence. In Ybarra, however, the strong possibility that the de-
fendants actually had superior knowledge-plus the presence of insur-
ance, the unconscious state of the plaintiff, and the special relationships 
involved-probably served to make the choice an easy, if logically ques-
tionable, one. 
In any event, the Ybarra doctrine today is firmly entrenched in Cali-
fornia malpractice law, having been applied on several recent occa-
sions.1189 The doctrine was considerably extended, however, in Litz-
mann v. Humboldt County,1190 a lower court decision deserving special 
mention. There the plaintiff, a nine-year-old boy, found an unexploded 
aerial bomb on certain fairgrounds. The bomb exploded, and the plain-
tiff sustained severe injuries. There were two companies located on the 
fairgrounds who owned and had used such bombs, but there was no 
evidence indicating that one company more probably than the other was 
such a rule today, there is no doubt that the suspicion of such superior knowledge is a 
strong factor influencing courts to apply the doctrine. Prosser 209-210. 
1189 See; e.g., Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App.2d 108, 26o .P.2d 997 (1953); Seneris v. 
Haas, 45 Cal.2d 8n, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospi-
tal, 47 Cal.2d 509. 305 P.2d 36 (1956). 
1190 273 P .2d 82 (Cal. App. 1954), hearing granted Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 30, 1954, 
dismissed Nov. 16, 1954. noted in 3 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 122 (1955) and discussed in Mc-
Coid, supra note n82 at 497· 
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the source of the particular offending bomb. The companies were en-
tirely independent of one another; there was in no sense the cooperative 
undertaking or conscious unity of purpose present in Ybarra. Res ipsa 
loquitur was held to apply even though it was clear that one of the de-
fendants was entirely innocent.1191 If Ybarra is read in its broadest 
terms without regard to the particular fact situation involved, Litzmann 
follows the pattern. In the latter case, however, there was not even a 
semblance of concurrence of action among .defendants, and it would 
seem that Ybarra has been stretched further than the actual opinion 
would justify. Statements of law and of fact are so interspersed in 
Ybarra that it is somewhat difficult to say that the case stands for any 
particular abstract propositions, 1192 without reference to the facts on 
which the propositions are based. 
Prosser's justification for the Ybarra decision, that of "special re-
sponsibility" on the part of the defendants toward the plaintiff, could 
perhaps be stretched to cover the Litzmann situation. This could mean 
that the possessor of any unusually hazardous instrumentality would 
run the risk of the imposition of res ipsa loquitur against him any time 
the plaintiff sustains injuries for which his instrumentality might have 
been a cause. Discounting the possibility of superior knowledge on the 
part of the particular potential defendant, such a broad doctrine would 
appear unwarranted. 
Litzmann also might be said to stand upon another ground that 
under particular circumstances would not make imposition of res ipsa 
loquitur against independent defendants seem quite so unjust. The 
facts show that there were only two defendants, one of whom clearly 
was negligent, the other of whom clearly was innocent. In other words, 
the probability of one or the other being the responsible negligent person 
was "so-so." Although res ipsa loquitur is phrased logically in "more 
probably than not" terms, who is to measure the difference between "so-
so" and "s I -49" ? 1198 Some might argue that since the probabilities are 
only a guess in a close case anyway, we should be willing at least to ex-
tend our thinking to the case where we know the probabilities are equal. 
The theoretical difficulties with this type of argument are fairly ob-
vious. In the traditional sense, the justification for having the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine at all is the fact that we can reasonably denominate the 
defendant as the responsible cause. In essence, then, the question be-
1191 Litzmann v. Humboldt County, supra note 1190 at 85. 
1192 See the quoted portion of the opinion accompanying note 1 181 supra. 
1193 For a critical discussion of this type of approach to the probabilities question, 
see Jaffe, supra note 1161. 
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comes whether to take what was once a legitimate evidentiary tool and 
make it an instrument of social policy. Many_ courts would argue that 
even the "SI-49" probability is not good enough to justify imposing res 
ipsa loquitur upon the defendant, for the reason that they do not feel 
qualified in such a close case to say flatly that the defendant's negligence 
is the more probable cause. These courts are acutely aware, it would 
appear, that our system of justice (for better or worse) requires the 
plaintiff to prove his case, or lose,1194 Dilution of the res ipsa loquitur 
requirement to the "so~ so line" theoretically, if not practically, works 
contrary to this basic principle. 
If Litzmann-type thinking is accepted for cases involving two named 
defendants, the next question is what to do when there are six or seven 
defendants or more, only one of whom is negligent and none of whom 
is connected in any way with his fellow defendants. This would be the 
case if, instead of two companies at the fairgrounds, there had been 
several. The plaintiff clearly cannot invoke res ipsa loquitur in its true 
sense, for our assumption is that he has no evidence which points more 
strongly to one defendant than any of the others. The "so-so prob-
ability" thesis of Litzmann is unavailable, of course, and there is no 
room for argument, as in Ybarra, that the defendants engaged in a joint 
enterprise or conscious mutual undertaking to treat the plaintiff with 
care. Nor is there nearly as good a basis for assumption of superior 
knowledge on the defendants' part, since they are independent operators 
with no knowledge of how others acted or perhaps even of their exist-
. ence. Indeed, application of res ipsa loquitur to these facts-"calling 
upon defendants to explain"--can only be predicated on an argument 
that the defendants are possessors of dangerous instrumentalities and 
probably are insured against public liability. This, of course, begins to 
sound like strict liability talk. But, in one se~se, it goes much further 
than that: it eliminates the causation requirement from. the plaintiff's 
cause of action as well. Assuming. no superior knowledge on the de-
fendants' part which eventually would force liability on the one negli-
gent party, Litzmann-type thinking would make innocent parties-
without proof of negligence or causation-liable for. the acts of an un-
related wrongdoer. This is surely a curious result and not likely to be 
approved by too many courts or commentators. Any attempt to so 
"liberalize" the second res ipsa loquitur requirement is dangerous and 
improper. 
uut The validity of our present scheme of tort liability, as applied to radiation in-
juries, is discussed elsewhere in this chapter. See text following note Io6o supra. 
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Ybarra may be justified on the ground of joint undertaking, or 
group responsibility, or revealing concealed common knowledge. The 
line between a joint venture and the concept of conscious unity of pur-
pose that we may distill from the opinion necessarily is a hazy one. Can 
we not say that when the relationship between each defendant and plain-
tiff is such that th~ defendant's duty of due care also includes guarding 
the plaintiff from the negligence of the other defendants, this will be 
sufficient to satisfy a group unity requirement for multiple defendant 
cases? This stays within the legitimate extremes of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine since, although detailed causation is admittedly not proved, 
neither is such proof important, inasmuch as each member of the group 
is responsible for the others' misconduct. 
If Prosser's "special responsibility" thesis is adopted, res ipsa loqui-
tur can easily get out of hand. A court might find that all the fireworks 
companies on the fairgrounds owe nine-year-old boys special responsi-
bility. Then res ipsa loquitur could be applied despite a lack of any other 
relationship among the defendants and, in effect, the causation re-
quirement is eliminated. 
As long as insurance is not compulsory for all business and profes-
sional enterprises and as long as all insurance is not derived from a 
single source, causation remains a legitimate element of a tort action. 
In taking what was once a logically justifiable evidentiary device and 
converting it into a lever for forcing evidence out of multiple defend-
ants, the courts run the danger of eliminating causation as a prerequi-
site to recovery in this type of case. Probably not many courts would 
be willing to say, "We will shift the burden of going forward to de-
fendants in the hope that their evidence, reluctantly divulged under the 
threat of liability, will narrow the cause-in-fact to the one responsible de-
fendant; but if it appears from their evidence that their knowledge of 
the circumstances is no greater than plaintiff's, he must be nonsuited 
for failure on the general issue of causation." Courts are much more 
likely to apply res ipsa loquitur against independent multiple defend-
ants on the breach of duty issue, in the sense that somebody was negli-
gent, and upon the defendants' failure to pinpoint the source of negli-
gence, permit the jury to find all the defendants liable, for "failing to 
rebut the inference of negligence," without further regard for the issue 
of causation-in-fact. Depending upon how one chooses his words, this 
process either eliminates causation or permits res ipsa loquitur-if we 
may still call it that-to solve the general causation issue as well as the 
breach of duty issue. 
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This is valid, of course, if plaintiff predicates his cause of action on 
a theory of group responsibility-he need trace negligence only to the 
group. However, if the plaintiff's case is such that not all the members 
of the group are responsible for the negligence, a mere tracing of causa-
tion to the group is insufficient. It should be insufficient whether done 
by direct evidence, or indirectly, by way of inference. 
In any event, whatever one's conclusion as to the legitimacy of the 
Ybarra-Litzmann trend, the lawyer must be prepared to recognize 
clearly the existence of such deviations from a logical application of res 
ipsa loquitur. The device is logically used only when it is more probable 
than not that a particular legal entity is responsible for the negligence 
connected with an accident. When it is used without this foundation-
either to force out evidence under a threat of liability or to impose lia-
bility because of overriding social conceptions--res ipsa loquitur is a 
different concept than that traditionally accepted by American and 
English courts. 
(c) Eliminating- the Party Injured 
The final basic requirement for application of res ipsa loquitur, as 
stated by Wigmore and as generally accepted by modem writers, is that 
the accident must have happened "irrespective of any voluntary action 
... by the party injured." 119$ This is an obvious corollary of the 
second condition, that the defendant be responsible for any negligence 
connected with the accident. The plaintiff therefore must eliminate 
himself, as well as third persons, as reasonably probable causes before 
an inference of negligence through res ipsa loquitur is available against 
the· defendant. 
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff must not have been 
an active participant when the accident occurred. Indeed, as in the ex-
ploding bottle and collapsing seat cases, he may be in exclusive control 
of the instrumentality. But it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that 
he was using the instrumentality in an ordinary manner such that the 
inference of the defendant's negligence is still reasonably probable.1198 
1195 4 Wigmore, Evidence §2509 ( ut ed. 1905). Prosser states this condition: "The 
possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is elimi-
nated." Prosser 199. This is logically a different issue than that of contributory neg-
ligence and must be demonstrated by plaintiff even in states where generally he is not 
given the burden of proof as to absence of contributory negligence. See Harper & 
James §1g.8. 
noa Prosser, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in California," supra note 1150 at 201-o2. 
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(3) Procedural Effect 
Should the plaintiff satisfy a court's conditions precedent to the appli-
cation of res ipsa loquitur, the pertinent question becomes : What pro-
cedural advantage, aside from the fact that he is temporarily relieved 
from proving negligence directly, does the plaintiff gain from the doc-
trine? Initially, of course, he escapes the possibility of a nonsuit, but 
what then? 
There is considerable disagreement among the courts on this ques-
tion. The vast majority of American courts-supported by the com-
mentators-hold that successful invocation of res ipsa loquitur creates 
an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.1197 This is an 
inference which the jury may or niay not accept, as it chooses, just as 
the jury decides the weight to be given to other forms of circumstantial 
evidence. No legal burden is placed upon the defendant to introduce 
rebutting proof. His failure to do so will not result in a directed ver-
dict against him, and the jury may even find in his favor upon comple-
tion of the case.1198 
If this were the only effect of res ipsa loquitur, one might wonder 
why claimants' attorneys seek so tenaciously to bring it into every pos-
sible case. The answer lies in a general feeling about how juries react 
in negligence cases. Lawyers seem to feel that in the great majority of 
these cases all the plaintiff needs is to get beyond nonsuit, to place his 
case in the jury's hands; the vision of a rich, heavily insured defendant 
will do the rest. The end result, if this is an accurate description, is no 
different than if strict liability had been applied formally in the first 
place. 
A minority view holds that res ipsa loquitur has an even greater ef-
fect on the procedural burden. Some courts say that it creates a legal 
presumption which, if the defendant does not offer some probative 
evidence to the contrary, will permit a directed verdict for the plaintiff 
once all other elements of a negligence cause of action are shown.1109 
1197 Prosser 2II-I2. 
1198 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 S.Ct. 416 (1913). In California, however, 
while the courts hold that application of res ipsa loqmtur created only an inference of 
negligence, "in all res ipsa loquitur situations the defendant must present evidence 
sufficient to meet or balance the inference of negligence, and that the jurors should 
be instructed that, if the defendant fails to do so, they should find for the plaintiff." 
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691, :z68 P.2d 1041 (1954). A procedural 
effect such as this, as we shall indicate, traditionally is reserved for the presumption. 
See text preceding note 1 199 infra. 
1199 Prosser 212. Dean Prosser notes that this ·doctrine derives from early cases in-
volving injuries to passengers caused by common carriers. where the latter had the 
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In addition, a few decisions have given res ipsa loquitur the effect of 
shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant, re-
quiring that the latter show a preponderance of evidence in favor of 
non-negligence.1200 Under the inference and presumption views, the 
burden of proof of course does not shift from the plaintiff, although 
the presumption view. temporarily does shift the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence to the defendant. 
There is disagreement, as well, on the question of the effect to be 
given to evidence introduced by the defendant to show non-negligence. 
This depends, of course, on the effect originally given res ipsa loquitur. 
In states where application of the doctrine permits only an inference of 
negligence, the defendant can introduce no evidence and hope that the 
jury will find in his favor anyway, or he may introduce whatever evi-
dence he has to show non-negligence.1201 This normally will consist of 
proof of safety precautions taken in the particular manufacturing or 
operational process, and the jury will be free to weight the inferences 
suggested by this evidence against the original res ipsa loqu·itur infer-
ence. In presumption states, on the other hand, the defendant must 
provide probative evidenc~ showing non-negligence or suffer a directed 
verdict.1202 It is to be doubted, however, that the mere introduction of 
probative evidence will cause the presumption of negligence to disappear 
entirely from the case, as is often said to happen with presumptions 
other than that created by res ipsa loquitur. 1203 Finally, in those states in 
which the burden of proof is said to shift, the defendant himself must 
introduce enough evidence of non-negligence to sustain the ultimate 
burden of persuasion, i.e., the evidence must preponderate in his 
favor. 1204 
burden of proof on the negligence issue. ld. at 213. A controversy concerning the 
proper procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur has raged for years. ld. at 213, n. 2. 
See also lfarper & James §19.IJ. 
1200 Prosser 212. For a decision going even farther than this position, see Thomas 
v. Lobrano, 76 So.2d 599 (La. App. 1954) discussed in some detail in text following 
note 1229 infra. 
1201 Harper & James §19.n. 
1 2°2 "A presumption, in other words, gives to evidence an artificial effect over and 
above its logically probative effect. The difference is far more theoretical than real. 
Few defendants fail to offer some defense by way of explanation or rebuttal in liti-
gated res ipsa cases. And if no defense is offered, defendant is usually gambling on a 
court ruling that the doctrine does not apply. He does not expect to win from a jury 
and almost never will. Plaintiff does not need a directed verdict and is ill-advised to 
move for one except under a procedure for reserving decision on such a motion until 
after verdict. For these reasons few of the cases which use the language of presump-
tion actually deal with a situation where it would affect the result." ld. at IIOI-o2. 
12oa See McCormick, Evidence §311 (1954). 
1204 Harper & James §19.11. 
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b. In Radiation Cases 
(I) Radiation Injury Characteristics 
.As indicated previously, there is no generic reason why courts should 
refuse to apply res ipsa loquitur to cases involving radiation injuries. 
On the other hand, certain characteristics of radiation injury will per-
haps make application of the doctrine more difficult than in the normal 
tort actions. The obstacles posed by these characteristics will be most 
formidable when the plaintiff attempts to satisfy the second condition 
precedent, that of the defendant's responsibility. In view of the fact 
that there exists only limited (and in this respect, not very helpful) 
judicial precedent for application of res ipsa loquitur to radiation· in-
juries, a brief reminder of the characteristics of radiation which will 
cause the most trouble is warranted. 
First, ionizing radiation, unlike other forms of injurious force, can-
not be detected by the usual senses.1206 Unless an individual wears a film 
badge or similar device, or unless the event through which he receives 
radiation is so dramatically apparent that he cannot escape the realiza-
tion, a person may be injuriously exposed without ever being aware that 
he is in danger. Any demonstration of defendant's "control," even in 
a loose sense, over the harmful instrumentality is obviously made more 
difficult when the plaintiff cannot, upon discovering his injury at a later 
time, pinpoint the incident of exposure. If the plaintiff has been sub-
jected to more than one potential source of substantial radiation, less 
than all of which are within the defendant's control or responsibility, 
he may have an extremely difficult task in :t:easonably discounting other 
sources as probable causes. 
This picture is further confused by a second consideration- the fact 
that even though the plaintiff may suspect that he has received radia-
tion from a defendant's source, resultant injuries may not appear for 
years. Particularly is this true when the emissions are of low intensity, 
but periodically repeated.1208 The greater the lapse of time between the 
defendant's act and discovery of injury by the plaintiff, the more diffi-
cult it becomes to conclude that the injury was caused by the defendant. 
Proof of causation-in-fact becomes even more diffi.eult when account 
is taken of the fact that a number of injuries caused by radiation-in-
120G See Chapter I, Section C. 4· 
12os Ibid; Dunlap, supra note n48 at 140; National Res~ch Council (Report of 
Committee on PathologiCal Effects). The Biological EffeCts of Atomic Radiation, re-
ported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!4028. 
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eluding cancerous conditions--can be caused by other forces. 1207 To a 
considerable extent, scientists and medical men have established rational 
predictions of injury resulting from radiation, 1208 but this typically is 
a matter of greater likelihood of injury, not of known direct causal 
connection with a particular person's injury. This often means that the 
plaintiff must discount, besides emissions of radiation controlled by 
other persons, the remaining possible causes of the condition of which 
he complains. 
Despite this rather bleak picture, one further characteristic of radia-
tion may assist plaintiffs seeking to invoke res ipsa loquitur. In some 
respects, the effect of multiple and continuing radiation is cumulative 
in nature, so that each new radiation incident serves to aggravate latent 
injury potential.1209 Let us assume that a plaintiff has received expo-
sure from several sources in a given period of time. None of these 
sources emanates from the defendant. Their effect, however, has been 
cumulative, and when the defendant appears on the scene, the plaintiff's 
body tolerance for radiation is nil. The plaintiff receives just enough 
radiation from the defendant's instrumentality to result in perceptible 
radiation injury. He sues the defendant, and seeks to invoke res ipsa 
loquitur. Assuming the incident is one which ordinarily would not oc-
cur without negligence, can the plaintiff satisfy the second condition 
precedent-reasonably discounting those causes of injury for which the 
defendant is not responsible? 
The answer apparently is "yes." It is not to the fact of the plaintiff's 
injury that res ipsa loquitur is applied-that is an entirely separate is-
sue of proof. Res ipsa loquitur deals only 1210 with the questions of 
breach of duty: whether it can be said, more probably than not, that the 
circumstances indicate that the defendant has violated his duty to use 
due care in his relationship to the plaintiff. This being the ·case, it 
would appear that the plaintiff, to employ res ipsa loquitur, only must 
show that the defendant more probably than not was responsible for 
the single instrumentality charged to him. While perhaps not the ex-
clusive cause of injury, the defendant's act is at least a cause-in-fact-
it is a substantial faCtor. The exclusivity aspect of the second res ipsa 
loquitur prerequisite does not require that the defendant's negligence 
1201 See Chapter I, Section C. 4- e. (4) et seq. 
uos Chapter I, Section C. 4-
1209 See discussion of cumulative effect, supra Chapter I and discussion supra text 
following note 750. 
1 210 N. b. discussion concerning use of res ipsa loquitur to obviate the causation-in-
fact issue as well, text following note 1191 supra. 
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be the sole cause of the plaintiff's injury. Conceivably, res ipsa loquitur 
might be applied to the separate but contributing acts of several defend-
ants:._each of whom could be shown to have been negligent in his 
relationship with the plaintiff. Such a finding is not to be confused, how-
ever, with the Litzmann and Ybarra situations,1211 where the probabili-
ties indicated that only one of the named defendants in fact caused the 
injury. Here, to the contrary, the assumption is that the cumulative na-
ture of radiation injury means that possibly more than one "negligent" 
radiation source, over a period of time, could concur in the ultimate in-
jury. This concurrence should be sufficient basis for liability under 
normal tort rules.1212 The plaintiff, therefore, while faced with the 
problems of non-detectability, latency, and unidentifiability in solving 
the question of probable ·cause-in-fact, need ·only establish that the 
defendant's radiation source was probably one cause-in-fact. Res ipsa 
loquitur is then presumably available. 
(2) Precedent: The X-Ray Cases 
Judicial consideration of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to 
radiation injury accidents has been confined to malpractice actions for 
negligent use of X-ray machines.1213 These decisions to some extent 
turn on the special physician-patient relationship, and their value as 
precedent for other nuclear energy enterprises must be discounted ac-
cordingly. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the medical use of radio-
isotopes may be one of the most fertile sources of future negligence liti-
gation in the atomic energy area. The X-ray cases thus assume 
considerable importance, since there should be no appreciable legal 
difference between radiation injury induced by over-exposure to X-rays 
and that caused by other radioactive substances. 
Regrettably no general rule of thumb can be distilled from the de-
cisions either permitting or denying application of res ipsa loquitur to 
X-ray accidents. Unequivocal affirmative precedent favoring use of the 
1211 Ibid. 
1212 "If defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, 
it foiiQws that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because other causes 
have contributed to the result. Nothing occurs in a vacuum, and the event without 
multiple causes, numbered in the thousands, is inconceivable. In particular, the de-
fendant is not necessarily relieved of liability because the negligence of another person 
is also a contributing cause." Prosser 222. See discussion supra text at notes 923 ff. 
121s Most of the cases in this area are collected in the Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 329, 355 
(1955). A discussion of selected cases appears in Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and 
Actionable Radiation Injury/' 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 327, 334 et seq. (1958). 
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doctrine exists today in at least six jurisdictions,12u and several other 
states have announced rules so similar in end result that they must be 
numbered in the "friendly" group.1215 Application has been specifically 
denied, however, by the courts in nine jurisdictions.1216 In three states-
the best example being California-there appear to be irreconcilable 
conflicts among recent pronouncements, and no clear rule can be said 
to have evolved.1211 
The over-all judicial disharmony cannot be justified solely on the 
basis of differing factual situations, although as will be indicated below, 
the facts of a particular case, particularly the amount of radiation re-
ceived, may have considerable influence. Principally, differences rest on 
divergent judicial attitudes toward ( 1) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
in general, ( 2) the nature of the physician-patient relationship, and 
(3) the peculiarities of X-ray accidents and the likelihood that negli-
gence is responsible for radiation injury. In Michigan, for instance, the 
court has specifically repudiated the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or its 
12u Illinois: Holcomb v. Magee, 217 Ill. App. 272 (1920) and Johnson v. Marshall, 
241 Ill. App. 8o (1926); Kansas: Emrie v. Tice, 174 Kan. 739, 2s8 P.2d 332 (1953); 
Minnesota: Jones v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., n8 Minn. 217, 136. N.W. 
741 (1912) and Holt v. Ten Broeck, 134 Minn. 458, 159 N.W. 1073 (1916); Missis-
sippi: Waddle v. Sutherland, 156 Miss. 540, 126 So. 201 (1930) ;. Tennessee: Lewis v. 
Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W.2d 8o8 (1928), later appealed 163 Tenn. 163. 40 
S.W.2d 1038 (1931); Texas: Hess v. Millsap, 72 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 
and Martin v. Eschelman, 33 S.W .2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). 
1215 E.g., Louisiana: Thomas v. Lobrano, supra note 1200; Virginia: Hunter v. 
Burroughs, 123 V a. JJJ, g6 S;E. 36o ( 1918). 
1 21&District of Columbia: Sweeney v. Erving, 35 App. D.C. 57 (1910), aff'd 228 
U.S. 233, 33 S.Ct. 416 (1913); Indiana: McCoy v. Buck, 87 Ind. App. 433, 157 N.E. 
456 (1927); Maryland: Streett v. Hodgson, 139 Md. 137, ns Atl. 27 (1921); Michi-
gan: Barnes v. Mitchell, 341 Mich. 7, 67 N.W.2d 208 (1954) and Facer v. Lewis, J26 
Mich. 702, 40 N.W.2d 457 (1950); New York: Antowill v: Friedmann, 197 App. Div . 
. 230, 188 N.Y. Supp. 777 (1921); North Carolina: Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. I, 76 
S.E.2d 461 (1953); North Dakota: Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D. 416, 217 N.W. 666 
(1928); Oklcih07na: Cooper v. McMurry, 194 Okla. 241, 149 P.2d 330 (1944); Penn-
sylvania: Stemons v. Turner, 274 Pa. 228, II7 At!. 922 (1922). 
1217 Arkansas: Gray v. McLaughlin, 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d 686 (19M) (applying 
rule closely similar to res ipsa loquitur} and Routen v. McGehee, 2o8 Ark. 501, 186 
S.W.2d 779 (1945) (denying applicability of res ipsa lOquitur to this class of cases); 
California: Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute, 102 Cal. App.2d 293, 227 P.2d 
473 (1951) (denying applicability for several reasons) and Costa v. Regents of Uni-
versity of California, supra note n63 (assuming applicability of the doctrine); Iowa: 
Shockley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103 N.W. 300 (1905) (applying doctrine akin to 
res ipsa loquitur) and Berg v. Willett, 212 Iowa nog, 232 N.W. 821 (1930) (deny-
ing application); Wisconsin: Rost v. Roberts, 18o Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923) 
(approving instruction on res ipsa loquitur or closely analogous doctrine) and Kuehne-
mann v. Boyd, 193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W. 326 (1927) (denying application in physician-
patient context). 
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equivalent in malpractice cases and has seen no need for varying the 
precedent when it was faced with an action involving X-ray injuries.1218 
Several courts have similarly rejected res ipsa loquitur on the broad 
theory that the doctrine, which frequently in effect makes the physician 
an insurer against bad results, should have no application in malpractice 
actions.1219 One of the more articulate courts of this group has stated 
its reasoning thus: 
To put upon the medical profession ... such a burden as 
financial responsibility for damages, if injury or death results, 
without proof of specific negligence, would drive from the 
profession many of the very men who should remain in 
it. . . .1220 
However one evaluates the validity of this argument (and many have 
disputed it), 1221 it is embraced by several courts and has not been limited 
to actions involving X-ray machines.1222 It has potential, therefore, in 
any malpractice action. 
The third and perhaps most significant justification for refusal to 
apply res ipsa loquit1tr in X-ray cases,-i.e., that this is not the type of 
accident which would occur only if there were negligence--appears in 
several decisions.1228 The basis of this objection is that a number of 
expert medical witnesses have stated that, because of the peculiar sen-
sitivity of some persons to X-rays, radiation injury can take place dur-
ing diagnostic or therapeutic treatment without neglect on the part of 
the administering doctor or technician.1224 This is because sensitivity is 
not a characteristic which can be determined before administration of 
X-ray, but only becomes apparent from the patient's reaction to early 
121s E.g., Barnes v. Mitchell, supra note 1216. 
1219 E.g., Streett v. Hodgson, supra note 1216, Cooper v. McMurry, supra note 1216. 
122o Stemons v. Turner, supra note 1216 at 233. 
1221 It may be questioned whether professional medical men, who universally carry 
insurance against public liability, are deterred in great measure by legal doctrines 
(such as res ipsa loquitur) from attempting the more risky cures. For a protestation 
of contrary opinion, however, see e.g., Morris, "'Res Ipsa Loquitur'-Liability With-
out Fault," 25 Ins. C.]. c;n, II2-13 (1958). 
1 222 See generally Morris, supra note 1221 ; Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law 
§30 (2d ed. 1949). 
1228 Normally such a conclusion is limited to the facts of the particular case. Re-
fusing application of the doctrine on these grounds, therefore, does not necessarily mean 
that the court would reject it if faced with more appropriate facts. E.g., Nance v. 
Hitch, supra note 1216; Antowill v. Friedmann, supra note 1216. 
122~ See e.g., testimony of experts in Nance v. Hitch, supra note 1216. See also 
Gray, 1 Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine,1!71.37 (3d ed. 1958). But see Dunlap, supra 
note 1148. 
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exposures. Thus, while continuing applications of X-ray, after knowl-
edge of super-sensitivity has been or should have been obtained, may 
constitute a specific act of negligence, it is possible to argue that a physi-
cian in many instances might be said to act with due care in administer-
ing treatment initially in small doses. In cases involving this latter type 
of fact situation, courts have been reluctant to apply the res ipsa loqui-
tur assumption, i.e., that the accident is one which ordinarily would not 
occur without negligence.1226 
On the other hand, there are experts who discount the hypersensitiv-
ity argument and argue for application of res ipsa loquitur in the ma-
jority of cases involving diagnostic use of X-rays and even in some 
therapeutic use cases. 
It seems that diagnostic films properly made, considering the 
low voltage of the rays and the transient exposure required, 
should never result in burns; injury of the patient therefore 
raises an inference of negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur should be uniformly applied .... In case of thera-
peutic burns, on the other hand, one cannot say so confidently 
that production of a bum always proves negligence. . . . 
The factor of hypersensitivity of the patient is . . . much 
overstressed ; furthermore, the exposure required in making 
diagnostic films ordinarily should not bum a sensitive indi-
vidual and lastly, in cases requiring prolonged treatment, there 
is no reason why the physician should not determine for him-
self, by initial small dosage of irradiation, whether the patient 
is hypersensitive or not.1228 
Even if a physician determines that a person is hypersensitive, the pa-
tient's disease may be so grave that the possibility of its cure or arrest-
ment could warrant taking the chance of radiation bums. It would be 
difficult to argue that the physician, embarking upon this course of 
treatment, should be subjected to an inference that he was negligent, 
without more specific proof, should radiation injury result. 
Courts approving application of res ipsa loquitur in X-ray injury 
cases have done so rather automatically. Decisions normally are limited 
to their facts, the court stating that wider the circumstances, an infer-
ence or presumption of negligence is warranted.1227 Almost invariably 
these "circumstances" have included expert testimony to the effect that 
1220 Nance v. Hitch, supra note 1216, is perhaps the best example of this approach, 
although there is admittedly conflict in the expert testimony on many of the points in 
controversy. 
122s Dunlap, supra note 1148 at 15o-st, n. 25. 
1221 Holt v. Ten Broeck, supra note 1214; Holcomb v. Magee, supra note 1214. 
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this particular burn could not have been made without negligence on 
the part of someone. While no absolute factual pattern emerges, the 
majority of these decisions involve the treatment of milder maladies 
during which the patient has suffered third-degree burns.1228 These courts 
demonstrate a readiness to discount hypersensitivity as a source of 
plaintiff's injury, particularly if there has been a continuing course of 
treatment permitting defendant to have ascertained the condition.1229 
The most recent decision of this variety is one which, while not ap-
plying res ipsa loquitur by name, applies a procedural theory of the same 
general cast. In the Louisiana decision of Thomas v. Lobrano/230 the 
plaintiff over a three-year period received therapeutic X-ray treatment 
for boils. She eventually developed serious radiation burns in the gen-
eral area of application. Commenting on the fact that one of plaintiff's 
counts was predicated on res ipsa loquitur, the court indicated that it 
was incumbent on the defendant physician to show in a malpractice 
action that he possessed an ordinary degree of professional skill "and 
that in applying that skill.to the given case he used reasonable care and 
diligence along ·with his best judgment." This, the court stated, "re-
lated" to the res ipsa loquitur rule. The court then went on to say : 
. . 
... [T]he burden in the instant case is upon the defendant 
physician to affirmatively establish his use of reasonable care 
and diligence, together with his best judgment, in his treat-
ment of the plaintiff .... It follows as a corollary that the 
defendant is also under the burden of negativing the many 
specific charges of negligence or want of proper care.1281 
This doctrine, it may be suggested, if "related" to res ipsa loquitur 
also considerably exceeds it in effect if it should be applied to radiation 
treatment cases generally and is not limited solely to the rather peculiar 
facts of the Lobrano case. Res ipsa loquitur in theory is predicated on 
the assumption that, although the plaintiff cannot show specific acts of 
122s E.g., Emrie v. Tice, supra note 1214 (severe burns over large area resulting 
from removal of wart on ear); Thomas v. Lobrano, supra note 1200 (applying strong 
presumption of negligence where severe burns resulted from treatment of boils); Jones 
v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 1214 (severe burns after diagnos-
tic ·treatment); Waddle v. Sutherland, supra note 1214 (treatment for eczema caused 
burns so severe as to necessitate amputation of limb). But see Berg v. Willett, supra 
note 1217 (radiation burns from treatment for ringworm, doctrine not applied) and 
McCoy v. Buck, supra note 1216 (severe burns from treatment for eczema, doctrine 
not applied). 
1229 Waddle v. Sutherland, supra note 1214; Lewis v. Casenburg, supra note 1214 
1230 Supra note 1200. 
1281 !d. at 6os. (·;Emphasis added.) 
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negligence, the probabilities of the situation, because of known circum-
stances of the accident, point to the fact that defendant has been negli-
gent. The burden of proving negligence except in a very few states/232 
remains with the plaintiff. Under the broad language of the Lobrano 
case, however, the burden of showing due care in a malpractice action 
in Louisiana is automatically on the defendant. The apparent assump-
tion, without contrary proof, is that the defendant has been negligent. 
This is not an instrument of logic, but solely one of policy, made all.the 
more dramatic by the Louisiana rule permitting direct action against 
the insurer as a named defendant.1283 If followed, the Lobrano reason-
ing will mean that in Louisiana the physician in many cases will be held 
strictly liable for damaging results of his treatment. 
Thomas v. Lobrano is seemingly the furthest extension of pro-
plaintiff sentiment in the X-ray field. It has been remarked that the 
case promises to be a leading one, 1284 but such a conclusion is very ques-
tionable. Practically all courts show some deference to the awkward po-
sition of the physician, who works constantly with dangerous instru-
mentalities and must continually make hair-line decisions as to the best 
course of treatment. The courts are not likely to disregard this diffi-
culty in future cases. 
In addition, those courts which are willing to apply res ipsa loquitur 
to the X-ray cases do so at best on an empiric basis, and one may doubt 
that this rather hesitant approach can form the foundation for the long 
jump to the . Louisiana doctrine. As a precedent outside Louisiana, 
Thomas v. Lobrano would appear to have little weight except perhaps 
as one more decision applying a doctrine similar to res ipsa loquritur in 
the X-ray· cases. One also should not ignore the fact that the way in 
which the doctor kept, or failed to keep, his treatment records rather 
dearly indicated to the court (and reasonably so if the facts stated in 
the opinion are taken at face value) that the defendant frequently was 
very careless and hence he probably was negligent in this instance as 
well. 
More significant, perhaps, are some of the distinctions which have 
been drawn in the decisions to indicate those instances in which res ipsa 
loquitur would or would not be applicable. Some courts are willing to 
apply the doctrine when X-rays are used purely for diagnostic purposes, 
1232 See note 1201 supra and accompanying text. 
123sLa. Stat. Ann. (1952) §22:655 (Supp. 1956). 
1234 Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 
327. 338 (1958). 
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but not in the case of therapy.1235 This is explained principally by the 
fact that there is a much greater likelihood that injuries resulting from 
diagnostic treatment are the product of negligence than is the case in 
therapeutic cases. Relatively low radiation exposure is required for X-
ray diagnostic photography, and it is felt that even persons allegedly 
hypersensitive to radiation should not be affected by the rays if they are 
applied with ordinary care. 
A further distinction is sometimes drawn between instances in which 
radiation burns are localized at the point of treatment and those in 
which injuries cover an area larger than necessary for treatment. Courts 
are more willing to apply res ipsa loquitur in the latter case,1236 because 
the probabilities of negligence appear stronger than when radiation is 
localized. With known techniques, physicians are assumed generally to 
be able to localize the place of application. 
Two restrictions on the use of res ipsa loquitur-generally repudiated 
elsewhere-<>ccasionally are voiced in the X-ray decisions. One recent 
California decision stated that res ipsa loquitur could be applied only 
when, as a matter of common knowledge, the accident was one which 
would not happen ordinarily without negligence.1237 The court con-
strued this test to mean that expert testimony was not admissible on 
this issue of probability. Such a construction has seldom been followed, 
however, and indeed, the decisions as to the applicability or inapplica-
bility of res ipsa loquitur to X-ray treatment accidents almost invariably 
are based in part on expert testimony. 
There also have been a few cases in which the courts have declined 
to consider the plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur count on another ground, i.e., 
that he pleaded and introduced evidence to prove specific acts of negli-
gence.1288 Thus some decisions, which at first glance appear to repudiate 
res ipsa loquitur in the X-ray context, are based only on this technical 
procedural point. The more liberal modern attitude toward permitting 
alternative pleading generally has spelled the decline of this argument, 
but it is still alive in some jurisdictions.1289 Practitioners seeking to in-
voke res ipsa loquitur in radiation cases would do well, therefore, to 
12ss Holt v. Ten Broeck, supra note 1214; Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute, 
supra note 1217. 
1236 Emrie v .. Tii:e, supra note ·1214; Martin v. Eschelman, supra note 1214. Cf. 
Hamilton v. Harris, 223 S.W. S33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). 
1237 Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute, supra note 1217. But see Costa v. 
Regents of University of California, s~tPra note 1163. 
1238 E.g., King v. Dotto, 142 Ore. :Zo7, 1!.) P.2d 1100 ( 1933); Hess v. Millsap, st~pra 
note IZI4. 
12se See generally Harper. & James. §19.10. 
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make a preliminary check of local precedent to avoid the possible embar-
rassment of seeing their strongest argu~ent rejected on a pleading 
technicality. 
Despite the divergent courses followed and theories advanced by the 
courts in X-ray cases, it is possible to draw certain conclusions which 
may form a basis for prediction as to future judicial action in radiation 
cases. Of course some jurisdictions will continue to refuse recognition 
to res ipsa loquitur, either in all cases or in malpractice actions. The 
discussion which follows is predicated on the assumption that the court 
is willing to apply res ipsa loquitur "under appropriate circumstances." 
Even with this assumption, the first conclusion perhaps must be a 
negative one: there is or should be a general presumption against the 
applicability of res ipsa loquitur to radiation accidents resulting from 
radiation treatment, particularly when radioactive isotopes are used. 
There are three justifications for this statement. First, experts gener-
ally agree that untoward resu,lts may be produced, particularly in radia-
tion therapy when used for serious diseases such as cancer, without any 
lack of care on the doctor's part. In part, this is because, as one expert 
has stated: 
This field of treatment is still in its infancy. A doctor must 
proceed as best he can, and with the meager knowledge of 
this field available. Unfortunate results are bound to occur in 
spite of his best efforts. He cannot properly be held at fault 
if he proceeded in accordance with the practice used by other 
men of like ability in his community.mo 
Even those experts, who feel that the science of treatment by X-ray is 
sufficiently developed so that the doctor knows what the possible results 
will be, nevertheless agree that taking the chance of severe radiation in-
jury in the hope of arresting serious disease may be action commensu-
rate with due care and good practice.1241 There is much that is unknown 
about medical use of isotopes, but their use holds great promise and 
must not be stultified. 
Further, it has been pointed out that not even expert radiologists can 
control with absolute certainty the amount of emitted radiation, so that 
excessive radiation may not always be the product of human error.1242 
Finally, a number of experts point to hypersensitivity as a possible 
1240 Gray, supra note 122i. 
1 241 See Dunlap, supra note II48 at 153 et seq. See generally, Comment, 30 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 8o (1956). 
1 242 Gray, supra note 1224 at 1T71.JI. See Berg. v. Willett, supra note 1217. 
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source of radiation injury, even though due eare has been exercised.m3 
There is a difference of opinion, of course, as to the validity of this last 
justification, 1244 but the lack of unanimity among experts is all the more 
reason for rejecting the flat assumption that res ipsa loquitur should 
apply to radiation injuries caused by the use of radioactive isotopes for 
medical purposes. 
Given the case of diagnostic treatment, however, where proved good 
practice dictates the use of radiation which should not harm even the 
hypersensitive person, or given the therapeutic case in which the condi-
tion is mild but burns are severe, res ipsa loquitur becomes easier to 
apply. Likewise, if the doctor subjects his patient to a long course of 
treatment, but fails to test for reaction following early treatment, or if 
he administers further radiation when first-degree burns are apparent, 
the doctrine is more inviting in all but the most advanced malignancy or 
similar cases. 
In brief, the more serious the results of the exposure and the less 
grave the patient's condition, the less attractive theories of reasonable 
hope of cure, uncontrollable radiation error, or hypersensitivity become. 
Experts in radiology have shown marked willingness to evaluate these 
various sources of injury in a given case, and ·the courts have displayed 
equal receptiveness to such opinions.1245 This expert testimony, together 
with the lay reaction to defendant's conduct and plaintiff's condition, 
spell the ultimate fate of res ipsa loquitur in those jurisdictions where 
the doctrine is considered acceptable under proper circumstances. 
(3) Application of Principles in Other Radiation Cases 
It would be impossible to chronicle here all tlie potential accidents in 
nuclear energy operations and processes and then predict the extent to 
which courts may be expected to apply res ipsa loquitur in each situa-
tion. Such a study would require technical acumen beyond the scope of 
this discussion, since the all-important probability of negligence can be 
determined only through knowledge of the specific technical feature~ of 
a particular operation. More valuable, perhaps, would be a brief sum-
marization of the general considerations which are likely to influence a 
court faced with a radiation injury case. The court normally will be 
interested in the questions of probability of negligence and defendant's 
1ua Ibid. See also testimony of expert witnesses in Nance v. Hitch, supra note 1216. 
1244 Dunlap, supra note II48. 
1245 In practically all of the X-ray cases herein cited, expert testimony was received 
on the issue of probability of negligence. 
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responsibility. As indicated before, these will be affected not only by a 
strict evaluation of the probabilities involved, but also by broader con-
siderations of policy which some courts allow to replace a strictly logical 
approach in a given case. 
(a) Negligence Probability 
With the modem dilution of the "exclusive control" condition pre-
cedent, the judicial evaluation of Wigmore's first res ipsa loquitur con-
dition (i.e., probability of negligence) becomes the most significant 
obstacle to the attorney seeking to invoke the doctrine. 
(i) Expert Testimony 
Probability of negligence is likely to be most strongly influenced by 
the testimony of experts. As previously noted, 1246 at first courts were 
disinclined to accept expert opinion on whether or not a particular ac-
cident could have happened without negligence and was therefore ap-
propriate for res ipsa loquitur. This hesitancy may be laid to the fact 
that in the beginning judges were willing to accept res ipsa loquitur 
only in the simple accident situation, e.g., the falling brick or scaffold. 
Situations began to arise, however, involving more complicated ins.tru-
mentalities not understood by laymen, but occurring under circum-
stances, after explanation by the expert, strongly indicating negligence 
to the lay mind. It soon became evident that for accurate appraisal of 
the probable causation of an accident induced by such instrumentalities, 
testimony of someone familiar with their operation was indispensable. 
Thus a significant increase in judicial willingness to accept expert opin-
ion became discernible. · 
The use of experts to determine whether or not res ipsa loquitur 
should be applied to radiation incidents often is imperative. In the nu-
clear field, ho~ever, there is no justification for a court's assuming that 
it knows enough to determine if the probabilities of negligence are 
great enough to justify using the doctrine without first hearing expert 
testimony. There may be situations which experts will agree probably 
could happen only if there has been negligence, but this should not be 
guessed at by the judge or the jury unaided by experts. As greater ex-
perience is gained in nuclear operations it may become generally recog-
nized that in certain situations the probability of negligence is as great 
as in the "exploding bottle" .cases, but this is surely not yet true for 
most cases. 
1246 See text following note u62 supra. 
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Assuming that strict liability will not be applied at least to certain 
types of small research reactors, particularly to low power and sub-
critical assemblies, is this the type of case in which res ipsa loquitur 
should be applied? If a reactor "burns up" 1241 after operating safely 
for several months in compliance with all safety requirements estab-
lished by the AEC and other expert consultants, should the law assume 
or allow the jury to conclude that someone has been negligent unless 
the defendant comes forth with proof of lack of negligence? 1248 
It is true that under AEC regulations extraordinary safety pre-
cautions must be used in operating a reactor with its potentiality for 
harm. In the light of the fact that there is much to be learned about the 
nature and properties of the atomic nucleus it clearly would be negli-
gence to fail to use such precautions. The AEC makes a finding as to 
each reactor licensed to the effect that it can be operated without undue 
risk to public health and safety, and this determination is made only 
after careful study by competent scientists and engineers. Do these 
facts justify an assumption that if an incident occurs it probably re-
sulted from negligence? Should res ipsa loquitur be available since 
present knowledge indicates that the safety precautions make it unlikely 
that an incident will occur? Or should we say that the requirement of 
so many safety precautions indicates that unless there is evidence that 
the safety devices were by-passed, mere human error in operation 
could not be a logical explanation, but instead the incident must have 
happened because of some scientific fact not heretofore known or at 
least not fully understood ? 
Unless res ipsa loquitur is to be used simply as camouflage for what 
actually is strict liability, there are some situations in which there is no 
possible justification for imposing liability on the basis of an assumptio11 
of negligence. If an airplane should crash into a reactor and cause a 
burn-up and subsequent release of radioactive material into the atmos-
phere under adverse weather conditions, it is not realistic to say that 
the release was the result of negligence. The same is true if it happened 
to be an unusually large meteorite or an enemy missile or bomb which 
pierced the reactor shell, or an earthquake of completely unpredictable 
magnitude which caused a burn-up. These possibilities have been recog-
nized, but scientists for government and industry have decided that the 
chances of these events taking place are so small that they should be 
1247 See generally Chapter II, Section A. 1., supra. 
1248 See incidents described. infra. Chapter IV See also report of a recent reactor 
incident at Idaho Falls. Idaho NY Times, Nov. 29, 1958, p. 2. col. 7. 
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ignored rather than to require the extreme precautions necessary to pre-
clude them. This is not negligence but deliberate choice, approved by 
responsible persons including government officials. If liability is im-
posed for consequent injuries, this is application of strict liability, not 
negligence rules. 
These, however, are not the difficult cases. If the burn-up occurs 
when no such obvious and non-negligent cause is known, should it then 
be assumed that negligence is responsible? This question cannot be 
answered generally; rather the answer should depend on the many 
variables for each installation, including the development of the art, 
particularly as to safety precautions, which will change from time to 
time as experience is gained. What is non-negligent procedure today 
may become negligent in the light pf new knowledge. Likewise, the 
converse is possible. Surely, res ipsa loquit1tr should not be applied 
automatically but rather only when the facts of a particular installation 
as to a specific incident at a given time are considered. Types of reac-
tors and incidents should not' be catalogued either as _calling for or not 
calling for an application of the doctrine. If any generalization has 
validity at all, it might be that, while a more complicated reactor in-
creases the chance that some negligence in procedure is the cause, the 
chances are much greater that something unforeseeable or at least un-
preventable caused an incident. Perhaps the same can be said for re-
actors using new and relatively untried designs. If liability is to be 
imposed, it should be an honest application of strict liability, not an as-
sumption of negligence. 
While in general similar conclusions may be drawn with respect to 
industrial and medical uses of radiation other than from reactors, there 
are differences. In the first place, the amount of damage including the 
number of persons that might possibly be hurt is very much less, even 
for high level radioactive material. Secondly, the variety of materials 
and their radiation characteristics is great and the possible uses cover 
a very wide range. Lastly, the possibilities for unforeseeable incidents 
are much less with radioisotopes-we know so much more about the in-
jury potential and what might happen to cause trouble than we do about 
reactors and what happens when neutrons interact with material. Sev-
eral conclusions concerning the use of res ipsa loquitur possibly can be 
drawn from these facts. 
Laying aside medical therapy cases, the safety procedures are much 
more standardized and consequently there is a smaller number of pos-
sible explanations should something go wrong. Likewise, the proper 
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procedures may be learned readily, although it may be difficult to get 
personnel to follow them. Undoubtedly this will lead to greater will-
ingness of courts to apply an assumption of negligence rule. On the 
other hand, it would be unrealistic to require the presence of a trained 
safety officer whenever a radioisotope is being used because this will 
impede greatly the more extensive use of such materials, a program the 
AEC is now promoting vigorously. In many cases at least the level 
of radiation and the difficulty of carrying out safety procedures would 
not call for such precautions, and the expense would be prohibitive. 
This conclusion probably is sound for many industrial uses, but it may 
not be a realistic one for the radiation laboratory where high level 
sources are present and where disposal problems may be so great that 
extreme care must be taken and only a properly trained specialist can 
provide it. 
With sealed sources of radiation now being used in many industrial 
processes, there may be little to distinguish cases involving the handling 
of such sources, e.g., a leaking thickness gage,1249 from normal product 
liability situations in whiCh it is thought proper to assume that there was 
negligence if an accident happens. 
It may be completely reasonable to apply res ipsa loquitur if someone 
is injured by a high-level cobalt 6o source in a research laboratory 
which is properly safeguarded. If there are electrical interlocks, special 
light signals, limited access by special keys available only to trained 
personnel, and requirements of maze-type construction and precaution-
ary use of detection devices, it would seem almost impossible for acci-
dental exposure to occur unless some human negligence intervened. 
Undoubtedly, there are other similar examples of cases in which it 
would be fair to adopt the res ipsa loquitur principle. 
The necessity of offering expert testimony before applying the doc-
trine in isotope cases may not be nearly as great as in reactor cases ; 
nevertheless in many cases conclusions should not be drawn without 
such testimony. The same probably is true of accidents arising during 
the transportation of radioactive materials. If the question of negli-
gence turns on whether sufficient precautions were taken, including ade-
quate warning signs, to advise an unsuspecting layman or even a pro-
fessional rescuer of the danger, the jury would seem in an even better 
position than an expert to determine adequacy of precautions. If the 
t249 This does not necessarily mean, of course, that res ipsa loquitur can be applied. 
The requirements that defendant is probably responsible for any negligence con-
nected with the accident and that plamtiff eliminate himself as a <:ontributing cause 
still post> formtdahlt> ••hstacles 
u 
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question involves a determination of whether there was sufficient shield-
ing or a strong enough container to withstand the impact of a crash or 
other accident, then it would be unrealistic to assume negligence without 
expert advice. 
In connection with radioactive isotopes, as in the reactor cases, it is 
impossible to list those cases in which res ipsa loquitur should or should 
not be applied. Many judgments of social policy should be left to the 
layman; but when a technical question of probabilities is involved, ex-
pert evaluation should be sought. The court which errs on the side of 
caution and refuses to permit the unaided jury to decide such cases will 
do neither the parties nor justice a disservice. 
( ii) Accident Experience in Operations 
Taking account of developments in aircraft accident cases, there is 
yet another pertinent consideration in applying res ipsa loquitur in 
radiation cases. An improving safety record for an industry or opera-
tion may result in an increased willingness in the courts to apply the 
principle.1250 The logic behind this tendency is that, with increased 
technical knowledge and prevention procedures, the probability of an 
accident occurring without someone's having been negligent decreases 
considerably. It has been argued already that the fine safety record in 
reactor operations may serve as a "boomerang," opening the way for 
res ipsa loquitur with its concomitant decreased burden of proof for 
plaintiffs.1251 This argument is tenuous at best. Its basic thesis-that 
a: rare accident means negligence--is valid only if it is assumed that 
design and operating procedures have been perfected, i.e., that from a 
safety standpoint at least, there are no substantial vacuums of knowl-
edge and that compliance with established procedures by operating 
personnel almost certainly will prevent any accident. This assumption 
simply is not applicable to many phases of nuclear energy operations, 
particularly reactors. Scientists, engineers, and medical researchers 
admittedly are only on the threshold of understanding nuclear energy 
and its many ramifications. In addition, the safety record thus far 
spans considerably less than two decades and is based on the operation 
of relatively few reactors. This would not seem sufficient, either as to 
comprehensiveness of knowledge or extensiveness of experience, to jus-
tify judging the probabilitjes as to cause with sufficient accuracy to 
1250 See text accompanying, and authorities cited in, note 1167 s11pra. 
1251 Becker & Huard, supra note II49 at 67. But see Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur 
and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 327, 340 (1958). 
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permit general application of res ipsa loquitur. It is not even accurate 
to draw the conclusion that, because there have been so few injuries in 
past operations, this means that accidents are not likely to happen. As 
Dr. C. Rogers McCullough, chairman of the AEC Advisory Committee 
on. Reactor Safety, stated at the Geneva conference, there is "serious 
doubt that our skill and care is sufficient to prevent all [reactor] acci-
dents. . . . [ W] e are convinced that the record is better than we have 
a right to expect .... [C]olleagues in other countries have been some-
what less fortunate than we and this emphasizes our own conviction 
that we cannot expect perfection in this regard." 1252 In evaluating the 
likelihood of accidents, we must consider that the large reactors with 
which we hope to produce economical electrical energy will be much 
more complex and of less tested design than existing reactors. 
(iii) Relationship of Parties 
A third, and possibly more important, general consideration in deal-
ing with res ipsa loquitur is the relationship of the parties. It has al-
ready been pointed out that a number of courts are reluctant to impose 
res ipsa loquitur in the physician-patient context.1258 This reluctance 
stems from judicial recognition that sound medical practice often may 
suggest more than one course of conduct. m• Some treatments may 
carry with them great risk of untoward result yet perhaps also offer 
the only hope for complete cure or arrestment of the disease. Judicial 
doctrines which potentially second-guess a physician's reasoned choice 
among the courses open to him, without requiring specific showing of 
negligence, are certain to have a deterrent effect upon the progress of 
medical treatment techniques and knowledge. Thus, whenever courts 
are presented with cases involving the use of radioactive materials for 
the cure of human ills, this type of reasoning is likely to be utilized. 
In a sense, the logic which emerges from the X-ray cases is likely to 
cut across the enti-re atomic energy industry when the question of res 
ipsa loquitur arises. There is reluctance to second-guess the physician 
who is faced with alternative courses of action, but more willingness 
to do so when it appears that the malady that he sought to cure was of 
a less dangerous nature. In other words, choosing the more dangerous, 
but also potentially more effective, course may more easily be termed 
negligence when a serious untoward result occurs from treatment for a 
1252 Reported in 4 BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 324 (1958). 
1258 See text following note 1218 .rupra. 
t2u Dunlap, .rupra note u48 at I53· 
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mild condition rather than a serious one. In essence, the process is one 
of weighing the possible end result against the personal health risk in-
volved. Similarly when isotopes are being used commercially for an 
industrial purpose, e.g., to determine the thickness or purity of some 
material, an accident in which a non-employee is injured by radiation is 
likely to be classified as appropriate for res ipsa loquitur.1255 Commer-
cial perfection of materials, the desired result, generally would be con-
sidered a less important end, certainly minor in significance when com-
pared with the cure of disease in a human body, and thus would be less 
justifiable as a ground for risking radiation injury. Conversely, it 
might be less appropriate to apply res ipsa loquitur to an accident occur-
ring during experimental nuclear energy studies undertaken to advance 
the art which is so important to national welfare-particularly if some 
exposure was unavoidable.1256 
This particular policy decision is probably an unconscious one, how-
ever, and can be exaggerated in importance. Often it may be much 
more difficult to weigh the end against the risk than in the cases sug-
gested here. But it is a consideration which should not be ignored, for 
it often is basic to a court's conclusion that an accident speaks for it-
self, although such considerations have no logical relationship to the 
statistical chance that certain accidents were caused by negligence 
rather than an unforeseen circumstance. 
( iv) Dangerous Instrumentality 
One final factor deserves mention. The statement has been made 
that courts tend to apply res ipsa loquitur more freely if the instru-
mentality is dangerous in nature.1257 While this conclusion has received 
some support in judicial dictum and has obvious significance for reactor 
operators, it should be viewed with skepticism. A review of cases in-
volving explosions of dangerous materials, in which the plaintiff has 
attempted to apply res ipsa loquitur, indicates a strong tendency among 
1 255 If, of course, the local workmen's compensation schedule applies to radiation 
injury, the question of res ipsa loquitur is obviated. At the present time, however, there 
is serious question whether many of these schedules are set up to cover radiation 
injury adequately. See Part II, infra. . 
1256 This would seem ·to be basis for refusing recovery under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act for damages arising out of the Texas City disaster; Dalehite v. United States, 346 
U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). See discussion of disposal operation and vicarious lia-
bility, supra notes 297 ff. 
1257 E.g., Hutton, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Actionable Radiation Injury," 25 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 327, 340-41 ( 1958). 
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courts to reject the doctrine.ms Indeed, one finds no greater willingness 
to ignore other hypotheses of cause in these "dangerous instrumen-
tality" cases than appears in cases involving less dramatic occurrences. 
Harper and James argue, 1259 however, that the more complicated and dan-
gerous a machine or process becomes, the more likely it is that the defend-
ant's negligence caused the accident. Apparently the logic of this argu-
ment is not nearly as irresistible as they believe.1260 The mere fact that 
more parts, people, complications, or dangers are involved is significant 
in determining what precautions should be required; but it does not 
mean that the probability of negligence in a specific case is greater. If 
anything it could be argued that if the defendant is at all conscientious 
and sensible, probably he will be more careful than when the situation is 
more familiar, simpler, and less dangerous. Familiarity and low danger 
potential breed carelessness. While negligence may occur in more places 
or ways, there is an equally great if not greater increase in the chances 
that something not reasonably to be foreseen or prevented is the cause 
of an accident. The probabilities that an accident will occur have in-
creased because of the number of people or parts. It does not follow 
that there is a greater chance that someone was negligent, except in the 
sense that the more people there are, the greater the possibility of neg-
ligence. This would be like concluding that, because there is a greater 
likelihood that a negligent collision will occur when there are 1,000 
··people driving cars than when there are only IOO doing so, this means 
that when a collision occurs while I ,ooo are driving it follows that it 
was the ~esult of negligence. The number of negligent collisions will 
increase, given enough chances for the rules of probability to work, but 
· the probability that any one of the drivers will be negligent does not 
increase. If the precautions required by the standard of care in a par-
ticular setting are so high that normal persons cannot be expected to 
live up to them, then the standard, by hypothesis, is too high or the law 
is imposing absolute liability or a variation of it by making defendant 
show his lack of negligence. The situation does not speak for itself and 
res ipsa loquitur should not be applied. If the rule of liability is to be 
1258 See e.g., East End Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 190 Pa. 350~ 42 At!. 
707 (1899); Carter OiL Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla. 209, 232 Pac, 419 
(1924); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); · 
Brooks v. United States, g8 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. N.C. 1951). See comparable conclu-
sions as to vicarious liability in transporting explosives discussed in text 'following 
note 291 supra. 
t25o Harper & James §19~6, especially at 1084. 
12eo See !d. at n. 21 for their cute but completely uninformative and therefore un-
persuasive answer to Prosser's difficulty in seeing the logic .of the argument. 
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changed it should be done honestly and not camouflaged with a Latin 
phrase. 
(b) Defendant's Control 
The second condition precedent to application of res ipsa loquitur-
that the defendant probably was responsible for the negligence con-
nected with the accident-posed no difficulty in the X-ray cases. Treat-
ment invariably was administered by the single named defendant or by 
a person for whom the named defendant was legally responsible. Sel-
dom was there any difficulty in tracing the probable cause of the acci-
dent to the operation of the X-ray machine. As previously noted, usu-
ally the real question in these cases concerned the probabilities involved 
in Wigmore's first condition: Would the accident probably not have 
happened except for negligence? No case has been found in which the 
court's decision to accept res ispa loquitur turned on a concept similar 
to the reasoning in Ybarra o~ Litzmann. Nor has any case been found 
in which res ipsa loquitur was applied against the manufacturer of the 
X-ray machine or a component part thereof. 
The existing plethora of these latter complicating factors in the X-
ray cases does not mean, however, that the atomic energy industry can 
ignore their obvious implications. As has been pointed out elsewhere,1261 
res ipsa loquitur has been invoked successfully against suppliers of chat-
tels and their component parts, where there is some reasonable thesis 
upon which the court can discount possible causes-in-fact controlled by 
third persons. The willingness of the Ybarra and Litzmann courts to 
apply the doctrine against multiple defendants where there was no legal 
responsibility relationship inter se/262 is of significance to the industry. 
Indeed, in Nichols v. N old, 1263 . the Kansas Supreme Court permitted 
res ipsa (oquitur to be applied. against the manufacturer, distributor, 
and dealer of a bottled beverage. For the designer or manufacturer of 
a reactor or its component parts, for the medical researcher who de-
velops new therapeutic uses of radioisotopes, for the packager or ship-
per of radioactive materials, these judicial tendencies are extremely 
important. If the second condition precedent to the application of res 
ipsa loquitur, i.e., control by the defendant, can be satisfied by fact situ-
1261 Infra Chapter V, discussion of product liability. 
1262 This is at least one possible thesis for the result in Ybarra. See quotation ac-
companying note n81 supra. 
1263 174 J{.an. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953). For ~ sirn.ilar holding, see Loch v. Confair, 
372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) noted in ZJ Temp. L. Q. 238 (1953). · 
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ations such as these, then the potential vistas of liability are broadened 
greatly. 
One concrete example should serve adequately to illustrate the prob-
lem. Suppose that a reactor burn-up takes place, and the cause is traced 
to the fuel core of the reactor. The plaintiff may not be able to obtain 
evidence as to the preparation of the fuel by the processor, design of the 
core by the reactor designer, or operation by the reactor licensee. He is 
reasonably certain that one of these three persons, whom he names as 
defendants, is negligent, but he has no evidence to indicate which of the 
three. He can argue for application of res ipsa loquitur on two prin-
cipal theories. First, he can claim joint enterprise or joint responsibility, 
thereby obviating the issue of specific causation-in-fact. Since, at least 
in some cases, each defendant will be held responsible for the errors of 
the others, the determination of which defendant is at fault becomes 
unnecessary. 
Second, if this is not possible, he can fall back on the theory tacit in 
Ybarra and Litzmann. All the inducements for application of this 
doctrine are present: a totally innocent plaintiff, the probability of in-
surance, the knowledge that . this insurance may stem from a single 
source/264 and the strong possibility that the defendants have superior 
knowledge. Faced with these facts, the California court almost certainly 
would be willing to throw the logic of traditional res ipsa loquitur to 
the winds and shift the burden of "explanation" to the defendants. The 
pull in this direction for other courts may be equally strong. 
C. Insurance and Indemnity 
I. Introduction 
In the 1957 Anderson amendment 1265 to the Atomic Energy Act, 
Congress- offered at least a partial solution to the gigantic third-party 
liability problem facing AEC licensees. In the worst imaginable case, 
·property losses might run as high as $7 billion, with personal injury 
. 126• The government insurance an<f indemnity program is constructed on a frame-
work that provides for the i"~ctor operator to obtain insurance -for other persons con-
nected with operati~ of the reactor. See text accompanying notes IJOO ff. infra. The 
fact that one pOlicy insures all the persons . Potentially liable can be a strong argument, 
of oourse, for eliminating the specific cause~hi-fact question (rom the case. Whether 
it is a legitimate argument, in view of our traditional reluctance judicially to recognize 
the· fact o{ insurance. at all, is another question. . 
. U 65 Pub. La~. 85-256, 85th. Co~g., 1st Se5s. (1957), i1 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§22io (Supp, -1958), amending the Atomic Energy Act of l954. 68 Stat. 919. 42 
U.S._C.A, §§20n-2:z81 (Supp 1958). Section references that follow are to the 1954 
Act. as amended .. 
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and wrongful death claims aggregating additional untold amounts.1266 
Neither licensees nor domestic insurers were inclined or equipped to 
meet such a risk, and it soon became apparent that some form of gov-
ernment action was necessary. 
a. What the Amendment Does 
Several possible solutions were offered to Congress. One was to limit 
liability of a licensee or contractor to an amount equal to twice the 
original cost of the reactor or to an amount equaling the total private 
insurance available. Each of these limitations would have left the po-
tential public claims largely unsatisfied, and the plans were rejected for 
that reason.1267 A second solution involved unlimited government in-
demnification for all liability, but this also was rejected for the reason 
that Congress was reluctant to undertake such an obligation with so 
little knowledge concerning the extent of its commitment.1268 The AEC 
suggested a third program, by which the government would sell (for a 
premium) indemnity coverage in excess of the amount of private in-
surance available on the open market. The purchase of indemnity under 
this plan was purely voluntary, however, and the fear that licensees 
might not purchase sufficient additional financial coverage to protect 
the public, led ultimately to the abandonment of this scheme as welJ.1269 
The insurance and indemnity plan finally enacted contains features 
drawn from all the suggested programs and closely parallels the idea 
embodied in the AEC program-government financial backing to sup-
plement funds available from private sources. Private insurance, or 
"financial protection," is made mandatory in amounts prescribed by the 
AEC for all Section 103 and 104 licensees and may be required of all 
other licensees and· AEC contractors up to the maximum amount of 
insurance offered by insurance companies.127° For those licensees or 
contractors of whom financial protection is required, the amendment 
grants : (I) limitation of liability to the amount of financial protection 
required plus $500 million, and (2) governmental indemnity, for a 
nominal charge, of $500 million beyond the level of required financial 
1266 Statement of Lewis L. Strauss at Hearings before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 
p. 11 (1957) [Hereinafter cited as "Indemnity Hearings"].· 
128T H.R. g8o2, B4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750, 751 
(1958). 
1288 H.R. 9701, B4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
128& H.R. II242, B4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750, 751 
(1958). 
1210 Subsection 17oa. 
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protection.1271 If damages aggregate more than the total of these two, 
third-party losses theoretically will lie 1272 where they fall and neither 
the indemnitee nor the federal government will be held to further 
liability. 
b. What the Amendment Does Not Do 
The general congressional intent is thus clear: to satisfy the interests 
of the nuclear entrepreneur and the general public, at a non-prohibitive 
price, through a combination of private insurance and indemnification 
by the federal government. Equally clear is the fact that, beside the 
limitation on liability and certain other less significant provisions to be 
discussed below, Congress in no way has attempted to affect substantive 
doctrines of liability as they have been and are to be developed by state 
courts for the atomic industry. The report of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy accompanying the Anderson amendment states unequiv-
ocally: 
1. Since the rights of third parties who are injured are 
established by State law, there is no interference with the 
State law until there is a likelihood that the damages exceed 
the amount of financial responsibility required together with 
the amount of indemnity. At that point the Federal interfer-
ence is limited to the prohibition of making pa-yments throuqh 
the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available. 1213 
Sta~e courts, therefore, are left free, at least as to the usual tort dam-
ages, to impose upon licensees their own legal liability doctrines when 
adjudicating claims under the amendment, and federal district courts 
1 2 71 Subsections 17oc, 17oe. "A system of indemnification is established rather than 
an insurance system, since there is no way to establish any actuarial basis for the full 
protection required. The chance that a reactor will run away is too small and the 
foreseeable possible damages of the reactor are too great to allow the accumulation 
of a fund which would be adequate. If this unlikely event were to occur, the contribu-
tions of the companies protected are likely to be too small by far to protect the pub-
lic, so Federal action is going to be required anyway. If the payments are made large 
enough to insure that there is an adequate fund available, the operation of reactors will 
be made even inore uneconomic. On the other hand, if, as the Joint Committee antici-
pates, there never will be any call on the fund for payments, the funds will have been 
accumulated to no purpose. Hence, ~n this instance it seemed wisest to the Joint 
Committee not to treat this as an insurance problem but to treat it as an indemnifica-
tion problem." S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9 (1957); This is the report 
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy written to accompany the Anderson legis-
lation, and it will hereinafter be cited as "Joint Committee Report." 
1272 Congress can probably be expected to augment the funds authorized by the 
amendment if a more serious .nuclear incident develops. See Joint Committee Report 
21, 22. 
121s Joint Committee Report g. (Emphasis added.) 
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sitting in diversity cases will apply the law of the state in which they 
sit. The controversies, therefore, concerning the application and exten-
sion of doctrines of strict liability, res ipsa loquitur, and the duty of 
manufacturers and suppliers, continue to be extremely important and 
have received detailed treatment elsewhere in this volume.1214 It is only 
after the state laws establish legal responsibility under these and other 
relevant principles that the Anderson legislation comes into play as a 
framework for satisfying the defendant's liability. 
It would be naive in the extreme, however, to fail to recognize that 
the existence of the Anderson amendment, as a practical matter, may 
have a profound effect on state liability doctrines. The simple knowl-
edge that defendant-licensee is protected by a fund of perhaps $560 
million is certain to affect the thinking of legislators, judges, and juries, 
whether or not we like this kind of reasoning.1275 But this tendency is 
not to be confused with a notion that the amendment imposes strict 
liability, authorizes the use of res ipsa loquitur, or establishes a manu-
facturer's duty to the ultimate person injured. Congress dearly did 
not intend this; and the states are at liberty to apply their own substan-
tive, procedural, and conflicts rules without regard to the amendment, 
at least for most cases.1276 
There is no provision in the 1954 act or any of its amendments 
authorizing the AEC or any other federal agency to award damages for 
radiation injuries except for those arising from testing atomic weap-
ons.1277 Therefore, under the reasoning of such cases as United Auto-
mobile Workers v. Russell (allowing state awards of damages arising 
from union unfair labor practices) it is clear that the states are not 
precluded in' general from determining their own damage rules.1278 
1214 See B6 of this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5· See also, Becker & Huard, "Tort 
Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry," 44 Geo. L. ]. 58 (1955). 
12u The problems of. claim adjudication created by the Anderson amendment are 
discussed in Section C3 of this chapter. 
1210 Congress' specification as to types of injuries which do not come within the 
protection of the amendment, together with the limitation of liability given thereby, 
is certain in some instances to have an effect on state liability doctrines. Thus, as we 
shall see, one who demonstrates mere depreciation in land values from the presence 
of the reactor, or one who is injured outside this country, may not be able to assert 
a claim under the amendment even though perhaps state law would accord him a 
valid cause of action. See the suggestion that psychological nuisance damages are 
precluded, mpra text following note 716. 
1211 See Section 167. See also discussion infra at notes 1290-92. 
121s See discussion of this problem infra Part III, Chapter V at note 311. (United 
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932 (1958). The related 
question of the impact on state tort rules of compliance with federal health and safety 
standards is discussed supra Section B2b(2). 
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On the other hand, Congress in a sense was restrictive as to the state-
established liabilities for which financial protection and indemnity 
would be available. In general, 1279 the Anderson amendment extends 
only to domestic public liability arising from the hazardous properties 
of radioactive materials. This eliminates numerous potential causes of 
action. Injuries abroad, damage to property caused in a normal non-
nuclear accident during construction of a reactor, or damage to the licen-
see's reactor itself, for example; are not covered by the amendment. 
These are broad areas which clearly have been excluded, and there are 
many other refined and complicated questions of exclusion. One who 
seeks to act or advise under this amendment must familiarize himself 
with these questions, or run a dangerous risk not necessarily apparent 
at first glance. 
This discussion is devoted, therefore, to a scrutiny of the amendment. 
Several analyses of the general type of risks covered have already ap-
peared in print,1280 and references will be made to them and to the leg-
islative history in the course of the discussion. Some of the most 
troublesome questions have not been commented on. at all, or have only 
been mentioned casually. To understand these matters it is necessary 
first to define and explain the risks for which protection is provided. 
Then will follow discussions of the nature of the indemnity, the extent 
and nature of financial protection required and offered, and, briefly, the 
limitation of liability. Finally, discussion will be directed toward a con-
sideration of the administrative problems inherent in the process of 
claim satisfaction under the amendment, a vital problem concerni1tg 
which there must be some legislative changes. 
2. The Program in Detail 
a. Nuclear Incident and Public Liability 
The risks against which insurance and indemnity are provided are 
circumscribed by several definitions which become terms of art, the 
most important of which for our immediate purposes are "nuclear in-
cident" and "publi~ liability," Unless ~<public liability" .arises from a 
127.9 Generalizations expressed here will be discussed in detail below. 
12so See especially Conunent, 5Q Mich. L. Rev. 752 (1g58); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 
750 (1958). The best source of background material for dealing with the legislation 
is undoubtedly Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic 
Hazards (1957). See also recent' discussions of indemnity provisions in Atomic In-
dustrial Forum, Nuclear Liability Insurance and Indemnity (1959); AEC Report on 
Indeninity Act and Advi5ocy Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). · 
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"nuclear incident" there is no governmental indemnity and no federal 
limitation of liability. 
( 1 ) Nuclear Incident 
As defined in the amendment, a "nuclear incident" is 
... [A]ny occurrence within the United States causing bod-
ily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage 
to property, or for loss of use of property, arising out of or 
resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other haz-
ardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct 
materiaP281 
The report of the Joint Committee indicates that this definition "is 
designed to protect the public against any form of damage arising from 
the special dangerous properties of the materials used in the atomic 
energy program." 1282 The rather broad terms of this statement and the 
definition itself make it clear. that Congress intended that the scope of 
the statute should be delineated liberally ; nevertheless there are a 
number of apparent limitations. 
The first major exclusion is express in the definition. A nuclear in-
cident can occur "within the United States" only. Where both a radio-
active discharge and the resulting injury take place outside this country, 
as where materials have been exported to Europe, the answer is defi-
nite: no protection.1283 The problem is more difficult, however, when 
one or the other of these conditions is changed. If, for example, a re-
actor "bums-up" near Detroit and a person living in Canada is injured, 
that person logically should be protected since the nuclear incident took 
place "within" the United States, albeit causing damage in Canada.1284 
The joint Committee hedged on this question, however, saying that the 
problem would require further investigation when and if it should 
arise.1285 
1281 Subsection no. 
1282 Joint Committee Report 16. 
1283Jbid. 
1 284 Contrary to the normal oonflict of laws rule which posits a tort at the place of 
injury, the amendment fixes the site of a nuclear incident as the place where the 
incident occurs, and not where damage may be caused. Subsection 17oe. See Joint 
Committee Report 22. 
12ss Joint Committee Report 16. The Atomic Industrial Forum report, on the other 
hand, concludes that the Anderson legislation covers both this and the situation in 
which an incident occurs abroad and causes injury in this country. See Atomic In-
dustrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards 61, n. 355 (1957). This 
theory is based on the statement, found elsewhere in the amendment, that the statute 
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In the same category, according to the Joint Committee, is the situa-
tion in which "there is any activity abroad which causes further injury 
in the United States." 1286 Presumably, if American special nuclear 
material exported to Canada caused a reactor "burn-up" there, and 
persons in this country were injured, Congress would want to consider 
the possibility of extending coverage to such persons at that time. The 
report does not state whether "activity abroad" refers only to American 
activity, or also includes a reactor operated by foreigners with foreign 
materials. It can be argued that Congress did not intend. to extend pro-
tection to any persons other than American licensees. On the other 
hand, part of the reason for the act was to protect the American public 
as a whole, which suffers no lesser injury because the radiation ema-
nates from a foreign source than from a domestic one. Congress' reluc-
tance to deal with this problem in the amendment again seems to 
indicate a desire to consider any such incident at the time it happens, 
rather than making advance provision for protection. 
Obviously, the restrictive geographic definition placed upon "nuclear 
incident" constitutes a deterrent to our nuclear materials export pro-
gram, and would pose an even more substantial threat to eventual wide-
spread overseas activity by American licensees.1287 Without protection 
similar to that offered in the Anderson legislation, entrepreneurs are not 
eager to expose themselves to the unprotected risks that foreign nu-
clear development would involve. Congressional leaders are aware of 
this problem, but display understandable hesitancy to enact an indemni-
fication program that would cover non-nationals all over the world, 
when the benefits of such a program to the American people to a great 
extent would be quite indirect. Alternative means of establishing inter-
national protection are now under careful study.1288 Perhaps the most 
covers "any legal liability" and therefore should encompass both cases. The Joint Com-
mittee Report indicates, however, that this phrase was included to remove time 
restrictions on claims, rather than for some other purpose. Joint Committee Re-
port 16. 
1286 Joint Committee Report 16. 
1287 An excellent statement of the foreign problem was made by Stoddard M. Stevens 
of Sullivan & Cromwell at the Indemnity Hearings 191-202. 
1288 See Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards, 
The International Aspects, Preliminary Report (1958). This study, conducted under 
the auspices of the Harvard Law School, examines the various means available for 
affording financial protection · to American nuclear entrepreneurs abroad. Among 
those methods which have been suggested are : ( 1) extension of the indemnity 
scheme of the Anderson amendment to foreign operations; (2) permitting only 
limited access to American courts by foreign claimants; (3) insulation of assets 
through formation of independent subsidiaries abroad; (4) contractual arrangements 
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promising, and yet an arrangement most difficult to achieve would ap-
pear to be an international convention limiting the liability of nuclear 
entrepreneurs.1289 There is precedent in the maritime and aviation areas 
for this type of international agreement, but obviously the problems of 
geographic scope and latent injuries offered by the dangers of a sub-
stantial reactor "burn-up" complicate the picture for a convention in 
the atomic energy field. 
Accepting the fact that the Anderson amendment generally is limited 
to application in the United States, one must further consider some less 
well-defined limits on the statute's scope. These relate particularly to 
the types of injuries which are compensable. In its broadest terms, a 
"nuclear incident" involves a sickness or loss arising from the hazard-
ous properties of nuclear materials. It may be asked whether this defi-
nition would cover damages for mental suffering caused by the appre-
hension of having a major power reactor operate nearby.1290 In a 
similar vein, what of the case of the well-established private school 
whose entrance applications fall off sharply the year after a minor nu-
clear incident occurs at a facility in the general neighborhood? Are 
claimants entitled to compensation for such "losses" arising from "haz-
ardous properties"? Does the phrase "loss of use of property" include 
the profits lost by a manufacturer who is deprived of the commercial 
power supplied by a reactor when the reactor suddenly "burns-up"? 1291 
These questions are not answered in the amendment, and one can 
only try to deduce congressional intention from the language of the 
"nuclear incident" definition and the general history of the legislation. 
The Joint Committee apparently contemplated one limitation: a mere 
for indemnification' by foreign purchasers; and (5) an international convention for 
limitation of liability. See also Hearings before the Joint Committee 01~ Atomic 
Energy, Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 32 et seq. (1958). 
1 289 Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards, The 
International Aspects, Preliminary Report, pp. 47 et seq. ( 1958). The study points 
out that an international convention limiting liability will be of little value to the 
general public unless there is also some government assumption of responsibility for 
damages exceeding the liability to which operators and suppliers are limited. Any 
such international commitment of government funds will certainly mean that the con-
vention will require considerable time for ratification. It would probably be neces-
sary, therefore, to negotiate bilateral agreements as interim devices. 
1290 This question would become pertinent, of course, only if applicable state law 
also permitted recovery for such damage. This may often be a greater hurdle for 
claimants alleging mental suffering than is the "nuclear incident" definition itself. See 
discussion supra in text following note 716. 
1291 It is probable that this would not be compensable under insurance policies pres-
ently available to the industry. See text accompanying note 1356 infra. 
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drop in land values caused by the presence of a reactor is not intended 
to be compensable.1292 From this clue and from a reading of the amend-
ment as a whole, it perhaps is safe to say that coverage was intended for 
personal injury and property damage caused by actual radioactive con-
tamination, rather than loss resulting indirectly from the presence or 
operation of a facility. 1293 Indeed, compensation in a hypothetical case 
of a manufacturer probably would not turn upon a reading of the def-
inition at all but would be provided for in the contract between his 
company and the pqwer utility. Undoubtedly many interpretive ques-
tions can be obviated by contrast, and it is only in the cases where con-
tractual protection is not feasible that courts must turn to close scrutiny 
of the amendment. 
( 2) Public Liability 
The second crucial term of art is closely related to the first. The 
amendment's requirement of financial protection and provisions for 
indemnification are against "public liability," which is defined as: 
... [A]ny legal liability arising out of or resulting from a 
nuclear incident, 'except claims under State and Federal 
Workmen's Compensation Acts of employees of persons in-
demnified who are employed at the site of and in connection. 
with the activity where the nuclear incident occurs, and except 
for claims arising out of an act of war. "Public liability" also 
includes damage to property of persons indemnified : Pro-
vided, That such property is covered under the terms of the 
financial protection required, except property which is located 
at the site of and used in connection with the activity where 
the nuclear incident occurs. 1294 
Within this definition are limitations and exceptions which must be 
added to those suggested with respect to the "nuclear incident" defini- · 
tion. It is clear that the on-site property of an indemnitee used in con-
nection with the activity is not protected by the amendment, but as 
pointed out later, independent insurance against such a hazard is avail-
1 292 Joint Committee Report 16, 17. The Report also indicates that the Committee 
did not intend to include in the definition of "nuclear incident" any "similar causes of 
action which may occur, namely, from the location of an atomic energy facility at a 
particular site." I d .. at 17. 
1293 Such a limitation would appear to be a proper interpretation of the Joint Com-
mittee Report. ld. at 17. It also generally coincides with the limitation written into 
the avail~ble nuclear energy insurance policies. See note 1356 infra and accompanying 
text. 
1294 Subsection nu. 
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able from private sources. It also should be suggested parenthetically 
that the word "indemnitee" includes more than just the licensee who 
signs an indemnification agreement. While this feature will be discussed 
later,1295 it is mentioned here to emphasize the fact that everyone for 
whom indemnification exists under an agreement is denied a claim for 
damages for loss of his on-site property. 
Off-site property belonging to indemnitees, however, is fully covered 
within the "public liability" definition, so long as the underlying insur-
ance policy or other form of financial protection is equally extensive. 
The insurance policy currently approved for the nuclear industry pro-
vides such coverage.1298 Thus it is possible that one who is at fault in 
causing a nuclear incident nevertheless may proceed,· with respect to his 
off-site property loss, against the insurance and indemnity fund on as 
favorable a basis as injured third parties. The Joint Committee has 
indicated that this provision was inserted to protect universities operat-
ing reactors on their campuses,1297 but the language of the definition 
does not limit protection to ·this type of situation. Whether a court 
would be willing to construe the statute more narrowly when faced with 
the case of a tortious indemnitee-licensee asserting a large (but credi-
ble) claim against the fund for lost profits from loss of use of off-site 
property on a par with innocent claimants is an open question. The 
question becomes a hard one when there -are insufficient funds by ·way 
of insurance and indemnity to pay all valid claims. It is probable that 
the expression of congressional motive for insertion of the provision, 
together with the obvious equities, could open the door for a construc-
tion favoring claims of innocent third parties. In any event this would 
seem to control as against any contrary result under state law, if state 
law should call for no distinction betwe~n types of claims. 
Two exclusions are explicitly stated in the definition. First, daims 
usually falling under workmen's compensation acts of employees of 
persons indemnified, who are employed at the site and in connection 
· with the activity where a nuclear incident occurs, are not part of the 
public liability against which indemnity is offered. Congress felt that 
these claims could be satisfied adequately through existing legislation.1298 
That this may not always be the case is indicated in the discussion else-
1295 See text following note 13o6 infra. 
1296 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684 
et seq. (1958). Such persons are covered by the policy, and off-site property is not 
listed as an exclusion. 
129T Joint Committee Report 18. 
1298 I d. at 18, 19. 
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where in this volume of problems' under the present workmen's compen-
sation statutes. 
The second express exclusion involves war damage. The Joint Com-
mittee explained that in the event of war, "damages would be so great 
and the task of proving causation so difficult that further congressional 
study would be needed. . . . [However any] single act of sabotage 
would be covered by the indemnification provisions of the bill if it could 
not be proven to be an act of war." 1299 
In both the "nuclear incident" and "public liability" definitions, there 
are such general phrases as "arising out of," "in connection with," and 
"at the site of," to delimit certain claims or losses which are intended to 
be either included or excluded from the protection of the act. These 
phrases, necessarily ambiguous in the final analysis, invite speculation 
as to their actual meaning, and one may be sure that they will pose dif-
ficulties on the outer fringes of intended coverage.1300 It is doubtful, 
however, that the statute could have been drawn with greater specificity 
and still permit some liberality in construction to take care of the "hard 
case." Nevertheless, these broad phrases make the interpretive process 
extremely important to numerous Claimants, and the potential problems 
inherent in a system which entrusts this process' to myriad state and 
federal courts, permitting centralized control only at the enforcement of 
judgment level, are dramatically apparent.1801 
b. Indemnification 
With this brief picture of the risks to which the Anderson amend-
ment protection is applicable, what is the protection offered to licensees 
and contractors? As indicated in the introduction, coverage normally 
will consist of private financial protection (syndicate insurance in the 
usual case) and government indemnification. The coverage of the latter 
1299 I d. at 18. 
uoo "This language obviously includes any incident which occurs on the site of 
the licensed activity, and the Committee Report specifically includes any mishap that 
may arise while radioactive materials are being transported to or from that site. Does 
the phrase 'in connection with the· licensed activity' embrace an incident which occurs 
at the plant of the fuel elements fabricator or re-processor? While such an inclu-
sion appears reasonable, can the language be further extended to cover an accident 
occurring in one of these independent plants arising out of work done for another 
customer (which has no indemnity agreement) but whi"ch is aggravated by fissionable 
materials on hand for use in the indemnified reactor? To state such questions is to 
emphasize that they are a matter of degree and must be determined on their facts 
as they arise." Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev 752, 759-6o (1958). 
1801 The problems created by this system are discussed in detail in Section 33 infra. 
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will coincide to a considerable extent with the terms of the proposed 
insurance policy approved by the AEC. In some instances, however, 
indemnity protection may be somewhat broader, and this state of affairs 
will pose problems as to the nature of actual coverage. To simplify 
consideration of these problems, it will be best to analyze first the more 
comprehensive protective device-government indemnification. 
( 1 ) Generally 
The principal feature of the Anderson amendment without question 
is the government's offer of $500 million third-party liability protection 
as a stimulus to further activities in the nuclear energy industry.1302 
This protection, which takes the form of individual indemnification 
agreements, is available to all licensees and contractors who are required 
under the operation of the amendment to obtain private financial pro-
tection against a nuclear risk. It may even be available to those who are 
not so required.1303 By the terms of these agreements, the government 
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless "the licensee and other persons 
indemnified, as their interest may appear, from public liability arising 
from nuclear incidents which is in excess of the level of financial pro-
tection required of the licensee." 1804 If, therefore, a particular licensee 
is required to obtain $6o million of private financial protection, the gov-
ernment will sign an agreement to protect him for another $500 million 
-or a backstop fund totalling $56o million public liability protection 
for third parties who may assert claims in the event of a nuclear 
incident. 
As pointed out in the previous section, indemnification is provided 
against public liability only as that term is defined in the statute.1805 
Thus there is no coverage for on-site property losses to indemnitees, 
off-site property losses of indemnitees where private insurance does not 
also cover such losses, claims of employees properly covered under 
workmen's compensation plans, and war losses. Indemnity is provided 
only for "nuclear incident" injuries and damage, not for claims arising 
from some other type of activity at the atomic facility. Protection gen-
erally is limited to domestic incidents. 
1s02 Subsection I70C. The AEC has promulgated a proposed regulation containing 
a general form of indemnity agreement. This form rather closely parallels the spec-
ifications of the Anderson amendment. 23 Fed. Reg. 6681 et seq. (1958). 
1803 The language of the amendment is not clear on the question of indemnity for 
contractors and materials licensees who are not required to obtain financial protection. 
See discussion in text following note 1311 infra. 
1304 Subsection 17oc requires this language. 
1305 See Subsection I 1u. 
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( 2) Protective Scheme 
Indemnification covers "the licensee and other persons indemni-
fied." 1306 As previously indicated, only the prime licensee signs an in-
demnity agreement for a facility, 1807 but its protection extends to any 
other person who might be subject to public liability, including sub-
contractors, designers, independent contractors dealing with the prime 
licensee, and tortfeasors such as trespassers. This relatively unusual 
scheme of coverage was motivated primarily by the requests of insurers, 
who feared that any other system would lead to pyramiding of insur-
ance at each facility. 1308 Rather than requiring insurance of each person 
potentially responsible for a nuclear incident, Congress permitted all but 
the prime facility licensee to gain protection from the agreement exe-
cuted by the latter. Cost to the facility licensee of the additional cover-
age probably will be passed along to the consumer of the facility's 
product, if any, just as it would if each sub-contractor were required to 
obtain protection for his own operations. 
Foreign to this analysis, however, is the trespasser who causes a 
nuclear incident. Although he has no contractual dealings with the 
prime licensee, he is as fully protected by the licensee's indemnity agree-
ment as is the licensee himself. Thus the operator of an aircraft who 
negligently crashes into a reactor/809 causing a nuclear inci~ent, is af-
forded $500 million indemnity. The reason for this particular feature 
of the statute is obvious. Congress had as one of its two primary objec-
tives in enacting indemnity legislation the protection of the general 
public, and an innocent third person is no less irradiated because the in-
cident is caused by a tortious stranger than by the licensee himself. 
( 3) Indemnity for Contractors and Materials Licensees 
Analysis thus far has been predicated on the assumption that some 
financial protection would be required of the licensee and that the gov-
ernment indemnity would be given in addition thereto. For some licen-
18.06 Subsection 17oc. 
1807 The AEC plans the same scheme for contractors. Hearings before the I oint 
Comtmittee on Atomic Energy, Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., zd Sess., 
pp. I!)-20 ( 1958). 
1aos "Having the agreement run to the benefit of any other person who may be liable 
will parallel the policies which the insurance companies are planning to issue. They, 
too, will be entered into with the licensee or prime contractor and will run for the 
benefit of any other person who may be liable." Joint Committee Report 17. 
1809 This hypothetical case is specifically mentioned in the Joint Committee Report. 
ibid. 
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sees and for government contractors, however, private financial pro-
tection is not mandatory but rests on the discretion of the AEC. Only 
facility operators under Sections 103 and 104 of the Atomic Energy 
Act are required to obtain financial protection. Materials licensees 
under Sections 53, 63, and 81 and Commission contractors are not so 
required unless the AEC requires financial protection.1310 Thus far, 
these latter individuals have not been asked to show private financial 
responsibility.1311 
If this is so, then the question immediately arises as to whether a 
licensee or contractor having no private financial protection can demand 
and obtain government indemnity coverage of $500 million? As to AEC 
contractors, by Subsection 1 7od. the Commission is "authorized" to enter 
into indemnity agreements in which the Commission "may" require 
financial protection and "shall indemnify the persons indemnified ... 
above the amount of the financial protection required," in the amount 
of $500 million. It would appear perfectly defensible to read this .lan-
guage either as authorizing the Commission to sign indemnity agree-
ments only with contractors who have obtained financial protection or 
as authorizing indemnification of contractors, whether or not private 
financial protection is required. The Joint Committee Report is of no 
assistance in choosing the proper interpretation, and our only clue, for 
what it is worth, is the fact that the AEC signed indemnity agreements 
(without insurance) before the Anderson legislation was passed and 
has indicated its intention to do so under the new statute.1312 
The statute is no more helpful with respect to materials licensees. 
Subsection 1700 provides that financial protection "may" be required 
of such licensees in the discretion of the Commission, and that "when-
ever such financial protection is required, it shall be a further condition 
of the license that the licensee execute and maintain an indemnification 
agreement." Subsection 170c then states that the Commission, with 
respect to licenses for which· it requires financial protection, shall agree 
to indemnify. Nothing in the amendment specifically authorizes the 
Commission to sign indemnity agreements when financial protection is 
not required, but neither is there provision to the contrary. 
1s1o Subsection 17oa. 
1su Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. March 
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!9571 (1958). 
1s12 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic E11ergy, Governmental In-
demnity, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 76-85 (1956); BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 4:29 
(1958). See also Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Operation 
of the AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 19 et seq. (1958). 
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Since the cost of indemnification under the amendment is nominal,1313 
an indemnity agreement without the cost of private insurance would be 
a real boon to contractors and materials licensees. During the hearings 
on the legislation, strong arguments were made in favor of mandatory 
financial protection for all contractors and licensees, and not just Sec-
tions 103 and 104licensees.1814 Thus far it appears that the Commission 
has not exercised ifs discretion to require financial protection of its con-
tractors· and materials licensees and, if it continues on this course, the 
question of whether it is nevertheless empowered to give indemnity 
becomes quite important. If the risks involved in the operations of 
AEC contractors and materials licensees are great enough to warrant 
the advocacy of their inclusion within the mandatory provisions of the 
amendment, they also would appear great enough to require that some 
form of protection be given the public immediately. In the case of con-
tractors particularly, the Commission may be reluctant to impose the 
financial protection requirement since the cost of insurance undoubtedly 
would be passed along to the government/815 but this is no reason why 
the indemnity agreement should not be signed anyway, for the sake of 
the public and for the protection of the contractor or materials licensee. 
Since the statute can be fairly interpreted to permit such a practice, it 
is submitted that the more liberal construction should be applied and the 
AEC should follow the course it has already set with respect to con-
tractors, 1316 thus providing indemnification for both materials licensees 
and contractors, even when no insurance is required. 
c. Financial Protection 
The $500 million government indemnity generally is designed to 
supplement third-party liability protection obtained from private re-
sources in the form of "financial protection." We thus far have used 
this term as if it were self-explanatory in the nuclear industry context. 
This is far from the case, as an examination of the requirements of the 
act will demonstrate. 
1818 "The Commission is authorized to collect a fee from all persons with whom an 
indemnification agreement is executed under this section. This fee shall be $30 per 
year per thousand kilowatts of thermal energy capacity for facilities licensed under 
seetion 103. For facilities licensed under section 104, and for construction permits 
under section 185, the Commission is authorized to reduce the fee set forth above. . . . 
No fee under this subsection shall be less than $100 yer year." Subsection 170f. 
1aa E.g., Indemnity Hearings 162-63, 185. 
1815 See BN A, Atomic Industry Rep. 4: rsS C 1958). 
ts1e I d. at .4 29. 
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( 1 ) General Requirements 
By Subsection I 70a, each license for a production or utilization facil-
ity under Sections 103 or 104, and permits for the construction thereof 
under Section 185, must contain a condition that the licensee will obtain 
"financial protection" against public liability of such type and in such 
amount as the AEC may require. As indicated in the previous section, 
licenses for the handling and use of special nuclear, source, and byprod-
uct materials also may contain such a condition, if the Commission 
deems it necessary.181~ Financial protection may take the form of pri-
vate insurance, contractual indemnity, self-insurance, or other proof of 
financial responsibility, or a combination of such measures.1318 The 
Commission may not, however, require protection in excess of the 
amount available from private sources, currently some $6o million, and 
its discretion is further limited by a statutory provision that any facility 
capable of producing Ioo,ooo electrical kilowatts or more must carry 
insurance in the maximum amount privately available.1819 
( 2) Educational Institutions 
Soon after passage of the Anderson amendment, the AEC promul-
gated temporary regulations implementing the legislative provisions.1320 
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Commission, inter alia/321 ini-
tially set the minimum level of financial protection at $250,000.1822 Be-
cause it soon became apparent that this relatively low minimum figure 
would potentially force the AEC into the "small claims" business, the 
Commission thereupon proposed a draft amendment to the proposed 
1317 Subsection 17oa. 
1s1s Subsection 17ob. The Commission recently reported that of 22 licensees required 
to file proof of financial protection, 12 have submitted insurance binders and one has 
elected to make a showing that he possesses adequate resources to provide the re-
quired amount of protection. Nine licensees claim immunity from tort liability and 
one is considering such a claim. Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954. March 28, 1958, ·reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 
1f9571 (1958). 
1819 Subsection 170b. 
182o Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements, 10 C.F.R. Pt. 140 
(Supp. 1958). 
1 321 Other sections of the regulations deal with such questions as the permissible 
types of financial protection, proof of financial protection, Commission review of 
such proof, reports by licensees asserting immunity from liability, indemnity agree-
ments, and exemptions. ld. at §§140.12-140.18. 
1 322 I d. at §140.II. Financial protection was to be required at a rate of $150,000 per 
thousand kilowatts of thermal energy capacity authorized. 
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regulation by which the minimum level of protection required would be 
increased to $3 million.1823 Criticism of this new figure immediately 
arose from reactor-operating educational institutions, who pointed out 
that a policy providing coverage for the required $3 million might . 
cost as much as $24,000 annually, a sum too great for the operating 
budgets of most university reactors.1824 
Many universities were at the same time faced with another related 
problem. Serious doubt was being expressed as to the authority of state 
universities to waive their immunity from suit as might be required 
under the terms of Subsection 170a of the Anderson amendment.1825 
Five out of six state universities claiming immunity for their reactor 
operations advised the AEC that they had neither the power to waive 
or modify such immunity nor authority to purchase public liability in-
surance.1826 In some of these states, the prohibition against waiver was 
constitutional,1827 so that mere legislation could not eliminate it were 
the Commission to so require. 
To meet this awkward situation, and at the same time to relieve 
educational and research institutions from the prohibitive burdens of a 
$3 million financial protection requirement, the House in mid-1958 pro-
posed the addition of a new Subsection I 70k to the Atomic Energy 
Act. This provision stated that : 
k. With respect to any license issued pursuant to section 
53, 63, 81, 104a., or 104c. for the conduct of educational ac-
1323 See proposed amendment to 10 C.F.R. §140.11 (Supp. 1958), reported at BNA, 
Atomic Industry Rep. 54:31, 54:33 (1958). A further amendment has been more 
recently proposed, not affecting this particular provision but containing a draft in-
demnification agreement. See 23 Fed. Reg. 6681 ( 1958). Other provisions of the 
draft amendment revising §140.11 change the formula by which the ·required amount 
of financial protection ·would be determined. The level of protection between $3 mil-
lion and $6o million would be determined by an empirical formula based primarily on 
the authorized power level of the reactor, the length of the fuel cycle, and the popu-
lation density in the general area. For reactors having a rated capacity of 100,000 
electrical kilowatts or more, of course, the maximum $6o million would be required, 
as specified in the Anderson amendment. Subsection 170b. 
1824 Communication from Director, Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan. This figure does not include the cost of property insurance on the 
facility itself, which would probably amount to another $8,ooo annually. Ibid. 
1825 It is probable that this type of activity would be held to fall under the aegis 
of sovereign immunity, absent legislative waiver, in the vast majority of our states. 
For a recent review of this question, see Comment, 42 Corn. L. Q. 540 (1957). See 
also Livingston v. Regents of New Mexico College of A. & M.A., 328 P.2d 78 (N. 
Mex. 1958). 
1 326 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 28, 
1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. ff957I (1958). 
1a21 Ibid. 
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tivities to a person found by the Commission to be a nonprofit 
educational institution, the Commission shall exempt such 
licensee from the financial protection requirement of Subsec-
tion I 70a. With respect to licenses issued between August 30, 
I954, and August I, I¢7,.1328 for which the Commission 
grants such exemption : 
(I) The Commission shall agree to indemnify and hold 
harmless the licensee and other persons indemnified as their 
interests may appear, from public liability arising from nu-
clear incidents. The aggregate indemnity for all persons in-
demnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not 
exceed $soo,ooo,ooo, including the reasonable costs of in-
vestigating and settling claims and defending suits for 
damage .... 
* * * 
(3) such contracts of indemnification, when entered into 
·with a licensee having immunity from public liability be-
cause it is a State agency, shall provide also that the Com-
mission shall make payments under the contract on account 
of activities of the licensee in the same manner and to the 
same extent as the Commission would be required to do if 
the licensee were not such a State agency.1829 
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This enactment, ostensibly providing indemnification by the federal 
government from the ground up for approved educational institutions, 
eliminated both the problem of large financial protection premiums and 
that of the inability of some institutions to waive their immunity and 
purchase insurance. No financial protection would be required for such 
facilities, and liability would fall only on the federal government under 
its $500 million indemnity provisions. 
Objection was raised in the Senate, however, to federal assumption 
of indemnitor's liability from the first dollar up, the thesis being that 
this was too much like the federal government entering the business of 
private insurance.1830 A compromise measure therefore was reached, 
whereby the House version remained untouched except for the inser-
tion, in paragraph ( 1) of the subsection following the phrase "public 
1 8 28 This language, taken together with the preceding sentence, appears to indicate 
that such institutions will be exempted from the financial requirement indefinitely, 
whereas indemnity will be provided only under licenses issued until August I, I¢';. 
It is probable, however, that Congress intends to re-evaluate the exemption as well as 
the indemnification provisions by the I967 date. 
122e H.R. I3455, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (I958). Paragraph (2), omitted here, is 
merely repetitive of concepts discussed elsewhere in this discussion. The bill is ac-
companied by H. Rep. 2250, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
188o 104 Cong. Rec. I4834 ( 1958). 
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liability," of the words "in excess of $250,000." Exception from finan-
cial protection requirements is given while government indemnity 
still would be provided, but rather than beginning with the first dollar, 
indemnity would begin only at the $250,000 level. Up to that point the 
institution itself would be responsible. For private universities and 
state educational agencies not claiming immunity, the initial liability 
span would be covered by "private insurance, suppliers' liability insur-
ance, or special State procedures." 1331 The compromise bill was passed 
in August 1958.1832 
Congress' decision refusing to indemnify non-profit educational in-
stitutions from the ground up, while it preserves the indemnity program 
as a purely supplemental protective device, still leaves unsolved the 
waiver of immunity problem so neatly obviated by the House measure. 
As enacted, the legislation makes no provision for public liability claims 
up to the amount of $250,000 damages when the facility at which a 
nuclear incident occurs successfully invokes sovereign immunity. To 
satisfy damage claims beyond that level, the $sao million indemnity will 
operate "in the same manner and to the same extent as ... if the 
licensee were not such a State agency." For the "first" $250,000 of 
claims, however, some or all third-party claimants are certain to find 
their judgments not fully satisfied. Congress does not indicate whether 
the loss will be borne only by the first claimants to obtain their judg-
ments, or will be divided pro rata among all the claimants who ulti-
mately win judgment. While the latter course obviously is more equi-
table, it also means that no final settlement of the amount to which each 
claimant is entitled can be determined until all judgments are ren-
dered.1888 
As indicated, liability beyond $250,000 of state agencies successfully 
invoking sovereign immunity will be covered by government indemnity 
just as if the agency were a private institution. One technical criticism 
of such a statutory scheme is in order. The new provision contemplates 
that payments under this indemnity provision will be made pursuant to 
a contract of indemnity signed by the Commission and the indemnitee. 
One may legitimately ask under what authority does an immune agency 
sign an agreement of indemnity? Indemnity protection for one who is 
immune is an anomaly, to say the least; there is no need to be indemni-
1831 H. Rep. 2585, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1958) (Statement of managers on part of 
the House of Representatives). 
133 2 104 Cong. Rec. r6o76 (House of Representatives), 16207 (Senate) (1958). 
1838 See the discussion of similar problems arising under Subsection 17oe, Section 
3b ( 3) of text infra. 
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fied from non-existent liability. And if the agency is immune, whom 
does the claimant sue in order to obtain judgment? Certainly he can-
not name an immune person as defendant. While the over-all congres-
sional intent as to these questions is clear, courts undoubtedly will be 
forced to read the statutory language liberally to overlook the technical 
defects of the congressional scheme. Probably courts will merely find 
an unwritten authorization that the government itself be named as de-
fendant and be liable under its indemnity agreement for $5oo,ooo,ooo 
worth of claims, although this will require some verbal, if not mental, 
gymnastics. 
A final aspect of the new provision, dealing with the type of institu-
tion to which its coverage extends, should also be mentioned. While the 
terms of the amendment restrict its operation to "nonprofit educational 
institutions," Congress has indicated that this term includes "privately 
owned and sponsored nonprofit educational institutions" as well as 
those operated under state funds. 138• The language of the provision 
thus encompasses reactors at private universities, and this is said to be 
true even though the facility is used for "incidental nonprofit research 
... for outside organization. and industries." 1885 Apparently excluded 
by implication are licensees using radioactive materials purely for med-
ical or other philanthropic purposes (but not educational), although the 
equities in favor of exemption for this type of operation would seem 
to be just as compelling as for those installations already covered by the 
amendment. . 
( 3) Federal Facilities 
With respect to the immunity of federal agencies operating reactors, 
the AEC has acknowledged that these bodies are without authority to 
make a more extensive waiver of. sovereign immunity than that pro-
vided for in the Federal Tort Claims Act,1338 and that they are without 
133• H. Rep. 2250, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3 (1958). 
1aa5 Ibid. 
1888 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!9571 (1958). The Federal 
Tort Claims Act permits suit in tort cases where a private person under the same 
circumstances would be liable, except that "an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government ... in the execution of a statute or regulation .•. based upon the exer-
cise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or 
duty ... whether or not the discretion involved be abused" will not subject the fed-
eral government to liability. 62 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §:z68o (1950). This 
exception has been broadly construed, but the Supreme Court has distinguished the 
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authority to purchase policies for nuclear energy liability insurance.1337 
No mention of federal facilities is made in H.R. 13455 or its accom-
panying report, but it is possible that certain government facilities could 
be_ classified as a "non-profit educational institution" by the Commis-
sion. Instead of legislation exempting federal agencies from the insur-
ance requirements altogether, however, the Commission at one time was 
considering a bill which would waive government immunity from tort 
with respect to claims rising from a nuclear incident caused by federally-
operated facilities. 1338 The AEC recently has indicated, on the other 
hand, that it will enter into indemnity agreements with federal agencies 
without requiring them to obtain financial protection. These agree-
ments, subject to the $500 million limitation on liability, will indemnify 
federal licensees and other persons who may be liable. The Commission 
concluded that requiring federal agencies to obtain financial protection 
"would not accomplish any useful purpose under section 170." 1339 
( 4) AEC Contractors 
As previously indicated, financial protection for AEC contractors is 
authorized but not required by Section 170. No limitations are placed 
upon the discretion of the Commission as to the criteria for, or amount 
of, such financial protection to be obtained by its contractors, perhaps 
because Congress was aware that the cost of any insurance ultimately 
would be borne by the federal government and therefore there was no 
need of establishing an equitably-rated standard. For this same reason, 
use of governmental discretion to undertake a given activity and the mechanical 
aspects of carrying out that activity. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 
U.S. 6r, 76 S.Ct. 122 ( 1955). "Two recent district court decisions have evidenced 
a conflicting approach as to how far the exercise of discretion extends in the process 
of testing atomic weapons. These cases indicate generally that if, e.g., the alleged 
negligence of a federal employee is in the determination of safety standards, rather 
than their proper administration, the government will escape liability." Comment, 
56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 759 (1958), citing Bulloch v. United States, (D.C. Utah 1956 
145 F. Supp. 824), and Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (D.C. 
S.D. Cal. 1955). 
1337 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1T9571 (1958); Hearings before 
the Joint Committee 011 Atomic Energy, Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1958). 
1388 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 28, 
1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 119571 (1958). 
1339 H carings before the I oint Committee on Atomic Energy, Operation of AEC 
Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 ( 1958). 
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the Commission decided late in 1957 to omit the requirement of finan-
cial protection for contractors.1840 This decision presently is being 
reconsidered in light of the fact that services of insurance groups for 
the handling and investigation of claims arising from nuclear incidents 
probably would not be available in case of injuries caused by contrac-
tors due to the disinclination or lack of authority of insurers to engage 
in settlements when they had no pecuniary interest therein.1841 Sub-
section 170g imposes upon the AEC the duty to use private insurers' 
services to the maximum extent possible, ostensibly to avoid building 
a claims-investigation branch within the Commission itself and also, of 
course, to take advantage of insurance company know-how in this area. 
Costs of such services normally would be charged to the indemnitee, 
but in the case of an AEC contractor, the federal·govemment would 
bear the ultimate burden. The Commission has expressed hope, how-
ever, that nuclear insurance may be made available on a retrospective 
rating plan " 'that will permit AEC to require its contractors to obtain 
nuclear insurance for damages caused by AEC contractors' " without 
bearing the burden of a high annual premium.18u 
d. Financial Protection Available 
Under the terms of Subsection 170b, the required financial protec-
tion tnay be furnished through private insurance, private contractual 
indemnities, self-insurance, or other proof of financial responsibility, 
or a combination of these means. While there are thus several alterna:. 
tive programs available to licensees, the vast majority of corporate and 
state licensees in fact have turned to private ins~rance for protection. 
In 1958 the AEC reported that only one licensee had elected to show 
that he himself possessed adequate resour~es to provide the required 
amount of protection.1848 For the remainder, the only practically avail-
able sources of insurance were the syndicates formed in 1956 to provide 
third-party liability coverage for the industry. 
These s)'ndicates or insurance pools came into existence in responst: 
to the need for a policy adequate to meet the unusual risks involved in 
1a4o BNA, Atomic Industry Rep. 4: 158 (1958). 
1su Ibid.; Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Operation <if 
AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp .. 21 et seq. ( 1958). 
1842/bid. 
1843 Report by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on Operations under Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, March 
28, 1958, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[9571 (1958). See note 1318 
supra. 
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reactor operation. While licensees could boast a nearly unmarred safety 
record, 18H the mere possibility was a gigantic risk for which to provide 
protection. Insurers have little or no experience upon which to base rate 
tables, but it was rather clear that any rate which was reasonable from 
the standpoint of the insurer would be grossly too large if no incident 
took place and grossly too small if a real disaster should occur.1845 No 
single private company was equipped financially or was inclined to pro-
vide coverage in the face of such problems at any level approximating 
the desired amount. The obvious solution, if the government was to 
adhere to its normal policy of offering indemnity only when no insur-
ance was available from private sources, was to turn to the pooling of 
insurers' resources.1846 The insurance companies responded with three 
associations, two providing protection against the public liability hazard 
and the third against property damage to the licensee's facility. 
(I) NELIA-MAERP Policy 
One of the liability syndicates is the Nuclear Energy Liability Insur-
ance Association (NELIA), composed of more than 130 insurance 
stock companies, which eventually will offer third-party protection to 
the extent of $50 million per nuclear incident.1347 Supplementing the 
policy offered by NELIA is the further protection available from the 
Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool (MAERP), which is ex-
pected to develop a capacity for an additional $I 5 million insurance, 
including reinsurance. 1848 
A tentative draft of a combined NELIA-MAERP policy was first 
promulgated in I957.1349 Certain provisions of this draft came under 
criticism, and the insurance syndicates undertook to draw a more satis-
factory policy.1830 In August I958, the AEC published an amendment 
1844 See Chapter IV at summary following note 126 for a discussion of this record. 
1845 Snow, "Atomic Energy and Financial Protection," 24 Ins. Counsel ]. 353, 358 
(1957). 
1846 Discussion of these pooling arrangements is found ibid., and· in Thomas, "Can 
We Insure Against Liability from Nuclear Incidents ?" 46 Calif. L. Rev. 14 I 5 (I 958) . 
See also CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1'11'14043, 4044 ( I958). 
1847 Press Release, Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association (Feb. I, I957), 
reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1'[4044 (1958). 
1848 Snow, supra note I345· 
1349 Indemnity Hearings IOO-I07. The best discussion of this contract is found in 
Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 6o Public Utilities Fort. 
9I3, 9I7 et seq. ( 1957). See also Thomas, supra note 1346 at I6. 
1350 See, e.g., letter from Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association officer, 
included in Joint Committee Report 10. 
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to its regulations issued under the Anderson amendment, approving the 
second NELIA-MAERP policy as one by which the financial protec-
tion requirement could be satisfied.1351 Since undoubtedly this policy 
will be the most popular means by which licensees will insure against 
public liability, it warrants closer scrutiny. 
It first should be noted that the approved policy extends only to the 
"nuclear energy hazard," i.e., "the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other 
hazardous properties" of source, special nuclear, or byproduct mate-
rials.1352 Injuries to which public liability coverage extends generally 
are the same as those specified in the "nuclear incident" definition of 
the amendment.1363 The terms of the policy state, however, that con-
tinuing discharges in the course of transportation or periodically over 
a long period of time from a single facility amount to only one nuclear 
incident. 1354 This provision spells out the answer to a question which is 
left undecided by the Anderson amendment.1m 
Protection for loss of use of property is restricted to instances in 
which the property is "injured, destroyed or contaminated" or with-
drawn from use because of real or potential contamination.1558 This 
limitation by its terms is narrower than the broad indemnity coverage 
for "loss of use nf property," but as was indicated previously,1857 judi-
cial construction of the indemnity provision probably would circum-
scribe the latter in just about the same terms as those included in the 
policy. 
Persons insured under a policy include the named insured (the prime 
licensee) and other persons with whom the prime licensee has entered 
into contractual relations concerning the facility. 1358 This clause is sub-
stantially the same as the ''persons indemnified" concept written into 
1 851 See 23 Fed. Reg. 6684 et seq. (1958). At the time of this writing, the AEC 
has issued a notice of proposed rule-making only. The proposed amendment includes 
the following statement: "The Commission will accept any other form of nuclear 
energy liability insurance as proof of financial protection, if it determines that the pro-
visions of such insurance provide adequate financial protection. ... " Ibid. 
1 852 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §II C, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684 
(1958). 
135s Subsections II o, 11 u. 
1854 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 4. 23 Fed. Reg. 
6684. 6685 (1958). 
1355 Subsection 11 o. 
1856 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §lA (2), 23 Fed. Reg. 6684 
(1958). 
1857 See text accompanying note 1293 supra. 
1358 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §III, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684, 
6685 (19s8). 
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the Anderson legislation, and it is to be doubted that coverage under the 
latter would be any broader than the insurance scope, as far as con-
structors, suppliers, and other contractors are concerned. 
In the original tentative policy, there was no provision to include a 
trespasser or other non-contracting tortfeasor as a person indemnified. 
Thus presumably the owner of an aircraft crashing into a reactor would 
not have been able to claim insurance coverage under the NELIA-
MAERP policy, although statutory indemnity protection would have 
extended to him. 1359 Such a situation would have seriously endangered 
the public, since government indemnification is merely supplemental to 
insurance, beginning where the insurance coverage ends. This problem 
was raised with the insurance syndicates, and in the approved policy, 
the definition of persons insured includes, besides the named insured, 
"any 'other person or organization with respect to his legal responsi-
bility for a nuclear incident." 1360 
Exclusions under the approved policy, except for the limitation on 
the· amount of insurance available, are not extensive.1361 It must be 
noted, however, that on-site property generally is not protected, and 
coverage does not extend to nuclear materials being transported, 
handled, or stored.1862 Off-site property of persons insured apparently 
is covered, and therefore off-site property will have insurance coverage 
and statutory indemnity coverage as well under the terms of the amend-
meni.1B63 
Further exclusion is made in the proposed policy for all operations 
and facilities outside the United States and its territories and posses-
sions, so that, in general, exporters and prospective operators of foreign 
reactors at present cannot expect to obtain insurance for their activi-
ties.1364 On the other hand, it appears that persons in Canada or Mex-
ico who might be injured by United States domestic incidents would be 
18!19 Note 1309 supra. 
136o Approved Form of .Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §III, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684, 
6685 (1958). By this_ provision, an agency of the United States cannot be an insured 
party. 
1361 The principal exclusions to the standard policy are (I) for workmen's com-
pensation; (2) for liability assume:d under contract;· (3) for the handling or use of 
any nuclear weapon; (4) war damage; . (5) the reactor property itself; (6) damage 
to nuclear materials in the course of transport; and (7) damage arising from use 
of such materials outside the United States and its possessions. Approved Form of 
Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Exclusions (a)-(h), 23 Fed. Reg. 6684,6685 (1958). 
1362 /d., Exclusions (f), (g). 
1363 See· text accompanying note . 1296 supra. 
IS64 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Exclusions (h)(l ), 23 
Fed. Reg. 6684, 6685 (1958). 
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able to claim under the policy.1365 This is broader coverage, of course, 
than Congress has been willing to acknowledge with respect to indem-
nity.1366 The insurers have further suggested that insurance may be 
available for foreign operations sometime in the future, 1867 perhaps as 
soon as the domestic program begins to function smoothly. 
Because of the risks involved, the absence of loss-experience tables, 
and the lack of a broad base of exposure to spread the risk, 1368 the syn-
dicates are demanding premiums which at first glance appear exces-
sively high. For the maximum insurance of $60 million, the licensee 
may be forced to pay as much as $26o,ooo annually.1869 This rather 
staggering figure may be somewhat deceptive, however, because the 
syndicates have announced a plan of retrospective premium adjustment. 
By this program, if it develops after ten years that accumulations in the 
premium funds, as diminished by actual payments under the policy 
and other normal expenses and charges, indicate that the premium level 
is too high, pro rata adjustments may be made whereby considerable 
portions of the paid premium would be returned.1870 
Application of the proposed policy is limited to bodily injury and 
property damage resulting from nuclear incidents which occur within 
the policy period ahd for which a written claim is filed not more than 
two years following expiration of the policy period.1871 Either party 
1aes See Joint Committee Report 10; Testimony of Charles J. Haugh, Nuclear 
Energy Liability Insurance Association, Indemnity Hearings 97· 
1366 The Joint Committee has indicated that "further investigation" will be required 
on this question. See note 1284 supra and accompanying text. 
1887 See Butler, supra note 1349 at 920; Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Pro-
tection Against Atomic Hazards : The International Aspects, Preliminary Report 37 
(1958). 
1868 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 17. 
1389 Butler, supra note 1349 at !)22. 
187o "The premiums earned by the pools for the first ten years of operation will be 
accumulated. From these premiums will be deducted actual incurred losses and loss 
adjustment expense thereon. A specified provision for expenses and long-term reserves 
will also be deducted. The balance of the Io-year premiums will be accumulated in a 
special reserve. During the eleventh year of operation, a procedure of gradual refund 
of this reserve will begin. The portion of the reserve to be returned in the eleventh 
year will be that percentage of it which corresponds to the relationship of the first-year 
premium to the accumulated ·Io-year premiums .... This return will be made to the 
insureds who paid premium in the first year of operation and will be divided [pro 
rata] ..•. In the twelfth year, the process will be repeated .... " ld. at 924· 
1an Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, §IV, 23 Fed. Reg. 6684, 
6685 ( 1958). The inadequacy of the policy's coverage will be even more dramatic in 
some nuclear situations if a recent Arkansas modification of its statute of limitations 
should be adopted in other states. Act 140, Laws of 1959, reported at CCH, Advance 
Sess. Laws Rep. 139 (1959), provides that the statute is tolled "whenever the identity of 
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can terminate the policy by giving advance notice, 1372 and if such a step 
is taken, then any claimant who does not or cannot discover his in-
juries and report them within two years after termination cannot claim 
under the policy. Potentially, therefore, the requirements of NELIA-
MAERP are even stricter than the already-inadequate periods of limi-
tations which presumably would be applied by our state courts to radia-
tion injury claims growing out of a nuclear incident. 
There is no mention in the contract ·as to when coverage first can be 
obtained by a facility operator. The Anderson amendment itself un-
doubtedly anticipates that financial protection may be required of con-
struction permittees be fore the facility is in operation, 1373 and any policy 
which would not be available as early in the process of construction as 
a (adiation hazard is present, therefore, would appear inadequate. 
The approved policy differs from the normal third-party liability in-
surance contracts available in that it is continuous, rather than for a 
fixed period such as a year. As indicated, however, it may be cancelled 
on notice.1374 The policy further provides that the limit of liability 
stated in the policy itself is the total aggregate liability of the insurers, 
and that each payment by the companies shall reduce by the amount of 
such payment the limit of the companies' liability under the policy.1375 
When payments of claims have exhausted this total of liability, the 
policy terminates automatically and the insurer is discharged. 1376 Thus 
presumably if a nuclear incident occurs at an insured facility, and the 
third-party claims exhaust the insurance fund, the policy terminates 
the tortfeasor or tortfeasors be unknown," if an action against "John Doe" is filed. 
This might apply in the multiple defendant cases when it is not known which one of 
several possible defendants caused the injury, discussed supra in text beginning at note 
875. It also might apply to situations in which a person suffering from radiation in-
jury cannot determine the source until more than two years after his symptoms ap-
pear. If he can use the Arkansas statute to extend the period for bringing his cause of 
action this will be another claim not covered by the insurance policy. Under such a 
statute the plaintiff's attorney should file a "John Doe'' as soon as he knows the in-
juries are caused by radiation, and then he can investigate possible defendants at his 
leisure. The Arkansas statute is too concise and leaves many important uncertainties. 
1372 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 12, 23 Fed. Reg. 
6684, 6686 (1958). 
1378 Subsection 17oa specifically requires that construction permits under Section 185 
shall contain a financial protection provision. The Joint Committee indicates that use 
of the term "license" throughout the Anderson bill is intended to include the construc-
tion permittee. Joint Committee Report 20. 
1314 Note 1372 supra. 
1375 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 3, 23 Fed. 
Reg. 6684. 6685 (1958). 
1a1a Ibid. 
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and the facility operator is without financial protection until he can 
obtain another insurance contract. Even if the insurance fund is not 
exhausted, it is reduced by the amounts paid out. One may speculate 
whether the requirement of financial protection under the Anderson 
amendment would prevent a reactor operator in such a position from 
conducting -further activities. It could be argued that if NELIA-
MAERP refused him another policy, then the maximum amount of 
financial protection would be zero, and he therefore should be granted 
indemnification from the ground up.1377 On the other hand, the insur-
ance group probably would offer further coverage for another premium. 
It is anticipated that the larger facility operators will obtain policies 
from both NELIA and MAERP, each containing very similar provi-
sions.1318 In the event of a nuclear incident, the two syndicates will be 
proportionately liable on all claims. The ratio normally should be be-
tween four and five to one, with NELIA of course assuming the greater 
burden. 
( 2) Potential Gaps in Protection 
Of the NELIA-MAERP policy, one legitimately may observe that 
in general its coverage is co-extensive with that of the government in-
demnity. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Oaims arising 
from a nuclear incident might be asserted more than two years after 
termination of the policy and thus fall beyond the policy's discovery 
period, yet still be within the period of limitations for government con-
tractual liability. Some types of injury, such as lost profits, may be 
construed to be covered by the indemnity, but not by the private insur-
ance. A clause of the insurance contract gives the insurer the right to 
suspend the contract for unsafe operations; if an incident should occur 
after such suspension but before the AEC closed down operations at 
the reactor, presumably the indemnity would apply but the insurance 
would not.1819 Remote as these possibilities may be, they pose funda-
1377 Article II, 1[2 of the AEC indemnity agreement says the licensee "will make 
all reasonable efforts to obtain such reinstatements" in case the insurance policies fall 
below the figure set for financial protection. 23 Fed. Reg. 6682 (1958). 
1378 The policies issued by NELIA and MAERP will be identical in terms and 
conditions. Thomas, supra note 1346 at 20. For this reason, available insurance is 
frequently referred to as "NELIA-MAERP" in this chapter. 
1379 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 2, 23 Fed. Reg. 
6684, 6685 (1958). This contingency was suggested in Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 750, 
753 (1958). The new approved policy lessens the likelihood of this happening by re-
quiring twelve hours advance notice to the AEC prior to suspension. Approved Form 
of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 2. Presumably the same question 
could arise if the insured failed to pay the annual premium, although no express 
power of suspension is included in the policy for this breach. 
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mental questions concerning the government indemnity : Is it intended 
to operate as an extension of financial coverage beyond the level of re-
quired insurance, or is it also intended to reinsure the risk covered by 
the policy, e.g., the first $6o million? If it is the latter, then an exclu-
sion operating under the policy will merely mean that only a total of 
$500 million will be available for payment of claims within the excluded 
area, and that the government will pay from the ground up for such 
claims. This of course would be ideal for facility operators who could' 
be assured always of full protection of their own assets from the attach-
ment of creditors. It does not appear, however, that Congress has. 
chosen this interpretation. The Joint Committee Report indicates that 
if, for some reason, the policy does not apply to the incident or to the 
claim, the burden must be borne by the insured himself, to the level of 
the required financial protection. 138° From the latter point only will 
government indemnity operate. The remote but distinct possibility ex-
ists, therefore, that in spite of the insurance and indemnity program, a 
licensee may himself be ruined financially or seriously injured by a nu-
clear incident, and third parties may go substantially uncompensated. 
(3) NEPIA Policy 
Loss to the licensee, however, may be prevented at least in part under 
the third insurance policy offered to the atomic energy industry-pro-
tecting against property damage to the nuclear facility itself.1881 This 
is not the "financial protection" against public liability required by the 
statute, and therefore it is not a condition precedent to obtaining gov-
ernment indemnity. Coverage is expressly limited to on-site property, 
thereby avoiding duplication with the NELIA-MAERP policy, and 
such property may be owned either by the insured or by other persons 
with whom the insured prior to loss has agreed to provide protection.1382 
This policy is offered by the Nuclear Energy Property Insurance As-
1380 "The protection of indemnification afforded by the Government under the agree-
ment of indemnification is intended only to start when the damages exceed the face 
sum or the level of the financial protection required by the Commission. This means 
that if there are any exceptions in the scope of coverage of the underlying financial 
protection which may be applicable. to a particular incident the indemnification does 
not pick up from the ground up but still picks up only after the amount of damage 
reaches the level of the financial protection required of the licensee." Joint Commit-
tee Report 21. 
1381 On-site property of indemnitees is, of course, not. covered by the Anderson 
amendment. Section IIu. 
1382 NEPIA. Specimen of Policy, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 
114047 ( 1958) . 
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soc1atwn ( NEPIA), another syndicate of stock companies, and is ex-
pected to provide facility operators protection up to $56 million.1383 At 
the time the amendment was passed, such an amount was believed suf-
ficient to cover the value of even the most expensive reactor, but this 
estimate may prove to be incorrect.1384 In any event, it is to be doubted 
that Congress will be interested in providing supplementary protection 
by way of indemnity. 
NEPIA insurance is not limited to damages arising from the nuclear 
energy hazard, but extends to all risks to the property of the insured 
by any periP385 Of the numerous specified exceptions, however, the 
most important would appear to be gradual accumulation of radioactive 
contamination, neglect of the insured to use reasonable means to save 
and preserve the property when it is in danger of physical damage, theft 
losses, injuries to land, war damage, business interruption costs, and 
property removed from the premises for purposes other than preserva-
tion from danger.1386 Considering the "all risk" nature of the policy, 
one can deduce that there is certain to be some overlapping with other 
already-existing types of property insurance offered by individual syn-
dicate members, and no doubt endorsements similar to those anticipated 
in the liability area will be common provisions of normal property in-
surance contracts, excluding therefrom the nuclear risk.1887 
e. Limitation of Liability 
The last of the three essential protective features of the Anderson 
legislation is the limitation of liability of persons indemnified to an 
aggregate of $Soo million plus the amount of financial protection re-
qui.red.1388 As we shall see below/389 if claims arising from a nuclear 
1888 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 20. 
1384 The AEC has estimated that the cost of the entire reactor plant at Shipping-
port, Pennsylvania, including the fuel element fabricator, will be about $72.5 million. 
See AEC Twenty-Third Semi-annual Report, Progress in Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy 436-37 (1957). 
1385 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 20. 
u8e NEPIA, Specimen of Policy, reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law Rep. 
1[4047 (I9s8). 
1887 Thomas, supra note 1346 at 21. Four states have passed legislation permitting 
damage from "nuclear reaction" to be excluded from coverage under standard policies. 
North Dakota Laws 1959, H. 652, CCH. Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 135 (1959); 
Nebraska Laws· 1959, Leg. 111, CCH, Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 37 (1959); West 
Virginia Laws 1959, S. 192, CCH, Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 99 (1959); Idaho Laws 
H. 194, CCH, Advance Sess. Laws Rep. 207 (1959). 
1s8s Subsection 17oe. 
1889 Section 3c infra deals with problems of claim administration. 
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incident exceed these combined amounts, the indemnitee or the Commis-
sion may petition the appropriate district court for limitation. This ac-
tion would prevent claimants from satisfying claims by execution on 
other property of the indemnitee, and would force them to accept only 
partial payment if total claims did in fact exceed the funds. If, of course, 
the insurance policy for some reason is found not to apply to the nuclear 
incident, the limitation is for the most part illusory, since claimants 
presumably would satisfy their judgments out of other assets belong-
ing to the indemnitee, up to the level of financial protection required. 
From that point on, government indemnity and limitation would take 
over. 
In adopting the closed-end indemnification concept, Congress did not 
altogether shut the door on claimants when aggregate judgments ex-
ceeded the level of limitation. On the contrary, it was quite clear that 
Congress would be willing to consider the appropriation of further 
funds when and if a major disaster occurred,1390 if all claims were not 
substantially compensated. The closed-end indemnity simply reflects the 
legislators' reluctance to promise unknown amounts of federal funds 
for an event, the probability of occurrence and extent of which are 
speculative. 
Potentially, however, the limitation prevents full satisfaction of a 
valid state judgment, and the constitutionality of such federal action 
may eventually be questioned.1891 In the present state of Supreme Court 
authority, it is extremely doubtful that this provision could be said to 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Over forty 
years ago, the court upheld a limitation imposed on recovery under 
workm.en's compensation acts, on the theory that in return for the limi-
tation, a valuable right (absolute employer liability) was given by the 
legislation.1892 The same reasoning has been applied with respect to the 
limitation given under the Warsaw Convention.1893 It woulq appear to 
be equally applicable here, since the government's $500 million indem-
nity will in all but the n:iost unu~Ufll case be a completely adequate sub-
stitute for the right to levy against all of the indemnitee's property. 
There have been several cases in which limitation was imposed by 
Congress with no apparent substitute offered. to claimants in return. 
Limitations in these cases also are upheld if the wngressional action is 
found to be a reasonable and appropriate exercise of a substantive 
1890 Joint Committee Report 21, 22. 
1891 See Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 765-66 (1958): 
1392 New York Central R.R. v. White, ~43 U.S.· r88, 37 S.Ct. 247 ( 1917). 
1 393 Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.C. N.J. 1959). 
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power.1394 The substantive bases for the atomic energy program are 
several, and it is to be doubted that the Supreme Court would find the 
Anderson legislation an unreasonable restriction on claimants' rights 
(even ignoring the indemnity) in view of the need for protecting the 
nuclear industry. · 
Subsection 17oe provides that for a single nuclear incident, the ag-
gn!gate liability of persons indemnified, including the reasonable costs 
of investigating and settling claims and defending suits for damage, 
shall not exceed $500 million plus the financial protection required. 
Several special matters should be noted with respect to this provision. 
First, the limitation is available not only to the prime licensee, but also 
to any person indemnified, including a malicious trespasser. Although, 
from the public's point of view, there would appear to be justification 
for granting an indemnity to this latter class of persons, there seems 
to be no reason why they should also enjoy the limitations on liabil-
ity.1395 Protection against levies on the property of malicious or inten-
tional trespassers really in no way fosters the atomic energy program. 
The statute well might be amended to provide that the government in-
demnity would operate only when insurance and leviable assets of such 
trespassers were exhausted. This should not include merely negligent 
trespassers, such as an airline whose plane crashes into a reactor. 
A further question arises as to whether persons of whom no financial 
protection is required can obtain the benefit of the limitation. Obvi-
ously, this question turns upon the answer to our previous inquiry, 
whether such a person can sign an indemnity agreement under the terms 
of the Anderson amendment.1396 The same policy considerations which 
would seem to dictate that these persons should be permitted to enjoy 
indemnity would operate equally to justify a limitation. Contractors 
and materials licensees deserve the same type of protection as operators 
of production and utilization facilities. 
A very closely related but nevertheless distinct problem is whether 
the limitation on liability applies to all liability of the licensee or only 
to that liability for which the government provides indemnity, i.e., "pub-
lic liability" arising out of a "nuclear incident." The whole act is keyed 
carefully to these two terms of art. If they are applied to the limitation 
of liability of the individual as well as that of the government, it means 
there will be no limitation in some circumstances, such as ( 1) damages 
1 394 Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 765 (1958). See also discussion supra at note 
1276. 
1395 I d. at 757. 
1396 See text following note 131 1 supra .. 
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caused in foreign countries possibly either from a domestic facility or 
certainly from one sold or operated in a foreign country, and ( 2) prop-
erty of some indemnitee not at the site of the accident and not covered 
under the terms of the financial protection required. 
An argument can be made that the limitation applies to all liability 
and not as limited by the terms of art. The language of Section 170e 
is that the "aggregate liability" shall not exceed financial protection 
plus $500 million. Because the word "public" is not found here it can 
be argued that the limitation is not so restricted, since in most of the 
rest of the indemnity amendment provisions the term used is "public 
liability." This certainly is true of Section 170a, c, d, and even of e. 
The difficulty with this argument is that "public" also is omitted when 
reference is made to liability in Section 53e(8), Section 17ob, and in 
the last part of 17oe itself. These would seem to indicate that the two 
phrases, "public liability" and "liability" were used synonymously. If 
this is the interpretation accepted by the courts, it will mean that some 
very substantial liability will not be limited by the Anderson amendment 
provision. It is true that this is not likely to exceed the amount of in-
surance available and Mexican and Canadian damages apparently are 
covered by the approved insurance policies, but in the event of a major 
reactor incident such liability might well exceed the amount of insur-
ance coverage. 
One final matter remains. If a nuclear incident takes place and it ap-
pears that two persons who have signed agreements of indemnity are 
found at fault and responsible, is government indemnity for the inci-
dent doubled? The language of Subsection I 70c appears to give a 
negative answer. It says that the "aggregate indemnity for all persons 
indemnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not exceed 
$soo,ooo,ooo .... " This does not necessarily indicate, however, that 
where two licensees independently obtaining insurance under NELIA-
MAERP are both responsible for an incident, the insurance fund avail-
able would not be the sum of the two policies. The terms of the 
NELIA-MAERP agreement do not state that the syndicates will only 
be liable to a certain extent for a single nt.).clear incident, but merely that 
they will be liable to that extent "under tpis policy." 1897 In the rare 
case, then, indemnity would be available in the amount of $500 million, 
plus the sums of two insurance policies. · 
E:ven as to government re~ponsibility to indemnify it is arguable that 
each release of harmful radiation which causes qamage is a separate in- · 
1397 Approved Form of Nuclear Energy Liability Policy, Condition 3. 23 Fed. Reg. 
6684, 6685 (1958). . 
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cident, whether it comes at widely separated times from the same facil-
ity or at the same time from two widely separated installations. The 
language of Section I I o, "any occurrence . . . causing" harm, might 
be read to mean each separate release of material which causes harm, 
no matter how many indemnified sources also contribute, rather than 
each occurrence of harm to a person or particular property. It would 
seem more consistent with the over-all policy of the indemnity scheme 
if the former interpretation were accepted. The general philosophy 
seems to be to limit the liability of the government for a single incident 
at a single installation to $500 million. There is no reason to limit the 
protection of the injured public to $500 million when the injury results 
from two separate installations merely because they happened to coin-
cide in time of occurrence or effect. So long as each facility incident 
causes some of the injury and the government would have been liable 
up to $500 million for each incident if the other had not happened at 
the same time, the government should be liable as fully as if they had 
happened separately. Liability should not be limited because of a coin-
cidence in time of occurrence or effect. To so interpret the act would be 
to subvert the theory of covering each installation up to $500 million 
for each harmful incident at that installation. 
Where two installations contribute to a total injurious radiation dose, 
but the contribution of neither would have been enough alone to cause 
compensable harm, will the government be liable for an "incident"? 
Certainly it can be argued that unless discharge from a specific instal-
lation causes harm there is no "incident" within the terms of the act. 
If legal liability should be imposed on the owner, however, the whole 
theory of the indemnity legislation to protect both the operator and the 
public would be defeated. It could be argued that each installation 
caused some harm, though recovery is not allowed until the harm mani-
fests itself in an observable manner when added to the radiation from 
another source. This type of situation is not likely to cause injury ex-
tensive enough to call for government indemnity, but it is not im-
possible. 
3· Claim Satisfaction Under Subsection I70e. 
One provision of the Anderson amendment which has drawn little 
comment or criticism is Subsection I7oe, dealing with the procedural 
aspects of satisfying claims arising from a nuclear incident. In part, 
the subsection states : 
The Commission or any person indemnified may apply to the 
appropriate district court of the United States having venue 
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in bankruptcy matters over the location of the nuclear inci-
dent, and upon a showing that the public liability from a sin-
gle nuclear incident will probably exceed the limit of liability 
imposed by this section, shall be entitled to such orders as may 
be appropriate for enforcement of the provisions of this sec-
tion, including an order limiting the liability of the persons 
indemnified, orders staying the payment of claims and the 
execution of court judgments, orders apportioning the pay-
ments to be made by claimants, orders permitting partial pay-
ments to be made before final determination of the total 
claims, and an order setting aside a part of the funds avail-
able for possible latent injuries not discovered until a later 
time.1a9s 
The relative dearth of commentary on this provision is somewhat re-
markable when one considers the number of difficult problems either 
created or totally ignored under its terms. One explanation for this 
situation perhaps lies in the general attitude that a substantial nuclear 
incident is so unlikely that there is little point in worrying about the 
procedural problems until they arise. The Anderson amendment, how-
ever, was enacted on the assumption that a nuclear incident could hap-
pen 1399 and that there should be federal legislation to cover such a pos-
sibility. Accepting this basic assumption, the procedural aspects of 
claim satisfaction become extremely important, and for that reason 
warrant careful analysis. Unless procedures are adequate, substantive 
benefits well may prove illusory. 
In the report made by the Joint Committee to accompany the amend-
ment, it was emphasized that Subsection 170e sets venue at the site of 
the nuclear incident giving rise to liability, not at the place where re-
sulting damage might occur.1400 This specification of venue, however, 
is applicable only to petitions by the Commission or indemnitee for 
the various orders enumerated in the subsection. No restriction is 
placed upon venue for suits by claimants. Indeed, the report states that 
"the right of the State courts to establish the liability of the persons in-
volved in the normal way is maintained, but the payment of those lia-
1398 Subsection 1703. The venue provision is somewhat similar to the admiralty rule 
setting venue for petitions to limit liability when no libel has as yet been filed. See 
28 U.S.C.A., Admiralty Rule 54 (1950). 
1399 For an interesting study of the possible effects of a reactor burn-up under 
"ideal" meteorological conditions, see University of Michigan Engineering Research 
Institute, Report on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding Population of an 
Assumed Release of Fission Products Into the Atmosphere from a 300-Megawatt 
Nuclear Reactor Located at Lagoona Beach, Michigan (1957). 
Hoo Joint Committee Repo.rt 22. 
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bilities can be stayed." 1401 Thus it is apparent that Congress intended 
a two-step process for satisfaction of claims: ( 1) determination by 
state courts, and federal courts sitting in diversity of citizenship cases, 
of the fact and extent of liability of the indemnitee, and ( 2) apportion-
ment of the financial protection amount and indemnification fund to 
these judgments, presumably on a pro rata basis, by the federal district 
court having venue over the nuclear incident. The second step un-
doubtedly is included to prevent the discrimination which might other-
wise result from the satisfaction of some judgments earlier than others, 
and from the "race of diligence" that could be expected if no such pro-
visions were made. 
_ It is important at this point to note one very substantial limitation 
upon the power of the local federal court to enter limitation and appor-
tionment orders under Subsection 17oe. Under its express terms, the 
provision restricts the court's authority to those instances in which 
claims "will probably exceed'' the available fund. In other words, the 
amendment makes absolutely no provision for centralized control of 
judgments or payment of claims as long as there appears to be sufficient 
monies available for satisfaction of all judgments. Thus when a 
"small" incident takes place (perhaps involving only $300 million worth 
of valid claims), the federal district court having venue is not vested 
with the power to set aside a fund for latent injuries, or to permit pay-
ments before judgment to claimants demonstrating immediate financial 
crisis, or to stay execution of court judgments against the indemnitee's 
property. Any of these steps, if a district court takes them, could only 
be based upon a general equitable power to implement apparent congres-
sional intent implied in the amendment. 
In the situations most likely to happen, therefore, Subsection 17oe is 
of no assistance whatsoever. On the other hand, it does purport to deal 
with incidents in which claims probably will exceed the fund-where 
the special problems of limi~ation and apportionment are presented. 
Our discussion deals primarily with this particular problem, but many 
of the considerations and suggestions which follow will relate equally 
to the case in which the fund is adequate to meet valid claims. 
There is no express indication in the subsection that the district court, 
even in the instance where the fund is inadequate, is given the power 
to stay proceedings in state courts uo2 before their culmination in judg-
uo1 Ibid. See also the general statement of purpose for the amendment made by 
the Joint Committee, text accompanying note 1273 supra. 
uo2 Reference to "state courts" will henceforward include federal courts sitting in 
diversity and therefore applying state substantive law. 
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ments or to consolidate all claims for trial before it. Any such power 
would have to be derived from an application of the doctrine of ejus-
dem generis to the phrase "such orders as may be appropriate for en-
forcement of the provisions of this section" and the enumerated author-
ized orders which follow. 1403 The other orders seem more limited and 
this probably makes the use of ejusdem generis of little value. One of 
the permissible orders under the subsection is for the stay of execution 
of court judgments. Enumeration of such an order is clearly inconsist-
ent, without explanation, with an intention that the district court 
should have the power to consolidate before a judgment is rendered by 
the state court. In addition, a finding of a power to consolidate is made 
extremely difficult by the statement quoted above from the congres-
sional report accompanying the amendment which appears to contem-
plate "normal" state proceedings on the question of liability. 
a. Effect of Inability to Consolidate Claims 
· While certainly the limited statutory grant of power to issue stay 
and apportionment orders will alleviate considerably the confusion and 
vexation engendered by prosecution of multiple claims against the in-
demnitee, the apparent failure of Congress expressly to empower the 
district court to take jurisdiction over all claimants' suits is unfortunate. 
Potentially a nuclear incident may cause damage over a large area en-
compassing several states. It is more than probable that the indemnitee 
will be sued in each jurisdiction where'injuries result, since a corpora-
tion in general today is amenable to process in any state where it does 
business or its property can be attached. Within each of these jurisdic-
tions, actions sometimes may be brought in several different trial courts. 
Thus thousands of actions arising from a single incident may be 
brought and pursued in a vast number of courts: Each court of course 
will apply its own procedural rules; and, smce the prevailing conflicts 
rule for substantive tort questions- is "place of injury" rather than 
"place of defendant's act," 1404 it will apply different substantive prin-
1~os This would actually be an inverse application of ejusdem gmeris, which nor-
mally comes into play when a list specifics is followed by a general descriptive phrase 
into which further specifics of like nature can logically be placed. Here the authoriza-. 
tion for granting "such" orders as are "appropriate" invites a reading which would 
permit the court to make other orders to those subsequently listed in the subsection. 
uo• Stumberg, Conflict of "Laws, 182 e.t seq. (2d .ed. 1951). N{)te also that in 
wrongful death actions, the law of the place of injury, rather than the place of death, 
controls the substantive questions of liabltity. ·[d. at 191. See also Goodrich, Conflict 
of Laws, ·263 et seq. (3d ed. 1949). The best illustration of conflict of laws problems 
involved in a tort having multi-state impact is the case of the so-called "national libel," 
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ciples depending upon the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff's person 
or property was located at the time of injury. Thus one court may 
apply a one-year statute of limitations to a claim arising from the in-
cident, whereas another will be bound by a two-year limitation pe-
riod.1m Substantively, the defendant may be held only to a standard of 
due care or, on the other hand, to strict liability, depending upon the 
plaintiff's location. Because of these differences, it is entirely possible 
that one claimant, whose injuries are no less serious than another's, 
may be barred because of the vagaries of place of injury or place of 
suit. The equality of treatment for claimants apparently intended by 
Congress thus often may not be fully realized under the explicit terms 
of the subsection. Even if consolidation were possible, state substantive 
rules are applicable and this would cause the same unequal treatment. 
Even if we ignore these vexing considerations, we are further struck 
by the profoundly difficult task facing any district court seeking to 
administer the fund under the terms of the subsection. Let us assume 
that the incident causes dama·ges of over $500 million plus the amount 
of required insurance (although such a determination in itself may 
Often be an enormous problem) and that an order has been granted 
limiting liability to that amount. Assuming the court has no power to 
consolidate claims, it apparently must wait until all judgments are 
entered before it can finally apportion the indemnity and insurance 
fund. In the interim, however, it is empowered to permit "partial pay-
ments to be made before final determination of the total claims." 1406 
Does this mean that the court may authorize payments to persons who 
have not reduced their claims to judgments if defendant agrees to a 
in which a defamatory statement is made to persons in numerous jurisdictions through 
the medium of a large-circulation magazine or newspaper. Even if the states are able 
to establish a "single-publication" rule by legislation or judicial decision, the courts 
are still confronted with the problem of what substantive law to apply to defendant's 
act. Prosser lists ten possible rules for the choice of law-including the law of each 
place of impact, the law of the place of predominant impact, the law of the place of 
defendant's act, the law of the place of plaintiff's domicile, and the law of the forum-
arid concludes that possibly the last has been employed more frequently than any of the 
others. Prosser, "Interstate Publication," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971-78 (1953). See 
also, ~'Developments in the Law-Defamation," 6g Harv. L. Rev. 875, 950 et seq. 
(1956). The defamation rules are complicated in the context of the nuclear incident, 
however, by the traditional "place of injury" rule for the physical torts involving 
negligence or intentional conduct. It is probable that the latter test would prevail 
in the event of a nuclear incident. 
uo5 Periods of limitation, with some exceptions, are considered procedural matters, 
and the law of the forum therefore controlling. Stumberg, supra note 1404 at 147 
et seq. 
1406 Subsection 17oe. 
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settlement, or does it merely mean that some judgments may be satis-
fied before all judgments are rendered? Either interpretation of the 
statutory language leads to confusion. If the former construction is 
correct, what happens if the state court ultimately determines that the 
claimant is not entitled to judgment, because the defendant's conduct 
is non-tortious or because the statute of limitations had run on the 
claim? Or if the latter interpretation is adopted, the question becomes: 
How much should be paid-what if the amount paid turns out to be 
more than the claimant's ultimate proportionate share? Too liberal pay-
ments early in the administration of the fund possibly will leave nothing 
for those obtaining judgments later. It has been suggested that in the 
event of serious mishap Congress can be expected to appropriate more 
monies for compensation of claimants. While this may be a reasonable 
assumption, it is no basis for accepting the ambiguity of the subsection. 
A clarifying amendment should be enacted. 
Crucial to many of these problems is the fact that the touchstone of 
the district court's power is the preliminary state court judgment. It is 
entirely possible that the last valid judgment will not be finally rendered 
until years after the nuclear incident. Claims may not have been filed 
until shortly before the statute of limitations was to run; courts fre-
quently find themselves two or more years behind their docket calendars, 
and appeal and retrial processes are likely to consume even more time. 
The district court, therefore, can look forward to a five to ten year 
period before the fund can be apportioned to the initially adjudicated 
claims. 
Even when all state judgments have been rendered, the subsection 
poses yet another obstacle to complete claim satisfaction. The district 
court is permitted, upon petition, to set aside a portion of the fund 
"for possible latent injuries not discovered until a later time." 1407 While 
such a provision is admirable in its recognition of the fact that the dam-
age picture is immensely more complex when radiation injury is in-
volved, its terms also provide further problems for the district judge in 
requiring his continuing supervision for an even longer period. It is 
almost impossible for him to determine what a fair reserve should be. 
The subsection gives him rio guide on this point, and indeed, there is no 
indication whether the judge should determine the amount based on his 
conception of what would be equitable in view of probabilities of latent 
injuries, or based on his estimate of what legal liabilities for latent in-
juries will be adjudicated by state courts. If the latter, then the size of 
1407 Ibid. 
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the reserve fund will be exceedingly small, since there is little precedent 
in our state courts for delayed assessment of damages to compensate 
for later-appearing injuries.1408 Even if the district judge should decide 
on a figure, he is faced with the dilemma of how long he should keep 
the reserve open. Theoretically, at least, genetic damage may appear 
more than 100 years after the incident, and there is excellent indication 
that latent in juries such as bone damage and leukemia may appear as 
much as thirty years after harmful radiation.1409 Surely Congress did 
not intend that claimants demonstrating present injuries for which the 
insurance and indemnity fund (as reduced by the reserve fund) does 
not provide adequate compensation, should be forced to wait for such 
a period in order to obtain more adequate satisfaction of their judg-
ments. 
While these reserve fund matters are not problems peculiarly pres-
ent when the district court finds itself unable to consolidate the nu-
merous actions, they nevertheless are made more complicated if multi-
tudinous state courts are permitted to take the initial action. In one 
state, a jury may include in its damage award an amount equated to the 
degree of possibility of future manifestation of radiation injury, where-
as in another state a judge may direct the jury to disregard such a 
factor in assessing damages. How can the district court weigh such 
differences when petitioned for an order to permit payment from the 
reserve fund? And for that matter, who is to determine what later 
uos "There is also the matter of statutes of limitations. There is no uniformity 
among the states as to the length of the period during which they run. Further, and 
more importantly, these statutes are not well adapted to take care of radiation in-
juries. As presently worded, most of them, except those with reference to fraud 
and to occupational diseases, begin to run from the time of the harmful impact. The 
diseases which result from radioactive substances may not be discovered for years 
after the impact. In fact, until the disease becomes manifest its victim may have no 
realization of the radiation. I suggest that the federal statute should include a pro-
vision which would enable suit within a reasonable time after the disease or disability 
is discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care. Fur-
ther, since the immediate consequence of radiation is frequently only apparently 
minor harm for which an action might or might not be brought, the statute should 
provide for a subsequently appearing but unpredictable harm. The present rules of 
res judicata prevent a subsequent action if judgment has been obtained in an action 
based on the impact, although at that time, the harm appeared to be minor. Perhaps 
it would be better to provide for installment payments, to be increased or diminished 
as subsequent events determine the extent of "the total harm." Seavey, "Torts and 
Atoms," 46 Calif. L. Rev. 3, 12 (1958). 
uoD Atomic Industrial Forum, Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards 16-17 
( 1957); National Academy of Sciences, Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (Re-
port of Committee on Pathological Effects), reported at CCH, Atomic Energy Law 
Rep. 1!4028 (1958). 
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payments are to be made out of the reserve fund-the state court with 
the approval of the district court or the district court alone? 
These are a few of the immensely difficult questions that will con-
front any district judge called upon to administer the insurance and 
indemnity fund and apportion it equitably to numerous state judg-
ments. One can conjure up further problems almost at will. Should 
any distinction be made between claims based on personal injuries and 
those involving property damage? Should the traditional notion that 
the claim is merged in the state court judgment be followed? How can 
the district court prevent juries in a given jurisdiction from inflating 
damages for local claimants in order to assure them a greater share of 
the funds? 
The secondary and supervisory role apparently accorded the federal 
district court by the subsection thus appears an exacting one indeed. It 
can readily be seen that many of the suggested legal and administrative 
problems would be alleviated if an effective means of consolidation 
could be found. A single set of procedural rules would thereby be 
applied to all actions. One tribunal only would decide the fact of lia-
bility and the monetary extent of injury.1410 Administration of the in-
demnity fund, including the provision of reserves for latent injuries, 
would be in the hands of the district judge alone, subject of course to 
appellate supervision. Enormous administrative difficulties would no 
doubt remain, but the fact that a district court could deal with them ab 
initio, rather than after t~e picture has become confused by the actions 
of numerous state courts, would surely lead to saner, more equitable 
distribution of the indemnity fund. 
b. Available Consolidation Devices 
If the desirability of consolidation and the apparent omtsswn of 
Congress to include such a device in Subsection I 7oe is accepted, there 
remains the question of whether the federal district court is not other-
wise vested with the power to consolidate without regard to the sub-
section. Several equitable devices have been employed with great suc-
cess in previous mass tort cases.1411 Any attempt, however, to use one 
of these devices always meets several serious obstacles which cannot be 
1410 Without further federal legislation, however, the district court would still 
apply that substantive law dictated by traditional conflicts rules. Thus the possibilities 
of inequities among claimants would still exist, although perhaps to a lesser extent. 
See the discussion of this problem in Seavey, supra note 1408 at 11. 
1411 Instances of the use of such devices will be discussed in some detail below. See 
generally, Comment, 63 Yale L. ]. 493 (1954). 
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dismissed lightly. Most formidable of these is the legislative limitation 
on range of process. With minor exceptions, a federal district court 
cannot render a valid and binding in personam judgment based on per-
sonal service of process beyond the territorial limits of the state in 
which the court sits.1412 Facts litigated in one action before the district 
court could therefore have no binding application to a foreign claimant 
who chooses not to appear. 
A further problem which becomes immediately apparent is the very 
limited power of federal courts to enjoin concurrent state proceedings. 
The general rule is that a court of the United States "may not grant 
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly 
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its juris-
diction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." tm Of course, no 
express authorization is found in Subsection 17oe for such an order, 
and the tendency has been to construe the latter two exceptions strictly 
against the injunctive power.1 m "Aid of its judisdiction" refers to 
cases in which the jurisdiction of federal courts is exclusive, not where, 
as here, it is concurrent with that of the states.1m Protection of judg-
ments is valid as a basis for injunction only when the federal court has 
rendered a judgment; it is not construed as a ground for staying other 
proceedings while an action is pending or in progress in a federal 
court.1416 Thus when it is possible for claimants also to bring action in 
state courts, consolidation is of limited value since the court is without 
power to consolidate all claims before it by use of the injunction. 
Still another obstacle to an equitable proceeding into which all claim-
ants might. be forced is the right to trial by jury. While in strict con-
stitutional terms, an equitable action probably would not violate federal 
or state guarantees, tm yet it is widely accepted in this country that tort 
1 412 "All process other than subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial 
limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United 
States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state." 28 U.S.C.A., Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f) (1950). This is a legislative and not a constitutional re-
striction on the range of process. Howard v. United States, 126 F.2d 667, 668 (1oth 
Cir. 1942), cert. den. 316 U.S. 699, 62 S.Ct. 1297 (1942). See 2 Moore, Federal Prac-
tice 1!442 (2d ed. 1948). 
1413 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §2283 (1950). 
1414 See Moore, Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 407-15 (1949). 
141~ I d. at 412. 
u1a I d. at 41o-n. 
1417 The federal and state constitutions generally preserve the right to jury trial as 
it existed at common law. There is evidence that equity courts took jurisdiction in 
this type of case at the time the constitutions were adopted. See Comment, 63 Yale 
L. J. 493, 5oS (1954). 
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actions, and particularly negligence actions, should be tried by jury.1418 
One writer has suggested that such a tradition will not be easily broken 
for the mere sake of convenience for the defendant and the court,1419 
especially in view of the fact that the claimant has an equally strong 
interest in having his grievance independently litigated before a jury. 
Formidable though these objections may be, yet, as indicated, there 
is a growing body of precedent for the consolidation of mass tort claims 
before a single court, although none of the procedural devices thus far 
evolved can completely surmount the enumerated obstacles. Several of 
these devices have received extremely careful consideration in two re-
cent law review comments,1420 and the discussion which immediately 
follows draws liberally on the factual background provided by their 
authors. It must be noted, however, that these comments were not writ-
ten in contemplation of the nuclear incident. While many of the ques-
tions arising with respect to previous non-nuClear disasters may be 
related by analogy to the nuclear incident, yet obviously the problems 
peculiar to the latter merit special attention in the context of Subsection 
I7oe. Particularly important are the probabilities that, should a nuclear 
incident occur, (I) there will be latent injuries whereas in all previous 
mass tort cases the injuries have been immediately or soon apparent 
and (2) injury or damage may be spread over a much larger area than 
previously considered by courts. Finally, it bears repeating that Con-
gress may well have intended, by its failure to provide for consolidation 
in Subsection I70e, to preclude such proceedings altogether, in which 
case consolidation under an independent device is impossible. Our as-
sumption must be either that Congress intended to permit consolida-
tion, or in view of the ease in administration which it affords, will 
amend the subsection to include its use. 
( r) Bill of Peace 
This traditional remedy has been employed occasionally at the in-
stance of the defendant in a mass tort situation to enjoin multiple suits 
in other courts and to bind all claimants to the decision of a single 
equity court.1421 There is little uniformity in the decisions to define the 
permissible limits for use of this device, but a safe general rule is that 
a bill of peace may be entertained in a federal district court only (I) 
1418 See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 186 et seq. (1950). 
1419 Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493, 496 (1954). 
1420 Note, 6o Yale L. ]. 1417 (1951); Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493 (1954). See also, 
Molnar, "Equity Jurisdiction in Tort Actions" 10 Ga. B. J. 309 (1948). 
1421 Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493, 501 et seq. ( 1954). 
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where the defendant shows that he will be subjected to multiple suits 
and ( 2) where a common or "general" interest binds the multiple claim-
ants together.1422 A recent court of appeals decision interprets the latter 
requirement to mean, not that there must be "privity" among claimants 
in the narrow sense of common title, but that there need only be a com-
mon and substantial question of law or fact involved in the general con-
troversy.u23 Thus construed, the equitable bill of peace would appear 
generally appropriate to the consolidation of claims arising from a sin-
gle nuclear incident. 
Use of the bill of peace, however, is severely limited by the problems 
of process, power to enjoin, and right to jury trial discussed above. As 
indicated, process of the federal court generally extends only to the 
borders of the state in which it sits. The power to enjoin state court 
proceedings already begun in the mass tort situation has been specifi-
cally denied in a recent district court case based on Section 2283 of the 
Federal Judicial Code quoted above. 1m And an equity suit pursuant to 
a bill of peace in which the co'urt decides questions of fact may well run 
contrary to traditional notions of the right to jury trial in negligence 
cases.14211 
( 2) Spurious Class Actions 
Under the federal rules of civil procedure, a class action is authorized 
when, inter alia, the character of the right sought to be enforced for 
or against the class is "several, and there is a common question of law 
or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought." 1426 
This class action is known as the spurious type, in which the only rela-
tion of the claimants inter se need be one of related law or fact rather 
than common title. 
In an action by one of the alleged tortfeasors in the recent South Am-
boy ammunition explosion causing injury to several thousand claimants, 
u22 I d. The most recent federal case upon this point in relation to mass tort claims 
is Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, :zo6 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. I953) involv-
ing property damage caused by flooding. 
u2s I d. at 888, rejecting the narrower construction offered in Tribette v. Illinois 
Central R.R., 70 Miss. 182, I2 So. 32 (I8g2), and relying on I Pomeroy, Equity Ju-
risprudence §269 (5th ed. I94I). 
142f Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, III F. Supp. So, 88-Sg, (D.C. N.J. I953) 
refusing to enjoin state court proceedings arising out of the I950 South Amboy ammu-
nition explosion. 
u211 See note I4I7 supra. The mere showing of a multiplicity of actions was not 
sufficient grounds for equitable intervention at the time of adoption of the Federal Con-
stitution, so the objection may be constitutional as well as traditional. Ibid. 
1426 28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (a) (3) (I958). 
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the plaintiff sought to employ this device to bind all claimants to the 
findings made by the court in which the spurious class action was 
brought.1427 In addition to refusing to enjoin prosecution of the numer-
ous state actions already initiated, the court refused to permit its de-
cision to be binding on any claimant who had not expressly signified 
an intention to enter the suit.1428 Such a refusal appears to accord with 
previous interpretations of the meaning of a spurious class action judg-
ment.1429 It is thus evident that such a device is of extremely limited 
efficacy in the context of a nuclear incident, where the claimants' normal 
disposition will be to refrain from entering the class suit and where it 
is probable that numerous claimants can be neither served nor notified 
of the action. 
(3) Receivership 
The use of receivership proceedings by a lower Connecticut court 
to handle the problem of multiple claims arising from the Ringling 
Brothers, Barnum and Bailey circus fire in Hartford several years ago 
has received detailed consideration in a recent law review article.1430 
This procedural device was settled upon by agreement between defend-
ant circus and the prospective plaintiffs as an effective means of assur-
ing payment of the numerous claims asserted. The defendant waived all 
affirmative defenses, claims were submitted to arbitration, and the ar-
bitrators' findings were made binding upon the parties. The receiver-
ship order placed all of the defendant's prop~rty under the court's con-
trol, abating previous attachments and barring subsequent attachments. 
Court permission was required for suits against the receiver. Within 
six years following the disaster, this procedure resulted in the arbitra-
tion or settlement of every claim. 
Employment of a receiver in the mass tort context has little precedent 
in American law.1431 Two reasons are indicated for judicial reluctance 
to turn to this device. In the first place, the traditional but now gen-
1427 Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, supra note 1424, discussed at length in 
Comment, 63 Yale L. J. 493, 511 et seq. (1954). 
1428 Supra note 1424 at 90· 
1429 See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1T23.II [3] (2d ed. 1!)48). For the most recent 
case on this point, see Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 
1956). 
1430 Note, 6o Yale L. J. 1417 (1951). The facts surrounding settlement of the claims 
are drawn from this note, at 1418-20. 
us1 Receivership was permitted to handle tort claims arising from a hotel fire 
in Geele v. Willis, 203 Ga. 267, 46 S.E.2d 126 (1948). See Molner, supra note 1420. 
So far as the authors have determined, receivership has never been used in this con-
text in a federal court. 
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erally discredited view that a non-judgment creditor has no standing 
to ask for a receiver normally would appear to prevent a mere tort 
claimant from doing so.1432 Secondly, receiverships designed solely for 
moratorium purposes, abating the rights of creditors, are looked upon 
with disfavor.1488 Receivership is normally considered a remedy ancil-
lary to some other equitable proceeding, not an end in itself. The argu-
ment is made, however, that receivership may be peculiarly adapted to 
the solution of the mass tort problem, and that creditors would be aided 
rather than injured by the creation of a moratorium during which 
claims are adjusted by arbitration.14u 
By application of ejusdem generis to the phrase in Subsection I 7oe 
granting power to issue orders "appropriate for enforcement of the 
provisions of this section," 1485 one could further argue that the subsec-
tion permits the use of this procedural device. Such an interpretation 
no doubt would circumvent the traditional objection that a non-judg-
ment creditor cannot demand receivership since by Subsection 17oe the 
Commission or the indemnitee could so petition. Whether it would also 
circumvent the objection to the use of receivership except as an ancillary 
device is an open question. But even it be found that receivership was 
contemplated by Congress and that these problems are obviated, sub-
stantial judicial legislation would be necessary to impute sufficient 
powers to the district judge appointing the receiver to make the device 
effective. Receivership, by itself, does not accomplish consolidation. 
Without a power in the court to enjoin claimants from participating in 
actions against the receiver other than those brought in the federal 
district court having venue over the incident, the effectiveness of the 
device would be seriously curtailed. The Ringling Brothers receivership 
was created by common consent, and it was the accompanying arbitra-
tion provisions which gave real force to the centralized proceeding.m6 
Moreover, it must be noted that the principal feature favoring re-
ceivership in the mass tort context is that it permits continued operation 
us2 I Clark, Receivers 2IO el seq. (:zd ed. 1929). For a more recent discussion of 
the question with respect specifically to the power of a federal court, see Note, IO 
Stan. L. Rev. 361 (1958). 
usa Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334. 345, 52 S.Ct. 512 (1932). See 
also I Clark, Receivers 6o (2d ed. 1929). 
us• Note, 6o Yale L. J. 1417, 1422 (1951). 
us5 This appears to be the tacit assumption of a comment writer, who states that 
the subsection "suggests as a solution to these [claim administration problems arising 
under section 170] the use of a device akin to the equity receivership." Comment, 
56 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 768 (1958). 
usa See text following note 1466 infra. 
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of the defendant's business, which in turn permits greater likelihood 
that claims will be more promptly and fully paid. This feature probably 
would be of little significance in the event of a nuclear incident. In the 
latter case, a fund for the payment of claims theoretically is already 
available in the form of compulsory insurance and the indemnity fund. 
The existence of these funds and the limitation of liability above such 
amounts mean there is little justification for receivership as a guarantee 
for continued operation of the business. The only possible exception 
would be when, because of some exclusionary clause in the policy cover-
ing the incident, the insurer is not liable, and the company must then 
meet claims from its own assets up to the point where indemnification 
begins. 1437 
( 4) Consolidation 
The federal rules of civil procedure permit a federal court to order 
consolidation (in the technical sense) 1438 or joint hearing or trial of 
actions pending before it involving a common question of law or fact. 
This device, coupled with the pre-trial conference, has been used with 
considerable effectiveness in the district court on at least two occasions, 
the most recent of which involved claims arising from the sinking of 
the Italian liner, Andrea Doria.1489 But in both cases, the district court 
had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the multiple claims; in the Andrea 
Doria case, because of federal admiralty jurisdiction; 1440 in the other, 
because defendant was the federal government and could be sued only 
in the federal district court under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims 
1437 See text following note 1379 supra. 
1438 The term "consolidation" up to this point has been used in the broad sense, 
encompassing all of the various devices by which a court can .bring numerous claim-
ants before it in one action or group of actions. In its nariow construction, "con-
solidation" means the procedural device authorized by Rule 42(a) of the Federal 
Rules. See 28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a) (1958), which 
states : "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before 
the court, it may order joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the 
actions ; it may order all the actions consolidated ; and it may make such orders con-
cerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." 
1439 Clark v. United States, (D.C. Ore. 1952 13 F.R.D. 342) discussed at length in 
Comment, 63 Yale L. ]. 493, 517 et seq. (1954), involved some 3,000 damage claims 
for property loss from flooding for which the federal government was liable. Litiga-
tion ensuing from the sinking of the Andrea Doria is progressively described in The 
New York Times, beginning on August I, 1956. See particularly, N. Y. Times, Aug. 
9, 1956, p. 49, col. 2. 
1440 See Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§10-16 to 10-18 (1957), describing the court's 
power over other proceedings once the owner has petitioned for limitation. 
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Act.1441 In neither, therefore, was the injunction against concurrent state 
court proceedings a problem. Thus it is relatively clear that the unwill- · 
ingness or inability of federal district courts to enjoin state proceedings 
would render consolidation under the federal rules of little value in 
deciding claims arising from a nuclear incident, since potentially there 
is concurrent state court jurisdiction. Only those claims actually 
brought in federal courts would be subject to consolidation. 
( 5) Interpleader 
Another device which appears to have pertinence in the mass tort con-
text, but which clearly was not designed for such use, is the statutory bill 
in the nature of interpleader. Such a bill may be brought in any district 
court by a stakeholder having custody or possession of money or prop-
erty of the value of $500 or more when there is diversity of citizenship 
between two or more adverse claimants and when these claimants 
threaten to subject the stakeholder to multiple liability. This is federal 
statutory interpleader.1442 Each of the traditional obstacles to consoli-
dation is in great measure overcome by this relatively new device. Proc-
ess is expressly designed to run throughout the United States.1448 The 
federal code provisions authorize the district court to enter an order 
restraining all claimants from initiating or prosecuting any proceed-
ings in state or federal courts affecting the property. 1m Interpleader is 
an equitable action, and while there may continue to exist the accepted 
notion that actions involving negligence or similar conduct should be 
tried before a jury, there is no constitutional prohibition to trial of the 
factual issues by a judge when interpleader is brought.1u 5 
1441 6o Stat. 842 (1946); 28 U.S.C.A. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2404. 
2411, 2671-So (1950). 
1442 62 Stat. 931,936,970 (1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §§1335, 1397, 2361 (1950). This 
is the most recent of a series of federal interpleader statutes. Interpleader may also 
be accomplished in a suit based on the normal diversity of citizenship and amount in 
controversy rules. See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §551 
(1950). Statutory interpleader liberalizes the diversity rule by requiring diversity 
between "two or more claimants" only, whereas complete diversity is required in the 
non-statutory interpleader suit. See Note, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 1183 (1957). See gen-
erally 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §552 (1950). The 
statute further liberalizes the interpleader device with respect to range of process, 
jurisdictional amount, and power to enjoin other proceedings. See 3 Moore, Federal 
Practice fii[22.0I-22.og (2d ed. 1948). The statute is supplemented by 28 U.S.C.A., 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 (1958). 
1443 62 Stat. 970 (1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §2361 (1950). 
1444 Ibid. 
1445 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §555 (1950). 
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Interpleader in this statutory form would appear in general to pro-
vide an excellent foundation for settlement of claims arising from a nu-
clear incident. The minimum diversity requirement of the statute. 
almost certainly would be met, and even less question should be antici-
pated with respect to the jurisdictional amount of $so::>. Interpleader 
claims need not be in privity nor of an identical nature.1446 And a bill 
in the nature of interpleader under the statute does not carry with it a 
requirement, as in the traditional practice, that the stakeholder admit 
his liability and thus seek only a determination of the person or persons 
entitled to the fund. 1447 Thus the insurance group, who would be the 
most likely party to bring this type of bill, would be free to assert 
defenses to the indemnitee's liability, or to its own liability under the 
policy. 
Two requisites for the maintenance of the statutory action appear 
troublesome if interpleader in its strict sense is to be used in this con-
text. First, the adverse claims must expose the stakeholder to potential 
double or multiple liability, that is, the aggregate claims must appear 
to exceed that which will be available for their payment.1448 If it ap-
pears that damage or injury is caused only in a sum less than that for 
which the indemnitee has financial protection, interpleader apparently 
is not available-a serious limitation on the effectiveness of the device. 
If on the other hand, claims exceed both the insurance and indemnity 
funds, the incident would clearly appear appropriate for a bill in the 
nature of interpleader,1449 unless it should be argued that the limitation 
against any liability above financial protection requirements plus $500 
million makes it impossible to be subjected to multiple claims. 
In the case, however, where the claims total a sum more than the 
amount of financial protection carried, but less than the amount of total 
insurance plus indemnity, a second difficulty arises. It has been held 
(and probably quite properly) by a lower federal court that the United 
we 62 Stat. 931 (1948); 28 U.S.C.A. §1335(b) (1950). 
1447 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1[22.07 (2d ed. 1948). 
1448 /d. at 1!22.o8. The original use of statutory interpleader was to protect insurers 
who hold a fund being wholly claimed by two or more persons, as in Sanders v. 
Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 54 S.Ct. 677 (1934). It is recognized, how-
ever, that the requirement of multiple liability is also met if claims to only a part of 
the fund all total more than the fund itself. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1[22.o8 
(1948). 
1449 Note also, however, that as Subsection 17oe now reads, the district court hav-
ing venue apparently has no power at all in the event of a nuclear incident unless 
claims exceed both the insurance and the indemnity fund. See paragraph of text fol-
lowing note 1268 supra. 
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States under the statutory language may not act as interpleader plain-
tiff.1450 If this is so, then it would be possible that in the normal case, 
the sole interpleader plaintiff would be the insurer, and that at best the 
United States would be an intervenor defendant. One might argue, 
therefore, that the sole amount of money for which interpleader is 
brought is the insurance fund alone, and that the claims need only ag-
gregate an amount larger than this. On the other hand, the court might 
recognize that in substance, since the United States is a party to the 
action as intervenor, its judgment would have binding effect on the 
United States as well and therefore the presence of the indemnity fund 
also must be accepted. The court could thus conclude that the claims 
must aggregate more than both the insurance and the indemnity before 
interpleader could lie. 
These complications surely arise in part because interpleader was 
never designed for this type of situation. Either interpretation of the 
requirements of the statute will still mean that the device is of limited 
value in dealing with nuclear· incident claims. Indeed, the equitable bill 
of peace or even the declaratory judgment 1451 more closely resembles 
the desirable type of procedural device for the mass tort situation. But 
the liberalized aspects of interpleader-its broad range of process, the 
court's injtinctive power, and the absence of a jury trial requirement 
-are all essential for a really effective consolidation proceeding and are 
common to none of the other devices discussed above. 
(6) Federal Removal Power 
One final device by which consolidation conceivably might be effected 
in the mass tort situation is the use of federal removal power and the 
federal statutory successor to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
The Federal Judicial Code provides that: 
· {a) Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, any 
civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court 
of the United States for the district and division embracing 
the place where such action is pending. 
H 50 The interpleader statute is available by its terms only to "any person, firm, or 
corporation, association, or society." In United States v. Coumantaros, 146 F. Supp. 
51 (D.C. N.Y. 1956), the court held that the United States did not fall within this 
definition. 
uu See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 68 Stat. 89o (1954), 28 U.S.C.A. 
§§2201-2 (Supp. 1958). 
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(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be 
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of 
the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only 
if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served 
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought.1452 
On the face of the statute, defendants in actions brought in state 
courts, if they can demonstrate a federal question or diversity of cit-
izenship as a basis . for original federal judisdiction, are in a position 
to have the actio.ns removed to the federal district court. Thereupon, 
the more liberal provisions of statutory forum non conveniens 1453 in 
federal courts are potentially available, opening the way for drawing 
all actions into a single court. 
Let us examine this possibility more closely, beginning with the pro-
vision for removal where original jurisdiction is not based on a federal 
question. The statute states that such actions shall be removable only if 
none of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the action is 
brought. A recent change in the Judiciary Act expressly provides that 
for the purposes of this section, a corporation shall be deemed a citizen 
of any state by which it has been incorporated and of the state where it 
has its principal place of business.1454 This being the case, even though 
there is original jurisdiction based upon complete diversity of citizen-
ship among the parties to the action, if the defendant or any one of sev-
eral defendants is a corporation which is either incorporated in or has 
its principal place of business in the state where the action is brought, 
removal to the federal district court is impossible. Often this will be the 
precise situation if there is a "burn-up." Many reactors will be operated 
under license issued to private domestic corporations. The chances 
would appear great that the plaintiff would be forced to sue in a state 
where the defendant was incorporated or had his principal place of 
business. If a nuclear incident took place in Michigan, for example, and 
the defendant was incorporated or had his principal place of business 
14s228 U.S.C.A. §1441 (1950). 
1453 §1404 (a) of the Federal Judicial Code provides: "For the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any 
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." For 
thorough discussions of the pre-statutory federal forum non conveniens doctrine and 
its limitations, see Barrett, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens," 35 Calif. L. 
Rev. 38o (1947); Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum," 6o Harv. L. Rev. 
go8 (1947); Comment, 56 Yale L. ]. 1234 (1947). 
H 54 Pub. Law. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 ( 1958). 
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in Michigan, undoubtedly many Michigan plaintiffs would sue in the 
courts of that state. Under such circumstances the defendant would be 
powerless to remove to the federal courts. As indicated previously, a 
device by which less than all of the actions can be brought into one 
court is defective in the mass tort context.· It is to be doubted, therefore, 
that the non-federal question removal power is a practical basis for 
consolidation. 
Still a possibility, of course, is the removal power where the basis of 
original jurisdiction is that the action is "founded on a claim or right 
arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States . 
. . . " .Here, citizenship is ·irrelevant, so the basic question becomes 
whether an action brought in a state court against a defendant who is 
licensed, insured, and indemnified under the aegis of the indemnity 
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is one "founded on a 
claim or right arising under the ... laws of the United States." The 
interpretation of this phrase, as to whether a given suit is "founded" 
on .a federa] law,. forms a vast body of law in itsel£,1455 and a study 
thereof is beyond the scope of this presentation. Certain basic principles 
~re clear, however. First, the Supreme Court has decided that to be re-
movable a suit must involve a real and substantial dispute or contro-
versy, the resolution of which turns on the construction of a law of the 
United States.1456 A cause cannot be removed merely because it may 
become necessary to construe the laws of the United States. Rather the 
cause must be one the decision of which depends on such construction, 
i.e., the plaintiff's right to recovery stands upon federallaw.w7 Finally, 
it is the federal nature of the right to be established that is important 
for removal purposes, not the source of the authority to establish it. 1458 
The mere fact that a state establishes a right in an area which could be 
pre-empted by the federal government is no justification for saying the 
state-established right is "foun~ed" on federal law. 
The foregoing summarization of the federal-question removal juris-
diction is neither detailed nor specific; nevertheless it can serve as a 
general guide for our purposes here. It is safe to say that the basic right 
asserted by a plaintiff in the nuclear incident situation is a tort right 
created by state statutory or common law.1459 A federal license in the 
1455 See 2 Cycl. of Fed. Procedure §§3.22 et seq. (3d ed. 1951). 
1456 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ann Arbor R.R., 178 U.S. 239, 20 S.Ct. 867 
(1900); Williams v. 1st Nat!. Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 30 S.Ct. 441 (1910). 
1457 Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877). 
1458 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 53 S.Ct. 447 (1933). 
1459 See discussion in text, supra at notes 1401 ff. 
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hands of the reactor operator and insurance purchased under the fed-
eral financial protection requirements, while required by federal statute, 
have no direct bearing on establishing_ the state-created right. At most, 
the insurance enhances the insured's ability to respond in damages. It 
has no effect in most cases on the fact of liability, because the plaintiff's 
right is substantively affected only by the existence of the federal limi~ 
tation of liability provision. If total claims aggregate more than $560 
million (assuming maximum financial protection required), each plain-
tiff potentially can be prevented from full collection of his state judg-
ment. One could argue, of course, that this federal provision begins to 
operate only after the state right has been vindicated and judgment 
awarded, and therefore no federal question is raised before this time. 
Probably, however, a court would be willing to look through the form 
to the substance, saying that potentially each plaintiff's right is· dimin-
ished substantively by the federal provision. Then, of course, the ques-
tion of construction previously raised with respect to the exact opera-
tion of Section 17oe comes into play-and one can argue that the exte1:1t 
of the plaintiff's right turns on a federal statute. To succeed with this 
argument, however, the defendant would have to induce the Supreme 
Court to overrule those cases that clearly hold that a federal question 
defense does not make the case one involving federal question jurisdic-
tion.1660 The federal question must be the basis for the plaintiff's claim. 
Even if successful, which seems. unlikely, the argument is valid only 
when the total claims. aggregate more than the limitation level. Fre-
quently, indeed normally, this will not be the case. It is likely that a 
given court will refuse to look beyond the fundamental limitation of the . 
indemnity provision-that it only affects state remedies at the judg-
ment level. Likewise, removal jurisdiction is available only if the claim 
exceeds $Io,ooo,1481 and if a major reactor incident occurs it is likely 
that there will be thousands of claims for less than this amount. 
Even assuming that all suits brought by injured plaintiffs in state 
courts could be removed to a federal court on the ground of diversity 
of citizenship or federal question, twc;> difficulties of almost insurmount-
able proportions block effective consolidation of all claims. If the plain-
tiff brings his action where he was at the time of impact (the place of 
146D Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149. 29 S.Ct. 42 (1!)08) (Fed-
eral statute wiping out pass privileges previously contracted for used as a defense held 
not to be a federal question). And see similar concept applied in declaratory judg-
ment case, Skelley Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876 
(1950). 
ast §§1331, 1332 of Federal Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §§1331-2 (Supp. 1958). 
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injury), there would seem to be considerable doubt that a federal court 
would transfer the trial on the ground of a more convenient forum.1462 
This might be true also if the plaintiff shows nothing more than that he 
lives where he brought the action.1463 Perhaps more important is the 
fact that an action cannot be removed to a federal court and then the 
place of trial transferred on the basis of more convenient forum until 
the plaintiff chooses to start <!- suit. There is no way to force all poten-
tial plaintiffs to bring their actions within a given time so they all can 
be removed to the court of the federal district where the incident 
occurred. For all of these reasons we can only conclude that the re-
moval power will not be of service in connection with the mass tort liti-
gation resulting from a nuclear incident. 
One author has suggested the propriety and need for congressional 
legislation to deal with the mass tort problem, and we support the sug-
gestion with particular reference to nuclear incidents and Subsection 
· 17oe.1464 A statute is required which combines the best features of the 
bill of peace and the bill in the nature of interpleader, by which one 
who is threatened with suit by potentially numerous claimants can bring 
1462 The general theory of the federal transfer provision is that it codifies the old 
forum non conveniens doctrine and was not intended to give plaintiffs a better hunt-
ing license in shopping for a desirable district for trial. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 
181 F.2d 949 (2 Cir. 1950); noted 45 Ill. L. Rev. 676 (1950), 6o Yale L.J. 183 (1951). 
In accord, Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950). See also 
Kaufman, "Observations on Transfers under Sec. 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code," 
10 F.R.D. 595 (1951); Comment, "Limitations on the Transfer of Actions under the 
Judicial Code," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1347 (1951); Comment, "Change of Venue in Fed-
eral Courts under Section 1404-A of the New Judicial Code-Effect on Rights of the 
Parties," 2 Hastings L. J. 29 (1950). 
In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 75 S.Ct. 544 (1955), the Supreme Court 
held that the district courts in transfer cases could order transfer upon a lesser show-
ing of inconvenience by a defendant than would be required for dismissal under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Noted 55 Col. L. Rev. 1o67 (1955); 36 Bost. U. L. 
Rev. 127 (19s6); 41 Va. L. Rev. 813 (1955); 2 N.Y.L. For. 127 (1956). In this 
case the cas~ was transferred to the place where the three employees suing under the 
F.E.L.A. had been injured. This is a more appealing case for transfer than when the 
plaintiff brings suit where the injurious impact took effect as would likely be the 
case if there were a reactor "bum-up." 
1468 This was the rule under the forum non conveniens doctrine prior to enactment 
of §1404 (a) ; Braucher, supra note 1453 at 919-20; Barrett, supra note 1453 at 413. 
But see Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951). One of the plaintiffs in 
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1462, resided in the district in. which the suit 
was brought. This fact brought forth a sharp dissent. In any event, the appeal courts 
refuse to upset the trial judges' exercise of discretion unless a serious injustice results. 
Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1950); Moore, Commentary 
on the U. S. Judicial Code 210 (1949). 
1464 Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 493, 521-22 (1954). 
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a single action into which all claimants can be forced and by which they 
are all bound. It would appear that the desirability of individualized 
determinations of the liability relation between each claimant and the 
defendant is far outweighed by the factors of timeliness, equality, and 
efficiency that a centralized proceeding would bring. In short, Congress 
should modify Subsection I7oe to provide for an original bill in the 
federal district court having venue ov~r the incident, under which 
process would run throughout the United States, the court having the 
power to enjoin proceedings elsewhere, and the right to jury trial being 
discretionary with the judge, although this raises the problem of the 
constitutional right to jury trial in civil proceedings in federal courts.1465 
It should not be necessary that claims exceed the fund available, but 
only that the defendant will be subjected to a multiplicity of suits and, 
in the opinion of the court, the ends of justice will be served by con-
solidation. Only when this or a similar provision is enacted into law 
will Subsection I 7oe provide an adequate basis for the sa tis faction of 
nuclear incident claims. 
c. Administrative Detail 
Assume that the federal district court has discovered or been given 
a procedural device by which it can force substantially all of the injured 
parties to consolidate their claims: Although many administrative prob-
lems thus would be solved, others emerge. The court is confronted 
with the task of sorting out, evaluating, and satisfying the thousands 
of valid claims likely to arise from a nuclear disaster. The district 
judge, if possible, must seek further procedural tools at this stage to 
assist him in the administration of this enormous proceeding. Again 
there is some precedent in previous mass tort cases which may have ap-
plication to an action resulting from a nuclear incident, and the judge 
may also find additional assistance in the federal rules of civil procedure. 
(I) Arbitration 
Arbitration was used with considerable success in the R-ingling 
Brothers case, discussed above with respect to receivership.1466 The 
appointment of a receiver in that action was accompanied by an arbitra-
tion agreement, signed by the circus and most of the claimants, by the 
terms of which (I) the circus waived defenses of contributory negli-
gence, absence of negligence, or the statute of limitations; ( 2) the 
1465 Jacobs v. Ringling Bms., Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 141 Conn. 
86, 103 A.2d 8os (1954). See Note, 6o Yale L. J. 1417 (1951). 
1466 Supra note 1430 and accompanying text. 
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assets of the circus were released to the receiver; and (3) with certain 
minor exceptions, the award of the arbitration panel was made final. 
Additional provision was made for direct settlement of claims, with 
the arbitration panel having the right to supervise settlement of any 
claim in excess of $200. It further was agreed that successful claim-
ants were to be paid in periodic dividends from operational profits, in-
come tax refunds, and proceeds of insurance policies. 
While such a device would appear highly efficient as a means of proc-
essing claims, there are several serious limitations on its use in federal 
courts in the context of a nuclear incident. The first drawback is some-
what obvious; such arbitration agreements are by definition the product 
of consent. Local pressures, such as the obvious favor with which the 
Connecticut court and the local bar association looked upon arbitration 
in the Ringling Brothers case, strongly induced claimants to submit to 
arbitration.1467 These pressures might be absent in the event of a nu-
clear incident, particularly since damages are certain to be of a less lo-
calized nature in many instances. 
The probability, therefore, that a substantial majority of claimants 
would agree to arbitration is not great and is at best speculative. On 
the one hand, arbitration could be expected to insure more rapid settle-
ment of claims; but on the other, the claimants would lose the advan-
tage of jury trials. Wide geographical distribution of claimants and the 
fact that many potential claimants would not know at the time of recom-
mended arbitration that they had sustained injuries or the extent of 
those injuries further lessen the effectiveness of the arbitration device. 
In the Hartford disaster and in all other mass tort cases herein dis-
cussed, injuries were of such a nature that all claims were asserted with-
in a relatively short time. An arbitration agreement signed by less than 
all of the claimants has only limited value, and the fact that many claim-
ants will not know of their injuries probably will mean that consid-
erably fewer than all the claimants would be parties to the contract. 
A final difficulty with arbitration of claims in federal courts is the 
fact that the United States Arbitration Act apparently is restricted in 
scope to "transactions involving commerce" and "maritime transac-
tions." 1468 It is clear that a rather broad construction of the term 
1467 Note, 6o Yale L.]. 1417, 1419, n. 12 (1951). 
1468 61 Stat. 66g et seq. (1947); 9 U.S.C.A. §§1-14 (1953). The statute specifically 
empowers federal courts with respect to these transactions only, and it has been con-
cluded that although Congress could constitutionally extend the statute further, it did 
not do so. See Sturges & Murphy, "Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration 
under the United States Arbitration Act," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 58o, 585 et seq. 
(1952). 
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"commerce" would be required before one could conclude that the dis-
trict courts had the power under the statute to implement the arbitra-
tion process judicially. The authors have found no tort cases in which 
issues have been submitted to arbitration pursuant to the federal act. 
Further, it is to be doubted that a federal court would enforce an agree-
ment to arbitrate tort claims solely on the basis of its inherent equity 
powers, in view of the traditional doctrine that arbitration agreements 
are both revocable and non-enforceable unless a statute dictates other-
wise.ue9 
(2) Pre-Trial Conference 
Advantageous use of this simplification device in mass tort litigation 
was illustrated in Clark v. United States,1410 a case in which consolida-
tion of all claims was possible because all the actions were against the 
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court insured 
complete claimant participation in the proceeding by waiting until the 
statute of limitations had run before beginning hearings. Under the 
close supervision of the district court, numerous pre-trial conferences 
were then held for the purpose of drafting a definitive pre-trial order 
as a basis for the simplification of the issues of liability. Twenty cases 
eventually were selected for trial at a final conference between the gov-
ernment and claimant's attorneys, arid at the same time a final pre-trial 
order was submitted to the court. Counsel for claimants whose causes 
were not selected for trial were directed to submit proposed definitive 
pre-trial orders of their own, or to agree of record to abide by the order 
for the selected cases. After careful review of its terms through the 
submission of briefs by the parties, the district court ultimately. gave 
final approval to a binding pre-trial order framing all the issues of fact 
and law in the case. 
So employed, the pre-trial conference with its resulting order is a 
powerful weapOn for simplification of mass tort litigation. The real 
questions of fact and law at issue are brought out forcefully in the 
candid atmosphere that can characterize such a proceeding. Stipula-
tions among parties as to agreed facts are encouraged, and without a 
doubt, the frank airing of issues provides an excellent opportunity for 
initiation of settlement discussions.1411 Particularly where the only real 
U 69 I d. at 587. 
HTO Supra note 1439. For a discussion of the procedures followed, see Comment, 
63 Yale L. J. 493, 517-18 ( 1954). 
1471 See Murrah, "Pre-Trial Procedure, A Statement of Its Essentials," 14 F.R.D. 
417, 418 ( 1953). This paper was prepared for use by federal district judges seeking 
to work under Federal Rule 16. The rule states: "In any action, the court may in 
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controversy is over the extent of claimants' injuries, the pre-trial con-
ference can easily become the most satisfactory forum for the satisfac-
tion of claims. It was in this fashion that hundreds of claims arising 
from the sinking of the Andrea Doria were settled and paid in less than 
a year.1472 A district court finding itself able to consolidate claims 
arising from a nuclear incident almost certainly would wish to make 
extensive use of this device for rapid, reasonable satisfaction of claims. 
In this regard, however, Subsection 17oh of the Andet:son amend-
ment introduces a complication. There it is provided that, as a term of 
each indemnity agreement, when the AEC determines that the govern-
ment probably will have' to make payments under the indemnity agree-
_ment, the Commission "shall collaborate with any person indemnified 
and may approve the payment of any claim under the agreement of 
indemnification, appear thr~ugh the Attorney Genera,) on behalf of the 
person indemnified, take charge of such action, and settle or defend 
any such action." 1478 The Commission is further given the authority 
"on behalf of the United States to settle or approve the settlement of 
any such claim on a fair and reasonable basis with due regard for the 
purposes of this Act." uH The Joint Committee report indicates that 
its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference 
to consider (I) The simplification of the issues; (2) The necessity or desirability of 
amendments to the pleadings; (3) The poss.ibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of 
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof; (4) The limitation of the number of 
expert witnesses; (5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master 
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; (6) Such other 
matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. The court shall make an order 
which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the plead-
ings; and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and 
which liinits the issues 'for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements 
of counsel ; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, 
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice .... " 28 U.S.C.A., Federal 
Rules of ·civil Procedure, 16 (1950). 
u12 See reference to Andrea Doria settlements, note 1439 supra. 
u1s The full text of Subsection 17oh is as follows : "The agreement of indemnifica-
tion may contain such terms as the Commission deems appropriate to carry out the 
purposes of this section. Such agreement shall provide that, when the Commission 
makes a ·determination that the United States will probably be required to make in-
dentnity payments under this section, the Commission shall collaborate with any per-
son indemnified and may approve the payment of any claim under the agreement of 
indemnification, appear through the Attorney General on behalf of the person indem-
nified, take charge of such action, and settle or defend any such action. The Com-
Inission shall have final authority on behalf of the United States to settle or approve 
the settlement of any such claim on a fair and reasomible basis with due regard for 
the purposes of this Act. Such settlement may include reasonable expenses in con-
nection with the claim incurred by the person indemnified." 
HH Ibid. The indemnity agreement proposed by the AEC provides in this respect 
that the "Commission shall have the right ... to require the prior approval of the 
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this latter authority is given the Commission so that it will not be bound 
by legal technicalities "such as rules of legal proof in a situation in 
which the courts have not yet had a chance to establish new rules for 
new problems arising from radiation." 1475 
The problems that lurk in this rather remarkable provision are 
myriad. While the Commission's powers under the subsection are ap-
parently restricted to settlement of claims against the indemnity fund,_ 
it would appear as a practical matter that separation of claims against 
the insurer and the indemnitor is impossible, particularly when Sub-
section 17oe appears to contemplate apportionment of claims among the 
entire fund of insurance plus indemnity. Cali it be that Congress in-
tended two apportionments: first, payment by the insurer of those legal 
liabilities which are established against the insurance fund; and then 
second, payment through settlement or otherwise by the government of 
"fair and reasonable" claims out of the indemnity fund, whether or not 
the insurer's legal liability therefor has been established? This is 
certainly a curious, cumbersome process. But if this is not what Con-
gress intended, then the insurers undoubtedly are laboring under the 
misapprehension that they will be liable for payment only when such 
liability is established in a court of record under legal rules, albeit 
"new," or in the alternative, when they themselves decide that settlement 
is the more intelligent course. If the Commission can tell the insurers 
when and for how much to settle, then really an insurance policy con-
taining conditions and exclus~ons is little· more than a pious gesture. 
Also illusory would be the hope that the insurer's liability would be 
based on legal doctrine, except to the extent that legal doctrine may ac-
cord with the Commission's notion of what is "fair and reasonable.'' 
Commission for the settlement or payment of any claim . . . and . . . take charge 
of such action and settle or defend such action." Proposed 10 C.F.R. §140.76, 23 Fed. 
Reg. 6682, 6683 ( 1958). 
1475 Joint Committee Report 23. The report also states that this authority is given 
to the Commission so that its settlements need not "wait for an action to go to final 
judgment but can be settled when it seems fair and reasonable." Ibid. One can easily 
see the dilemma that this provision brings to the district court judge having venue. 
He is empowered to limit liability and make the other orders specified in Subsection 
17oe only when it appears that claims will exceed the combined funds. With the gov-
ernment settling state actions even before they come to trial, it is almost impossible for 
him to know whether claims are actually "sufficient" to empower him. Assuming that 
the government does settle many claims before state judgments are rendered (even so, 
sufficient claims go to judgment that they aggregate more than the insurance and in-
demnity fund), does an apportionment by the district court require those with whom 
the government settled to refund part of their payment? Or is the amount of indem-
nity reduced by the settlements made, and therefore apportionment is only necessary 
among those claims which go to judgment? 
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Perhaps this interpretation would also result m significant changes 
being made in state substantive tort rules. 
One possible interpretation of this subsection is that it is merely 
designed to place final authority in the Commission, among govern-
ment agencies, to establish the government's position on each claim. 
This would not necessarily mean that the Commission's authority was 
final with respect to the insurer or indemnitee. So restricted, the sub-
section would pose less of a problem, although certainly in any case in 
which the decision as to settlement is to be made by more than one 
agency, there will always be differences of opinion. But so to restrict 
the subsection is to ignore much of its language and much of the lan-
guage of the Joint Committee report. Oarification of Congress' posi-
tion in this respect is certainly in order, for undoubtedly the settlement 
process will be extremely important in the event of a nuclear disaster. 
(3) Reference to a Master 
One of the appropriate issues for discussion at a pre-trial conference 
under the federal rules is the advisability of preliminary reference to a 
master for findings to be used in evidence when trial is to be by jury.1476 
The purpose of such reference is the simplification of complex evidence 
for the jurors, and the master's report, while. not conclusive, appears as 
strong and impartial evidence for them to weigh with whatever testi-
mony is introduced by the parties at tl,le trial. Good practice would 
seem to support the use of a master in a jury case where it is necessary 
to introduce technical, scientific, and medical data in order to show the 
fact and extent of indemnitee's liability to various claimants allegedly 
suffering radiation injury.1477 
If, however, the proceeding in which claims are to be satisfied is of 
a non-jury variety, the possibility of reference to a master is consider-
ably less. Rule 53 of the federal rules provides that in these cases a 
reference is to be made "only upon a showing that some exceptional 
condition requires it." u 78 It is clear that the mere fact of a crowded 
docket is not sufficient ground for reference.1479 The court may be able 
1476 28 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16(5) (1950). 
1477 "A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions 
to be tried by a jury, reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; 
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, a reference shall be 
made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." 28 U.S.C.A., 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53(b) (1950). "Complicated" jury cases in which 
reference has been allowed are listed in 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1Ts3.05[2] (2d ed. 
1948). 
H7B See Federal Rule 53(b), supra note 1477. 
1479 McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634, 6o S.Ct. 703 (1940). 
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to show, on the other hand, that speCialized training on the part of the 
master in the field of radiation injury makes him peculiarly suited for a 
preliminary hearing of claims arising from a nuclear incident.1480 If 
such a justification is possible, then, of course, the court will be spared 
the task of holding full individual hearings on each claim. Perhaps 
the most desirable procedure that a court could follow would be to ap-
point a master to hear matters of damage or injury after pre-trial con-
ferences have been held on the issue of liability. The chance of rapid 
settlement for just amounts would appear excellent should such a course 
be followed. 
As with the question of possible consolidation, there is little guidance 
in Subsection I 70e for a federal district court called upon to deal with 
these basic problems of administration. While undoubtedly consider-
ably more latitude should be left to the judge in these matters than in 
the issue of deciding upon a consolidation device, yet the Atomic 
Energy Act or regulations promulgated thereunder at least should pro-
vide a framework for a claims proceeding. As Subsection 170e now 
reads, there is no indication of· the nature of the action in which the 
enumerated orders are to be granted, or the manner in which adjudi-
cated claims actually are to be paid. Such procedural details are easily 
specified and should not be left to judicial invention. 
4. Conclusion 
The government indemnity provisions found in the 1957 enactment 
badly need some clarifying amendments. This should be d_one im-
mediately, before more reactors are put into operation, since a reactor 
incident, should it occur, could cause enough datnage to bring the in-
demnity provisions into play. 
The form of insurance policy as approved by the AEC should be 
changed in at least one respect ; liability from all operations during 
the time the policy is in effect should be covered so as to give protection 
commensurate with the applicable statute of. limitations, and not be 
arbitrarily limited to two years after the policy is cancelled. This means 
that most radiation injuries will not be covered because they often are 
delayed more than two years after irradiation. The only alternative is 
to allow the possibility of immediate recovery for future injuries. As 
pointed out in the previous discussion of such damages, this is far from 
Hso See 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1T53.05[2] (2d ed. 1948) for cases in which refer-
ence has been made when trial was to be before the court without a jury. See also 
Kaufman, "Masters in the Federal Courts," 58 Col. L. Rev. 452, 455 ( 1958). 
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satisfactory so long as present compensation methods are used.1481 If 
the approved policy is not changed, the question then is posed as to 
whether legal liability will be indemnified by the government for the 
whole amount beginning with the first dollar not covered by the ap-
proved policy or whether the indemnitee will have to stand the losses. 
It can be argued that the indemnitee will have satisfied the financial 
protection requirement by taking out insurance under an approved 
policy and that the government must step in where the insurance policy 
ceases to protect. This will mean that much of the private insurance 
coverage is illusory even though very high premiums have been paid 
for it. Congress should answer this question specifically. 
us1 Supra discussion at Section B 5 c (4) (a). 
Chapter IV 
STRICT LIABILITY FOR RADIATION INJURIES* 
A. Introduction and Historical Background 
Strict liability for all damages inflicted by one person upon another 
was anciently the rule of the common law. Every man was held re-
sponsible for the consequences of his acts, however reasonable he may 
have been and however carefully he may have performed his tasks. 
In the beginning this doctrine was apparently applied by the courts 
principally if not exclusively to trespasses commited by the defendant's 
domesticated animals upon the adjoining land of a neighbor. Strict 
liability was imposed in such instances on the ground that owners of ad-
joining land owed the mutual obligation to save each other's property 
from harm caused by such incursions upon it. Even today, apart from 
statutory provisions to the contrary, such strict liability is the rule in 
most of the courts of the United States as regards animals that are likely 
to stray and do damage to others. Some of the western states have re-
jected the idea because of their range grazing needs, and statutes now 
very generally cover the field. 
Likewise something approaching strict liability was imposed by the 
early common law for injuries caused by fire escaping from the premises 
of a landholder to those of his neighbors. This harsh result was, how-
ever, mitigated in England by a statutory provision enacted in 1707/ to 
the effect that no action should be maintained against one whose build-
ing or estate caught fire accidentally, although liability was imposed 
for negligence and for intentional acts. This early English statute was 
carried to this country as part of the common law and was taken over 
by the courts on this side of the Atlantic. Our courts have consistently 
held in the absence of legislation that there is no liability for the escape 
of fire if the defendant was not negligent or guilty of an intentional 
wrong.2 
These early doctrines of strict liability and those related to them ap-
* The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Rinaldo L. Bianchi, 
John W. Birchall, and Mrs. Mimica Janez, Graduate Research Assistants, University 
of Michigan Law School, and E. B. Stason, Jr., in connection with his LLM degree 
program at the University of Harvard Law School. 
1 6 Anne c. 31, 1[6, as amended by 10 Anne c. 14, 1[1, and 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, 1[86. 
2 See Prosser, Torts 327 (2d ed. 1955). 
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plied in other areas of the law did not derive from deep moral principle; 
instead the law was occupied principally with the very practical prob-
lem of keeping peace between individuals. To that end it provided a 
judicial remedy that would be accepted by the people in place of self help 
or private vengeance. Moral bases of the law were a later development. 
With the lapse of time and by the process of evolution, as growing 
moral consciousness in the community made itself felt, the courts moved 
away from the cruder methods of early complete liability toward the 
more discriminating rule of equating legal liability in tort with conduct 
which would not be expected of a worthy member of the community. 
Accordingly, two types of conduct were in general found to involve such 
a degree of moral or social fault as to make the actions unworthy in 
the eyes of the law ; first, conduct intended to invade the legally protected 
interests of others and; second, conduct which created an unreasonable 
risk to such interest, i.e., negligence. 
As Lord McMillan stated it in the recent and important English case, 
Read v. The Lyons Company, Ltd.: 
The process of evolution has been from the principle that every 
man acts at his peril and is liable for all the consequences of 
his acts to the principle that a man's freedom of action is sub-
ject only to the obligation not to infringe any duty of care 
which he owes to others. The emphasis formerly was on the 
injury sustained and the question was whether the case fell 
within one of the accepted classes of common law actions; the 
emphasis now is on the conduct of the person whose act has 
occasioned the injury and the question is whether it can be 
characterised as negligent. I do not overlook the fact that 
there is at least one instance in the present law in which the 
primitive rule survives, namely, in the case of animals ferae 
naturae or animals mansuetae naturae which have shown 
dangerous proclivities. The owner or keeper of such an animal 
has an absolute duty to confine or control it so that it shall 
not do injury to others and no proof of care on his part will 
absolve him from responsibility. 8 
Accordingly the law became so shaped that unless a man were guilty 
of "a fault" in the sense indicated he would not be compelled to respond 
in damages for injuries resulting from his acts. 
There has, however, developed in the latter part of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries stiJJ a new direction in the law of civil liability; that 
is, a limited though more sophisticated return to "liability without 
8 [1946] :z All. E. R. 471 at 476. 
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fault," at least without fault in the ordinary sense, unless the term be 
broadly defined to include ultrahazardous activities. 
Following the lead of an 1868 English decision in the case of Rylancfts 
v. Fletcher • a modern doctrine of strict liability has been enunciated 
and applied to certain types of activities which may, in general, be 
loosely characterized by the phrase "ultrahazardous in nature." The 
application of this doctrine to particular fact situations is quite unclear 
for it depends not only upon potentialities for harm, but also upon such 
vague and intangible considerations as social utility, the nature of the 
location, common usage within the area, and other related factors. 
The twentieth century development of the Rylands v. Fletcher doc-
trine is of substantial concern to the atomic energy industry, for it 
would seem that certain segments of that industry will in all probability 
become subject to its financial burdens although certain other segments 
may be dealt with under conventional negligence doctrines. Or, on the 
other hand, some parts of the new industry may follow the course de-
veloped in connection with damages occasioned by fire, for in many re-
spects fire is a predecessor of atomic energy. If this parallelism should 
prove to be appealing, atomic energy may in the initial stages of its use 
be held subject to absolute liability, in some of its applications at least, 
although social utility and community needs may, in the more distant 
future, bring about through statutory means a change in the theory of 
liability to one less drastic in nature. 
At all events we shall find ourselves, in discussing the question of tort 
liability of atomic enterprise, facing the full circle of historical develop-
ment starting from ancient strict liability, continuing through the Vic-
torian doctrines of negligence, and now back again to strict liability.6 
B. Current Common Law Principles in General 
As the peaceful uses of atomic energy become more and more com-
monplace, we shall find it necessary to deal increasingly with the prob-
lems of civil liability for the very simple reason that, notwithstanding 
all of the care that will be exercised, injuries due to overexposure to 
radiation will occur in ever increasing numbers. For practical purposes 
there are three principal theories of liability demanding consideration 
in this connection: negligence, nuisance, and strict liability, the latter 
sometimes called liability without fault. 
• 3 Hurl. and C. 774 (1865); L. R. I Exch. 265 (1866); L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). 
s For further development of the historical background of strict liability, see Prosser, 
Torts 315 (2d ed. 1955), and 2 Harper & James, Torts 785 (1956). 
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Negligence has been defined as conduct which involves an unreason-
ably great risk of causing harm to others, or, in different words, conduct 
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of 
others against unreasonably great risk of harm. Conduct falls short 
o{ this standard when the individual against whom the charge is ad-
vanced has failed to act as the reasonable man of ordinary prudence 
would act under similar circumstances. The standard is an objective one 
rather than one based upon the individual judgment of any particular 
person. Negligence, as a legal basis for imposing liability, emerged as a 
judicial doctrine after the Industrial Revolution. It constituted a de-
parture from the more primitive concepts of the earlier common law. 
Over the last century or more it has developed into a widespread and 
omnipresent theory of liability applicable to most forms of human ac-
tivity and enterprise. 
Nuisance, or at least "private nuisance," according to Dean Prosser 
is "a term applied to unreasonable interference with the interest of an 
individual in the use or enjoyment of land." He further states that the 
interference "may be intentional, or negligent, or may result from an ab-
normally dangerous activity for which strict liability is imposed. It must 
result from conduct of the defendant which is found to be unreasonable 
in the light of its utility and the harm or risk which results." 8 
Not all authorities in the law of torts agree with Dean Prosser in his 
definition of nuisance. For example, Professor Warren Seavey argues 
that the term "nuisance" should not be deemed to refer to the fact of 
interference with the land of another but to the nature of the defend-
ant's conduct which causes the interference. He places emphasis not 
only upon the conduct of the defendant but also he would require unlaw-
fulness ; that is, to be a nuisance there must be a tortious or criminal act 
interfering with the use of the land of another. 7 
However, regardless of definitions given by commentators, the term 
"nuisance" is in fact widely used by the courts in rendering judgments 
for damages in situations not too far removed from those which may 
and probably will in due course arise out of peaceful utilization of atomic 
energy. Nuisance, therefore, must be taken into account as a possible 
theory of liability applicable to this new field. 
The third theory demanding consideration is so-called strict liability, 
e Prosser, Torts 389 (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1955). 
7 See Seavey, "Nuisance, Contributory Negligence, and Other Mysteries," 65 Harv. 
L. Rev. 984 (1952). The Restatement of Torts follows Prosser rather than Seavey; 
see 4 Restatement, Torts, S~ope Note to Ch. 40 (1939). We shall deal more fully 
with this matter later in this chapter. 
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sometimes referred to as liability without fault. As previously noted 
there is a new direction in the evolution of the law, a change from the 
course of development which limited liability in tort to acts involving 
fault of the defendant, and a movement, in certain areas in any event, 
toward developing a policy of imposing liability without regard to such 
fault. This is particularly the case when injuries arise out of activities 
involving unusual danger to persons and property in the community. 
It is possible to argue, in support of strict liability as a mere extension 
of negligence, that the actor who carries on a dangerous activity in a 
community under such circumstances that harm is likely to be inflicted 
upon other persons is by virtue of that fact alone guilty of committing 
a fault. Or, on the other hand, one can say, as courts have frequently 
said, that the person who carries on such activities should be obliged to 
pay (as a matter of proper social distribution of the loss) the damages 
resulting therefrom, that is, to "pay his way." The social expediency of 
this development in the law has been favorably commented upon by cer-
tain authorities writing recently on the law of torts. Professors Fowler 
Harper and Fleming James, Jr., have written: 
There is a growing belief, however, that in this mechanical age 
the victims of accidents can, as a class, ill afford to bear the 
loss; that the social consequences of uncompensated loss are of 
far greater importance than the amount of the loss itself; and 
that better results will come from distributing such losses 
among all the beneficiaries of the mechanical process than by 
letting compensation tum upon an inquiry into fault. 8 
In specific reference to atomic energy injuries, Dean Prosser, writing 
in 1955, offered this observation: 
The first case involving damage from the escape of radia-
tion from the use of atomic energy has yet to reach the courts. 
When it does, it is not difficult to predict that there is no court 
which will refuse to apply to it the principle of strict liability 
found in the cases which follow Rylands v. Fletcher.9 
In this chapter we shall explore with considerable detail the doctrines 
to which Professors Harper, James, and Prosser refer, namely, the 
doctrines stemming from Rylands v. Fletcher and involving this modem 
trend toward liability without fault. It is this trend and these doctrines 
with which atomic energy users and their insurance carriers will be 
chiefly concerned. We shall also concern ourselves with the possible ap-
82 Harper & James, Torts 794-795 (1956). 
o Prosser, Torts 336 (2d ed. 1955). 
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plications of nuisance doctrines to activities involving peaceful utiliza-
tion of atomic science. In other words, in this chapter all phases of 
liability imposed upon operators of equipment containing radiation 
sources except liability founded upon negligence, will be discussed. 
C. Strict Liability Under the Doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher-The 
English Decisions 
We will now proceed to examine the current theory of strict liability 
employed in common law jurisdictions as derived from the English case 
of Rylands v. Fletcher. The case was decided by the House of Lords in 
1868, and, although it is now ninety years of age, its value as a prece-
dent seems to grow with time. It is a part of a modern trend toward 
strict liability. In the United States especially, it has become a very 
broadly ranging and even severe doctrine in some of its applications. 
In Rylands v. Fletcher a mill owner built a water reservoir on his own 
land over an abandoned mine shaft that, unknown to him, connected 
with a mine located on the plaintiff's adjoining premises. The water 
accumulated in the reservoir and thereafter escaped into and through 
the abandoned shaft and thence into the plaintiff's workings. Damage 
resulted and the plaintiff brought suit. Neither negligence, nuisance, 
nor trespass was claimed or found to exist. 
In the lower court (Exchequer Chamber) Justice Blackburn found 
the defendant liable though without fault. He stated the rule of the case 
in these often quoted words : 
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who 
for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps 
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it 
in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence 
of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the 
escape was owing to the plaintiff's fault; or perhaps that the 
escape was the consequence of a vis major, or the act of God.10 
This decision was affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords, but 
some important limiting qualifications were added to the doctrine of the 
case as stated by Justice Blackburn. Specifically a requirement of "non-
natural user" of the defendant's land was added. The court, Lord Cairns 
speaking, said : 
[I] f, in what I may term the natural user of that land, 
there had been any accumulation of water, ... and if, by the 
to Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R., I Exch. 265, 279-28o (1866). 
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operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water 
had passed off into the close occupied by. the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff could not have complained. . . . 
* * * * * 
On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the 
natural use of their close, had desired to use it for any purpose 
which I may term a non-natural use ... and if in conse-
quence . . . the water came to escape and to pass off into the 
close of the Plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the 
Defendants were .doing they were doing at their own peril.u 
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The court did not specifically limit the rule of the case to damage in-
flicted on adjoining land but, on the contrary, as it was stated, it could 
readily be made applicable to personal injuries as well. That aspect of 
the decision has subsequently been given judicial consideration in 
England with results that we shall presently note. 
In accordance with these pronouncements, therefore, three important 
limitations appear in respect to the application of the Rylands doctrine; 
namely, ( 1) liability is imposed only in case of bringing and maintain-
ing on to the land a dangerous substance likely to cause mischief if it 
escapes, ( 2) this activity must constitute a "non-natural use" of the land, 
and (3) there must be an "escape" that causes damage. These limita-
tions create great uncertainty in the application of the doctrine to other 
situations. 
In regard to the first point, i.e., the dangerous quality of the s-ubstance 
or instrumentality, Dr. Stallybrass reached the conclusion, after an ex-
tensive examination of all of the English decisions down to the time of 
writing in 1929, that the application of the doctrine rests upon a principle 
of relativity. He wrote that "just as there is nothing which is at all 
times and in all circumstances dangerous so it seems that there is scarcely 
anything which is in all circumstances safe." 12 He elaborates the princi-
ple in the following language: 
The principle of law behind all these cases is, it is submitted, 
that if a man takes a risk, which he ought not to take without 
also taking upon his shoulders the consequences of that risk, 
he shall pay for any damage that ensues. 
In every case the question really is : Was the risk one which 
the defendant was entitled to take only on condition of paying 
compensation to those injured thereby irrespective of any 
negligence on his part? And the answer to that question will 
11 Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R., 3 H. L. 330, 338-339 (1868). 
12 Stallybrass, "Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land," 3 Carob. 
L.J. 376, 387 (1929). 
642 TORT LIABILITY 
not depend upon whether the thing in question was dangerous 
per se, but upon whether it was dangerous in the circumstances 
of the particular case.13 
In short, if the defendant brings a substance on his land which in-
volves an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property in the 
vicinity, he falls within the doctrine of the Rylands case. It is obvious 
that application to specific situations will present difficulties. 
Moreover, there is serious uncertainty in connection with the ap-
plication of the term "non-natural user." The court's opinion in the_ 
Rylands case offered no assistance, and the problem of determining 
when a given user is non-natural persists to this day. The words have 
now become "terms of art," and the courts have indicated that they are 
susceptible to change as the world becomes more crowded, and as in-
dustry becomes more complex. The doctrine has been said to be con-
fined to activities which are "extraordinary" or "abnormal." It does 
not apply to "usual," "ordinary," and "normal" types of activity. It has 
also been said that "the reasonable use of property in the way most 
beneficial to the community" is not deemed to be a "non-natural use" 
so as to render the actor subject to strict liability.14 
Forty-five years after Rylands v. Fletcher was decided the case of 
Rickards v. Lothian came before the English courts. That case, some-
what like Rylands, involved an overflow of water on an upper floor 
damaging plaintiff's stock in trade stored below. Recovery, sought on 
the basis of the Rylands case, was denied, however. The court said: 
The provision of a proper supply of water to the various 
parts of a house is not only reasonable, but has become, in ac-
cordance with modern sanitary views, an almost necessary 
feature of town life .... in some form or another it is 
usually made obligatory in civilized countries. Such a supply 
cannot be installed without causing some concurrent danger of 
leakage or overflow. It would be unreasonable for the law 
to regard those who instal or maintain such a system of supply 
as doing so at their own peril. 
* * * * * 
It is not every use to which land is put that brings into play 
that principle [namely the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher]. It 
must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to 
others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or 
such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the com-
munity.15 
18 !d. at 387, 388. 
14 Bramwell, ]., in Nichols v. Marsland, L. R ro Exch. 255, 259 (1875). 
15 [1913] A. c. 263, 2&>-282. 
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It is clear, then, that not only the character of the activity but also the 
place and manner in which it is carried on are pertinent to the classifica-
tion of the function as a non-natural user or otherwise. 
In accordance with the foregoing principles, the English courts have 
applied the strict liability doctrine in a considerable variety of cases in-
volved in some seventy English decisions. They have applied it against 
defendants who collected water in large quantity in hydraulic power 
mains; who operated a plant for washing film in close proximity to the 
plaintiff's land; who stored illuminating gas in quantity; who conducted 
high voltage electricity in the public streets; who operated a traction 
engine with the fire under its boiler shooting out sparks along the high-
way; who operated a ten-ton traction engine too heavy for the highway; 
who stored large quantities of explosives, or inflammable liquids; who 
engaged in blasting or accumulating sewage; who maintained a facility 
involving the emission of creosote fumes; or who operated a pile driver 
which caused excessive vibration. All of these have been deemed "non-
natural users" for which strict liability ensued. On the other hand, 
maintaining water in a cistern, or in household pipes, or household gas 
or electricity supply, or fire in a fireplace, or driving automobiles on the 
highways are customary uses for which strict liability does not apply.18 
In respect to the requirement of "escape" of a dangerous substance 
from the defendant's premises, the recent English case of Read v. The 
Lyons Company, Ltd.11 may well exert considerable influence upon 
American courts in further evolution of the American doctrines of strict 
liability. The cause of action arose during World War II as a result of 
an accident in defendant's ordnance factory. The plaintiff, an employee 
of the Ministry of Supply, was on the premises as a shell inspector, and 
she was injured by the explosion of a shell. The issue was briefly sum-
marized by Lord Porter who asked : 
Are the occupiers of a munitions factory liable to one of those 
working in that factory who is injured in the factory itself by 
an explosion occurring there without any negligence on the 
part of the occupiers or their servants? 18 
A claim of strict liability was advanced by the plaintiff but without suc-
cess. Said Viscount Simon, one of the judges : 
The fact that the work that was being carried on was of a kind 
which requires special care is a reason why the standard of 
1 6 For a citation of the many English cases, see Prosser, Torts 329, 330 (2d ed. 
1955). 
17 Supra note J. 
18 I d. at 478. 
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care should be high, but it is no reason for saying that the 
occupier is liable for resulting damage to an invitee without 
any proof of negligence at alP' 
On the question of "escape" Viscount Simon commented : 
The first essential condition of "escape" does not seem to me 
to be present at all. "Escape," for the purpose of applying the 
proposition in Rylands v. Fletcher means escape from a place 
which the defendant has occupation of, or control over, to a 
place which is outside his occupation or control. 20 
Lord McMillan also participated in the court's opinion. He commented 
both on "escape" and also on "non-natural user" as follows : 
The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, as I understand it, 
derives from a conception of the mutual duties of adjoining or 
neighboring landowners. . . . The two prerequisites of the 
doctrine are that there must be the escape of something from 
one man's close to another man's close and that that which 
escapes must have been brought on the land from which it 
escapes in consequence of some non-natural use of that land 
whatever precisely that may mean. Neither of these features 
exists in the present case. I have already pointed out that 
nothing escaped from the defendant's premises, and, were it 
necessary to decide the point, I should hesitate to hold that in 
these days and in ari industrial community it was a non-natural 
use of land to build a factory on it and conduct there the manu-
facture of explosives. I could conceive it being said that to 
carry on the manufacture of explosives in a crowded urban 
area was evidence of negligence; but there is no such case 
here.21 
Lord Simonds who also wrote an opinion mentioned the rule set forth 
in the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, reference to which 
will be made later in this chapter, to the effect that "ultra-hazardous 
activities" should carry with them the doctrine of strict liability. He 
rejected both the Restatement rule and other American strict liability 
doctrines in the following language: 
Somewhere the line must be drawn unless full rein be given 
to the doctrine that a man acts always at his peril. . . . I 
speak with all deference of modern American textbooks and 
judicial decisions, but I think little guidance can be obtained 
from the way in which this part of the common law has de-
veloped on the other side of the ocean.22 
19 /d. at 473· 
zo /d. at 474-
21 /d. at 477. 
22 /d. at 48I. 
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In regard to liability of persons on the defendant's premises, Lord 
Simonds concluded : 
I would reject the idea [of the Restatement] that, if a man 
carries on a so-called ultra-hazardous activity on his premises, 
the line must be drawn so as to bring him within the limit of 
strict liability for its consequences to all men everywhere. On 
the contrary, I would say that his obligation to those lawfully 
on his premises is to be ultra-cautious in carrying on his ultra-
hazardous activity, but that it will still be the task of the in-
jured person to show that the defendant owed him a duty of 
care and did not fulfil it. It may well be that in the discharge 
of that task he will sometimes be able to call in aid the maxim 
res ipsa loquitur. 28 
It should not be assumed, however, from the above quotations that 
the English courts apply the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher only to 
injuries to land. It is true that most of the seventy decisions involve 
such injuries, and, in English law, landed interests are for historical 
reasons highly regarded-perhaps considerably more so than are per-
sonal interests. However, there are cases imposing strict liability. for 
purely personal injuries such as the I enning$ Brothers case concerning 
an amusement park with its centrifugal whirling chair device which 
went awry and injured the plaintiff.2' 
Moreover, there are certain exceptions to the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity that may be gleaned from the British decisions. Strict liability is 
not applicable : 
I. When the defendant is able to ". . . excuse himself by showing 
that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default"; 25 
2. When the damage is caused by ·the intervention of an Act of 
God; 26 
3; When the harm results from the deliberate act of a third party 
stranger ; 27 or 
4· When the defendant is acting under .and in accordance with statu-
tory authority, a subject to be more fully developed later in this chapter. 28 
In short, the views of the British courts as reflected in the cases, in-
cluding the· significant Read v. Lyons Company, Ltd., may be summa-
rized as follows: ( 1) strict liability un:der the Rylands rule is founded 
2s I d. at 481-482. 
24 Hale v. Jennings Bros. [1938] I All. E. R. 579· 
25 L. R. I Exch. 265, 279 (Ex. 1866). 
26 Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 10 Exch. 255 (1875). 
27 Box v. Jubb 4 Ex. Div. 76 (1879). 
28 Green v. Chelsea Water Works Company, 70 L. T. R. 547 (1894); Longhurst v. 
Metropolitan Water Board [1948] 2 All. E. R. 834. 
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historically upon a mutual obligation of adjoining or neighboring land-
owners, a fact which to no small degree affects its interpretation; and 
( 2) in order to apply the Rylands doctrine the court must find : first, 
a dangerous substance or instrumentality; second, non-natural user of 
th~ land under defendant's c<;mtrol; third, an escape of the dangerous 
substance or instrumentality from the defendant's premises; fourth, 
harm caused to the owner of adjacent or neighboring premises, or to 
persons in the vicinity; and, fifth, that none of the named exceptions is 
applicable. 
In considering the future application of the British cases to injuries 
occasioned by escaping radioactive substances it would seem that the 
principal difficulty will arise from the necessity of applying the concept 
of "non-natural user." Because radioactive particles migrate with 
distressing ease, there will be little question but that in the years to come 
untoward incidents will result in the escape of radioactivity into the sur-
rounding countryside, and the question will be raised whether or not the 
source from which the escape takes place does or does not amount to a 
"non-natural user" of the land. The determination of this issue will 
depend upon ~ considerable number of factors, including location of the 
source with resped to outside persons and property, the character of the 
utilization device with respect to its dangerous propensities, and the 
social utility expected to be derived from the location of the particular 
activity in the community where the inciderit occurred. 
D. The Doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher Under American Decisions 
We will now consider the American cases which are obviously of 
greater significance than are the English cases in connection with an 
appraisal of the possibility of strict liability for radiation injuries being 
imposed uport nuclear industry in the United States. In this country 
Rylands v. Fletcher has been accepted by some courts and rejected by 
others. · · 
At a very early date the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts and Min-
nesota approved the doctrine.29 Soon afterward, however, the doctrine 
was repudiated in New York,80 New Hampshire,81 and New Jersey.82 
29 Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868), involving the escape of filthy water from the 
defendant's premises; Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 ( 1871), involving damage to 
property caused by escape of water onto plaintiff's premises through a tunnel con-
structed by the defendant. 
8o Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 .(1873), a steam boiler case. 
81 Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H.' 442 (1873), a traffic situation. 
82 Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876), a steam boiler case. 
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In subsequent litigation- the doctrine has been repudiated by name, at 
least, in seven additional states-Kentucky, Maine, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington. On the other hand, an 
even greater number of American courts have accepted the doctrine and 
applied it in one way or another. In addition to Massachusetts and Min-
nesota, decisions to this effect have been rendered in Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mary-
land, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia.88 
Accordingly it would appear that the doctrine has met with substantial 
favor in the United States and the extent of the approbation is increas-
ing. The doctrine has been applied to many and varied cases involving 
such situations as the impounding of water, the storage of explosives 
and inflammable liquids, blasting, fumigation,- crop dusting, oil well 
operations, and the emission of smoke, dust, or noxious gases. Like the 
courts in Great Britain, the United States courts have declined to apply 
the doctrine to so-called "natural uses" of land, and for this reason they 
have declined to apply it to such activities as carrying water in pipes 
for household use, conducting gas in ordinary household supply devices, 
installing electric wiring, storing gasoline in filling stations, coal mining 
operations, and other affairs that are deemed normal and natural in re-
lation to the community where they are carried on. 
In view of the importance of the American cases in connection with 
possible strict liability of the atomic industry, it will be desirable to 
survey a number of the leading cases. For this purpose, we shall divide 
the cases into three categories : first, cases in which the doctrine has 
been repudiated altogether and the plaintiffs have been referred for 
redress to the doctrines of negligence; second, cases in which the 
doctrine has been recognized and applied; and third, cases in which the 
doctrine has been recognized but the courts have declined to hold the 
defendant in the particular situation to a rule of strict liability. 
I. Rylands v. Fletcher Repudiated 
As has already been stated, in the United States the doctrine of 
Rylands v. Fletcher was early repudiated by several of the leading state 
courts, and there is today a substantial body of judicial authority to the 
effect- that it will not be applied, at least under the conditions and circum-
stances involved in the cases in which the question has been raised. Al-
though the trend of modern decisions may be in the direction of accept-
ss Dean Prosser in his volume Selected Topics on the Law of Torts (1953) has 
assembled a most complete listing of citations. See pp. 152-157. 
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ance rather than rejection of the doctrine, these cases nevertheless 
possess considerable current authority. 
In Losee v. Buchanan,34 decided by the New York Court of Appeals 
shortly after the English courts handed down their decision in Rylands 
v. Fletcher, action was brought to recover damages occasioned by the 
explosion of a steam boiler as a result of which parts were projected onto 
the plaintiff's premises and through several of his buildings, damaging 
the same and destroying personal property therein. The plaintiff urged 
the court to apply the principle of liability without fault apart from 
considerations of negligence. The court declined to do so, not because 
the operation of a steam boiler was a "natural use" of the premises, but 
because the doctrine of strict liability was generally distasteful. A quo-
tation from the opinion reveals the theory. 
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled 
to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a 
compensation from the surrender by every other man of the 
same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which 
the laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have 
the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real 
estate, and that I must so use iny real estate as not to injure my 
neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social 
state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and 
railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of man-
kind and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any 
of these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not 
so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any 
damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. 
He receives his compensation for such damage by the general 
good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place 
the same things upon his lands. I may not place or keep a 
nuisance upon my land to the damage of my neighbor, and I 
have my compensation for the surrender of this right to use 
my own as I will by the similar restriction imposed upon my 
neighbor for my benefit. I hold my property subject to the risk 
that it may be unavoidably or accidentally injured by those 
who live near me; and as I move about upon the public high-
ways and in all places where other persons may lawfully be, I 
take the risk of being accidentally injured in my person by 
them without fault on their part. Most of the rights of prop-
erty, as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute 
but relative, and they must be so arranged and modified, not 
unnecessarily infringing upon natural rights, as upon the 
whole to promote the general welfare. 86 
B4 Supra note JO. 
SG /d. at 484, 485. 
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In a more recent Oklahoma case, Gulf Pipe Line Company et al v. 
Sims,S6 the plaintiff claimed that absolute liability should rest upon the 
defendant for injuries occasioned to the plaintiff while he was riding 
as a passenger in an automobile driven along a public highway. As he 
approached a bridge over a small ravine, gas which had collected near 
and around the bridge was ignited causing an explosion and fire as a 
result of which the plaintiff was severely burned. The gas came from 
crude oil leaking from the defendant's pipelines. The plaintiff contended 
that the defendant should be held liable regardless of negligence, relying 
upon the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. Yet the court refused to apply 
the doctrine to the circumstances as they existed in Oklahoma. Said the 
court: 
We think that case, (i.e., Rylands v. Fletcher) is not in point 
here upon the facts. And we conclude that the rule there 
announced, and here contended for the plaintiff, Sims, cannot 
be sustained in this jurisdiction in this character of action, 
and that our conclusion that it should not be followed is justi-
fied both by the trend of modern decisions, and by modern 
economic and industrial developments. 
The business engaged in by the defendants, that of transpor-
tation and storage of crude oil, is one of the basic industries 
of the state; that business is not only legal, necessary, and 
proper, but has an outstanding part in the development of the 
natural resources of the state. When that business is con-
ducted in the recognized manner, with all diligence, and with 
the use of standard equipment, materials and appliances, and 
without negligence, then the persons engaged in such business 
should not, under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, be held to 
be insurers that in no event would it be possible that damage or 
injury could result from such operation.87 
In later cases the Oklahoma Supreme Court has pointed out that the 
Sims case has no application in cases of injuries to real property which 
is protected by Section 23, Article 2 of the state constitution providing 
that no private property shall be "taken or damaged" for private use 
without compensation.88 
sa 168 Okla. 209. 32 P.2d 902 (1934). 
37 ld. at 213. 
ss See Phillips Petroleum Company v. Vandergriff, 190 Okla. 28o, 122 P. 2d 1020 
(1942), and British-American Oil Producing Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P.2d 
530 (1942). See Comment on the Oklahoma cases in Foster and Keeton, "Liability 
Without Fault in Oklahoma," 3 Okla. L. Rev. 38-41 (1950), where the authors criticize 
the Sims case, referring to the fact that, in the later British-American case, the coui:t 
had stated that the views expressed in the Sims case were largely dictum. They add 
"It would appear that there is substantial doubt as to the present vitality and future 
application of the Sims case." However, it still stands as the law of Oklahoma. 
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A similar question has arisen in the neighboring state of Texas in 
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Company.89 This case also involved oil produc-
ing operations. In a state in which such operations form a very large 
part of the economy, Turner brought suit against the oil company for 
damages for alleged pollution of the plaintiff's land and his water holes 
resulting from the defendants' permitting the escape of salt water from 
oil producing operations on its property. The jury found that the de-
fendants were not guilty of negligence. The plaintiffs on appeal con-
tended for a doctrine of strict liability, referring for authority to the 
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and American cases in accord with it. The 
Texas court declined to apply the rule stating that "in Texas we have 
conditions very different from those which obtain in England" and that 
it had "long since repudiated the general rule announced in Rylands v. 
Fletcher." The court referred with approval to another Texas Supreme 
Court opinion, in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, in which case the 
court criticized the rule of the Rylands case stating: 
The rule laid down was largely deduced from prior rulings 
establishing absolute liability for damages caused by fires 
kindled on one's premises and spreading to those of another; 
by injuries inflicted by one, in his lawful self-defense against 
another, upon an innocent bystander; and by animals straying 
from the lands of their owners upon those of others. The law 
has become settled, in this country at least, that there is no 
liability in the first two instances without negligence on the 
part of the person permitting the fire to spread or inflicting the 
injury; and in the case of animals, the law is entirely different 
in this and other states.'0 
Accordingly, the court in the Turner case concluded : 
Since we have repudiated the bases of the rule announced 
in Rylands v. Fletcher, it follows as a necessary corollary 
that we should not apply the rule in cases such as the one be-
fore us.61 
Although the Texas court declined to apply the rule of Rylands v. 
Fletcher in the Turner case, it did at several points in its opinion refer 
to the possibility of imposing an equivalent of liability without fault 
by reference to nuisance doctrines, if a nuisance were in fact created 
by the defendant. 42 
89 I28 Tex. ISS. g6 S.W.2d 221 (I936). 
40 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. ISS at IS8, IS9, s8 S.W. 999 (Igoo). 
41 Supra note 39 at 162. 
42 See Prosser, "Nuisance Without Fault," 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (I942), criticizing 
the Turner case and indicating that the effect of strict liability might perhaps be 
achieved in Texas by pleading and urging a nuisance doctrine. 
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These cases make it dear that there is at least some authority in the 
United States to the effect that the doctrines of strict liability should not 
be applied indiscriminately. The vitality and extent of this opposition 
are open to question in view of current trends in thinking about tort 
liability, and, in any event, there is still left open the question as to 
whether or not the doctrine should be applied to damages occasioned by 
radioactive substances. 
2. Rylands v. Fletcher Accepted and Applied. 
We have already mentioned the fact that more state supreme courts 
have accepted and approved the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher than 
have ·refused to give it recognition. It is now desirable to review a num-
ber of the better reasoned opinions rendered in cases approving and 
applying the doctrine, or its American eguivalent, and thus to attempt 
to derive a theory which will permit us to predict the likelihood of strict 
liability being invoked against those who inflict radiation injuries on 
others. We shall not be able to derive the sam,e clearcut pattern of theory 
as that which can be derived from the opinions of the English courts. 
However, by examining a selection of six leading cases, we can obtain 
a fairly adequate understanding of the extent of the doctrine as it is ap-
plied in those states that have accepted it, and thus place ourselves in a 
position to make a projection into the atomic age. 
The Kansas case of Berry v. Shell Petroleum Company .a involved a 
claim for damages caused to real property by the seepage of salt water, 
thereby. ruining the water supply on the plaintiff's premises. The de-
. fendant owned and operated an oil producing field. The oil, as it came 
from the ground, was mixed with salt water. Separation was achieved 
by .storage in tanks, drawing the oil off the top and the water off the 
bottom. The salt water was discharged through pipes which connected 
with a drainage ditch in the city of Wichita, Kansas. This was done 
pursuant to and in accordance with a city ordinance. It was understood 
that the salt water would be carried through the sanitary sewer system 
except in case of. emergency or when it was found necessary to divert 
it into a drainage canal fo.r the purpose of flushing the drainage canal 
. system. During the course of a flushing operation salt water apparently 
seeped through the sand bottom of the canal and into the wells used by 
the plaintiff. The water was rendered unfit for use. The plaintiff made 
no allegation of negligence; reliance was placed squarely upon the doc-
trine of absolute liability. The defendant not only denied the applicabil-
48 140 Kan. 94. 33 P.2d 953 (1934). 
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ity of strict liability rules but also contended that when it delivered its 
water, impregnated with salt, to the city, all duties resting upon it came 
to an end. The court nevertheless held the defendant strictly liable. 
The court first spoke in terms of nuisance, saying : 
The rule· is well settled that an individual who sustains an 
injury peculiar to himself may have relief against a public 
nuisance and is entitled to maintain an action at law for dam-
ages on account of the special injury which he has sustained.44 
The court did not, however, rest its decision exclusively on the ground 
of nuisance. It also turned to the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, re-
ferring to it with approval and stating : 
It is well settled in this state that when a water supply is 
damaged by salt water percolating through the soil and im-
pregnating it with salt so that the water is rendered unfit for 
use, the owner of the land may maintain an action for damages 
against the owner of the land from whose land the salt water 
escaped. 45 
It must be remembered that negligence is not a necessary 
element of the right of recovery in a case like this. The right 
to recover results from the company having the harmful sub-
stance on its land and permitting it to escape to the damage 
of plaintifV6 · 
It should be notedthat the facts in the Berry case are in interesting 
contrast to those in the Turner case, referred to in the preceding section, 
decided by the Texas Supreme Court only two years later. The fact 
that the economy of the state of Texas is so largely dependent upon the 
production of oil, whereas that of Kansas depends more on agricultural 
and industrial pursuits, can no doubt be regarded as at least a partial 
explanation of the difference in the attitude of the two courts concerning 
the applicability of the doctrines of strict liability to the business of oil 
production. It should be noted that in the Be"y case the Kansas Su-
preme Court made no mention whatsoever of the Ryland.r requirement 
of "non-natural use of the land." The court simply stated that "the 
liability . . . springs from the fact that the companies had salt water 
on their property and permitted it to escape." 47 Furthermore, the court 
said : "We are aware of the fact that such a ruling places a great burden 
on the oil industry. It is, however, no new principle which we are an-
44 !d. at 99. 
45/d. at 100. 
46 /d. at 101. 
47 ld at 102. 
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nouncing. It is as old as the industry of man. We consider that the 
water supply of the people is of greater importance than the operation 
of a business at a reduced cost." 48 Thus the court enunciated a doctrine 
of relative social utility which is more nearly akin to nuisance doctrines 
originating in equity. 
In Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Company 49 the defendant, a gas 
manufacturer and distributor, maintained a reservoir containing crude 
petroleum. The petroleum escaped and percolated through the ground 
to the plaintiff's premises where it caused damage. The defendant con-
tended that the case should be dismissed since there was a failure to 
show negligence. Nevertheless the trial court instructed the jury that the 
defendant was liable without proof of negligence. The Supreme Court, 
citing Rylands v. Fletcher with approval, agreed with the instruction 
and sustained the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, saying that the 
proofs showed that the defendant fell within the limits of strict liability, 
and that 
The essential condition of liability, without proof of negli-
gence on the part of the owner, for injury to others by the 
escape of things kept by him on his own premises, is that the 
natural tendency of the things kept is to become a nuisance or 
to do mischief, if they escape.~0 
Thus the Minnesota court, like the Kansas court in the Berry case, ap-
parently ignores the question of "non-natural use" of the land, but con-
centrates simply and solely upon the question as to whether or not some-
thing of dangerous potentialities has been permitted to escape. Thus 
the decision is rested upon only one of the principal requirements im-
posed by the English courts in connection with Rylands v. Fletcher. 
The fact is that the doctrine of strict liability is developing in this 
country on an. even broader base than in the country of its origin. If, 
for example, the defendant's crude petroleum tank had been located far 
away from centers of population and in a location in which such storage 
in tanks was a common practice, the defendant would still have been 
held liable according to the language used by the court. 
Another ·case worthy of attention in this connection is Frost v. 
Berkeley Phosphate Co. 51 This was an action for damages inflicted upon 
the plaintiff and his' property by the defendant who operated a mill i11 
which he manufactured sulphuric acid and commercial fertilizers. In 
48 Ibid. 
• 9 6o Mitm. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895). 
GO /d. at J01. 
u42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 28o (1894). 
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the process of producing sulphuric acid certain gases and fumes were 
produced which had injurious effects upon vegetable and animal life. 
The plaintiff charged that gases escaping from the defendant's mill 
injured and destroyed his crops and other vegetation growing upon 
his land, and proved so detrimental to health as to render his premises 
unfit for habitation. Under the instructions of the trial court a verdict 
was returned by the jury for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found the instructions of the 
trial court objectionable for the reason that they propounded a doctrine 
of non-negligent liability based solely upon nuisance (i.e., unlawful 
action) and leaving no room for strict liability in cases of lawful conduct 
of business. The Supreme Court disagreed with so limited a doctrine 
and in so doing laid down its views concerning strict liability as follows: 
The second objection to this charge is, as it seems to us, that 
it unwarrantably limits the operation of the maxim, Sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non ltEdas, so as to allow the owner of a tract 
of land to so use his own land in the prosecution of any lawful 
business as would necessarily or probably injure his neighbor, 
provided he takes all reasonable care to prevent such injury. 
This we do not understand to be the law. On the contrary, we 
think if one uses his own land for the.prosecution of some 
business from which injury to his neighbor would either neces-
sarily or probably ensue, he is liable if such injury does result, 
even though he may have used reasonable care in the prosecu-
tion of such business. This doctrine is supported not only 
by reason, but by the weight of authority . . . . 62 
Rylands v. Fletcher was referred to with approval. Here again we 
find no limitation to "non-natural user" but instead a very broad enun-
ciation 'of a: doctrine of strict liability, far broader than the principles 
initially derived by the English courts from Rylands v. Fletcher. 
·A Maryland ~se, $usquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone/3 also in-
volving a fertilizer plant producing sulphuric acid fumes, affords a 
somewhat similar broad theoretical base for the doctrine. In this case 
the plaintiff. was the owner of .several dwelling houses in one of the 
suburbs of B~timore. On the adjoining lot was the defend;mt's large 
fertilizer factory frorp which, so the plaintiff charged, noxious gases 
escaped, not only to the great physical discomfort of his tenants and 
himself, but also to cause material injury to the property itself. The 
court, in its opinion, specifically negated the possibility of submitting 
n I d. at 409. 
n 73 Md. 268, 20 At!. 900 ( 18c)o). 
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to the jury the question as to whether ot not the factory was located in a 
convenient and proper place for carrying on such business, i.e., whether, 
under all of the circumstances it was a "natural use" of the land. Citing 
Rylands v. Fletcher among other authorities the court expressed itself 
as follows: 
No principle is better settled than that where a trade or busi-
ness is carried on in such a manner as to interfere with the 
reasonable and comfortable enjoyment by another of his 
property, or whi~h occasions material injury to the property 
itself, a wrong is done to the neighboring owner, for which an 
action will lie. And this, too, without regard to the locality 
where such business is carried on; and this, too, although the 
business may be a lawful business, and one useful to the public, 
and although the best and most approved appliances and meth-
ods may be used in the conduct and management of the busi-
ness}1" 
And further quoting from the opinion : 
We cannot agree with the appellant that the Court ought to 
have directed the jury to find whether the place where this fac-
tory was located was a convenient and proper place for the car-
rying on of the appellant's business, and whether such a use 
of his property was a reasonable use, and if they should so find 
the verdict must be for the defendant. It may be convenient 
to the defendant, and it may be convenient to the public, but, 
in the eye of the law, no place can be convenient for the carry-
ing on of a business which is a nuisance, and which causes sub-
stantial injury to the property of another. Nor can any use of 
one's own land be said to be a reasonable use, which deprives 
an adjoining owner of the lawful use and enjoyment of his 
property}111 
We must not fail to note the breadth of the doctrine thus enunciated 
and further, we should note the continual reference to "nuisance." In 
the opinions of many of the state supreme courts in the United States 
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher becomes inextricably involved with 
doctrines of nuisance. The two are often used interchangeably to im-
pose strict liability in those cases.i"n which they are invoked. "Nuisance" 
is at best a vague concept of uncertain dimensions used in different ways 
by different courts. The breadth of the views enunciated by the Mary-
land court in the Susquehanna case are in part at least attributable to 
this fusion of doctrines, and results in a principle that runs far beyond 
54 /d. at 276. 
Ufd. at 276, 277. 
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that of Rylands v. Fletcher which is rather precisely limited to "non-
natural" user resulting in an "escape" of substances "likely to do 
mischief." 
A very recent case of significance is Gotreaux v. Gary. 56 This was an 
action against a farmer who employed a certain flying service to spray 
his rice crop with the chemical 2, 4-D. Unfortunately the chemical was 
carried by the wind to the plaintiff's premises three and one-half miles 
away, and there it served to destroy some thirteen acres of cotton and 
three acres of peas under cultivation. The Louisiana Code contained 
a provision reading as follows : 
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he 
pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which inay deprive 
his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may 
be the cause of any damage to him. 57 
However, the legislature of Louisiana had adopted regulations con-
cerning the use of 2, 4-D and permitting its use during periods of wind 
velocity of less than six miles per hour. With this limitation the de-
fendant had complied. The defendant pleaded that fact and· lack of 
negligence. The court, however, declared that it was unwilling to follow 
any rule which rejected the doctrine of absolute liability in cases of this 
nature. The court stated that nuisance was not involved but based· its 
holding for the plaintiff upon the principle that in such circumstances 
negligence or fault is not a requisite to liability, but that liability should 
follow irrespective of the fact that the activities resulting in the damages 
were conducted with reasonable care and in accordance with modern 
and accepted methods. Said the court without mentioning Rylands v. 
Fletcher but reaching a like result : 
. . . . [I]t is true that theLegislature consented to the use 
of herbicides, btit this did not entitle the defendants to injure 
plaintiff's crops. Although the use of the spraying operation 
was lawful, it was carried out in such a manner as to unrea-
sonably inconvenience plaintiff and deprive him of the liberty 
of enjoying his farm. 58 
One other case should be given consideration in this discussion of the 
Rylands doctrine in United States courts. In Green v. The General 
Petroleum Corporation 59 the plaintiff instituted an action to recover 
damages for injuries to his property occasioned by the defendant's oil 
56 232 La. 373, 94 S.2d 293 (1957). 
57 La. Rev. Civ. Code art. 667. 
n Supra note 56 at 378. 
59 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928). 
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drilling operations. It appeared that in the process of drilling 'for oil, 
although the defendant had exercised ordinary care and was not guilty 
of negligence in any particular, a stream of oil, gas, mud, and rocks was 
shot into the air and onto the plaintiff's property located about two 
hundred feet from the well. The defendant denied liability, asserting that 
under the California decisions there was no such thing as liability with-
out negligence. The court, outlining the California law on the subject, in-
dicated that, quite apart from negligence or the commission of a nuisance 
per se, neither of which existed in this case, and notwithstanding the 
fact that the production of oil is a legitimate and lawful business, never-
theless, a doctrine of strict liability should be applied. Without referring 
to Rylands v. Fletcher the court stated the rule in California to be as 
follows: 
Where one in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise 
lawful and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under 
known conditions, and, with knowledge that the injury may 
result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to the other as 
the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however care-
fully done, the one who does the act and causes the injury 
should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other for 
the damage done. The instant case offets a most excellent ex-
ample of an actual invasion of the property· of one person 
through the act of another.80 
Thereupon the court after emphasizing the fact that there was here 
an actual invasion of the plaintiff's property, i.e., a trespass upon his 
premises, said in holding the defendant to strict liability: 
Any other construction would permit one owner, under like 
circumstances, to use the land of another for his own purpose 
and benefit without making compensation for such use. We 
do not conceive that to be the law.81 
We can note in this case another type of extension of the principle of 
Rylands v. Fletcher, which was limited on its facts to substances brought 
on to the defendant's land. In the Green case the substances were al-
ready on or under the land in extraordinary quantity, but the ~efendant 
by his activity put them in such a position as to make. their escape pos-
sible. In other words the defendant did not bring onto his land a danger-
ous substance, but he used his land in such a way as to release a sub-
stance already there. 
Many more cases could be discussed but those which have been here 
80 I d. at 333, 334· 
81 I d. at 334. 
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set forth are illustrative of the breadth bf the doctrine of strict liability 
as it has been applied by some of the state supreme courts to certain 
highly useful activities in this country. As we have already several times 
noted, those courts that are applying the doctrine do so in a manner 
which gives it greater coverage than that indicated for Rylands v. 
Fletcher. The purport of this for the operator of a nuclear reactor is 
apparent. 
3· Rylands v. Fletcher Accepted but Not Applied, in View of the 
Circumstances of the Particular Case 
From the standpoint of atomic enterprise the cases outlined in the 
preceding subsection would seem to leave but little room for the applica-
tion of any less rigorous doctrine of liability in the case of radiation in-
juries than that of Rylands v. Fletcher. Indeed an even more severe 
doctrine may, and in all probability will, in many jurisdictions emerge 
and be ·applied in appropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, we should 
not immediately conclude that all cases of radiation overexposure will 
result in the imposition of the doctrine. We should now view briefly 
certain of the rather numerous cases arising in jurisdictions which ac-
cept the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, but which have declined to apply 
it in the particular circumstances of the cases at hand. We shall see that 
in some of the states at least there is dev~loping, as in England, a re-
quirement of "naturalness of use,'' or "reasonableness under the cir-
cum~tances," or "appropriateness in view of the public benefit derived," 
which may serve tb mitigate the harshness of strict liability in connec-
tion with certain uses of atomic energy, 
An illustration of this type of case is McCord Rubber Company v. 
St. Joseph Water Com-pany,62 an action for damages for the flooding of 
plaintiff's cellar with water, ther.eby destroying the value of a large 
quanticy pf merchandise stored therein. The defendant water company 
supplied water to the -plaintiff's premises and also to the premises of a 
co-defendant who occupied quarters adjacent to the plaintiff's. The 
water pipes entering the co-defendant's premises were frozen and 
ruptured filling the co-defendant's cellar with water which then over-· 
flowed into. the -plaintiff's cellar ruining his stock of goods. The trial 
~ourt instructed the jury on a negligence theory. A verdict was rendered 
for defendant. The plaintiff on appeal contended that the defendant 
should be held liable regardless of negligence and that the jury should 
have been so instructed. The plaintiff rested its contention upon Rylands 
62 181 Mo. 678, 81 S.W. 18g (1904). 
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v. Fletcher. However, the court declined to agree. It distinguished the 
case from Rylands v. Fletcher saying: • 
There is a wide difference between a great volume of water 
collected in a reservoir (Rylands v. Fletcher) in dangerous 
proximity to the premises of another and water brought into 
a house through pipes in the manner usual in all cities, for the 
ordinary use of the occupants of the house. Whilst water so 
brought into a house cannot literally be said to have come in in 
the course of what might be called in the language . . . of the 
Lord Chancellor "natural user" of the premises, yet it is 
brought in by the method universally in use in cities and is not 
to be treated as an unnatural gathering of a dangerous agent. 
The law applicable to the caging of ferocious animals is not 
applicable to water brought into a house by pipes in the usual 
manner. 
The learned counsel for the plaintiff tried their case on the 
theory that the defendants were negligent, and that is the only 
theory on which they could have tried it.83 
In short, the Missouri court accepted the distinction stated in Rylands 
v. Fletcher between natural and non-natural uses, regarding only the 
latter as subject to the application of the doctrine of strict liability. 
Two cases involving the coal industry of Pennsylvania, both with ex-
ceptionally well-reasoned opinions, illustrate "tlie·Jines of division which 
properly can be drawn in the ~pplicat1on':of the doctrines of strict liabil-
ity. In the first of these two cases, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Sanderson,64 it appeared that the plaintiff, Mrs. Sanderson, had bought 
a tract of land in the city of Scranton bordering on Meadow Brook. 
The existence of the stream, the purity of its water, and its utility for 
domestic and other purposes were inducements leading to the purchase. 
She erected a home and built dams across "the brook to form a fish and 
ice pond and to supply a cistern. Thereafter the defendant, Pe~sylvania 
Coal Company, opened coal .veins upstream, and.as a result of these 
operations a large volume of mine water was accumulated and was 
pumped into Meadow Brook, corrupting the stream to such an extent 
as to render it totally unfit for domestic use, destroying the fish, corrod-
ing pipes and apparatus, and rendering Mrs. Sanderson's equipmet:tt use-
less. A suit was ~rought to recover damages. The. trial court ent~red a 
nonsuit on the ground of failure to sh.ow negligence. · On ·writ of error 
88 I d. at 694, 6gs. 
64 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886). 
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the plaintiff contended that a doctrine of strict liability should be applied. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, stating: 
It will be observed that the defendants have done nothing 
to change the character of the water, or to diminish its purity, 
save what results from the natural use and enjoyment of their 
own property. They have brought nothing on to the land 
artificially. The water as it is poured into Meadow Brook, is 
the water which the mine naturally discharges; its impurity 
arises from natural, not artificial causes. The mine cannot, 
of course,· be operated elsewhere than where the coal is natur-
ally found, and the discharge is a necessary incident to the 
mining of it. 
It must be conceded, we think, that every man is entitled 
to the ordinary and natural use and enjoyment of his property; 
he may cut down the forest trees, clear and cultivate his land, 
although in so doing he may dry up the sources of his neigh-
bor's springs, or remove the natural barriers against wind and 
storm .... 65 
* * * * * 
The defendants were engaged in a perfectly lawful business, 
in which they had made large expenditures, and in which the 
interests of the entire community were concerned; they were at 
liberty to carry on that business in the ordinary way, and were 
not, while so doing, accountable for consequences which they 
could not control. . . . 
* * * * * 
I~ may be said that . . when the flow of water is in-
creased artificially or is greater than would result from gravi-
tation alone, the mine owner who causes it is liable for the in-
creased injury; that this may be termed a non-natural use of 
the land, and the mine owner would be held for any injury, 
which would be sustained in consequence of this artificial 
increase in the amount. . . :oe 
* * * * * 
But the defendants, in the case at bar, brought nothing 
upon the land ; they accumulated nothing there; the water was 
there without any act of theirs, and it was the accumulation of 
it which they sought to prevent. They were in the natural user 
of their lands for a lawful purpose, and the discharge of the 
mine water was an absolute necessity in order to that use of the 
land. The distinction is obvious, and we cannot see how 
Fletcher v. Rylands can be supposed to have any application in 
the consideration of this case. 87 
osfd. at 145. 
66 ld. at 147. 
67 I d. at 151. 
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Then follows a significant sentence from one of the opinions filed 
in a previous review of the case, as follows : 
The trifling inconvenience to particular persons must some-
times give way to the necessities of a great community. Espe-
cially is this true where the leading industrial interest of the 
state is involved, the prosperity of which affects every house-
hold in the Commonwealth:68 
We should not fail to take note of the fact that in this last sentence 
above quoted the court adds to the fact of "natural use" the idea that 
the balance of convenience for the community is a significant factor in 
determining whether or not the doctrine of strict liability shall be ap-
plied. This doctrine of balance of convenience appears also in other con-
nections, and it may well be that, on balance, certain activities, even 
though somewhat hazardous, will be permitted in our modern techno-
logical age in view of the fact that the best interests of. the entire com-
munity will be served thereby, notwithstanding the potentialities of the 
hazardous conditions. The chemical business is illustrative of this 
aspect .of the law in an industrial age. Perhaps some aspects of the 
atomic business will furnish another illustration. 
The second Pennsylvania case presents the other side of the coin. In 
Robb v. Carnegie Brothers & Company 69 Robb brought an action 
against Carnegie Brothers to recover damages for injuries to his land 
arising from the operation of certain coke ovens owned and operated 
by the ddendants. In the course of such operations large volumes of 
smoke and gas were emitted from the defendants' ovens and carried 
over to the plaintiff's land. In consequence of this, the plaintiff con-
tended, his timber and fruit trees were killed, and the productiveness of 
the greater part of his land was diminished to a point of almost total 
destruction. The earlier Sanderson case was argued by the defendant in 
support of its claim that, apart from negligence, there would be no 
liability. With this argument the court disagreed, holding the defendant 
strictly liable, distinguishing from the Sanderson case on its facts and 
using the following language : 
The coal company (in the Sanderson case) was using its own 
land in the only manner practicable to it. The harm done 
thereby to others was the least in amount consistent with the 
natural and lawful use of it own. . . . But the defendants are 
not developing the minerals in their land, or cultivating its 
surface. They have erected coke ovens upon it, and are en-
68 I d. at 162. 
69 145 Pa. 324. 22 Atl. 649 (1891). 
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gaged in the manufacture of coke. Their selection of this site, 
rather than some other; is due to its location and to their con-
venience, and has no relation to the character of the soil, or to 
the presence or absence of underlying minerals. The selection 
was no doubt ·a wise one, quite secluded, and quite convenient 
to the several mines from which the material was to be ob-
tained for the making of coke; but it was the selection of a 
manufacturing site, and is subject to the same considerations 
as though glass, or lumber, or iron had been the commodity 
produced, instead of coke. The rule in Sanderson's case has 
therefore no application to the facts of this case. The injury, 
if any, resulting fr9m the manufacture of coke at this site, is 
in no sense the natural and necessary consequence of the exer-
cise of the legal right of the owner to develop the resources of 
his property, but is the consequence of his election to devote his 
land to the establishment of a particular sort of manufactur-
ing, having no natural conne{:~ion with the soil or the subjacent 
strata.70 · · 
Accordingly, the court held that. the plaintiff was entitled to damages 
without proving negligence, but_at the'same time he was held not en-
titled to an injunction _to preclude the operation of a great industry 
important to the economy of the region. Rylands v. Fletcher was not 
mentioned by the court although it was. cited and relied upon by the 
plaintiff. 
The atomic industry also will be bringing something dangerous upon 
its premises-and the analogy to the Rylands case is apparent: Yet at the 
same time the balance of interests and considerations related to general 
prosperity and welfare are significant in seeking an answer to the 
question of the extent of liability to be imposed upon peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. We are entitled to- regard this new form of energy as 
something that, in due course, will have a· pronounced effect upon the 
welfare of the nation. It must be encouraged so far ·as it can be done 
consistently with justice and equity. · -
. Reference may riow be made briefly to cas~s invoiv_ing da~age oc-
casioned by fire. As we have already noted, the basic principles of liabil- · 
ity for such damage, brought to this country from England, required 
proof of negligence, but, nevertheless, from time to time attempts have 
been made to impose strict liability in. connection with such injuries. 
Two cases decided by the Minnes9ta Supreme Court are worthy of note. 
In the .earlier case, D'ay v. H. C. Akeley Lumber Company,71 _it appeared 
70 I d. at 338, 339· 
71 54 Minn. 522, 56 N.W .. 243 (I8gJ). 
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that fire had escaped in the form of sparks and cinders from large stacks 
used in connection with burning sawdust and refuse in the defendant's 
sawmill. The plaintiff requested an instruction for the jury based upon 
strict liability. Refusing it the court said: 
This request eliminated from the case any consideration by 
the jury of defendant's alleged negligence, and planted the 
plaintiffs' right to recover upon grounds independent of such 
negligence. The fire used by defendant was for manufacturing 
purposes, arid, if used with proper safeguards and without 
negligence, no liability attached for damages caused by its 
escape. Any other rule would make the person who uses fire 
for manufacturing or mechanical or propelling purposes, or 
even for heating, an insurer against accidents. . . . Doubt-
less, one who employs the element of fire for manufacturing 
or mechanical or propelling purposes, or who employs it for 
any purpose under circumstances which render it especially 
dangerous to others, is held to the exercise of more care and 
caution than is one who -employs the same element for a less 
dangerous purpose. Yet the degree of care is the same, for 
in either case reasonable care, or, what is the same thing, 
ordinary care, only is required. 72 • 
In short, the court declined to apply the doctrine of strict liability to this 
useful instrumentality. 
In the second Minnesota case, August Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight 
C ompany/8 to which reference has hitherto been made, the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota_ did apply a doctrine of strict liability to the de-
fendant from whose premises quantities of crude petroleum were dis-
charged through the soil to the plaintiff's premises where the damage 
was caused. The earlier Day case was relied upon by the defendant, but 
the court disposed of it using the following language: 
The case .of Day v. Akeley Lumber Company . . . relied 
upon by defendant's counsel, is . . . not in point, for it was a 
case :where fire escaped from the defendant's premises, and 
destroyed the plaintiffs' property, and it was correctly held that 
there could be no recovery without proof of negligence on 
the part of the defendant. Fire is, and has been ever since the 
statute of 6 Anne, c~ 31, an exception to the-rule that, where a 
person receives and keeps ·upon his premises anything not 
naturally there, the natural tendency of which is, if it escapes, 
to injure others, he is liable, without reference to any con-
siderations of care and skill on his part. It is difficult to see 
72 I d. at 527, 528. 
18 Supra note 49· 
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why fire should have ever been included in the rule, for fire is 
one of the most beneficent servants of man,-an absolute 
necessity,-and, from its own nature, does not necessarily 
injure surrounding persons and things. 74 
·This is strictly in line with American case law dealing with liability 
for fires occasioned by industrial operations, 75 although in most states 
there are special statutes imposing more or less strict liability upon rail-
roads and sometimes other activities in cases of fire damage. 
The foregoing cases are illustrative of the special limitations that 
are imposed upon strict liability in some of the courts in this country. 
They reveal a thoroughly reasonable appr<;>ach-one that may prove to 
be of interest in connection with problems of radiation liability that are 
likely to arise in the future. We shall discuss their possible application 
later in this chapter. 
4· Special Cases-Blasting and X-Rays 
Blasting cases. The courts may, when required to determine the liabil-
ity of a reactor operator, look for precedent to cases of handling ex-
plosives and blasting operations. In a recent article,78 Harley J. McNeal 
of the Cleveland Bar notes that the majority of the current decisions 
result in absolute liability, but he calls attention to the confused state of 
the law in connection with such cases. He finds that questions of negli-
gence, nuisance, and absolute liability are thoroughly intermingled, that 
Rylands v. Fletcher is applied in some states in blasting cases, but not in 
others, that fine spun distinctions are being based upon differences be-
tween direct and indirect trespasses to adjoining property, that some 
courts refuse absolute liability for considerations related to the. social 
utility of blasting as an agency used for the benefit of mankind, and that 
liability is often dependent upon the location of the blasting and the 
foreseeability of damage with respect to other ·persons and property. 
He points out that the balance of equities as revealed in current case law 
tips towards the blaster in direct proportion to the distance of his ac-
tivity from the major population centers, and hence in inverse ratio to 
the likelihood of causing serious harm should a mishap occur. 
Mr. McNeal divides the cases into three categories:. (I) those in 
which strict liability is enforced for all foreseeable harm, ( 2) those in 
Hfd. at JOO, JOI. 
75 See 2 Harper & James, Torts h4.15 (1956); see also Prosser, Torts 326-328 
(2d ed. 1955). 
76 McNeal, "Use of Explosives and Liability Questions Involved," 23 Ins. Counsel]. 
125 ( 1956). 
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which no liability is imposed except for negligence, and (3) a rather 
indefensible intermediate position that blasters are to be held strictly 
liable for their activities if the explosions cause direct trespass to ad-
jacent land by casting rocks or other debris upon it, but not if the same 
explosions cause harm by vibration or percussion. The latter are deemed 
indirect in their effect and not trespasses in the historical sense. The 
principal purport of the blasting cases so far as the atomic energy prob-
lem is concerned is to place emphasis upon the location of the activity 
and its relationship to foreseeable harm on the one :hand, and direct 
trespasses to valuable property on the other. 
Certain courts in blasting cases have reached a result of absolute 
liability through application of the doctrine of nuisance. This is true, 
for example, in New York state where in fact the doctrine of Rylands v. 
Fletcher has been disapproved. In Vincent v. Hercules Powder Com-
. pany 77 the defendant, a munitions plant, suffered a devastating explosion 
which damaged the plaintiff's home situated at a considerable distance. 
The defendant contended that it should be protected from strict liability 
because of the provisions of a state statute which fixed the relative lo-
cations of powder magazines, the quantity which each might contain, 
and their distances from the buildings, railroads, and highways. The 
defendant had complied with this statute and argued that an act which 
the law sanctions and authorizes cannot be deemed a nuisance, although 
it may cause damage to individual rights on private property. The 
analogy to the licensed atomic reactor is apparent. Notwithstanding the 
argument of the defendant, however, the court held the defendant 
strictly liable on a theory of nuisance and, in addition, citing Richards v. 
Washington Terminal Company, 78 declared that under the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution, the legislature, although it might legalize 
what otherwise would be a public nuisance could not confer immunity 
from suit on the theory of private nuisance such as to amount, in effect, 
to a taking of private property for public use. 
So far as atomic operations are concerned we can draw some general 
conclusions. from the blasting and explosive cases which in fact indicate 
a clear leaning and trend tOWiJ.rd strict liability in most of the state COUrtS 
in this country. Conclusions that may be stated with assurance are as 
follows: 
1. The trend of the more recent decisions reveals an increasing num-
ber of courts moving in the direction of absolute liability for damages 
resulting from blasting. 
rr 228 App. Div. n8, 239 N.Y.S. 47 (1930). 
78 233 u.s. 546, 34 s. Ct. 654 (1913). 
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2. Eyen in those jurisdictions where negligence must be proved, it 
would appear that the degree of negligence required to be proved in such 
cases is slight; or, in reverse, that the standard of due care is correspond-
in~ly high,-more so than in situations involving less hazardous ac-
tivities. 
3· There are a few courts, possibly seven or eight in number, that 
continue to adhere to the distinction between direct and indirect tres-
passes, imposing absolute liability in blasting cases only for the former. 79 
4· It is generally held that no recovery of damages can be expected 
for injuries so remote that they cannot reasonably be foreseen or antici-
pated.80 
S· As distinguished from the blasting cases, the storage of explosives 
in quantity in places adjacent to crowded areas, if followed by an ex-
plosion, is quite likely to result in the individuals involved being held 
absolutely liable for all injuries inflicted upon others, regardless of negli-
gence Or failure tO exercise due Care.81 
One cannot avoid a feeling that, in view of the current trend in the 
blasting and explosive cases, they are certain to be used in support of 
strict liability in the event of a reactor burn-up, which although not an 
explosion in a technical sense would have many similar characteristics. 
X-ray cases. Before leaving the subject of liability under the doctrine 
of Rylands v. Fletcher we should also take account of the numerous 
cases involving injuries by overexposure to X-rays. X-ray macines sub-
ject persons engaged in operating them, as well as persons undergoing 
treatment or examination by means of them, to two primary dangers, 
namely, the possibility of harm from the X-rays themselves and also 
from the powerful electric currents necessary to the production of the 
X-rays. It is generally held that the principles of law normally applicable 
to physicians and surgeons, i.e., that a medical practitioner is subject 
to no more severe requirement than the duty of exercising reasonable 
skill and care in his patient's behalf, is also applicable to an action against 
a physician for X-ray injuries to patients.82 
The same result has been reached in connection with injuries resulting 
from industrial uses of X-ray machines. For example, in Rakowski v .. 
T9 See cases cited in Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 161, n. 175 (1953). 
8o See cases cited in McNeal, supra note 75 at 132, n. 4· 
8l See Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Company, 54 Fed.2d 510 (1931), and 
many cases cited in Anno., So A.L.R. 6g2. Judge Augustus Hand in the Exner case 
said of those who store explosives or engage in blasting "When a person engages 
in such a dangerous activity, useful though it be, he becomes an insurer." 
82 See many cases cited in 41 A.L.R.2d pp. 329 et seq. 
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Ray-Bestos-Manhattan, Inc.83 the court, speaking of .the duty of an 
industrial employer toward an employee engaged in making X-ray ex-
aminations to disclose defects in manufactured products, pointed out 
that liability must be based upon negligence as distinguished from strict 
liability, but that a high degree of care, higher than in the ·ordinary 
affairs of life, must be exercised. A more extensive and inclusive 
measure of liability is achieved by enlarging the duty to exercise rea-
sonable care, rather than by applying a doctrine of absolute liability. 
The negligence doctrine as distinguished from strict liability has been 
applied to the use of X-rays by beauty specialists. Greenberg v. Post 84 
was an action for X-ray burns sustained by the plaintiff while under-
going treatment by a beauty specialist for the.removal of superfluous 
hair from her face. The court ruled that the specialist owed the plaintiff 
only a duty to exercise due care. She was liable only if the plaintiff 
proved negligence. 
It is true that in most of these X-ray cases there was a contractual 
relationship between the operator of the machine and the victim, and 
t}:tis may constitute a partial distinguishing fact based upon a claim of 
assumption of risk by ·the injured party. This fact, however, by no 
means precludes the courts from imposing 'a doctrine of strict liability 
if they should deem the social pressures or other considerations to be 
sufficiently compelling. Indeed, patie11ts do not intend to assume the 
burden of injuries whether accidental or otherwise, and hence the con-
tractual relationship should not be of significance. 
In actions involving X-ray machines it is conventionally held that the 
burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, and that he must not only show 
t}:te defendant's negligence, but aJso that the negligence proximately 
caused the harm. On the side of the plaintiff, applicability of the doc-
tripe .of: res ipsa loquitur is frequentiy urged. The ~ourts are in dis-
agreement on .the point, but there have been many decisions in which the 
d~trinehas been held available to the plaintiff, thus making it necessary 
only for him to prove that he received an injury from overexposure ~o 
the X-ray apparatus, placing upon the defendant the burden of going 
forward with proof that he exercised due care under the circumstances. 
On the other hand, the defendant can be aided by proof of contributory 
negligence or by establishing an unusual susceptibility of the plaintiff.to 
injury from X-ray. 
From the standpoint of users of rac;lioactive substances the important 
8s S N.J. Super. 203, 68 A.2d 641 (I949),.certif. den., 3 N.J. S02, 70 A.2d .908 (19SO). 
84 ISS Fla. IJS, 19 S.2d 714 (1944). .. · 
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conclusion to be gleaned from the X-ray cases is the fact that the doctrine 
of absolute liability is not applied, coupled with the further fact of 
similarity of X-rays to other radioactive emanations so far as injury to 
man is concerned. Whatever may be the applicability of the doctrine of 
Rylands v. Fletcher to reactor operators and others who make use of the 
more highly dangerous fissionable materials, one can properly urge, on 
the basis of analogy, that the theory of liability imposed in the X-ray 
cases, namely, the requirement of the proof of negligence, should also 
be applied to the numerous medical, biological, agricultural, and in-
dustrial uses of radioisotopes. These are, after all, merely utilization of 
sources of ionizing radiation, varying in intensity and often even less 
hazardous than the X-rays given out by high voltage X-ray machines. 
5· Concluding Observations with Respect to the Doctrine of 
Rylands v. Fletcher 
Before we proceed to the next phase of the subject matter, we may ask 
ourselves what conclusions should be drawn from our examination of 
the cases discussing the· doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, particularly 
insofar as they may apply to injuries caused by radioactive substances. 
The first impression that one receives is that the English decisions 
present a reasonably precise and satisfactory pattern, but that there is 
utter confusion in the principles developed by the American courts. 
Under 'the English decisions there must ordinarily be a "dangerous 
substance" brought by the defendant to his premises or at least brought 
under his control, the activity must involve a "non-natural use," and 
there must be "an escape," not caused by an "act of God," or a "third 
party," or the plaintiff himself, which results "proximately" in damage 
to the plaintiff· or to his property. 
We in the United States inherit these specifications of the doctrine 
and apply them variously in different parts of the country. Moreover, 
we interject in varying degrees in different courts at least three signifi-
cant corollaries to the English rule as above stated. Each of these corol-
laries involves a vague standard not easily applied. 
First, the utility of the enterprise, in relation to the economy or gen-
eral welfare of the 'community, has an important bearing upon whether 
or not the .doctrine of strict liability shall be applied. This may be 
nothing more than a different approach to "non-natural user," but, in 
effect, it brings forth a "balance of convenience" doctrine under which 
many courts resort to equity principles originating in private nuisance 
cases to resolve strict liability problems. 
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Second,. in a not inconsiderable number of cases the escaping sub-
stances, though somewhat "dangerous," create a relatively minor degree 
of hazard and, accordingly, the courts require proof of negligence rather 
than apply strict liability. Thus, in connection with fire which escapes, 
explosions which result in damage by concussion or vibration, X-rays 
which over-irradiate the victims in medical, industrial, or commercial 
applications, and other "lesser danger" instances, courts in general ad-
here rather consistently to conventional negligence doctrines. 
Third, the rule of strict liability can be and sometimes is approached 
by the courts by using and extending the techniques of the law of negli-
gence rather than by resort to Rylands v. Fletcher. The standard of 
care is raised to require "a very high degree of care" or even "the highest 
degree of care." Thus, the defendant, though he is not made an absolute 
insurer, is obliged to exercise such a high degree of care that the appli-
cable principles do not fall far short of ultimate liability without fault. 
This third point merits further elaboration for it has implications 
of especial concern to those who engage in atomic activities. By way 
of i-llustration consider the rather unique and striking circumstances 
in Chase v. Washington Water Power Company.85 In this .case an 
accident that was almost fantastic resulted in the burning of plain-
tiff's bam and wheat fields. Two chicken hawks, fighting while in 
flight, struck and short circuited the defendant's high tension wire, 
completing contact through a guy wire attached to one of the supporting 
towers. In addition, the weight of the hawks on the guy wire caused it 
to sag enough to contact <!- barbed wire fence c<;mnected with the plain-
tiff's bam and the accident resulted. The court, holding the electric com-
pany liable, said that was bound to" exercise "a very high degree of care, 
indeed the highest that human prudence is equal to." This comes very 
close indeed to strict liability under the Rylands doctrine, reached by a 
different route--one that well merits attention in connection with our 
discussion of radiation injuries. 
From all of the foregoing it becomes abundantly clear there is no 
single or simple formula of liability that will dispose of all of the cases 
from all of the states or even the majority of the cases from a majority 
of the states. Moreover, it would be a ~ompletely unacceptable over-
simplification to attempt to set forth in summary form on the basis of 
existing case law what the effect of the Rylands doctrine is likely to be 
when atomic energy cases come before the courts and plaintiffs seek to 
impose strict liability. Finally, if certainty in the law is to be obtained, 
so 62 Idaho 298, III P.2d 872 (1941). 
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it must be reached in some other way than through common law methods 
of evolution of the Rylands doctrine by judicial decision. 
E. Strict Liability Under the American Law Institute Doctrine 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, published in 1938 under the 
auspices of the American Law Institute, purports to present a compre-
hensive and orderly statement of the common law of the United States, 
including not only the law developed by judicial decision, but also that 
which has grown from the application by the courts of generally accepted 
statutes that have been enforced for long enough periods to have be-
come thoroughly imbedded in the law of the land. Since the Restatement 
may be resorted to by some courts in this country in deciding cases aris-
ing from radiation injuries, we must examine its scope and effect. 
With respect to ultrahazardous activities in the law of torts, the Re-
statement expresses its principles in six short sections, which for the sake 
of complete understanding will be quoted in full as follows: 
§519. Miscarriage of Ultrahazardous Activities Carefully 
Carried On. Except as stated in §§521-4, orie who carries on 
an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, 
land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be 
harmed by .the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for 
harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity 
ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to pre-
vent the harm. 
* * * * * 
§520. Definition of Ultrahazardous Activity. An activity is 
ultrahazardous if it 
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the per-
son, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by 
the exercise of the utmost care, and 
{b) is not a matter of common usage. 
• • • * • 
§521. Ultrahazardous Activity Carried On in Pursuance of a 
Public Duty. The rule stated in §519 does not apply if the ac-
tivity is carried on in pursuance of a public duty imposed upon 
the actor as a public officer or employee or as common carrier. 
* * * * * 
§522. Contributing Actions of Third Persons, Animals and 
Forces of Nature. One carrying on an ultrahazardous activity 
is liable for harm under the rule stated in §519, although the 
harm is caused by the unexpectable 
(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third 
person, or 
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(b) action of an animal, or 
(c) operation of a force of nature. 
* * * * * 
§523. Participants in Ultrahazardous Activities. The rule 
stated in §519 does not apply where the person harmed by the 
unpreventable miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity has 
reason to know of the risk which makes the activity ultra-
hazardous and 
(a) takes part in it, or 
(b) brings himself within the area which will be endan-
gered by its miscarriage 
( i) without a privilege, or 
(ii) in the exercise of a privilege derived from the con-
sent of the person carrying on the activity, or 
-(iii) as a member of the public entitled to the services 
of a public utility carrying on the activity. 
* * * * * 
§524. Effect of Contributory Fault. 
(I) A plaintiff is not barred from recovery for harm done 
by the miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity caused by 
his failure to exercise reasonable care to observe the fact that 
the activity is being carried on or by intentionally coming into 
the area which would be endangered by its miscarriage. 
( 2) A plaintiff is barred from recovery for harm caused by 
the miscarriage of an ultrahazardous activity if, but only if, 
(a) he intentionally o.r negligently causes ~e activity to 
miscarry, or -
(b) after knowledge that it has miscarried or is about to 
miscarry, he fails to exercise reasonable care to avoid harm 
threatened thereby.88 
671 
In an accompanying commentary the authors of the Restatement 
point out by way of illustration that the term "ultrahazardous" includes 
such items as the operation of airplanes, the storage and transportation 
of explosive substances, and the drilling of oil wells. They also include 
blasting for clearing woodlands and otherwise. On the other hand, they 
do not include the ordinary automobile because of the fact that it is a 
matter of "common usage" and thus is excluded by reason of Section 
520(b). 
The question which confronts us is whether or not under the Restate-
ment doctrine any or all phases of atomic enterprise will be included 
within the range of strict liability. Should we conclude that all uses of 
atomic energy "necessarily involve a risk of serious harm which cannot 
sa See 3 Restatement, Torts, ch. 21, pp. 41-53. 
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be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care" ? Or may we argue 
with good reason that certain uses of less dangerous radioisotopes fall 
on the other side of the line? Or may we so interpret the phrase as to 
exclude certain types of reactors or certain processes involving the 
handling of critical quantities of fissionable materials when the reactors 
or processes become well established, with well understood technology 
and good safety records? Do they then become "matters of common 
usage"? What is to be deemed "common usage" under the circum-
stances? . 
As Dean Prosser has pointed out so clearly,87 the Restatement doctrine 
is more inclusive than the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher in at least one 
respect, for by ignoring the effect of the place where the activity is car-
ried on and its surroundings, even a location far removed from popu-
lation centers would be included. Also it falls short in another respect, 
namely, in the insistence placed upon the necessity of extreme danger 
and the impossibility of eliminating it with all possible care. This 
sharply limits the list of "dangerous substances." Accordingly it would 
follow that, under the Restatement, the fact that an atomic reactor is 
located in the middle of a desert would not constitute a defense, but, on 
the other hand, a cobalt 6o source used for the irradiation of food or 
drugs might not be deemed so extremely dangerous as to warrant the 
imposition of strict liability. The Restatement doctrine was not formu-
lated until. 1938, and thus far only a very few cases have been decided in 
which it has been interpreted and applied. In California, for example, 
the courts seem to have adopted the Restatement rule, possibly for the 
reason that they have in at least three cases expressed disapproval of 
the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and they are seeking some basis for 
granting relief in proper cases. Luthringer v. Moore 88 is illustrative. 
There the California court took advantage of the Restatement and ap-
plied it to impose strict liability in a case involving the use of hydro-
cyanic acid gas for fumigating operations on certain premises. The gas 
escaped into an adjoining building where it injured the plaintiff. The 
court regarded the use of the gas under the circumstances as "a hazard-
ous activity," holding that it was "perilous and likely to cause injury 
even though the utmost care is used" and that "the use of it. under these 
circumstances [i.e., the circumstances of the case] is not a matter of 
common usage within the meaning of the term." Thus the Restatement 
paved the way to the plaintiff's recovery. 
87 Prosser, Selected Topi~ on the Law of Torts IsS (1953). 
88 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P. 2d I (1!)48). 
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On the other hand, in another California case, Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. 
Merritt, Clw,pman & Scott Corporation,89 the federal court, following 
what it believed to be the law of California, declined to apply either the 
Rylands case or the Restatement doctrine to a case of water damage 
caused to plaintiff's property by the failure of a cofferdam built by the 
defendant. There was no charge of negligence involved, and the coffer-
dam failed because of flood conditions. Refusing to find ground for 
imposing strict liability the court said with respect to the Restatement 
doctrine: 
This court does not believe that this doctrine has been or 
should be extended to damage by water under the circum-
stances set forth in the complaint. 90 
The Oregon Supreme Court relied upon the Restatement doctrine in 
Bedell v. Goulter,91 which involved injuries to real property caused by 
concussion and vibration from blasting operations. The court quoted 
Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement and concluded that "blasting 
is ultrahazardous because high explosives are used." Continuing, the 
court said, "The one who causes the injury must be held to engage in 
the dangerous activity at his peril 'because it is impossible to predict with 
certainty the extent or severity of its consequences.' " 
In another blasting case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached 
a like result, also relying upon the Restatement. In Federoff v. Harrison 
Construction Co.92 it appeared that the p.laintiff's house, distant some 
1,600 feet from the defendant's blasting operations, was damaged by 
vibration and concussion. The defendant was held liable. The court, 
relying primarily upon the Restatement, said : 
We think the record supports a finding that the damage was 
caused by the blasting, thus bringing the case within the rule 
stated in Section 519 of the Restatement of Torts: that, sub-
ject to exceptions not now material, "one who carries on an 
ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land 
or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by 
the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm result-
ing thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, 
although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." 98 
The Restatement principle has also been applied in the state of Con-
necticut. In Whitman Hotel Corp. v. The _Elliott & Watrous Engineer-
59 123 Fed. Supp. 720 (1954). 
90 I d. at 722. 
91 199 Ore. 344. 261 P ..2d 842 (1953). 
92 362 Pa. t8t, 66 A.2d 817 (1949). 
93 I d. at 183. 
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ing Company 94 the court relied upon the doctrine in a case involving 
damage caused by dynamite blasting within the city of Norwich, the 
damage again having been caused by vibrations of the earth set in mo-
tion by the activities of the defendant. In the absence of proof of 
negligence the court nevertheless held the defendant liable, referring to 
Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement and stating: 
The rule [i.e., the Restatement rule] is adhered to in Con-
necticut. It has been stated as follows: A person who uses an 
intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a lawful end, in 
such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose the person 
of another to the danger of probable injury, is liable if such 
injury results, even though he uses all proper care.95 
The foregoing brief examination of the· cases is a summary of the 
rather limited number of judicial decisions in which the Restatement 
doctrine has been directly applied in support of the imposition of abso-
lute liability. Only twenty years have elapsed since the publication of the 
Restatement, and it is therefore not surprising that the number of 
decisions based upon it is not great. 
There have been several opinions in which the courts have cited the 
Restatement doctrine with general approval, but have declined to apply 
it to the facts of the particular cases a:t hand. For example, in Smith v. 
Okerson 98 an action was brought to recover the cost of fodder which 
the plaintiff purchased to feed his cattle after the defendants, while 
spraying their potato crop with arsenic solution, had rendered the plain-
tiff's alfalfa crop useless. It appeared that some of the arsenic spray 
had drifted to the plaintiff's adjoining fields. The court, stating that 
the New Jersey courts have declined to follow Rylands v. Fletcher, also 
observed that it was doubtful if they would go as far as indicated by the 
Restatement rule. Section 519 of the Restatement was cited, the court 
saying: 
The prevailing American rule admits liability in the absence 
of negligence, only in connection with an activity that is not a 
matter of common usage and that necessarily involves a risk of 
serious harm to others, and not even in such case if the activity 
is carried on in pursuance of a public duty. . . . I doubt 
whether in New Jersey we go even that far. 
* * * * •. 
94 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951). 
95 /d. at s6s. 
ee 8 N .]. Super. s6o, 73 A.2d 857 ( 1950) . 
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I conclude that the defendants are not answerable to plaintiff 
unless they were negligent in the spraying of the arsenic solu-
tion.'" 
675 
The fact of "common usage" of arsenic solution spray for potato 
fields would have saved the day for the defendant in the absence of proof 
of negligence, but unfortunately for the defendant in this particular case 
the court found evidence of negligence on the basis of which the plaintiff 
recovered a judgment for damages. 
Again, in a Delaware case, Fritz v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.98 
an action was brought against the company for personal injuries oc-
casioned when the plaintiff was overcome by a concentration of chlorine 
fumes which escaped from a plant operated by the defendant. The court, 
although urged to do so, declined to apply the doctrine of absolute liabil-
ity either under Rylands v. Fletcher or under the Restatement, stating 
its position as follows: 
In the present case it was not unlawful for DuPont to have 
on its premises chlorine gas, nor was its presence there un-
usual, and it cannot be said that the mere possession of chlorine 
gas by DuPont without more was dangerous per se in the light 
of recognized industrial use. To say that any corporation or 
individual possessing or using dangerous substances upon its 
or his premises should be held liable as an insurer in the event 
of injury to others by reason of the mere possession, use, or 
escape thereof would be but to strangle corporate and indi-
vidual enterprise in many well recognized fields of endeavor. 
If the rule of absolute liability is to be adopted in this State, 
it seems to me that its application should be confined to those 
operations which have connected with them a history of doing 
injury to others or the destruction. of their property, and 
only in those cases where a nuisance by reason of their pres-
ence or use can be established. 99 
Chlorine gas would seem to be a reasonably dangerous commodity, 
perhaps fully as dangerous as some forms of radioisotopes. Yet the 
court, persuaded in part by considerations of relative utility_;_a balance 
of convenience-reduced the scope of the Restatement doctrine as well 
as Rylands v. Fletcher to uses having a "history of doing injury." 
Again, in South Dakota, in Midwest Oil Company v. City of Aber-
deen 100 the court, in the absence of proof of negligence, declined to apply 
91 ld. at 564, 565. 
98 6 Terry 427, 75 A.zd 256 (1950). 
99 I d. at 437, 438. 
too 6g S.D. 343, 10 N.W .zd 701 (1943). 
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the Restatement doctrine to impose absolute liability in a suit for dam-
ages inflicted upon plaintiff's gasoline filling station by a break in the 
defendant city's water main. In regard to the applicability of the Re-
statement doctrine the court said : 
The present facts disclose water being sent through a ten-inch 
main in the manner now generally accepted for the purpose of. 
furnishing a water supply to city dwellers. We think it clear 
that such a distribution of water does not constitute an ultra-
hazardous activity. The definition of an ultrahazardous ac-
tivity as set forth in Section 520 in the Re&tatement of the 
Law of Torts is as follows: [Thereupon Section 520 is 
repeated.] 
Water mains are universally in use in cities, and to hold that 
a proper and reasonable use of such mains "necessarily in-
volves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of 
others" would be contrary to the experience of at least several 
generations.101 
This is, of course, quite like the result that would be reached by most 
courts in applying the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher. 
By way of conclusion, we may suggest that the doctrine of the Ameri-
can Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts, though not yet 
widely applied, is, at least, a worthy attempt to achieve precision and 
definiteness in the field of absolute liability. At the same time, although 
there is not enough case Jaw as yet available to warrant reaching a 
definite conclusion on the matter, it would seem likely that the Restate-
ment would not accomplish the desired result of bringing order out of 
chaos in strict liability. Iri the twenty years in which it ·has been avail-
able the courts have been inclined to ignore it and to rely upon previ-
ously developed common law principles derived from Rylands v. 
Fletcher. So, at the very most, we can only say that the Restatement 
gives us one more doctrine of occasional utility to be added to the welter 
of confusion under American law, and that, up to the present time at 
least, it has not made a significant contribution to the solution of strict 
liability problems. 
l\4oroover, there are several good reasons why the Restatement doc-
trine is not likely to contribute much in the future to the solution of 
problems of liability for radiation injuries. Not only has it not as yet 
enjoyed wide acceptance by the courts in this country, but, more im-
portantly. its rigid coverage runs counter to the flexible application of 
Rvlands v Pletcher, which is current practice in this country. Further-
"H ld at 347 
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more, it may be said with accuracy that certain courts both in England 
and the United States have receded somewhat from their earlier en-
thusiasm for the Rylands doctrine. Finally it should be noted that the 
language of Sections 519 to 524 of the Restatement departs rather 
markedly from the patterns of liability for radiation injuries that are 
currently being developed by statute in other important countries-in 
England, Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere in the world. Both 
the scope of the coverage and the specified exceptions differ radically 
from current thinking elsewhere. It is far more likely that European 
influence will be effective than that the American Law Institute doctrine 
will be accepted even in the United States, for the former is better and 
more realistically fitted to the facts of radiation injuries. The foreign 
proposals will be examined later in this chapter. 
F. Private Nuisance Doctrines-Absolute Nuisance 
1. Nuisance Doctrines and Remedies 
In order to complete the review· of American doctrine involving or 
related to absolute or strict liability we must give brief consideration 
to a considerable group of cases disposed of either wholly or in part 
under the law of private nuisance.102 Of especial interest is a doctrine 
that has been developed which for want of a better name has often been 
called "absolute nuisance," or "nuisance per se," although the addition 
of the words "absolute" or "per se" cannot be regarded as either sig-
nificant or definitive. 
By way of definition we may say that, in general, a private nuisance 
may result whenever there is an interference with the use or enjoyment 
of the land of the plaintiff occasioned either by the intentional miscon-
duct of the defendant, or conduct which is negligent, or conduct with 
respect to which the courts are inclined to apply strict liability without 
proof of either intent or negligence. It is this third category with which 
we are primarily concerned. A nuisance case normally is disposed of by 
a petition in equity in which the plaintiff seeks an injunction to restrain 
continuance of the nuisance and perhaps asks damages as well. How-
ever, the decisions reveal that the courts of law also, in actions in which 
damages alone are sought, frequently refer to nuisance principles and 
apply them in reaching the conclusion that the circumstances call for the 
imposition of the equivalent of an absolute liability. 
1o2 We are not concerned with public nuisance which is, in effect, a crime and is 
punishable as such. 
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In considering the possible relation of nuisance doctrines to liability 
for radiation injuries we should take account of two classes of cases. 
The first includes cases in which the defendant intentionally maintains 
an_ activity in a neighborhood where in normal operation it causes annoy-
ance or injury to occupants of property in the vicinity, e.g., the operation 
of a plant which gives off sulphuric acid fumes, or, in the atomic field, 
possibly radioactive gases. The second covers cases of unduly hazard-
ous operations which, in normal and successful operation cause no harm 
whatsoever, but if an accident takes place trouble ensues, e.g., storage 
of nitroglycerin, or, in the atomic field, operating a reactor or a fuel 
processing plant. In both instances the courts work out and apply a 
"balance of convenience" doctrine with the result that no nuisance is 
found and no liability is imposed apart from negligence, if the activity 
is reasonable in relation to its location, its proximity to population, its 
economic worth, and other related factors. If otherwise, however, the 
court will enjoin or will give judgment for damages, or will afford both 
such remedies as the equities may require. It is apparent that such a 
doctrine will embrace many cases that would fall within the scope of 
Rylands v. Fletcher as currently interpreted, and therefore the two 
doctrines are concurrent in effect to a considerable degree. We need not 
be surprised, therefore, when we find some courts using the two doc-
trines interchangeably, or perhaps using both in the same opinion. 
Doubtless, defendants in radiation accident cases will encounter the 
double-barrelled approach with considerable frequency in the years to 
come. 
For example, we have previously referred to the case of Be"y v. 
Shell Petroleum Company/08 an action for damages in which the court 
based its conclusion of absolute liability both upon a theory of nuisance 
and also upon the precedent of Rylands v. Fletcher. Many such cases 
could be cited and, indeed, several of the other cases previously referred 
to in this chapter reveal more or less of the same dual reasoning. 
It is also apparent that many courts which purport to reject the prin-
ciple of Rylands v. Fletcher do in fact reach like conclusions under the 
name of absolute nuisance. As stated by Dean Prosser : 
There is in fact no case applying Rylands v. Fletcher which is 
not reasonably duplicated in all essential respects by some 
American decision whirh proceeds on the thf'ory of nuisance. 104 
to8 Supra note 4J. 
104 Prosser, Selectt:d Topics on the Law of Torts r70 ( l9S3). 
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A wealth of authority could also be cited in support of the foregoing 
statement, but the following will serve as illustrative and typical cases. 
In none of them was there a showing of either negligence or wrongful 
intent. In Longtin v. Persell 105 the plaintiff recovered damages in an 
action involving use of explosives producing vibrations which were held 
to constitute an actionable nuisance ; in Holman v. Mineral Point Zinc 
Co.106 the plaintiff was refused an injunction but was awarded damages 
in an action to abate as a nuisance and to recover damages for losses 
caused by defendant's plant emitting sulphuric acid fumes; in Bartell v. 
Ridgefield Lumber Co.101 the plaintiff also recovered damages but was 
denied an injunction asked by him to prevent the operation of defend-
ant's saw mill which emitted sparks, smoke, and soot; in Whittemore v. 
Baxter Laundry C o.108 the plaintiff brought an action to restrain the stor-
age of inflammable liquids on the defendant's premises adjacent to those 
of the plaintiff, and under the circumstances the court held that an injunc-
tion should issue. In the Holman and Bartell cases, in which the injunc-
tion was denied, the court based its action on balance of convenience un-
der the particular circumstances in each instance. In the Whittemore case, 
the injunction was issued, but actual construction had not yet com-
menced, thereby illustrating a phase of the nuisance remedy not avail-
able under the Rylands doctrine. Other cases that might be cited involve 
percolating water, storage of explosives, fireworks, oil wells, mining 
operations, the accumulation of sewage, and bad odors, noxious gases, 
smoke, dust, etc. In other words, the cases in which American courts 
have resorted to an absolute nuisance doctrine as the basis of strict lia-
bility cover much the same territory as that covered by cases directly 
based upon Rylands v. Fletcher and the doctrines developed there-
under.109 
Professor Warren Seavey, an eminent authority in the field of tort 
law, is inclined to criticize the theory underlying these cases and to 
feel that this broad application of the doctrine of nuisance is unjustifi-
able. He asserts that it should not be applied to accidents arising from 
lawful conduct but only in cases involving tortious conduct.110 He main-
105 30 Mont. 3o6, 76 Pac. 699 (1904). 
108 135 Wis. 132, ns N.W. 327 (1go8). 
101 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 3o6 (1924). 
1o8 181 Mich. s64. 148 N.w. 437 (1914). 
109 Dozens of other cases are cited in Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 
166-171 (1953). 
no See Seavey, supra note 7. 
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tains that some wrongful act, either intentional or negligent, should be 
established as a proper basis of the charge of nuisance. He says : 
The primary function of nuisance as a separate topic in the 
law of torts is to mark out the area within which it is unrea-
sonable for one to subject his neighbors or the public to noise, 
vibrations, fumes, immorality or the risk of physical harm. 
Where there is a nuisance because of the risk of harm, nuisance 
overlaps negligence. But its rules are neither esoteric nor ec-
centric; they follow the normal pattern of tort principles. A 
few courts have been misled by incautious statements, espe-
cially statements dealing with harm resulting from a public 
nuisance. But the results reached by those courts are not repre-
sentative. In general it may be said that legal fault is a requi-
site for nuisance and that contributory negligence is a defense 
to an action for harm caused by a nuisance resulting from 
merely negligent conduct, whether or not the physical condi-
tion which was the cause of the harm was intended.111 
Mr. Seavey is undoubtedly right so far as the historical origin of the 
doctrine of nuisance is concerned. But the plain fact is that the Ameri-
can courts have, in large numbers of cases, ignored the historical dis-
tinctions and have spoken in terms of nuisance when they have wished 
to impose strict liability in situations where the activity itself was not 
illegal either by reason of wrongful intent or negligence. This being 
the case, we can only take account of these decisions as existing factors 
of importance in the current juristic scene. Therefore, we must perforce 
recognize the existence of an absolute nuisance doctrine when we seek 
to appraise the likelihood of strict liability being imposed upon the 
atomic industry of the future. 
2. Some Special Features of Absolute Nuisance as Compared with 
Rylands v. Fletcher 
We have already called attention to the fact that, under the doctrine 
of Rylands v. Fletcher, the location of the dangerous instrumentality 
becomes important, for if it is located at a sufficient distance from 
others who might conceivably be injured by it, or if, because of the 
customs of the community or the nature of the activity, it is appropriate 
to the place where it is maintained in the light of the character of that 
place and its surroundings, no strict liability will ensue. The doctrine of 
nuisance embraces an equivalent line of reasoning, and that which might 
111 /d. at 995, 996. 
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be deemed a nuisance in a congested community would not be so re-
garded if located in a desert miles removed from human habitation. 
With respect to another feature, however, there would seem to be an 
important difference between Rylands v. Fletcher and the doctrines of 
nuisance. The Rylands theory focuses primarily upon the "dangerous 
nature" of the instrumentality, and if it escapes and it "does mischief," 
strict liability is imposed without further question. On the other hand, 
the nuisance doctrine, in accord with the general approach of courts of 
equity where most of the cases arise, is more likely to produce decisions 
based upon a balance of public convenience or a balance of interest be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. The court of equity has discre-
tionary authority, particularly (although not exclusively) used in con-
nection with issuing the injunction. Intangible factors, including among 
others a high measure of social utility or economic value, may serve to 
exculpate an activity that otherwise would be deemed a private nuisance. 
The fact that the strict liability cases which we are now considering 
normally (although not always) have arisen in courts of equity has 
given rise to the idea of balancing of equities. It should be observed that 
this element not only serves to mitigate undue hardship, a worthy con-
sideration, but also it serves to create a decidedly vague and indetermi-
nate standard to be applied. Under such a theory the lines of demarca-
tion between strict liability and otherwise become shadowy indeed. 
One other point of interest is the distinction that is sometimes as-
serted to the effect that in order to constitute a nuisance the defendant's 
conduct must result in a continuing or recurring damage to the plaintiff, 
whereas the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher contains no such limitation 
and a single event may give rise to liability. This distinction finds some 
justification in American decisions for most of them involve situations 
in which the damage has been a continuing one. It is a fact, however, 
that courts have, in a number of instances, found an absolute nuisance 
to exist when but a single damaging event has taken place, such as a 
single accidental explosion setting off a powder magazine or the setting 
off of a single charge of blasting powder.112 Accordingly, we may con-
clude that the singleness of the act is no absolute bar to resort to the 
application of the nuisance doctrine, although the duration or recurrence 
of the interference with plaintiff's property is always a factor to be 
weighed in determining whether or not the damage is sufficiently sub-
stantial to constitute a nuisance.118 
n2 See Heeg v. Licht, 8o N.Y. 579 (188o), and Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407, 
134 Pac. 1076 (1913). Also see the discussion of the subject in Prosser, Torts 397 
(2d ed. 1955). 
us See 4 Restatement, Torts 245, Comment on §827. 
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Wholly apart from the fine points of refinement relative to the pre-
cise scope of the doctrine of absolute nuisance and the remedies which 
it affords, we must conclude that in a general way the doctrine parallels 
that of Rylands v. Fletcher, and that courts in the United States are 
inclined to use the two doctrines more or less interchangeably and even 
simultaneously, although not coextensively. As Dean Prosser has pointed 
out, although the two remedies have a large area in common, the nui-
sance remedy is primarily directed toward providing redress for injuries 
to land, and does not cover personal injuries not connected with land. 
Moreover, it can lead to the issuance of an injunction as well as an 
award of damages. On the other hand, Rylands v. Fletcher, strictly a 
damage remedy, reaches personal injuries but does not, so far as the 
decisions reveal, reach certain relatively non-hazardous types of injury, 
such as those arising from noise, for example, which might conceivably 
be subject to attack under the nuisance doctrine. It is clear that both 
doctrines must be taken into account in dealing with radiation hazards. 
G. Defenses to Strict Liability-Defendant's Contributory Negligence 
or Assumption of Risk-Third Party Actions 
We have hitherto noted that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher has been 
held not to apply in case the escape of the dangerous substance arises 
from plaintiff's contributory negligence, or from an act of God, or of 
a third party stranger, or if its activity is specifically sanctioned by 
statutory authority.i14 We have also noted that the American Law 
Institute Restatement specifically provides for exemption in case of ac-
tivities carried on in pursuance of a public duty (Restatement, Sec. 521), 
in case of an assumption of risk by the person harmed (Sec. 523), in 
case of action by the person harmed which causes the dangerous activity 
to miscarry (Sec. 524), or, after knowledge that the activity has mis-
carried or is about to do so, in case he fails to exercise reasonable care 
to avoid harm (Sec. 524) .m 
It is desirable, before concluding this discussion of strict liability un-
der common law doctrines, to give further brief consideration to certain 
of these defenses. They are often resorted to i~ connection with or-
dinary actions based upon negligence. This is true of contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and contributing third party action. These 
defenses may be pleaded and relied upon in actions for damages based 
upon strict liability for radiation injuries. Are they to be deemed valid 
• •• See text at notes 25-28 supra. 
' " Set> text at note 86 supra. 
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defenses when the action is based upon the Rylands theory, or the Re-
statement, or the doctrine of nuisance? Are they valid under all circum-
stances, or, if not, to what extent may they be relied upon? 
Defendant's Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk. It is 
frequently said that contributory negligence is not a defense in cases of 
strict liability whether such liability is based upon Rylands v. Fletcher 
or upon a doctrine of nuisance. Yet this statement is only partially true. 
The Institute Restatement seeks to clarify the point by dividing con-
tributory activities of the plaintiff into two categories. The plaintiff is 
not barred from recovery on the ground of contributory action if it con-
sists of negligently failing to observe the dangerous situation, or of 
intentionally coming into proximity to the hazard (Restatement, Sec. 
524(u) ). However, he is barred if he precipitates the miscarriage of 
the dangerous substance, or if, after learning of the hazard, he fails to 
take reasonable care to avoid personal harm (Sec. 524 ( 2) ) . In other 
words, he is barred in those instances in which his own default or his 
own assumption of the risk has contributed to his injury in such manner 
as to suggest the injustice of holding the defendant to the absolute lia-
bility. If contributory negligence and assumption of risk are to be ac-
cepted as valid defenses in an action based upon negligence when the 
defendant is proved guilty of a social wrong, i.e., negligence, it would 
seem only just that a somewhat equivalent defense be available when 
the defendant is by hypothesis innocent of social wrongdoing. This 
the Restatement seeks to achieve. Moreover, the cases and text writers 
bear out a like conclusion with respect to actions based upon Rylands v. 
Fletcher and also those based upon nuisance.116 Therefore the general-
ization to the effect that these defenses are not valid in strict liability 
proceedings is inaccurate. 
Third ParJy Activities. It can and sometimes does happen that a 
third party contributes in a significant way to the incident causing the 
damage, and the question arises as to whether or not such third party 
action will exculpate the defendant from strict liability. So far as radia-
tion injuries are concerned, one of the principal problems raised by third 
party activities is the possibility of two or more users of atomic energy 
each contributing to stream or air pollution under such circumstances 
that neither acting singly would have caused damage or created a nui-
sance, but the combination of the several users does so. What should 
be the effect of these third party contributions? In cases of a similar 
116 See Prosser, Torts 341-343, 423-426 (2d ed. 1955); also Harper & James, Torts, 
Vol. I, p. 8z-8s, Vol. II, p. 8o2-8o5. 
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nature based upon the nuisance theory it has been consistently held that 
each contributor to the plaintiff's injury is liable jointly with his fellow 
contributors for the full amount of the damage, although, if appor-
tionment of damage can readily be made, the court may undertake to do 
so.117 A like result would be reached under Section 522 of the Restate-
ment. On the other hand there have been a number of cases tried under 
the Rylands doctrine in which third party action has intervened in such 
manner as to relieve the defendant of his strict liability.118 In short, the 
confusion and inconsistency of doctrine to which reference has hitherto 
been made in another connection also prevails with respect to these 
special defenses. 
H. Conclusions Concerning Common Law Doctrines 
We should now attempt to shape some conclusions from the forego-
ing review of case law, particularly having in mind the problem of ob-
taining redress for persons injured by radioactive substances. 
(1) We must keep general principles in mind. It is a principle not 
only of the common law but also of the Roman law and the Codes based 
upon it that no one is to be held liable unless he is guilty of negligence 
or wrongful intent. However, today, under all responsible legal systems, 
there is a tendency to gravitate from liability only in case of fault 
toward the principle of absolute liability-"liability without fault." 
Over-all absolute liability without any restrictions or limitations what-
soever is rare. It is to.o severe and too unsophisticated. Instead the law 
seeks (and should seek) what has been aptly called "the golden mean" 
between too much and too little-between the ancient Roman principle 
that persons are responsible only for negligence, (a principle under 
some circumstances too generous to the defendants) and the primeval 
common law principle that persons who cause injury are to be held un-
conditionally liable in all circumstances (a principle too generous to the 
plaintiff). 
The basic problem in connection with users of radioactive substances 
is to find this "golden mean," the middle way suited to the atomic user's 
circumstances, appropriate in view of the desirability of encouraging the 
development of atomic enterprise, yet taking due account of justice to 
the injured persons. 
(2) As we have noted, there are two directions from which the 
111 See Northup v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 Pac. 266 ( 1918), a stream pollution case; 
see also Prosser, Torts 422 (:zd ed. 1955). 
us See Prosser, Torts 340, 341 (2d ed. 1955) and cases cited. 
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''golden mean" may be approached. On the one hand we may extend the 
concept of negligence by expanding the standard of due care in such 
manner as to facilitate recovery by the injured person, thus promoting 
justice without taking the ultimate step of invoking a doctrine of abso-
lute liability. Or, on the other hand, we may create absolute liability, 
yet, by attaching appropriate conditions and limitations to the concept, 
bring it into line with justice and good sense. Each approach is exempli-
fied by judicial decisions in more or less analogous fields. It is apparent, 
however, that the approach of absolute liability with exceptions is the 
more in harmony with current thinking. 
(3) We must take account of the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine, in-
cluding the many variations found in different states of the Union. Yet 
this doctrine has not helped us to the "golden mean," but has left us 
with a welter of indefinite boundary lines and differences of judicial 
v1ews. 
(4) We must also take account of the American Law Institute doc-
trine of ultrahazardous activities. Although this doctrine has been 
formulated by eminent authority, it has not yet been fully ripened by 
judicial decisions. However, it is sufficiently important to have been 
accepted in several jurisdictions. At the same tin:te, for the purposes of 
atomic energy, it seems quite unlikely to bring about an orderly and 
acceptable solution. 
(5) We must also take account of the vague contours of the doctrine 
of absolute nuisance, with its possibilities for injunction as well as judg-
ments for damages. This doctrine, although frequently invoked, does 
not provide the precise answers necessary to dispose adequately of civil 
liability for radiation injuries. 
( 6) None of the foregoing theories leads us to any helpful drawing 
of lines of demarcation in the atomic field. For example, a reactor con-
taining critical quantities of uranium is relatively more dangerous than 
a cobalt 6o radiography capsule, and the latter is worse than a radioiso-
tope thickness gage. In one sense all are "dangerous substances," likely 
to "cause mischief" if they escape. Yet a line must be drawn unless we 
wish to place all atomic uses in a single category so far as liability is 
concerned. This would not be realistic, yet common law methods offer 
very little help in resolving the difficulty. 
(7) In view of this complicated and uncertain state of affairs of one 
thing we may be certain, namely, that before we move very many years 
into the atomic age, state legislatures will be taking action to provide 
statutory rules covering the matter of liability in radiation injury cases, 
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thus making an effort to bring order out of choas, giving certainty to the 
law, and attempting to satisfy contemporary ideas concerning justice for 
in jured persons. We should not anticipate the discussion later in this 
chapter but we may merely suggest that in the near future statutes will 
be. enacted, as they have been, for example, in. connection with fires 
caused by railroads, to impose calculated, though varying, degrees of 
liability upon users of radioactive substances. Indeed, as we shall later 
see, a statutory solution of the problem of liability for radiation injuries 
may well become the standard of practice throughout the civilized world, 
both in common law countries and in those basing their law upon civil 
codes.119 
I. Factual Analysis of Applications of Atomic Energy to Show Basis of 
Liability 
Up to this point we have examined the existing law, with only occa-
sional references to atomic energy uses and radiation accidents. We 
must now, before attempting to reach final judgments concerning the 
law that will be applied to such accidents, undertake to get a fairly de-
tailed view of the highly variant kinds of accidents and injuries that 
may take place. We will then be in a position to draw some informed 
conclusions. These fact situations vary widely in extent, severity, char-
acter, and quality, and we can predict with certainty that courts will 
react differently depending upon individual circumstances. They will 
no doubt be sympathetic with the applications of doctrines of strict lia-
bility in certain of the aspects of this new development, but they are far 
less likely to do so in others. 
I. Early History of Radiation Accidents 
Hitherto in this volume we have called attention to the fact that at 
an earlier day the pitchblende miners in Czechoslovakia were found to 
be dying of pulmonary ailments at a rate approximately thirty times 
greater than that of the general population. They were in fact dying of 
lung cancer although the nature of the ailment was not known at that 
time. It is believed that the inhalation of the radioactive radon, a gas 
created from the disintegration of pitchblende, caused the cancerous 
growths and resulted in the high degree of mortality. 
We have also called attention to the fact that, when radium was first 
discovered, the earlier workers with the element suffered radiation in-
uu This idea of a statutor-y liability receives interesting support in a recent brief 
article by Professor Warren A. Seavey, "Torts and Atoms," 46 Cal. L. Rev. 3-13 
(1958). 
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juries as a result of undue exposure. The same has been true of X-rays, 
for, in the early stages of development of that useful instrumentality, 
the scientists and technicians working with it were frequently overex-
posed, with the resultant development of malignancy. 
One of the most highly publicized of the earlier cases involves the 
radium dial painters of New Jersey. The well-known case is LaPorte v. 
United States Radium Corporation.120 In this case it appeared that the 
decedent had been employed for approximately a year and a half paint-
ing watch dials with radioactive luminous paint. She had been follow-
ing the common practice of pointing the bristles of the paintbrush with 
her lips, thereby ingesting small quantities of radioactive material. 
Twelve years after she left the company she began to exhibit the symp-
toms of radium necrosis. She commenced an action for damages, and 
shortly thereafter she died. The action was revived by her legal repre-
sentative. 
There was a two-year statute of limitations. The action, which took 
the form of a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from pleading the 
statute of limitations as a bar, was dismissed. Because of the statute, 
the plaintiff was unable to recover damages. 
2. Radiation Accidents Since World War II 
We now turn to injuries which have been suffered in more recent 
years as a result of undue exposure of persons and property to radioac-
tive substances. These are the World War II and later developments 
connected with the important contemporaneous expansion of nuclear 
enterprise. 
In general, there are three broad classes of injuries arising and likely 
to arise from atomic enterprise. There are those that arise from acci-
dents of a conventional character although occurring in atomic installa-
tions, e.g., ordinary cuts, bruises, broken bones, etc. Then there are 
accidents that are peculiar to atomic industry because they arise from 
materials or processes peculiar to that industry but do not involve radia-
tion as such, e.g., uranium scrap fires. Finally, there are those in which 
radiation is the principal or the exclusive cause of injury. Since we are 
concerning ourselves with the unique legal problems of atomic energy, 
we will direct our attention primarily to this third category. No doubt 
the shape of the law of civil liability is going to be very largely deter-
mined, as we have seen, by the characteristic hazards of the business, and 
we must try to appraise these hazards as they are revealed by experience. 
We can learn something from "the incidents" that have already arisen, 
120 13 Fed. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935). 
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although fortunately they are few in number. Thereafter, we will hy-
pothesize the possibilities for the future, thereby obtaining a complete, 
though necessarily speculative, view of the field. 121 
(I) Criticality Incidents. During the earlier years of experimenta-
tion with fissionable materials several tests at Los Alamos, New Mexico, 
involving the assembly of critical quantities of such material, resulted 
in accidents. Two deaths ensued, one in 1945 and the other in 1946. 
Thereafter, remote control devices were utilized, strict regulations were 
imposed governing the conduct of criticality experiments, and the most 
meticulous precautions were taken to prevent further accidents. Al-
though several other unexpected criticality incidents have taken place 
since then, and several staff members have been overexposed to radia-
tion, there have been no observable, untoward symptoms. However, 
these incidents reveal the need of the highest degree of care and skill 
and the utmost in precautions to be taken in carrying out all experiments 
or operations in which supra-critical masses may be assembled. If a pri-
vate reactor operator should have an accident with off-site injuries to 
persons or property, it would seem certain that a court which follows 
Rylands v. Fletcher would impose strict liability upon him. Moreover, 
the same result would probably be. reached under the Restatement prin-
ciple and also under nuisance doctrines unless the court should insist 
upon a continuing or recurring activity before relying upon the latter. 
(2) The NRX Reactor at Chalk River, Ontario. The Chalk River 
reactor which commenced operation in 1947 was a high power reactor 
being used for experimental purposes. Natural uranium was the fuel; 
heavy water, the moderator; and ordinary water, the coolant. There-
actor was used for general reseach purposes and for the production of 
radioisotopes as well as plutonium. In December 1952, when a special 
experiment was . being carried on, a power surge took place which re-
sulted in the reactor "running away." The incident is thought to have 
been due to a combination of human and mechanical errors. Melting 
caused the failure of the aluminum sheathing of some ten per cent of the 
uranium rods in the reactor. Both melting and oxidation of the uranium 
accompanied the failure. As a result a considerable quantity of radio-
active fission products was carried into the coolant water. Simultane-
ously gaseous fission products spread throughout the reactor structure 
and into the ancillary equipment. The reactor vessel was damaged be-
yond repair. It contained highly radioactive uranium which could not 
121 See Hayes, "A Summary of Accidents and Incidents Involving Radiation in 
Atomic Energy Activities, June, 1945 Through December, 1955," published by the 
AEC, Safety and Fire Protection Branch, Wash., D.C. (1956). TID-336o. 
STRICT LIABILITY 689 
be withdrawn in the ordinary way. All the ancillary equipment was ra-
dioactively contaminated, and the basement was flooded with radioactive 
water. The ceiling, walls, and floors of the upper part of the building 
were also contaminated. About a million gallons of radioactive water 
had to be pumped to a remote deposit area. It was, however, found 
possible by using entirely new techniques to decontaminate the surround-
ing property, and by early 1954 the reconstructed reactor was working 
again. There were no personnel injuries, although about ten thousand 
curies of fission products were released. So far as legal implications are 
concerned the incident can be regarded as illustrative of the fact that 
even a major reactor disaster can take place without unduly serious re-
sults excepting to the plant itself, and yet there is an "escape" of a 
dangerous substance and the potentialities are such that strict liability' 
for damages may well be deemed a certainty. Moreover, the radioactive 
effiu.ent would produce a continuing condition of private nuisance that 
would without question support a finding of absolute liability on that 
theory. · 
,(3) The Argonne Control Rod Test Incident. On June 2, 1952, at 
Argonne National Laboratory a damaging incident took place in con-
nection with an operation involving the testing of a series of newly 
manufactured control rods. The standard procedure for inserting a new 
control rod required that the water moderator of the critical assembly be 
first drained away, thus reducing reactivity and permitting the safe with-
drawal of the control rod for which substitution was to be made. How-
ever, in the particular operation that resulted in an accident, the water 
was not first removed. One of four test crew members proceeded to 
withdraw one of the control rods by hand. As he did so a bluish glow 
was emitted by the center of the reactor core. A large bubble formed 
and an explosion took place. The operator immediately dropped the rod 
<~,nd automatic devices drained the water from the core. All four op-
erators left the assembly room. Later tests showed exposures of 190, 
I6o, 70, and 12 rems respectively. Two of the operators suffered nausea, 
but there were no other observable symptoms. Clinical tests revealed in-
crease in excretion of urinary amino acids and decreased sperm counts, 
althoug\1 these effects disappeared in due course. No damage to the eye 
lenses was observed. What the future may hold for the victims no one 
can say.122 Apparently the human being can absorb a very substantial 
122 For a report of these four cases see Hasterlik & Marinelli, "Physical Dosimetry 
and Clinical Observations on Four Human Beings Involved in Accidental Critical 
Assembly Excursion," II Proceedings of the International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy 25 (Geneva 1955). 
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overexposure for a short period without suffering immediate and ob-
servable damage, although it is usually estimated that a total dosage of 
450 rems will be fatal to about one half of the population, i.e., this is the 
"mean lethal dose." Although the injuries were limited to persons em-
ployed on the premises, it is quite conceivable that under a proper com-
bination of circumstances, off-site damage could take place, and again 
one can hardly doubt that the dangerous nature of the test device would 
lead to strict liability. 
(4) Borax No. I Run Away. A small experimental reactor at Arco, 
Idaho, known as Borax No. r, was constructed in 1953 with water as 
both coolant and moderator. The core assembly consisted of plates made 
from an alloy of enriched uranium and aluminum, clad in aluminum and 
immersed in water inside a steel tank. In July 1954, after more than 200 
tests on the reactor, it was decided that it should be sacrificed in an ex-
perimental runaway. Control rods were withdrawn, the last one rapidly. 
The results were much as expected. Most of the fuel melted, and the 
reaction from the molten metal in contact with the water burst open 
the tank. The control rod mechanism was carried away, and the remains 
of the reactor core were ejected high into the air. Most of the fuel ele-
ment fragments fell within a radius of two hundred feet. There was 
no appreciable radioactive fallout except within a radius of a few hun-
dred feet. The explosion by ordinary standards was a mild one, being 
comparable with that which would be produced by a few pounds of TNT. 
Indeed those who may feel concern lest peaceful atomic industry may 
result in explosions approximating those of atomic weapons may take 
comfort from the fact that this is virtually an impossibility. Highly 
specialized techniques are required to produce sharp explosions. Indus-
trial atomic reactor accidents even if serious will inevitably be of a 
milder character, although this is not to say that extreme precautions are 
not desirable and even necessary. If, instead of taking place miles from 
the nearest habitation, Borax No. 1 had "run away" on the outskirts of 
a city, the question of legal liability would be presented. In view of the 
precedents involving explosions, nuisances, and escaping dangerous sub-
stances there can hardly be a doubt of strict liability under such circum-
stances. 
(5) The EBR..;r Reactor Accident. In November 1955 at the Arco 
testing station a partial meltdown and release of radioactive substances 
took place in an experimental breeder reactor being operated under the 
supervision of the Argonne National Laboratory. Dr. Walter H. Zinn, 
Director of the Laboratory, described the accident as follows: 
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EBR-1 had been used for a number of years in an experi-
mental program, mostly in the physics of fast reactors. The 
core loading was reaching the end of its useful life and it was 
scheduled to be removed from the reactor early in 1956. As a 
last series of experiments with this core, it was decided to make 
measurements on transient temperature coefficients. The ex-
periments consisted of measuring changes in reactivity of the 
reactor as the temperature of the fuel elements was increased. 
. . . Because it was desired to obtain the temperature coeffi-
cient of the fuel only, it was necessary to shut off the flow of 
the liquid metal coolant. 
* * * * * 
Increasing the temperature of the uranium rapidly involved 
very considerable chance of distorting the fuel element jackets, 
especially since uranium metal and stainless steel form a eutec-
tic at about 725° C. This is very little above the temperature to 
which it was desired to pulse the fuel elements. 
That there was some ri~k of melting the fuel elements was 
well appreciated. 
* * * * * 
In previous experiments of this type, it had been possible to 
interrupt the excursion and return the reactor to low power by 
making use of the motor-driven control rods. These subtract 
reactivity slowly. In this excursion, the technician at the con-
trol panel was expected to use the fast-acting shut-off rods 
upon receipt of a spoken instruction from the scientist in 
charge. . . . Upon receiving instruction to shut down the re-
actor, th~ technician repeated the use of the slower control 
rods. The staff scientist, as soon as he realized the situation, 
reached over and pressed the rapid shut-off button and, simul-
taneously, the automatic power-level trips responded to ac-
tivate the shut-off rods. The delay in time, which was almost 
two seconds, was sufficient to permit the reactor power to over-
shoot to a point where the alloying of uranium and steel and 
melting of the uranium took place. 
The reactor shut down and there was no way by sound or sight 
to know that anything untoward had occurred .... After a 
period of fifteen minutes, detectors for radioactivity installed 
both in the cooling system, . . . and in the ventilation exhaust 
ducts . . . began to show readings higher than normal.128 
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A dangerous quantity of radioactivity escaped into the atmosphere of 
the test building, but material damage was restricted to the reactor core 
and the inside of its vessel. There was severe distortion of the elements 
12s Forum Memo, June 1956, pp. 26-28. 
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but there were no personnel injuries. The incident illustrates the possi-
bility of human fallibility and the need for protection against accidents 
by use of all possible mechanical devices, shields, protective envelopes, 
and other safeguards, j4st in case something does go wrong. 
If similar human fallibility connected with a private reactor should re-
sult in off-site damage, the ensuing law suits will raise many interesting 
questions involving not only strict liability under its various· doctrines, 
but also questions related to the standard of care to be exercised in con-
nection with such an operation. Yet the time may arrive in the distant 
future when fast breeder reactors will be used to produce a significant 
percentage of the electric power supply. When that time arrives the 
technical problems will have been resolved, the safety of the facilities will 
be assumed, the installations will become numerous and commonplace. 
Under such circumstances there will be much force in the argument that 
they have become "matters of common usage" subject only to liability 
for negligence. 
(6) The Saclay Reactor. A reactor at Saclay. France, was fueled 
with natural uranium using heavy water as the moderator and carbon 
dioxide as the coolant. The reactor was used for the preparation of 
radioisotopes for research purposes and for the production of small 
quantities of plutonium. Continuous operation at a high power level 
was permitted. In June 1956, a rupture occurred, breaking the sheathing 
enclosing one of the fuel rods. This caused a slight contamination of the 
cooling circuit. The incident lead to release through the ventilation 
system of a quantity of slightly radioactive carbon dioxide gas. Meas-
urements of radioactivity on the instruments located near the reactor 
showed only a modest increase, and there was little, if any, contamina-
tion of personnel. The incident was such that repair could be effected 
quickly with only a temporary holdup in operation. The incident was 
a minor one, but it reveals the dangerous possibilities inherent in a de-
fect in a minor component part, in this case the sheathing on one of 
the control rods. We can anticipate that the highest of mechanical skills 
will be required in the fabrication of essential component parts of atomic 
equipment, that private reactor operators will be held to the very high-
est inspection standards, and that mechanical faults must be completely 
eliminated if liability for legal fault is to be avoided. Even if all this is 
done, strict liability seems a virtual certainty under present day theories 
and circumstances. 
(7) The Benjamin Zawacki Case. Every half hour throughout the 
evening of January ro, 1956, and all during the night, radio and tele-
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vision stations in Connecticut and New York flashed emergency bulle-
tins ending with this sharp warning : 
The life of the person carrying the radioactive cylinder miss-
ing from a construction job at Devon is in danger. Dispose 
of it in a remote area at least a hundred feet from any house. 
Call the police, giving them its location. Then go immediately 
to the nearest hospital. 
Benjamin Zawacki was the man who had the radioactive cylinder. 
As an electrician he had been working on a new building being erected 
on the outskirts of Bridgeport, Connecticut. Late in the afternoon he 
was seeking a piece of cord to tie down a cable that was being installed. 
Nearby, passing through a hole in the concrete floor, there was a twelve-
inch steam pipe. Loosely tied to this pipe and hanging down to the 
floors below was a long strand of cord, apparently not serving any use-
ful purpose. Zawacki pulled the cord up through the hole and detached 
it from the steam pipe. After tying up the cable, he observed that there 
was a little weight hanging on the end of the remaining cord. He auto-
matically dropped the capsule into his shirt pocket. Upon leaving the job 
he tossed the contents of his pocket, including the capsule, into the glove 
compartment of his car. Another electrician rode with him into Bridge-
port, and later in the evening a friend also rode some distance in Za-
wacki's automobile. 
The next morning another construction worker rode with Zawacki 
to the job site. As they approached the watchman's gate they saw a long 
line of cars waiting, each being tested for radioactivity. When Za-
wacki's car reached the test point, the Geiger counters began to click 
violently, and the capsule was discovered in the glove compartment. The 
capsule was a cobalt 6o source, 1,280 millicuries in strength, which had 
been used for radiography on the construction· job. The radiographer 
had left it unguarded and no warning signs were posted. 
Two weeks of hospitalization and much testing failed to reveal any. 
outward signs of physical disorder. However, the incident had a sub-
stantial demoralizing effect not only on Zawacki but on his companions 
as well. Various psychosomatic disturbances resulted. 
A suit for $200,000 in damages for negligence has been filed against 
the contractor on the construction job and against the subcontractor 
who was engaged in radiological inspection. If this incident cannot be 
regarded as actually prophetic, at the very least it indicates that in the 
atomic future unusual care must be taken in instructing workmen, in 
posting danger signals, and in alerting the public generally to the 
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hazards involved. We can and must learn to live with these hazards as 
we have learned to live with other dangerous instrumentalities, e.g., 
the automobile, but we must also learn how to protect ourselves against 
overexposure to radiation. Whether or not the use of cobalt 6o in radi-
ography will call for an application of the doctrine of Rylands v. 
Fletcher remains to be seen, but it may well be that such uses are already 
so commonplace as to be deemed "common usage" as that term is used 
both in the Rylands case and in the Restatement. 
(8) TheM. W. Kellogg Company Incident. The M. W. Kellogg 
Company was an Atomic Energy Commission licensee doing business 
in South Houston, Texas, engaged in the task of encapsulating and 
selling iridium 192, a radioactive isotope which is used for industrial 
radiography. On March 13, 1957, irradiated pellets of a mixture of 
compressed iridium 192 and aluminum metal powder were broken while 
being handled. The incident resulted in severe contamination of the 
laboratory. The laboratory was not used for several days thereafter 
and was partially decontaminated by the company. Two employees were 
present at the time of the incident and at least one of them may have 
have inhaled some of the radioactive powder. The exposure to external 
radiation was not believed to have been large. Investigation indicated 
that the clothing of at least the two employees was contaminated and was 
not removed until after the employees arrived home. Radioactivity was 
detected in the home of one of the employees and also in a trailer where 
the other lived at the time of the incident. Some of the clothing of 
other members of the family was found to be slightly radioactive, pre-
sumably as a result of being washed along with the employee's clothes. 
The Atomic Energy Commission immediately directed a temporary 
suspension of the license of the company and issued an order to show 
cause at a hearing in Washington as to why the order should be modi-
fied or vacated. Subsequently the Commission modified the order suf-
ficiently to permit salvaging and sale of the inventory of radioactive 
material, but the company was not permitted to resume its normal 
activity.126 
-Only careful and competent operation can be tolerated, and the regu-
latory power of government must be utilized to protect against the care-
less and the incompetent. However, even rigorous compliance with 
governmental regulations will be no more than evidence of due care and 
will not relieve the defendant if strict liability principles are applied. 
(9) Oak Ridge National Laboratory "Wrong Room" Incident. On 
12• See AEC Release No. 1213, Nov. 6, 1957. 
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October 4, 1957, an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission's Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory accidentally received an exposure to radia-
tion when he mistakenly entered a room containing highly radioactive 
material. He was looking for a wrench which he had actually left in 
another nearby roomit:t which he had been working. He entered the 
wrong room although the door was clearly marked with radiation hazard 
signs. The incident was discovered when laboratory technicians noted 
that his pencil-type radiation detection instrument revealed the overex-
posure. The facts were confirmed when the film badge was subsequently 
processed. Investigation revealed that he received an exposure of about 
63 roentgens in the period of about one minute in the room. The inci-
dent involved only exposure to external radiation with no internal con-
tamination involved. According to all appearances the employee was in-
excusably careless, but in the atomic age especial care will have to be 
exercised to protect others against employee inattention and even stu-
pidity. The defense of assumption of risk will be applied only under 
unusual circumstances when the claim is based upon strict liability. 
{ IO) The Windscale Accident. On October 17, 1957, one of Britain's 
plutonium producing reactors located at Windscale, Cumberland, pro-
duced the free world's worst nuclear accident to date from the stand-
point of off-site injuries to persons and property. Although at this 
writing a security blackout masks the cause of the accident and the ex-
tent of the damage, it is clear that it was a major occurrence possibly 
involving as much as several hundred tons of uranium. Seemingly a 
really major catastrophe was averted only by a successful, on-the-spot 
emergency action led by nuclear experts. 
The reactor was an open-cycle, air"'-cooled machine (thus to be dif-
ferentiated from Calder Hall's closed-cycle, pressurized gas-cooled type 
with carbon dioxide used as the coolant). · According to reports, the 
Windscale reactor was shut down for routine maintenance. It was then 
discovered that a considerable number of the fuel elements were glowing 
red hot. This meant that they were several hundred degrees hotter than 
they should have been, and that uranium was fissioning in the sup-
posedly idle reactor. Also it meant that radioactive products were being 
discharged from the stack being carried by the rising column of coolant 
air. The immediate threat was the escape of volatile fission products, 
principally radioactive ·isotopes of iodine which could pass through the 
chimney filters. Solid particles such as radioactive strontium and cesium 
were for the most part trapped in the filters. After careful consideration 
water was applied to quell the overheating. 
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Milk samples from freshly milked cows in the vicinity were rushed 
to Harwell and showed traces of radioactive iodine. In twenty-four 
hours the content had rocketed to six times the permissible tolerance 
level. Soon a special press conference announced a shutdown of all milk 
distribution within a three-mile radius, an area that was later extended 
to cover 200 square miles. All contaminated milk was discharged into 
the sea. 
Speculation has indicated that the cause of the unexpected heating 
effects lay in fission products trapped in the fuel elements the heat pro-
ducing reactions of which continued after the reactor was closed down. 
Further study will be necessary to determine the exact cause of the diffi-
culty, and doubtless an official report will be issued in due course. 
This incident is the first that has resulted in extensive damage to 
persons or property off the plant site, although the Chalk River affair 
gave rise to a certain amount of neighborhood inconvenience. The fact 
that such incidents can occur is certainly of significance in appraising the 
theory of civil liability to be applied to atomic operators, but at the same 
time the rarity of such occurrences is also both significant and encourag-
ing. It is understood that the people in the vicinity who have suffered 
damage will be fully compensated for their losses by the Atomic Energy 
Authority; for under Section 5 (3) of the Act of I954 the Authority 
is made absolutely liable for injuries occasioned by the escape of radio-
active substances. However, even so, there will be troublesome questions 
of damages to resolve. For example, will compensation be paid for 
diminution of property values caused by popular fears of another such 
accident ? This question has arisen at Windscale and up to the moment 
has been answered negatively by the Authority. 
(I I) The Hot Fish Study. The disposal of radioactive wastes is one 
of the primary obstacles to widespread use of atomic energy. A three-
year study was recently initiated by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion and the Tennessee Valley Authority for the purpose of determin-
ing if the partially purified liquid wastes discharged by the plant into 
White Oak Lake had any ill effects on fish life in the lake. The study 
brought forth the significant information that discharge water released 
by the plants produces "hot" fish many times more radioactive than the 
water in which they live. 
The study particularly revealed that two species of fish, the bluegill 
and the blackcroppe, absorbed and concentrated in their bone structures 
large quantities of radioactive strontium. This substance is readily de-
posited in bone tissue much the way calcium is deposited. Skeletons of 
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these fish were found to contain radioactive strontium in concentrations 
20 to 30 thousand times as great as that of the lake water itself. For 
example, it was noted that the body of a seven-inch blackcroppe pro-
duced on the average well over one microcurie of radioactivity. More-
over, it was noted that the fish in White Oak Lake not only grew more 
slowly than those of the same species in nearby reservoirs but that 
they died younger. 
Studies such as this may well give pause to those who would dispose 
of radioactive wastes in the ocean depths or in fresh waters inhabited 
by fish on which man relies for food supply. Damage suits will be a 
certainty, and strict liability will probably be the applicable rule of law. 
Moreover, if there are several contributors, each may be held fully liable 
although his own contribution is well below tolerance levels. 
(12) The Oak Ridge Y-12 Radiation Accident. In June 1958, at 
Oak Ridge, a quantity of highly enriched uranium bearing solution, 
normally stored in "always safe" tanks of such geometric configuration 
that a critical quantity could not be assembled, was permitted by a 
most unusual series of events to flow into an ordinary ss-gallon drum: 
A critical quantity was thus assembled and a chain reaction followed. 
Eight persons were within fifty feet, one being not over six feet away. 
Injuries to personnel seemed to be temporary only, but the incident il-
lustrates the possibilities that exist when handling critical quantities of 
fissionable material. As stated in the official report, the accident "could 
not have happened unless a chain of about twelve unusual and unrelated 
events happened in just the right order. None of these twelve events 
was by itself sufficient to be called an error. The chance of just these 
twelve events occurring in just the right sequence is so small as to be 
rightly called impossible." 126 An accident of this sort would seem to 
involve an ultrahazardous activity that would satisfy even the restricted 
category of Section 520(a) of the Restatement doctrine. 
( 13) Miscellaneous Minor Incidents.· In addition to the foregoing 
that may be regarded as the major and more striking radiation incidents, 
we should refer briefly to a number of other minor occurrences which, 
although they caused no serious damage, nevertheless indicate the kinds 
of hazards to which the atomic business may be subject. For example, 
there have been instances of contamination of premises due to the break-
ing of radium sulphate capsules used in laboratories; similar results have 
followed the rupture of neutron source capsules (such as those con-
taining polonium and beryllium); there is one recorded instance of 
1 26 See Forum Memo, August 1958, p. 39. 
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considerable quantities of radioactive mesothorium being discharged 
into a city sewer system where it was handled in a "complete treatment" 
sewage plant, from which the dry sludge (with fairly high radiation 
levels) was spread as a fertilizer; a tank trailer containing I 500 gallons 
o{ radioactive uranyl nitrate hexahydrate has overturned and spilled its 
contents on a highway; fires have taken place in contaminated waste ac-
cumulations, in uranium scrap, in plutonium turnings, etc. (These metals 
are pyrophoric in nature, and although natural uranium is of negligible 
radioactivity, U-235 and plutonium can cause serious contamination). 
These are illustrative of the possibilities and indicate the wide range of 
events of possible legal consequence against which those who engage 
in nuclear enterprises must guard. 126 · 
Summary. The foregoing is a virtually complete list of the principal 
nuclear "incidents" that have taken place during the thirteen years fol-
lowing World War II. The period really shows a remarkable record of 
freedom from serious accidents. The Atomic Energy Commission has 
taken extraordinary precautions to minimize the hazards both for per-
sonnel working on plant sites and even more so for outsiders. Very few 
workers have been exposed beyond the allowable limits of radi~tion. A 
few accidents have resulted in injury and even death. A few workers 
have undergone technical overexposure but without untoward symptoms. 
Indeed the entire history of the thirteen year period affords consider-
able assurance that operations utilizing radioactive substances can, 
by proper precautions, be made extraordinarily safe. Such installations 
may eventually become rather highly regarded as good places in which 
to work and good neighbors in the community. When that time arrives 
the facts should have a material bearing upon the rules of law to be 
applied. Developing still further the remarkably safe record up to the 
present time, in a complete tabulation set forth in the July-December, 
1956, report of the Atomic Energy Commission can be found a complete 
listing of all incidents involving radiation overexposure during the 
period 1945 through 1956 in Atomic Energy Commission activities. 
In that period of time some sixty-nine persons were overexposed in 
eight separate incidents. There were two fatalities, the two previously 
noted as occurring at Los Alamos. Twenty-eight of the total number of 
overexposures resulted from an unexpected fallout in the course of a 
weapons test in the Marshall Islands. Of the total sixty-nine exposed, 
nineteen suffered only skin injury and several other exposures were 
comparatively minor. In a word, to date, the atomic energy business has 
128 For a more complete coverage, see Hayes supra note 121. 
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proved to be an exceedingly safe operation so far as employees are con-
cerned. 
With respect to persons and property off the plant sites, the fact is that 
the public has not suffered in any material degree, notwithstanding the 
potentialities of the h11siness and the rather widespread extent of its uti-
lization. Adequate safety precautions seem to make the activity fully as 
safe as many other types of industrial enterprise-as safe, for example, 
as the chemical business. A reference to the Texas City disaster in-
volving nitrate fertilizer 127 and the East Cleveland disaster involving a 
large gas container, 128 each resulting in many deaths and much property 
destruction, is all that is necessary to indicate that an industrial economy 
necessarily involves certain limited hazards. They must be minimized 
and guarded against as well as possible but an occasional accident is al-
most inevitable. To date, then, the atomic industry has no cause for 
concern about its safety record. It has been remarkably good. In regard 
only to the safety of reactors, as distinguished from other atomic ac-
tivities, in over twelve years of operation, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion reported two years ago that it has operated twenty-five nuclear re-
actors for a total of 6o6,868 hours using 17,799,000 man hours with 
no accidents involving either contamination of off-site property or per-
sonnel exposure sufficiently serious to cause lost time. This is good evi-
dence that reactors can be safely operated, as safely, perhaps, as the 
more conventional sources of heat energy. When they become common-
place and a necessary part of the economy, there would be good reason 
for urging that they be subjected to the legal principles applicable to 
other industrial units with equivalent safety records. 
3· Some Hypothetical Possibilities of Radiation Accidents 
Although the record of atomic industry ·up to the present time has 
been an extraordinarily good one, remarkably free from incidents re-
sulting in damage to persons or property, we should not for this reason 
alone become too optimistic with respect to the future. When peaceful 
applications of atomic energy become widespread throughout industry, 
agriculture, medicine, and the numerous other possible areas of utility, 
we can expect that accidents will take place, that people will be injured, 
and that property will be damaged and destroyed. Safety regulations 
will, of course, be in effect, at both state and national levels. But, with 
1 2 7 See Dalehite v. United States, ·346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956 (1953). 
t28 See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, 166 F. 2d go8 (3d Cir. 
1948). 
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the large number of persons utilizing radioactive substances, persons 
of varying degrees of knowledge and competence, and with the many 
possibilities of dispersion of radioactivity here and there throughout 
the numerous areas of human activity, we can be reasonably sure that 
injuries will ensue. --
We are seeking to determine the nature and extent of the remedial 
rights of the individual whose person or property is subjected to over-
exposure to radiation. Is liability to be predicated on doctrines of negli-
gence or, taking account of the possibilities, is the operator to become 
strictly liable for the damage resulting from his atomic activities? In 
order to further place this problem in proper perspective, let us now add 
to the previous account of actual accidents by trying briefly but sys-
tematically to envisage hypothetically the principal types of accidents 
which may be anticipated in the atomic future if something goes wrong, 
as it may well do. Examination of these types will give us background 
for more adequate consideration of the legal theories that should be 
made applicable. Let us consider a dozen or so hypothetical possibilities 
starting with those displaying the more serious potentialities. 
( 1) A large power reactor meltdown. We shall start with the type 
of accident that, although extremely unlikely to happen, could be the 
most devastating of all-a reactor "burn-up." As of June 30, 1958, 
one full-scale civilian power reactor was in operation, four more were 
being built in the United States, and some ten more were being planned. 
These operations contain certain inherently dangerous potentialities 
against which proper precautions must be taken. In the first place, each 
reactor contains an amount of fissionable material considerably in excess 
of the critical figure, i.e., in excess of the quantity which if properly con-
centrated would result in a chain reaction. Secondly, in addition to the 
fuels themselves, after operation for a period of time a reactor will con-
tain a considerable inventory of radioactive byproducts. Some of these 
byproducts are said to be from three million to two billion times more 
toxic than chlorine, the most potent common industrial poison. More-
over, these substances cannot be detected by the senses, even in lethal 
concentrations, and they are capable of producing injuries which may 
not become evident until many years after exposure. 
Although the reactor will not explode in the sense of an atomic bomb 
explosion, it may, if the unexpected takes place, become overheated, the 
fissile elements may melt, perhaps become vaporized, and the rapid 
formation of gaseous products create pressures which will rupture all 
containment structures,. and release radioactive fission products to the 
environment. Operating personnel on the plant site may be injured or 
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killed, and a cloud of lethal gas with radioactive particles in suspension 
may escape from the reactor building and drift downwind toward in-
habited areas. Fallout of radioactive material may take place which 
will contaminate farms, animals, and buildings, as well as people in the 
vicinity. Radioactive materials may be deposited on or in the ground 
and be carried by the percolating ground waters to adjacent rivers or 
other water supply sources. Under certain atmospheric conditions a 
radioactive cloud of gases and particles in suspension may proceed down-
wind for many miles at approximately ground level, carrying its de-
structive potentialities along with it. 
All of this is decidedly on the pessimistic side and is quite unlikely to 
happen especially in view of the extensive precautions taken· by the 
Atomic Energy Commission in evaluating plans and facilities prior to 
issuing operating licenses. Moreover, all power reactor accidents are 
not necessarily going to be as violent as that indicated. There may be 
no rupture of the containment vessel. Or if there is a rupture, the radio-
active cloud may rise vertically and disperse itself without damage to 
persons or property on the ground. Nevertheless, if an accident of 
major character takes place within a short distance of a major center 
of population, it is theoretically possible, assuming a high percentage of 
dispersion of the core inventory of fission products and unfavorable 
inversion type of atmospheric conditions to produce a serious situation 
that might require the evacuation of the population and possibly result 
in widespread damage to persons and property .. Unlikely as all of this 
may be, it is within the range of remote possibility and must he taken 
into account in appraising the applicability of various doctrines of legal 
liability.129 Should an accident such as that described take place, at least 
during the earlier years of atomic industry, ther.e can be little doubt that 
strict liability will be imposed upon the reactor operator.- He must pro-
tect himself by appropriate insurance coverage. 
( 2) A contained power reactor accident. The above-stated case is an 
extreme. Let us assume that, instead of the foregoing extensive disper-
1 29 For a full scale study of this problem, see Gomberg, Bassett, & Velez, "Report 
on the Possible Effects on the Surrounding Population of an Assumed Release of 
Fission Products into the Atmosphere from a 3oo-Megawatt Nuclear Reactor Located 
at Lagoon Beach, Michigan," published by Engineering Research Institute, University 
of Michigan, July 1957, 2500-1-F. Also see the so-called "Brookhaven Study," offi-
cially and lengthily entitled "Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major 
Accidents in Larger Nuclear Power Plants-A Study of Possible Consequences if 
Certain Assumed Accidents Theoretically Possible but Highly Improbable were to 
Occur in Large Nuclear Power Plants," written by a team of Brookhaven staff mem-
bers with Kenneth W. Downes as Project Director, March 1957. 
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sion of radioactive products, we have the massive large scale reactor 
meltdown but the gaseous fission products are retained within the reactor 
containment vessel-a structure that has become an essential feature of 
reactor design. The only leakage is relatively minor, consisting perhaps 
of gamma radiation penetrating the walls of the containment vessel 
which may affect persons within a narrow radius, or possibly leakage 
through the foundations or otherwise which result in some contamina-
tion of underground waters, which in turn affects wells in the vicinity 
and possibly water supply sources of larger communities. This may be 
referred to as a partially contained accident, and the question arises as 
to whether or not the fact of more or less successful containment should 
affect the principles of liability. One can only speculate on the answer, 
but in view of the decided cases and the general trend of thought of the 
present day, the fact that a critical mass of fissionable material has been 
brought by the operator to the premises would doubtless result in the 
imposition of strict liability. 
(3) An accident involving a small privately owned research reactor. 
Consider the possibility of the small research reactor with a thermal ca-
pacity of perhaps one or two megawatts "running away" and distributing 
a limited amount of radioactive substance over a limited area, compell-
ing evacuation of farmers and others in the vicinity, and contaminating 
agricultural products and farm animals within a relatively limited 
radius. Such a reactor might be owned by an industrial organization 
which utilizes it for research purposes, or it might possibly be owned 
by a university or a research institute. Again, legal liability principles 
come up for consideration. Is the same principle of strict liability to be 
applied as to the large power reactor with its more lethal potentialities? 
The law has not, in evolving its strict liability doctrines differentiated 
on the ground of size. 
(4) An atomic fuel-reprocessing plant radioactivity accident. Con-
sider the possibility of an accident taking place in a fuel-reprocessing 
plant, with the result that radioactive fission products escape by some 
means other than an uncontrolled chain reaction, either into the air or 
into adjacent water supply, thus causing damage to nearby persons or 
property or. both. The damage might be no more extensive than that 
which would result from the escape of chemicals as a part of an accident 
in a chemical plant. However, it would involve radioactive substances in 
a plant containing critical quantities of fissionable materials, and for this 
reason alone it may subject the operator to a strict rule of civil liability. 
Yet the fact that no chain reaction is involved means that the potentiali-
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ties are less severe, and this fact affords a significant distinction that 
could well affect the legal result. _Should it do so? The available case 
law is inconclusive. 
( 5) An atomic fuel-processing plant non-radioactivity accident. 
Consider the possibility of an atomic fuel-processing plant having an 
accident involving the explosion of zirconium oxide or some other ma-
terial connected with the atomic industry but not of itself fissionable or 
radioactive. Such accidents have taken place; for example, at the 
Sylvania Products Company plant on Long Island and at Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee. Employees may be injured, and we may assume also that 
minor elements of damage may be inflicted upon surrounding property 
as. a result of the force of the explosion. Such an event would be com-
parable to and not significantly different from an accident in any in-
dustrial installation where explosive materials are kept on hand as a 
part of the process. Should the principles of legal liability be different 
simply because the accident is connected with atomic energy? It would 
seem otherwise. 
(6) An accident in a radiation laboratory connected with an in-
dustrial plant. Let us suppose that a chemical plant maintains for de-
velopmental purposes an experimental radiation laboratory in which it 
carries on various types of testing and experimentation with radioiso-
topes or possibly with high level radiation sources, all in an endeavor to 
find new ways of making articles useful to mankind. Let us assume that 
by accident some of the radioactive isotopes are discharged into the sew-
age system and thence to the river or lake water supply or possibly into a 
sewage treatment plant. Damage to individuals or possibly to farm ani-
mals can ensue if these radioactive elements become incorporated in a 
drinking water supply or fish life or vegetation. What will be the 
theories of liability to be imposed in such instance? Should they be 
different from those applicable to a chlorine plant? Should the fact that 
radioactive substances are permitted to escape result in the same strict 
liability as that applied to the reactor in which a chain reaction takes 
place? Tlw available case law does not afford the answer. 
( 7) An escape of radioactivity from a waste disposal plant. Consider 
the legal status of an operator who is licensed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission to carry on activities which involve the disposition of radio-
active waste products. Presumably either the terms of the license or 
general Commission rules will include appropriate specifications for 
operation which will cover matters of health and safety, including the 
maximum concentrations of radioactivity that may be dispersed into 
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air, water, sewers, etc. Suppose the licensed operator proceeds in ac-
cordance with the specifications without exceeding prescribed limits, 
but nevertheless damage ensues (a) if radioactivity is deposited on land, 
by. pollution of air or underground waters, or, (b) if deposited at sea, 
by pollution of fisheries, or (c) if discharged in diluted form into a 
sewage system, by eventual damage to fish, animal, or vegetable life. 
Will the fact that the operator under such ,circumstances has proceeded 
in accordance with specifications of the Atomic Energy Commission 
license preclude his being liable, or, at least, to strict liability? Or con-
sider another possibility, namely, that the operator has accidentally or 
negligently permitted the release of radioactive substances and in so 
doing he has failed to act in accordance with the specifications in his 
license. Will he then become per se liable and if so, shall it be on the 
basis of strict liability or merely for negligence? Discussion in the next 
section will throw some light on these questions, but the answers are far 
from crystal clear. 
(8) An accident in food or drug irradiation pla.nt. Consider the pos-
sible liability of an operator of a food or drug irradiation plant, who by 
reason of accident over-irradiates the articles involved, thus causing un-
expected changes in the irradiated products and damage to persons or 
animals who consume the products. What is to be the nature and 
measure of the operator's liability under such circumstances? Under 
American decisions he probably will be deemed an insurer since the 
end products are intended for human consumption. 
( 9) An accident involving an industrial user of radioactive isotopes. 
Suppose an industry makes use of radioisotopes for thickness gages, 
or for tracers in connection with wear testing, or in the form of a cobalt 
6o gamma ray source to be used in radiography. Assume that certain 
of these radioactive substances, through accident, are removed from their 
protective shielding and get into contact with persons or property either 
on the plant site or possibly off-site as a result of transmission through 
the air, water, or otherwise. Again we must ask ourselves whether or 
not the operator is to be held liable on the theory of negligence or on the 
basis of a doctrine of strict liability. Since no chain reaction is involved, 
it is not unreasonable to argue that the same rules of negligence should 
be applied as would be used if the incident had involved chemicals of a 
less hazardous nature. 
( 10) An accident involving medical 14ses of radioactive substances. 
Suppose a doctor of medicine is engaged in operating a teletherapy unit 
on a cancer patient, or is using a radioactive tracer to locate the seat of a 
malignancy, or administers a radioactive substance to be taken internally 
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for therapeutic purposes. Assume an overdose or overexposure, due to 
accident. Is the medical operator to be held strictly liable if it can be 
proved that the injury to the patient bears a causal relation to the ex-
posure to radiation? Or is he to be held liable merely for negligence as 
seems to be the case in connection with the X-ray operators? Both rea-
son and precedent would indicate that only the principles of negligence 
should be applied, but can this conclusion be reconciled with the strict li-
ability cases? 
(I I) An accident involving transportation of radioactive substances. 
Radioactive substances will be transported throughout the country 
by bus, truck, rail, and airplane. They may also be transported across the 
ocean by surface vessel. Suppose the truck overturns, or the train is in 
an accident, or the airplane crashes, or the vessel sinks in the harbor. 
The radioactive substances may be either relatively inoffensive tracers, 
or they may be high energy cobalt, or they may be even more dangerous 
objects, such as irradiated fuel elements that have been taken from a 
power reactor and are being returned to a processing plant for separation 
of the unexpended fuel from the fission products. Are all of these opera-
tions to be treated alike so far as legal liability is concerned ? Or is strict 
liability to be applied in certain instances and not in others? Unless 
normal principles of liability of those who operate transportation facili-
ties are applied, law suits for such accidents will become decidedly 
complex. Again, current case law fails to afford the answers. 
4. Conclusions Concerning Types of Accidents and Injuries 
The foregoing hypothetical possibilities might be multiplied many 
times over, and doubtless some of them will materialize in the form of 
actual incidents as the atomic age becomes a reality. ·However, the types 
of situations exemplified by the recapitulation of the accidents that have 
already taken place, together with the dozen or so hypothetical sug-
gestions, present sufficiently well the kinds of fact situations with which 
the law must now concern itself. · 
Let us now proceed to take a broadly perspective view of the entire 
range of possibilities of injury from overexposure to radiation. 
First of all, we note the wide range of possible incidence of over-
exposure, i.e., from injuries to many persons and much property, both 
on-site and off-site, to very minor affairs, involving possibly the pollu-
tion of a single well or a slight overexposure to gamma radiation of one 
or two persons. Second, we note that the damages may extend in in-
tensity throughout a wide range-from death and widespread devasta-
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tion of property, to trivial injuries of no real consequence. Third, we 
note that the undertakings causing the injuries may vary from ac-
tivities of fairly serious potentialities to rather commonplace, routine, 
and relatively non-hazardous affairs; the meltdown of a reactor illustrat-
ing the former, the use of a radioactive isotope for industrial wear test 
representing the latter. Fourth, we note that in the nature of things the 
locations in which the activity will be carried on will range all the way 
from unpopulated deserts to great population centers in industrial areas, 
-from Frenchman's Flat, Nevada, to New York City. Finally, we note 
that the utilization of atomic energy in its peaceful applications will 
range all the way from well-established, long-tried, and generally ac-
cepted operations that eventually become quite conventional, to new 
and unusual applications of an experimental but promising nature, 
well worthy of trial, but not yet fully accepted as a safe and normal pro-
cedure. 
In short, in thinkingabout the problem of the nature of civil liability 
for radiation overexposure we cannot think of a single, simple operation 
or activity. This would be unwarranted oversimplification. There is 
instead a vast spectrum of possibilities, of coverage, of damage, of 
hazards, of locus, and of uniqueness. Nevertheless, sooner or later we 
must come to grips with the problem as to whether or not and to what 
extent we must accept and apply the doctrine of strict liability or its 
equivalents, or, in the alternative, be satisfied with an application to any 
or all atomic injuries of the more widely accepted doctrines of negli-
gence. Can we properly say that the same rule of legal liability should 
be applied throughout all of the spectra? This would be both unrealistic, 
unwise, and unnecessary. 
In turning to our attempt to reach solutions of these problems we 
shall take into account both the foregoing spectra of possibilities and 
also the fact that to date, at least, the atomic energy business has been 
extraordinarily successful in minimizing the overexposure of persons 
or property. In the final section of this chapter we shall assemble our 
conclusions based upon the decided cases, the general trend of the times, 
and the nature of the fact situations likely to arise. Before reaching this 
point, however, we must give consideration to various statutory enact-
ments that bear on the problem and that suggest some helpful ideas. 
]. Statutory Provisions Affecting Strict Liability 
With the chaos of case law, and the great variety of possibilities as 
to radiation accidents laid before us, we can now give consideration to 
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possible statutory means of bringing some measure of order out of the 
juristic confusion facing operators in the atomic field. We shall first 
examine certain statutory provisions which may, to a greater or lesser 
extent, immunize defendants from strict liability. Thereafter, we shall 
consider certain other statutory possibilities which serve to extend strict 
liability, incorporating appropriate exceptions and limitations, and in-
troducing helpful statutory clarification of the applicable rules. 
I. Statutory Immunization from Strict Liability 
A1. this point we are confronted with a question of policy. In view of 
social trends is there any justification whatsoever for considering the 
possible immunization of atomic activity in whole or in part from the 
non-intentional and non-negligent accidents which are certain to take 
place? 
Recognizing that it is desirable to encourage and promote the develop-
ment of atomic enterprise, should this be done by holding it within the 
limits of liability for negligence only, and thereby minimizing the costs 
--doing this, however, at the expense of persons who may, without fault 
of their own, be damaged by overexposure to radiation. All members 
of society must pay a price in the form of inconvenience or even assump-
tion of loss for the privilege of living in an improved society. If accre-
tion to general welfare will be sufficiently accelerated by relief from 
strict liability, then it is possible that society should pay the price in the 
form of individual assumption of the risks and burdens. On the other 
hand, there are those who argue for the proposition that industry should 
pay its own way by being subject to strict liability excepting, perhaps, 
for catastrophic disasters, in which event the government should step in 
with indemnity from the public treasury. The trend of present day 
thinking is, as we shall see, toward the latter alternative. It is socially 
more acceptable, and accordingly we shall not find much current empha-
sis on statutory immunization. 
a. Statutory Franchises, Licenses, or Privileges and Their 
Effect 
There is some authority, mostly in the form of early court decisions, 
for the proposition that activity which would otherwise entail strict 
liability may be privileged beca.use conducted under statutory authority, 
or because it involves the performance of a public duty, to the extent of 
relieving that activity from the burden of responding to strict liability, 
holding it, however, within the conventional standards of the doctrines 
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of negligence. This proposition has been most frequently applied to 
transportation facilities and public utilities which, although they may 
in fact constitute dangerous activities, are, nevertheless, highly valued 
for their social utility and, by virtue of their franchises, licenses, or 
privileges, are given a special place by the governing authority of the 
state as an essential part of the economy. The rationale seems to be that 
statutory authorization and regulation amount to a government declara-
tion that the activities concerned are sufficiently necessary to the public 
welfare to justify immunity from strict liability. There is also to be 
found in the cases the suggestion that such functions are compulsory 
and are quasi-governmental in nature and should therefore share the 
ancient sovereign immunity to the extent of relief from liability with-
out fault. In view of the necessity of obtaining licenses for the conduct 
of atomic activities, this theory has an obvious possible application to 
atomic industry. 
A brief examination of some of the pertinent decisions will show 
more precisely the limits of this doctrine. In reviewing the cases it 
should be remembered that, although immunity from strict liability 
may perhaps be conferred, a result almost the equivalent of strict liabil-
ity may be reached through the application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, or by an elevation of the standards of care to which the jn-
dustry is subjected. Therefore, the change may be of but little signifi-
cance. 
In an early English case, Price v. South Metropolitan Gas Co./ 80 the 
plaintiff was injured by an explosion of the defendant public utility's 
gas line. The court of the Queen's Bench refused to apply strict liability, 
saying: 
It is clear, too, that where a gas company such as this, hav-
ing statutory authority to lay pipes, does so in exercise of its 
statutory powers, the ... [rule of] Fletcher v. Rylands is 
inapplicable.181 
In an early American case, Actiesselskahet Ingrid v. Central Railroad 
of New Jersey 182 the court voiced a somewhat different reason for a 
similar immunity. The action was based upon a theory of strict liabil-
ity, the complainant demanding compensation for injuries inflicted upon 
him by the explosion of a quantity of dynamite then in transit on the 
defendant's railroad. The court held that, since the defendant was a 
1so6s L.J.Q.B. 126 (18gs). 
181 /d. at 127. 
132 216 F. 72 ( 1914). 
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common carrier, it was obliged by law to transport explosives as well 
as other commodities, and, this being so, it would be unduly harsh to 
impose the additional burden of an insurer's liability. 
The type of statutory authorization deemed to immunize a quasi-
public enterprise from strict liability was defined in Cogswell v. New 
York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co.188 In that case the court 
made the following statement: 
But the statutory sanction which will justify an injury to . 
private property, must be express, or must be given by clear 
and unquestionable implication from the powers expressly con-
ferred, so that it can be fairly said that the legislature con-
templated the doing of the very act which occasioned the in-
jury. This is but an application of the reasonable rule that 
statutes in derogation of private rights, or which may result 
in imposing burdens upon private property, must be strictly 
construed. For it cannot be presumed, from a general grant of 
authority, that the legislature intended to authorize acts to the 
injury of third persons, where no compensation is provided, 
except upon condition of obtaining their consent.184 
Occasionally the question has arisen as to whether or not such statu-
tory privilege will serve to immunize the operator so that he may con-
duct a nuisance adversely affecting the lawful utilization of neighboring 
property. On this point a distinction must seemingly be drawn between 
the right of the aggrieved person to obtain an injunction to prevent the 
continuance of the alleged nuisance, and his right to obtain a judgment 
for damages to the extent he has suffered loss. There are several cases 
in which it has been held that the aggrieved party cannot enjoin a 
licensed activity. 
For example, in Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co.185 an attempt was made 
to enjoin the defendant from maintaining and operating his business of 
refining and distributing petroleum. The defendant had invested many 
millions of dollars in his plant and many more millions were invested 
in tank steamers and other materials used in his business. The site of the 
plant was well fitted for the conduct of such a business. A permit for 
the building of the refinery and its operations had beeti duly issued by 
the proper authorities to the defendant, and it was found that there was 
no failure on the part of the defendant to comply with the statutes and 
regulations, as well as the conditions of his license. The court found 
1SS IOJ N.Y. 10 (1886). 
1s• I d. at 21. 
185 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 (1925). 
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that, although the normal conduct of the business resulted in more or less 
pollution of the air, nevertheless, on balance, these acts did not con-
stitute a nuisance in view of all of the circumstances. But the court also 
addressed itself to the question of the effect of the licenses held by the 
defendant. Said the court : 
The question remains whether the defendant has conducted 
its business in conformity with the licenses granted to it. It is 
settled that under statutes similar to those under which the de-
fendant was granted the licenses, if the licensee has complied 
in all respects with the terms, what he does thereunder cannot 
be considered a nuisance or be restrained, even if without such 
licenses the acts done would be a nuisance.136 
The court cited many cases in support of its conclusion as thus stated and 
dismissed the bill. 
However, so far as damages are concerned two leading cases decided 
by the United States Supreme Court throw light on certain constitu-
tional aspects of this question of statutory immunity. The cases are 
Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church 181 and 
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.188 In the latter case it was 
claimed by the plaintiff that his property had been damaged by large 
quantities of dense black smoke and dust, together with dirt, cinders, 
and gases, emitted from trains while passing in and out of a tunnel in 
the District of Columbia. A fan system caused all such gases to be 
forced out of the south portal of the tunnel and the plaintiff's nearby 
property was especially damaged thereby. 
The Court held that in view of the act of Congress which authorized 
the establishing of the railroad and specifying its location within the 
District, the activity could not be deemed a public nuisance. N everthe-
less, said the Court, the acts referred to, if done without legislative sanc-
tion, would form the subject of an action by the plaintiff to recover 
damages as for private nuisance, and, with respect to this element, the 
provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution are applicable 
to the effect that private property shall not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation. The Court said : 
We deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment, as under 
state constitutions containing a similar prohibition, to be that 
while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a 
public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a 
t86 /d. at 487. 
131 lo8 u.s. 317. 2 S.Ct. 719 (I88J). 
t8s Supra note 78 
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private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a 
taking of private property for public use.139 
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Accordingly, it was held that, although the railroad duly licensed by 
public authority would not be subject to the issuance of a restraining in-
junction, an action for damages would be available. As to the extent of 
recoverable damages, the Court held that there would be a limited im-
munity with respect to those damages that naturally and unavoidably re-
sult from the proper conduct of a railroad, such as are shared generally 
by property owners whose lands lie within the range of the incon-
veniences necessarily incident to proximity thereto. This would include 
ordinary noises, vibrations, and the necessary emission of smoke and 
sparks from locomotives. The Court pointed out that this limited im-
munity from liability for incidental injuries, although it is attended by a 
considerable degree of hardship to the private landowner, nevertheless is 
a necessity unless the company is to be made liable for damages for these 
minor items in which case the practical result would be to bring the 
operation of the railroad to a standstill. But this principle, held the 
Court, does not carry to the point of construing the act of Congress in 
the light of the Fifth Amendment to authorize the imposition of a 
special, direct, peculiar, and substantial burden upon the· plaintiff's prop-
erty without compensation to him. Accordingly, the defendant was held 
subject to liability for damages suffered by the plaintiff over and above 
those incidental inconveniences suffered by all who live nearby a railroad 
right of way. In short the statutory privilege precludes the injunction 
and the payment of damages for incidental inconveniences, but the Con-
stitution prevents closing the door to damages for special and severe 
losses. This principle would clearly be applicable to licensees of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. · 
We may conclude from the foregoing that, although there is some 
possibility in view of the case history of a limited immunity deriving 
from statutory privileges, such immunity has not been particularly sig-
nificant in the more recent evolution ofthe law, and it is unlikely to play 
an important part in atomic activity except perhaps to preclude the use 
of the injunction against Atomic Energy Commission licensees. 
b. Statutory Limits on Maximum Liability 
Statutory limits upon the recoverable damages seem destined to be a 
significant feature of atomic liability legislation, not only in the United 
States but in other countries as well. We have long been used to the 
130 I d. at 553. 
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imposition of such limits in workmen's compensation legislation where 
fixed dollar limits serve to offset the broader liability coverage. As to 
atomic energy in the Anderson-Price Act, adopted in 1957, amending 
the. United States Atomic Energy Act, it is provided that .the liability 
of a licensee shall not exceed the amount of insurance coverage pre-
scribed in· his license (not to exceed the approximately $6o,ooo,ooo 
available in the insurance market) plus the government indemnity that 
covers amounts in excess of the insurance up to $soo,ooo,ooo. 
. In other countries, similar liability limits are under consideration. In 
England, a limit of £s,ooo,ooo for any one accident may be adopted; in 
West Germany the figure is DM 1 s,ooo,ooo; in Switzerland, Sw fr 30,-
ooo,o~. Some form of government indemnity in excess of those sums 
is also under consideration in Germany and Switzerland. Accordingly, 
it may be concluded that atomic industry, although it may be subjected to 
strict liability in connection with its more hazardous activities, will have 
the benefit of definite monetary limits on such liability, probably also 
supported by governmental indemnity. Such limits will permit insurance 
companies to enter the field with assurance of manageable losses, and 
operators will be enabled to protect themselves by covering predictable 
maximum risks by insurance. Such provisions serve to promote the 
development of a new and usef_ul field of activity, and we may conclude 
that they stand a good chance of becoming universally a part of the pat· 
tern of atomic legislation for the future. 
c. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
The Federal Tort Claims Act 160 provides a major exception to the 
rule of sovereign immunity from private legal action. The government 
is made liable for certain of its torts. It is interesting to note, however, 
that courts are in effect establishing an "exception to the exception" to 
the effect that in no case shall the government be held subject to strict 
liability while in the execution of certain of its public duties. It is this 
feature that interests us especially in connection with atomic energy 
liability. 
The Tort Liability Act permits an injured party to sue the United 
States government for a tort claim brought because of harm caused by 
activities that would otherwise enjoy sovereign immunity on account of 
their governmental character. However, an important limitation is 
embodied in Section 268o which prevents action being brought upon 
140 z8 U.S.C.A. §§1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2512, 2671-Bo (1952 
Supp.). 
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claims for harm caused by "discretionary acts" of government officials. 
Then there is another limitation which does not expressly appear in the 
act but is implied by the federal courts. It is that the government cannot 
be found liable without fault in connection with harm caused by legiti-
mate pursuit of activities of a purely governmental character. This is 
in interesting contrast to the British policy under Section 5 ( 3) of the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Act which provides for 
strict liability without limit. 
The most dramatic case that has arisen up to the present time under 
the act is Dalehite v. United States.141 This case involved an action for 
both personal injuries and property damage caused by an explosion of a 
shipload of ammonium nitrate while in transit to Europe to be used as 
fertilizer. 142 The fertilizer was produced from surplus military ex-
plosives and was being sent to the Continent as a part of the govern-
ment's plan to aid European agricultural development. Action was 
brought under Section 1346 (b). and Section 268o of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act and was based upon negligence. The Court denied recovery 
on the ground that, even if the accident had been caused by negligence 
of government personnel, the government could, nevertheless, claim im-
munity under the "discretionary exemption" provision of Section 2680. 
It is in a dictum, however, that the item of especial interest in connec-
tion with this examination of the doctrine of strict liability is to be 
found. The court, interpreting Section 1346(b), stated that the govern-
ment could not be held to liability without fault in an action prosecuted 
under the Tort Claims Act. This aspect of the opinion is particularly 
applicable to the government owned nuclear industry, since, in the event 
of a reactor burn-up, evidence of negligence would be most difficult to 
come by and much of it would doubtless be obliterated in the accident. 
Hence strict liability would be the only recourse. 
The court's dictum that the government was not to be held liable with-
out fault uder the Federal Tort Claims Act was actually followed in a 
later case, Bartholomae Corp. v. United States.148 In that case action was 
brought against the government for damages to the plaintiff's building 
caused by shock waves produced by atomic weapons that were being 
141 Supra note 127. 
tu The ship was in the harbor at Texas City when the explosion occurred, so the 
mishap is now known as the "Texas City disaster." The incident is somewhat like a 
possible though unlikely major reactor disaster because of the enormous amount of 
damage involved. A large area of Texas City was laid waste by the explosion and 
some 300 claims were filed totaling approximately $2oo,ooo,ooo dollars. 
148 135 F. Supp. 651 (1955). 
714 TORT LIABILITY 
tested on the government's proving grounds at Los Alamos, New 
Mexico. The plaintiff's buildings were about 150 miles away from the 
scene of the testing. In an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
one of the four counts was based on a claim of absolute liability. The 
court denied recovery on that count, saying: 
There is an additional reason why there can be, no recovery 
on count three which is founded on a theory of absolute liabil-
ity without fault where the government is engaged in an ultra-
hazardous activity. In Dalehite v. United States, supra, the 
court stated that liability under the Tort Claims Act does not 
arise by virtue of the United States engaging in an extra-
hazardous activity and that it is to be invoked only on a negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of an employee.144 
The Tort Claims Act thus limits recovery to actions based upon negli-
gence. By implication strict liability has no place in actions against the 
government. In effect the government claims the immunity that its 
licensees or franchise holders might conceivably derive under the theory 
of the utility cases heretofore referred to in this chapter. 
2. Statutory Extension of Strict Liability 
As we have indicated hitherto, the trend in judicial decisions is in 
the direction of extending strict liability rather than limiting it. We 
shall find that, in line with general social policies of the day, the same is 
true in the field of statute law, which we now proceed to examine. 
a. Illustrations of Legislation in the United States Imposing 
Strict Liability 
Strict liability is no novelty in contemporary legislation. The example 
which comes first to mind is the workmen's compensation legislation, 
almost universally enacted in this country. Under such legislation the 
burden of industrial accidents is placed upon the employer if injuries 
"arise out of and occur in the course of the employment." Negligence 
is not a factor. Strict liability for occupational diseases of many differ-
ent kinds is also imposed. Such legislation is based upon a desire to pro-
vide summary relief for injured employees, and also to place the burden 
of industrial accidents upon the employer who is in the better economic 
position to bear the burden or shift it to the public. 
Another kind of strict liability legislation is exemplified by the Federal 
Safety Appliance Act which requires interstate railroads to install pre-
144 I d. at 654. 
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scribed safety devices, making the railroads subject to absolute liability 
for injuries caused by any deficiency in complying with the terms of the 
statutes or regulations. Again, we find many of the Pure Food and 
Drug Acts making the manufacturer or the seller of defective food or 
drugs absolutely liable to the injured consumer, without regard toques-
tions of negligence or reasonable care. 
In the field of aeronautics a dozen states have adopted a rule of abso-
lute liability for "ground damage" through statutory enactment of the 
Uniform Aeronautics Act, promulgated in I922 by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Several other 
states have adopted limited versions of the Uniform Act. Still other 
states, influenced no doubt by the safety records and the wide extent of 
use of civil aviation, have leaned more recently toward a negligence rule, 
and at least two states, namely. Pennsylvania and Idaho, have adopted 
laws affirmatively applying ordinary rules of negligence to aviation ac-
cidents. Three other states, Georgia, Nevada, and Maryland, have 
adopted a presumption of negligence rule, but stop short of absolute 
liability.145 
b. Illustrations from Other Countries of Statutory Exten-
sions of Strict Liability 
Turning to other countries for further illustrations, Sweden, as long 
ago as I902, adopted an act imposing strict liability upon operators of 
electric installations. In principle this act prescribes absolute liability 
for the operator for all damage occasioned by electricity flowing from 
the plant. The act, however, establishes certain exemptions from liabil-
ity. Exempted are damages resulting from acts of God, or major ex-
ternal force, those resulting from the negligence of the injured party by 
infringing regulations or otherwise, those caused by installations operat-
ing with an electric potential of less than I so volts, and those that result 
from facilities that are completely fenced in or placed underground. In 
short, Sweden has long since concluded that its social structure de-
mands widespread, strict liability for the electric power industry utilizing 
its special kind of dangerous facility. 
Germany likewise has entered the field with its Federal Law on Liabil-
ity. Article I of this law imposes absolute liability upon operators of 
railroads. They can exempt themselves only by proving that the accident 
arose because of an act of God, or major external force, or because 
us For statutory citations, see Eubank, "Land Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases," 
57 Dickinson L. Rev. 188 (1953). 
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of the fault of the injured person. Article 1 (a) of the German law deals 
with electric companies, providing that such companies also are to be 
held strictly liable if personal injury or property damage is caused by 
their activities. Again, strict liability is made subject to exceptions for 
acts of God, major external force, or fault on the part of the damaged 
person.146 
These brief references to Swedish and German laws illustrate the 
fact that in other highly developed legal systems, social regard for the 
injured party has resulted in legislative measures to assure the payment 
of damages regardless of proof of negligence. 
c. Atomic Energy Acts and Proposed Acts Establishing Strict 
Liability for Atomic Activities 
We may most assuredly anticipate that in the atomic field we shall find 
legislatures moving in the direction of establishing strict liability by 
statute. Such legislation in effect will be forced by the completely un-
satisfactory state of the common law on the subject; the confusion of 
Rylands v. Fletcher, the Restatement, and nuisance doctrines leaves too 
much to be desired. 
In England, the country of origin of Rylands v. Fletcher, the most 
positive and sweeping legislation along this line has been placed in effect. 
The Parliament of the United Kingdom in adopting its Atomic Energy 
Authority Act of 1954 made the Atomic Energy Authority absolutely 
liable for all radiation injuries both from reactor operations, and also 
from all other nuclear activities, by providing in Section 5 ( 3) of the Act 
as follows: 
It shall be the duty of the Authority to secure that no ionising 
radiations from anything on any premises occupied by them, 
or from any waste discharged (in whatever form) on or from 
any premises occupied by them, cause any hurt to any person 
or any damage to any property, whether he or it is on any such 
premises or elsewhere. 
This section places the English Atomic Energy Authority under an 
absolute duty which permits of no exceptions whatsoever, even for acts 
of God, except that possibly the Authority can plead a counter-claim to 
146 See Gesetz betr. die V erbundlichkeit zum Schad en ersatz fiir die bei dem Betriebe 
von Eisenbahnen, Bergwerken usiv. herbeigefiihrten Totungen und Korperverletzungen 
(Reichshaftpflichtgesetz) vom 7. ]uni 1871 (R.G. Bl. 207) h and ha. Also see 
Gesetz iiber die Haftpflicht der Eisenbahnen und Strassenbahnen fiir Sachschaden 
vom 29. April 1940 (R.G. :at. I 691) in der Fassung des Gesetzes vom 16. Juli 1957 
(B.G. Bl. I 710), §I. 
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any action brought by a person who by his own negligence or willful 
act causes or contributes to the escape of radioactivity. Moreover, the 
act covers all kinds of radioactivity, both that resulting from chain re-
actions and that from less dangerous sources. Thus, the Authority in 
Britain is under an exceptionally broad duty to see that their reactors 
and all other atomic activities are proof against acts of God, falling 
airplanes, and mishandling by strangers, as well as the vicissitudes of 
normal operational activity. Finally, the Authority's liability is without 
financial limit. u 7 
It should be noted, however, that Section 5 ( 3) applies only to the 
Atomic Energy Authority, namely the British government agency. It 
does not apply to private industry. At the present time such industry 
is not actively engaged in England in reactor operation but it doubtless 
will be so engaged in the near future ; and if an accident takes place, the 
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher would then be controlling, unless in 
the meantime legislation is enacted. 
But Parliament is about to act. On February 10, 1958, the British 
government announced its intention to intro4uce legislation providing 
for the licensing and inspection of all privately owned atomic energy 
operations, announcing, further, that all such private owners would be 
subject to the same duty as that of the Atomic Energy Authority with 
respect to the prevention of damage and the obligation to make rec-
ompense for personal injury or property damage occasioned by their 
operations. In other words, the British do not seem to feel that Rylands 
v. Fletcher is adequate for atomic energy purposes, and they intend to 
provide a very comprehensive strict liability measure covering atomic 
operations, government, private, and otherwise. There is some uncer-
tainty as to whether or not the act to be applied to private industry would 
require strict liability for escaping radioisotopes as distinguished from 
chain reactions. A high government official has indicated that he does not 
believe the act in its final form will be quite so drastic. In any case this 
proposed measure represents the current thinking in the land of origin 
of the common law--one of the principal competitors for the world's 
atomic business in the future. 
In Germany also the matter of liability for atomic injuries has re-
cently received extensive and intensive consideration. As early as 1955 
H7 See discussion by C. ]. Highton, General Counsel for the U.K. Authority, in a 
paper entitled "International Problems of Tort Liability and Financial Protection 
Arising Out of the Use of Atomic Energy-Law Relating to Atomic Operations in 
Great Britain" presented to the International Bar Association Convention, Cologne, 
Germany, July 21, 1958. 
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German lawyers and insurance experts were studying the liability prob-
lems likely to arise from peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of 
these deliberations a draft of a Federal Atomic Energy Act was pre-
pared. In 1957 this draft was ready for adoption, but because of politi-
cai obstacles final action was deferred. In the meantime several of the 
West German Lander having research reactors operating or under 
construction have felt the need for enacting provisional laws on the 
subject. In January, 1958, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen adopted a 
measure that included a brief interim treatment of civil liability and in-
surance coverage therefor and other somewhat similar measures have 
been adopted in Bavaria, the City of Berlin, the City of Bremen, the City 
of Hamburg, Hesse, Schleswig-Holstein, and Wiirttemberg-Baden. 
The 1957 German draft bill as proposed by the government of the 
Federal Republic of West Germany contains an exceptionally thoughtful 
treatment of the question of liability, and it will be worth while to 
summarize these provisions.148 They may become useful in connection 
with the formulation of American legislation. The principal articles of 
Part IV on Liability for Injuries are in substance as follows: 
Article 2 I. ( 1) Should any person suffer death, bodily in-
jury or any deterioration in health or should property sustain 
damage owing to the effect of a nuclear fission process or of 
radiation from a radioactive substance emitted from an instal-
lation within the meaning of article 7 (.installations for the 
production or fission of fissile materials or for the processing 
of irradiated fissile materials) or from equipment forming 
part of such installation or from any operation, including the 
disposal of waste, the owner of the installation shall be re-
quired to pay compensation for such damage in accordance 
with the provisions of articles 23 to 31. Liability for compen-
sation shall not arise where the damage is caused by act of 
God. 
( 2) Where the use of property has been impaired by the 
effects of radiation from a radioactive substance, this shall be 
deemed to be damage to property for the purpose of the regu-
lations under this Part. 
Note that this provision does not spell out strict liability for all 
radioactivity from reactor plants, but merely from the reactor itself and 
the disposition of waste products. If there should be other radioactive 
substances involved, the question of liability would fall under Article 22. 
us The original draft of this measure was submitted to the Bundestag in a report 
dated May 9, 1957, (Paper 3502) as a result of the deliberations of the 38th Parlia-
mentary Commission on Atomic Questions. A revised version, translated into English 
by Centre D'Etudes de Ia Commission Permanente du Risque Atomique (CERA) 
can be found in Information Bulletin No. 12, July 1958. 
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This differentiation in liability between cases falling within Article 2I 
and those under Article 22 is most important. 
Article 22. (I) Should any person suffer death or bodily 
injury or any deterioration in health or should property sus-
tain damage through the effects of a nuclear fission process or 
of the radiations from radioactive substances in cases other 
than those set out in article 2 I, the possessor of the substance 
affected by the nuclear fission or the radioactive substance 
from which the radiation is emitted shall be required to pay 
compensation for the damage arising therefrom in accordance 
with articles 23 to 3 I. Liability shall not arise where the dam-
age is caused by an event which the possessor, his servants or 
agents cannot avoid, even by taking every precaution possible 
in the circumstances, and which is due neither to faulty safety 
arrangements nor to faulty workmanship. 
The effect of this rather obscure inversion of language is to provide 
that there will be no liability if proper care is utilized, but the burden 
is placed on the defendant to exculpate himself,-a so-called "inversed 
burden of proof." 
It is further provided in Article 22 that the burden will not be re-
versed if the radioactive material is used by a physician or dentist in 
medical treatment of the plaintiff, nor will it be reversed if there is a 
legal relationship between the operator and the plaintiff whereby the 
latter accepts the risk occasioned by the dangerous material. 
Article 23. This article deals with the so-ailed "contributory re-
sponsibility" of the injured. It is provided here that, if damage is 
caused by his "cooperative fault," _another provision of the German Civil 
Code shall be applied, prorating the damages according to the respective 
faults-an adaptation of a "comparative negligence" theory. 
. Article 24. This article provides the specific items of damages to be 
compensated. They include medical treatment, loss of earnings, funeral 
expenses in case of death, and maintenance costs of legal dependents, 
but no provision is made for pain and suffering. This subject needs 
careful treatment in any such statute. 
Article 27. This article deals with limits upon the liability. In case 
of death a maximum of DM Ioo,ooo, or in case of injury a yearly pay-
ment of not to exceed DM6,ooo is provided. The total amount to be 
paid by the operator or his insurance carrier for any one accident shall 
not exceed DM I s,ooo,ooo, except in case of negligence for which there 
is no limit. 
Article 28. The statutes of limitations are revised. All claims under 
the act continue alive for two years after the time the injured person 
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obtains knowledge of the damage done and the person liable, but not 
more than thirty years frorri the time when the overexposure took place. 
Article 29. This article deals with forfeiture and provides that the 
person entitled to the compensation will lose his right under the law if 
he does not furnish the liable person with notice of the damage within 
three months after becoming conscious of his injury. This "notice of 
damage" must be followed by bringing the suit within two years as 
provided by Article 28. 
It is contemplated that the foregoing provisions will be supplemented 
by another federal enactment, somewhat like the United States Ander-
son-Price Act, requiring insurance and providing indemnity by the 
government to the extent of DMsoo,ooo,ooo over the amounts of 
private liability stipulated in Article 27.149 
The foregoing provisions illustrate the very thorough current think-
ing in the West German Republic with respect to statutory extension of 
liability for overexposure to radioactivity. 
A somewhat similar measure is being currently drafted in Switzer-
land. In fact, a second draft of this measure was completed by the 
commission charged with the task on May 6, 1958, and is now ready for 
submission to the Swiss Parliament. This draft also provides for abso-
lute liability for injuries caused by those who engage in "nuclear 
processes," a term which is defined to be the substantial equivalent of 
"nuclear criticality," i.e., processes involving chain reactions. It should 
be observed that on this point the Swiss draft is the reasonable equiva-
lent of that of West Germany. In short, absolute liability is to be 
limited in both countries to the chain reaction process and its necessary 
radioactive auxiliaries. It will not include other radioactive substances 
which are therefore left to the ordinary principles of negligence. 
Moreover, the Swiss draft excludes damages resulting from acts of 
God, earthquakes, events of war, or grave faults of the injured person. 
Neither the German nor the Swiss draft exempts from strict liability any 
accidents resulting from the activities of third persons. The Swiss draft, 
like the German draft, limits the amount of liability per accident, the 
Swiss figure being Sw fr JO,ooo,ooo, which is the maximum amount of 
insurance coverage available in the Swiss Insurance Pool. Under Swiss 
policies a deduction will be made from the face value of the policy for 
any amounts paid out or incurred for prior accidents during the policy 
period. Accordingly, the Swiss draft provides that when the remaining 
149 For a complete discussion of the proposed West German law, se«> a-paper entitled 
"[nternational Problems of Tort Liability and Financial Protection Arising Out of the 
u~ of Atomic Energy" presented on July 21, 1958, by Dr. H Fischerhof to the 
International Bar Association at Cologne, Germany. 
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maximum liability is reduced by one-tenth or more, the insured must 
seek additional coverage to meet the deficiency. 
The Swiss draft includes a statute of limitations of only ten years 
from the date of the accident, but provision is made for a "delayed 
damages" fund to cover cases that turn up after the expiration of the 
statutory period. This fund, which would be administered by the State, 
would be accumulated by contributions required. of all operators in the 
form of a supplementary payment of an amount not to exceed one-third 
of the insurance premium. 
We may anticipate that these German and Swiss bills will become law 
in substantially the form stated within the next year or two. Moreover, 
they are likely to set a pattern for legislation in other countries of 
Western Europe and perhaps for other parts of the world. They have 
value to the United States as precedents. First, they confirm, so to 
speak,· the wisdom of the Anderson-Price Amendment by imposing 
similar requirements, i.e., by requiring insurance, providing govern-
ment indemnity, and limiting maximum liability; and second, they point 
the way toward a solution of the civil liability problem by statutory pre-
scription of absolute liability in its proper field with clearcut definitions 
and appropriate exceptions. Of especial importance is the segregation of 
the chain reaction elements, making them subject to strict liability, but 
leaving other radioactivity subject to normal principles of negligence. 
This last named feature serves to establish an orderly system in place 
of the present unsatisfactory state of affairsand should provide a system 
of redress for injured persons based upon a: careful legislative appraisal 
of the economic and social needs as well as the problems of a new in-
dustry. The search for such a wisely conceived statutory solution is 
the next important step in the law of the atomic age. 
K. Conclusions Concerning Strict Liability 
We have now sufficiently reviewed both the case law, the statute 
law, and the facts pertaining to the question of strict liability so that 
we may formulate some conclusions concerning its proper applicability 
to atomic activities, drawing together the tentative suggestions hereto-
fore set forth and attempting to express a comprehensive prospectus of 
this area of the law. With a reasonable degree of assurance we offer 
the following: 
( 1) As has already been noted, the judge-made law, particularly 
that made by American courts, is in a state of confusion, with manifold 
uncertainties created by the indefiniteness of the standards to be applied. 
Under Rylands v. Fletcher, what are "dangerous substances?" \Vhat is 
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a "non-natural use?" Under the American Law Institute Restatement, 
what is the meaning of "ultra-hazardous?" When does an activity 
"necessarily involve a risk of serious harm?" What is "common 
usage?" Under the nuisance doctrine, how shall we evaluate the "bal-
ance of convenience" in connection with possible nuisances from atomic 
activities? All of these vague terms create uncertainties in the case law. 
The terms cannot be readily applied to users of atomic energy to de-
termine who are included within strict liability and who are not, or 
what accidents fall within the exceptions and which do not, or what 
defenses are available in special circumstances. In addition, we find that 
variances between the views of different courts compound the difficulty. 
In short, common law processes seem ill-adapted to meet the atomic 
liability problem. 
(2) The facts related to atomic injuries present widely variant pat-
terns. Some radioactive substances are highly dangerous, others not so 
much so. Some atomic activities are unique or nearly so, others are or 
soon will be commonplace. Some will be carried on in centers of popula-
tion, others in remote areas. No single rule can wisely be applied to all of 
the variants. These diverse facts further complicate the legal scene and 
bespeak a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal solution. 
(3) Notwithstanding an excellent safety record to date, injuries to 
persons and property are certain to occur in the future in connection 
with peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is a fast moving technology, too 
swift, indeed, to be readily accommodated under the relatively deliberate 
evolutionary processes of the common law. Yet the law must provide a 
suitable framework for the new industry, both clarifying the duties and 
obligations of those who take part in it, and providing adequate, speedy, 
and certain redress for injured persons. 
(4) Insurance and indemnity programs sponsored and administered 
by government are being made available to protect the industry against 
undue liability, but we have not yet really come to grips with the proper 
extent and nature of this liability so far as individual cases are con-
cerned. This is an essential next step. 
( 5) In other leading countries constructive minds are coming to grips 
with the problem of civil liability by resort to statutory measures, with 
clearly expressed principles to guide the solution of problems in the field. 
Some statutes have already been adopted, others are in the drafting 
stage. It is a field in which the legislative process best serves the public 
needs. 
( 6) Certain European proposals are of especial interest by reason of 
the differentiation established between two classes of radiation accidents 
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(a) those connected with chain reaction, in which case strict liability 
is imposed, and (b) those due to other radioactive substances, in which 
case the usual rules of negligence prevail. 
(7) In the United States we must give serious consideration to a 
similar statutory approach to determining liability for radiation injuries. 
The trend is towards strict liability, but exceptions must be worked out 
to achieve justice and avoid discouraging the development of a new and 
valuable technology. Many phases of nuclear enterprise can properly 
be fitted into the normal standards of negligence. Others must accept 
strict liability. The lines of cleavage must be carefully drawn. 
(8) In the light of the materials presented in this chapter, we suggest 
the following principal points as essential to the formulation of a just 
and sensible law of civil liability for radiation injuries. 
(a) Those who engage in atomic activity (including both private 
and government operations) involving critical quantities of fissionable 
material, or the disposition of waste fission byproducts therefrom, and 
those who have in their possession critical quantities of fissionable ma-
terials, should be held strictly liable for injuries occasioned by ariy acci-
dental escape of radioactivity resulting from such operations, if the 
escape is in excess of the permissible tolerance limits specified by the 
Atomic Energy Commission or state regulatory bodies. This would in-
clude the power reactor "runaway," the EBRI situation, the Chalk 
River, and Windscale types of accidents, the fuel processing and re-
processing plants, and waste disposal facilities and even the small re-
search reactor accident which some may feel should not be subject to 
such strict liability. 
(b) If in connection with activities included in (a) radioactive 
effluents escape, not by accident, but necessarily in the ordinary course 
of operations but in quantities less than the officially prescribed toler-
ance levels, liability should be based upon principles of negligence only. 
This will afford reasonable latitude for normal operations without the 
harassment and expense of constant litigation. For example, the hypo-
thetical escape of radioactivity from a waste disposal plant would be 
covered by this provision. 
(c) Those who engage in atomic activity of kinds other than those 
included in (a) which involve the irradiation of food, drugs, or other 
articles for human consumption should likewise be ·held strictly liable 
for injuries caused by their products. 
(d) Exceptions, if any, from strict liability should be clearly spelled 
out and defined. Such exceptions should be kept at a minimum, limited 
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at the most to acts of God, acts of war, and results that flow from the 
intentional acts of the injured person. The availability or otherwise of 
defenses in the nature of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, 
or actions of third parties should also be spelled out and defined. In 
general, if there is good reason for strict liability, there is an equally 
good reason for keeping the exceptions and defenses within the nar-
rowest possible bounds. 
(e) Those who engage in any atomic activity not included in (a) or 
(c) above should be held liable for negligence only. This would in-
clude radiography, thickness measurement, the use of tracers, medical 
diagnosis and therapy; and the dozens of other highly valuable appli-
cations of radioisotopes. Again, there is a good argument for including 
in this category small research reactors of conventional types and proved 
stability. Dividing lines between negligence and strict liability situations 
would thus be sharply drawn in common-sense way, and all concerned 
would profit thereby. 
(f) Statutes of limitations should be revised to extend substantially 
the period within which suit may be brought, thus to take account of the 
fact that the damaging effects of overexposure to radioactivity fre-
quently do not become apparent for many years. A reasonable period, 
perhaps two years, should be allowed after acquisition of knowledge of 
the injury and identification of the person liable, with possibly an over-
all limit of twenty years from the date of the accident. Such a provision 
would give redress to the victim who after many years develops cancer, 
cataract, or leukemia. 
(g) Statutory provision must be made to deal with the extraordinary 
problems of evidence and burden of proof that will arise in radiation 
cases. In negligence cases the proof of negligence will be extremely 
difficult and it is possible that the only feasible solution will be the "in-
served burden of proof" of the German draft. Moreover, it may be 
necessary to resolve problems of causation by resort to statutory pre-
sumptions based upon roentgens of exposure or other available objec-
tive data. 
* * * * * 
A statutory approach to the problem of strict liability utilizing as a 
framework the foregoing points, and taking advantage of the West 
German and Swiss thinking on the subject, would minimize litigation, 
bring prompt justice to injured persons, and, at the same time clarify 
the law to facilitate the growth of a new type of industry. 
Chapter V 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN ATOMIC ENERGY 
A. Product Liability 
1. Introduction 
Ascertaining the potential liability of designers, manufacturers, 
wholesalers, retailers, and suppliers of goods and services in an atomic 
energy industry is extremely difficult. This is due in part to the fact that 
the theories of liability are in a state of ferment and in part because there 
is a confusion between tort and contract law concepts and the applica-
tion of each in particular fact situations. Out of the confusion, we can 
draw one conclusion. There is a marked tendency to provide compensa-
tion to persons injured by defective chattels or services by the imposi-
tion of a type of "enterprise liability," apparently on the assumption 
that suppliers can shift the economic loss through price increases and by 
obtaining liability insurance coverage. 
The importance of determining the extent of liability under existing 
legal doctrines is perhaps obvious from the standpoint of obtaining 
recoveries for persons injured by atomic radiation and also of advising 
entrepreneurs of desired insurance coverage and of possible measures 
to limit liability. Nonetheless, a few hypothetical questions inay indicate 
some problems that will have to be dealt with by lawyers in the atomic 
age. Will or should the designer of a nuclear reactor be liable for in-
juries caused to persons subjected to radiation outside the facility? Will 
or should the manufacturer of radioisotopes be liable for injuries caused 
as a result of leaks in packaging even though a wholesaler or retailer had 
control over the goods after the manufacturer? Will or should the sup-
plier of a mechanical device used in conjunction with radioactive ma-
terials be liable for radiation injuries caused by ~defect? Does it make 
any difference if the supplier had no knowledge that his product was to 
be so used? What is the effect of failing to warn a purchaser that a 
radioisotope should not be used for particular purposes? What duty 
rests on the manufacturer or supplier to know the propensities of his 
product for causing injury? What liabilities may be imposed as a result 
of statements made in advertisements? Can the scope of liability for 
defects be limited by disclaimers and notices? These are only a few of 
the many questions that must be answered. Some conclusions can be 
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drawn on the basis of analagous cases involving product liability in 
other types of endeavor. Therefore, we shall proceed to discuss some of 
the significant features of the law governing the liability of suppliers 
of goods and services, emphasizing throughout the landmark and 
frontier cases and their possible applicability in the light of specific 
atomic energy fact situations. 
2. Negligence 
a. Historical Background 
Although it is clear today in many jurisdictions that a supplier of 
chattels is liable for injuries to any person caused by his negligent con-
duct, this was not the case less than a century ago. The liability of 
suppliers for injuries caused by defects in chattels was considered to 
extend only to those who were in privity with the supplier under the 
contract of sale. Since this evolution in doctrine is of comparatively 
recent origin and since there continues to be considerable doubt in some 
jurisdictions as to the applicability of negligence and strict liability 
doctrines, a discussion of the landmark cases will be helpful in supplying 
the necessary perspective to deal with the new atomic energy situations. 
The rule of law to the effect that the supplier of chattel was not liable 
to persons not in privity was first announced in the English case of 
Winterbottom v. Wright. 1 There the defendant had contracted with the 
postmaster general to furnish a mail coach and keep it in repair. As a 
consequence of the defendant's negligent failure to keep the coach in re-
pair, the driver, who was in the employ of another contractor with the 
postmaster general, was injured. Lack of a contractual relationship be-
tween the driver and the defendant was held to preclude liability, be-
cause "unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the 
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous conse-
quences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." 2 This rule of law 
protected the supplier from bearing certain burdens, but it failed to pro-
vide any redress for the persons injured by the supplier's negligence. 
Only ten years after the Winterbottom case, the New York court in 
Thomas v. Winchester 8 made an exception to the rule of no liability 
to third parties. In that case the defendant negligently mislabeled, as a 
harmless medicine, a jar of a poisonous extract of belladonna. The 
plaintiff had purchased the poison from a physician who had obtained 
1 10M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). 
2 /d. at 114. 
s 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). 
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it from a druggist who in turn had purchased it from the defendant. 
In allowing the plaintiff to recover, the court distinguished the fact situa-
tion from those in which a rule of non-liability prevailed, stating: 
No such imminent danger existed in those cases. In the 
present case the sale of the poisonous article was made to a 
dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer. The injury therefore 
was not likely to fall on him, or on his vendee who was also a 
dealer; but much more likely to be visited on a remote pur-
chaser, as actually happened. 4 
The second landmark case in the development of the doctrine that 
persons not in privity with a supplier could nonetheless recover damages 
for injuries under negligence theories is Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing 
Machine Co. 5 In allowing recovery to an employee of the purchaser of 
a threshing machine which was inadequately shielded, the court outlined 
three exceptions to the general rule of no liability in the absence of 
privity. These exceptions, which were. to exert considerable influence 
in future litigation, were said to be : 
The first is that an act of negligence of a manufacturer or 
vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of 
mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of 
an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is 
actionable by third parties. . . . 
The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence 
which causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his 
defective appliance upon the owner's premises may form the 
basis of an action against the owner .... 
The third exception . . . is that one who sells or delivers 
an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life 
or limb to another without notice of its qualities is liable to 
any person who suffers an injury theref:t;"om which might have 
been reasonably anticipated. . . . 8 
In analyzing the court's statement of the exceptions, Professor Bohlen 
forcefully brought out its incongruities.7 He observed that under the 
court's formulation of the rule, manufacturers of chewing tobacco and 
drinks would be liable to persons not in privity, but the manufacturers of 
automobiles, high-powered machines, boilers, etc. would· not be liable 
for negligence since such articles are not intended to affect human life 
and are not immently dangerous in their use when free of defects. 
4 I d. at 409. 
5 120 Fed. 86s (1903). 
e !d. at 870-871. 
1 Bohlen, "Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than their Immediate 
Vendees," 45 L.Q. Rev. 343 (1929), 
728 TORT LIABILITY 
Perhaps the best known case in the area of liability of manufacturers 
to third parties is that of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,8 in 
which Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion. There the plaintiff was in-
jured when a wheel collapsed on a car manufactured by the defendant 
and purchased by the plaintiff through a dealer. Although the wheel 
came to the defendant from a supplier, the defect was such that reason-
able inspection would have disclosed it. In holding the defendant liable 
under negligence doctrines, the court said: 
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester 
is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, 
to things which in their normal operation are implements of 
destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reason-
a:bly certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently 
made, it is then a thing of danger.9 
The court, however, did indicate some limitations on this test, by 
stating: 
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the 
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and 
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the 
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make 
it carefully. That is as far as we are required to go for the 
decision of this case. There must be knowledge of a danger, 
not merely possible, but probable. It is possible to use almost 
anything in a way that will make it dangerous if defective. 
That is not enough to charge the manufacturer with a duty 
independent of his contract .... There must also be knowl-
edge that in the usual course of events the danger will be 
shared by others than the buyer.10 
The culmination of the establishment of a general rule of liability of 
manufacturers based on negligence was reached in Carter v. Yardley & 
Co., Ltd. by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.11 In that case, 
the plaintiff, a remote purchaser, had been injured by the use of per-
fume manufactured by the defendant. The court swept aside the distinc-
tion between things ''inherently dangerous" and others not so, stating 
the rule to be as follows : 
In principle, a manufacturer or other person owning or 
controlling a thing that is dangerous in its nature or is in a 
dangerous condition, either to his knowledge or as a result of 
B 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 ( 1916). 
9 /d. at 389. 
1o Ibid. 
11 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). 
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his want of reasonable care in manufacture or inspection, who 
deals with or disposes of that thing in a way that he foresees 
or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to foresee will 
probably carry that thing into contact with some person, 
known or unknown, who will probably. be ignorant of the 
danger, owes a legal duty to every such person to use reason-
able care to prevent injury to him.12 
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Instead of stating the rule in form of an exception to the general 
rule as established in Winterbottom v. Wright the court stated: 
The time has come for us to recognize that that asserted 
general rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It 
tended to produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the 
great weight of authority elsewhere.13 
Thus in slightly more than a century the law has been completely re-
versed from a doctrine of non-liability of manufacturers to persons not 
in privity by contract to a doctrine of liability for negligence. Not all 
courts have had occasion to enunciate the broad doctrine of the Carter 
case, but it can be expected that in most jurisdictions liability based 
upon negligence will become the established rule of law. Although the 
negligence doctrine as applied to product liability situations seems to be 
established in most jurisdictions today, problems in its application still 
remain. Furthermore, there appears to be some tendency in the cases 
to impose what amounts to strict liability. 
b. The General Nature of the Duty 
In general, a supplier of chattels has a duty to use care and skill 
when a reasonable, prudent man occupying the position of the supplier 
would recognize that a failure to use such care and skill would cause an 
unreasonable risk to other persons. 14 This duty is owed to every per-
son who may foreseeably be injured by a failure .to exercise the care 
and skill required.15 The duty may be breached by several types of acts, 
including a failure by the supplier to disclose the unfitness of the chattel 
for the purchaser's purpose, a failure to exercise reasona:ble care in 
manufacturing or inspecting the chattel, a failure to produce a safe 
product as a result of errors in design, a misrepresentation of the quali-
12ld. at g6. 
lSJd. at 104. 
14 See James, "Nature of Negligence," 3 Utah L. Rev. 275, :28o (1953); James, 
"Products Liability," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 44 (1955). 
1s For a discussion of the foreseeability issue in atomic energy cases, see Chapter III, 
supra. 
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ties of the chattel or their fitness for a particular purpose, or a sale to a 
person who is incompetent to handle the chattel safely.18 Because of the 
several forms which the negligence may take, the duty owed by the 
supplier is often phrased more specifically in the cases and in discussions 
of the product liability field. For example, the duty may be described 
as a duty to disclose defects in the product or its dangerous nature or 
as a duty to inspect.17 Thus, the general duty owed by suppliers of 
chattels is not expressed judicially, but it can be derived from an accumu-
lation of the principles developed in the cases. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that suppliers in the atomic energy industry undertake duties in respect 
to their goods, a breach of which will result in the imposition of liability 
under negligence doctrines. 
c. By Whom. Is the Duty Owed? 
The general duty to exercise reasonable care in conjunction with 
supplying chattels extends to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, les-
sors, bailors, donors,18 and even repairmen who return chattels with 
knowledge of defects due to the repairs they were employed to under-
take.19 In addition, it should be noted that the manufacturer may be 
held liable for negligence, even if he did not produce the defective article 
but incorporated it into the final finished product. 20 
In connection with the atomic energy industry, the duty will extend 
to all manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of nuclear devices. Per-
haps more important, however, is the fact that suppliers of non-nuclear 
devices which are used in conjunction with reactors may subject them-
selves to tremendous liabilities if the failure of the device results in a 
major nuclear accident. Thus, the unusual feature of the supplier's 
liability in atomic energy is the vastness of the potential liability. For 
example, the supplier of a defective gear may normally expect to incur 
liability, but in all probability it will be confined to employees of the 
purchaser and occasionally a limited number of other third parties. 
16 Prosser, Torts §83 (2d ed. 1955). 
11 See Restatement, Torts §388, and the several comments thereunder. 
1s Restatement, Torts §388, comment c (1934); James, "Products Liability," 34 Tex. 
L. Rev. 44, 45 (1955), especially at Note 8 where cases are cited in which donors 
have been held liable as well as cases which are contra. See also Prosser, Torts §83 
at 493 (2d ed. 1955), indicating Dean Prosser's opinion that the gratuitous bailor or 
donor only has the duty to disclose dangers of which he has knowledge. 
to Restatement, Torts §388, comment c (1934). But see Hanson v. Blackwell Motor 
Company, 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927). 
20 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), 
wheel supplied to car manufacturer by independent supplier. 
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However, supplying a defective gear which causes a nuclear accident 
may cause injury to hundreds and even thousands of persons, as well as 
causing substantial property damage. 
Because there is a practice in the atomic energy industry for one 
group to design reactors or reactor components and another to engage 
in their manufacture or construction, a question arises as to whether 
the designers owe duties equivalent to those of the manufacturers of the 
product. The Restatement of the Law of Torts 21 and Professor James 22 
both take the position that negligence in design is a basis for recovery 
against the manufacturer even where the product was designed by 
others, although Professor James acknowledges that the courts have 
been reticent in allowing recovery in cases based upon negligence in de-
sign where the manufacturer was responsible for the design.23 We are 
unaware of any cases holding a designer, as distinguished from a de-
signer-manufacturer, liable to third persons injured as a result of use of 
a chattel. In the case of architects the courts have refused to allow re-
covery by third persons injured by defects in design.24 However, as 
we shall note later in this chapter, the courts have generally followed 
more restrictive rules in cases against building contractors and have 
not allowed recovery when the building has been accepted, apparently 
on the basis that the contractor has no control over subsequent acts con-
cerning the realty and because of the lack of privity. When third parties 
have initiated actions against architects for negligence in design, re-
covery has generally been denied on the same theories employed in the 
building contractor cases. In contrast, the owners of the premises have 
been successful in obtaining recovery for injuries caused by the negli-
gence .of the architec.t.25 However, in 1956 an Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York held that an allegation of negligence by 
an architect causing injury to a third person stated a cause of action. 26 
Furthermore, the New York court even suggested that the architect 
may be liable and the building contractor not liable because the building 
contractor may have been justified in relying on the plans and specifica-
21 Restatement, Torts §§389. 398 (1934). 
22 James, "Products Liability,'' supra note 18 at so et seq. 
23 Ibid. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in seeking recovery for injuries 
on the basis of negligence in design, see Katz, "Negligence in Design as a Basis of 
Liability: The Auto Industry,'' 1956 Ins. L.J. 466. 
24 See e.g., Geare v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 2.;6 (1!)26). 
25 See Annotation, "Responsibility of one acting as architect for defects or insuffi-
ciency of work attributable to plans,'' 25 A.L.R.2d 1o85 (1952). 
26 Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, I App. Div. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 
( 1956). 
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tioris. Therefore, the question of liability for negligence in design of 
designers of chattels who do not also manufacture the product remains 
doubtful. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that the ultra-hazardous 
nature of an improperly designed atomic device may lead the courts to 
employ general negligence doctrines in suits by third parties against de-
signers. Moreover, the general trend of the law in the field of product 
liability has been to broaden the field of application of negligence con-
cepts. Therefore, we conclude that there is considerable likelihood that 
designers of chattels for atomic industry will be held to a general duty 
similar to that owed by manufacturers. 
One additional factor should be noted. The specific nature of the 
duty owed by the various types of suppliers may differ. For example, 
a retailer or wholesaler may not be subject to the same duty to inspect 
a product .as the manufacturer. Similarly, the manufacturer may not 
be under a duty to disclose to an ultimate purchaser the unsuitability of 
his product for the particular use contemplated by the purchaser whereas 
the retailer may be under such a duty when he knows of the contem-
plated use. 
In the field of atomic energy a special problem exists because of the 
activity of the federal government. The Atomic Energy Commission 
actively engages in the production and marketing of radioactive by-
product materials, and the United States is the exclusive owner of special 
nuclear material. 27 Furthermore, under contract arrangements the AEC 
may supply research facilities, possible designs, and fuel refabrication 
services. As a supplier of goods, is the United States liable for negli-
gent acts on the same basis as private suppliers? Since the govern-
ment can be held liable only to the extent of the waiver of its immunity 
from suit, the answer lies in the applicable provisions of the Federal 
Tort Oaims Act. 28 Generally, if injury results from the performance 
of other than a discretionary act upon the part of government officials 
and employees, the government has waived its immunity. Therefore, 
it would appear that if the AEC supplies a negligently mislabeled radio-
isotope, the government may be held liable. However, if the negligence 
consists of improperly licensing an unqualified person, the government 
probably cannot be held liable because of the discretionary nature of the 
27 Section 53e of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1957, requires that 
special nuclear licenses be subject to the condition that the licensee "hold the United 
States and the Commission harmless from any damages resulting from the use or 
possession of special nuclear material by the licensee" except to the extent that the 
indemnification and limitation of liability provisions of the act apply. 
28 28 U.S.C. §h346(b), 268o(a) (1950). 
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negligent act. 29 An additional question is whether governmental liability 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act can be based solely upon ownership 
of special nuclear material, absent any showing of negligence.80 In the 
Texas City litigation, the Supreme Court answered this question nega-
tively: 
. . . [T]he statute requires a negligent act. So it is our 
judgment that liability does not arise by virtue either of 
United States ownership of an "inherently dangerous com-
modity" or property, or of engaging in an "extra-hazardous" 
activity. 81 
d. To Whom Is the Duty Owed? 
When the courts in the last century required privity as a condition to 
recovery for injuries occasioned by negligence in supplying a chattel, 
the purchaser could, of course, fulfill that requirement in an action 
against his immediate supplier. However, in the MacPherson case an 
ultimate purchaser was allowed to recover from a remote vendor, and 
since the date of that case the principle of liability for negligence has 
been gradually extended to cover members of the purchaser's family,82 
the purchaser's employees, other users of the product,88 casual by-stand-
ers, and even second-hand purchasers of the product.84 However, not 
every jurisdiction has had occasion to consider the extension of negli-
gence doctrines to include non-users of a product, so soQle doubt exists 
as to the exact legal situation now prevailing. For example, the Wash-
ington court has declined to hold a repairman liable to a guest-pas-
senger for negligence in the repair of an automobile,35 but the Kentucky 
and Wisconsin courts have reached an opposite result. 88 The trend ap-
pears to be to enlarge the class to whom the duty is owing and thereby to 
broaden the liability based on negligence doctrines. 
Moreover, both the direct purchaser and in some cases the ultimate 
purchaser may also be able to recover on the basis of either express or 
29 For a discussion of the nature of discretionary acts, see Dalehite et al. v. United 
States, 346 U.S. IS, 73 S.Ct. 9S6 (I9S3). 
so For an interesting discussion of the possible goverrunental liability, see Hearing 
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity, 84th 
Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 109-114 (May 16, I9S6). 
81 Dalehite et at. v. United States, supra note 29 at 4S· 
82White Sewing Machine v. Fiesel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927). 
ss Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 48S, 6 N.E.2d 4IS (1936). 
84 Prosser, Torts §84, p. SOI (2d ed. I9SS). 
as Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., supra note 19. 
88 Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (19II); Flies v. Fox 
Brothers, 196 Wis. Ig(i, 218 N.W. Bss (1!)28). 
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implied warranties. Recovery tinder warranty doctrines is based upon a 
contractual type of liability and, as such, results in the impostion of a 
kind of strict liability, as contrasted with negligence. Recovery on war-
ranty theories will be discussed later in this chapter. The fact that a 
purchaser may in some cases recover under either doctrine (negligence 
or warranty) has resulted in confusion in the cases. In any event, sup-
pliers of chattels in atomic energy industry must take account of both 
doctrines in ascertaining the potential scope of their liability and in 
devising methods of providing protection, either by limiting the basis 
for recovery in warran_ty through contract terms or by seeking adequate 
insurance coverage. 
Because of the unusual nature of radiation, the most difficult question 
confronting suppliers of chattels in atomic energy industry is whether 
the duty is owed to remote non-users. Normally, a supplier whose negli-
gence causes an accident can expect relatively few persons in areas 
immediately adjacent to the chattel to be injured. But this may not be 
the case in respect to defective chattels supplied in connection with 
operations creating radiation hazards. For example, if the negligence of 
a manufacturer of a reactor control mechanism causes the reactor to 
melt-down and release radiation into the atmosphere, personal and prop-
erty damage of outsiders may be measured in millions of dollars. More-
over remote and unexpected injuries may ensue, as for example if a 
supplier's negJigence causes injury to a person who eats fruit covered 
by radioactive wastes released several miles away. 
Under ordinary negligence doctrines the duty to the remotely injured 
person is resolved on the basis of foreseeability. It would appear that 
once recovery based upon negligence is permitted, the same tests of 
foreseeability should be employed in the atomic energy product liability 
cases as used in other negligence cases. However, the Restatement of 
the Law of Torts and Dean Prosser depart from the usual foreseeability 
concepts employed in discussing negligence when they describe the liabil-
ity of suppliers of chattels to third persons. Both express the liability 
of the supplier in terms of persons who may be expected to be "in the 
vicinity of the chattel's probable use." 87 A literal application of these 
statements of the rule may suggest a more restrictive scope of liability 
for suppliers of products in atomic energy cases involving radiation 
injuries suffered in places far removed from the location of the chattel. 
87 Prosser, Torts §84, p. 497 (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1955). As expressed in the 
Restatement, Torts §388 ( 1934), the supplier's liability is "to those whom the supplier 
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be in the vicinity 
of its probable use." 
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On the other hand, use of this.statement of the rule may result in even 
greater liabilities because the statement takes no account of the device 
employed in ordinary negligence cases of finding no duty in respect to 
the "unforeseen" injured person.88 
It is doubtful whether any distinction can be justified between the 
tests of duty in pure negligence cases and those applied to product liabil-
ity cases. For example, in Margulies et al. v. Denner et al.39 the owner, 
the agent of the owner, the supplier of the product, the trucking com-
pany, and the truck driver were held jointly liable to a group of persons 
who, while subway passengers, inhaled chlorine gas escaping from a de-
fective tank in a truck when the driver, upon noticing the escape of gas, 
stopped near a subway grating. It is difficult to conclude that the subway 
passengers were in the vicinity of the probable use of the chlorine gas; 
nonetheless the court found a duty on the part of the supplier to the 
passengers, apparently on the basis of ordinary foreseeability tests. 
As we shall see, the dangerousness of the product also plays a role in 
determining the existence and nature of the duty!0 Accordingly, it can 
be expected tha1: a supplier of radioisotopes who ships them in a defec-
tive container will be held liable to persons exposed along the shipping 
route. Moreover, all persons who may foreseeably be injured by radia-
tion exposures caused by defective chattels will, in all probability, be 
found to be among the class of persons to whom a duty is owed, no 
matter how remote from the source of injury both in space and in time.u 
e. The Dangerous Nature of the Product 
In the MacPherson case Justice Cardozo indicated that liability for 
injuries to third persons, not in privity, would be imposed if the manu-
facturer knew or should have known that .the product was a "thing of 
danger." A thing of danger was defined as a product which is "reason-
ably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made." 42 
Other cases 48 have also expressed the opinion that manufacturers would 
88 See discussion of duty cases, supra Chapter III. 
89 185 Misc. 139, 56 N.Y.S.:zd 856 (1945), aff'd 271 App. Div. 827, 65 N.Y.S.:zd 441 
(1946), aff'd 297 N.Y. 562, 74 N.E.:zd 481 (1947). 
40 See Restatement, Torts §293 (1934). 
n Although some courts apparently attempted at one time to confine liability of 
suppliers to personal injury cases, today similar rules are followed whether the damage 
consists of injury to the person or to property. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United 
States et al., 6g F. Supp. 6og (1947). 
42 See quotes .from the MacPherson case, supra at note 9· 
48 See, e.g., Huset v. ]. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (1903). 
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be held liable in the absence of privity if the product is "imminently 
dangerous" or "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril." 44 
Similar language is often used by the courts today where the rules of 
ordinary negligence have not been extended to the product liability 
field.*5 In some of these opinions there apparently is an intimation that 
more than a simple breach of a reasonable standard of conduct is essen-
tial to establish liability of product suppliers. The dangerous nature of 
a product, of course, aids in the establishment of whatever greater 
breach of the standard of conduct may be required by the courts. 
Because of the unusual dangers involved in radiation hazards, it 
appears that certain products, such as radioisotopes, containers for 
radioactive materials, reactor fuel elements,· and reactor control systems, 
meet the "imminently dangerous" tests. On the other hand, such 
products as electronic tubes, gears, bolts, pins, etc., which may be in-
corporated into a reactor do not seem to meet the tests. However, there 
have been several decisions which have held similarly apparently in-
nocuous articles to be "imminently dangerous," even including such 
normally innocent items as shoes, bar stools, and children's toys.*6 These 
cases represent the trend toward the application of ordinary negligence 
doctrines throughout the field of product liability although the courts 
still are basing their decisions on an exception to the old no-liability rule 
as stated in the MacPherson and other similar cases. In any event, it 
would seem that where the courts stiii employ the exceptions, as dis-
tinguished from ordinary negligence concepts, many of the products 
employed in atomic energy industry would appear to fall within the 
ex~eptions, and therefore it is doubtful if the suppliers can expect to 
avoid liability. 
The dangerous nature of a product may have yet another effect on the 
duty owed. The burden may be imposed upon the product manufacturer 
to discover the possible dangers, and this duty may greatly increase the 
standard of reasonable care applicable in respect to dangerous products. 
For example, in Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, et al./1 a manu-
facturer of 2-4-D weedkiller was held liable to a person whose cotton 
crop, which was located three-quarters of a mile from the place of spray-
•• U.S. Radiator Corp. v. Henderson, 68 F.2d 87 (1933). 
' 5 See cases listed by James, "Products Liability," supra note 18 at 61. 
' 6 Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, n N.E.zd 718 (1937); S. Blickman, 
Inc. v. Chilton, II4 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Gittelson v. GothanJ Pressed 
Steel Corp., 266 App. Div. 866, 42 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1943). For a more complete listing 
of the cases, see James, supra. note 18 at 62. 
47 215 Ark. 630,222 S.W.zd 820 (1949). 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 737 
ing by aircraft, was injured when wind caused the chemical to drift and 
settle thereon. At the time, the manufacturer knew of the danger of the 
chemical to certain crops but neither it nor other manufacturers ap-
parently knew of the tendency of 2-4-D to drift farther than other types 
of agricultural chemicals. Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
approved the following instruction by the trial court to the jury: 
It was the duty of the defendant Chapman Chemical Com-
pany before putting an inherently dangerous product on the 
market to make tests to determine whether or not it would 
damage crops of others; if you believe from a preponderance 
of the evidence in this case that the 2-4-D dust applied ... 
[by the purchaser] ... was an inherently dangerous product 
liable to damage property of others, and that such tests were 
not made, then you are told that the defendant Chapman 
Chemical Company is negligent. 48 
It is apparent that the court felt there was a duty to make more com-
plete tests in respect to "inh.erently dangerous" articles. By its very 
nature, the additional duty, in effect, established a higher standard of 
care in dealing with the dangerous product. That the standard of care 
may be affected by.the dangerous nature of a product is also indicated by 
the Restatement's conclusion that a supplier who knows that a product 
is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being used is liable to 
users and others in the vicinity of use even though the supplier has in-
formed the purchaser of its dangerous character.49 
For those products in the atomic energy field that can be described as 
"inherently dangerous," it appears that additional duties and higher 
standards of care will be imposed by the courts. Which products may 
be so classified by the courts is a doubtful matter. As we have seen, some 
rather commonplace products have been so classified in certain instances. 
Radioactive materials having intermediate half-lives and emitting the 
more dangerous gamma rays will probably be classified as "inherently 
dangerous." Perhaps short-:lived isotopes or those emitting alpha and 
beta radiation only may not be so considered. Possibly distinctions may 
48Jd. at 642. 
49 Restatement, Torts §Jl!g ( 1934). The section reads as follows: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another's use 
knowing that the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before being put to 
a use which the supplier should expect it to be put,· is subject to liability for bodily 
harm caused by such use to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel 
or to be in the vicinity of its probable use and who are ignorant of the dangerous 
character of the chattel or whose knowledge thereof does not make them contributorily 
negligent, although the supplier has informed the other for whose use the chattel is 
supplied of its dangerous character. 
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be drawn by the courts on the basis of the likelihood of ingestion of the 
particular material if it is harmful as an internal source of radiation. 
A radiation detection device may be classified as inherently dangerous 
or not, possibly depending on whether the supplier knows that failure 
of the device may lead to harmful exposure of employees and others to 
radiation. The lines will be drawn by the courts, often on the basis of 
whether the supplier is more capable of bearing the economic loss caused 
by the injury. However, this concept is seldom mentioned in the opinions 
although it is recognized as being a very material factor by most legal 
scholars. One statement may be made with some assurance; namely, 
although the dangerous nature of the product will have a materia.! effect 
upon the standard of care required of product manufacturers, there is 
as yet no certainty about the extent to which it will affect suppliers 
of the various kinds of products used in atomic devices. The law on this 
subject will be shaped by future decisions. 
f. Warnings of Danger and Assurances of Safety 
There are a number of devices and products utilized in atomic in-
dustry which have dangerous aspects that are known to· the supplier. 
For example, a processor of radioisotopes may supply tracers, some of 
which may be safely used for diagnosis and treatment of humans but 
others, harmful to humans, may be useful only in conjunction with 
insecticides. Similarly, a supplier of reactor components may produce a 
device which is suitable for thermal reactors but unworkable if used 
with fast breeder reactors. Suppliers of radiation detection instruments 
may know that certain devices may not be satisfactory for protecting 
personnel of the purchaser from certain types of harmful radiation. 
Moreover, because many aspects of atomic energy technology and the 
nature of injury to humans remain unknown, though knowledge is con-
stantly expanding, and because the theories of atomic structure still are 
in a continuous state of evolution, suppliers of atomic energy products 
must necessarily rely on knowledge currently existing although it may be 
assumed to be incomplete. Since the suppliers may be held liable for 
their negligent acts, among the most crucial questions to be answered 
are: What warning must be given to the purchaser and user of atomic 
energy products? What liabilities may result from a failure to warn? 
What liabilities may result from giving assurances of safety when sup-
plying an atomic energy product? What liabilities may result even 
though warnings are given to the purchaser? It should be noted that 
these questions involve the possibility of liability of a supplier in some 
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cases even though no negligence can be shown in respect to the design 
or manufacture of the product. 
The importance of the necessity of providing warnings is indicated 
by the Restatement's general rule governing liability of suppliers: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel 
for another to use, is subject to liability to those whom the 
supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of 
the other or to be in the vicinity of its probable use, for bodily 
. harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which 
and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier 
(a) knows, or from the facts known to him should realize, 
that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for 
which it is supplied; 
(b) and has no reason to believe that those for whose use 
the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition; and 
(c) fails to e~ercise reasonable care to inform them of its 
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be 
so. [Emphasis added.] 60 
Illustrative of the liability that may be imposed in conjunction with 
an inherently dangerous product where no notice of danger is supplied 
is the case of Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc. 61 In that case the manu-
facturer of a dress which was sized with an inflammable material was 
held liable, the court stating the rule to be applied as follows : 
The rule in this State is now settled that when a manu-
facturer sells an inherently dangerous article for use in its 
existing state, the danger not being known to the purchaser 
and not patent, and notice is not given of the danger or it can-
not be discovered by reasonable inspection, the manufacturer 
is legally liable for personal injuries received by one who uses 
the manufactured article in the ordinary and expected manner. 
[Emphasis added.] 82 
In Ebers v. General Chemical Company 63 the defendant manu-
factured and marketed a new insecticide which the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture had tested in several states successfully. In its adver-
tising, after giving directions for the use of the insecticide which was 
sold under the trade name E-D-E, the manufacturer supplied the fol-
lowing statement : 
The foregoing information is supplied by us gratuitously 
and is believed to be reliable and of value, but is in no way 
60 Restatement, Torts §388 (1934). 
61 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 46o (1944), aff'd 294 N.Y. 68o, 6o N.E.2d 839 
(1945). 
62 I d. at 152. 
5 8310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945). 
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guaranteed. The use of this material being beyond our knowl-
edge and control and involving elements of risk to vegetation, 
we do not make any warranty, express or implied, as to the 
effects of such use, whether or not in accordance with direc-
tions or claimed so to be." 54 
The plaintiff applied the insecticide as directed but nearly one-fourth of 
his orchard trees died. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff show-
ing that in the following year both the defendant and the United States 
Department of Agriculture had changed their directions for use to in-
clude a warning that the product should not be sprayed on the tree 
trunks. The directiqns supplied to the plaintiff had recommended that 
some of the chemical be sprayed on the trunk. Despite the disclaimer 
the court held that the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence of either 
a failure to make satisfactory tests or a failure to provide adequate di-
rections for use to warrant submission of the case to the jury. In revers-
ing the lower court's ruling dir~cting a verdict for the manufacturer, 
the court stated : 
. . .. If it was negligent in placing such product on the market 
in Michigan without proper field tests to determine its effect 
on peach trees in this State, or if it gave improper direction for 
the use and application of the product, it cannot escape re-
sponsibility for such negligence merely by adding a disclaimer 
of warranty to its representation of safety. 511 
Both of these cases demonstrate the necessity of giving warning or 
adequate <;lirections for use to purchasers of products. The adequacy of 
the warning or direction is, of course, a jury question, but it is clear 
that the adequacy will be determined on the basis of knowledge which 
should have been known. 56· In the General Chemical Co. case, the court 
infers that this knowledge should have been derived by tests in Michigan 
because of different climatic and soil conditions even though the product 
had been tested in a number of other states by the Department of 
Agriculture. 
In addition, in McClaMhan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp./1 the 
Virginia Supreme Court seems to have concluded that, even where the 
directions for use of a fungicide were not followed, the manufacturer 
had a duty to provide warnings concerning the possible damages in ad-
54 Id. at 268. 
u /d. at 274-275. See also E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 
(1934). 
56 See Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930 (1952). 
117 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953). 
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clition to supplying directions for safe usage. A pamphlet supplied by 
the 'defendant stated that the· chemical was not to be used later than 
two weeks following petal fall, but the label on the container cautioned 
against use "later than petal fall." However, in both instances the di-
rections inferred that the reason for the warning was "a possibility of 
residue remaining at harvest." In reversing the trial court, which had 
set aside the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court stated, in part: 
It follows then, that a manufacturer of an economic poison 
in giving direction for use is fulfilling only a part of his obliga-
tion to the purchaser. He is saying simply "Here is a way to 
use this product which we guarantee will kill the weeds infest-
ing your lawn or the scab infecting your orchard." Of course, 
that way must be a safe way. The manufacturer by instructing 
how to use is not necessarily saying, nor is he understood by 
the purchasing public to say, "This is the only safe way to use 
our product." 18 · · · 
Two justices dissented. vigprously, stating : 
The prohibition ~s to application "later than petal fall" was 
positive, simple and direct. It could serve no purpose other 
th<tn to warn of danger upon violation, a warning with special 
meaning to experienced orchardists who know the condition of 
the foliage on their "trees at the time of petal fall. No addi-
tional warning wa:s necessary· under the statutes. To say that 
there should have been added a statement "Use only as di-
rected, and not otherwise or damage may result," is a reflection 
upon the intelligence of the plaintiffs. 
* * * * * 
... It having been established that no injury would have 
been. incurred by plaintiffs had they observed the directions 
and caution statement on the label . . . and the accompanying 
pamphlet, it must logically follow that their default was a 
proximate cause of the damage occasioned them. There is a 
question of wisdom and fairness of subjecting defendant to 
liability for damages under such circumstances. The majority 
opinion fashions ·a broad, new law of negligence in conflict 
with that which we have followed for many years,-one apt 
to cause embarrassment in the future. 59 
The applicability of these cases to atomic energy entrepreneurs is readily 
seen. The supplier of a radioactive sterilizer or food preserver must 
58 I d. at 862. The McClanahan case and several others concerning the duty to warn 
are ably discussed by Dillard and Hart, "Product Liability: Directions for Use and 
the Duty to Warn," 41 Va. L. Rev. 145 (1955). 
59 /d. at 87o-871. 
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not only provide directions for safe usage, but he may also be required 
to warn against a possible dangerous usage, even though the Atomic 
Energy Commission may have conducted experiments and even issued 
statements concerning proper usage of the same or substantially similar 
radiation sources. 
A failure to give proper warning to the purchaser may also be the 
basis for liability to third persons even if there is no evidence that the 
manufacturer should have known of the danger at the time of the 
purchase of the product, provided he becomes aware of the danger at a 
later time. In DeVito v. United Air Lines, Jnc. 60 the plaintiff obtained 
a judgment for wrongful death against the purchaser and manufacturer 
of an aircraft, alleging negligence against the manufacturer for failure 
to warn the purchaser that carbon dioxide may enter the cockpit of the 
aircraft, thereby suffocating the pilots. The planes were purchased in 
the spring of 1947 and the evidence of the carbon dioxide danger did not 
come to the attention of the manufacturer until January 1948. The 
manufacturer thereafter conducted tests but failed to tell the purchaser 
of the potential danger and of the precautions to be taken to avoid suffo-
cation. 
Suppliers of products either directly or indirectly employed in con-
junction with radiation sources may be subject to the extraordinary 
duty, therefore, to keep abreast of the almost daily new technological 
and theoretical develO'pments in order to inform past as well as future 
purchasers of their products whenever evidence of danger is known to 
exist or should have been known to exist.61 The question of precisely 
when a manufacturer may be charged with foreseeing harm so that he 
has a duty to warn cannot b.e definitively answered. However, the courts 
do not appear to have had too much difficulty in finding the duty where 
the facts involved <~inherently dangerous" articles, of which there are 
many in the atomic energy industry. The burden placed upon manu-
facturers of new products in respect to the duty to warn and fulfilling 
that duty is not an easy one, especially with respect to prior purchasers. 
As stated in Dillard and Hart : 
In cases involving ne'W products, it is thus clear that a duty 
to warn will depend on the extent to which knowledge of the 
danger should reasonably be attributed to the manufacturer. 
If the product is launched prior to <~adequate" testing, to at-
6098 F. Supp. 88 (1951). 
61 Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 1o8 N.E. 474 (1915), holding 
the defendant liable although he had no knowledge of the dangerous character of the 
product since he did not manufacture the article but sold it under his name. 
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tribute knowledge would seem reasonable. Furthermore, if 
products like drugs are launched while still in such a clinical 
stage that the manufacturer cannot be sure of their effects, a 
warning of that danger would also seem necessary. Paradoxi-
cally, the manufacturer should then be required to give warn-
ing of what he does not know. The paradox is an apparent one 
only, since he does or should know that, in general, the product 
is capable of harm. 
Oearly, we have here an area in which "law," "scientific 
knowledge," and the demands and price of "progress" sharply 
react upon one another. They do so in a way which makes ra-
tional reconciliation of conflicting interests unusually difficult . 
. . . [I]t would seem that the point at which the benefits of 
experimentation should be permitted to outweigh the rights of 
an injured plaintiff should be decided, not by a judicial balanc-
ing of interests, but by a common-sense jury determination of 
what was reasonably to be expected in view of the nature of 
the commodity and its foreseeable use." 62 
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The full extension of this duty remains to be ~orked out in future deci-
sions by the courts. 
Even when warnings are given to the .purchaser, or when warnings 
would be unnecessary because of actual knowledge of the danger on the 
part of the purchaser, the supplier may be held liable for failure to 
warn actual users of the product, including secondhand purchasers. 68 
For example, in Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Son,84 a manufacturer of 
a grinding wheel was held liable for injuries sustained as a result of his 
failure to indicate the maximum speed at which the wheel could be 
operated even though the defendant contended that the wheel was sold 
originally to the United States government. The court merely stated 
that it was foreseeable that the wheel might be acquired from the 
government by third persons. Similarly, in Beadles v. Servel, Inc.,65 
the secondhand purchaser of a gas refrigerator was allowed to recover 
for injur.ies because the manufacturer failed to provide notice of the 
necessity of cleaning certain component parts that had a tendency to 
clog after a lengthy period of operation. Where the warning has been 
given to the purchaser, but not to the actual user of the product, liability 
has also resulted. For example, in Rosebrock v. General Electric Com-
pany,68 the manufacturer provided a warning on the bill of shipment, 
62 Dillard and Hart, supra note 58 at 159-100. 
63 For a recent case indicating the difficulties encountered by a court in determining 
the adequacy of a warning, see Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (1957). 
64 209 F.2d 544 (1954). 
65344 Ill. App. 133. 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951). 
· 66 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923). 
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but failed to place a warning tag on the container to the effect that 
certain blocks placed in a transformer for shipment should be removed 
befor·e use. The warning on the bill of shipment was filed by clerks and 
did not reach the personnel engaged in the unpacking and installation. 
The manufacturer was held liable for his negligence in not giving warn-
ing suitable for those persons who actually engaged in the i~stallation 
process.67 
Because of the dangerous nature of radioactive materials and devices 
using radiation, these cases demonstrate the probable high degree of care 
that must be used in giving warnings to purchasers and others who 
may come into contact with the products. Certain symbols and _color 
schemes to denote radiation hazards have generally been adopted. Fol-
lowing the standards of the industry will undoubtedly be essential, but 
even these may not provide the kind of warning required to avoid liabil-
ity. Adequacy of the warning is usually a jury question, with the results 
in specific cases always in doubt, especially because the standards im-
posed may be relatively high since radiation is not capable of detection 
by the human senses. 68 
If the manufacturer gives assurances of the safety of a product for 
the use intended, this fact alone makes it easier for injured persons to 
show negligence in fulfilling the duty to warn. 69 Thus, even where a 
warning was attempted to be given by directions concerning the use of 
an inherently dangerous product, other statements assuring or even 
intimating assurance of safety have made it difficult for the supplier to 
show the exercise of reasonable care.70 Moreover, providing assurances 
of safety may give rise to a type of strict liability under theories of 
67 See also Gall v. Union Ice Company, 1o8 Cal. App.2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951). 
In that case there was evidence that a letter had been sent to purchasers of the product 
four years before the injury to the third party plaintiff warning of the danger. It also 
appeared that several lots of the same article had previously been acquired by the 
same purchaser and that the defendant had made a practice of attaching warning labels. 
However, in. this instance, the defendant was held liable since there was no specific 
evidence that the particular article had a warning label. 
6&See Farley v. Edward Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930), and Maize 
v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 5I; 41 A.2d 850 (1945),·as examples of cases show-
ing the high standard of conduct for warnings that may be required and the dangers 
involved in advertising which may detract from the warning. 
119 See Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal.2d 97, 179 P.2d 8o7 (1947), in 
which the conrt upheld a verdict of liability of the defendant manufacturer to users for 
failure to warn. The court stated at 103: "There is a particular need for a sufficient 
warning where, as here, there is a representation that the product is not dangerous. 
10 See e.g., Ebers v. General Chemical Co., swpr-a note 53; E. I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co., v. Baridon, supr-a note 55; and McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 
supra note 57 
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express or implied warranty which will be discussed below. Further-
more, certain statements of assurance of safety may occasion liability 
in a tort adion on the theory of deceit. 11 The courts have allowed re-
covery under theories of deceit even though an intent to deceive was 
not proved to exist.72 The classification of the cases as deceit, negligence, 
or warranty is often extremely difficult because there is an overlapping 
of theories of liability. 
Representative of cases in which it is difficult to ascertain the precise 
theory of liability is the case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.13 There the 
manufacturer had distributed to automobile dealers catalogues and 
printed matter containing representations that the car windshields were 
made of non-shatterable glass. The plaintiff was injured when a pebble 
thrown by a passing car struck the windshield causing a piece of the 
windshield to strike the plaintiff's eye. The court, holding the defendant 
liable, stated that the plaintiff "had a right to rely upon the representa-
tions" even though there was no privity of contract, suggesting a theory 
of liability based upon misrepresentation. However, at the same time 
the court cited a number of cases holding suppliers of chattels liable in 
the absence of privity because of the "inherently dangerous" quality of 
the product. n 
In Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine/5 the 
California Supreme Court upheld, as sufficient to state a cause of action, 
an allegation of fraud by the plaintiff who suffered blindness as a result 
of taking drugs manufactured by the defendant even though the drug 
was taken in accordance with a physician's prescription. The allegation 
of fraud was that the defendant had by publication in newspapers, circu-
lars, and elsewhere represented that the drug was harmless, that the 
defendant knew that the drug was inherently dangerous and liable to 
cause blindness, and that the plaintiff had relied on the representations. 
The court stated : 
The intept to deceive sufficiently appears . . . by the facts 
alleged, from which it may be inferred that the alleged false 
statements were made with the intention of inducing the public 
to purchase the drug.78. 
11 Prosser, Torts §86 (2d ed. 1955). 
12 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts c. VII (1956). 
78168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). 
H In a substantially similar case, the Michigan court founded liability on the basis 
of warranty where plaintiff alleged deceit and fraud, negligence, and breach of war-
ranty. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939). 
75 20 Cal..2d 713, 128 P.2d. 522 (1942). 
16 I d. at 716. 
746 TORT LIABILITY 
Cases are relatively rare, however, holding defendants liable to remote 
purchasers of chattels on theories of misrepresentation or deceit. The 
bases for liability of suppliers usually employed are either negligence 
or warranty, 77 with the misrepresentation playing an important role in 
showing the breach of the standard of conduct required or in establish-
ing the warranty. Theories of misrepresentation or deceit are used, how-
ever, to establish liability to a purchaser when the product will not serve 
the purpose for which it was purchased. For example, in Horrell v. 
Santa Fe Tank and Tower Company 18 the supplier was held liable for 
damages on the basis of a representation that his atmospheric-type cool-
ing tower would cool the volume of water necessary for the purchaser's 
refrigeration processes.19 Liability of this type also holds warnings for 
suppliers to atomic energy industry because the unique technological 
problems involved may lead to representations of the suitability of a 
product which proves to be false. For example, an ordinary valve may 
be perfectly satisfactory for general industrial application, but because 
of susceptibility to corrosion it may be entirely unsatisfactory for use 
-in conjunction with radioactive materials. Therefore, suppliers of 
standard products should exercise extreme caution in making representa-
tions concerning applications of their products in atomic energy opera-
tions. 
It may be safely concluded that the duty to warn may be onerous for 
suppliers of articles which either employ radiation sources or are used 
. in connection with nuclear processes. If the product is inherently dan-
gerous, the cases seem to require a high standard of care in fulfilling 
the duty imposed. Moreover, we have also seen that the supplier may 
be held liable to third parties even if he has provided warnings to the 
purchaser. The extent of potential damage that may be caused by a de-
. fective component incorporated into a reactor is far greater than that 
encountered in more usual types of industrial pursuits, so suppliers to 
atomic industry should avoid unusual risks by exercising a very high 
degree of care in giving adequate warning to purchasers and so far as 
possible to third parties, thus assuring to the maximum possible degree 
that no accident will result from a failure to warn of the dangerous 
nature of the product. 
11 See Prosser, Torts c. 18 (2d ed. 1955); Restatement, Torts §525 (1934). 
18 117 Cal. App.2d II4, 254 P.2d 893 (1953). 
19 See also Traylor Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. National Container Corp., 
45 Del. Rep. 143, 70 A.2d 9 (1949). 
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g. Effect of Qualifications of Purchaser 
Suppliers of chattels may also be held negligent because of the prob-
ability that injuries will result from supplying chattels to incompetent 
persons. The rule, as explained by the Restatement, is as follows : 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel 
for the use of another whom the supplier knows or from facts 
known to him should know to be likely because of his youth, 
inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving un-
reasonable risk of bodily harm to himself and others whom 
the supplier should expect to share in, or be in the vicinity of 
its use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby to 
them.80 
This statement of the rule raises a number of pr.oblems for suppliers 
to atomic energy industry. It is generally realized that only highly 
trained scientific and technological personnel are equipped to handle the 
problems encountered in employing the fission' process or radiation 
sources in research, medicine, or industry. Moreover, under the A:tomic 
Energy Act of 1954 persons utilizing special nuclear materials (fission-
able) or byproduct materials (radioactive) and operators of reactors 
must be licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission. 81 In respect to 
use of byproducts, licenses can be and are usually granted prior to the 
installation of the activity, but in connection with the utilization of 
special nuclear materials to produce electrical energy, the owners and 
their operators need not, and normally will not actually, receive their 
licenses until the installation is fully equipped and prepared for regular 
operation. However, the owner of a reactor must obtain a construction 
permit before building the facility. 82 To complicate the picture, the 
Atomic Energy Commission has promulgated regulations which estab-
lish general licenses for particular uses and quantities of radioactive by-
product materials. The existence of a general license, in effect, means 
that no individual licen'se is required for certain activities although the 
participant may be required to comply with stated regulations.83 
The supplier of radioisotopes or devices directly or indirectly as-
sociated with the fission process. or the utilization of radiation sources 
is confronted with several questions. Should the supplier demand that 
his purchaser have a license? If a license is not essential or if general 
licensing exists, must he investigate the competence of the purchaser? 
80 Restatement, Torts §390 (1934). 
81 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§81, 101, and 109. 
82 !d. at §ISs. 
83 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30. 
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Can he rely on the fact that a license has been issued to prove that he 
has not been negligent in supplying his prod~ct to the particular pur-
chaser? If a construction permit has been issued for a reactor facility, 
must he investigate the degree of competence of the purchaser in view of 
the fact that the construction permit seems to require only a finding by 
the AEC that there is "reasonable assurance" that the facility will prove 
to be safe at a future date, namely at the time the reactor is ready for 
operation ? 84 Where the license is issued to a corporation, must he in-
vestigate the CO!Tlpetence of the persons who will actually use special 
nuclear or radioactive materials? Obviously, these questions relate to a 
standard of care which must usually be resolved in relations to the facts 
of specific cases, so no definitive answers are possible. 
Possibly, an examination of the cases establishing liability for supply-
ing dangerous products to children·or incompetents may, although they 
are not too closely parallel, serve to indicate how some of these questions 
may be answered when litigated. 
Generally the cases establishing liability for what may be described 
as a breach of duty in selection of a purchaser have involved sales to 
children of firearms,811 fireworks, 88 or inflammable substances,87 or the 
lending of motor vehicles to persons who were known by the lendor to be 
either reckless or inebriates.88 Recently, a New York court upheld, as 
stating a good cause of action, an allegation that a wife was negligent 
in allowing her husband to drive her automobile when she knew that her 
husband had a dangerous heart condition. The plaintiff was injured 
when the defendant's car swerved to the wrong side of the road during 
a fatal heart attack suffered by the husband.89 Manufacturers have also 
been held liable for negligence because of illegal sales of explosives or 
dangerous products to retailers.8° For example, in Milton Bradley Co. 
u xo Code Fed. Regs. fso.35. 
85 See e.g., Neff Lumber Co. v. First National Bank, 12.2 Ohio St. 302, 171 N.E. 
J27 ( 1930) ; Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377, 90 Atl. 657 ( 1914). 
8& See e.g., Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 157 Atl. 538 (1931); Bosserman v. 
Smith, 205 Mo. App. 657, 226 S.W. 6oS (1920). 
8 7 See e.g., Yachuk v. Oliver Blais Co., [1949) A.C. 386, 20 A.L.R. 2d 111 (1951); 
Grieving v. La Plante, 156 Kan. xg6, 131 P.2d 8g8 (1942). 
88 See e.g., Herrman v. Maley, 159 Miss. 538, 132 So. 541 (1931); Slaughter v. 
Holsomback, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318, (1933); Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 
170 Atl. SJ2 ( 1934) ; Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 
(1941); but cf. Estes v. Gibson, (Ky) 257 S.W.2d 6o4 (1953), finding no liability 
because the transaction was a gift. 
89 Schneider v. Van Wyckhouse, 54 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1945). 
eo See cases cited in Annotation, "Liability of manufacturer or wholesaler for injury 
caused by third person's use of explosives or other dangerous article sold to retailer 
in violation of law,'' II A.L.R.2d 1028 (1950). 
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of Georgia, Inc. v. Cooper/1 the defendant wholesaler sold fireworks 
to a retailer in violation of a city ordinance. The son of the retailer 
took a torpedo toy, which e:x.plodes when thrown on the ground, from the 
store and threw it so as to explode near the plaintiff. The resulting ex-
plosion caused the plaintiff to lose the sight of his left eye. The Georgia 
Court of Appeals held that a cause of action had been stated and that 
the question of "proximate cause" should be determined by the jury. 
Moreover, sales in violation of statute are classified in many jurisdic-
tions as negligence per se if the plaintiff is a member of the class, and the 
harm is of the type, designed to be protected by the legislation.92 
We have discovered no cases which have imposed liability on a sup-
plier for furnishing a dangerous product to an adult person even where 
there may have been knowledge that the adult person did not have suf-
ficient technical skills to handle the product safely. However, it is pos-
sible that the courts may impose liability by analogy to the cases dealing 
with children if the supplier has knowledge of incompetence and the 
product is "inherently dangerous," such as radioactive materials. Prob-
ably liability would not be imposed in conjunction with sales of atomic 
energy products, not radioactive in themselves, nor would it be imposed 
if the seller has no knowledge of the incompetence. At the present time, 
it appears that the seller of atomic energy products has no duty to in-
vestigate the degree of skills possessed by his purchaser. However, if 
the sale is to a non-licensed person, where licensing is required, liability 
to the purchaser and others may be imposed because of violation of the 
statute, or the violation may create a presumption or constitute evidence 
of negligence. . 
Lack of knowledge or competence on the part of a purchaser may 
have some bearing upon the duty to warn. If purchasers of a product 
are not likely to have knowledge of inherent dangers or dangerous uses, 
the supplier may have to exercise a higher standard of care in providing 
warnings in order to avoid liability under negligence doctrines. Repre-
sentative of cases indicating that a high degree of care may be required 
is J. C. Lewis Motor Company, Inc. v. Williams. 98 In that case the 
plaintiff claimed injury as a result of inhaling carbon monoxide fumes 
91 79 Ga. App. 302, 53 S.E.2d 761 (1949). 
92 Prosser, Torts §34 at 161 (2d ed. 1955). Dean Prosser points out that in some 
states a violation of statute creates a presumption of negligence and in a few only 
evidence of negligence. Also violations of ordinances or regulations of administrative 
agencies may be treated only as evidence of negligence even in those states holding 
violations of statutes to be negligence per se. 
9sss Ga. App. sJB, 69 S.E.2d 816 (1952). 
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emanating from a tractor purchased by her husband, but operated by 
her. The facts showed that the defendant supplier had failed to de-
liver a pipe which would have diverted the fumes away from the operator 
of the tractor. Furthermore, the plaintiff's husband knew of the omis-
sion since he contacted the supplier on several occasions, and the sup-
plier promised to place an order for the missing pipe. The instructions 
supplied with the tractor contained no specific warning concerning the 
danger of carbon monoxide, but did state, that to avoid fumes, the pipe 
should be attached. The court held that the allegations were sufficient 
for the case to go to the jury for a determination of the questions of 
negligence of the supplier and possible contributory negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff only had a fifth-grade education but 
the facts did not indicate the level of competence of her husband. It 
would seem that a knowledge of the danger of carbon monoxide would 
be almost universal among adults today; nonetheless, the cout:t found 
that the jury should determine whether the supplier was negligent for 
failing to warn. The case ilfustrates the proposition that suppliers of 
radioactive materials and devices employing radiation must exercise ex-
treme care in providing warnings, even though one might assume that 
any AEC lic~nsee must know of the dangers involved. 
h. Effect of Negligence by Others 
Because of the complexities of our modern economic system, a num-
ber of problems arise in product liability cases concerning the effect of 
negligence that may be committed by others. Generally speaking, negli-
gent acts committed by persons other than the defendant supplier in 
respect to the product may have one or both of two possible effects. 
First, a negligent act of another may insulate the supplier from liability, 
either because it proves that the supplier himself was not negligent, or 
that his negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the injury. Second, 
a negligent act of another may be the basis forshifting the economic loss 
suffered as a result of a judgment against the particular supplier for 
injuries sustained by the purchaser or third persons. The legal ramifica-
tions in respect to both of these possible effects are so complex, particu-
larly because of the many possible factual variations, that we shall 
merely suggest the major considerations involved. 
· . Th~ pqssibility. that negligence of another may serve to insulate a 
supplier from liability may be illustrated by a hypothetical atomic energy 
case. Suppose X markets a portable reactor power installation into 
which it incorporated a part negligemly manufactured by Y, and the 
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defects cause a release of radioactive materials which results in bodily 
injury to A, the purchaser, who sues X. Can X avoid liability by show-
ing that Y produced the part and that X used reasonable care in selecting 
Y as his supplier? A first consideration is the question whether X was 
separately negligent for his failure to inspect or in his manufacturing 
operations. In the MacPherson case,94 the defendant had purchased the 
defective part from another but the Buick Motor Company was not re-
lieved from liability since it was found to be negligent in its inspection.95 
Accordingly, it would appear that if the supplier has been negligent, he 
cannot successfully avoid liability to purchasers injured by the product 
he assembled. However, and to the contrary, in similar cases an as-
sembler has avoided liability, apparently on the basis that the degree of 
care required of the assembler in inspecting the part is not as great as 
that imposed upon the manufacturer of the part.96 Professor James 
suggests that these cases do not follow the moden~ rule imposing liability 
on the pers.:m who represents the product as his own even though it is 
actually manufactured by others.97 To the extent that the cases deny 
liability where the product is represented by the seller as his own, they 
probably will afford little protection against liability of the seller in view 
of the more recent decisions. However, it would appearthat they may 
have some validity where the part bears the trade-name of the actual 
manufacturer and the seller of the finished product is not equipped to 
make the same type of inspection as the manufacturer. For example, 
if, in our hypothetical portable reactor situation, the defective part was 
an electronic control mechanism for the reactor and if that mechanism 
bore the trade-name of Y after assembly of the reactor by X, it would 
seem that X may avoid liability if his selection of Y' s product was rea-
sonable and if he made reasonable inspections. The extent of the in-
spection required of X, of course, might be substantially less than that 
required of Y for it might not be readily p~ssible to disassemble the de-
vice, and, furthermore, X may not be required to hold himself forth as 
an expert in electronic mechanisms. However, because of the dangerous 
qualities of reactors, the standard of care required of X would un-
doubtedly be higher than that encountered in respect to ordinary in-
dustrial products. In our survey of product liability cases, we have not 
94 Sufwa note 20. 
95 See also Witley v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 4o6, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952); Sullivan v. 
Manhattan Market Co., 251 Mass. 395, 146 N.E. 673 (1925). 
96 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932); Martin v. 
Studebaker Corp., 102 N.J.~. 612, 133 Atl. 384 (1926). 
97 James, supra note 18 at 192, 215. See cases cited therein at n.-142. 
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discovered any case defining the liability of the manufacturer where the 
defective part was a separate product assembled into the finished product 
with the original manufacturer's label attached. Therefore the possible 
effect of this fact upon liability remains conjectural. 
It is clear, however, that the failure of any subsequent handler of the 
product to fulfill his duty to inspect will not prevent a prior handler 
who also had the duty to inspect from being held liable for his negli-
gence. In Willey v. Fyrogas Co.,98 the plaintiff's husband was killed 
in attempting to light a gas heater because a defective valve caused an 
explosion. The manufacturer of the valve, the manufacturer of the 
finished product, the wholesaler, and the retailer were all joined as de-
fendants. The valve manufacturer and the manufacturer of the finished 
product both argued that they were not liable because of the custom in 
the trade for the retailer to make further tests at the time of installation. 
The valve manufacturer further argued that the manufacturer of the 
gas heater made tests that should eliminate his liability. The court 
stated: 
. . . The retailer's duty to test or his negligence in making 
tests certainly does not discharge the manufacturer's duty to 
also test and inspect and is not a defense to the manufacturer's 
negligence in constructing the article or in failing to properly 
test and inspect it. ... The failure of the vendee to properly 
inspect and test is within the foreseeable risk of the manu-
facturer. 99 
The valve manufacturer, the gas-heater manufacturer, and the retailer 
were held jointly liable. ·The wholesaler was not held liable since he 
merely warehoused the heaters in their original crates until retail orders 
were received. Therefore, subsequent negligent acts by others in mer-
chandising processes from the supplier of raw materials to the retailer 
will not immunize a prior handler or supplier from liability. 
A more difficult question is whether negligence on the part of the pur-
chaser or user of the product will permit the supplier to avoid liability 
for his negligence. In those states not following comparative negligence 
rules, it is generally recognized that contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk are defenses against liability even where negligence has been 
established on the part of the defendant.100 It is impossible for us to 
98 363 Mo. 4o6, 251 S.W.2d 635 (1952). 
99 !d. at 421. See also Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. I, 68 A.2d 517 
(1949), and Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d !)OS (1948), dis-
cussed infra. 
too See Prosser, Torts c. 10 (2d ed. 1955). 
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consider the innumerable cases involving these defenses in negligence 
actions in this study, but it should be pointed out that in the product 
liability cases, Dean Prosser's statement that the courts are becoming 
more reluctant to find contributory negligence as a matter of law and 
that juries are "notoriously inclined" to enter verdicts for the plaintiff 
where there has been evidence of contributory negligence 101 appears ac-
curate.102 Representative of the possible obstacles to reliance on the 
defense of contributory negligence where radiation injuries are involved 
is the case of O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-ray Co., Inc.103 There the 
plaintiff, an experienced surgeon, claimed negligence on the part of the 
manufacturer of an X-ray machine for failure to explain the proper 
method of using the machine and for failure to provide a guard. The 
plaintiff, who did not witness the demonstration of the machine, there-
after used it during operations and suffered severe burning leading to 
the loss of three fingers. He also offered evidence. that the condition was 
progressively deteriorating and that further amputations would be 
necessary. The jury returned a verdict against the manufacturer for 
$100,000 which was sustained by the trial court.104 On appeal, the 
Appellate Division found that the surgeon was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law, stating: 
It may be doubted that the truth is that plaintiff, a surgeon 
who had some experience with X-ray works, was ignorant of 
the fact that the nearer the hand is placed to the source of the 
X-ray beam, the greater the intensity of the beam falling upon 
the hand. But that is plaintiff's own claim, and it cannot be 
disregarded. If the purpose of the testimony is to lay the basis 
for a legal contention that a surgeon who works on bones 
under a fluoroscopic machine is not charged in law with knowl-
edge of the factors determining intensity of effect upon the 
body, and that the surgeon is entitled to rest upon the same de-
gree of ignorance as a layman, then it must be held that even a 
layman who attempts to set a fracture under a fluoroscopic 
machine without knowledge that intensity varies with distance 
is chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
101 I d. at 296. 
102 See e.g., Pezzo v. Paterno, 277 App. Div. 496, 101 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1950), rev. 
302 N.Y. 884, 100 N.E.2d 176 (1951), where the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that there 
was contributory negligence as a matter of law, and the New York Court of Appeals 
reversed the Appellate Division stating that the submission of the issue of contributory 
negligence to the jury was proper. 
103 16 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1939), rev. 261 App. Div. 8, 24 N.Y.S.:zd 268 (1940), rev. 288 
N.Y. 486, 41 N.E.:zd 177 (1942). 
1o• 16 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1939). 
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The evidence in plaintiff's case not only fails to establish his 
freedom from negligence, but establishes affirmatively as a 
matter of law that he was heedless of his own safety.106 
Despite the rather positive assertions of contributory negligence on the 
part of the surgeon by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals re-
versed, ordering a new trial. 106 The difficulties involved for suppliers 
of devices that create radiation hazards are obvious. Even where knowl-
edge of the danger may be assumed for persons in the same general class 
as the plaintiff, the supplier cannot escape liability if the plaintiff can 
show the absence of knowledge on his part and hence contributory negli-
gence cannot be established. 
The product liability cases where the plaintiff is a third person and 
there is evidence of negligence by the purchaser or user are even less 
susceptible to strict legal analysis. The problem i~ usually presented to 
the jury in terms of "proximate cause," but often this concept embraces 
the issue of duty and the standard of conduct.107 Again, in the product 
liability cases there is a marked tendency to find that the intervening 
negligence was foreseeable so that the supplier is not relieved from 
liability. 
Consider the following hypothetical atomic energy fact situations : 
r. A supplies a container for radioactive material which is defectively 
constructed so that even a slight impact will cause it to break. B, in 
transporting cobalt 6o in the container, negligently drives the truck 
into a viaduct. C, a bystander, suffers radiation injuries: Is A liable 
to C.? 
2. X supplies a reactor control mechanism which is defective. Y, the 
reactor operator, negligently permits an increase in power level and 
the control mechanism fails causing a release of radiation injuring Z. 
Is X liable to Z? 
In both cases, it should be noted that the suppliers may be able to defend 
successfully against suits by Band Y if the court or jury find they are 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law or fact. However, 
A and C may nonetheless recover from the suppliers for the intervening 
1°6 24 N. Y.S.2d at 270-271 ( 1940). Another issue involved was the nature of the 
negligence of the manufacturer in respect to the guard. The court pointed out that 
the omission of the guard was intentional since the purchaser wanted to keep dowri 
the price of his gift to the hospital of the machine. This fact situation alone, absent 
other allegations of negligence, raises the difficult question of what the supplier must 
provide from the standpoint of safety of radiation devices even though the purchaser 
does not want to pay the additional costs. 
1 o6 288 N.Y. 486, 41 N.E.2d 177 (1942). 
101 See Prosser, Torts c. 9 (2d ed. 1955). 
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negligence may be considered foreseeable so that a jury determination 
that A's and X's negligence was the "proximate cause" will be sustained. 
An example of cases involving a similar fact situation is Benton v. 
Sloss. 108 In that case the defendant used-car dealer obtained a partial 
down payment for a car from a minor and permitted the minor to take 
possession. The minor's father refused to sign the sales contract and 
told the minor to return the car. After two unsuccessful attempts to 
return it, the minor took the plaintiffs for a ride, and he raced with 
another car. When a car coming from the opposite direction suddenly 
appeared above a rise in the road, the minor tried to use the brakes, but 
only the right brake worked. The car was thrown off the highway into 
a telephone pole, thereby injuring the plaintiffs. They recovered judg-
ments in the trial court against both the minor and the used-car dealer. 
In sustaining the judgment against the used-car dealer the Supreme 
Court of California stated: 
... [The minor's] negligent driving was unquestionably a 
cause of plaintiffs' injuries .... [The dealer's] negligence 
was also a cause of those injuries, if it was a substantial factor 
in bringing them about. . . . In the light of the evidence [the 
jury] could reasonably conclude that because of the defective 
brakes [the minor] could not avoid the collision. . . . 
. . . The negligent conduct of [the minor] did not relieve 
[the dealer] . from liability, for the likelihood of negligent op-
eration of the vehicle was one of the hazards that [the dealer] 
could reasonably foresee. 109 
The conclusion to be drawn would seem to be that suppliers must accept 
the risk that the extent of the injuries resulting from their own negli-
gence may be increased by subsequent negligent acts of the purchaser or 
user of the products. Intervening negligence is often found to be "fore-
seeable," and the determination of the issue is left to the juries under 
the nebulous concept of "proximate cause." 
There remains for discussion the possibility that all or a part of the 
economic loss suffered as a result of a judgment against a product sup-
plier may be shifted. The incidence of economic loss may be shifted by 
contractual arrangements or, absent express agreement, by the operation 
of certain legal factors. The former includes express agreements be-
tween the seller and the purchaser under which the purchaser of the 
product promises to reimburse the seller for any losses that he may suf-
fer for damages based upon defects in the product. It would also include 
108 38 Cal.2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952). 
los I d. at 405. 
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insurance. These pose no especially unique legal problems for atomic 
energy suppliers except that they may afford no real protection if the 
assets of the purchaser are insufficient to cover the liability or where the 
insurance coverage is limited in amount. However, atomic energy sup-
pliers should explore these possibilities in conjunction with their sales. 
There is already some indication that "save harmless"· clauses are be-
coming standard practice in the atomic energy field. 
The possibility of shifting the economic loss suffered as a result of 
satisfying a judgment by seeking recovery of all or part of the moneys 
paid to the injured from other persons is more tenuous. If two or more 
suppliers of the same chattel, such as a part manufacturer, the assembler, 
the wholesaler, and the retailer, are held jointly liable for a breach of 
duty, such as the duty to inspect, in the same action, the plaintiff may 
seek satisfaction of his judgment from one or all. ·If the plaintiff col-
lects the judgment from only one of the defendants, that defendant may 
seek contribution from the others who were held jointly liable. How-
ever, contribution is not generally available unless there is statutory 
authority.110 A discussion of the applicability of the statutes authorizing 
contribution in various fact situations is beyond the scope of this study, 
but the supplier who suffers the economic loss involved in a judgment 
should investigate the potentialities of having others share the loss. 
Indemnity may also be available as a possible means of shifting the 
entire loss where negligent acts of others occur either prior or subse-
quent to the negligence of the person held liable to an injured person. 
The law concerning indemnity, however, is highly confusing,111 and for 
some inexplicable reason there is a paucity of cases dealing with at-
tempts by suppliers to seek recoveries from others whose negligence may 
have caused the injury. The Restatement of the Law of Restitution con-
tains the following : 
Where a person has supplied to another a chattel which be-
cause of the supplier's negligence or other fault is dangerously 
defective for the use for which it is supplied and both have be-
come liable in tort to a third person injured by such use, the 
supplier is under a duty to indemnify the other for expendi-
tures properly made in discharge of the claim of the third per-
son, if the other used or disposed of the chattel in reliance upon 
uo See Davis, "Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed ~tionale," 
37 Iowa L. Rev. 517 (1952). 
111 Bohlen, "Contribution and Indenmity Between Tortfeasors," 21 Cornell L.Q. 552 
(1936), 22 Cornell L.Q. 469 (1937); Hodges, "Contribution and Indemnity Among 
Tortfeasors," 26 Tex. L. Rev. 150 (1947); Note, "Contribution and Indemnity Among 
Tortfeasors in Minnesota," 37 Minn. L. Rev. 470 (1953); Davis, supra note 110. 
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the supplier's care and if, as between the two, such reliance was 
j ustifiable.112 
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Most of the cases cited by the Reporters for this proposition, however, 
have dealt with the right to indemnity of the purchaser-owner from the 
supplier. 113 Nonetheless, the principle involved should be equally ap-
plicable to indemnity by the retailer against the manufacturer, etc. In 
food product cases where under warranty doctrines a type of strict 
liability may be imposed against the retailer, indemnity has been allowed 
against the wholesaler and by the wholesaler against the packer.114 In 
two recent cases, manufacturer-assemblers have been unsuccessful in 
recovering from their suppliers for defective parts or materials, ap-
parently on the ground that reliance on the prior supplier was not justi-
fiable. In Heath v. Channel Lumber Co.115 the manufacturer of a ladder 
settled for $57,500 a claim for injuries sustained by a workman when 
the ladder broke. The manufacturer then sought indemnity for breach 
of warranty from the lumber supplier who supplied fir instead of hem-
lock as ordered by the manufacturer. The court refused indemnity on 
the ground that the plaintiff did not prove that the "efficient cause of the 
structural failure of the ladder was that one of its railings was fir and 
not hemlock without which circumstance the ladder would not have 
broken." 116 Similarly in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Independent Metal 
Products Co.111 the plaintiff insurer, as subrogee of the manufacturer4 
assembler of the finished product, sought to recover the damages re4 
covered by a third person on the theory that it was the defendant part 
supplier's negligence in manufacturing a tank for a truck trailer which 
caused the injury. The ciaim for indemnity was disallowed apparently 
because the insured Fruehauf Trailer Company actively supervised the 
supplier's work and because actual negligence could not be established 
although it seems that the injured person had no difficulty with this issue 
in the prior litigation.118 Indemnity, therefore, appears to be only a 
112 Restatement, Restitution §93(1) (1937). 
113 See Seavey and Scott, Notes on Restatement of Restitution §93 (1937). 
114 See e.g.~ McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936); Hughes 
Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., 242 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. App. 1951). 
See also Annotation, "Recovery for loss of business resulting from resale of unwhole-
some food or beverages furnished by another." 17 A.L.R. 2d 1379 (1951). 
115 25 N.J. Super. 6, 95 A.2d 425 (1953). 
116 95 A.2d at 429. 
117 99 F. Supp. 862 (1951), 203 F.2d 838 (1953). 
11s The difficulties in obtaining indemnity suggest that it may be advisable to have 
prior suppliers or subsequent vendees joined in the original action as defendants. In 
the Independent Metal Products Co. case, Fruehauf did tender the defense of the 
original action to the supplier, but he refused to accept. "Vouching in" practice should 
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remote possibility, but it exists and its possibilities should be explored by 
atomic energy suppliers in specific cases where there has been prior or 
subsequent negligence by other suppliers connected with the same chattel. 
In summary, negligence by others may immunize product suppliers 
from liability, the most significant factor being, of course, contributory 
negligence on the part of the injured person. In addition, negligence by 
others, either prior or subsequent to the negligence of the product sup-
plier, may offer the possibility of obtaining reimbursement of sums paid 
to satisfy claims of the injured. However, it appears that to date at-
tempts to obtain reimbursement under indemnity theories have not been 
too effectual. For the product supplier to atomic energy industry, the 
most practicable approaches appear to be to obtain express agreements 
from purchasers or to purchase comprehensive insurance coverage. 
i. Problems of Proof 
In the atomic product liability field, as applied to atomic energy in-
dustry, some of the most unique problems are encountered in respect to 
the making of proof. As pointed out previously, the very nature of ra-
diation injuries makes it difficult to prove causation in fact, 119 and there 
are the innumerable unique problems of proof connected with cumulative 
injuries, intervening causes, and peculiar injuries, such as genetic dam-
age and shortened life span. All of these will appear in product liability 
cases and solutions similar to those evolved for other negligence situa-
tions will undoubtedly be evolved by the courts. In product liability 
cases involving negligence doctrines the plaintiff must show that an in-
jury occurred because of the condition of the product, that the condition 
was unreasonably dangerous, and that the condition resulted from the 
defendant's negligence.120 Each of these essential proof requirements 
may prove to be insurmountable obstacles to the plaintiff in atomic 
energy cases. In a highly scientific field it will frequently be extremely 
difficult for an injured person to prove that it was a defective product 
that caused a radiation injury. Possibly only the most exacting investi,. 
gation would reveal the nature of a product defect that may have caused 
·a reactor mett:.down. Moreover, the accident may destroy the evidence 
of the defect. Even assuming that the injury may be traced to a defec-
be carefully scrutinized for its possible effects. For a recent case in which General 
Motors attempted unsuccessfully to. have a retailer joined as defendant for its failure 
. to inspect the brakes so that General Motors could avoid liability, see Birdsong et al. 
v. General Motors Corp., 99 F. Supp. 163 (1951). 
ue See Chapter III, supra. 
uo James, supra note 18 at 68-77. 
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tive product, the plaintiff may have difficulty in establishing the negli-
gence of the supplier. Atomic science is undergoing almost daily change, 
and many theories are being subjected to complete reanalysis. Proof of 
reliance upon the best known existing methods may prevent the case 
from going to the jury because it may be impossible for the plaintiff to 
establish the precise nature of the standard of care which the defendant 
should have exercised in connection with the product.121 If the product 
or the processes in which the product is used are complex, proof of neg-
ligent acts will be especially difficult. Moreover, proof of governmental 
inspection and certification, which may often be available for atomic 
energy installations and particularly in respect to reactors, may be of-
fered as proof of the exercise of reasonable care, and hence freedom of 
negligence on the part of the supplier.122 On the other hand, the doctrine 
of res ips:t loquitur may assist the plaintiff in establishing negligence 
on the part of a supplier. Although it is impo~sible in this study to 
explore fully the implications of the doctrine, a brief discussion of its 
use in a few cases wilt" demonstrate its possibilities for assisting to 
establish negligence by suppliers of chattels. 
In general discussions of res ipsa loquitur one of the stated require-
ments is that the defendant must have had exclusive control over the 
instrumentality causing the injury. Literal application of this require-
ment would prevent application of the doctrine in product liability cases 
involving suppliers once the product has passed into the hands of the 
purchaser or user. Although some courts have held that the doctrine was 
not applicable in such cases,123 the modern and more commonly accepted 
view is that exclusive control by the defendant at the time of the acci-
dent is not essential. Thus, in Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co.124 res ipsa 
loquitur was applied against the bottler of the beverage in a case in 
which the explosion of the bottle caused damage to the plaintiff notwith-
standing the fact that intermediate handlers had been in control of the 
product after it had left the possession of the bottler.125 Moreover, the 
doctrine has been applied in product liability cases against multiple de-
121 For an interesting analysis of the possible liability of Cutter Laboratories for 
the recent polio vaccine deaths indicating that negligence probably cannot be estab-
lished, see Note, "The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers' 
Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty," 65 Yale L.J. 262 (1955). 
122 For a discussion of the possible effects of inspection and certification as a defense 
in the aircraft industry, see Hotchkiss, "Aircraft Manufacturers' Liability and the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938," 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 469 (1948). 
128 See e.g., Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 At!. 720 (1932). 
124 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d. 522 (1949). 
1 25 See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
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fendants. In Nichols v. Nold 126 res ipsa loquitur was employed by the 
plaintiff who was injured by an exploding bottle to establish liability 
against the bottler, the distributor, and the retailer of a carbonated 
beverage. Furthermore, as in other negligence cases, the inference of 
negligence established by the doctrine is extremely difficult to refute. 
For example, in Ortego v. N ehi Bottling W arks 127 the defendant of-
fered considerable evidence tending to prove that because of the extreme 
precautions taken there was no negligence on its part. Nonetheless, the 
inference of negligence based upon application of res ipsa loquitur was 
deemed sufficient to sustain the verdict against the bottler. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court, in commenting on this evidence, stated : 
In fact [the defendants] are so strenuous in their arguments 
and the proof adduced to sustain the same that if it were not 
for the fact that the bottle in this case did actually explode 
without the touch of human hands, we would have no other re-
course than to hold that the bottle did not in fact explode.128 
In addition, res ipsa loquitur has been employed against suppliers of 
chattels even where the product has been in use for an extended period 
by the purchaser. In Ryan v. Zweck-W ollenberg C ompatJy 128 the plain-
tiff sought recovery from the retailer and the manufacturer of a re-
frigerator (Philco Corporation) for injuries suffered from electrical 
shock received when she placed one hand on the refrigerator and the 
other on a stove. The injuries were sustained in the spring of 1952, but 
the refrigerator had been purchased by the plaintiff's daughter in the 
spring of 1949. Moreover, in the interim the purchaser had moved the 
refrigerator from one community to another. Nonetheless, res ipsa 
loquitur was held to be applicable, reliance being placed on the fact that 
the·defect was in a "sealed unit." The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
Because of the fact that the refrigerator in the instant case 
had passed out of the possession of the defendant manufac-
turer approximately three years prior to the accident, Philco 
maintains. that the principle of res ipsa loquitur cannot be in~ 
voked in behalf of the plaintiff to establish Philco's negligence 
inasmuch as the ·refrigerator was not within the exclusive 
control of Philco. If the refrigerator were a machine or appli-
ance, such as an automobile or sewing machine, the moving 
parts of which are capable of being operated by the user, de-
fendant's point would be well taken. In case of injury result-
ing from the use of such a machine the inference would be 
126 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953). 
121 199 La. 599, 6 S.2d 677 (1942). 
128 I d. at 007. 
129 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954). 
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just as strong that the defect causing the injury occurred as 
the result of the operator's use as would the inference that the 
same was due to some defect in manufacture, and therefore the 
principle of res ipsa loquitur would not be applicable. 
However, the operating mechanism of the refrigerator in 
question, consisting of the motor and compressor, was her-
metically sealed within a metal inclosure and is commonly re-
ferred to as a "sealed unit." The evidence in the record shows 
that the sealed unit of the refrigerator causing plaintiff's in-
jury was never opened or tampered with by anyone from the 
time the refrigerator was removed from its original shipping 
crate in which Philco had shipped the same, to the time of trial. 
There was nothing in connection with such sealed unit for the 
users of the refrigerator to operate. In the use of the refrig-
erator all that was done was to plug the electric cord of the 
refrigerator into one of the electric outlets forming part of the 
wiring system of the home. The testimony in the case defi-
nitely established that there was nothing in connection with the 
wiring of the refrigerator outside of the sealed unit which 
could have caused a short circuit. On the other hand, the evi-
dence is undisputed that plaintiff did receive a severe electric 
shock as a result of a short circuit in the refrigerator. The 
inference, therefore, is almost inescapable that something in-
side of the sealed unit must have gone wrong to have caused 
such short circuit.130 
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The conclusion to be adduced by atomic energy suppliers from the 
application of res ipsa loquitur in product liability cases is perhaps abun-
dantly obvious. It apparently will be difficult to avoid application of the 
doctrine, particularly where the product may be described as "inherently 
dangerous." If the doctrine is applied, the plaintiff's burden in establish-
ing negligence by the supplier is diminished considerably. In fact, it may 
even be argued that the application of res ipsa loquitur amounts in its 
effect to the imposition of strict liability in the particular case. There-
fore, res ipsa loquitur may serve as a method of removing the substantial 
difficulties confronting a plaintiff who suffers radiation damage in prov-
ing negligence by suppliers of chattels. 
j. Summary 
-
Throughout this discussion of liability of suppliers under general 
negligence doctrines two themes predominate so far as atomic energy 
130 I d. at 639-640. See also Peterson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 207 Minn. 
387, 291 N.W. 705 (1940). But compare Jastrzembski v. General Motors Corp., 100 F. 
Supp. 465 ( I95i), in which ·the court thought several months use of a car prevented 
application of res ipsa loquitur to injuries caused by a defect in an automobile trans-
mission because it was subjected to outside forces, namely use or abuse by the owner. 
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suppliers are concerned. First, general negligence doctrines are avail-
able as a basis for imposing liability, especially where the product can be 
described as "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous, which will often, 
if not normally, be the case where radiation injuries are involved. Sec-
ond, the unusual scope of potential liability in a reactor disaster situation 
creates serious risks for the supplier since a single accident may destroy 
his business assets unless the potential economic losses can be avoided 
by insurance coverage, by other legal devices, or through indemnification 
under the recent amendments of the Atomic Energy Act, discussed be-
low. Conversely, for those suffering injuries as a result of defects in 
atomic energy products, it will be difficult to prove negligence by sup-
pliers because of the uncertain and constantly changing state of scien-
tific knowledge and because it will often be difficult to prove in fact that 
radiation caused a particular injury. 
3· Warranties 
a. Express and Implied Warranties 
Although warranty is generally considered today to be based on con-
tract theory, it was originally based upon tort, and it still retains many 
tort elements.181 For suppliers an important factor is that a breach of 
warranty results in the imposition of strict liability so that it is not 
necessary for the injured to prove negligence. Warranties may take 
one of two forms--either express or implied, and both are defined in 
most jurisdictions by legislative enactments of either the Uniform Sales 
Act or the Uniform Commercial Code.182 The Uniform Sales Act de-
fines an express warranty as follows : 
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating 
to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of 
such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase 
the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying 
thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any 
statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion 
only shall be construed as a warranty.188 
The Uniform Commercial Code contains substantially the same defini-
tion. m What amounts to an express warranty in particular fact situa-
181 r Williston, Sales §§195, rg6 (Rev. ed. 1!)48). 
182 The Uniform Sales Act has been adopted in 36 jurisdictions and the Uruform 
Commercial Code is now operative in Pennsylvania. The Commercial Code has also 
been adopted, although not yet operative, in Massachusetts and Kentucky. 
188 Uniform Sales Act §12. 
18' Uniform Commercial Code §2-313. 
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tions has been the subject of considerable litigation.135 In this study we 
cannot undertake a detailed analysis of the many problems involved in 
determining the existence of an express warranty. However, since ex-
pr~ss warranties may result in the imposition of strict liability, caution 
should be exercised by atomic energy suppliers during the negotiations 
for sales of products and in the drafting of sales agreements. In addi-
tion, atomic energy suppliers who wish to avoid liability on the basis of 
breach of express warranty should exercise care in the preparation of 
advertising circulars and literature. In some cases, the advertising 
represen,tations have been characterized as warranties extending even 
to those not in privity with the advertiser.186 For example, in Bahlman 
v. Hudson Motor Car Co.m the defendant had issued advertising mat-
ter representing that its car had a seamless roof. The plaintiff claimed 
reliance on this statement in purchasing the car from a dealer. He 
claimed damages for head lacerations received when the car overturned; 
the injury being caused by jagged edges along a welded seam in the 
roof. The court held the car manufacturer liable, even though it was 
conceded that the purchaser was negligent in operating the car, on the 
ground that the "defendant's representations amounted to express war-
ranties of quality and construction." 188 Once express warranty was 
found, the court had no difficulty in dispensing with contributory negli-
gence as a defense since warranty doctrines impose strict liability, the 
only question being whether the breach was the "proximate cause" of 
the in juries.189 
In contrast with express warranties, over which the seller has a large 
degree of control, warranties are often implied even though the seller 
has apparently attempted to avoid all warranties in respect to his product. 
Once again it is impossible for us to consider the many ramifications of 
implied warranties,140 but the statutory treatment is, of course, signifi-
cant. The Uniform Sales Act provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in 
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to 
185 See I Williston, Sales c. VIII (Rev. ed. Ig48>". 
136 See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., I67 Ohio St. 224. I47 N.E.2d 6I2 
(I958). . 
m 290 .Mich. 683,' 288 N.W. 30!f (I939). 
13s I d. at 69«>. 
139 See also Baxter v: Ford Motor Co., supra note 73, which may also be character-
ized as an express wiut:anty case. · 
140 See I Williston, Sales c. IX (Rev. ed. I948); Amram and Goodman, "Some 
Problems in the Law of Implied Warranty/' 3 Syracuse L. Rev. 259 (I9s2). 
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the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods sup-
plied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows : 
. ( 1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes 
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods 
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's 
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer 
or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be 
reasonably fit for such purpose. 
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a 
seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the 
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty 
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality. 
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no 
implied warranty as regards defects which such examination 
ought to have revealed. 
( 4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified 
article under its patent or other trade name, there is no im-
plied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose. 
· ( 5) An implied warr~nty or condition as to the quality or 
fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage 
of trade. 
( 6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a 
warranty or condition implied under this act unless inconsist-
ent therewith.1n 
The Uniform Commercial Code has broadened the implied war-
ranty provisions slightly, but the same general types of implied war-
ranties remain.1• 2 The possibility that implied warranties of fitness and 
merchantability under the statutes may expose atomic energy suppliers 
to strict liability is apparent. Furthermore, it can readily be understood 
from examination of the statutory language why the plaintiffs in product 
liability cases often plead both negligence and breach of warranty with 
the result that many cases are disposed of under warranty doctrines. 148 
The availability of implied warranty theories to establish liability of 
suppliers of chattels, however, is limited by a number of technical re-
quirements. By far the most drastic limitation is the requirement of 
u1 Unifonn Sales Act hs. 
u2 Uniform Commercial Code §b-314. 2-JIS. 
ua A recent Georgia statute, Ga. Laws, 1957, Act 342, provides: 
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either 
directly or through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall 
warrant the following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise 
caution when purchasing to detect defects, and, provided there is no express 
covenant of warranty and no agreement to the contrary : 
1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use 
intended. 
2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defects undisclosed. 
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"privity of contract." Although we have seen that privity is no longer an 
essential element under negligence doctrines, implied warranty doctrine 
is not available to persons not parties to the contracts in a majority of 
jurisdictions.144 Moreover, there are a number of potential pitfalls even 
for those in privity, such as the requirement of notice to the seller 
within a reasonable time after the breach, the possible selection of an 
inadequate remedy, and the necessity of showing reliance on the seller.145 
However, in nearly one-third of the states the privity requirement 
has. been abandoned in respect to food, drugs, and economic poisons.u6 
Thus, there appears to be a development in the law of implied warranty 
corresponding to that in negligence law in that the privity requirement 
is being relaxed where the product is "imminently dangerous." A repre-
sentative case is Burr et al. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of California.141 
There the plaintiff sought recovery for damage to his cotton crop sus-
tained from spraying the crop with a chemical, s.upplied by the defend-
ant, which apparently contained 2-4-D, a weedkiller. The plaintiff al-
leged both negligence and breach of implied warranty. The trial court, 
·after reading the provisions of the Sales Act, gave the following in-
struction to the jury : 
If you decide that any of the provisions of the code section 
. . . are applicable, and further decide that an implied war-
ranty was made by the manufacturer, that warranty runs with 
the goods to the ultimate consumer, there being no requirement 
of privity of contract between the ultimate consumer and the 
manufacturer. And if you further find that the manufacturer 
breached such warranty, then it is liable for the damage caused 
by such breach, regardless of negligence.148 
The California District Court of Appeals, after holding that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitttr was applicable in respect to the cause of action 
based on negligence, concluded that the trial court's instruction was 
proper. Although the affirmation of the jury verdict was justified on 
grounds of negligence, the approval of the jury instruction on warranty 
indicates the willingness of the court to relax the requirements of 
privity when dealing with "imminently dangerous" articles. 
H 4 See James, supra note I8 at I92, I9J-Ig6, and cases cited therein. 
H 5 For an excellent discussion of these requirements in relation to product liability, 
see James, .supra note IS at Igli-205. Also see I Williston, Sales c. IX (Rev. ed. z94f!) ; 
Prosser, "The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality," 27 Minn. L. Rev. II7 
( I94J). 
146 Prosser, Torts §84, p. 507 (2d ed. I955). 
141 (Cal. App.) 258 P.2d 58 (I95J). 
148 258 P.2d at 64. 
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The Supreme Court of Kansas also has allowed recovery under im-
plied warranty doctrines in the absence of pri.vity. In Graham v. Bot-
tenfield's Inc. 149 the plaintiff was injured by a hair preparation which 
was purchased by the defendant distributor corporation from the manu-
facturer and was sold in the original container to a beautician who ap-
plied it to the plaintiff's hair. The plaintiff sought recovery for breach 
of an implied warranty of fitness. The defendant distributor defended 
on the grounds of no privity of contract and on the ground that it had 
no duty to test the product. The court, in holding that plaintiff could 
recover for breach of the implied warranty, discussed the food cases 
and stated: 
If the reasons . . . for recognizing the exceptions to the 
general rule of the common law are to be followed and adhered 
to we are forced to agree there is merit in appellee's position 
that there is just as much reason for holding public policy, 
which it is to be noted is the basic foundation for the imposi-
tion of liability under the doctrine of implied warranty . . . , 
requires, that a manufacturer, jobber or distributor who sells 
[hair preparations] ... impliedly warrants that preparation 
as suited and fit for use ... as there is for holding that food 
manufactured and sold for domestic consumption is impliedly 
warranted as wholesome and fit for that purpose or that glass 
bottles when sold and/or delivered in connection with the sale 
of liquid beverages are impliedly warranted to be in a safe and 
noneXplosive condition. Therefore, on the basis of the .reason-
ing of such decisions and what is there said and held, consist-
ency requires and we feel constrained to hold the scope of the 
exception to the common law rule of caveat emptor . . . 
should be extended to include sales of the product here in 
question.150 
Despite the extensions of the implied warranty doctrine to cover those 
not in privity in the food, drug, economic poisons, and cosmetic cases, 
the courts have been reluctant to allow the use of implied warranty in 
connection with other products. For example, in Wood v. General 
Electric Co. 161 where the plaintiff sought to recover damages for a fire 
au 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954). 
lGO !d. at 74. See also DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Com 
Pleas Ohio, 1951): " ... [T]his court is of the opinion that the sale of the grinding 
wheel carried with it an implied warranty of merchantability and fit for the usages 
designed and that such warranty extended to the workman of the vendee who was 
injured in its ordinary use because of a latent defect and in the absence of contributory 
negligence such workman could recover on the basis of a breach of warranty against 
the party who sold the wheel to his employer." 
151 159 Ohio St. 273, II2 N.E.2d 8( 1953). 
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caused by a defect in an electric blanket manufactured by the defendant 
on both theories of negligence and breach of implied warranty, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the implied warranty doctrine was not 
available, stating: 
Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article 
may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in making 
and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser 
or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be 
maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser 
for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the 
article so purchased. . . . Here, there was no such privity 
and hence no implied warranty upon the part of General Elec-
tric and no valid issue on that subject.u2 
Nonetheless, the parallel history of recovery for negligence seems to 
indicate further extensions of implied warranty doctrines in the product 
liability field. For those atomic energy products -that fall into the cate-
gory of food, drugs, or economic poisons, such as radioactive materials 
that are to be used upon humans for medical tests or therapy, implied 
warranty will be available to those injured by a defect in the product. 
Other atomic energy products will escape strict liability on implied war-
ranty theories until there are further extensions of existing rules of law. 
However, the high degree of danger involved in certain atomic energy 
products and the difficulties for the injured in proving negligence may 
provide the type of case in which courts initially may allow recovery for 
breach of implied warranty. 
b. Effect of Disclaimers 
Since liability under warranty doctrine arises either as a result of 
express contract provisions or is implied by law as a part of the contract 
of sale, it is generally recognized that by mutual consent the parties may 
exclude all warranties, both express and implied.168 However, in some 
cases, such agreements have been denied effect on grounds of public 
policy. This is especially true in the food cases.m Moreover, the courts 
have been reluctant to find an exclusion of warranties unless the lan-
guage of the sales agreement is absolutely clear.155 Finally, the courts may 
152 I d. at 279· 
1 53 Both the Uniform Sales Act §71 and the Uniform Commercial Code §2-JI6 pro-
vide that agreements may be made to exclude all express or implied warranties. 
154 See e.g., Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 
(1939). 
155 See Note, 23 Minn. L .. Rev. 784 (1939), and cases cited therein; James, "As-
sumption of Risk," 61 Yale L.J. 141, 162 et seq. (1952); James, supra note 18 at 192, 
210.2II. 
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find a disclaimer of warranties to be ineffective because the purchaser did 
not have proper notice of its existence, either because it was on the 
package, on an invoice, in small print, etc. 1~ 8 Nonetheless, if care is exer-
cised, atomic energy product manufacturers may make effective use of 
disclaimers to limit liability under warranty theories. 
In addition to disclaiming warranties, the supplier may also, by mutual 
consent, disclaim any liability on his part under negligence doctrines if 
public policy does not render the contract provision void. For example, 
in Charles Lachman Co., Inc. v. Hercules Powder Co., Inc. 151 the plain-
tiff sought recovery under negligence doctrines for damages caused to 
its carpets by use of a chemical manufactured by the defendant. The 
contract provided, in part: "Seller makes no warranty of any kind, 
express or implied, except that the materials sold hereunder shall be of 
Seller's standard quality, and Buyer assumes all risk and liability what-
soever resulting from the use of such materials, whether used singly or 
in combination with other substances." The court held that the contract 
provisions were sufficiently broad to preclude recovery under negligence 
theories, 158 stating : 
The general rule is that one party to a transaction may 
ordinarily contract to limit or eliminate his liability for negli-
gence in performing his obligations. There is no rule of public 
policy which makes such provisions ineffective, particularly 
when the obligee is under no disadvantage by reason of con-
fidential relationship, disability, inexperience or the necessities 
of the situation. In the present case the parties were both 
corporations engaged in large scale manufacturing. The plain-
tiff was under no compulsion to buy from the defendant and, 
if it desired to buy from it, had the choice of accepting the de-
fendant's terms or going elsewhere.169 
The court's statement indicates that there may be limitations on con-
tracting away liability for negligence where one party is in a disad-
vantageous bargaining position. Such has often been found to be the 
case where public utilities, common carriers, innkeepers, and public 
warehousemen have attempted to limit liability.180 However, for many 
168Note, supra note ISS at 79S; 1 Corbin, Contracts §33 (I9SO). 
m 79 F. Supp. 206 (1!)48). 
1~8 See also Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 20S F.2d 68s (19S3), where the Lachman 
case is quoted with approval in holding a truck manufacturer not liable for negligence 
where the contract provided, in part, that "this Warranty being expressly in lieu of 
all other Warranties expressed or implied and of all other obligations or liabilities on 
our part, and we neither assume or authorize any other person to assume for us any 
liability in connection with the sale of our vehicles." 
us Supra note IS7 at 207· 
1eo See Prosser, Torts §ss, pp. 30S-307 {2d ed. 19SS), and cases cited therein. 
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atomic energy suppliers there appears to be no public policy that would 
render agreements to limit liability void. 
However, disclaimers of warranty or liability for negligence will af-
ford only limited protection to atomic energy suppliers in those instances 
in which a defect in the product leads to a major reactor mishap. The 
agreement between the supplier and his purchaser will have no effect on 
liability for negligence to persons not in privity. Even the broadest type 
of disclaimers of warranties and of liability for negligence will protect 
the supplier only from claims of injury to the purchaser and his property. 
They cannot be relied upon as a solution to the problem of the potential 
large-scale damages for which atomic energy suppliers may be held 
liable. They may, however, considerably reduce economic losses in those 
cases where the negligence caused minimal injuries to those not bound 
by the disclaimer. For example, if a defective control rod causes a re-
actor melt-down and if all radiation is contained within the building, the 
liability of the supplier who has the protection of disclaimers will be 
limited to satisfying the claims of persons irradiated within the building. 
It will not include the reactor loss. Therefore, the usefulness of dis-
claimers in the atomic energy industry should not be minimized, pro-
vided purchasers will accept the products on the specified terms and 
conditions. 
4. Strict Liability 
a. Common Law 
It may be argued, and, we believe, quite effectively, that the extension 
of negligence concepts, the liberal use of res ipsa loquitur, the greater 
willingness to submit cases to juries, and the extension of implied war-
ranty doctrines have carried us very close to the application of strict 
liability rules in the product liability field. However, with one possible 
exception, the courts have not as yet applied such rules against the 
product supplier, and the cases still are analyzed in terms of negligence, 
misrepresentation, or breach of warranty, even though a number of 
legal writers appear to urge the imposition of strict liability.181 The one 
possible exception is the case of Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor 182 
in which 2-4-D weedkiller sprayed from an airplane by a farmer drifted 
three-quarters of a mile and settled on .the plaintiff's cotton crop. The 
defendant was the manufacturer. Testimony indicated that neither the 
101 See e.g., James, supra note 18 at 192, 215; Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without 
Fault (1951). 
182215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). 
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manufacturer nor the user knew that 2-4-D had a propensity for float-
ing much larger distances than experienced . with other agricultural 
chemicals. Although the case may be analyzed in terms of negligence, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court, in holding the manufacturer liable, sug-
gested that strict liability rules applied to the manufacturer by stating: 
We do not think the Chemical Company excused itself from 
liability by the mere showing that it was unaware of the 
peculiar carrying quality of the dust it was selling. Ordinary 
care required that it should know in view of the dangerous na-
ture of the product it was selling, and it was charged with the 
knowledge which tests would have revealed. The case is there-
fore one in which the rule of strict liability should be applied.183 
If other courts apply strict liability rules when dangerous products 
are involved, many atomic energy suppliers will be faced with potential 
liabilities that might not exist if only negligence concepts were applied. 
On the other hand, strict liability rules would assist injured persons in 
overcoming the difficulties of ·proving negligence in the highly technical 
atomic energy field. These difficulties may lead the courts to broaden the 
application of strict liability in atomic energy cases so that eventually 
liability in conjunction with any dangerous product may well be estab-
lished under strict liability doctrines.16~ 
b. Under Statutes 
Statutes may also be the basis of imposing strict liability in the prod-
uct liability field or of imposing what amounts to strict liability by the 
use of presumptions. For example, in many states violation of the pure 
food and drug laws gives rise to a civil action for damages, and it is not 
necessary to allege and prove specific negligence or knowledge on the 
part of the maker or seller.166 Under such circumstances the basis of 
liability may be characterized as strict. Also, violation of statutory re-
strictions is treated as negligence per se by some courts while others 
treat it as creating a presumption of negligence which must be rebutted 
by the defendant. Only a small minority of courts treat violations of 
statutes as mere evidence of negligence.168 Thus, in most jurisdictions 
168 !d. at 644. In Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 S.2d 293 (La. 1957), the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana held the user of 2-4-D liable for damages caused by the drifting of the 
weedkiller, applying a strict liability doctrine. The manufacturer was not a party to 
the litigation, however. 
164 See Chapter IV for a discussion of the applicability of strict liability to atomic 
energy pursuits. 
1ss See generally, Prosser, Torts §61, p. 345 (2d ed. 1955). 
166 !d. at §34. 
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statutory violations afford the plaintiff considerable assistance in prov-
ing negligence with the result that a type of strict liability may be said 
to exist in fact. Atomic energy suppliers, therefore, must carefully avoid 
violations of statutory standards that may be prescribed by the Congress 
or the state legislatures. Violation of regulations of administrative 
agencies in most states are apparently treated only as evidence of negli-
gence,161 but in the atomic energy field the hazards are so unique that 
perhaps violations of rules of the Atomic Energy Commission or state 
health agencies may be held to be negligence per se. Once again, the 
atomic energy supplier must exercise utmost care to avoid violations of 
regulations. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives the Atomic Energy 
Commission broad rule-making powers to protect the public health and 
safety 168 and many of the regulations promulgated by the Commission 
will apply to the activities of atomic energy suppliers. 
5· Contractual Indemnification 
Because of the magnitude of potential liability of atomic energy 
product suppliers, there are indications that the suppliers are requiring 
purchasers to execute sales contracts containing agreements to indemnify 
and hold the suppliers harmless from any possible liabilities. Such agree-
ments, of course, will afford protection to the supplier only to the extent 
that the purchaser is able to bear the economic burden, either through in-
surance or otherwise. If the purchaser is unable to pay the claims of the 
injured, the supplier must respond in damages to the injured parties. 
If the federal government has agreed to indemnify the purchaser, the 
supplier is probably as adequately protected from economic loss as he 
can expect to be. Furthermore, under the recent governmental indem-
nity amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, the use of "save harmless" 
clauses will provide even greater protection to atomic energy suppliers. 
Therefore, atomic energy suppliers should examine thoroughly the pos-
sibilities of indemnity clauses in their sales contracts as a method of 
shifting the economic loss incurred through a nuclear accident, with 
the admonition, of course, that indemnity agreements will not insulate 
_the supplier from loss if the purchaser is unable to pay. 
6. Conclusion 
We have sketched at length the several legal theories under which sup-
pliers of atomic energy products may be held liable for injuries to third 
167 Ibid. 
168 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §i6I (b). 
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persons. We feel that it is abundantly clear that, even without further 
expansions of strict liability doctrines, there are several available legal 
avenues for imposing liability on atomic energy suppliers. In· our so-
ciety there is a definite trend toward the establishment of enterprise 
liability in conjunction with the sale of products in our economy. Un-
doubtedly the major compelling reason for this trend is the fact that the 
supplier is more likely, than is the injured person, to be able to suffer 
the economic losses or to take appropriate steps to minimize them. In 
respect to atomic energy products we can expect a continuation of the 
trend because of the unusual dangers involved. Therefore, atomic 
energy suppliers should adopt two courses of action: ( 1) initiate all 
necessary and reasonable procedures to assure that their products are 
incapable of becoming the cause of radiation injuries and ( 2) take all 
expedient legal steps either to avoid the imposition of liability or to 
shift possible economic losses by taking advantage of insurance and 
other contractual arrangements. 
B. Liability of Building Contractors 
Persons who design or construct fixtures and buildings expose them-
selves to liability for injuries to third persons at least during the con-
struction period and possibly thereafter. In respect to atomic energy, 
the problems of liability during construction of an atomic energy facility 
are no different than those encountered in respect to any other building 
activity. Hence they will not be discussed herein. However; we are con-
cerned with liability problems arising after the building contractor of an 
atomic energy facility has completed performance of his contract. Per-
haps these problems can best be brought into focus through the use of 
hypothetical fact situations. Suppose X, a building contractor, builds 
a reactor building designed by A and supposed to be leakproof in case of 
a reactor mishap. If a reactor accident occurs and radioactive gases 
leak into the environment causing injuries to third persons, is X liable 
if he followed A's design? Would X be liable if he knew that A's design 
was improper? Would X be liable if during construction he made minor 
variations in the design? Would X be liable if the owner accepted know-
ing of the changes by X? Would X be liable to third persons if he 
warned the owner that the design was faulty or that the construction 
should be inspected periodically? It will be noted that these questions 
are substantially the same as those we have already considered in the 
product liability field. The major difference here is that we are dealing 
with a product which is likely to be large and stationary so that it is 
treated as real property rather than personalty. 
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The general rule in the United States appears to be that building 
contractors are not liable to third parties who may be injured as a result 
of the contractor's negligence after completion and acceptance of the 
construction by the owner .169 Among the various reasons expounded 
by the courts for the rule are ( 1) lack of contractual privity between the 
parties, (2) the owner's intervening negligence as the proximate cause 
of the injury, (3) lack of foreseeability of injury by the contractor, (4) 
lack of control by the contractor over the design, and ( 5) lack of control 
after completion of the work which prevents the contractor from cor-
recting the defects.170 It will be noted that most of these reasons no 
longer have any application in the product liability field although they 
were once employed to restrict the liability cif manufacturers of chattels. 
As in the case of the rule of non-liability for defects in chattels sup-
plied by a party not in privity, exceptions have in recent years been made 
to the general rule in the case of contractors. Thus, where the com-
pleted work is turned over to the owner in a condition so negligently 
defective as to be imminently dangerous to th-ird persons, recovery has 
been allowed.171 In Hale v. Depaoli 172 the builder of a house was held 
liable for injuries sustained by the daughter of a tenant, when a railing 
which had been installed eighteen years previously gave way and the 
child was injured in a fall. An examination of the railing showed that 
nails too weak for safety had been used. The opinion referred to the 
doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company 178 as supporting 
authority, despite the fact that that case concerned only a defective 
chattel. The court stated that the general rule was one of non-liability, 
and then proceeded to establish a significant exception, stating first, that 
when an article is such as to place life and limb in peril when negligently 
made, it then becomes a "thing of danger," and is subject to a rule of 
liability under the MacPherson doctrine ; and, second, that when the 
article is of an abnormally dangerous and noxious nature, the rule 
against liability must give way, even in cases of defects in construction 
169 For an extensive collection of the cases, see Annotation, "Negligence of building 
or construction contractor as ground of liability upon his part for injury or damage 
to third person occurring after completion and acceptance of the work," 13 A.L.R.zd 
191 (1950). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Holmes v. T. M. Strider & Co., x86 Miss. 38o, xSg So. 518 (1939), defective 
guard rail on bridge; Holland Furnace Company v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 
N.E.2d 339 (1938), negligent installation of furnace; Davey v. Turner, 55 Ga. App. 
786, 191 S.E. 382 (1937), defective gas heater was installed and products of combus-
tion escaping from a hose killed petitioner's daughter. 
172 33 Ca1.2d 228, 201 P.2d I (1948). 
178 Supra note 20. 
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or design of structures on land. This has, indeed, great significance for 
atomic energy industry, because it may herald a blanket application of 
the rule of liability to third parties against the builders of atomic instal-
lations. 
While it is commonplace to find general statements in nearly all of the 
opinions to the effect that the rule is still one of non-liability to third 
parties, even aside from the widening exceptions, some cases have boldly 
·obliterated all distinctions between chattels and realty and have adopted 
identical rules of liability both for contractors and suppliers of chattels. 
Two recent decisions are likely to figure prominently in cases dealing 
with the failure of nuclear energy structures and the liability of their 
constructors or designers. In 1944 a cyclindrical tank, designed, con-
structed, and installed by the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company for 
the purpose of storing liquefied gas, exploded. Many persons were killed 
or injured and much property damage ensued. Over a hundred claims 
were filed against the defendant. Two test cases were tried, one in the 
federal and the other in the Pennsylvania state court. In each case the 
appellate courts expressly extended the doctrine of manufacturers liabil-
ity to third parties to cases involving structures. 
The federal decision, Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Com-
pany,m was the first one rendered. The plaintiff's decedent, Moran, was 
an employee of the East Ohio Company, an operating public utility en-
gaged in selling natural gas for both industrial and consumer use in the 
City of Cleveland. To meet the problem of storing the gas so as to be 
able to meet the consumer demand, which fluctuated according to the 
seasons of the year, a plan was worked out whereby the gas was lique-
fied by subjecting it to temperatures 26o 0 below zero F. The conden-
sation in volume attained by liquefying the gas was so great that 6oo 
cubic feet of natural gas became one cubic foot of liquid gas. The gas 
remained liquid as long as the temperature was kept at the extremely 
low level. To contain the liquid gas and to keep it at the low tempera-
ture required, steel tanks were placed within outer tanks with cork 
insulation between them, somewhat like the principle of a thermos 
bottle. The defendants built three of these tanks and experience with 
them proved satisfactory. Increased demand for gas led East Ohio to 
seek further storage space. The defendants contracted to build a new 
tank with twice the storage space of those first installed. The new tank 
was cylindrical in design (rather than spherical as the earlier tanks had 
been) and was completed and installed in May 1943. Thirteen months 
later it exploded. 
m 166 F.2d go8 (1948). 
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The plaintiff presented two alternative theories of recovery. One 
called for application of the doctrine of strict liability under Ohio law.115 
However, because the structure was not under the control of the de-
fendant at the time of the explosion, the court held that the doctrine of 
strict liability was not applicable. The second theory was negligence, 
and the negligence alleged was that the defendants had installed a tank 
of improper design, made of inferior materials. Conflicting evidence 
on these subjects was adduced at the trial. The trial court refused to let 
the. case go to the jury and entered an involuntary non-suit. In re-
versing this action of the trial court, Judge Goodrich, of the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, stated: 
The second theory of responsibility which the plaintiff urges 
against the defendants is that the defendants were negligent 
in the plans for the structure and materials used therein. Be-
fore we outline the plaintiff's allegations with regard to negli-
gence there is a legal question to be met. Assume, for the 
moment, that the plaintiff has alleged and shown negligence on 
the part of the defendants in planning and erecting the struc-
ture. Does their responsibility extend to harm suffered by one 
in the position of the plaintiff after the structure has been 
turned over to the purchaser, East Ohio? ... · 
The old rule was that the manufacturer of a chattel was not 
responsible for injuries to others than his immediate vendee. 
Exceptions grew up to the rule and the whole matter received 
clarification by the New York Court of Appeals, through 
Judge Cardozo, in what is now the leading case of Mac 
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. This decision puts responsibility 
for an injury to one operating the car on one who negligently 
manufactures a part of an automobile, and it is fair to call 
the decision a landmark in tort law. An examination of the 
Ohio authorities shows clearly, we think, that the principles 
upon which MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. was decided are 
part of the law of Ohio. They are, likewise, generally, though 
not universally, accepted in modern law and are adopted in the 
Restatement of Torts.116 
Recognizing that the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Com-
pany in itself was not enough to sustain the position of the plaintiff, the 
court went on to explain the development of that doctrine in Ohio: 
We need to find that those courts have taken, or would take, 
one step more and possibly two. The first step is the manu-
175 Although the case was tried in the Pennsylvania district the lex loci delicti 
was applicable. 
176 I d. at 914-915. 
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facturer's or supplier's responsibility, not merely to the ulti-
mate consumer of the article, but to a person in the vicinity of 
its use who is injured by the manufacturer's lack of due care. 
This extension of the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. doc-
trine is indicated in the Restatement and is clearly indicated to 
be the Ohio law in the decision of White Sewing Machine Co. 
v. Feisel. ... We have no difficulty, therefore, in finding 
that the Ohio law imposes liability on a manufacturer, not 
alone to the ultimate consumer, but to one who might reason:-
ably have been expected to be in the vicinity of the chattel's 
use.17' 
The second step to which the court alluded ·was whether or not the 
doctrine was applicable to cases concerning realty. On this subject Judge 
Goodrich continued with the statement that: 
We have no doubt that an Ohio court confronted with the 
question would, in accordance with the development of the 
law shown in its previous decisions, extend the liability of the 
manufacturer to negligence involved in building a structure 
even though that structure was affixed on another's land.178 
Thus the MacPherson doctrine was extended to impose liability for 
injuries to third parties other than the purchasers or ultimate users in-
jured as a result of negligence in the construction of a structure usually 
denominated as realty under property law rules. 
The companion case, Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,119 
reached the same result by applying the same legal theories. There the 
trial court had permitted the case to go to the jury on the negligence 
issue, but when the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the court 
granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on the same principles 
as those applied by the federal court. In so doing the court stated that 
there was no logical basis for a distinction between chattels and realty 
"and it would obviously be absurd to hold that a manufacturer would be 
liable if negligent in building a small, readily movable tank which would 
undoubtedly be a chattel, but not in building an enormously large and 
correspondingly more potentially dangerous a one that legalistically was 
classified as realty." 180 
The older rule of non-liability for injuries caused by structures seems 
to be uniformly followed in England. In a fairly recent case a builder 
111 ld. at 915-916. 
118Jd. at 916 
179 363 Pa. I (1949). 
180 I d. at 34-35. 
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was held under no duty, either to a future purchaser or to persons who 
come to live in the house, to take care that it is well constructed and 
safe. In Bottomley v. Bannister 181 a boiler had been installed which 
was heated by a gas burner. No flue was provided to carry the gas out-
side, and the occupants, husband and wife, were killed by the poisonous 
gas. The court found negligence, but since the case involved the instal-
lation of a structure on realty, the court held the chattel cases inapplicable 
and recovery was denied. Donoghue v. Steven.son,182 the English equiva-
lent of the MacPherson case, raised certain doubts as to the validity of 
the non-liability rule in the case of building contractors, but a later case, 
0 tto v. Bolton and N orris/88 expressly differentiated between chattel 
suppliers and builders and held the old rule still to be in effect. Certain 
qualifications were made, however, in the Otto case, which although 
mere dicta may forecast a weakening of the rule of non-liability even in 
Britain. The court speculated on the result if the rule of liability as 
stated in the Stevenson case should be applied to a case of negligent 
construction of realty if the defect was not discoverable by the purchaser 
on a careful inspection. It was the opinion of the court that the Steven-
son case opened the door to p()ssible liability to third parties when no in-
spection by the occupant was to be expected or possible. This reasoning 
could expose the designers and builders of atomic energy installations in 
England to liability to third parties, if the defect in the construction or 
design is so hidden that reasonable inspection would not disclose it. 
The similarity between the explosion of pressurized gas in steel tanks 
and the effect of loss of control of nuclear re.actors is too clear to escape 
the notice of the courts in :the United States if the issue of liability of a 
builder of atomic energy installations should ever arise. Even some of 
the language used in the opinion of the Moran case is suggestive of the 
likely results if a "burn up" of a nuclear reactor should occur. The 
court noted that the plant was a novel experiment and a "poignant epi-
sode in the development of the kind of bold and ingenious engineering 
for which Americans have become famous," lU a comment which is 
particularly apropos in respect to nuclear reactors. Although techni-
cally the Moran and Foley cases could be limited in their future appli-
cation, the logic of the cases is compelling and can be viewed as the 
culmination of the slow process of equalization between the cases of 
suppliers of chattels and those involving builders of structures on land. 
181 (1932) I K. B. 458. 
182 < 1932 > A. c. s62. 
188 ( 1936) 2 K. B. 46. 
18• Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 at 911 (1948). 
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Therefore, these decisions may well represent the law to be applied to 
atomic energy enterprise with respect to the liability of designers and 
builders of nuclear installations. If this should be the future develop-
ment of the law, designers and contractors for real property structures 
will be held liable under doctrines comparable to those now applied to 
suppliers of chattels with similar results. 
C. Protection Afforded Supplier Under the Indemnification Provisions 
of the Atomic Energy Act 
In 1957 the Atomic Energy Act was amended to place a limitation 
upon the total public liability of atomic energy entrepreneurs and to pro-
vide for governmental indemnification. 186 These provisions, which were 
discussed in detail in Chapter III, are specifically designed to provide 
protection for suppliers of chattels, designers, and building contractors 
whose negligence may possibly result in a radiation accident. The sig-
nificant provision is the defini~ion of "person indemnified," which reads: 
The term "person indemnified" means the person with 
whom an indemity agreement is excuted and any other person 
who may be liable for public liability. 
In its report, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy indicated the 
applicability of the indemnification provisions to suppliers of chattels by 
stating: 
The definition "person indemnified" means more than just the 
person with whom the indemnity agreement is executed. In 
the case of license this agreement will be executed with the 
licensee. Where the Commission and a contractor decide to 
take advantage of the provisions of this act, an indemnity 
agreement will be executed with the prime contractor. The 
phrase "person indemnified" also covers any other persons 
who may be liable. For a licensee for a reactor, this would 
mean in addition to the licensee that the indemnification ex-
tends to such persons as the subcontractors of the licensee, in-
cluding those responsible for the design and construction of 
the reactor and the supplying of parts. However, it is not 
meant to be limited solely to those who may be found liable 
due to their contractual relationship with the licensee. In the 
hearings, the question of protecting the public was raised 
where some unusual incident, such as negligence in maintain-
ing an airplane motor, should cause an airplane to crash into 
a reactor and thereby cause damage to the public. Under this 
bill the public is protected and the airplane company can also 
186 Public Law 85-256, Act of . Sept. 2, 1957. 
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take advantage of the indemnification and other proceedings. 
The proposed AEC limitation to those in privity with the 
licensee was reconsidered by the Commission, and the Com-
mission decided to accept the premise of the original bills 
which would make the person indemnified any person who 
might be found liable, regardless of the contractual relation.188 
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The sweeping nature of the indemnification and limitation of liability 
provisions removes the qtajor hazards of potential liability from sup-
pliers of goods and services for atomic energy industry in that financial 
protection is required for reactor installations. However, in respect to 
certain licenses, namely those for domestic distribution of special nu-
clear material, source material, and byproduct material, the Commis-
sion does not have to require financial protection. If the financial pro-
tection is not required, an indemnification agreement by the Atomic 
Energy Commission is also not required. Therefore, suppliers of goods 
and services may not be protected under the federal legislation in respect 
to some radiation injuries. However, financial protection will probably 
always be imposed by the Commission as a condition of a license wher-
ever the hazard is substantial. If the hazard is not unusual,. the sup-
pliers should be able to obtain satisfactory private insurance coverage 
or indemnification agreements from their customers. It should be noted, 
however, that the existence of federal indemnification may have the 
effect of broadening present liability concepts in the law and these con-
cepts may be carried over eventually into other product liability cases 
not involving atomic energy activities. _ 
Although the indemnification provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 
cover the major areas of liability which are of deep concern to atomic 
energy suppliers, three limitations in the effectiveness of the indemni-
fication provisions warrant attention. First, the definition of "public 
liability" does not include liability for damage to property "at the site 
and used in connection with the activity where the nuclear incident 
occurs." Since reactor installations are very costly, product suppliers 
will be faced with the potentialities of liability in tremendous sums if 
the .purchaser can recover for property damage under theories of negli-
gence, warranty, or strict liability. Therefore, suppliers should continue 
to obtain indemnity agreements from their purchasers wherever pos-
sible. The second limitation arises out of the definition of "nuclear 
incident" which is limited to "any occurrence within the United States." 
If a supplier furnishes his products to purchasers for use in other 
1ss H. Rep. 435, 85th Cong., xst Sess. 17 (1957). 
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countries. or upon the high seas, and injuries occur outside the United 
States· for which the supplier may be held lial;>le, the provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act will afford no relief.187 Therefore, if atomic energy 
suppliers are engaged in sales of products to be used outside the United 
States, potential liability must· be examined with reference to the laws 
of the foreign nations and the law of the high seas. A third limitation 
on the effectiveness of the indemnification provisions may arise when-
ever the scope of the financial protection required and obtainable through 
private insurance is less than the scope of possible public liability. Under 
the Atomic Energy Act the indemnification provisions do not operate 
unless the public liability is "in excess of the level of financial protection 
required of the licensee." 188 Therefore, if the private insurance arrange-
ments of the licensee have a shorter limitations period or if they do not 
provide coverage for certain types of injury, the supplier who may be 
liable under theories of strict liability, negligence, or warranty still faces 
the possibility of substantial liability. 
Although these limitations on the protection afforded by the indemni-
fication provisions may affect some suppliers in certain phases of their 
activities, generally the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has 
created a favorable cliinate for suppliers to atomic energy industry. 
Unless some such indemnification were available, atomic energy sup-
pliers ·would be forced to accept highly unusual monetary risks and 
entrance into the supply industry would be discouraged. As further 
studies are made in connection with foreign sales and activities, it is 
entirely possible that other governments will provide similar protection 
for atomic energy product manufacturers or an expansion of the indem-
nification provisions may be enacted by Congress. The Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Joint Committee are continually studying the prob-
lems and any severe legal restraints on the development of peacetime uses 
of atomic energy will undoubtedly be corrected. 
187 Legislation providing indemnity protection for the proposed nuclear-powered 
merchant shop, the U.S. Savannah, has been approved by the Senate Committee on 
.Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and has been transmitted to the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy .for further study. S. 31o6, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1958). Suppliers 
are expressly indemnified if the amendments recommended by the Maritime Commis-
sion ·are included in the proposed legislation. See BNA Atomic Industry Reporter 
54= 17 (1958). 
188 Section 17oc, 42 U.S.C.A. §221o(c). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Because of the extensive harmful potential of the materials and tech-
niques involved in utilizing atomic energy and radioactive materials, 
radiation injuries to employees must be avoided wherever possible. To 
this end, atomic industry may be required to follow a number of unique 
personnel procedures not encountered in other industries. For example, 
consideration must be given to revision of the work week if radiation 
exposures become too hazardous for normal periods of time. Employ-
ers must also ascertain the significance of the age and sex of employees 
in relation to potential radiation exposures. It is generally believed that, 
due to rapid rate of development, persons under ·eighteen should not be 
employed in work requiring exposure to ionizing radiation. Moreover, 
the idea has been advanced, although it has not received any great degree 
of acceptance, that persons over forty-five may be able to tolerate doses 
of radiation double those considered safe for younger adults. Still 
again, pregnant women should not be exposed because prenatal sensi-
tivity to radiation is high. These and other related factors obviously 
must be evaluated by employers in the assignment of work and per-
sonnel. 
Once employees have been assigned to jobs associated with radiation, 
suitable monitoring apparatus is essential. Any employee apt to be 
working in locations where he will be exposed to radiation should be 
issued a personal monitoring device, such as a film badge or a pocket 
dosimeter, to measure the radiation received by him. Special problems 
arise in connection with the handling of radioactive equipment and ma-
terials. Remote control devices have been developed which permit 
handling of objects by means of tongs, mechanical hands, etc., while 
the operator remains behind suitable shielding. Specialized tools and 
methods have been devised to permit radioactive liquids to be handled; 
pipetting, filtering, precipitation, and the like can thus be carried out 
• The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance in the preparation of this 
manuscript of Rinaldo L. Bianchi, Graduate Research Assistant, University of Michi-
gan Law School; Law Degree, University of Pisa (Italy), 1947; A.B., Wayne Uni-
versity, 1951; A.M., Wayne University, 1952; ].D., University of Michigan, 1955; 
and John W. Birchall, Graduate Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law 
School; A.B., University of Michigan, 1949; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1952. 
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with minimum hazards to the operator. Employers must provide the 
necessary equipment and facilities to avoid or to minimize radiation 
exposure. 
From the point of view of protecting employees from radiation haz-
ards the waste disposal problem is also highly significant. Not only 
must wastes be disposed Of at no risk to the surrounding area, but also 
methods for accomplishing this must be devised with a view to pro-
tecting employees while handling the wastes or while working in the 
vicinity of disposal sites or along the routes selected for transportation 
of wastes. All areas involved in the disposal process will require regular 
monitoring to assure that the level of radiation is not such as to imperil 
employees. Wastes accumulating in work areas must be stored in suit-
ably shielded containers. 
An overriding consideration in this· field is that of supervision and 
training. Employees will require constant supervision to make certain 
that they understand and will take the necessary precautions. Specific 
persons must be assigned tlie responsibility for radiation protection 
measures, including checking the efficiency of protective devices as well 
as detecting, with the use of the monitoring apparatus, the possible 
presence of contamination. 
Since the effects of radioactivity on the human body are cumulative, 
at least when irradiations of a certain intensity occur and possibly also 
regardless of the minuteness of the amounts received, it will become 
necessary to maintain permanent records for the workers concerned, so 
that their exposures may be adequately and accurately followed through-
out the course of their various employments. Just as radiation hazards 
must be· given a long-term evaluation, so too will long-term personnel 
records become an integral part of operations in the atomic industry. 
Complete medical supervision, covering not only the period of employ-
ment but also the prior medical history, will permit detection of condi-
tions rendering a person unsuitable for work in a radioactive environ-
ment. Such evidences may be provided by examinations of skin, bone, 
gonad, blood, and lung conditions, and complete records should be kept 
as a matter of personnel routine. 
Although the .first line of defense for atomic industry will be the 
avoidance of radiation injuries by utilization of adequate radiation 
safety measures, we must recognize that despite these efforts some such 
injuries will be inflicted. For industrial accidents, in general, workmen's 
compensation has been evolved as the method of supplying economic 
protection to employees. The existing workmen's compensation statutes 
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wanant re-examination to determine their adequacy in dealing with the 
new hazards created by the advent of industrial application of atomic 
energy. In identifying and discussing the problems likely to be raised by 
specific provisions of the workmen's compensation laws in relation to 
atomic energy injuries, it will be helpful to review briefly the several 
types of statutes providing relief for injuries which might occur in 
atomic industry. It is, of course, to be expected that the bulk of existing 
legislative provisions in this field can be adapted to radiation injuries 
without undue stress and will serve substantially the same policy ends 
as effectively as under present conditions. Atomic industry will doubt-
lessly have its share of typical industrial accidents whose nature and 
circumstances will not present any unusual difficulties. The fact re-
mains, however, that the potential industrial applications of nuclear 
energy may precipitate situations of unusually complicated and unex-
pected character and of sufficient frequency to w~rrant concern over the 
adequacy oi certain aspects of present day compensation legislation. The 
following review has the purpose of presenting a selective illustration 
of areas of workmen's compensation law that may require amendment 
so that we may not be totally unprepared for the proper disposition of 
industrial radiation injury cases. · 
II. SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER EXISTING LAWS 
Workmen's compensation legislation, now enacted in every state, im-
poses, in effect, strict liability for certain injuries arising out of the em-
ployment relationship. Under workmen's compensation the losses are 
distributed throughout the industry by a liability insurance system with 
the theory being that the consumer should eventually bear the financial 
burden for injuries to employees. As we have already seen in connection 
with common law tort liability rules, the peculiarities of atomic energy 
and radiation injuries raise several new legal problems. An examina-
tion of selective workmen's compensation acts from the standpoint of 
atomic energy and radiation injuries also, as we shall see, uncovers new 
problems that must be resolved in the atomic age. 
Since our discussion will be limited mainly to the possibilities of re-
covery for radiation injuries under existing compensation statutes, it 
may be helpful to define the several types of radiation injuries with 
which we are concerned primarily. For purposes of convenience, four 
types of radiation injuries warrant attention. First, there is the "im-
mediate radiation injury" which is occasioned by a harmful exposure 
to radiation, fixed in time, and which results in radiation sickness or 
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death, coterminously or shortly after exposure. Second, there is the 
"delayed radiation injury" for which the cause (the harmful exposure) 
can be fixed in time but in which the effect develops over a period of 
time, or, conversely, the effect may be fixed in time but the harmful ex-
posure occurs over an extended period. Third, there is the "cumulative 
radiation injury" where the cause occurs over an extended period and 
the effect also gradually develops. Fourth, there are the "distinctive 
radiation injuries" which have unusual effects, not normally encountered 
in other industrial pursuits, such as shortened life span, temporary or 
permanent sterility, probable or possible genetic damage, or increased 
susceptibility to disease, and which may occur as a result of any of the 
three other types of injury. 
Under most workmen's compensation acts the statutory language 
covers two broad types of injuries; namely ( 1) "injuries by accident" 
"arising out of and in the course of employment" and ( 2) "occupational 
diseases." To be compensable, any injury suffered by an employee sub-
ject to the act must come within the definitions established for these 
two general categories of injuries by the statutes. Therefore, in re-
spect to radiation injuries, we will first examine the extent to which cur-
rent statutory provisions provide cover~ge. Secondly, problems arising 
out of successive injuries and successive exposures culminating in occu-
pational diseases will be explored. Thereafter, the statutory provisions 
relating to the bases of compensation awards will be examined to as-
certain their adequacy when ~pplied to radiation injuries. · 
A. General Accidental Injury Coverage 
i. Injury by Accident 
Nearly all compensation statutes require that an injury be "acci-
dental" to be compensable. "Accidental injury" or "injury by accident" 
is not defined in the statutes, with the result that judicial construction 
of these terms has been· essential. In construing these terms the courts 
have universally required an element of unexpectedness, and most courts 
have added the further requirement that an accidental injury must be 
reasonably traceable to a definite time, place, and occasion or cause. In 
respect to ·"immediate radiation injuries," where both the cause and 
effect can be ascertaine9 immediately, there appears to be no doubt that 
the statutory language is sufficiently broad to provide coverage. How-
ever, in applying traditional court tests difficulties are encountered in 
respect to the "delayed radiation injuries." In specific non-radiation 
AND RADIATION INJURIES 787 
cases, the courts have reached divergent results in attempting to apply 
definitions of "accidental" to similar injuries. The common but trouble-
some issue is the question of whether the injury must have resulted from 
an unexpected and traceable external cause, or, in the alternative, 
whether it is sufficient that the injury was sudden and unusual though 
the immediate cause was not an external and unexpected event. The 
resolution of this question, is of course, crucial if the radiation injury 
is not compensable as an occupational disease. 
In respect to "delayed radiation injuries," the cases of routine ex-
posure, either to the elements or to conditions peculiar to the employee's 
environment while at work, provide some analogies. Many courts have 
distinguished between abrupt results on the one hand and subtle physio-
logical disturbances on the other. For example, prolonged exposure to 
either heat or cold, resulting in heat prostration or frostbite respectively, 
has been held by most courts to give rise to an 3:ccidental and compen-
sable injury/ though some courts stress the need for the· existence of 
unusual conditions as contrasted with the usual exposure of the gen-
eral public. A minority of courts have, however,. refused relief on the 
ground that in certain jobs there is nothing unusual in being exposed 
to heat or cold whether in greater or lesser degree in relation to the 
normal exposure of the public, and thus the injury is held not to be a 
sudden and unexpected accident, and no compensation is allowed. 2 In 
atomic industry comparable cases may take the form of acute radiation 
sickness caused not by sudden excessive_ irradiation, but by the effect of 
cumulative exposures normal for the kind of employment. If the degree 
of usual exposure in the particular employment test should be imposed 
when dealing with immediately discernible radiation injuries, compen-
sation may be unavailable. Such a result, however, may be seriously 
questioned, and it is doubtful that even courts following th~ minority. 
rule would apply the same test in radiation cases. 
In contrast to cases of immediate, tangible injury; -cases involving rou-
tine exposures to the elements or to artificial conditions causing a latent 
disease or the formation of degenerative conditions in .the organs or 
tissues, have found the courts much inore reluctant to find an "accident." 
1 See citations classified by state in i Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
§38.40, n. 20 ( 1952) . 
2 Beadle v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 172 Md. 541, 193 At!. 240 (1937) (heat stroke 
suffered by employees whose duties were to remove heavy pieces of metal from furnace 
with temperature of 1300 degrees); Savage v. City of Pontiac, 214 Mich. 626, 183 · 
N.W. 798 (1921) (freezing suffered: by fireman whose wet clothes froze on him and 
whose neck was cover:ed by ice). 
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When an employee incurs a disease from exposure to heat, cold, damp-
ness, fumes, or dust, and the disease is not covered as an occupational 
disease under the statute, a majority of courts deny compensation for 
lack of accidental character of the injury.8 The rule is tempered some-
times by the implication that if the exposure is of unusual occurrence 
for persons engaged in the victim's type of work, the disease can be 
held accidental. 
A typical case illustrating the chief objection to the recognition as 
accidental of slowly developing injuries from exposure to the weather 
or to noxious substances, and indicating that the difficulty springs solely 
from the traditional definition of "accident," is Deyo v. Village of Pier-
mont.4 In that case a policeman's arthritis was aggravated from stand-
ing for hours in wet and freezing weather to direct traffic. The court 
denied compensation, saying: ", .. [W]e do not think the interpreta-
tion of what constitutes an 'accident' should be extended to fringe cases 
such as this, where there is no single incident which would be regarded 
as an accident by the common man. There must be some element of 
suddenness..:..._something catastrophic-and some incident immediately 
noticeable." 6 
A minority of courts hold compensable, as accidental, slowly develop-
ing injuries that result from greater exposure than that to which the 
general public is submitted even if the exposure is a matter of routine 
in the victim's type of employment. The fact that the exposure is pe-
culiar to the employment is often a corroborative factor· in favor of 
compensability for courts following this approach.6 • 
Any "delayed radiation injury" not compensable as an occupational 
s Powell v. Taylor, I77 Pa. Super. 647, 112 A. 2d 4I5 (I955) (carpenter employed 
for :over 3 years during which he used dusty and mouldy lumber which required 
brushing and scraping before use, breathed and inhaled this material and became totally 
disabled and afflicted with moniliasis. Medical expert was unable to state whether a 
single contact with fungus spores or exposure over a period of time had caused the 
disease. Held: compensation denied since neither an accident was shown nor a sched-
uled occupational disease); Davis v. Sunshine Mining Co., 73 Idaho 94. 245 P. 2d 822 
(I952) (miner's tuberculosis from neither unusual conditions nor fortuitous eventr; 
Hasbrouck v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (Ohio, Ct. Com. Pleas) 99 N .E. 2d 329 
(I95I) (victim overcome by fumes while mixing vat of alcohol and benzol; recovery 
denied for lack of suddenness and unforeseeability and thus of accidental nature of 
injury); see also citations by state in I Larson, supra note I at §38.50, n. 2I. 
•283 App. Div. 67, I26 N.Y.S. 2d 523 (I953). 
6 !d. at 69 and 525. · 
6 Black v. Creston Auto Co., 225 Iowa 67I, 28I N.W. I89 (I938) (lead poisoning 
from inhaling poisonous fumes over a period of time); Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 
47 N.M. 279. I4I P. 2d 333 (I943) (dermatitis from 6 months' use of irritating soap); 
see also citations by state in I Larson, supra note I at §38.50, n. 2I. 
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disease would presumably receive similar judicial treatment whenever 
the injury was in the form of an aggravation of a latent disease or a 
slowly developing deterioration of tissue or organs. The fact that radia-
tion-caused ailments may include disorders heretofore beyond scientific 
expectation and of a kind which may not be included within restrictive 
lists of occupational diseases suggests a reappraisal of policies of the 
law in this area for atomic energy industry. 
"Cumulative radiation injuries," not covered as occupational diseases 
under the statutes, raise similar problems of coverage under existing 
legislation. The chief obstacle under many American statutes to com-
pensability of gradual injuries of a clearly occupational nature consists 
in the difficulty experienced in determining the exact time of their oc-
currence. This is essential for the purpose of satisfying the require-
ment of proving an "injury by accident," which has been generally 
interpreted as calling for an accident and not including cases of slow 
and often imperceptible deteriorations. When the element of suddenness 
is totally absent for the reason that neither is the cause of an injury 
an untoward and unexpected event nor is the result a clear-cut collapse 
(for example, in a case of heat prostration), compensability has been 
granted and denied alternately in the same state. 
These cases are often difficult to distinguish from the accidental dis-
eases discussed above. They include situations in which protracted ex-
posures result in gradual physical deteriorations or diseases but where 
both the cause and effect are gradual and span a considerable period of 
time. Some courts have granted compensation in these cases by as-
similating gradual injuries to the traditional conception of "injury by 
accident," saying that each exposure produced a new trauma and con-
stituted a small accident the repetition of which finally led to a com-
pensable injury. 7 But some of the same courts have denied compensa-
tion in other similar cases because of absence of an accident sufficiently 
definite in time. 8 
Most of the radiation injuries caused by repeated exposures are, of 
course, of a nature that would qualify for compensation under statutes 
providing coverage for all occupational diseases, and the problem raised 
by gradual injuries in the atomic industry can perhaps be solved best by 
the amendment of compensation statutes where necessary to effect com-
7 E.g., Pan American Airways v. Willard, 99 F. Supp. 257 (1951) (skin disease 
from exposure to tropical sun) ; Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 
·s.W. 2d 31 (1947) (inhalation of excessive dust for 23 years causing heart injury). 
8 Compare cases listed by jurisdictions in I Larson, supra note I, at §Jg.Io, notes I6 
and I]. 
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prehensive occupational disease coverage. Otherwise unexpected gradual 
radiation injuries would be likely to remain uncompensated and thus 
produce an incongruity difficult to defend when we realize that constant 
though minimal and supposedly safe exposures to radioactivity are apt 
to be routine for employees in atomic industry. 
2. "Arising out of and in the Course of Employment" 
Another all but universal coverage provision in American compensa-
tion statutes is the requirement that the industrial injury must be one 
"arising out of and in the course of employment." Forty-one states and 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act 9 use this test. Utah has 
modified the formula to read "arising out of or in the course of the 
employment." 10 The statutes of North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
and Washington, and the United States Employees' Compensation Act 
do not contain the "arising out of" portion of the formula. 11 West Vir-
ginia requires an injury "res~lting from" instead of "arising out of" 
employment.12 Wyoming has rejected the entire traditional approach 
and requires that the injury be "incurred in the employment." 18 Wis-
consin has replaced the "course of employment" phrase with the require-
ment that the employee be injured "while performing service growing 
out of and incidental to his employment," u and the United States Em-
ployee's Compensation Act covers injuries "sustained while in the per-
formance of duty." u 
"Arising out of and in the course of employment" is normally said 
to indicate two separate tests which must be met before an injury may 
be held compensable. An injury is said to arise out of the employment 
when a causal connection between the conditions of work and the re-
sulting harm is apparent to the rational mind. While restrictive inter-
pretations of this phrase in earlier years interposed additional obstacles 
to compensability (such as the doctrine that an added peril resulting 
from the conduct of the worker himself excluded the requisite causal 
connection and the view that a hazard common to all mankind did not 
9 33 U.S.C.A. §§901-950. 
10 Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1953). 
11 N.D. Rev. Code §65-0102(8) ( 1943) ("arising in the course of employment"); 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, §4II (1952); Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8309, h (1956); Wash. 
Rev. Code §51.o8.1oo (1951) (resulting from "a sudden· and tangible happening, of a 
traumatic nature"). 
12 W.Va. Code Ann. c. 23, §4-1 (1955). 
18 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. §72-106 (1945). 
HWis. Stat. Ann. §102.03 (1)(c) (1957). 
15 5 U.S.C.A. §751. 
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satisfy the "arising out of" test), the trend of recent decisions is to the 
effect that it is enough if the employment was a contributing cause. Gen-
erally whether the employment is a sufficient contributing factor be-
comes a simple question of proof not subject to the ordinary tests used 
to determine the presence of proximate cause in tort cases. Insofar as it 
relates to the problems confronting atomic energy industry, this phase 
of the law will be considered when we deal with the modes of establish-
ing a causal relation between the work and the injury or disease. 
The part of the coverage formula which may work a hardship in cer-
tain radiation cases is the requirement that an injury arise "in the course 
of employment." This phrase implies that to be compensable, an acci-
dent must overtake an employee during working hours, or at a place 
where he is reasonably expected to be while carrying on an activity inci-
dental to his job. Generally the courts have held that manifestation of 
the injury as well as origin must occur during the.course of employment. 
This approach is likely to be unsatisfactory in atomic industry for the 
reason that the effects of an overexposure may make themselves felt 
hours after the workman leaves his place of employment. 
There are at least two judicial decisions which, when considered in 
relation to comparable radiation injury situations, illustrate the awk-
ward solutions which the present coverage formula may inspire. In 
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Steel 16 an employee whose job 
required the drilling of holes in metal suffered a severe injury when 
sharp shavings, which had lodged in his eyebrows, fell into his eye. The 
accident took place about fifteen minutes after the end of working hours 
while the workman was on his way home. Because the harmful result 
did not occur "during the course of employment," the injury was held 
non-compensable. Again in Gill v. Belmar Construction Company 17 the 
workman had negligently left a dynamite cap in his pocket and was badly 
injured when it exploded the next morning while he was dressing in 
his hotel room. The time and place of the accident not coinciding with 
the employment, compensation was denied. 
It is not difficult to imagine situations in atomic industry in which 
delayed-action injuries will occur. Indeed, without resorting to imagina-
. tion, it is already possible to advance hypotheses _based on actual events 
as reported in the press. For example, a worker on a construction proj-
ect in Connecticut innocently carried away in his trousers pocket a cap-
sule of cobalt 6o which was being used on the job for radiography of 
1 6 (Tex. App.) 229 S.W. ;!d 386 (1950). 
t 7 226 App. Div. 616, 236 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1929). 
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welds. The workman was interested in using the long string from which 
the small, one and three-eights inch cylinder of deadly cobalt was hang-
ing, and he was unaware of the radioactive nature of the contents. 
After a general alarm had been given and a thorough search started, the 
cobalt was found in the glove compartment of the worker's car. Final 
information on the physical effect of this episode is lacking, but the con-
struction worker is suing for $2oo,ooo damages. If he and perhaps 
some of his companions in his car suffered radiation injuries, the rule 
of the above two cases would probably exclude compensability. 
3· Summary 
Existing statutory prov1s1ons relating to accidental injuries appear 
to cover adequately "immediate radiation injuries." However, in respect 
to "delayed radiation injuries" or "cumulative radiation injuries," statu-
tory language requiring an "accident" probably cannot be relied upon, 
except in a minority of court.s, as a basis for awarding compensation. 
Whenever the cause of an injury occurs over a prolonged period of time 
or whenever the injury develops at a remote time, the courts have often 
denied compensation because no "accident" can be established. Where 
both cause and effect span lengthy time periods, even the more liberal 
courts have found considerable difficulty in awarding compensation. 
Therefore, for many radiation injuries, the general statutory provisions 
relating to accidental injuries do not provide satisfactory coverage if it 
is deemed desirable that radiation injuries be afforded the same treat-
ment as other types of industrial injuries. However, satisfactory com-
pensation for radiation injuries may be available under occupational 
disease coverage provisions of the workmen's compensation acts. 
B. Occupational Disease Coverage 
Although they may occur occasionally, radiation "accidents" in all 
probability will not constitute the major source of atomic energy in-
juries. Of greater concern are the "cumulative radiation injuries'' 
caused by chronic exposure, such as cataract, cancer, leukemia, leuco-
penia, bone necrosis, sterility, genetic mutations, shortened life span, 
epilation, or injury to any of the various organs within the body. While 
all these injuries can be caused by a single large dose of radiation, as in 
the case of an accident, most of them can also be caused by repeated 
exposures to low amounts of radioactivity. 
Because of the manner in which these injuries develop, they resemble 
those injuries which have typically been classified as occupational dis-
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eases under workmen's compensation statutes. Occupational diseases, 
which ordinarily develop gradually, generally lack the character of 
unexpectedness typical of industrial accidents. They are recognized as a 
hazard inherent in continued exposure under the peculiar conditions of 
the specific employment. The statutes which provide compensation for 
occupational diseases, either by defining "injury by accident" to include 
such diseases or by separate specific coverage, must be examined in each 
state to determine their effectiveness as a means of providing compensa-
tion for "delayed" or "cumulative" radiation injuries for which com-
pensation would not be awarded under the "accidental" injury pro-
VISions. 
Some of the statutes literally provide compensation for "all occupa-
tional diseases" and leave it to industrial commissions or the courts to 
decide which diseases fit within the terminology. Others provide full 
coverage by including within the scope of "injury" all known or even 
unknown diseases which result from employment.18 A variation of this 
type of legislation is found in statutes which include a list of diseases 
for which compensation is provided, this device being known as "the 
schedule type of coverage." The lists may be exclusive or non-exclusive. 
Full coverage is achieved by those statutes which adopt a definite list of 
diseases and then add a general clause which usually reads : ·"any and 
all occupational diseases" or "all other occupational diseases." 19 
A number of states, not having full coverage for occupational dis-
eases, have adopted statutes providing coverage, specifically and appar-
ently exclusively, for some radiation diseases.20 The statutes of six 
states that provide for occupational disease coverage by use of a schedule 
do not cover radiation-induced diseases expressly, and it is doubtful 
18 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia (alter-
native coverage), Washington, West. Virginia, Wisconsin. Under federal legislation 
civil employees as well as workers falling under the Longshoremen's Act are similarly 
covered. 
1 9 New York, Ohio, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah. 
20 Arizona (ulceration of skin or destruction of tissue due to roentgen rays or radium 
emanations), Colorado (poisoning or disease caused by exposure to radioactive ma-
terials, substances, or machines, or fissionable materials), Georgia,· Kansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont (diseased condition caused by exposure to X-rays or radio-
active substances), Idaho (radium poisoning or disability due to radioactive properties 
of substances or to roentgen rays), New Mexico (all diseases directly traceable to 
fissionable materials or radioactive materials), North Carolina (radium poisoning or 
injury by X-rays), South D.akota (ulceration of skin or destruction of tissue due to 
prolonged exposure to roentgen rays or radium emanations). 
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whether they can be construed to include such disorders. 21 Two states 
provide no coverage for occupational diseases. 22 
I. General Coverage 
In respect to those statutes providing full coverage by the use of the 
language "all occupational diseases," it is obvious that anything that can 
be classified as an occupational disease will be compensable. This, of 
course, leaves open the question of what constitutes an "occupational 
disease," so as to come within the meaning of the statute. An occupa-
tional disease is generally defined as a disease which is peculiar to a 
particular industrial process, trade, or occupation and which does not 
arise from any single occurrence in the employment, but develops gradu-
ally. 2a 
The problem of defining an occupational disease is one of attempting 
to draw a distinction between those diseases to which the human race 
as a whole is constantly subjected, and those diseases which are distinc-
tively connected with the conditions under which the employee works. 24 
Consequently, most of the definitions place emphasis upon the causal 
relationship of the particular disease to the employment. 
, The occupational disease statute of the state of Illinois defines occu-
pational disease as follows : , 
In this act the term "Occupational Disease" means a disease 
arising out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary 
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside 
21 Alabama (specified dust diseases such as pneumoconiosis including silicosis, 
anthraco-tuberculosis, aluminosis, etc.), Iowa (16 specific diseases), Maine (15 specified 
diseases), Montana (a separate statute provides for payment of $6o.oo a month from 
stat~ funds -for workers totally disabled from silicosis if they are residents of the state 
of 10 years standing), New Hampshire (silicosis and other pulmonary diseases, anthrax, 
lead poisoning, dermatitis venenata, and diseases caused by inhalation of poisonous gas 
and fumes), Tennessee (full coverage permissible). 
22 Mississippi and Wyoming. 
2s " ••• an occupational disease is one which is due wholly to causes and conditions 
which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation'; 
that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate." 
Cell v. Yale and Towne Manufacturing Co., 281 Mich. 564, 568, 275 N.W.250 (1937), 
quoting -from Seattle Can Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Industry, 147 Wash. 303, 309, 265 
Pac. 739 (1928). 
24 Many of the cases which are used to define occupational disease are cases in which 
the distinction between an occupational disease and an injury by accident was drawn 
so as to label the particular injury uncompensable. This occurred in the situation 
where there was no occupational disease law, and if the particular injury of the em-
ployee was labeled as an occupational disease, it could not be compensated as an "injury 
by accident." Thus in reading cases, it is important to keep in mind the purpose for 
which the distinction or definition of occupational disease is being made. 
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of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the 
said disease follows as an incident of an occupational disease 
as defined in this section. 
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment, 
only if there is apparent to the rational mind upon considera-
tion of all the circumstances, a direct causal connection be-
tween the conditions under which the work is performed and 
the occupational disease, and which can be seen to have fol-
lowed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the ex-
posure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which 
can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause, 
and which does not come from a hazard to which workmen 
would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. 
The disease must be incidental to the character of the business 
and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. 
The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but 
after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a 
risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from 
that source as a rational consequence. 25 
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Some state statutes are briefer. For example, the Nebraska statute 
reads: 
The term "occupational disease" shall mean only a disease 
which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic 
of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process, or 
employment, and shall exclude all ordinary diseases of life to 
which the general public are exposed. 28 
An even briefer statute defining "ocetipational disease" in terms of 
causal connection is that of the state of Connecticut: 
The words "occupational disease" shall mean a disease peculiar 
to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due 
to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as 
such.27 
In addition, some statutes provide coverage for occupational diseases 
without providing any definition of what is meant thereby. In these 
states it has been left to the courts to decide the limitations of the statu-
tory language. The New York court, in Harman v. Republic Aviation 
Corp., was required to define what was meant by the scheduled item 
"any and all occupational diseases." Expressing itself in terms of causal 
connection, the court said : · 
An ailment does not become an occupational disease simply be-
cause it is contracted on the employer"'s premises. It must be 
25IIl. Rev. Stat. c. 48, h72.36(d) (1955). 
26 Neb. Rev. Stat. §48-151(3) (1943). 
27 Conn. Gen. Stat. §7416 (1949). 
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one which is commonly regarded as natural to, inhering in, and 
incident and concomitant of, the work in question. There must 
be a recognizable link between the disease ·and some distinctive 
feature of the claimant's job, common to all jobs of that sort. 
As this court observed in Matter of Goldberg v. 954 Marcy 
Corp. (276 N.Y. 313, 318-319), an occupational disease is 
one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by 
nature is meant * * * conditions to which all employees of a 
class are subject, and which produce the disease as a natural 
incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupa-
tion a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of 
occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending employ-
ment in general." 28 
In contrast to the foregoing statutory and judicial definitions of occu-
pational disease emphasizing an "affirm~tive" showing of the causal 
relationship between the disease and the job, the state of South Carolina 
has taken a negative approach. Its statUte provides : 
The words "occupational disease" mean a disease arising out 
of and in the course of employment, which is due to hazards 
in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment and is pe-
culiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged. A 
disease shall be deemed an occupatipnal disease only if caused 
by a hazard recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, proc-
ess, occupation or employment as a direct result of continuous 
exposure to the normal working conditions thereof. · 
No disease shall be deemed an occupational disease when: 
( 1) It does not result directly ahd naturally from exposure 
in this State to the hazards peculiar to the particular employ-
ment; 
( 2) It results from exposure to outside climatic conditions; 
(3) It is a contagious disease resulting from exposure to 
fellow employees or from a hazard to which the workman 
would have been equally exposed outside of his employment; 
(4) It is one of the ordinary diseases of life to which the 
general public is equally exposed, unless such disease follows 
as a complication and a natural incident of an occupational dis-
ease or unless there is a constant exposure peculiar to the oc-
cupation itself which makes such disease a hazard inherent in 
such occupation; 
(S) It is any disease of the cardiac, pulmonary or circula-
tory system not resulting directly from abnormal external 
gaseous pressure exerted upo~ the body or the _natural entrance 
into the body through the skm or natural onfices thereof of 
foreign organic or inorganic matter under circumstances pe-
28298 N.Y. 285, 288, 82 N.E. 2d 785 (1!)48). 
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culiar to the employment and the processes utilized therein or 
(6) It is any chronic disease of the skeletal joints.29 
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The basic question is : Do statutes, which theoretically provide full 
coverage of occupational diseases, adequately cover radiation injuries? 
As we have seen, the crucial element is the showing of causal connection 
between a particular disease and the job. We must, then, determine the 
extent to which causal connection between radiation injuries and the 
occupations in which they are incurred can be proved. Consider, for 
example, the dis~ses of cancer and leukemia. These are diseases to 
which the general public is exposed, quite apart from employment. They 
are also diseases which are caused by exposure to radiation. While it 
has been shown that radiation does cause cancer, the mechanics of this 
causation have not yet been thoroughly understood. It is impossible, 
then, for even a medical expert to point to a particular case of cancer 
and assert with confidence that it was caused by·exposure to radiation. 
The same is true of leukemia. While a higher than normal incidence 
rate of leukemia can be shown to occur among persons exposed · fre-
quently to radiation, such as radiologists, it is still impossible to point 
to any specific case of leukemia and conclude that it was caused by ex-
posure to radiation. Thus, though we know that exposure to radiation 
can cause these diseases, it is impossible at present to testify that the 
occurrence of any of them in any individual employee is traceable to 
radiation exposure. 
It may in fact be easier on the basis of statistics for an employer to 
disprove causation in radiation cases than for an employee to prove it. 
For example, to satisfy the causation requirement under the Illinois 
statute, it is necessary that the disease be one which can be "fairly 
traced to the employment as the proximate cause, and one which does 
not come from the hazards to which workmen would have been equally 
exposed outside of the employment." In respect to the first requirement, 
would it be sufficient to offer testimony to the effect that, because there 
is a higher leukemia incidence rate among workers who deal with radia-
tion, the occurrence of a particular case was incident to the employment? 
.To answer affirmatively to this question, would, in effect, make the 
employer an insurer against the risk of his employees coming down with 
this particular disease. This would result from the fact that even 
though the incidence rates themselves show that causes other than radia-
tion produce a majority of the cases, the employer probably will be un-
29 S.C. Code §72-251 (1952). 
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able to prove that any particular case of leukemia or cancer was caused 
by circumstances external to the employment. . 
The second statutory requirement, that the disease be one which does 
not come from a "hazard to which workmen would have been equally 
exposed outside of the employment," presents another troublesome 
. problem of fact. The question is whether the cause of cancer or leu-
kemia can be said to be due to the same "hazard," whether that "hazard" 
is inside or outside of the employment. From available evidence, it 
definitely appears that radiation can cause cancer or leukemia. However, 
the sources of radiation are not confined to those artificially produced 
in atomic energy plants alone. Everyone is subjected to the radiation 
that comes from outer space and to the natural radiation caused by the 
deterioration of the composition of the earth's surface. The amount of 
such radiation to which a person is subjected varies according to the 
location. Decomposition of the materials of the earth's surface in some 
areas is higher than in others, and a person receives more natural radia-
tion from outer space when he is in the higher altitudes. It is very ques-
tionable therefore whether cancer or leukemia could be said to be due 
to a radiation "hazard" to which the workman would not have been 
equally exposed outside of the employment. The Atomic Energy Com-
mission has pointed out that the average dosage of radiation within its 
plants is no greater than people generally receive from natural radiation. 
As more is learned about the nature of these diseases and their causes, 
it may be disclosed that natural radiation is too low to be a significant 
factor. It could be true that cancer is caused by subjection to radiation 
on an "exponential" basis and follows inevitably after exposure to a 
certain amount of radiation, or that possibly it is caused by a "chance" 
passage of radiation at any time. At the present time, however, adequate 
information concerning the significance of natural radiation simply is 
unavailable. Moreover, X-ray radiation to which people subject them-
selves voluntarily for medical or other purposes, also must be con-
sidered. Such exposure could qualify as a "hazard to which workmen 
have been equally exposed outside of the employment." Therefore, the 
problem of proving the causal connection essential to classifying a radia-
tion injury as an occupational disease may prove insuperable. 
A recent Illinois case, City of ChicOJ(Jo v. Industrial Commission 
et al., 80 indicates the nature of the proof that probably will be required 
to show the causal connection in radiation cases where compensation is 
sought under the occupational disease provisions of the statute. In that 
so 403 Ill. 1os, Bs N.E. 2d 66s (1949). 
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case, an employee of the city's sewer department died from Weil's dis-
ease, a disease commonly transmitted from contact with the excreta of 
diseased rats. The presence of rats near or around the sewers where 
th~ decedent had worked was made to appear in the evidence. In affirm-
ing the denial of an award by the Industrial Commission, the court said: 
The evidence in the case at bar clearly falls short of establish-
. ing such a causal connection. In its aspect most favorable to 
plaintiff in error it shows merely that the disease from which 
the death resulted is commonly transmitted from contact with 
the droppings of infected rats, and that rats exist in the sewers 
where decedent worked. There is no evidence that any such 
rats were diseased or that the decedent came into contact with 
any rat droppings. A mere possibility of contamination in the 
course of employment is not sufficient to support an award of 
compensation. . . . In the case at bar the presence of spiro-
chetes at decedent's place of employment can be inferred only 
by speculation. This cannot serve as proof ·of a direct causal 
connection. 81 
Thus the court required a showing of actual contact with the disease, 
or the cause of the employee's disease, at the place of employment. The 
fact that there were rats at the decedent's place of employment and that 
these rats could have carried the disease was not sufficient. It was neces-
sary to show that there were diseased rats at the place of employment. 
The court distinguished this case from an earlier one, Arquin v. Indus-
trial CommissionJ82 where the disease had been treated as an injury by 
accident. In that case, the court held that there was a causal connection 
where an intern treating meningitis cases in a contagious ward had died 
from meningitis. The evidence showed that the employee had been in 
actual contact with the disease in the course of his employment. 
Although no court demands absolute certainty in establishing the 
occupational origin of a disease, the problems of causation are bound 
to be very serious in atomic energy compensation cases especially because 
the diseases caused by radioactivity are the same as those originating 
from other causes. In other types of cases the courts have permitted 
reasonable inferences drawn from medical testimony of probabilities to 
justify the finding that certain diseases are occupational in nature. For 
example, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. DonovanJ83 the claimant, an employee 
of the Red Cross, was assigned to duty in Kyoto, Japan, where he con-
tracted tuberculosis. The evidence showed that the incidence rate of 
81 /d. at 107-1o8. 
82 349 Ill. 220, 181 N.E. 613 (1932). 
88 125 F. Supp. 261 ( 1954). 
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tuberculosis at Kyoto in 1951 was 1040 per 100,000 population, and 
1090 per IOo,ooo population in 1952. This compared with an incidence 
rate of 220.9 per 100,000 in 1951 and 215.7 per 100,000 for 1952 in 
the District of Columbia, the employee's residence in the United States. 
An award made on this basis was affirmed. The court remarked that 
it was reasonable to conclude that the disease was contracted not only in 
the course of the employment but also out of the employment, because 
there was an aggravated risk as a result of work in an area with a high 
incidence rate of tuberculosis. The chances were five times those in the 
District of Columbia. Further, the court stated that, although in an 
action for damages governed by common-law principles the causal rela-
tion between the employment and the disease could not be deemed 
to have been established, different principles govern under workmen's 
compensation laws. 
In Zaepfelv. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.34 the deceased had been 
employed as a chemist by four successive employers. He had worked 
for DuPont from 1936 to 1943, for a second employer from 1944 to 
1946, for a third from 1947 to 1948, and for a fourth for two months 
in 1948. He stopped work in 1948 because of illness, and in 1949, at the 
age of thirty-nine, he died of aplastic anemia, a disease which impairs 
the function of the marrow· in producing blood. A claim was filed 
against all the employers, and it was alleged that exposure to chemicals 
during deceased's employment caused the disease. The compensation 
board found that the total disability was the result of poisoning from 
benzol and benzine derivatives contracted while in the employment of 
DuPont and causing an occupational disease. An award was made 
against DuPont only, for no causal relation was found between the dis-
ease and the employment with the other three defendants. An autopsy 
disclosed no trace of chemicals left from other employments. The 
medical testimony was conflicting as to the cause of the anemia. But in 
view of the general paucity of experience with aplastic anemia as an 
industrial disease, the court expressed a willingness to accept less than 
positive proof of causation. A physician's testimony to the effect that 
" ... the picture could well have begun at the time he was employed 
handling the benzine ring products at DuPont" was held sufficient to 
support the board's award. As to the use of the word "could," the court 
remarked that it is highly probative, and that indeed such evidence is 
preferable to a glib manifestation of certainty in these cases. Asked 
whether other employments had anything to do with the disease, the 
u284 App. Div. 693,134 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (1954). 
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medical expert refused to exclude them but maintained that the disorder 
was attributable to constant exposure to chemicals during the period of 
employment. He could not, however, give details as to how other em-
ployments could have contributed to or aggravated the disease. In justi-
fying the decision of the board, the court pointed out: "Neither the 
spirit, purpose nor the language of the Workmen's Compensation Law 
requires that, to become entitled to compensation his widow must es-
tablish the precise exposure which caused his death to an absolute cer-
tainty." 36 It is interesting to observe that if any trace of other chemicals 
had been found in the deceased's body, other employers would probably 
also have been held liable. 
On the question of causal relationship, therefore; it is possible for a 
court to take the view that a showing of exposure to radiation during 
the course of employment and a showing of subsequent development of a 
disease, which can be caused by radioactivity, sa.tisfy the requirements 
of proof of the occupational character of the disease. This approach, 
however, will tend to make the employer in atomic industry an insurer 
against certain diseases such as cancer. On the other hand, if a greater 
burden of proof must be sustained by the employee to establish the causal 
connection, it is doubtful whether many of the cumulative radiation in-
juries will be found compensable as occupational diseases because of the 
lack of sufficient scientific and medical evidence. It is to be hoped that 
further discoveries of the specific nature of atomic energy injuries will 
diminish the area of conjecture. For example, if it can be shown by 
statistical evidence that it takes a cumulative dose of ninety roentgens to 
cause a certain type of cancer, such as cancer of the breast, then unless 
the employee could show that he was exposed to this much radiation dur-
ing the course of his employment, he would have difficulty in proving a 
causal connection. In the absence of such conclusive scientific data, how-
ever, it seems preferable to err on the side of providing compensation 
for atomic injuries. If the existing statutory or judicial rules relating 
to proof of causal connection appear to create an insuperable burden 
for possible victims of radiation injuries, appropriate revision of the 
statutes appears desirable. 
2. Schedule Type of Coverage 
As previously mentioned, some statutes, instead of providing coverage 
for "all occupational diseases," purport to compensate for only a pre-
scribed, exclusive "list" of such diseases. There are several policy rea-
36 I d. at 696. 
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sons underlying the adoption of the schedule type of legislation. Pri-
marily, it is an attempt to limit the employer's liability, so that industry 
will not be burdened with the cost of compensation for those diseases to 
which the human race as a whole is subject. Another important con-
sideration is that of "definiteness," which serves the worthy purpose of 
reducing the amount of time and money employed in litigation over the 
question of whether the disease involved in the case is or is not a com-
pensable occupational disease. 
An examination of the various statutory lists of the occupational dis-
ease laws reveals a considerable variation concernihg both the items in-
cluded and the language employed. As indicated previously, in some 
states no item of the schedule relates to radiation injuries. In other 
states the schedules do incorporate items that have some relevancy to 
atomic injuries and these will be examined with a view toward determin-
ing their adequacy. 
a. Examples of Older Legislation 
North Carolina. The North Carolina statute enacted in I935 reads: 
The following diseases and conditions only shall be deemed to 
be occupational diseases within the meaning of this article: 
... (IS) radium poisoning or injuries by X-rays. 86 
Unless a particular disease appears on this list, it is not compensable. 
Twenty-six different items are listed as occupational dis.eases in the 
North Carolina statute and only item IS pertains to radiation injuries. 
Since today the use of X-rays in industrial processes probably ex-
ceeds the use of other radioactive materials or equipment, "injury by 
X-tays" probably will, numerically speaking, cover the greatest share of 
actual radiation injuries. However, as the use of newer atomic energy 
devices becomes more prevalent, the inadequacies of the North Carolina 
statute will become more apparent. 
The statute also covers what is termed "radium poisoning." The use 
of the generic term "poisoning" raises the question of whether the 
"poisoning" referred to is that of a toxic nature, or one due to radio-
active properties of the material mentioned in connection with it-in 
this case, radium. The dictionary definition of a poison is "any agent 
which, introduced into ·an organism, may chemically produce an in-
jurious or deadly effect." 87 Adopting this definition, the term radium 
88 N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-53 (1950). 
87 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. 
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poisoning would make compensable only those diseases wherein some 
toxic consequences were produced chemically from the ingestion of ra-
dium compounds, thus excluding injuries caused by external or internal 
radiation. However, most of the statutes which adopted the words 
"radium poisoning" did so after the injuries suffered by the radium dial 
painters in New Jersey were publicized. Thus, it would appear that this 
language was directed toward covering that sort of injury. Since the 
injury was not due to the toxic nature of the radium material, but due 
to its radioactive properties, it is quite likely that the legislature meant 
to provide compensation for any harm caused the body by ingestion 
of radium. However, this is a disputable point. Some of the statutes 
have avoided this difficulty through the use of the word "disability" 
instead of the word "poisoning." Regardless of the scope of the term 
"poisoning," the language of the statute is obviously limited to injuries 
involving use of radium compounds only, and the language could be 
construed to exclude compensation for occupational diseases due to 
contact with other radioactive substances. 
Accordingly there are several types of radiation injuries not covered 
by the North Carolina statute. One class not covered is that caused by 
the particle accelerators which produce high energy radiation, such as 
the cosmotron, the betatron, the cyclotron, the synchrotron, and the Van 
de Graaff machine. The development of cataracts due to chronic ex-
posure to neutrons suffered by the scientists who experimented with the 
cyclotron at the University of California illustrates the possibility of 
such machines producing injuries which under a properly drafted statute 
could be classified as occupational diseases. Similarly, the statute does 
not cover injuries caused by types of radiation other than X-rays, such 
as alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. 
Another type of radiation injury not made compensable under the 
language of the North Carolina statute is that which might be caused by 
the nuclear reactor or atomic pile. The nuclear reactor and the chemical 
separation plant needed to process the fuel elements are sources of tre-
mendous amounts of radiation. Since it is anticipated that nuclear re-
actors will be used extensively in research, in the production of elec-
tricity, and otherwise, it would seem that a considerable number of 
injuries might be anticipated from these sources. The North Carolina 
statute makes no reference to injuries from such sources either spe-
cifically or by reference to "fissionable" material. 
Te~as. The state of Texas provides another variation in the statu-
tory language concerning the atomic energy injuries considered com-
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pensable as occupational diseases. The Texas occupational disease law 
reads in part as follows: 
Wherever the terms "injury" or "personal injury" are used in 
the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state, such terms 
shall be construed to mean damage or harm to the physical 
structure of the body and such diseases or infection as natu-
rally result therefrom. Unless from the context the meaning 
is clearly to the contrary, such terms shall also be construed to 
mean and include occupational diseases, as hereinafter defined. 
The following diseases only shall be deemed to be occupational 
diseases : (a) Poisoning by : (separate and distinct items are 
listed including, for example, arsenic, chlorine, cyanide, hydro-
chloric acid, lead, nitric acid, phosphorus, sulphuric acid, and 
zinc) ... (h) Diseased condition caused by exposure to 
x-rays or radioactive substances . . . . 88 
Under this language it is readily apparent that the coverage is much 
broader than that afforded under the North Carolina legislation. Al-
though the Texas occupational disease law was enacted in 1947, indi-
cating that the legislature should have been aware of the possibility of 
injuries through the new uses of atomic energy, a number of problems 
may be raised concerning the adequacy of the language. For example, 
do the words "diseased condition" apply only to a degenerative physical 
condition so that atomic injuries such as cancer and leukemia are covered 
but sterility is not? In resolving this question, it should be kept in mind 
that some of the early cases of injury from radioactive materials in-
volved scientists who had experienced dermatitis and cancer. Also, the 
nature of the injuries received by the radium dial painters was such that 
the injury or disease grew progressively worse as time passed. In view 
of .the fairly recent date of the Texas legislation, it is likely that the 
term "diseased condition" would be broadly construed to include all 
atomic energy injuries otherwise compensable under the statute. More-
over, the tendency on the part of the courts to give a liberal interpreta-
tion to the language of the workmen's compensation and occupational 
disease statutes could induce a court to take this broader view. 
A number of questions may be raised concerning the meaning of 
"exposure to x-rays or radioactive substances." It may be argued that 
the language covers only exposures to external sources of radiation. Be-
cause the radiation injury which is compensable, i.e., the "diseased con-
dition," is accompanied by the phrase which links exposure to X-rays 
88 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 83o6, §zo ( 1956). The provisions of the Virginia statutes 
are comparable in that they cover "Radium disability or disability due to exposure to 
radioactive substances and X-Ray .... " Va. Laws 1958, H.B. 552, adding Va. Code 
§65-43· 
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and exposure to radioactive substances conjunctively and because ex-
posure to X-rays can only be by external exposure, it may be that only 
external exposure to radioactive substances was contemplated. More-
over, because those instances of poisoning intended to be compensable 
are grouped together under _another subheading, the failure to include 
certain radioactive materials which also have toxic effects may be in-
terpreted to mean that, if such materials should result in toxic damage, 
the poisoning would not be compensable. Therefore, the scope of 
coverage for injuries resulting from ingestion of radioactive materials, 
either because of their emission of radiation or because of their toxic 
effect, remains conjectural. 
More important is the question as to whether or not the fuel which 
"burns" in a nuclear reactor, or the nuclear reactor itself, can be termed 
a "radioactive substance." A radioactive element such as radium, or an 
artificially produced radioisotope like cobalt 6o, js designated as radio-
active because it is undergoing internal decay and ·in the process is giving 
off radiations of one kind or another. But what about neutron bom-
bardment from a nuclear reactor? It is questionable whether the nuclear 
reactor itself could be thought of as a radioactive substance, because, 
for one thing, the reactor needs more than simply "a substance," i.e., 
the uranium metal, in order to operate. Highly refined moderators, 
control rods, and cooling devices are essential to the operation of a. re-
actor. Conceding that the uranium or plutonium is radioactive, and that 
the nuclear reactor would give off some radiation from "substances," 
this would be insignificant compared with the radiation resulting from 
neutron beam exposure. The functioning of the nuclear reactor does 
not depend upon the radioactivity of uranium 235, but upon its fis-
sionable quality. Therefore, it would be more correct to speak of radia-
tions given off from a nuclear reactor as being due to "fissionable sub-
stances" rather than to radioactive substances. On this basis, the 
statutory language "radioactive substances" seemingly would not in-
clude exposure to neutron radiation from a nuclear reactor. Similarly, 
the Texas statute apparently provides no coverage for those injuries 
which may be due to exposure to radiation produced by any of the high 
energy machines, such as the cyclotron. 
Arizona. Another example of a statute supplying coverage for oc-
cupational diseases by setting forth a schedule of compensable diseases 
is that of the state of Arizona. This statute which was adopted in 1943 
reads: 
For the purposes of this Act only the diseases enumerated in 
this section shall be deemed to be occupational diseases : . . . 
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{I 2) ulceration of the skin or destruction of tissue due to the 
prolonged exposure to roentgen rays or radium emanations.89 
The injuries covered under this statute are limited to only those 
caused by prolonged exposure to either X-rays or radium emanations.~0 
This limitation means the exclusion of many potential radiation injuries 
previously discussed in respect to other statutes. The different concept 
introduced by the Arizona statute is that of "radium emanations." 
There are two possible meanings of this term. The one which seems 
most plausible is that radium emanations are the rays given off by a 
source of radioactivity consisting only of radium. In other words, the 
emphasis is on the material, radium, and not on the qualities of the radia-
tions. The other possible interpretation would include in the term all 
rays given off from any radioactive material, not only those from 
radium. The question is : Were the words "radium emanations" in-
tended to mean the "type of rays" given off by any radioactive material 
or just those from radium? Would gainina and beta rays given off from 
cobalt 6o come within this language as well as gamma and beta rays 
given off by radium? An affirmative answer would appear to be an 
unwarrantable construction of the language. When the language was 
adopted in· 1943, not much was known about the possibility of using 
other forms of radioactivity. The fact that other radioactive substances 
could be produced, which would give off the same types of rays as are 
given off by radium, was not general knowledge. Therefore, the 
coverage of occupational diseases provided for by this act is probably 
limited to those injuries caused by exposure to either X-rays or radium. 
Another limitation is imposed by the statement of the nature of the 
injury for which recovery will be permitted. The act lists as com-
pensable items, "ulceration of the skin and destruction of tissue." Since 
an ulcer is described as anything that festers and corrupts like an open 
sore, "ulceration of the skin" should cover an injury, such as cancer, 
that could occur to the skin through exposure to radioactivity. Whether 
heavy scar tissue would be included is questionable. There is also a 
question concerning the language "destruction of tissue." Is this broad 
enough to cover an injury that occurs to the cells, to internal organs such 
as the spleen or liver, or to the bone marrow? Tissue is defined biologi-
cally as an aggregate of cells, with its intercellular substance, constituting 
one of the structural materials of a plant or animal : for example, 
epithelium tissue, nerve tissue, muscular tissue, and connective tissue. 
se Ariz. Rev. Stat. §23-II02 (1956). 
•o "Roentgen rays" are X-rays. 
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Thus, since tissue encompasses any of the structural materials of the 
body, it probably is broad enough to cover injury to any of the organs 
of the body and to the bone. It would not include damage to individual 
cells, as in the blood, but since blood deficiencies and excesses are usually 
a consequence of damage to blood producing organs, adequate coverage 
may also be provided by the definition. Though some of the atomic 
energy injuries, such as cancer, are not really a destruction of tissue but 
rather a malignant growth of tissue, they probably would be covered if 
the statute is given a liberal interpretation. 
In summary, the Arizona statute covers only injuries caused by ex-
posure to either X-rays or radium. It does not cover injuries from other 
sources of radioactivity now available in the form of radioisotopes, nor 
is there coverage for injuries due to such instrumentalities as the nuclear 
reactor. Except for the X-ray machine, no coverage is provided for 
injury which can be traced to radiation given off by any of the high 
energy machines. 
Idaho. The schedule set out by the Idaho statute to provide compensa-
tion for radiation injuries reads as follows: 
Compensation as provided in this chapter shall be payable for 
disability or death of an employee resulting from the following 
occupational diseases : . . . ( 6) radium poisoning by or dis-
ability due to radioactive properties of substances or to 
Roentgen ray (X-ray) in any occupation involving direct 
contact therewith, handling thereof, or exposure thereto.41 
This language, although adopted in 1939, would appear to cover most of 
the possibilities of injury by radium, X-rays, or radioactive materials, 
because it speaks of both poisoning and disability. However, toxic in-
juries are not included because the "poisoning" or disability must be 
due to the radioactive properties of substances, not their chemical 
properties. Thus radium poisoning is made to refer expressly to the 
radioactive injury caused. There is nothing in the language which wouid 
cover the neutron radiation given off from a nuclear reactor, because 
such injuries would not be "due to radioactive properties of substances," 
but to their fissionable qualities. Nor is there any coverage provided for 
injuries due to high-energy machines. 
This statute, by using the words "in any occupation involving direct 
contact therewith, handling thereof, or exposure thereto," makes com-
pensability also depend upon employment in such an occupation. Would 
this statute provide compensation for the office worker who happened 
41 Idaho Code §72-1204 (IP49). 
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to be in an area close to a radioactive substance? Would his occupation 
be deemed to involve "exposure" to the radioactive material? His ex-
posure would simply result from his having performed his duties in a 
radioactive area. If the statute is interpreted to provide compensation 
only for those occupations where, as a part of one's duties, there is direct 
contact with, handling of, or exposure to radioactive materials, it is con-
ceivable that many radiation injuries will be excluded. 
b. Recent Legislation 
New Mexico. Some of the states which have utilized the schedule type 
of compensation law have attempted recently to modify their statutes to 
provide more complete coverage for radiation injuries. The New 
Mexico law, as amended in 1957, serves as an example: 
For the purpose of this act only the diseases enumerated in 
this section shall be deemed to be occupational diseases : . . . 
(27) ulceration of the skin or destruction of tissue due to pro-
longed exposure to roentgen rays or radium emanations . . . 
(32) diseases contracted by virtue of work connected with and 
directly traceable to fissionable materials or radioactive ma-
terials and not specifically listed herein.42 
Since we have discussed statutory language similar to that used in 
item 27 of this statute, we will not dwell upon the scope of its coverage, 
except to say that it is apparently limited to injuries caused by exposure 
to radiat~on either in the form of X-rays or that emitted by radium. 
The new provision in item 32 includes any diseases which can be traced 
directly to "fissionable" materials. Undoubtedly the legislature_ had in 
mind the desirability of adding injuries resulting from the new uses of 
atomic energy. Any injury due to an explosion, such as the setting off 
of an atom bomb, or even the inadvertent reaching of the critical mass 
of fissionable material, probably would be pin-pointed in time and would 
doubtless be covered under the workmen's compensation law as an 
"injury by accident," as distinguished from an occupational disease. 
Therefore, it seems that the legislature intended to make compensable 
occupational diseases caused by the operation of a nuclear reactor. 
What is the meaning of "fissionable"? Does it include any element 
which can undergo the fission process, in the sense of being split into 
two or more fragments, or does it apply only to those elements able 
u N.M. Stat. §59-10-45; N.M. Laws 1957, c. 246, §Io. 
AND RADIATION INJURIES 809 
to sustain a chain reaction? A statement from Glass tone indicates that 
the word is used by scientists in the former sense: 
Until 1947, fission had not been observed in any element of 
atomic number less than 90, but in that year successful fission 
of bismuth, lead, thallium, mercury, gold, platinum and tan-
talum was achieved in the Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley, by 
means of alpha particles, deuterons or neutrons of very high 
energy .... 43 
If this broad meaning is given to the word "fissionable," then the statute 
would cover diseases caused by many of the elements. However, it 
would seem more likely that the legislature intended to adopt the inter-
pretation of that word as it is used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 
They probably meant to include within the term "fissionable materials" 
only those materials capable of sustaining a chain reaction, such as 
thorium, plutonium, or uranium 235. Another _question raised by the 
language of item 32 is: Would an injury caused by fissionable material 
be compensable when caused by radioactivity or toxicity, rather than by 
the fissionable quality? For example, when plutonium is ingested, it has 
a very deleterious effect upon the body, both of a toxic and of a radio-
active nature. The language is probably broad enough to include such 
injuries. It should be noted, however, that injuries arising in connec-
tion with thermonuclear (or fusion) processes may not be covered. 
Colorado. On March 28, 1951, the state of Colorado added item 
number 22 to its list of compensable occupational diseases : 
The following diseases only shall be deemed to be occupational 
diseases, and compensation as provided in this act shall be 
payable for disability or death of employee resulting from such 
diseases and from no others : . . . ( 22) poisoning or disease 
caused by exposure to radioactive materials, substances, or 
machines, or fissionable materials. 44 
The words "poisoning or disease" are comprehensive enough to cover 
the possibility of injury by exposure to an external source of radiation. 
Also covered are injuries by ingestion of the material, causing either 
toxic or radiation damage or both. The descriptive wording of the 
sources of injury intended to be covered, i.e., "radioactive materials, 
substances, or machines, or fissionable materials," is quite comprehen-
sive. This language should be adequate to cover any disease or injury 
caused by exposure to any of the radioactive or fissionable materials 
4SG!asstone, Sourcebook on Atomic Energy 3-t9 (1950). 
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. §81-18-9 (1953). 
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with which we are now acquainted. On the whole, this statute repre-
sents one of the better attempts to describe comprehensively the instru-
mentalities which may produce radiation injuries. 
Conclusion. In nearly every state having schedule type coverage for 
occupational diseases, the existing statutory language is either non-
existent or unduly restrictive in coverage of atomic injuries that may 
be classified as occupational. In view of the fact that many delayed and 
cumulative radiation injuries will often not be compensable as "injuries 
by accident," amendatory legislation broadening the coverage for radia-
tion injuries as occupational diseases is indicated, following the example 
of Colorado. 
c. The Requirement of Causal Connection in Schedule Type 
Statutes 
The showing of causal connection between the injury or disease and 
the employment is a requiretl)ent which appears to be highly regulated 
in some of the statutes providing for a schedule of occupational diseases. 
An example is the statute of New Mexico which reads: 
The occupational diseases hereinafter defined are deemed to 
arise out of the employment only if: 
A. There is a direct connection between the conditions 
under which the work is performed and the occupational 
disease ; and 
B. The occupational disease can be seen to have followed 
as a natural incident of the work and as a result of the ex-
posure occasioned by the nature of the employment; and 
C. The. occupational disease can be traced to the employ-
ment as the cause ; and 
D. The occupational disease does not come from a hazard 
to which the employee would have been equally exposed out-
side of the employment; and 
E. The disease is incidental to the character of the business 
and not independent of the relation of employer and employee, 
(the disease need not have been foreseen or expected, but, 
after its contraction, it must appear to have had its origin in a 
risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from 
that source as a natural consequence). . . . 48 
Under this law an employee with a radiation injury may have extreme 
difficulty proving causation even though the injury appears on the 
schedule. The same considerations discussed previously in connection 
with the proof of causal connection under statutes providing coverage 
48 N.M. Stat. Ann. §59-10-44-
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of all occupational diseases apply in the ·case of statutes employing 
schedule type coverage. 
3· Voluntary Coverage 
Finally, some of the states have provisions whereby the employer may 
elect coverage of "all occupational diseases" in lieu of the schedule. The 
Tennessee statute provides: 
Any employer may, in lieu of the schedule of occupational 
diseases enumerated in section so- I 101, reject the same and 
elect by written declaration filed with the division of work-
men's compensation, department of labor, on a form provided 
by it, to be bound in accordance with the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law by the provisions of this section ·and section 
so-1 104 relating to full coverage of all occupational diseases. 
Thereupon the employer shall be liable for all occupational 
diseases arising out of and in the course of the employment 
pursuant to all the provisions of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law.'6 
This provision has already been acted upon by the contractors of the 
Atomic Energy Commission operating the Oak Ridge installations, 
thereby affording compensation for radiation injuries not covered by 
the compulsory coverage provisions of Tennessee law. In those states 
where there may be some reluctance to expand the occupational disease 
statutory provisions to include all types of atomic radiation injuries, 
it would be desirable to at least permit expanded voluntary coverage, and 
it is to be hoped that atomic energy entrepreneurs would take advantage 
of the opportunities thereby afforded for satisfactory compensation of 
such injuries. 
C. Successive Injuries and Second Injury Funds 
Among the problems besetting modern workmen's compensation 
legislation is the case of two physical disabilities overtaking one man at 
different times and while in the employ of different employers. The 
combined effect of the injuries may be catastrophic although each ac-
cident by itself would give rise only to partial or total but only temporary 
disability. The typical example is the case of a man who loses the sight 
of one eye at one job and his other eye later at another job, thus becom-
ing permanently and totally disabled. The vexing question in such 
instances is whether the last employer should bear the cost of compensa-
46 Tenn. Code Ann. §so-11o3 (1955). 
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tion for the whole final result or whether a system of apportionment of 
the loss among several employers ought to be ~sed. The consequence of 
failing to provide a sharing of the cost may be the resort to discrimina-
tory practices against previously injured workers, who present too great 
a financial risk, by refusing employment because of a prior minor injury. 
Three general approaches· to this problem are followed in American 
compensation statutes. The so-called "full responsibility" rule prac-
tically ignores the difficulty and places liability for the entire result on 
the employer in whose employment a worker became disabled. At the 
other extreme under some apportionment statutes the last employer is 
held liable only for the amount of the injury suffered in the second 
mishap, and the cumulative effect of the accidents is ignored. 
Most states, including several having apportionment statutes, the 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Longshoreman's 
Act, have sought to achieve equitable compensation for employees and 
fair relief for employers by instituting so-called second injury funds, 
under which usually an employer is held liable for the portion of dis-
ability arising out of the injury which occurred in his employment, 
while the fund contributes the difference between that amount and the 
total amount to which the combined effects of the two injuries entitle 
the worker.47 These funds are financed in different ways. Usually they 
are supported by charges imposed upon employers or their insurance 
carriers in cases of death of employees without dependents. Some states 
provide funds by assessments against carriers based on total premiums 
collected or on compensation payments. A small number of states sup-
port the funds by special appropriations from the legislature. 
In appraising the adaptability of existing second injury fund pro-
visions to injuries suffered in private atomic industry, it should be noted 
that some of the second injury fund provisions apply only when the 
first injury consists of a listed injury, such as loss of use of an eye, leg, 
arm, or other member of the body, which causes a permanent partial 
disability, and the second injury produces the cumulative result of 
permanent total disability through loss or loss of use of another member. 
In other states, however, the second injury fund provisions are not 
limited in their application to listed injuries compensable under the 
fixed schedule of benefits. But even where the statutes are not limited, 
some courts have stressed that the prime objective of the statutes is 
maintaining the unimpaired competitive position of workmen in the 
47 The only states which do not provide for a second injury fund are Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Virginia. 
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labor market and have denied the applicability of second injury fund 
provisions where the prior injury had no effect on the subsequent em-
ployment or where the "second injury" caused a prior non-disabling in-
jury to become disabling. If the second injury fund provisions are not 
applicable, the last employer is held liable for the whole injury since the 
nearly universal principle is that an employer takes an employee as he 
finds him, and if an injury causes a disability aggravated by a previous 
latent condition, the entire disability is compensable without weighing 
the relative contributions of the two injuries.48 
Illustrative of the cases imposing liability on the last employer for the 
entire e.Xtent of the ultimate injury is the case of Scott v. Alaska In-
dustrial Board.49 There the worker had been employed in mines since 
19o6 with the exception of several years in construction work. Prior 
to his disability he had worked in plaintiff's mine for thirty months. 
His prior injury was silicosis which, however, had not yet manifested 
itself at the time plaintiff hired him and therefore could not have 
placed him at a disadvantage when seeking new employment. The new 
injury was pneumonia, which, superimposed on silicosis, caused perma-
nent total disability. The employer was held not to be entitled to recover 
from the second injury fund the portion of compensation covering 
effects in excess of the disability caused by pneumonia only. The court 
was clear that recovery could be had under the statute only when the 
prior disability or injury was "obviously manifested" so that the 
employer may have been deterred from hiring the worker. In addition, 
where the second accident or disease merely precipitates and renders 
disabling a prior non-disabling condition, it was the opinion of the 
court that the second injury fund legislation was inapplicable. 
Radiation injuries are known to cause gradual deterioration of human 
tissues, and often the date of disability is postponed indefinitely. Cer-
tainly they are not of the type that will normally cause the immediate 
loss or loss of use of a member of the body except when amputations are 
necessary. Moreover, the possible cumulative effects of irradiation are 
not yet easily assessable. It is impossible for employers to appraise the 
financial risk involved in employing personnel with prolonged experi-
ence in atomic energy work, and yet skilled and experienced men offer 
the highest technical value. We must add to this the fact that the 
nature of atomic industry is such that irradiation of personnel often 
48 Only three states have special statutes on aggravation of disease: California 
Labor Code §4663; Kentucky Rev. Stat. §342.005 ( 1) ; North Dakota Rev. Code §65-
0102(8). 
4991 F. Supp. 201 (1950). 
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cannot be totally eliminated, but only reduced to levels believed to be 
safe. Consequently, a person applying for work in other than his 
original place of employment in atomic industry may be suspect to a 
prospective employer by reason of his experience in the field. If he has 
by chance been involved in minor radiation accidents, but has never been 
disabled even temporarily, it may nevertheless be unsound business prac-
tice for the employer to consider him for employment even in those states 
that do not place full responsibility on the last employer. Such hesita-
tion is made more understandable when we realize that the state of 
present day knowledge of the biological effects of radiation is far from 
perfect, and thus atomic industry is deprived of a basic yardstick for 
calculating the gravity of the risk and the duration of possible compli-
cations and their financial import in terms of workmen's compensation 
liability. Nevertheless, if the lack of adequate second injury fund pro-
visions, as applied to atomic energy injuries, tends to restrict the po-
tentialities of employment of employees suffering prior radiation in-
juries, liberalization of the applicability of the second injury funds seems 
warranted. 
D. Apportionment of Liability in Occupational Disease Cases 
The problem of occupational diseases incubating for years before they 
cause a disability, with the victim engaged in several employments in 
the meantime, is· similar in nature to the difficulties which inspired 
the creation of second injury funds. Its significance in relation to 
private atomic energy industry is apparent, for radiation diseases fre-
quently and, indeed, normally develop slowly, a fact which is demon-
strated by the medical histories of persons exposed to excessive amounts 
of radioactivity~ Such cases threaten to be among the most trouble-
some ftom the compensation point of view. 
Under present American statutes most courts impose liability on the 
employer or insurance carrier who assumed the risk as of the time when 
the disease caused the disability, so long as the employment at that time 
\yas of a kind contributing to the dis~se, regardless of the fact that the 
condition was caused in part through employment by more than the last 
employer. As an example, Willingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co. may 
be cited.50 In that case the deceased worker died of silicosis. He had 
previously been twenty years in the employment of the person against 
whom the claim for compensation was filed. Following his first employ-
ment, he was hired by a second employer for five months, and it was 
5o 240 N.C. 281, 82 S.E. 2d 68 (1954). 
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during this employment that he became totally disabled from the disease. 
The second employer was joined as a defendant in the pending compen-
sation case against the first employer and was held solely liable. 
Though the last employer is held liable to the employee for the total 
effect of a gradually maturing disability, several statutes nevertheless 
provide for procedures whereby an apportionment of liabilities may be 
had among previous employers whose employments contributed to the 
disease. 51 The contribution to which each of several employers is sub-
jected normally depends on the length of time spent in each employer's 
service, although Minnesota has adopted a system under which the 
compensation board can take into account the safety standards main-
tained by each employer in computing the share of contribution of each 
employer. This system ought to appeal greatly to framers of compensa-
tion legislation for the atomic industry because of the incentive it pro-
vides to maintain the highest safety standards. 
California has adopted an apportionment scheme by judicial deci-
sion.62 Under it a worker may recover fully from any insurance carrier 
who has assumed the risk at anytime during the long period of incuba-
tion of the disease, and the carrier may recover contributions from other 
carriers who insured the worker at some time during the several em-
ployments. 
The administrative difficulties of the apportionment rule in cases in 
which the period of incubation may last for years or even decades, as 
it may in radiation diseases, and the virtual impossibility of showing the 
proper causal relationship between injuries and employments in which 
exposures to radioactivity occurred years prior to the disability, may 
render the apportionment system as applied today rather unsatisfactory 
when the attempt is made to enforce it in radiation injury cases. But, 
on the other hand, the adoption of the rule imposing liability only on 
the last employer who may have employed a workman for a relatively 
brief period of time may be unfair. Statutory provisions to create de-
vices similar to those used in connection with second injury funds and 
intended to cover cases of slowly maturing occupational radiation-in-
duced diseases are deserving of consideration for they may reduce the 
problems of providing adequate compensation for employees of atomic 
industry. 
51 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.228; Minn. Stat. Ann. §176.66(5); N.Y. Work. Comp. 
Law §44. 
52 Colonial Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal. 2d 79, 172 P. 
2d 884 (1946). 
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E. Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity 
I. General Principles 
Workmen's compensation and occupational disease statutes are sub-
ject to a limitation which permits compensation only for those injuries 
resulting in total or partial disability. Unless an injury falls within 
the definition of "disability," it is not considered compensable regard-
less of its seriousness. This restriction springs from the very basic 
policies underlying the adoption of the workmen's compensation arid 
occupational disease acts. 
Among the reasons for the adoption of workmen's compensation 
legislation was the fact that the cost of common law litigation often de-
feated its purpose. In many cases it consumed a good share of the pro-
ceeds of the final recovery of the workman. The time consumed in such 
litigation, moreover, made it difficult for the employee to pay his medical 
bills or support his family pending the outcome. Furthermore, the ap-
plication of common law defenses to an action based upon negligence of 
the employer made recovery highly speculative. Confronted with the 
ever increasing number of injuries due to expanding industrialization, 
the legislatures concluded that the cost of support a~d medical care re-
sulting from these injuries should be borne by the industry which cre-
ated them .. Workmen's compensation and occupational disease laws were 
thus intended to make industrial employers "pay their way" and to 
reduce litigation ·to a minimum. 
Notwithstanding these factors underlying the adoption of all work-
men's compensation and occupational disease legislation, there has been 
cqnfusion regarding the basis for making awards for injuries. Some 
legislatures have been concerned with making awards for injuries 
which left employees in an impaired physical condition. Other legisla-
tures have been more concerned with whether the employee was sub-
sequently able to maintain his prior earning power, regardless of the 
injury he had received.fia 
In a tort action for personal injury, an "injury" to the person must 
be shown. Under compensation statutes a showing of "disability" is 
required to support an award. "Damages" in tort law and "compensa-
n Although death benefits comprise a substantial category of workmen's compensa-
tion claims and occupational disease claims, no discussion will be devoted to them here 
because there is apparently no significant difference between death caused by atomic 
energy and death caused by any other source, regardless of whether compensation is 
claimed under a workmen's compensation statute or under an occupational disease 
statute. 
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tion" under the statutes are different concepts. Therefore the extent 
to which atomic energy injuries will constitute compensable disabilities, 
taking into consideration the definitions used by the legislatures and the 
interpretations of the statutory wording by the courts, warrants exami-
nation. Generally speaking, a personal injury, while normally sufficient 
grounds for tort liability in another setting, may not be enough to en-
title the injured person to compensation. 
In deciding what constitutes either a total or partial disability, it 
should be recognized that there are two determinants: ( 1) actual physi-
cal disability which is determined by the reduction in ability of the 
claimant to use his body after the injury, e.g., the inability to see because 
of cataract or to move because of muscular damage; and ( 2) loss of 
earning power which is determined by the extent to which claimant's 
injury subtracts from his attractiveness in the labor pool. These factors 
are corollary to the policy considerations which prompted the adoption 
of the workmen's compensation and occupational disease acts. 
In most instances, both physical disability and inability to earn the 
same wages occur simultaneously. But this is not necessarily the case. 
At one extreme, it is conceivable that a workman can be made an almost 
totally handicapped person, such as a quadruple amputee, but yet, by 
perseverance and ingenuity, he may be able to earn a livelihood. Com-
mon sense would suggest that a man who has lost his arms and legs 
has suffered a serious decrease in his earning capacity. It would seem 
that the harm he has suffered physically should entitle him to compensa-
tion on the ground tha~ his capacity to earn has been destroyed so far 
as his competitive position with his. fellow workers is concerned. To 
deny him compensation becaus.e he develops a new means of earning a 
living would be to penalize a person who is more industrious and 
imaginative than the average. On the other hand, it is likely that a 
worker who· has suffered an injury which only slightly impairs his 
physical activity may not be able to find employment, and therefore has 
suffered a severe diminution of his wage-earning capacity. This latter 
situation may very well be the case when occupational disease is in-
volved, especially is this likely to be true in radiation overexposure cases. 
Since such radiation exposures have a cumulative effect, another atomic 
energy employer may refuse to hire a man who has been previously 
overexposed, for only a little additional exposure, even though small in 
amount, may produce disability. The last employer may have to bear 
the compensation payments because, as was noted in the preceding sec-
tion, under most of the occupational disease laws the last employer is 
responsible for the entire compensation. 
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For classification purposes a four-fold subdivision of compensable 
disabilities has been established. These are temporary total, temporary 
partial, permanent total, and permanent partial. disability. Ordinarily, 
there is little controversy regarding the loss of earning power under the 
categories of temporary partial or temporary total disability. The 
actual wage loss of the disabled employee can be determined directly 
from the amount of time and wages the employee has lost. Permanent 
partial and permanent total disabilities raise more complex questions in 
both accidental injury and occupational disease areas. In these instances, 
it becomes necesary to determine the employee's earning capacity after 
the condition created by the injury has stabilized. 
The first problem in dealing with atomic energy injuries is to de-
termine how they will be classified as disabilities. Then, it must be 
determined whether the disability is to be measured under the statutes 
on the basis of physical condition or loss of earning power, or both, in 
order to appraise the suitability of the solutions in respect to radiation 
injuries. 
2. Application of General Principles to Atomic Injuries 
a. Temporary Disabilities and Atomic Injuries from Acci-
dents 
Typical of the atomic energy injuries, which seem most likely to fall 
into the category of temporary disabilities, either partial or total, are 
the aftereffects, other than death, of a large single accidental over-
exposure to radiation. Radiation illness, due to a large overexposure to 
radiation, goes through four phases within a period of months, after 
which the immediately apparent effects either disappear or are latent. 
During this period, the employee may be totally incapacitated. In de-
termining the amount of compensation for temporary disabilities, the 
problem becomes one of ascertaining the extent of the "disability" ( un-
less this particular injury has a prescribed compensation listed in a 
statutory schedule). 64 "Disability" as used in a particular statute might 
mean either or both of the factors hitherto named, i.e., physical in-
capacity or loss of earning capacity. However, in the temporary dis-
ability situation, the emphasis will be on loss of current wages. No 
forecast as to the employee's loss of earning capacity in the future is 
64 Typically, workmen's compensation statutes provide a specified weekly benefit for 
temporary disabilities requiring loss of earnings and prescribe a maximum total com-
pensation. For example, see N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law §Is. It would be possible 
to prescribe a fixed number of weekly benefits for a specific injury, however. 
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necessary as would be true in the case of a permanent disability. In the 
case of acute overexposure to radiation, the effects are likely to be severe 
enough to warrant the assumption that the claimant will not be able to 
earn anything for the period of the disability. If the particular injury 
does not cause any loss of wages, compensation probably will not be 
awarded because of the emphasis in temporary disability cases on actual 
wage loss. 
b. Permanent Disabilities and Atomic Injuries from Accidents 
The atomic energy injuries which seem more likely to fall into the 
categories of permanent partial or total disabilities are those of sterility, 
genetic damage, leukemia, leukopenia, cancer, and shortened life span. 
The "distinctive radiation injuries," such as sterility, genetic damage, 
or shortened life span, may not fall within what is generally considered 
a "disability," although the damage is permanep.t. This results from 
the fact that these injuries may not result in wage loss or physical de-
terioration which affects the overall earning capacity. If the particular 
requirements of the statute as to a loss of earning capacity are not met, 
then regardless of whether the statute otherwise includes such an injury 
within its scope, no recovery will be allowed. 
In respect to those radiation injuries, such as cancer, which may be 
classified as permanent partial disabilities, most states determine benefits 
on the basis of decreased earning capacity, disregarding actual wage 
loss. This will create some problems in relation to radiation injuries 
unless they are covered by a schedule which provides a definite amount 
of compensation. For example, certain seemingly permanent atomic 
energy injuries, such as cancer, leukemia, leukopenia, and bone necrosis, 
while definitely constituting physical impairment of the body, may not 
result in decreased earning power in the immediate period after they are 
contracted. That these injuries should qualify as physical disabilities 
affecting earning power can be illustrated by the likelihood that if a per-
son had cancer, even though medical treatment temporarily arrested its 
development, his chances of future employment would be lessened. Since 
another employer would not be likely to hire him, the cancer would cause 
an actual decrease in the employee's earning potential thus warranting 
compensation. 
The experience in Illinois demonstrates the typical judicial construc-
tion given to statutes which determine disability in terms of loss of 
earning capacity. Prior to 1955 the. Illinois statute read: 
If, after the accidental injury ha:s b~en sustained, the employee 
as a result thereof becomes partially incapacitated from pursu-
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ing his usual and customary line of employment, he shall, 
except in cases covered by the specific schedule set forth in 
paragraph (e) of this section, receive· compensation . . . 
equal to fifty per centum of the difference between the average 
amount which he earned before the accident and the average 
amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable 
employment or business after the accident. 56 
The purpose of the statute was stated in Ridge Coal Mining Co. v. 
Industrial Com mission: 
The purpose of the act is to as nearly as possible give the in-
jured employee fifty per cent of the difference between what 
his earnings would have been had he not been injured and 
what he is earning or is able to earn subsequent to the injury. 56 
In that case an employer sought to terminate compensation payments 
on the theory that the employee subsequently was earning higher wages. 
The employer did not introduce any evidence of the employee's physical 
condition. The court held that: 
Since the plaintiff in error has contented itself with presenting 
testimony only concerning the wages of the defendant in error, 
and has offered no other evidence concerning the condition of 
the defendant in error, its evidence is not sufficient to justify a 
holding that the disability of ·the defendant in error has 
ended.67 
Thus the court interpreted the statute to mean that the employee's physi~ 
cal condition must be ascertained, regardless of his earnings, before an 
award will be terminated. 
In a decision rendered by the same court the following year upon a 
petition to reduce an award on the ground that in a new position the 
employee had been able to work more days and thus earn more money 
than he would have earned had he continued in his former occupation, 
the court said : "Compensation is not based on physical or mental dis-
ability, except as it affects earning capacity, nor on opportunity to work, 
but is based on previous earnings and earning capacity and is measured 
by the loss of such earning capacity due to the accident." 58 In a very 
recent case, however, involving an attempt by an employee to base his 
u Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 48, h45(d) (1949). The statute now provides for compensation 
equal to a minimum of 65% of the wage difference. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 48, h38.8(d) 
(1955). 
56 314 Ill. 509, 512, 145 N.E. 643 (1924). 
51 ld. at 517. 
sa Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Industrial Commission et al., 314 Ill. 526, 
528, 145 N.E. 675 (1924). 
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claim for compensation upon the fact that his wages were now less than 
formerly, if overtime pay were excluded, the same court stated: "The 
object of this provision is to compensate the injured employee for his 
reduced earning capacity and, if any injury does not reduce his earning 
capacity, he is not entitled to compensation." 59 From these cases, it can 
readily be seen that the earning capacity test cannot be easily applied in 
instances where there was no actual wage loss although some physical 
impairment could be demonstrated. For "distinctive radiation injuries," 
such as shortened life span and sterility, providing compens~tion under 
the loss of earning capacity test will be even more difficult unless statutes 
are amended to cover such cases in schedules or otherwise. 
Wisconsin has a provision in its statute which may have the effect of 
permitting coverage of most atomic energy injuries. The Wisconsin 
statute establishes a schedule of specific disabilities and relative disa-
bilities and makes allowance for disfigurement. ~t also states: 
For permanent partial disability not covered by the provisions 
of sections 102.52 to 102.56 [schedule, application of schedule, 
and disfigurement] the aggregate number of weeks of in-
demnity shall bear ,such relation to the number of weeks of 
indemnity set out ... as the nature of the injury bears to 
one causing permanent total disability and shall be payable at 
the rate of 70 per cent of the average weekly earnings .... 80 
By this language, an injury is made compensable on the basis of how 
much the injury tends to impair, percentage-wise, bodily function. In-
terpreting this language, the court has stated that the legislature in-
tended to put this kind of permanent partial incapacity on the same 
plane with scheduled injuries. The effect of this is to make an injury 
compensable much in the same manner as is true in the case of the 
regular scheduled injuries. In a recent case the court" stated: 
The general scheme of the statutes following the development 
of schedule and relative injuries, all of which constituted a 
permanent partial disability, indicates that the legislature 
was concerned with bringing nonschedule and nonrelative dis-
abilities into conformity with schedule and relative disabilities. 
. . . Such a construction leaves no disparity between schedule 
and relative injuries on the one hand, and nonschedule injuries 
causing permanent partial disability on the other. This also 
conforms to the practical necessities. During the healing 
period it is possible to establish a wage loss because that is a 
· past event. But since an award for permanent disability is to 
69 Sroka v. Industrial Commission et at., 412 Ill. 126, 128, 105 N.E. zd 716 (1952). 
80 Wis. Stat. Ann. hoz.44(3) (1957). 
822 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
be made for all time at the end of this period it must be based 
upon some sort of prediction as to impairment of earning 
capacity. It appears to us that the legislature has specifically 
chosen in the case of nonschedule permanent partial disabilities 
the method of comparing the severity of the injuries causing 
such a disability with those causing permanent total disabil-
ity.el 
The case involved a salesman who had injured a vertebral disc while 
lifting a refrigerator during a demonstration for a prospective cus-
tomer. Following an operation to alleviate his condition, he again re-
sumed his occupation as a salesman at higher wages than before the 
injury. In this situation, the employee continued in the same work as 
prior to the injury, and he earned more money, yet he was classified 
as permanently partially disabled to the extent of twelve and a half 
per cent, due to the loss of some motion in the spine. It would seem 
that the award was really made because of the physical disability with 
its resulting effect on the COJ11petitive earning capacity of the employee. 
Since the court construed the statute to mean that the legislature in-
tended to put nonschedule injuries on the same plane with schedule 
injuries, it appears that the award was made without reference to 
whether any diminished earning capacity is foreseeable. This treat-
ment would permit compensation for atomic energy injuries because 
the commission could simply consider the particular injury the em-
plqyee had suffered and could decide that it amounted to some per-
centage of· total disability. The employee would then be compensated 
on this basis without having to overcome the obstacle of showing his 
earning capacity had been specifically decreased. The effect is similar 
to that of listing atomic energy injuries in the schedule. Even this type 
of statutory provision, however, may be difficult to apply in respect to 
such injurie~ as shortened life span and sterility. Moreover, as applied 
to atomic energy injuries, insurance companies may have difficulty in 
preparing contracts that are actuarily sound. 
Generally, the post injury earnings used as the basis for computing 
decreased earning capacity are those the injured employee is able to 
earn in "any" kind of employment. However, a few states use earning 
capacity "in the same employment" as the basis for computing the dif-
ference between prior and subsequent earnings. The advantages of 
the latter approach to an employee are apparent. It would be quite 
possible for a highly skilled craftsman to receive injuries that compel 
61 Northern States Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 252 Wis. 70, 75-76, 30 N.W. 
2d 217 (1947). 
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him to discontinue his particular craft. However, if he is able to obtain 
employment as a common laborer, he might be able to earn some wages 
for the period which elapses before he has to file his claim. If wages 
earned in "any" employment were the criterion, the commission would 
be obliged to use his potential earning capacity as a common laborer 
in determining the disability award. In respect to atomic energy work-
ers, the advantage of special training might be lost if an overexposure 
is suffered which prevents continuing in the same job. The loss of the 
value of this special training might go uncompensated if the employee 
were able to earn equivalent wages under a statute which used "any 
employment" as a basis of comparing a loss in earning capacity. 
Michigan defines disability by reference to the same employment. 
The statute states : 
The word "disability" means the state of being disabled from 
earning full wages at the work in which the employee was 
last subject to the conditions resulting in disability .... 62 
In a case which arose under this statute an employee who had been 
employed as a motor tester suffered an arm injury which rendered his 
arm useless. Subsequent to his injury, he was employed as a motor 
inspector at a slightly higher rate of pay. The court held that though 
the occupations of the employee prior and subsequent to his injury 
were closely related, they were not identical and the statute explicitly 
provides that ability to work at the same employment is the statutory 
test. The court stated : 
Again, we must hold that this raises an equitable question 
barred from consideration as the law now stands, and we 
cannot hold that it was error for the board to award him com-
pensation on the ground that from the time of the accident 
he was wholly incapacitated from earning any wages in the 
employment in which he was engaged at the time of the acci-
dent.68 
Therefore, under Michigan law, an employee suffering an atomic en-
ergy injury preventing continuation in the same work would qualify 
as disabled. 
While the preceding discussion concerning the Michigan treatment 
of compensability is limited to a consideration of whether the injury 
is within the statutory definition of a compensable disability in the first 
62 Mich. Stat. Ann. §I7.22o(a) (1950). 
63 Geis v. Packard Motor .Car Co., 214 Mich. 646, 651, 183 N.W. 916 (1921). 
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instance, subsequent earnings of the employee are taken into considera-
tion under that part of the Michigan statute which provides: 
The weekly loss of wages referred to in this act shall consist 
of such percentage of the average weekly earnings of the 
injured employee computed according to the provisions of 
this section as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent 
of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment 
in which he was working at the time of the injury, the same 
to be fixed as of tbe time of the injury, but to be determined 
ih view of the nature and extent of the injury: Provided, 
The compensation payable, when added to his wage earning 
capacity after the injury in the same or other employment, 
shall not exceed his average weekly earnings at the time of 
such in)ury.64 . 
Interpreting this proviso, the Michigan court in Markey v. S. S. Peter 
and Paul's Parish 65 held that where the employee was regularly earn-
ing more money in a new and permanent employment subsequent to 
the injury, the proviso became operative, and the employer was entitled 
to an award stopping compensation. 
At first glance it would· seem that under this type of legislation if 
the employee subsequently earns equivalent or better wages, he will be 
denied compensation. However, in Michigan, once the employee is 
classified as ·having a compensable disability because he can no longer 
earn full wages at his old employment, he becomes entitled to compen-
sation. From this point on, in order to stop payments, it· is necessary 
for the employer to show that the employee is again holding a job 
which yields equal or higher wages. If such employment should cease, 
the employee .does not have to show any actual change of physical 
condition to have the compensation restored. The policy underlying 
this approach is to encourage rehabilitation of the injured employee. 
This system would seem highly suitable to meet the needs of employers 
and employees in private atomic industry where, undeniably, injuries 
. may have a marked impact on one's earning capacity in the indefinite 
future though no serious diminution of earning ability may result in 
the immediate or intermediate future, and, yet, on the employer's side, 
it may be considered fair not to burden an enterprise on account of 
damages which have not yet materialized. Of course, an extension of 
the limitations period for recovery may be necessitated to render these 
remedies meaningfulwhen applied to radiation injuries. 
64 Mich. Stat. Ann. h7.161 (1950). 
6 5 281 Mich. 292, 274 N.W. 797 (1937). 
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Another provision in many of the statutes which may provide com-
pensation for some of the atomic energy injuries is that which deals 
wit}]. "disfigurement." Under these provisions, compensation is usu-
ally allowed, with a maximum limit, in case of any disfigurement to 
the face, head, neck, or hands, when such disfigurement interferes with 
the employee's future earning capacity. Such a provision may be used 
to cover such disfigurements as resulted from the accident which oc-
curred during the Eniwetok experiments. In that case some of the 
personnel employed during the experiment picked up some "hot" equip-
ment, seriously exposing their hands to radiation. The hands were 
scarred. If a statute provided compensation for disfigurement to the 
hands, then such an item would be compensable if it interfered with the 
individual's earning capacity. Another item which might be included 
within the term "disfigurement," is that of epilation, or loss of hair. 
This would depend upon whether the loss of hair is permanent and 
whether or not it could come within the definition of disfigurement. 
Where a loss of hair could be shown to result in decreased earning 
capacity, it might be compensable. Generally, the statutes do not define 
disfigurement, but instead leave it to the discretion of the commission 
in each case. The only general limitation is that the disfigurement must 
be such that it may affect the future earning capacity of the employee 
or influence a subsequent employer in deciding whether or not to hire 
the claimant. 
c. Occupational Diseases and Atomic Injuries 
The question as to the meaning of "disability" also arises in con-
nection with radiation injuries that may be classified as occupational 
diseases, and problems similar to those discussed in connection with 
accidental radiation injuries are encountered. Generally speaking, in 
occupational disease legislation the emphasis is also placed upon di-
minished earning capacity. 
In Michigan, disability is defined in terms of being unable to earn 
full wages in the same occupation, but the compensation therefore is 
measured by loss of earning capacity. The statute reads : 
The word "disability" means the state of being disabled from 
earning full wages at the work in which the employee was 
last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability .... 66 
If an employee is disabled or dies and his disability or death 
is caused by a disease and the disease is due to the nature of 
66 Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.220(a) (1950). 
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the employment in which such employee was engaged and was 
contracted therein, he . . . shall be entitled to compensation 
. . . for his disablement . . . all as provided in part 2 of this 
act, except as hereinafter stated in this part: Provided, how-
ever, That if it shall be determined that such employee is able 
to earn wages in another occupation, which shall be neither 
unhealthful nor injurious and such wages do not equal his 
full wages prior to the date of his disablement, the compensa-
tion payable shall be a percentage of full compensation propor-
tionate to the reduction in his earning capacity.67 
Thus, when the employee is unable to earn fulJ wages at the work 
in which he was last subjected to the hazards of the disease, he will be 
considered disabled. However, the compensation he receives will de-
pend directly upon the loss of earning capacity he has suffered. 
Under the Wisconsin statute, compensation for occupational dis-
eases is handled the same as for injuries by accident. "Injury" is de-
fined as mental or physical harm to an employee caused by accident or 
disease. 68 Therefore, the compensation provisions which are applicable 
in the case of disability resulting from an injury by accident would 
also apply to the case of an occupational disease. The Wisconsin ap-
proach, as discussed in the preceding section dealing with injury by 
accident, is that of basing disability payments upon the percentage of 
the actual incapacity as related to permanent total disability. The 
employee is not disqualified from compensation simply because it can 
be shown that at the time of filing the claim he is able to earn more 
money than he did at the time of the injury. 
In the occupational disease area, some states limit compensability to 
those occupational diseases as a result of which the individual is totally 
incapacitated, as distinguished from partial incapacity. A reason for 
so distinguishing between partial and total incapacity probably lies in 
the fear that, if partial incapacity were also made compensable, the 
employer would be subjected to many claims for compensation based 
upon minor difficulties. For example, the Idaho statute provides : 
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this chapter, 
"disablement" means the event of an employee's becoming 
actually and totally incapacitated, because of an occupational 
disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in 
which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease; and 
"disability" means the state of being so incapacitated. 69 
67 Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.222 (1950). 
68 Wis. Stat. Ann. h02.0I(Z) (1957). 
69 Idaho Code §72-1205 (1949). 
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Thus in Idaho the employee who is only partially disabled from an oc-
cupational disease would not be able to recover compensation for his 
disability. 
3· Summary 
Under both the InJUry by accident and the occupational disease 
statutory provisions, there is a requirement that for the injury or dis-
ease to be compensable, there must be a "disability." The general ap-
proach taken is that a showing of decreased earning capacity satisfies 
the requirement of a disability. Most of the states also employ sched-
ules which set out specific injuries and the amount of compensation 
which will be awarded for them. Under the schedule system, it is usu-
ally immaterial whether or not any decrease in the earning capacity 
can be shown. Thus if an item appears on the schedule, it may be com-
pensable whereas otherwise it is not. It should be noted, however, 
that most of the injuries caused by radiation do not fall within the 
present coverage of the schedules unless amputation may be involved. 
In the occupational disease area emphasis is placed upon whether or 
not the disease only partially disables the employee. Some states re-
quire that the employee be totally disabled from performing his last 
occupation for his disability to be compensable. The extent to which 
the atomic energy injuries will be prejudiced by statutory language 
requiring a disability will depend upon the extent that the atomic 
energy injuries result in disabilities not affecting earnings, or not wholly 
incapacitating the employee. As of this time, not enough is known of 
_the atomic energy injuries to be able to say positively just what their 
effect will be. From general considerations of the nature of these 
injuries, and from the extensive use of monitoring systems, it would 
seem that many cases of overexposure may be caught in the early stages 
and result in a job shift of one kind or another. Also some of the 
atomic energy injuries, such as sterility, will not result in any decreased 
earning capacity. Therefore, it seems that the disability requirement 
may exclude some of the atomic energy injuries from compensability. 
III. MEDICAL BENEFITS 
A. Hospitalization and Treatment Costs 
In addition to financial assistance to injured workers, workmen's 
compensation statutes in the United States provide for hospital and 
medical care in varying d~grees. Roughly one-half of the statutes 
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grant unlimited benefits as to both amount and period of time, while 
the remainder limit benefits to certain maximum amounts and periods 
of time. 
In some states full benefits are authorized directly by statute, 70 and 
in other states, although the statutes set maximum costs or periods of 
time, equivalent unlimited benefits may result because the workmen's 
compensation boards are given authority to extend medical aid up to 
such amounts and for such times as they may consider necessary.71 
In many of the statutes prescribing medical care that is limited in 
terms of time or costs, or both, the maximum rates are such that it 
seems obvious that this legislation was conceived and enacted without 
consideration being given to the unique needs of private atomic in-
dustry.72 Although many of these statutes were enacted years ago when 
the legislatures could not have taken into account the problems likely 
to arise from the utilization_ of the atom, several states have only_ re-
cently increased their rates to levels that are still very modest notwith-
standing the fact that the legislatures presumably were aware of the 
forthcoming advent of private atomic industry. 
When we consider the imperfect state of present day knowledge 
concerning biological effects of radioactivity, and the further fact that 
such knowledge as we now possess indicates that radiation injuries 
and diseases frequently develop gradually and, even after resulting in 
disability, may extend over long periods of time, it seems unquestion-
70 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho (for occupational 
diseases only for a reasonable length of time), Illinois (up to six months only in case 
of silicosis or asbestosis), Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North 
Dakota, Puerto Rico, Washington, Wisconsin, United States Longshoremen's Act, 
and United States Civil Employees Act. 
7i Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. 
72 Alabama (maximum period 90 days; maximum amount $woo), Alaska (maxi-
mum period 4 years), Colorado (maximum period 6 months; maximum amount 
$woo), Georgia (maximum period 10 weeks extendable once; maximum amount 
$1125 ;-board may permit additional $375), Iowa (maximum amount $1500; commis-
sion may permit additional services up to $1000), Kansas (maximum period 120 days; 
in case of occupational disease commission may authorize additional 90 days; maxi-
mum amount $2500), Kentucky (maximum amount $2500), Louisiana (maximum 
amount $2500), Montana (maximum period 18 months; maximum amount $2500 which 
may be increased by $1000), Nevada (maximum period 6 months, may be extended addi-
tional year; maximum amount in case of silicosis $1250), South Dakota (maximum 
period 20 weeks ; maximum amount $1000) ; Tennessee (maximum period 1 year; 
maximum amount $1500), Texas (maximum period 18o days), Vermont (maximum 
amount $2500), Virginia (maximum period 1 year), West Virginia (maximum amount 
$I6oo; additional $8oo may be authorized). 
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able that they may result in extraordinarily high medical and hos-
pitalization costs to be borne by afflicted employees. The inadequacy of 
the arbitrary limits on medical benefits set by many statutes seems ob-
vious when applied to accidents and diseases caused by overexposure 
or by the cumulative effects of normal exposure to radioactivity. 
There is another consideration indicating that full coverage for 
medical benefits would be advisable in connection with radiation in-
juries. If experts in atomic medicine can be obtained to assist state 
boards in radiation compensation cases, and if unlimited medical aid 
is extended, publicly supervised treatment of such injuries and dis-
eases will in the course of time make available to the states a backlog 
of experience which can be used to advantage in regulating atomic in-
dustry with respect to health and safety problems. This may well 
result in i:'J.creased efficiency in the prevention and cure of the major 
effects of overexposure to radioactivity and in .consequent savings to 
private atomic industry and to society generally. 
B. Rehabilitation Provisions 
Statutory provisions for the rehabilitation of disabled workmen are 
relative newcomers to American workmen's compensation statutes. 
Already more than twenty states as well as the federal compensation 
acts provide varying degrees of assistance to injured employees for 
training purposes aimed at returning them to useful lives in the same 
or other employments which they can fill despite their disabilities. Arti-
ficial limbs and other appliances are included within the medical bene-
fits available under practically all compensation statutes. 
Many argue that this feature of workmen's compensation acts re-
sults in eventual savings to employers and insurance carriers who can 
thereby avoid the expense of supporting permanently and totally dis-
abled workers. In addition, under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, as 
amended in 1943,73 a cost-free state-federal program of vocational 
rehabilitation is open to patients unable to pay. 
The states are becoming increasingly aware of the advantages of re-
habilitation provisions and many already provide allowances for 
maintenance and travel while in training. One of the greater obstacles 
to the full development of this legislative device to offer more meaning-
ful compensation to men handicapped by industrial injuries is the 
continued presence on the statute books of provisions limiting medical 
78 57 Stat. 374. 
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benefits to certain plainly inadequate maximum amounts and periods 
of time. 
Viewing the workability of present legislation on rehabilitation as 
it concerns private atomic industry, it seems indisputable that the more 
complete programs currently available will be highly useful. It is en-
tirely possible that the sum total of irradiation of certain workmen in 
atomic industry may, as the result of repeated accidents or accumula-
tion of low level exposure, render them unfit to pursue further work 
in exposed areas, for additional exposure might tip the scales so as to 
precipitate serious disabilities. And yet these men may still be physically 
and mentally healthy enough to fill positions not involving exposure 
to radioactivity. When we consider that technicians and even rank and 
file personnel in atomic industry must at present and in the foreseeable 
future be possessed of skills which are acquired only through long 
periods of training and application, it is readily understood that the 
sudden destruction of their professional capabilities stemming from 
the necessity of relinquishing their old pursuits may entail severe dis-
placements in their economic life. Adequate provisions for the re-
habilitation of such highly qualified personnel may well be deemed a 
method of effectuating more fully the underlying policies of work-
men's compensation legislation. 
IV. LIMITATIONS PERIODS ON NOTICE OF INJURY AND 
FILING OF CLAIMS 
A. General Principles in Relation to Radiation Injuries 
Among the restrictions, which may add difficulty to the compensa-
bility of injuries or diseases caused by the unique qualities of atomic 
energy, are the requirements of giving notice to the employer and filing 
of a claim for compensation within a specific time limit. Generally, de-
pending on statutory variations, the injured or diseased employee must 
give his employer notice of such injury or disease within a specified 
short period of time, or as soon as practicable. Also, the injured em-
ployee must file his claim for compensation within a definite fixed 
period ranging between three or six months and two years. 
The objective of requiring notice to the employer is to enable him to 
protect himself both by seeing that the injured employee gets adequate 
medical treatment, so as to minimize damages, and by determining the 
cause of the injury. This latter point serves the dual purpose of pro-
viding the employer a better opportunity to defend himself and of giv-
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ing him knowledge of any dangerous condition within the plant which 
might be corrected before other employees are injured. For example, an 
unduly delayed notice of an alleged occupational disease might prevent 
the employer from making a reliable investigation. This would preju-
dice the employer, for he would be unable to gather the facts with 
which to defend the claim. 
Time limitations upon giving notice and filing claims may prove 
especially troublesome because of the peculiar nature of atomic injuries. 
In .an article dealing with the latent biological effects of radiation, 
Dr. G. Failla of Columbia University wrote: 
Radiologists in the early days, when the question of protec-
tion was not under study, got their hands particularly exposed 
to large doses of radiation. They did not see much change 
at first, but gradually skin changes started to appear. Warts 
began to develop, and sometimes open sores started to develop. 
It did not incapacitate them, but perhaps ten or fifteen years 
later cancer developed in those regions which had shown a 
considerable change in the appearance of the skin. Thus, you 
see the latent period can be even twenty-five years. As a 
matter of fact, there is a case on record in which cancer de-
veloped forty years after treatment. This patient was treated 
in the early days for an abdominal tumor. It probably was not 
a tumor because she lived forty years after the treatment. 
In those days X-rays were not very penetrating and the treat-
ment could not possibly have cured the tumor. 
It is the latent period which makes the problem of protec-
tion extremely complicated, because the worst effects may not 
appear until twenty-five or thirty years later. To predict the 
dose today that would produce effects, or rather would not 
produce effects, twenty-five years later is quite a problem. It 
would be hopeless if we did not have the experience of many 
radiologists who have been overexposed to radiation. We 
have been able to watch them for long periods of time and see 
what has happened to them, and thus we may arrive at our 
permissible limits. 
Cataracts are another result of overexposure. They do 
occur from exposure to X-rays, and it also seems that neutrons 
produce cataracts more readily than X -rays. As you probably 
read in the papers, individuals who have worked with cyclo-
trons and had considerable local exposure to neutrons have 
developed cataracts of various degrees. Some are rather badly 
affected and some rather slightly. It takes, roughly, three 
years following the exposure for cataracts to appear. The 
latent period can be shortened if the dose is very large, but 
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the height of the reaction really occurs at about the same 
time.14 
In the atomic energy field, for such latent radiation injuries as cancer, 
leukemia, leukopenia, anemia, cataracts, genetic damage, or sterility, 
compensability may be barred, depending upon the nature of the ap-
plicable statute of limitations. Consideration must therefore be given 
the various types of limitations expressed in the statutes regarding 
notice and filing of claim. 
B. Notice and Claims for Accidental Injuries 
The problem arising under statutes granting compensation for ac-
cidental injuries is two-fold. Some states commence the running of 
the period from the time of the "accident" which caused the disabling 
condition. Other states date the claim period from the time of the 
"injury." 
Under the former type of.statute, notice must be given to the em-
ployer within so many days after the "accident," namely the harmful 
exposure in the case of radiation injuries, and the claim must be filed . 
with the commission within a number of months or two years at the 
most after the same date. Under the "injury" type of statute the courts 
are almost unanimous in holding that notice and claim periods begin 
to run from the time a compensable injury becomes apparent. 75 
An example of the "accident" type of statute is the Kentucky one 
which reads : 
No proceeding under this chapter for compensation for an 
injury or death shall be maintained unless a notice of the acci-
dent shall have been given to the employer as soon as prac-
ticable after the happening thereof and unless a claim for 
compensation with respect to such injury shall have been made 
within one year after the date of the accident, or, in case of 
1• Failla, "Biological Effects of Radiation," AEC, TID-388, March 12, 1951, pp. 
65-66. 
7D Compare the following: Under "injury" type statutes: Acme Body Works v. 
Industrial Commission, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931) (cataract developed 6 
years after accident compensable), English v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 86, 
237 P. 2d 815 (1951) (injury from inhalation of gas fumes 5 years after leaving 
employment; claimant entitled to a hearing). Under "accident" type legislation: 
Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A. 2d 120 (1946) 
(cataract developed 5 years after accident; claim barred),· Whitted v. Palmer-Bee 
Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E. 2d 109 (1948) (cataract developed 18 months after steel 
chip hit claimant's eye; claim barred), Central Locomotive & Car Works v. Ind. 
Comm., 2go Ill. 436, 125 N.E. 369 (1919) (blindness 3 years after accident; claim 
barred). 
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death, within one year after such death, whether or not a 
claim has been made by the employee himself for compensa-
tion.76 
833 
Any recovery for latent accidental injuries caused by nuclear radia-
tion may well be barred under such a statute. Or at most, in the 
absence of square precedents on the point, it may be an open question 
whether the later development of an injury due to exposure to radio-
activity can be compensated in cases in which a workman .was never 
aware of any harmful effect until he became disabled. This happens 
to be the present state of authority in Kentucky where it is clear that 
if a worker has suffered a minor compensable accident he is absolutely 
barred later from recovery for the worsening of his condition after the 
running of the period of limitations. Thus, in Fiorella v. Clark 17 the 
claimant k:lew immediately after a fall of about five feet from a grease 
rack that he had suffered minor compensable injl,tries and received pay-
ment from his employer in _compromise of his claim. More than one 
year later it became apparentthat the worker had suffered severe spinal 
injuries. The statute was held to bar this claim, the court saying: 
"The word 'accident' as used in our Statute does i10t mean the resulting 
injury, but means the occurrence itself, the happening of which causes 
the injury." 78 In the more recent case of Goode v. Fleischmann Distill-
ing Corp.,79 the court, in reaching a result similar to that of the Fiorella 
case, expressly left open the question whether, in the case of a latent 
injury of a kind which was never preceded by a harmful event noticed 
by the claimant, the statutory period would be tolled until it became 
reasonably apparent that a compensable injury had been sustained. 
The policy argument concerning the choice of the date of the acci-
dent as the time from which the period should begin to run, rather than 
the time when the employee should become aware or actually becomes 
aware of the fact that he has an industrial injury, probably lies in the 
fact that the risk of permitting questionable claims to be compensated 
would be much greater under the latter situation. In the case of latent 
injuries, intervening factors beyond the employer's knowledge might 
7& Ky. Rev. Stat. §,342.185 (1956). 
77 2g8 Ky. 817, 184 s.w. 2d 208 (1944). 
78 ld. at 824 See also Rutledge v. Sandlin, 181 Kan. 369, 310 P. 2d 950 (1957), 
where workman suffered a severe blow which several months later required surgical 
removal of a malignant tumor. In denying compensation, the court held that the statu-
tory period started running with the day of the blow rather than with the day of the 
discovery of the injury. . 
79 275 S.W. 2d 903 (Ky. 1955) · 
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subsequently cause the injury. Further, with the passage of time it be-
comes increasingly difficult for the employer to defend. 
In other "injury by accident" states, the period for giving notice 
and filing claim commences as of the time of the injury. Thus, where 
an injury is latent, compensability is not barred because the injury de-
velops some time later.80 The Mississippi statute, which starts the 
period from the date of the injury, reads as follows: 
No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless, within 
thirty days after the occurrence of the injury actual notice 
was received by the employer or by an officer, manager or 
designated representative of an employer .... Regardless of 
whether notice was received, if no payment of compensation 
(other than medical treatment or burial expense) is made, 
and no application for benefits is filed with the commission 
within two years from the date of the injury or death, the 
right to compensation therefor shall be barred. 81 
Since the emphasis here is not upon the date of the accident but upon 
the occurrence of the injury, latent atomic energy injuries should not 
be denied compensability. 
There is a further problem created where the employee does not 
realize the occupational connection of his injury within the statutory 
period following the manifestation of the injury. Does the period 
commence running as of the time the employee knows that his injury 
has an occupational connection, or when as a reasonable man he should 
have known of the occupational connection? For example, the statute 
of Missouri reads: 
No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be 
maintained unless a claim therefor be filed with the commis-
sion within one year after the injury or death, or in case pay-
ments have been made on account of the injury or death, 
within one year from the date of the last payment.82 
The court, in interpreting this statute, which then had a six months 
limitation, said: "It seems to be a well-settled rule in respect to latent 
injuries that the six months' limitation for filing claims for compensa-
tion commences to run from the time it becomes reasonably apparent, 
and discoverable, that the employee has sustained a compensable in-
8o This, of course, is subject to some other limitations within the statutes. For 
example, the claim must be filed within 5 years after leaving the employment. 
81 Miss. Code Ann. §6998-18 (1952). . 
82 Mo. Rev. Stat. §287430 (1949). 
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jury." 83 Under this interpretation of the "injury" type of statute, the 
period begins to run from the date the employee reasonably should 
know of his injury. This is important in the radiation injury field 
since the cause of some injuries may be difficult to determine. 
Some states have attempted by statute to meet the problem of latent 
injuries. In Louisiana compensation claims generally must be filed 
within one year after the "accident"; however, in the case of latent 
injuries that statute is extended to two years. The Louisiana statute 
reads: 
In case of personal injury ... all claims for payments shall 
be forever barred unless within one year after the accident or 
death the parties have agreed upon the payments to be made 
under this chapter or unless within one year after the accident 
proceedings have been begun as provided in Parts III and IV 
of this Chapter. Where such payments have been made in any 
case, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of 
one year from the time of making the last payment. Also, 
where the injury does not result at the time of, or develop 
immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take 
effect until the expiration of one year from the time theinjury 
develops, but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be 
forever barred unless the proceedings have been begun within 
two years from the date of the accident.8~ 
The Louisiana court, in applying the above statute, has held that a 
suit for a latent injury is maintainable only if it is commenced within 
one year from the time the injury manifests itself, and within two 
years of the date of the accident.85 The limitation to two years, of 
course, would be inadequate for some radiation injuries, but the statu-
tory approach might be employed for a further relaxation of the notice 
requirements in respect to latent radiation injuries. 
Massachusetts has a provision for ameliorating the harsh effects of 
the running of the period for the giving of notice and the filing of claim. 
The law reads in part: 
Failure to make a claim within the time fixed by Section 41 
shall not bar proceedings under this chapter, if it is found that 
it was occasioned by the mistake or other reasonable cause, or 
if it is found that the insurer was not prejudiced by the 
delay .... 88 
83 Oeveland v. Laclede Christy Clay Products Company, (Mo. App.) 129 S.W. 2d 
12, 16 (1939). 
u La. Rev. Stat. tit. 23, §1209 (1950). 
85 Hannafin v. Pelican Cracker Factory, Inc., (La. App.) 185 So. 479 (1939). 
ss Mass. Laws Ann. c. 152, §49 (1957). 
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The effect of this provision is to allow an even more liberal period of 
time in which to file a claim, if the statutory excuses can be shown. 
The statutory excuses give the court a wide area of discretion and, in 
one case, were the basis for holding that seven years' delay in filing a 
claim was not prejudicial as a matter of law.87 It has also been held 
that delay in filing a claim until the employee learned from his doctor 
that his injury was probably caused by his work was for reasonable 
cause~ 88 On the other hand, the court has held that where delay is due 
to mistake, the claim must be filed within a reasonable time after the 
mistake is discovered. The court said that since the statute is silent, a 
reasonable time will be assumed, and all circumstances should be con-
sidered.89 
New · York has recently amended its statute creating a two year 
statutory limitation period to exclude expressly certain types of atomic 
energy industry injuries from the scope of the limitation. The New 
York statute reads as follows: 
The right to claim compensation under this chapter shall be 
barred, except as hereinafter provided, unless within two years 
after the accident . . . a claim of compensation shall be filed 
.... The right of an employee to claim co~pensation under 
this chapter for disablement caused by . . . blood or lung 
changes or malignancies due to occupational exposure to or 
contact with . . . beryllium, zirconium, cadmium, chrome, 
lead or fluorine or to exposure to x-rays, radium, ionizing 
radiation or radioactive substances, shall not be barred by the 
failure of the employee to file a claim within such period of 
two years, provided such claim shall be filed after such period 
of two years and within ninety days after disablement and · 
after knowledge that the disease is or was due to the nature 
of the employment. . . . 90 
This New York legislation obviously anticipates the problem of po-
tential injuries and warrants consideration: by other states. However, 
it is unfortunate that the exception is phrased in terms only of "blood 
or lung changes or malignancies" since these may be restrictively in-
terpreted so that the exception may not apply to some atomic energy 
injuries such as sterility, damage to bone marrow,. or cataract. 
87 The court would not overrule the finding of the commission that the employer was 
not prejudiced by the long delay in Morris Gaffer's Case, 279 Mass. 566, 181 N.E. 763 
(1932). 
BBWheaton's Case, 310 Mass. 504, 38 N.E. 2d 617 (1942). 
89 In re Carroll, 225 Mass. 203, 114 N.E. 285 ( 1916). 
90 N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law §28, as amended by N.Y. Laws 1957, c. 411. 
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C. Notice and Claims for Occupational Diseases 
Since occupational diseases are the result of chronic exposure to 
hazards over a long period of time, one-anticipates more variety in the 
selection of the particular event which will start the running of the 
period. It is possible to choose ( 1) the time of the last exposure to 
the hazardous conditions, ( 2) the time of termination of the employer-
employee relationship, (3) the time of the actual disability, or (4) any 
set period of years following exposure to the conditions which created 
the disease. 
In Arkansas, which treats occupational diseases as injuries by acci-
dent, the notice and filing of claim requirements are : 
A claim for compensation for disability on account of injury 
which is either an occupational disease or occupational infec-
tion shall be barred unless filed with the C()mmission within 
two years from the date of the last injurious exposure to the 
hazards of the disease. . . . 91 
This statute commences the running of the period as of the time of 
the last injurious exposure., Thus, it would cover those injuries which 
manifested themselves while the employee was still exposed to the 
hazard, or within two years thereafter. If the employee continued to 
work on the job and continued to be subject to the hazard, his latent 
injury would be compensable. The statute does not cover the situation 
where the employee was transferred to another department, or where 
the operation creating the hazard was changed, if the incubation period 
is longer ihan two years. Since radiation and ingestion of radioactive 
materials can have a much longer latent period of development, the 
relation of the statutory period to the last exposure is inadequate.92 
Under Utah law 93 a limitation is imposed upon "partial" disability 
cases; the partial disability must result within two years following the 
last day of exposure to the occupational disease to be compensable. If 
the manifestation of the disease or injury simply resulted in a partial 
disability two years after the last exposure to radiation or radioactive 
materials, it would not be compensable. 
A slightly different approach is taken by the Arizona statute which 
91 Ark. Stat. §8I-IJI8(a)(2) (1957). 
92 Some other states also have statutory language which sets the period of the 
statute running, in relation to the time of the last exposure, but which cuts the period 
off at different times, such as I year or 3 yeacs. 
98 Utah Code Ann. §35-2-s6(c) (1953). 
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speaks m terms of "disablement" rather than "last exposure," and 
reads: 
The right to compensation under this act for disability or 
death from an occupational disease shall be forever barred un-
less written claim is filed with the commission. . . . ( 2) If 
the claim is made by an employee and based upon a disease 
other than silicosis or asbestosis it shall be filed within sixty 
days after the employee first becomes disabled .... 9 • 
Under this statute, it would make no difference when the latent injury 
or disease occurred because the period of the statute does not com-
mence running until the employee is actually disabled. This could be 
at any time after the employee had ceased to be exposed to the hazards 
of radioactive materials. The language should cover all latent injuries, 
including toxic or radiation ingestion injuries and injuries caused by 
external exposure to radioactive materials. 
However, there is the pos~ibility that the employee, even after his 
disability occurs, may not discover its relationship to his employment 
until the sixty day period has elapsed. This is especially true in the case 
of latent. injuries caused by internal irradiation. In many cases the 
injury may not appear for years after the exposure to radiation or 
radioactive materials has ceased. Also, radiation-induced diseases such 
as cancer or leukemia are not peculiar to persons working with radio-
active materials. When the factor of time is coupled with the factor of 
ignorance, the occupational link between the disease and the employ-
ment may be difficult to discover even by competent physicians. 
Would the discovery of . occupational connection between the work 
and the injury after the sixty day period had elapsed bar the claim? 
This raises the question of whether "disablement" means not only the 
actual condition of the injury, but also awareness of its cause. The 
Pennsylvania court, under a similar statute which cuts off compensa-
tion unless notice is given the employer within ninety days after the 
beginning of disability, has held in Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works 95 
that where an employee did not realize the industrial connection of his 
disability within the time limit set by the statute, the date of disability 
was the date he learned the occupational nature of his disease. In the 
case, the physician did not inform the employee of the occupational 
nature of his disease until seven months after he had discontinued 
work, although he had been under constant medical ~are in the mean-
9•Ariz. Rev. Stat. §23-1224 (1956). 
95 157 Pa. Super. 227,42 A. 2d 28o (1945). 
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time. The court adopted a liberal rule of construction, stating that the 
legislature could not have intended that the employee do the impossible, 
i.e., file a claim when he was unaware that he had one. The court did 
su~gest, as a limitation on this doctrine, that a possibility that the em-
ployee should have known of the industrial connection of the disease 
would start the statute running. This construction gives the disabled 
employee a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the industrial connec-
tion of his disablement before he is barred by the running of the 
period. 
The Ohio court by way of dictum took the opposite approach in 
Raymotid v. Industrial Commission 96 applying the statute literally 
without considering whether knowledge was present or not, saying, 
"Just why these claimants indulged in these delays is a matter about 
which this court is not informed nor permitted to concern itself." Under 
a statute which required that a claim must be filed within six months 
following the injury, "injury" being interpreted to include occupational 
diseases, the California court said in Marsh v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission: 97 "Rather, according to our view should the date of the in-
jury be deemed the time when the accumulated effects culminate in a 
disability traceable to the latent disease as the primary cause, and by 
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and 
apparent that a compensable injury was sustained .... " 
In Connecticut the statut.e does not commence to run until the em-
ployee is aware of the industrial connection of his disability: 
No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this 
chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim 
for compensation shall be given within one year from the date 
of the accident or from the first manifestation of a symptom 
of the occupational disease .... For the purposes of this 
section, "manifestation of a symptom" shall be deemed to 
mean its manifestation to the employee claiming compensa-
tion, or to some other person standing in such relation to 
him that the knowledge of such a person would be imputed to 
him, in such manner as is or ought to be recognized by him as 
symptomatic of the occupational disease for which compensa-
tion is claimed.98 
The Connecticut court has interpreted this language by stating that: 
"The other implication arising out of the phrase in question is that there 
9 6 140 Ohio St. 233, 42 N.E. 2d 992 (1942). 
97 217 Cat. 338 at 351, 18 P. 2d 933 (1933). 
98 Conn. Gen. Stat. §7442 (1949). 
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must be a clear recognition of the symptom as being that of the occu-
pational disease in question; however plain is the presence of the symp-
tom itself, unless its· relation to the particular disease also clearly ap-
pears, there cannot be said to be a manifestation of a symptom of that 
disease." 99 
The Wisconsin statute is similar to the Connecticut statute and reads : 
No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless, within 
30 days after the occurrence of the injury or within 30 days 
after the employee knew or ought to have known the nature 
of his disability in its relation to his employment, actual notice 
. was received by the employer .... Regardless of whether 
notice was received, if no payment of compensation . . . is 
made, and no application is filed with the commission within 
2 years from the date of injury or death, or from the date the 
employee or his dependent knew or ought to have known the 
nature of the disability and its relation to the employment, 
the right to compensation therefor shall be barred, except 
. . . if the employer knew or should have known, within the 
2-year period, that the employee had sustained the injury on 
which the claim is based.100 
This. legislation has been interpreted fairly literally. In the case of 
a nurse who had acquired tuberculosis by working in a hospital, but_ 
who knew of its connection to her employment more than two years 
before filing her claim, the court _said in Reinhold v. Industrial Com-
mission: 101 "The statute does not require absolute knowledge of this 
relationship but simply that the applicant know facts indicating its' 
likelihood. What she probably did not know at that time was that she 
could get compensation. This is an error of law that we cannot re-
lieve against." In Trustees, Middle River Sanitarium v. Industrial 
Com mission 102 where a nurse did not know she had contracted tuber-
culosis the court said : "What an employee thinks must be based on 
something more than suspicion and conjecture in order to start the 
running of the statute of limitations .. Such thought must be based 
upon knowledge of, or upon reliable information regarding the nature 
of his disability and its relation to his employment~" 
Utah ~ommences the running of the period from the time of the 
accrual of a cause of action, the statute reading: 
99 Bremner et al. v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, Inc. et al., uS Conn. 666, 174 At!. 172 
( 1934). 
100 Wis. Stat. Ann. §102.12 (1957). 
1o1 253 Wis. 6o6, 34 N.W. 2d 814 (1948). 
102 224 Wis. 536, 542, 272 N.W. 483 (1937). 
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The right to compensation under this act for disability or 
death from an occupational disease shall be forever barred 
unless written claim is filed .... (b) If the claim is ... 
based on a disease other than silicosis it must be filed within 
6o days after the cause of action arises. . . .103 
841 
Since the statute permits the filing of the claim up to sixty days after 
a "cause of action arises," it could be quite unlimited in scope of cover-
age for latent occupational diseases, depending upon when a cause of 
action accrues in an occupational disease case. Such language could 
be interpreted to mean that the period commences running as of the 
time of ·the last exposure, as of the time of the disability, or as of the 
time the employee is not only disabled but knows of the industrial 
connection of his disablement. How the Utah court will interpret this 
language in atomic energy injury cases is not known, but the present 
attitude of the court is enlightening. In State Insurance Fund v. In-
dustrial Commission 104 a welder became disabled due to the inhalation 
of fumes over a period of twenty-two years, but was unaware of the 
industrial connection of his disability; the court held that the period 
of the statute had run against him. The welder had not filed the claim 
within the sixty day limit, although the full facts or reasons therefor 
did not appear. The court, in reaching its conclusion, said: · 
The cause of action arises in this kind of case when the em-
ployee suffers compensable disability under the act and could 
by reasonable diligence ascertain that his disability was em-
ployment caused and by its nature compensable .... But if 
on account of his own failure to press his case or have a com-
plete examination made under circumstances which would 
reasonably put him on notice that he was probably entitled to 
compensation, he failed to discover that this disability was 
compensable, then the fault is his own and he cannot re- . 
cover.108 
Thus Utah tends to take care of the situation where the individual, 
even though he is disabled, does not know of the industrial connection 
of his disease in much the same manner as those states which use the 
term "disability" and interpret it to mean the time when a disabled 
employee, as a reasonable man, should know of the industrial connec-
tion. 
Besides the limitations of the previously discussed language relating 
1os Utah Code §35-2-4B(b) (1953). 
104 II6 Utah 279. 209 P. 2d sss (1949). 
10~ I d. at 2B4-28s. 
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to the time when the period commences to run for the giving of notice 
or the filing of a claim, there are other broad. limitations, often in the 
same statutes. These limitations are designed to cut off liability at 
some final point, regardless of the fact that the statute may speak in 
terms of the date of injury or disability as the point from which the 
statute commences to run. · 
The statute of Connecticut contains such a limitation : 
No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this 
chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for 
compensation shall be given within one year from the date of 
the accident or from the date of the first manifestation of a 
symptom of the occupational disease . . . provided no claim 
on account of an occupational disease shall be made by an 
employee or his dependents against the employer in whose 
employ the disease is claimed to have originated, except while 
the employee is still in such employ, or within five years after 
his leaving such employ.106 
The additional limitation that the claim has to be filed during the em-
ployment or within five years after its termination has the effect of 
cutting off the period during which the claim may be filed, perhaps 
even before it has begun to run. If the claim must be filed within one 
year after the first manifestation of the disease and if the disease does 
not even materialize within five years after the employment terminates, 
then liability is cut off without regard to the period. 
A distinction would probably be advisable in atomic energy industry 
between employees still employed and employees who have left for 
more than five years. Most of the concerns dealing with atomic energy 
are. keeping records of the amount and. types of exposure to radiation 
to which an employee is subjected. This is being done through the use 
of film badges and various monitoring devices. Therefore, the em-
ployer may have some material available in the form of. records to use 
as evidence in disputing latent injury claims by disabled employees. 
This is a different situation from the case where the employer (e.g., in 
a stone cutting or grinding operation) does not have any records of 
the amount of dust to which any employee was exposed, and has, 
therefore, to conduct the initial investigation when the claim is made. 
In the atomic energy field, it would seem that since the employer should 
maintain records, there would be less reason to cut off liability because 
the passage of time operates.to the prejudice of the employer. 
too Conn. Gen. Stat. §7442 (1949). 
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The Michigan statute serves to illustrate a slight modification in 
those provisions which might affect atomic energy injuries. The 
Michigan statute reads : 
No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act 
shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury shall have 
been given to the employer within three months after the hap-
pening thereof, and unless the claim for compensation with 
respect to such injury, which claim may be either oral or in 
writing, shall have been made within six months after the 
occurrence of the same . . . Provided, however, That in all 
cases in which the employer has been given notice of the in-
jury, or has notice or knowledge of the same within three 
months after the happening thereof, but the actual injury, dis-
ability or incapacity does not develop or make itself apparent 
within six months after the happening of the injury, but does 
develop and make itself apparent at some date subsequent to 
six months after the happening of the same, claim for compen-
sation may be made within three months after the actual in-
jury, disability, or incapacity develops or makes itself apparent 
to the injured employee, but no such claim shall be valid or 
effectual for any purpose unless made within two years from 
the date the personal injury was sustained ... and Pro-
vided further, That in all cases in which the employer has been 
given notice of. the happening of . . . said accident within 
three months after the happening of the same, and fails, 
neglects, or refuses to report said injury to the compensation 
commission as required by the provisions of this act, the 
statute of limitations shall not run against the claim of the 
injured employee or his dependents, or in favor of either said 
employer or his insurer, until a report of said injury shall 
have been filed with the compensation commission.107 
Provision is made for an extended time in case of latent injuries, 
provided that the employer has be~n given notice of the injury within 
three months of the happening thereof. This statute also provides that 
the statute of limitations will not run in the event that the employer 
has notice or knowledge of the happening of the accident or notice of 
the happening of the injury and does not report this information to the 
industrial compensatiop commission. The notice requirements in re-
spect to occupational diseases are made applicable by another section 
which reads in part: 
The requirements as to notice as to occupational disease and 
death resulting therefrom and the requirements as to the 
bringing of proceedings for compensation for disability or 
101 Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.165 (1950). 
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death resulting from such occupational disease shall be the 
same as required in section 15 of part 2 of this act, except that 
the notice shall be given to the employer ·within one hundred 
and twenty days after the disablement.108 
Under the requirement of this section that notice of occupational dis-
ease be given to the employer within 120 days after disablement, the 
court has held that notice must be given within such time after the 
employee has knowledge or reasonable ground for knowledge of his 
disability. 109 The provision of the Michigan statute which does not 
allow the employer to plead the statute of limitations in regard to the 
giving of notice unless he has filed a report of the injury, is somewhat 
unusual. In a case involving benzol poisoning, where the employee 
subsequently interviewed an official of the defendant company, and 
the official had made the comment that he did not believe there was any 
of the "stuff in the finishing room," the court said: 
The reference to the "stuff in the finishing room" demon-
strates that the official had knowledge of the fact that the 
plaintiff attributed his condition to a substance in the room in 
which he had worked, and, therefore, the defendant employer 
cannot successfully claim in this case, . . . that, although 
informed of plaintiff's condition, the employer was not told 
that it arose out of and in the course of the employment. . . . 
In the instant case, the employer had knowledge of the 
plaintiff's contention within 73 days after the occurrence of 
the disablement. It filed no report with the department and, 
therefore, is estopped to plead the statute of limitations.110 
It should be noted that in accordance with an amendment made sub-
sequently the commission promulgated a rule stating when and what 
reports of injuries and accidents should be made. Thus, unless the 
conditions of such injury or accident are such that a report has to be 
made, the employer is not estopped. from using as a defense the statute 
of limitations.111 The pertinence of this particular provision to atomic 
energy injuries lies in the fact that it will give relief from the notice 
requirements of the statutes in those cases where the employer, with 
notice or knowledge of the disability, fails to file a report. This might 
be especially important in the cases of atomic energy injuries because 
even though the employer may know of the disability, there may be 
considerable confusion regarding the industrial connection of such 
disability. 
1os Mich. Stat. Ann. h7.229 (1950). 
109 Finch v. Ford Motor Co., 321 Mich. 469.32 N.W. 2d 712 (1!)48). 
110 Nicholas v. St. Johns Table Co., 302 Mich. 503, 516-17, 5 N.W. 2d 442 (1942). 
· 111 Amamotto v. ]. Kozloff Fish Co., 317 Mich. 641, 27 N.W. 2d uS (1947). 
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D. Summary 
From the available evidence, atomic energy injuries often may be 
of a latent nature. In workmen's compensation laws the "injury by 
accident" statutes generally start the period for notice and the filing of 
claims as of the date of the accident. However, some states start the 
period running from the date that the injury appears. Another course 
is that of making a statutory exception in the case of latent injuries. 
Also, whereas some states do not start the period running until the 
injury develops, others go one step further, and do not commence the 
period running until the employee would also know of the industrial 
connection of his injury. As for occupational diseases, some statutes 
start the period running as of the date of the last injurious exposure to 
the condition or hazard which caused the disease, while others com-
mence it as of the time the disability appears. At least one statute starts 
the period when a cause of action accrues. Many other limitations ap-
pear even where these requirements which concern the running of the 
period are met. Some states impose an over-all limitation, such as one 
year or five years, following the occurrence of the disability. Others 
cut off· the clairn within so many years .after termination of employ-
ment. Of possible significance in atomic industry is the use of a pro-
vision that the employer may not use the defense of the statute of limi-
tations if he does not file a report with the industrial commission. It 
may be concluded, therefore, that th~ amount of coverage afforded 
latent atomic energy injuries will depend in most cases upon the period 
of time allowed, after exposure to radiation, for filing the claim or 
giving notice. The application of notice and claim provisions to atomic 
energy injuries can be determined fully only by experience. It already 
seems evident that even on the basis of present knowledge of the nature 
of these injuries, and the causal relation between them and atomic radia-
tions, amendments. of the more restrictive statutes are desirable or 
essential. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since atomic energy is already a significant factor in industrial op-
erations and is destined to become even more important in our society, 
it seems clear that workmen's compensation laws should be amended 
to accommodate radiation injuries to the existing statutory patterns. 
There seems to be no reason at this time to conclude that an entirely 
separate compensation system is essential to deal adequately with the 
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peculiar features of atomic energy. Therefore, we conclude that each 
state should amend its laws to attain the following objectives: 
I. Complete coverage of all radiation injuries sustained as a result 
of an accident. 
2. Complete coverage of all radiation injuries which may be classi-
fied as occupational diseases. 
3· Sat-isfactory second injury fund provisions in order to assist per-
sons who have suffered prior radiation injuries to secure additional 
employment. 
4· Apportionment of liability among employers where the worker 
has been exposed in a number of employments and a cumulative radia-
tion injury results. (More accurate scientific and medical data are 
required before a satisfactory method of handling this objective can 
be resolved. ) 
5· Medical benefit payments in i sufficient amount and for a suf-
ficient period to provide essential medical care for persons suffering 
radiation injuries. · 
6. Limitations period for filing notice of injury and claims suf-
ficiently flexible to permit recovery for latent injuries and to permit 
recovery when the injured person discovers the connection of his 
employment to his injury. 
It may be argued that these extensions of existing legislation will 
unduly burden atomic energy entrepreneurs. However, it must be re-
membered that employees may still face serious handicaps in proving 
that a particular injury was caused by radiation exposure. In fact, at 
some future date it may become necessary to change the burden of 
proof in respect to certain radiation injuries. Necessarily the work-
men's compensation boards will have to exercise considerable discre-
tion ·to assure that all real injuries are compensated and at the same 
time deny compensation in those cases having tenuous or even imagi-
nary bases. The boards have had considerable experience in drawing 
similar lines under existing legislation, and it appears that they will 
be able to administer efficiently statutory provisions designed to handle 
radiation injuries. Furthermore, as experience is gained and as more 
scientific information concerning radiation injuries is developed, it will 
be possible to revise the governing legislation accordingly. Mean-
while, both employers and employees in atomic energy industry will find 
it beneficial if the state legisiatures adopt statutes sufficiently broad to 
award compensation for those sustaining injuries during the infancy 
of the industry. 
PART III 




A prospective entrepreneur in the field of peaceful uses of atomic 
energy is immediately faced with the task of investigating and evaluat-
ing existing and potential types of governmental regulation. Among 
the crucial questions that must be answered are: (I) What types of 
governmental regulation will be encountered in financing, constructing, 
and operating atomic energy facilities? ( 2) What aspects of regula-
tion will be unduly burdensome? ( 3) Can regulation be minimized 
properly by selection of place of activity, or by selection of financial 
and corporate organization techniques, or by requesting changes in 
legislation and regulation? Similarly, those responsible for formula-
tion of public policies must examine such questions as : (I) Are exist-
ing powers and regulations adequate from the standpoint of protection 
of the public interest, health, and safety for application to atomic energy 
activities ? ( 2) Do existing regulations unduly restrict the develop-
ment of a new technology? ( 3) Should new legislative and adminis-
trative regulatory techniques be developed for the control of atomic 
energy activities ? 
The purpose of this study is to present a brief survey of the principal 
types of state and interstate regulations likely to have application in 
the development of an atomic energy industry both for the generation 
of electric power and for other industrial uses. ·Although it is too 
early to encounter any considerable number of statutes and regulations 
dealing with the peculiar problems arising out of the use of fissionable 
and radioactive materials, some explicit recognition of these issues has 
already found its way into the books. Moreover, many aspects of the 
development of atomic energy will be regulated extensively under 
statutes originally adopted for other purposes but general enough in 
nature to embrace atomic affairs. Since the earliest commercial utili-
zation of atomic energy seems likely to be the production of electrical 
* The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Marvin 0. Young, 
Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan, member of 
the Michigan Bar, A.B., Westminster College, ].D., Michigan, 1954; Ivor M. Rich-
ardson, Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan, 
Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, LL.B., New Zealand, LL.M., S.J.D., 
Michigan, 1955; and Charle~ D. Olmsted, Research Assistant, Phoenix Project, Uni-
versity of Michigan, member of the Michigan Bar, LL.B., Michigan, 1957. 
849 
850 STATE REGULATION 
energy, considerable emphasis will be placed upon state public utility 
regulations which may affect the financing, construction, and opera-
tion of nuclear power reactors. In addition, state health and safety 
regulations will be emphasized because of the hazardous aspects of the 
utilization of fissionable and radioactive materials. 
Federal, international, and certain types of state regulation will, 
however, be . omitted from this discussion. For example, state labor 
relations acts, various forms of social insurance laws, general corpora-
tion laws, and blue sky laws are not discussed, since they are applicable 
to. industry generally and have no unique application to the atomic 
energy field. Local zoning ordinances and building regulations are 
likewise excluded, for they are too localized and varied in character, 
·although, of course, they must be explored prior to embarking upon an 
enterprise located in any particular locality. Furthermore, in the in-
terests of brevity, the details of the specific legal problems arising out 
of the statutes and regulations will not be discussed, the purpose of 
this study being primarily to· provide a check list which atomic energy 
entrepreneurs and governmental policy-makers may use as a basis for 
further investigation of specific legal problems. Limited in this man-
ner, this study will serve to reveal the scope and character of the legal 
and policy problems raised by state regulatory enactments which must 
be considered in formulating plans for the development of a peacetime 
·atomic energy industry. 
In order to reduce the breadth of the examination of state regulations. 
affecting atomic energy developments, ten states. have been selected for 
the study: California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New 
Y ark, Ohio, Pennsylvania, . Texas, and Wisconsin. Furthermore, be-
cause of the wide variatio~s found from state to state in the distribu-
tion of regulatory powers among various state and. local agencies, it 
has been found preferable to analyze the effect of these powers accord-
ing to type of regulation rather than type of agency. 
Chapter II 
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 
The use of a nuclear reactor to generate electric power would un-
doubtedly subject the power plant to regulation as a public utility. All 
ten of the states under study have created regulatory commissions, 
commonly called public utility commissions or public service commis-
sions, to regulate specified businesses said to be "affected with a public 
interest" and known as public utilities. It should be noted at the outset, 
however, that because electric companies are excepted from the juris-
diction of the Texas commission, an atomic energy electric power plant 
in Texas would encounter no regulation by a state public utility com-
mission, although it would be subject to a rate.-making power which 
has been delegated to incorporated cities and towns.1 
The extent of the jurisdiction of the commissions in the nine states 
other than Texas is, of course, determined by statute, subject to con-
stitutional limitations. In considering the jurisdiction of the commis-
sions in these nine states, the first question encountered is whether 
an atomic energy power plant, engaged in generating electricity, falls 
within the statutory jurisdiction of the state commissions. In the event 
electricity is supplied directly to consumers, the power plant would 
unquestionably be subject to regulation by the respective public utility 
commissions. With the possible exception of Ohio, it also seems clear 
that an atomic power plant which sells electricity at wholesale to other 
electric companies would also be subject to the jurisdiction of the vari-
ous state utility commissions. For example, the New York statute gives 
the Public Service Commission jurisdiction over "the manufacture, 
conveying, transportation, sale or distribution of . . . electricity" and 
over "electric plants" and "persons or corporations owning, leasing or 
operating the same." 2 The term "electric plant" includes "all real es-
tate, fixtures and personal property operated, owned, used or to be 
used for or jn connection with or to facilitate the generation, trans-
mission, distribution, sale or furnishing of electricity. . . ." 3 It seems 
clear that the language embraces an atomic power generating plant. 
It would seem, moreover, that the definition is sufficiently broad to 
1 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1119. 
2 N.Y. Public Service Law §5(2). 
3 /d., §2(12). 
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include a separate corporation operating a nuclear reactor and engaged 
in the business of selling heat energy to a generating station for con-
version by the generating company into electric energy. In defining 
terms such as "public utility," "electric corporation," and "electric 
plant," the statutes of the other states are equally broad.4 
However, a different situation may prevail in Ohio. There, "public 
utility" is defined as: "An electric light company, when engaged in 
the business of supplying electricity for light, heat, or power purposes 
·to consumers within this state." 3 The Ohio Supreme Court has held 
that a plant supplying electric energy to other utility companies for 
distribution is not a public utility within the Ohio statute, and the 
statute has not been amended since this decision was rendered. 8 A cor-
responding provision defining a "gas company" 7 was amended in 1933 
to include a person or corporation engaged in the business of supplying 
artificial or natural gas to consumers or of supplying artificial gas to 
gas companies or natural gas companies.8 Thus, it is not unlikely that 
the ·Ohio legislature may amend the statute in order to include an 
electric company supplying electricity to other electric companies. 
Nonetheless, only Ohio among the states having commissions regulat-
ing electric companies would seem to permit a general industrial firm 
to avoid regulation by the device of selling power to existing utilities 
rather than directly to consumers. 
Assuming that the nuclear plant itself is denoted a public utility 
and thereby subjected to regulation, what are the restrictions imposed 
·upon one or a group of existing utilities in attempting to finance, con-
struct, and operate a nuclear reactor for producing electricity? More-
over, what restrictions are imposed on investment by a general in-
dustrial firm in an atomic power corporation? In considering these 
questions, four specific problems have particular significance : ( 1 ) 
regulation of the acquisition of aft atomic reactor by a corporation 
organized for the specific purpose, or by an existing corporation ; 
(2) restrictions affecting the purchase of voting common stock in an 
atomic power corpor:ation; (3) regulation of transactions between 
affiliated utility companies ; and ( 4) rate regulation. 
'Cal. Public Utilities Code §§216, 217, 218; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §10.3; Mich . 
. Stat. Ann. §22.141; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§386.020(12), (13), (25); N.J. Rev. Stat. 
(1937) §48: 2-13; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1102(17); Wis. Stat. (1957) §1g6.o1. 
G Emphasis added. Ohio Rev. Code §4905.03(4). 
8 The Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, no Ohio St. 246, 
143 N.E. 700 (1924). 
7 Ohio Rev. Code §4905.03(5). 
s See Orndoff v. Public Utilities Commission, 135 Ohio St. 438, 21 N .E.2d 334 ( 1939). 
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A. Regulation of the Ownership of an Atomic Reactor by a Cor-
poration Organized for the Specific Purpose, or by an Existing 
Corporation 
The development by private capital of atomic energy for power . 
production may take place under a variety of organizational forms. 
An existing utility company may acquire an atomic reactor, owning 
and operating it within its existing corporate structure. Or it may 
be found advisable, at least during the experimental and develop-
mental stage, to organize a separate corporation to construct and 
operate the reactor. Several statutes which may be applicable, depend-
ing on the organizational pattern adopted, and which present problems 
unique to the atomic energy business, must be consulted. 
I. Ownership of Nuclear Reactor by an Existing Corporation 
Whether an existing public utility corporation could legally own 
a nuclear reactor without altering its corporate powers depends, of 
course, on the charter of the corporation involved. However, notwith-
standing the uniqueness of the source of energy, it would seem that 
generation of electric current, whatever the means used, and research 
for improved methods of generation would be rather clearly incidental 
to the business of supplying consumers with electric power; hence, 
there is little likelihood that such a venture would be deemed ultra vires. 
Actually, considerations other than corporate power to purchase a 
nuclear reactor probably will be controlling in determining whether the 
reactor should be owned by an existing public utility company or by 
one created for the special purpose. These considerations include 
financing, possible effect on rate determination, and damage liability 
problems. 
2. Certificates of Convenience and Necessity 
Obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity is fre-
quently a prerequisite to the initiation of a new type of activity on 
the part of a public utility. · Statutes of six of the ten states covered 
in this survey specifically require that such a certificate be obtained 
before an electric utility may construct a plant. Of these six statutes, 
that of California is typical: 
No . . . electrical corporation . . . shall begin the ·con-
struction of a .... plant, or system, or of any extension 
thereof, without having first obtained from the commission 
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a certificate that the present or future public convenience and 
necessity require or will require such construction. 9 
Moreover, a certified copy of the corporation's charter must be filed 
with the state commission, and any required municipal or county fran-
chise must be obtained.10 The statutes of Illinois, Michigan, Mi3souri, 
and New Y ark are substantially the same.11 The Wisconsin statute 
is somewhat more elaborate and detailed than those of the above five 
states. It permits the public service commission to require the utility 
periodically to submit plans of proposed construction. Furthermore, 
the commission is empowered to refuse a certificate if it appears that 
the completion of the project 
. . . (a) will substantially impair the efficiency of the serv-
ice of such public utility; (b) provides. facilities unreasonably 
in excess of the probable future requirements, or (c) will, 
when placed in operation, add to the cost of service without 
proportionately increasing the value or available quantity 
thereof unless the public utility shall waive consideration by 
the commission, in the fixation of rates, of such consequent 
increase of cost of service.12 
Until nuclear reactors are proved to be commercially competitive, this 
statute will undoubtedly have a substantial effect because of the prob-
able high cost of constructing the early nuclear reactors. Moreover, 
prospects of developing within a few years technological processes for 
commercial utilization of the fusion process and improved methods of 
using the fission process may lead public utility commissions to exer-
cise cautiously their power to issue certificates of convenience and 
necessity because of a possible high obsolescence factor in first com-
mercial reactor designs. It is likely that a similar result will also be 
reached in states that have adopted the California type of statute. As 
will be noted later, the problem of rate determination is one that is 
likely to assume considerable importance in the development of atomic 
energy for power purposes. 
The statutes of Pennsylvania, while not specifically requiring per-
mission to build a plant, require, subject to minor exceptions not 
relevant here, that a utility must obtain a certificate before acquiring 
any kind of property from any person.18 This seemingly would em-
9 Cal. Public Utilities Code §woi. 
10 !d., §ux)4. 
nnt. Stat. Ann. c. 111 2/3, §56; Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.142; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) 
§393.170; N.Y. Public Service Law §68. 
12 Wis. Stat. (1957) §196.49(4). 
1s Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1122. 
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brace plant construction.14 In addition, in Pennsylvania and also in 
Missouri, the commissions are specifically given authority, in granting 
certificates of convenience and necessity, to impose such conditions as 
they deem reasonable and just.15 These statutes obviously place great 
power in the hands of these commissions. 
New Jersey and Ohio do not require that a certificate of convenience 
and necessity be obtained by a utility before it may construct a major 
property addition.16 As previously noted, Texas has no state commis-
sion with jurisdiction over electric companies. 
It may be mandatory in some states to incorporate an atomic 
power plant in the state in which it is to be operated in order to obtain 
a certificate of convenience and necessity. An Ohio statute provides : 
No franchise, permit, license, or right to own, operate, 
manage, or control any public utility which is an electric light 
company ... shall be granted or transferred to any cor-
poration not incorporated under the law of this state.11 
Substantially identical provisions are found in the laws of California, 
Illinois, and Wisconsin.18 
3· Financing a Corporation to Construct a Nuclear Reactor 
State statutes frequently regulate various aspects of public utility 
financing .. The statutes of nine of the ten states under study require 
that all proposed electric utility security issues be approved by the state 
public utility commissions, subject to a few minor exceptions to be 
noted later. Again, Texas is. the exception.19 These statutes are al-
most certain to affect substantially the financing of early nuclear elec-
tric power plants, especially· for the reason that such developments 
frequently take the form of cooperative action by several utilities or 
possibly a combination of utilities and industrial corporations. Indeed, 
it may appear that desired financing programs are precluded by the 
applicable state regulatory statutes. 
14 The state officials so reported to the Federal Power Commission; see FPC, State 
Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 24 (1948). 
15 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.170; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §§1121, 1123. 
16 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
24 (1948). 
11 Ohio Rev. Code §4905.62. 
18 Cal. Public Utilities Code §704; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. I II 2/3, §28; Wis. Stat. ( 1957) 
§1¢.53. 
19 FPC, State Commission.Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
26 (1948). 
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New York and Wisconsin were the first states to create the modern 
type of public utility commission with broad powers. Many states have 
patterned their laws, to some extent, upon these pioneer statutes. 20 
For this reason the New York utility financing statute will be ex-
amined in some detail. 
The New York statute provides that an electric utility corporation 
may issue stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness if 
it has obtained from the public utility commission an order authoriz-
ing such issue, stating the purposes to which proceeds thereof are to 
be applied, and declaring that, in the opinion of the commission, the 
money, property, or labor to be procured or paid for by the issue of 
such stock, bonds, etc., is reasonably required. The purposes for which 
such securities may be issued are enumerated : ( 1) acquisition of prop-
erty, ( 2) construction, completion, extension, or improvement of plant 
or distributing system, (3) improvement or maintenance of service, (4) 
refunding, (S) reimbursement of moneys "actually expended from 
income or from other moneys in the treasury of the corporation not 
secured or obtained from the issue of stocks, bonds, notes or other 
evidences of indebtedness .... " 21 
As a matter of procedure, in New York, a public utility must obtain 
a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing construction of 
a new plant before the public service commission can authorize the 
issuance of securities to finance it.22 A rather important judicial 
decision holds that consent may be given for issuance of securities 
only- for purposes designated in the statute. 28 
The statutes of California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio 
contain provisions very similar to those of New York.26 In each of 
these statutes, construction of new facilities is stated to be a purpose 
for which securities may be issued. 
The New Jersey statute is less specific and provides merely that the 
commission shall approve the proposed issue when the commission is 
satisfied that the issue is in accordance with law, and the commission ap-
proves it as within authorized purposes. The executive officer of the 
Board of Public Utility Commissioners in New Jersey has indicated 
2o Trachsel, Public Utility Regulation III-112 (1947). 
21 N.Y. Public Service Law §69. 
22 People ex rel. N.Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N.Y. 86, 100 N.E. 705 (1912). 
2s P.S.C. v. N.Y. & Richmond Gas Co., 244 App. Div. 398, 279 N.Y. Supp. 824 
(1935). 
2• Cal. Public Utilities Code §§816-819; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. I II 2/3, §21; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §22.101; Mo. Rev. Stat. ( 1949) §393.200; Ohio Rev. Code §4905.40. 
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that, when confronted with a proposed security issue to finance an 
atomic energy facility, the New Jersey commission would consider 
the question as to whether or not such a plant could be expected to 
produce electric energy at or below the unit costs of a conventional 
plant. 25 In Pennsylvania and Wisconsin the commissions are em-
powered to take into account the present and probable future capital 
needs of the public utility and "other relevant considerations" when 
an application for approval of a security issue is presented.26 Pre-
sumably, all of these states would consider the possibility of initial 
reactors becoming obsolete at an early date because of improved tech-· 
nology or because of the development of processes for commercial 
exploitation of the fusion process. 
The commissions of six states, California, Michigan, Missouri, New 
Jersey, New York; and Ohio are authorized to require competitive 
bidding on security issues, although none of them actually requires 
it in all cases. 27 · · · 
In view of these statutes requiring a· commission permit to raise 
funds by the issuance of securities, cooperative action may be pre-
cluded unless the corporate contribution can be drawn from surplus. 
a. Exemption .of Short-Term Loans 
Conceivably the request for a financing permit could be avoided 
by resort to short-term loans. The New York statute permits an elec-
tric corporation to issue notes "for proper corporate purposes," pay-
able at periods of not more than twelve months, without approval of 
the commission. 28 Without further limitations, there is nothing to 
prohibit a utility from renewing these notes from year to year. How-
ever, the New York commission seeks to combat this practice when-
ever possible, as for example by requiring as a condition for approval 
of a bond issue that the company submit a plan for retirement of its 
outstanding short-term notes.29 There is some indication that the New 
2s Letter from H. J. Flagg, dated Aug. 25, 1953. He a!so felt that the New Jersey 
commission would not be faced with the problem for many years because of an adequate 
supply of oil, coal, and natural gas providing for cheap thermo-electric generation in 
New Jersey. . 
2s Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1243; Wis. Stat. (1957) §184.03. 
21 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
7 (1948). 
28 N.Y. Public Service Law §69. 
20 Re The Patchogue Electric Light Co., 73 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129 (1948). In this case, 
unsecured notes were involved. However, the statutory language appears to cover both 
secured and unsecured notes. 
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York courts might hold such a condition unlawful as in excess of 
the commission's powers, although no such d_ecision has actually been 
rendered.80 ' The Missouri statute is nearly identical with that of New 
York.81 
In California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania; notes maturing in less 
than one year are exempted, but limitations on renewal are included in 
the California and Illinois statutes.82 Michigan permits financing by 
notes maturing within twenty-four months without the consent of the 
Public Service Commission, but a refunding limitation is imposed.33 
In Wisconsin, obligations maturing in less than one year are exempt, 
since such obligations are not included in the statutory definition of 
"security," requir-ing approvat.B4 In New Jersey and Ohio the statutes 
are silent as to short-term obligations, but approval is required for 
those payable at periods of twelve months or more, hence short-term 
notes are exempted by implication. 85 
Accordingly, the short-ten~ note possibility of financing cooperative 
atomic power development is attended by numerous difficulties and is 
by no means an assured method of avoiding regulation of security 
issues. 
b. New York Public Service Commission-Basic Principles 
Certain other aspects of financing warrant mention at this juncture. 
All that can be done at present is to suggest certain problems that 
may have to be faced and the attitudes that seem to prevail among 
public utility commissions. 
The New York Public Service Commission indicates that approval 
of public utility securities should be guided by seven basic principles : 
( I) the issue must be for proper corporate purposes; ( 2) it must 
be adequately supported by assets; ( 3) there must be a proper ratio 
between funded debt and capital stock ; ( 4) the utility must show that 
earnings will be sufficient to meet interest or dividends on securities 
80 See 22 Fordham L. Rev. 77, 81 (1935). In Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Maltbie, 298 N.Y. 867, 84 N.E.2d 635 (1949), it was held that the commission had no 
power to require, as a condition to approving a security issue, that a certain type 
depreciation accounting be followed. 
st Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.200. 
82 Cal. Public Utilities Code §823; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §21; Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 66, §1241. 
ss Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.101. 
S4 Wis. Stat. (1957) §184.01(3). 
85 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 3-9; Ohio Rev. Code §4905.40. 
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authorized ; ( 5) the utility must make an effort to obtain the best 
terms possible ; ( 6) financing costs must be reasonable; ( 7) com-
petitive bidding and public sale may be required in some cases.36 Al-
though similar policy enunciations have not been issued by other public 
utility commissions, it may be expected that they will follow some, if 
not all, of these principles. 
Of these enumerated principles, two warrant special attention. The 
ratio between funded debt and capital stock may cause difficulty. The 
New York commission attempts to limit the proportion of bonds and 
fixed interest obligations to a maximum of 6o% of the total capital 
structure.37 This limitation is significant because of the preference of 
utilities for use of a higher percentage of debt obligations in high-cost 
undertakings. 38 . 
Again, the requirement of a showing that earnings will be sufficient 
to meet interest and dividends on securities au~orized may prove to 
be a subst:.mtial ·problem in view of possible high operating costs of 
initial electric generating plants employing atomic fuel. This problem 
seems intimately related to the matter of rate determination, and a 
further discussion of it will therefore be deferred until the rate-making 
problem is analyzed. 
B. Restrictions Affecting the Purchase of Securities of an Atomic 
Power Corporation 
In the event that a separate corporation shou14 be formed to con-
struct and operate a nuclear reactor generating plant, it is necessary 
to determine what restrictions may be imposed upon the ownership of 
stock in such a corporation. In this connection, it is desirable to con-
sider the effect of state regulatory measures upon a form of organiza-
tion that involves stock ownership of the nuclear reactor public utility 
by existing electric utility companies and also by non-utility companies. 
Related to this general problem is the more specific question of whether 
either type of corporation has authority to acquire and own stock in 
a nuclear generating plant company. Limitations on methods of 
financing the purchase of such stock likewise demand attention. 
36 N.Y. Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 13 (1951). 
3 7 N.Y. Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 46 (1949). 
88 For example, the projects undertaken by electric utilities to supply AEC installa-
tions with electricity at Portsmouth, O.hio and at Paducah, Kentucky. Re Ohio Valley 
Electric Corp., 96 P.U.R. (N.S.) 143 (1952); Re Central lll. Public Service Co., 88 
P.U.R. (N.S.) 28 (1951). 
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I. Regulation of Acquisition by Utility Companies of Stock in 
Other Utility Companies 
Many states require that the acquisition of voting stock of certain 
types of corporations by other corporations be approved by a state 
commission. In the electric utility area this requirement is very com-
mon. In eight of the ten states surveyed in this study, there is a 
requirement that a public utility company must obtain the permission 
of the public utility commission before it may acquire stock in another 
public utility. Only the Michigan and Texas statutes fail to impose 
such a limitation upon electric utilities. The ramifications of the statutes 
vary considerably. In some instances, bonds as well as stock are in-
cluded. 80 In seven states, approval of the public utility commission is 
necessary when any amount, no matter how small, of the stock of one 
utility is acquired by another utility.~0 However, in Pennsylvania ap-
proval of the commission is required only when a public utility seeks 
"to acquire five per centum or more of the voting capital stock of any 
corporation." n 
It is difficult to determine the standards that will be applied in de-
termining whether in any particular instance the acquisition of stock 
by one public utility in another utility will be approved. Statutes are 
frequently rather general in nature, conferring broad discretionary 
powers upon the commissions and typically requiring that the com-
mission shall approve the acquisition if it is "consistent with the public 
interest." •2 Other statutes are completely silent regarding the stand-
ards to be applied by the respective commissions. ~s In such states no 
doubt the public interest criterion is also applied by implication. 
On the other hand, the statutes of several states appear to be some-
what inore restricted in scope. For example, the California statute 
apparently requires approval of the commission only when the stock to 
be acquired is that of a utility "organized or existing under or by 
virtue of the laws of this State." u In Illinois, New Jersey, and Wis-
8o Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §27(e); Mo. Rev. Stat. (I949) §393.I90(2); N.Y. Public 
Service Law §70. 
~o Cal. Public Utilities Code §852; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §27(e); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
(I949) §393.I90(2); N.J. Rev. Stat. (I937) §48: 3-10; N.Y. Public. Service Law §70; 
Ohio Rev. Code §4905.48(D); Wis. Stat. (I957) §I!)6.8o(I) (b). 
n Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §n22(f). . 
u Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §27; N.Y. Public Service Law §70; Wis. Stat. (1957) 
§1!)6.8o(3) • 
~a Cal. Public Utilities Code §852; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.190(2); N.J. Rev. 
Stat. (1937) §48:3-10; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §n22(f). 
H Cal. Public Utilities Code §852. 
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consin approval apparently is required only for the purchase of stock 
in utilities operating within the state!3 
Ohio has a somewhat unique statute concerning the necessity for 
commission approval of stock acquisitions by public utilities in other 
public utilities. The statute provides : 
With the consent and approval of the public utilities com-
mission: 
{A) Any two or more public utilities furnishing a like 
service or product and doing business in the same municipal 
corporation or locality within this state, or any two or more 
public utilities whose lines intersect or parallel each other 
within this state, may enter into contracts with each other 
that will enable them to operate their lines or plants in con-
nection with each other. 
* * * 
(D) Any such public utility may purchase the stock of 
any other such public utility.46 · 
These provisions apparently mean that acquisitions by one public utility 
of the stock of another utility need be approved only if both are 
operating in the same locality, or if their lines are parallel or intersect.47 
As a result of this type of regulation, existing utilities desirous of 
investing in an atomic power corporation will have to obtain commis-
sion approval by showing the necessary prerequisites. A commission 
policy opposing such investments will preclude public utilities from 
engaging in a jointly sponsored enterprise to develop atomic power. 
2. Regulation of Acquisition by Non-Utility Companies of 
Stock in Electric Utility Companies 
Only three of the ten states under study require commtsston ap-
proval in case of a non-utility company seeking to acquire the capital 
stock of an electric company. The New York statute provides: " ... 
[N]o stock corporation of any description, domestic or foreign, other 
than a gas corporation or electric corporation . . . shall purchase or 
acquire . . . more than ten per centum of the voting capital stock 
issued by any gas corporation or electric corporation organized or 
45 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §10.3; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 2-13; Wis. Stat. 
(1957) §Ig6.oi(I). 
•a Ohio Rev. Code §4905-48. 
47 33 Ohio Jurisprudence 521. Such a restrictive interpretation of the section has 
been made by the Ohio Public Utilities Commission in respect to Clause (A); see 
Re Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. No. 827 (1916) O.P.U.C.R. 419, P.U.R. 1916 
D 929; Re Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. No. 3112 (1924) O.P.U.C.R. 122. 
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existing under or by virtue of the laws of the state ... " unless ap-
proved by the Public Service Commission. 48 However, the commission 
may not act arbitrarily in refusing its approval. 49 A Missouri statute 
is patterned after the New York provision.~0 The third state, New 
Jersey, requires approval by the Board of Public Utility Commis-
sioners when, as a result of the sale of any portion of the capital stock 
of a public utility incorporated in New Jersey, there will be vested in 
any corporation, domestic or foreign, "a majority in interest of the 
outstanding capital stock of such public utility corporation." 51 
Where non-utility companies must obtain commission approval to 
purchase secu.rities of an atomic power corporation, a restrictive com-
mission policy may prevent a jointly owned project. In view of the 
substantial interest of chemical companies in nuclear reactor tech-
nology and resulting radioactive byproduct wastes and materials, these 
regulatory provisions may have a particularly unique effect on pos-
sible cooperation among utility and chemical companies in atomic 
eriergy affairs. · 
3· Financing the Purchase of Common Stock m an Atomic 
Energy Power Plant 
Financing the purchase of common stock in an atomic energy power 
plant by existing electric utility companies presents some addi-
tional problems apart from the above-mentioned requirements that 
security issues be approved by state public utility commissions, and that 
security acquisitions by public utilities likewise be approved. Again, 
the fact that several utilities may wish to join in a cooperative effort 
during the early stages of the development of atomic power gives par-
ticular pertinence to these provisions. If any existing utility should 
have insufficient surplus with which to finance such a purchase, and 
should it desire to. issue stocks, bonds, or debentures to cover such 
financing, approval by the state public utility commissions would be 
needed in all states under study except Texas. 
48 N.Y. Public Service Law §70. 
49See New York State Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 227 App. Div. 
18, 236 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1929), 26o N.Y. 32, 182 N.E. 237 (1932). The Appellate 
Division held that the Public Service Commission had acted arbitrarily in refusing to 
permit a New York electric utility to sell stock to a Delaware holding company. The 
Court of Appeals in ruling that the order of the Appellate Division was not appealable 
seemed to say, however, that the order of the Appellate Division did not limit or 
destroy the discretion of the Public Service Commission. 
~o Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §393.190(2). 
~~N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 3-10. 
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In an administrative proceeding to obtain authority to issue stocks 
or bonds to finance the purchase of stock in an atomic energy corpora-
tion, there may be uncertainty as to whether or not it is a corporate 
purpose for which the commission may approve a security issue. It 
will be recalled that the statutes of New York, California, Ohio, 
Michigan, Missouri, and Illinois enumerate the purposes for which a 
public utility may issue securities. These purposes include : (I) the 
acquisition of property; ( 2) the construction, completion, extension, 
or improvement of its plant or distributing system; and (3) the im-
provement or maintenance of its service. The New York courts have 
approved the action of the Public Service Commission interpreting 
this statute to preclude approval of ·security issues for purposes other 
than those enumerated. 52 
The Ohio commission, under a nearly identical statute, had prior 
to 1945 repeatedly held that securities of ano.ther company do not 
constitute property, within the act, and that an issue for the purpose 
of acquiring such securities cannot be approved.53 Probably because 
of these decisions, the Ohio statute was amended in 1945 to permit 
a public utility to issue shares of common stock (bonds are not men-
tioned) to acquire or pay for shares of common capital stock of an-
other public utility, when approved by the commission. But certain 
limitations are imposed, including a requirement that the applicant 
must acquire 65% or more of the issued and outstanding common 
stock of the company whose shares are to be acquired. Moreover, the 
public utility whose shares are to be acquired must be located in Ohio 
or in an adjoining state so as to permit the operation of the properties 
as an integrated system.54 In August 1953 the general counsel of the 
Ohio Edison Company was asked to comment on this statute. His 
reply indicated that with respect to his company, the statute has not 
been a problem, since they financed stock purchases in other utilities 
from "uncapitalized capitalizable expenditures"; in other words, from 
surplus. 55 However, in the absence of such reserve funds the Ohio 
statutes would become an obstacle. 
In states other than Ohio, the commissions might approve the is-
suance of stocks or bonds to finance the purchase of electric utility 
52 P.S.C. v. N.Y. & Richmond Gas Co., 244 App. Div. 398. 279 N.Y. Supp. 824 
(1935). 
53 See 33 Ohio Jurisprudence, Public Utilities, §169<:, and cases cited therein. 
54 Ohio Rev. Code §4905-40. On the amendment, see 33 Ohio Jurisprudence, Public 
Utilities, §169<:. . 
55 Letter from D. Bruce Mansfield, dated Aug. 31, 1953. 
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securities either on the theory that such securities constitute "prop-
erty" or that they are being purchased for the "improvement or main-
tenance of service." 56 As hitherto noted, the statutes of New Jersey, 
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania are less specific than New York in regard 
to the purposes for which securities of public utilities may be issued, 
and accordingly in those states less difficulty could be anticipated. 
Nevertheless, a prospective entrepreneur in the atomic reactor field will 
be obliged to inquire of the state commissions to ascertain their views 
concerning approval of a security issue to finance the purchase of com-
mon stock in an atomic energy power plant. A letter received from 
the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Commissioners_ indicates that 
because the cost of generating electricity by the use of nuclear fuels 
may prove to be higher than by conventional methods, the commission 
will be obliged to consider this· factor in determining whether or not 
to grant the necessary approval for a security issue. 57 
C. Regulation of Transactions Between Affiliated Companies 
Again, because some type of joint financing among public utilities 
and non-utility corporations may be desirable during initial phases of 
developing the atomic power industry, atomic energy entrepreneurs 
are necessarily interested in the regulations that are imposed in respect 
to the resulting intercorporate arrangements. In some instances this 
regulation may be considered so unacceptable to some firms, particularly 
non-utilities, that they may not consider it feasible to engage in a 
joint venture. 
It must be kept in mind that state commission regulation of utilities 
vades not only with the statutes of the various states, but also with 
the strictness or liberality with which the commissions and courts in-
terpret the laws granting regulatory power to administrative agencies. 
While certain commissions interpret their powers narrowly, others ex-
tend their regulatory authority to activities reached only by a broad 
construction of the pertinent statutes. 58 This difference in basic ap-
proach is manifested especially in the area of regulation of intercor-
porate relations between public utilities and affiliates. 
Transactions with affiliates can be regulated to some extent without 
56 There are no reported court decisions defining these terms in other jurisdictions. 
57 Letter from H. J. Flagg, Executive Officer, N.J. Department of Public Utilities, 
dated Aug. 25, 1953. 
&a See FPC, State Commiision Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas 
Utilities (r!)48). 
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specific statutory authority, for such regulation is really an implied 
part of the power to control rates in that the commission may con-
sider the propriety and reasonableness of expenditures of utilities 
subject to its jurisdiction.59 
However, expressly authorized state regulation of such relations be-
gan in 1930 when New York and Wisconsin specifically accorded 
their commissions jurisdiction over these matters. 60 Because of 
federal constitutional difficulties, the states have resorted to indirect 
regulation of transactions with affiliated holding companies : by assert-
ing judsdiction over contractual relations of all local utilities over 
which they have jurisdiction, the states thereby reach affiliated com-
panies regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign corpora-
tions. A 1932 United States Supreme Court decision upheld this type 
of state control.61 Today, only California, Michigan, and Texas, of 
the ten states herein examined, do not have specific statutory provisions 
for regulation of transactions with affiliates of public utilities. 62 The 
other seven state commissions all exercise some degree of regulation 
over contracts and transactions between affiliated companies. 
On the basic preliminary question of what constitutes "affiliated 
interests" the statutory definition is likely to be very comprehensive, 
as in New York. There such interests are defined to include : 
a. Every corporation and person owning or holding di-
rectly or indirectly five .per centum -or more of the voting 
capital stock of such utility corporation. 
b. Every corporation and person in any chain of successive 
ownership of five per centum or more of voting capital stock. 
c. Every corporation five per centum or more of whose 
voting capital stock is owned by any person or corporation 
owning five per centum or more of the voting capital stock of 
such utility corporation or by any person or corporation in 
any such chain of successive ownership of five per centum or 
more of voting capital stock. 
d. Every person who is an officer or director of such utility 
corporation or of any corporation in any chain of successive 
ownership of five per centum or more of voting capital stock. 
e. Every corporation· which has one or more officers or one 
or more directors in common with such utility corporation. 
f. Every corporation or person which the commission may 
~o Barnes, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation 634-635 (1942). 
60/d., 628. 
61 Western Distributing Co. v. P.S.C. of Kan., 285 U.S. 119, 52 S. Ct. 283 (1932). 
62 FPC, State Commission. Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
26-27 (1!)48). 
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determine as a matter of fact after investigation and hearing 
is actually exercising any substantial influence over the poli-
cies and actions of such utility corporation even though such 
influence is not based upon stockholding, stockholders, direc-
tors or officers to the extent specified in this section. 
g. Every person or corporation who or which the commis-
sion may determine as a matter of fact after investigation 
and hearing is actually exercising such substantial influence 
over the policies and actions of such utility corporation in 
conjunction with one or more other corporations and/or per-
sons with which or whom they are related by ownership 
and/or blood relationship or by action in concert that together 
they are affiliated with such utility corporation within the 
meaning of this section even though no one of them alone is 
so affiliated. 63 
The Illinois definition is substantially similar, except that the 
percentage of stock ownership is fixed at ten per cent, instead of five 
per cent as in New York.64 The Wisconsin definition is nearly iden-
tical with that of New York.65 All three state commissions are em-
powered to obtain the names of all shareholders who own one per cent 
or more of the voting capital stock of utilities under their jurisdic-
tion.66 The Pennsylvania definition of "affiliated interests" also em-
ploys the five per cent stock ownership criterion as well as the "substan-
tial influence" test. 67 New Jersey defines affiliated interests only in 
terms of five per cent stock ownership. 68 
As to the type of regulation imposed on affiliated interests, the 
statutes in these states generally require that contracts providing for 
management, construction, engineering, accounting, legal, financial, 
or similar services must be filed with and approved by the state public 
utility commissions, and that contracts found to be not in the public 
interest may be disapproved by the commission.69 The commissions 
are also given the power to examine all necessary accounts and records 
relating to transactions between affiliated interests.70 These controls 
68 N.Y. Public Service Law §no(2). 
64 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §8a. 
65 Wis. Stat. (I957) §I¢.52(I). 
66 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §8a(I); N.Y. Public Service Law §no( I). Wis. Stat. 
( I957) §I¢.02(4). 
67 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §uoo(I). 
68 N.J. Rev. Stat. (I937) §48: 3-7.I. 
69 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §8a(3); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 3-7.I; N.Y. Public 
Service Law §uo(3); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §I27I; Wis. Stat. (I957) §I96.52(3). 
10 S~e Legis, "The Servicing Function of Public Utility Holding Companies," 49 
Harv. L. Rev. 957, g82 ( I936) for general discussion of this type regulation. See also 
Barnes, supra note 59 at 63o-655. 
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are, of course, familiar to public utilities, but for many non-utility 
industries, such controls are often considered so restrictive on man-
agement policies that management scrupulously avoids subjection to 
the regulation. If financing an atomic power development in any area 
is rendered more difficult by these provisions, a re-examination of the 
desirability of the regulation may be warranted in order to encourage 
development of the new technology. 
The statutes of Missouri and Ohio do not employ the term "affiliated 
interests," but the commission of each of these states has reported to 
the Federal Power Commission that it has jurisdiction over transac-
tions with affiliates.71 In Missouri it seems that the Public Service 
Commission regards the transactions between affiliates as within its 
rate-makiug authority, although there appears to be no express statu-
tory provision giving it this power of control. There are several pro-
visions in the Ohio statutes dealing with the subject. One states that 
when and as required by the Public Utilities Commission, "every public 
utility shall file with it a copy of any contract, agreement, or arrange-
ment, in writing, with any other public utility relating in any way to 
the construction, maintenance, or use of its plant or property, or to 
any service, rate, or charge." 72 Another Ohio statute provides that 
if the consent of the Public Utilities Commission is obtained, "Any 
two or more public utilities furnishing a like service or product and 
doing business in the same municipal corporation or locality within 
this state, or any two or more public utilities whose lines intersect or 
parallel each other within this state, may enter into contracts with each 
other that will enable them to operate their lines or plants in connec-
tion with each other." 73 In neither of these states is it clear what kinds 
of transactions among affiliates are actually regulated since there are 
no reported court decisions or statements of commission policy inter-
preting the scope of the commissions' powers. 
Since it may be desirable in the early stages of development of the 
atomic power industry to engage in a jointly financed product, these 
provisions will also have considerable importance for atomic energy 
entrepreneurs. 
71 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
27 (1948). 
12 Ohio Rev. Code §4905.16. 
73 /d., §4905-48(A). . 
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D. Rate Regulation Problems 
The primary function of public utility commissions is the determina-
tion of rates that may be charged by the regulated public utilities. 
Many of the regulatory powers conferred on public utility commis-
sions, such as the sup~rvision over accounting, control of capitalization 
and security issues, and regulation of intercorporate relations, are 
added for the principal purpose of effectuating and perfecting control 
over rates. 74 All of the states under study excepting Texas provide 
for the regulation of electric rates by a state commission. In Texas 
rate-making power is delegated to the governing body of each incor-
porated town or city.75 
The rate-making function of public utility commissions involves 
many complex and technical concepts, and no attempt will be made here 
to explain and discuss the many ramifications which have been the sub-
ject of extended discussion in legal periodicals and treatises. However, 
several unique rate-making problems which may stem from the develop-
ment and use of nuclear reactors for the production of electrical power 
should be noted. These problems may be divided conveniently into 
two categories : (I) the treatment of expenditures for research and 
experimentation by existing electric utilities in the initial stages of the 
development of atomic energy for power production, and ( 2) account-
ing and rate-making problems which may arise from the construction 
and operation of a full-scale atomic power plant financed by private 
capital. 
I. Expenditures for Research and Experimentation 
At present, certain electric utility companies are expending consider-
able sums for research and experimentation in the use of nuclear re-
actors as a source of heat to generate electricity. The position taken 
by the state utility commissions concerning the allowance of these 
expenditures for rate-making purposes will have a significant bearing 
upon the amounts utility companies are likely to spend for the develop-
ment of this new form of heat energy. To the extent that these expend-
itures are allowed to be charged to operating expenses (or perhaps 
capitalized and then amortized), they are of course being borne by 
the consumer. It is important, therefore, to examine the considera-
tions which will influence the decisions of the commissions and to 
74 Barnes, supra note 59 at 282. 
75 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 1119. 
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attempt to ascertain their attitude or probable attitude in regard to this 
matter. 
At present, nearly seventy-five per cent of the electrical power pro-
dQced in the United States is derived from steam-electric plants utiliz-
ing coal, oil, and gas as fuels. The remaining twenty-five per cent is 
produced in hydro-electric plants. The electrical power needs of the 
United States have been increasing tremendously year by year; In 
1953 the electric energy production was 442.7 billions of kilowatt hours 
as contrasted with a total production of 141.8 billions of kilowatt hours 
in 1940 .. Since available water power is limited, steam-electric produc-
tion has been steadily gaining in relative importance as a power source.16 
As compared with 75.8 millions of kilowatt capacity available in 1951,11 
it is estimated that by 196o the required generating capacity will be 
about 164 millions of kilowatts, and by 1970, 205 millions of kilowatts. 
In view of diminishing supplies of coal, oil, and gas used in steam-
electric ger.eration, the importance of discovering a new source of heat 
energy becomes obvious. Atomic energy appears to be an excellent 
solution for increasing power needs, and the public will benefit. How-
ever, much research and experimentation will be_ necessary before 
atomic fuels may be utilized as a source of energy at a cost competitive 
with conventional fuels. Even the possibility of valuable byproduct 
production still leaves the balance sheet in a questionable state. If 
atomic energy does prove to be a cheaper source of energy, the public 
will benefit even more. These considerations certainly seem to indicate 
that public utility commissions will be fully justified in allowing sub-
stantial expenditures to be charged against operating expense for the 
development of this new power source. Therefore, in rate proceedings, 
allowances for the expenditures would seem to be eminently reasonable. 
There are only a few reported rate cases in which allowance of 
expenditures for research has been a contested issue. Of course, pay-
ments to affiliates for services have frequently been questioned by 
utility commissions, but in such cases the question has usually been 
whether the payments have .exceeded costs reasonably incurred by the 
affiliate furnishing the services.18 State utility commissions have al-
lowed reasonable expenditures for advertising and promotional activi-
16 See FPC, Thirty-Fourth Annual Report 7, 63 (1955). 
11 Cisler, "Electric Power Systems and Nuclear Power," Atomic Energy-Industrial 
and Legal Problems 62, 1952 Summer Institute, Univ. of Mich. Law School. 
18 See, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. N.J., 12 N.J. 568, 97 A.2d 6o2 (1953); 
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. P.S.C., 332 Mich. 7, so N.W.2d 826 (1952). 
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ties to be claimed in rate p'roceedings.79 Somewhat more analogous to 
the development of electric power from atomic energy are the allow-
ances which have been made for costs of development of new wells by 
the gas utility industry. Limited expenditures for research and for 
development of new gas sources have been allowed as operating ex-
penses in some cases 80 but large expenditures have usually been treated 
as capital outlay.81 
The public utility commissions of the nine states (Texas being 
excluded) have been surveyed in an effort to determine their attitude 
toward expenditures for research and experimentation in the use of 
nuclear reactors for power production. The commissions of three states 
have indicated that they would allow "reasonable" expenditures for 
such purposes. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission recently 
in a rate proceeding allowed a "substantial sum" to be claimed .for this 
purpose.82 While such expenditures have not been involved in rate 
cases in Michigan and Wisco.nsin, the public service commissions have 
takeri official action by prescribing that the expenditures be charged 
to Account No. 8o1, Miscellaneous General Expenses.83 This account-
ing treatment results in the expenditures being allowed as operating 
expenses in current rate-making proceedings. This procedure has' been 
recommended by the Accounting Committee of the National Associa-
tion Of Railroads and Utilities Commissioners (NARUC) :84 The 
California Public Utilities Commission has indicated 'that no official 
action has been taken in this matter.85 No information on this specific 
problem could be obtained from the other five state commi~sions. 
'It seems probable that most public utility commissions will allow 
79 See, e.g., United Ice & Coal Co. v._ Pa. Power & Light Co., 8g P.U.R. (N.S.) 
432 (1951); Re Pacific Electric Railway Co., 96 P.U.R. (N.S.) 105 (1952). 
so See, for example, Re Northern Nat. Gas Co., 95 P.U.R. (N.S.) 289 (1952); Re 
Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 1921E P.U.R. 390; Re Clarksburg Light & Heat Co., 1917A 
P.U.R. 577· 
81 See, for example, Oarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
84 W.Va. 638, 100 S.E. 551 (1920); Re Montgomery Gas Co., 1917C P.U.R. 924; 
Re Mormarc Utilities Corp., So P.U.R. (N.S.) 53 (1949); Public Service Commission 
v. Mount4in Fuel Supply Co., 73 P.U.R. (N.S.) 428 (1947). 
82 Letter -from Leon Schwartz, Chairman, Pa. Public Utility Commission, Oct. 7, 
1953· 
8s Letter from John H. McCarthy, Chairman, Mich. Public Service Commission, 
March 17, 1954; letter from George P. Steinmetz, Commissioner, Public Service Com-
mission of Wisconsin, March 29, 1954. 
84 Letter from George P. Steinmetz, supra note 83. 
85 Letter from R. J. Pajalich, Secretary, Cal. Public Utilities Commission, April 15, 
1954· 
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reasonable expenditures for research and experimentation in the use 
of atomic fuels to be charged to operating expenses in the rate-making 
process. Most states do not have formal procedures whereby such ex-
penditures can be approved in advance, but instead the question is de-
termined by the allowance or disallowance in a subsequent rate pro-
ceeding.86 Therefore, companies contemplating such expenses will 
presumably follow the usual practice of trying to obtain the informal 
consent of the state commission before substantial expenditures are 
incurred. In this connection it should be noted that the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission is authorized by statute to require public 
utilities . to file budgets of estimated expenditures. The commission 
may reject part or all of any contemplated expenditure found to be 
"contrary to the public interest." If rejected at this stage, the expendi-
ture will not subsequently be allowed in a rate or valuation proceeding. 
If not rejected, the commission may nevertheless subsequently de-
termine whether expenditures made under the budget were reason-
able.87 In New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin budgets are required by 
regulation to be submitted in advance to the public utility commis-
sions. 88 Since the statutes contain no provisions concerning such 
budgets, it is doubtful if the commissions of the three latter states have 
authority to reject proposed expenditures. In all probability, expendi-
tures for atomic research may be charged to operating expenses, but 
the possibility that a commission may later either reject them as un-
reasonable or require a portion to be capitalized and subsequently 
amortized should not be overlooked. If the latter were done, the amount 
thus capitalized would become a part of the rate base until written off 
in subsequent years. 89 
Apparently, the f~deral government is taking the position that the 
taxpayers generally should bear some part of the costs of research in 
the development of atomic energy for power production and other pur-
poses. For example, under the agreement between the AEC and the 
Duquesne Light Company for the construction and operation of the 
nation's first full-scale atomic power plant, Duquesne supplied only a 
portion of the reactor costs· plus the generating facilities; other costs 
were absorbed by the federal government, with the electricity generated 
86 Barnes, supra note 59 at 6os. 
87 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1216. 
88 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
27 (1948). 
89 See Burt and Highsaw, "Developmental Costs Under the Prudent Investment 
Theory," 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev. I, II (1945). 
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going through Duquesne's distribution system to consumers at rates 
comparable to those charged for conventionally generated electricity. 
The Power Demonstration Reactor Program of the AEC, initiated in 
1955, also contemplates considerable federal financial assistance in the 
form of research assistance without charge, research and development 
contracts, and the waiver of certain source and special nuclear material 
charges.90 The object of this program is to promote the development 
of nuclear reactors for power production in the hope that future de-
velopment of the technology will produce a fully competitive operation. 
Of course, no question concerning the propriety of research expendi-
tures will arise in rate proceedings if the research costs are under-
written by a government subsidy, and in all probability, the federal 
government will continue to contribute to the development of atomic 
energy for peacetime uses. Private industry, however, is expected to 
contribute financially to the costs of atomic research and experimenta-
tion even under the Power Demonstration Reactor Program.91 When-
ever such private contributions are made, the question of how they will 
be treated for rate-making purposes will become important. 
2. Construction of a Full-Scale Atomic Power Plant 
There is little doubt that after further research and experimenta~ 
tion in the use of atomic fuels, it will become financially feasible for 
private capital to build electric power plants utilizing such fuels in 
conjunction with conventional generating equipment. The commence-
ment of such a program does not seem too remote, especially if favor-
able uses for byproducts can be developed. When this stage is reached, 
several regulatory problems somewhat unique in the electric utility 
field may arise. These problems can be understood only in the light of 
certain fundamental postulates regarding the cost of power and the 
role of a nuclear reactor in a power plant. 
The cost of power from any source may be said to be comprised of 
9o Power Demonstration Reactor Program: "First Round," AEC Release No. 589 
(Jan. 10, 1955); "Second Round,'' AEC Release No. 695 (Sept. 21, 1955); "Third 
Round,'' AEC Release No. 953 (Jan. 7, 1956). See CCH Atomic Energy La~ Rep. 
ff3021ff. 
91 Ibid. Also see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §33, 42 U.S.C.A. §2053, which pro-
vides : "Where the Commission finds private .facilities or laboratories ·are inadequate 
to the purpose, it is authorized to conduct for other persons, through its own facilities 
... [such research and development activities] ... as it deems appropriate to the 
development of atomic energy. The Commission is authorized to determine and make 
such charges as in its discretion may be desirable for the conduct of such activities and 
studies." 
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two major elements, first, operating expenses and fixed charges (in-
cluding, among the former, labor, fuel, materials, and among the latter, 
taxes, depreciation, and obsolescence) and second, return on capital 
(including interest and dividends, these being limited to a fair return 
on the fair value of the assets). In theory, the utility is entitled to 
establish a rate schedule which will result in total revenue equal to 
the aggregate of these costs. A conventional thermal-electric gen-
erating station may be considered as having two major components, 
one providing steam from heat energy sources and the other generating 
electricity by the use of the steam in the turbine. In an atomic power 
plant, the latter component will be substantially the same, but a reactor 
will be substituted as the heat source to produce steam. In a typical 
thermal-electric generating station utilizing conventional fuels, ap-
proximately one half of plant cost per kilowatt of capability is at-
tributed to each of these two components.92 The. total per kilowatt cost 
of installed capa(:ity of a conventional plant ranges between $1 so and 
$250.98 Present estimates of the per unit construction cost of a nuclear 
power plant greatly exceed these figures.9~ Moreover, it is undoubt-
edly a fact that the first nuclear plants will suffer a very high rate of 
obsolescence occasioned by the rapid development of the technology. 
Furthermore, development of methods of commercially utilizing the 
thermonuclear process may make present reactor technology obsolete 
in a relatively short period. However, entrepreneurs in the field hope 
that the resulting higher fixed charges and capital expenses can be 
offset in two ways : by lower operating expenses, principally because of 
lower fuel costs, and by the production and sale of byproducts. It will 
be deemed feasible from a competitive cost standpoint to construct and 
operate an atomic power plant when it appears that the reduction occa-
sioned by fuel economies plus returns from the sale of byproducts 
compensate for the increase in construction costs, plus the higher 
obsolescence charges. 
As noted earlier, before a new plant may be constructed it is neces-
sary in most states to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity 
from the state public utility ·commission. In determining whether such 
a certificate will be granted, or whether a proposed security issue to 
finance the plant will be approved, one factor that will surely be taken 
into account by most commissions is whether the new plant can be 
92 Cisler, supra note 77 at 64-65. 
93 AEC, Fifteenth Semi-Annual Report 17 ( 1954). 
9~/bid. 
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expected to produce electric energy at as low or lower a unit cost as a 
plant of conventional design.93 Until a nuclear plant can produce elec-
tric power at as low or nearly as low a per unit cost as that of existing 
generating methods, it is doubtful whether necessary commission ap-
proval can be obtained (excepting always for the small margin allow-
able in the name of research and development). Increasing scarcity of 
conventional fuels plus increased handling costs will certainly ac-
celerate the time when favorable competitive costs can be shown, and 
this is a factor to be considered by the commission. Furthermore, there 
are already certain areas in the country where higher than average fuel 
costs may possibly make an atomic reactor plant economically feasible 
at the present time. In the absence of these conditions, there may be 
a possibility of obtaining approval upon the condition that only a part 
of the capital expenditure will be included in the rate base for future 
rate-determination. Apparently this is a device that may be utilized 
in at least one state, Wisconsin, 96 although it can not be regarded as 
an attractive course of action for any utility concerned. 
If a certificate of convenience and necessity is issued for the 
construction of a nuclear plant which produces more expensive 
power than that produced in conventional plants, there is no legal as-
surance that actual costs will be reflected in the rate base for the pur-
pose of determining rates. The issuance of the certificate of convenience 
and necessity by the state public utility commission merely represents a 
determination by the commission that the proposed oonstruction is in 
the public interest. On subsequent rate proceedings the valuation of the 
facility is determined de novo as a legal matter. In other words, the 
issuance of the certificate does not commit the public utility commission 
to any specific valuation although the facility must be given some value 
since the certificate represents a determination that the construction was 
in the public interest. In fact, most state public utility commissions con-
sider several costs, inciuding reproduction cost, replacement cost, his-
torical cost, and the original cost, in the valuation process. Therefore, 
the atomic energy power entrepreneur has no legal assurance that he will 
be able to recoup all costs through the established rate structure. If a 
statute authorized the public utility commission to commit itself to a 
specific valuation at the time of issuing a certificate of convenience and 
necessity, the atomic energy entrepreneur would then be able to proceed 
95 See especially Wis. Stat. (1957) §196.49. Letter from H. ]. Flagg, N.J. Board of 
Public Utility Commissioners, dated Aug. 25, 1953. 
9 6 See Wis. Stat. (1957) §196.49. 
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with full knowledge of whether or not the consumer would be required 
to bear some portion of the increased costs occasioned by a change in 
generating methods at the time the atomic power plant is constructed. 
But as a practical matter, and wholly apart from the question of statu-
tory authority, state commissions probably will decline to make binding 
decisions at the time of certifying the construction for the reason, 
among others, that many of the estimates of cost will necessarily be 
somewhat speculative in nature. 
There are those who predict that all of the foregoing considerations 
may result in several private utility companies refraining from building 
nuclear power plants until they are actually known to be competitive with 
existing methods. 97 When that time arrives the development of atomic 
energy as a power source will not affect rates, except possibly in a down-
ward direction if the new source produces relatively cheaper p·ower. 
There is a· further aspect of the matter that demands consideration. 
If it proves possible to produce and sell byproducts from an atomic 
power plant in sufficient quantity to· ·affect the balance sheet ·materially 
and thus to produce power at costs competitive with power from conven-
tional fuels, several additional problems will be raised. 
Today, there appear to be two primary t,Ypes of-marketable atomic 
energy byproducts. 98 First, fissionable material may be produced and 
sold; secondly, radioisotopes arid radioactive waste· products of value 
may be produced, refined; and sold. Fissionable materials have value 
as the initial charge for new reactors, as fuel replacements for non-
breeding reactors, and for military purposes. Reactor-produced radio-
isotopes will also yield substantial revenues, for they are being used in 
increasing quantities by industry, medicine, and agriculture. As of the 
end of June 1957,4,109 organizations in the United States were licensed 
to use radioisotopes by the AEC,99 and the number of users and ship-
ments continues to increase. Furthermore, an increasing number of 
new uses of radioisotopes by industry, medicine, and research can be 
expected as the technology advances. 
One problem of a unique character arises out of the fact that under 
. . . 
97 This proposition was suggested by Leon Schwartz, Chairman, Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission, in a letter dated Oct. 7, 1953. 
98 "Byproducts" is used in a broader sense here and is to be distinguished from that 
used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Under Section ue, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(e), 
"byproduct material" means any radioactive material except special nuclear material 
(fissionable material) produced in the processes of producing or utilizing fissionable 
material. 
99 AEC, Twenty-Second Semi-Annual Report 31 (1957). 
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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the federal government takes title to 
all special nuclear material (fissionable material) produced in private 
operations.100 Lawful private producers are to be paid a "fair price" 101 
for their product. Moreover, the federal government has retained a 
monopoly over the distribution of fissionable materials, and normal 
competitive pricing and sales thereof are not to be expected in the near 
future. In respect to radioactive byproducts, under Section 81 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the AEC is authorized to distribute, "with 
or without charge,'' radioactive byproduct materiaP02 To date the prac-
tice of the AEC has been to distribute radioisotopes at cost. Accord-
ingly, as to fissionable materials the only market is the government; and 
as to other radioactive materials, the cost prices established by the fed-
eral government probably will have to be met by private utilities pro-
ducing the same products. Therefore, abnormal market conditions are 
to be expected, and this fact not only has its bearing on rate regulation, 
but it presents some unusual problems of federal-state relations. 
Another important question is the effect of the production and sale 
of byproducts on rate-making. Public utility commissions may treat 
the byproduct aspect of a nuclear reactor business in one of two ways, 
each of which will bear a definite relation to the establishment of power 
rates. 
First, the byproduct operations may be treated as an entirely separate 
and distinct activity. In that event, costs directly attributed to each 
activity will have to be accounted for separately, and costs attributable 
to both activities will have to be properly allocated between them.108 
100 42 U.S.C.A. §2072. "Special nuclear material" is defined as plutonium, uranium 
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235 or any other material determined by 
the Commission to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy. 
101 42 U.S.C.A. §2072. 
102 /d., §2n1. Radioisotopes for biomedical, agricultural, and medical research are 
available to domestic users at 20 per cent of catalog price. AEC Release No. 627 (April 
21, 1955). 
1os In several cases collateral operations of a utility have been treated as entirely 
separate for purposes of rate making. See, for example, Re Farmers Elevator Co., 
1g28A P.U.R. 469 (North Dakota) (grain elevator and electricity); Re Estelline 
Telephone & Electric Co., 1917F P.U.R. 151 (South Dakota) (telephone and elec-
tricity); Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee, 1919D P.U.R. 504 (Wis-
consin) (heating and electricity); Re Manchester Street Railway, 19 N.H.P.S.C.R. 
421 (1937) (New Hampshire) (street railway and electricity); Re Lockport Light, 
Heat & Power Co., 12 P.U.R. (N.S.) 413 (1935) (New York) (steam and elec-
tricity); Monticello v. Blue Mountain Irrigation Co., Case No. 148g (Oct. 29, 1935) 
(Utah) (irrigation and electricity); Re Northwestern Electric Co., 36 P.U.R. (N.S.) 
202 (1940) (FPC) (steam heating and electricity); Re Arkansas Power & Light 
Company, 55 P.U.R. (N.S.) 129 (1944) (Arkansas) (water, street railway, steam 
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The allocation of costs will be most difficult in regard to a nuclear re-
actor. A requirement that a large percentage of the costs be attributed 
to the separate and distinct byproduct operation will make electricity 
rates lower but may make the byproduct operation unprofitable. At the 
same time a different allocation of costs could conceivably make the by-
product operation extremely profitable. The method of allocation of 
costs will undoubtedly be prescribed by most public utility commissions. 
Except for Texas, all states examined in this study grant to their com-
missions a board authority over accounting.10• Furthermore, in several 
states there are statutes which relate specifically to accounting aspects 
of non-utility business of a public utility. For instance, an Illinois 
statute provides : · 
The Commission may require every public utility engaged 
directly or indirectly in any other than a public utility business, 
as defined by law, to keep separately in like manner and form 
the accounts of all such other business, and the Commission 
may provide for the examination and inspection of the books, 
accounts, papers and records of such other business, in so far 
as may be necessary to enforce any provision of this Act. The 
Commission shall have the power to inquire as to and prescribe 
the apportionment of capitalization, earnings, debts and ex-
penses fairly and justly to be awarded to or borne by the own-
ership, operation, management or control of such public utility 
as distinguished from such other business.105 
A second method of treating the byproduct operation would be to 
regard it as an integral part of the utility operation and, in establishing 
electricity rates, to include in the total estimated income, revenues antici-
pated from byproduct sales. This method has been employed in respect 
to certain gas utility byproducts such as coke, tars, and gasoline.108 
Moreover, in cases in which a subsidiary or affiliate has refined certain 
heat, ice, and electricity) ; Re Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 61 P. U.R. 
(N.S.) 94 (I94S) (Maryland) (gas, steam heat, merchandising, and electricity); 
Detroit v. Detroit Edison Co., so P.U.R. (N.S.) I (I943) (Michigan) (steam heating 
and electricity, where there was no physical interdependence). 
104 FPC, State Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities 
22 (I!)48). 
1os Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/J, §12. See also Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/J, §8. Substantially 
identical provisions relating to electric companies may be found in Mo. Rev. Stat. 
(I949) §J9J.I40(I2); and N.Y. Public Service Law §66(IJ). 
toe See Re Uniform System of Accounts, I9I7D P.U.R. I22 (New York); Re 
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., I9I9D P.U.R. I40 (California); Re Portage 
American Gas Co., 26 Wis. R.C.R. 369 (I922); Green Bay v. Wisconsin Public Service 
Co., I922B P.U.R. 67I (Wisconsin); Re Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., I922C P.U.R. 
829 (WISconsin); Re Great.Falls Gas Co., I922D P.U.R. 385 (Montana). 
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byproducts, public utility commissions have required the parent utility 
to include in its estimated revenues a substantial percentage of the net 
proceeds from sales, even though the contract between the utility and 
subsidiary or affiliate may have established a different percentage.107 
. Thus, when the revenues from byproduct sales are substantial, they will 
be reflected in lower electricity rates. 
To· summari"ze, whether the production and sale of byproducts is 
treated as an entirely distinct activity or as an integralpart of the utility 
operation of an. ~tomic energy facility, the byproduct aspects of the 
busin,ess will have a definite effect on rate-making. The greater the 
net proceeqs of the byproduct activity, the lower will be the cost of 
electricity. 
One additional aspect pertinent to rate-making should be mentioned. 
Public utility commissions may seek to impose, as a condition on the 
issuance .of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the con-
struction of an atomic power facility, the requirement that the utility 
will not charge higher· rat~s ·,than those permitted for electricity pro-
duced by a conventional facility. Whether or not the imposition of 
such· a condition is permissible under existing law is perhaps question-
able, for statutory authority is ordinarily not explicit, and the commis-
sions have apparently not hitherto attempted to impose such limitations 
under other circumstances.108 As a matter of policy, it would seem inad-
visable for commissions to impose such conditions, since they would 
·unduly hamper the development and use of the new technology. Only 
~through experience in operation can it be expected that the most· eco-
. nomical methods of utilizing atomic energy will be achieved. N onethe-
·less, it·must. be recognized that the cost estimates of an atomic energy 
facility will be examined by the utility commission and will be taken 
: itito consideration in connection with the issuing of certificates. · In fact, 
,it would be extremely difficult for a commission to decide that a reactor 
plant producing electricity at a cost, for example, twice that of conven-
tional plants should. be regatded as constructed "in the public interest," 
at least if the costs 'are to be borne by the consumer by th~ i~position of 
'\ . : 
, 1or See, for example, United Fuel .Gas Co, v.- Kentucky Railroad Cqmmi!\sion, 278 
U.S. 300, 49 ·s. Ct. 150 (1929); CM.rleston v. Public Service Commission, 95 W.Va. 
'9I, 120 S.E. 328 (1924) ;. East Qhio Gas Co: v. Cleveland, Z?·: P.U.R. (N.S.) 387 
(1939) (Ohio); Hope ·Natural <;;as Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 287, 47. P.U.R. (N.S.) 129 
(194J). . . . . '. . . 
10s However, under the Federal Power Act,, licenses' co11t;tin liftlitations requiring 
that rates b~ computed uP<>n the basis of or,iginal ~ost and·that excess earnings be ,kept 
·in reserve. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§8o3 et seq. · 
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higher rates. Thus, the probable fixed charges and capital expenses and 
treatment of revenues from sale of byproducts will receive careful con-
sideration both in issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity 
and in subsequent rate proceedings. 
E. Conclusions 
By way of summary of the foregoing discussion of the effect of public 
utility regulation statutes on atomic energy development we may ob-
serve that: 
· ( 1) Industrial development of atomic energy for power purposes 
poses several unique financial problems for an existing stabilized public 
utility and all pertinent statutes and regulations must be carefully ana-
lyzed before any particular financial organization or arrangement can 
be agreed upon ; 
( 2) Moreover, advance approval of many types of expenditures in 
the highly l·egulated public utility industry appears desirable if the eco-
nomic costs are to be borne by the consumers ; and 
(3) Finally, the accounting treatment of atomic energy byproducts 
costs and revenues should be ascertained at the earliest possible date 
because of the potential effect upon utility rates. 
· In some instances, it will doubtless happen that unfavorable public 
utility commission orders will preverit particular utilities from establish-
ing nuclear reactor facilities, and especially will this be true if no op-
portunity for recoupment of costs is provided. Such action may make 
the raising of capital difficult, if not impossible, of achievement. On 
the other hand, if lower power costs may eventually be expected, it 
would seem that most public utility commissions will look favorably 
upon investments by existing utilities in nuclear reactor power facilities. 
Chapter III 
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 
As with many industrial operations, proper precautionary measures 
must be taken in making industrial use of atomic energy if serious 
hazards to employees and the general public are to be avoided. The use 
of atomic energy presents a number of unique hazards, not so much 
from sudden atomic accidents, although these may occur, as from the 
cumulative effect of exposure to excessive radiation, the damaging ef-
fects of which may not be known for many years. However, the gen-
eral nature of the hazards is known and so are the techniques for pre-
venting or minimizing them. In the program of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, expenditures for radiation protection of workers as well 
as the public consume a substantial portion of the total expenditures for 
atomic energy development,1 Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Com-
mission has imposed rather stringent health and safety standards, not 
only on operations in government-owned installations, but also upon 
licensees who obtain and use fissionable materials and radioisotopes for 
private research and other purposes.2 The experience of the Commis-
sion clearly indicates that the application of rigorous health and safety 
standards makes it possible to use atomic energy for many, if not most, 
peacetime purposes without endangering the health of workers or the 
public generally.8 
Excessive radiation may become dangerous to health and even life in 
either of two ways. Due to close physical proximity to an external 
source of radiation, such as might result from inadequate shielding of 
radioactive materials or improper disposition of radioactive wastes, the 
human body may be injured by exposure to the source of radiation. An-
other type of radiation injury which can be even more serious than ex-
ternal radiation results from the ingestion of food, liquids, or gases 
contaminated by radioactivity. Radioactive particles which are ingested 
may remain lodged inside the body until the radioactivity has spent 
itself, which in the case of certain isotopes may be greatly in excess of 
1 AEC, "27 Questions and Answers About Radiation and Radiation Protection," 16 
(1951). 
210 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation"), re-
printed as Appendix A, Item 1. 
a AEC, Eighth Semi-Annual Report, "Control of Radiation Hazard in the Atomic 
Energy Program" (1950). 
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the life of the victim. This is referred to as internal radiation. Even 
small amounts of either type of radiation can have a very harmful effect 
on both animal and plant life. Therefore, in industrial use of atomic 
energy, the problem of protection against radiation hazards is a very 
important one. Not only are the hazards insidious in nature, just as with 
several other industrial operations, but the precautionary measures are 
often very expensive. 
In 1954, in asking Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 to allow private industry to enter the field, President Eisenhower 
recomm~nded the continuation of provisions authorizing the Atomic 
Energy Commission to establish minimum health and safety standards 
to govern the use and possession of fissionable and radioactive mate-
rials.4 As a result, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, like the 1946 Act, 
gives the Commission a broad authority to establish such standards.5 
This authority presents some unique problems for federal-state relation-
ships in thr~ regulation of health and safety with respect to industrial 
users of atomic energy. 
Whether or not Congress intended to pre-empt the field of radiation 
health and safety regulation of Atomic Energy Commission licensees 
from state control, and the extent to which it may constitutionally do 
so, are questions for which no very clear answers exist at the present 
time. Prior to and at the time the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was 
passed, Congress has very little to say on the subject, and the act itself 
does not contain an unequivocal statement of intent. Similarly, the case 
authority on the general subject of federal pre-emption in other areas of 
government activity is in a state of some confusion. Because the purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the general pattern of state health and 
safety regulation in the ten states selected for study-to consider the 
types of state agencies which may be involved, their respective jurisdic-
tions, and the nature of their powers-analysis of the pre-emption ques-
tions is deferred until Chapter V of this Part where recent state 
radiation health and safety regulations are discussed in some detail. In 
this chapter it is assumed that state agencies may exercise power in 
respect to those radiation hazards regulated by the Atomic Energy 
Commission. 
There are three general categories of state agencies which may possess 
specific authority under existing statutes to regulate various health and 
4 Message of the President to Congress, dated Feb. 17, 1954, New York Times, 
Feb. 18, 1954, p. 8, col. 8. 
5 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133, 2134. 
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safety aspects of the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. If 
private industry constructs plants which utilize. nuclear fuels to generate 
electricity, the public utility commissions may have such authority. 
Furthermore, state labor departments or industrial commissions 6 are 
typically given authority to promulgate rules and regulations to protect 
the health and safety of employees. Finally, state and local health boards 
or departments usually exercise extremely broad powers over matters 
of health and safety. Thus, both labor and health agencies are likely to 
possess powers affecting the operation of atomic energy power plants 
even though public utility commissions also have regulatory powers in 
this area. In fact, the following discussion will demonstrate the con-
fusing pattern of potential regulation and the overlapping jurisdiction 
of regulatory agencies in every state embraced in this study. 
A. Public Utility Commissions 
In the ten states surveyed in this study, most of the public utility com-
missions have been given general statutory authority that would permit 
the establishment· of health and safety regulations relating to the con-
struction and operation of atomic energy power plants. Since the first 
privately owned nuclear power generating station is yet to be built, there 
has been no occasion for the issuance of health and safety regulations 
by state public utility commissions relating to the operation of such a 
plant, but the authority is there ready to be exercised at the appropriate 
time. Actually, some of the commissions have not attempted to assert 
their health and safety regulatory powers, even in respect to conven-
tional plants, and Texas, as previously indicated, has no state utility 
commission with jurisdiction over electric utilities. 
· In California, Illinois, and Missouri the state utility commissions are 
granted statutory authority to require a public utility, by special or gen-
eral order, to construct, maintain, and operate its plant, equipment, and 
premises in such manner as to promote and safeguard the health and 
safety of its employees and the public generally.7 However, none of 
these commissions has exercised its powers in this respect. 8 
6 The name of the agency exercising rule-making power over the safety of employees 
varies from state to state. · 
1 Cal. Public Utilities Code §768; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §6I; Mo. Rev. Stat. 
(I949) §J86.JIO, 
s See Cal. Adm. Code, tit. 20, for regulations of the Public Utilities Commission. 
Letter from Marvin P. Moore, Secretary of the Missouri Commission, March IS, I954· 
The Illinois Commerce Commission has not replied to a specific inquiry concerning 
health and safety regulations and available published records reveal no exercise of the 
authority. 
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The Wisconsin Public Service Commission has power to "make rea-
sonable· rules, regulations, specifications and standards for the installa-
tion, operation and maintenance of all safety devices and measures." 9 
Another section of the Wisconsin statutes provides that every public 
utility which owns, controls, or operates any wires over which electricity 
is transmitted "shall construct, operate and maintain such wires and the 
equipment used in connection therewith in a ... safe manner .... " 10 
The commission may also order "any alteration in construction or loca-· 
tion or change of methods of operation required for public safety . 
• • • " 
11
. As a matter of practice, in Wisconsin the Public Service Com-
mission collaborates with the Wisconsin Industrial Commission in the 
preparation of the Wisconsin Electric Safety Code, and these two com-
missions administer the code jointly.12 The Public Service Commission 
administers that part of the code having to do with outside plant and 
equipment, and the Industrial Commission administers that relating to 
inside equipment.18 This method of demarking lines of authority serves 
to alleviate possibilities of duplicating and inconsistent regulation by the 
two agencies. In other states the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by 
these .two types of agencies is not so clearly defined. 
The New York Public Service Commission is given authority to in-
vestigate methods employed in manufacturing electricity, and it has 
power "to order such reasonable improvements as will best promote the 
public interest, preserve the public health and protect those using such 
gas or electricity and those employed in the manufacture and distribu-
tion thereof .... " 14 Many years ago, in 1913, an order was promul-
gated by the Public Service Commission relating to safeguarding and 
protecting employees from injury resulting from generating equipment, 
but it was revoked in 1932.15 ·No other regulations relating to the health 
a11d safety of employees have been found. Moreover, it should be noted 
.that the term "factory," as defined for purposes of the jurisdiction of 
the New York Labor Department, excludes generating plants of public 
utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.16 
9 Wis. Stat. (1957) §195.03(18). 
10 !d., §196.74· 
11 /bid. 
12 Provision is made for this type of joint administrative action in Wis. Stat. (1957) 
§20.904-
18 Letter from George P. Steinmetz, Commissioner, Wis. Public Service Commis-
sion, March 29, 1954-
H N.Y. Public Service Law §66(2). 
15 5 N.Y. Official Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regulations 1435, 1437 (1945). 
1s N.Y. Labor Law §2(9). 
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But whether the statutory definition means that the Public Service Com-
mission is intended to have exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption of 
standards to protect the health and safety of employees of electric plants 
utilizing nuclear energy is apparently far from clear.11 
The Ohio Public Utilities Commission is given general supervision 
over the marmer in which public utilities are operated with respectto the 
"adequacy or accommodation afforded by their service, the safety and 
security of the public and their employees." 18 The commission also 
may require that repairs, improvements, or additions be made to the 
plant or equipment of any public utility "in order to promote the con-
venience or welfare of the public or of employees .... " 19 
In Pennsylvania the service and facilities of public utilities must con-
form with regulations and orders of the Public Utility Commission, and 
every public utility "shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations, 
substitutions, extensions, and improvement!i in or to such service and 
facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, con-
venience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and ·the public." 20 A 
letter from the chairman of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
states : "While this Commission has express authority over matters of 
safety of workers and this would extend by implication to atomic en-
ergy plants the matter rarely comes up for adjudication." 21 
The Michigan and New Jersey statutes are somewhat less specific in 
granting authority to the utility commissions to prescribe health and 
safety regulations. The Michigan commission, however, apparently as-
sumes that a general grant of power is sufficient. The Michigan statute 
vests power in the Public Service Commission to "regulate all rates, 
fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service and all other 
matters pertaining to the formation, operation, or direction" of public 
utilities.22 Under this language, the Public Service Commission has 
promulgated an extensive set of regulations applicable to electric utilities, 
which includes provisions to protect employees. 28 The only relevant New 
11 Doubts were raised by letters from George H. Kenny, Ass't Counsel, N.Y. Public 
Service Commission, March 5, 1954, and Irving R. Tabershaw, Director, Division of 
Industrial Hygiene, N.Y. Dept. of Labor, March 25, 1954. 
18 Ohio Rev. Code §4905.o6. 
19 I d., §4905.38. 
2o Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §1171. 
21 Letter from Leon Schwartz, Chairman, Pa. Public Utility Commission, March 26, 
1954· 
22 Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.13 (6). 
2s Mich. Adm. Code (1954) R 460.501 et seq., especially R 400.530-R 400.538 and 
R 46o.56o-R 46o.565. 
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Jersey statute is one which provides that the Board of Public Utility 
Commissioners may require any public utility to furnish "safe, adequate 
and proper service and to maintain its property and equipment in such 
condition as to enable it to do so." 24 This provision seems to be directed 
primarily at the kind of service rendered rather than at the protection of 
employees, but it might, like the Michigan statute, be construed broadly 
to give the board jurisdiction over the safety of employees. 
B. . Labor Departments and Industrial Commissions 
All ten states selected for this study have created some form of a state 
labor department or industrial commission to administer their labor 
laws. One of the primary functions of these labor agencies is the pro-
tection of the health and safety of employees, and accordingly the labor 
agency is usually given rule-making power to promulgate regulations 
safeguarding the health and safety of workers. · 
Many state labor agencies are evincing considerable interest in regu-
lations relating to the use of fissionable and radioactive materials. As 
will be noted later, some states have already promulgated extensive regu-
lations covering the use, handling, and storage of radioactive substances, 
and several other states plan to adopt similar regulations in the near 
future. Probably most of the state agencies will follow substantially the 
recommendations contained in handbooks published by the Nation~l 
Bureau of Standards on problems of radioactivity.25 The extent of the 
jurisdiction of the labor agencies varies from state to state. In most 
states the agency is given jurisdiction over employers and employees 
24 N.J. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) §48: 2-23. 
25 Several letters from state labor agencies indicated this intention. The recommen-
dations contained in these handbooks are formulated by the National Committee on 
Radiation Protection and its subcommittees. The handbooks available thus far include: 
No. 23, "Radium Protection"; No. 27, "Safe Handling of Radioactive Luminous Com-
pounds"; No. 41, "Medical X-ray Protection"; No. 42, "Safe Handling of Radioactive 
Isotopes" ; No. 48, "Control and Removal of Radioactive Contamination in Labora-
tories" ; No. 49, "Recommendations .for Waste Disposal of Phosphorus-32 and Iodine-
IJI for Medical Users"; No. so, "X-ray Protection Design"; No. 51, "Radiological 
Monitoring Methods & Instruments"; No. 52, "Maximum Permissible Amounts of 
Radioisotopes in the Human Body and Maximum Permissible Concentrations in Air 
and Water" ; No. 53, "Recommendations for the Disposal of Carbon-14 Wastes" ; 
No. 54, "Protection Against Radiations from Radium, Cobalt-6o, and Cesium-137"; 
No. 55, "Protection Against Betatron-Synchrotron Radiations up to 100 Million Elec-
tron Volts"; No. 56, "Safe Handling of Cadavers Containing Radioactive Isotopes"; 
No. 57, "Photographic Dosimetry of X- and Gamma Rays"; No. sB, "Radioactive 
Waste Disposal in the Ocean"; No. 59, "Permissible Doses from External Sources 
of Ionizing Radiation"; No, 61, "Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative 
Means"; No. 63, "Protection Against Neutron Radiation Up to 30 Million Electron 
Volts." All are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office at nominal prices. 
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wherever located. Because the employment relation is emphasized, the 
labor agency would seem to be without power to regulate safety stand-
ards for other persons, such as the self-employed person and the inde-
pendent contractor, although the applicability of the statutes to the inde-
pendent contractor is by no means clear. Therefore, under this type 
of statute there is a possible gap in the regulation by labor agencies of 
the use of atomic energy. But it is an extremely small gap, because most 
uses of atomic energy will undoubtedly involve employment of persons 
in the usual sense. Certainly any electric utility operation would involve 
an employer-employee relationship. 
Another type of statute found in many states gives the labor agency 
jurisdiction over types of operations, typically "factories" or "manu-
facturing establishments." Under such statutes the jurisdiction of the 
agency will depend on the definition of these terms. Some states under-
take to define further these terms, while others are silent as to their 
meaning. There are few cases in which it has been necessary to decide 
whether or not an electric utility is a "factory" or "manufacturing es-
tablishment." Certainly the weight of authority supports the view that 
an electric generating plant is a manufacturing establishment, 26 and it 
would seem also that the term "factory" would normally cover electric 
utilities.27 However, as to certain potential users of radioactive by-
products, such as hospitals, laboratories, etc., it is doubtful whether the 
·statute will apply. 
Because of the differences in the statutory patterns in the states under 
··discussion, a state by state analysis seems to be the best method of sur-
veying the kinds of powers possessed by state labor agencies, 28 together 
with questions of possible overlapping jurisdiction, and the current state 
of regulation 'With respect to the use of radioactive substances. 
· r. California 
At least three provisions of the California labor statutes should be 
. noted for possible bearing on the regulation of uses of radioactive sub-
26 See Annot., "What is a 'manufacturing establishment' within meaning of regula-
tory statutes," g6 A.L.R. 1351 at 1354 ( 1935). 
' 27 See Annot., "What is a 'factory' within statutes relating to safety and health of 
employees," 163 A.L.R. 447 at 473 ff. (1946). 
28 Because many electric plants using nuclear power will still use steam boilers in 
their operations, it will 'be necessary for the industry to comply with any applicable 
state regulations. Nearly all states have statutes relating to the operation, inspection, 
and licensing of steam boilers. See, e.g., cat. Labor Code §§7681 et seq.; Ill. Stat. 
Ann. c. 24, §§23•72 et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. §17:132; N.Y. Labor Law §204'; Ohio 
Rev. Code §§41oJ.OI et seq. 
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stances. One provision requires that every "factory or workshop in 
which one or more persons are employed" shall be ventilated so as to 
render harmless, so far as practicable, all injurious gases, vapors, dust, 
or other impurities which may be produced,29 and criminal sanctions are 
provided for violations. 30 
Another statute requires the owner of every "factory" to register 
with the Division of Labor Statistics and Research, and also to furnish 
certain pertinent inforination.81 "Factory" is defined as " ... any fac-
tory, workshop, m.ill, or other manufacturing establishment where five 
or more persons are employed." 82 Although there is little authority on 
the matter, it is quite likely that an atomic power plant would be con-
sidered a "factory" for the purpose of this statute,38 and therefore any 
such plant built in California would be required to register. Chemical 
plants built to process radioactive substances would seem likewise to 
be .subject to registration under this statute.84 
The most significant California statute, however, is that which confers 
industrial safety rule-making authority on the Division of Industrial 
Safety.35 The division is given "power, jurisdiction, and supervision 
over every employment and place of employment in this State" in order 
to enforce all laws and lawful orders relating to the protection of the 
life and safety of employees. 5 6 "Employment" is defined to include "the 
carrying on of any trade, enterprise, project, industry, business, occupa-
tion or work . . . or any process or operation in any way related 
thereto. . . ." 8 ,.. "Place of employment" is defined to include "any 
place, and the premises appurtenant thereto, where employment is carried 
on, except a place the safety jurisdiction over which is vested by law 
in any State or Federal agency other than the division." 88 It was noted 
previously that in California the Public Utilities Commission is given 
authority to make rules and regulations to promote and safeguard the 
2s Cal. Labor Code §2351. 
30 I d., §2354· 
81 I d., §2601. 
32 I d., §26oo. 
33 See supra notes 26 and 27. 
34 The Division of Labor Statistics and Research has the duty to inform various 
health authorities of the location of factories registered with it. Cal. Labor Code §26o4. 
35 I d., §65oo. 
38 I d., §6312. 
87 Id., §6303. 
88 I d., §6302. An opinion of the Attorney General holds that the division's power is 
confined to the premises where the labor is performed. 13 Cal. Op. Atty. Gen. 48 
( 1949). -
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health and safety of employees in public utility plants.89 Since an atomic 
power plant would be classified as a public utility, does the statute mean 
that because the Public Utilities Commission has safety jurisdiction over 
plant employees, the Division of Industrial Safety does not? A 1953 
statute seems to answer this question in the negative, for it is there 
provided that the "jurisdiction vested in the division shall in no instance, 
except those affecting exclusively the safety of employees, impair, dimin-
ish, or in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Com-
mission .... " 40 Therefore, the division apparently has jurisdiction 
over the safety of employees in public utility plants, and the similar 
power previously vested in the Public Utilities Commission is displaced. 
Under this statutory authority over "employment" and "places of 
employment," and without any legislative authority to regulate radia-
tion hazards specifically, the Division of Industrial Safety has promul-
gated a somewhat extensive set of regulations as a part of the "General 
Industry Safety Orders" establishing minimum standards for employees 
exposed to ionizing radiation: 41 These regulations are discussed in de-
tail and compared with the standards of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion and the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measure-
ment in Chapter V. 
There are other General Industry Safety Orders which may be ap-
plicable to. establishments in California using radioactive substances. 
There are regulations establishing minimum standards for the preven-
tion of harmful exposure of employees to dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, 
and gases/2 and other regulations create minimum standards for the 
use, handling, and storage of hot, flammable, poisonous, corrosive, and 
hazardous substances in all places of employment except laboratories.48 
The General Industry Safety Order concerning radiation protection 
does not explain its effect on these orders. 
2. Illinois 
The Illinois Health and Safety Act of 1937 44 is applicable "to all 
employers engaged in any occupation, business or enterprise in this 
State, and their employees," except farming and coal mining opera-
89 Cal. Public Utilities Code §768. 
40 Cal. Labor Code §68o1. 
u Cal. Adm. Code tit. 8, §§38oo et seq. The pertinent General Industry Safety 
Orders are set forth in full in. Appendix A, Item 2. 
42 Cal. Adm. Code tit. 8, §§4100 et seq. 
48/d., §§4140 et seq. 
44 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 48, §§137.1-137.21. 
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tions.45 The Industrial Commission, an agency of the State Department 
of Labor,46 is given authority to administer the act 47 and to make rules 
to protect the life, health, and safety of employees.'8 However, to ef-
fectuate these purposes, the act limits the Industrial Commission by 
providing that it "shall make such rules only for : 
(a) The proper sanitation and ventilation of all places of 
employment to guard against personal injuries and diseases. 
(b) The arrangement and guarding of machinery and the 
storing and placing of personal property to guard against per-
sonal injuries and diseases. 
(c) The prevention of personal injuries and diseases by 
contact with any poisonous or deleterious materials, dust, 
vapors, gases or fumes." 49 
While no rules relating specifically to radiation or radioactivity have 
been adopted under this act,50 it would appear ~at the commission has 
power to adopt regulations affecting various aspects of the use of radio-
active materials. Clause (a) would authorize regulations in regard to 
air contamination and the disposal of radioactive wastes, Clause (b) 
would authorize the regulation of shielding and the storage of radioac-
tive materials, and Clause (c) would authorize rules for monitoring, 
maximum exposures, and the safe handling and use of radioactive sub-
stances. However, the commission is expressly denied power to make 
any rule requiring the "submission of any plan, specifications or other 
in formation concerning-any proposed installation, alteration, construc-
tion, apparatus or equipment ... " 51 and therefore no procedure can 
be established requiring advance approval of radiation installations. 
In 1951 the Illinois Industrial Commission issued regulations relat-
ing to labeling in the use, handling, and storage of substances harmful 
to the health and safety of employees.52 The regulations provide for 
the labeling of containers of substances "known to constitute a health, 
45 /d., C. 48, §137.2. 
46 /d., c. 127, §§5.03, 43.o6. 
47 /d., C. 48, §137.1. 
48 /d., c. 48. §137·3· 
49 /d., c. 48, §I37·4- There are two other clauses which relate to artificial atmos-
pheric pressure and scaffolds. 
50 Ill. Health and Safety Act and Health and Safety Rules (1953). These rules 
are required by statute to be published annually, and they are obtainable from either 
the Secretary of State or the Industrial Commission under a recent administrative 
procedure act. Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 127, §268. 
51 111. Stat. Ann. c. 48, §137.3. 
52 Ill. Health and Safety Rules, Industrial Commission (1953), Part "]". 
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poison, fire or explosion hazard." 58 Such regulations would probably 
apply to radioactive substances, since they constitute a health hazard 
and because poisons are defined as substances known to be "so toxic to 
man as to afford a hazard to health .... " 54 
It ~as noted previously that broad powers are granted to the Illinois 
Commerce Commission regarding the health and safety of employees 
and the public in the operation of public utilities. 55 In a rather recent 
case, it was argued that the authority given to the Industrial Commis-
sion under the Health and Safety Act gave that commission exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters relating to the health and safety of employees, 
and consequently by implication repealed the provisions of the Public 
Utilities Act giving jurisdiction to the Commerce Commission over the 
employees of public utilities. However, the Illinois Supreme Court 
rejected this argument on the well-recognized principle that a statutory 
construction which would result in repeal by implication of another 
statute is not favored, and that there must be an irreconcilable repug-
nancy to justify an inference of repeal. The court, therefore, enforced 
a Commerce Commission order applicable to railroad employees. 56 Ap-
parently, the decision means that both the Industrial Commission and 
the Commerce Commission may prescribe rules and regulations estab-
lishing standards covering the use of radioactive materials and maxi-
mum radiation exposures in atomic energy power plants if built in 
lllinois. 57 This type of overlapping jurisdiction is confusing and objec-
tionable. 
3· Michigan 
No general rule-making authority has been given to the Department 
of Labor in Michigan, consequently no general safety regulations are 
5Sfd., §I, Rule I. 
54fd., §I, Rule 2(b). 
55 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §6I. 
56 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern R. Co., 382 Ill. 
55, 46 N.E.2d 932 (I94J). 
57 One fact, peculiar to 111inois, which should be noted, is that the· industrial hygiene 
program is administered by the State Labor Department [U.S. Federal Security 
Agency, Public Health ServiCe, "Directory of State and Territorial Health Authorities 
-I952,'' p. 20], in contrast to other states in which this program is a function of the 
Department of Health. The statute provides that the Department of Labor shall 
prosecute any violation of law relating to the inspection of factories, provided that 
"before any prosecution is instituted based upon the laboratory findings of any indus-
trial hygiene unit of the Department of Labor, any person dissatisfied with such find-
ings shall be entitled to have an independent review by the central laboratory of the 
Department of Public Health." 111. Stat. Ann. c. 48, §59.I5. 
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in existence. 58 However, a statute requires that the owner of any fac-
tory operating "machinery of every description" must equip it with 
"proper safeguards." The "commission" or "factory inspector" shall 
determine whether machinery and equipment are properly guarded. 59 
The Commissioner of Labor also has authority to order the installation 
of proper and adequate ventilation devices to preserve the health and 
safety of persons in "manufacturing, mercantile and other establish-
ments." 60 Apparently, the conclusion to be drawn is that, while no gen-
erally applicable regulations can be adopted by the Department of Labor 
in Michigan, it has authority to deal with specific plants on an individual 
basis regarding industrial safety hazards. 
Under existing statutes, perhaps the Public Service Commission 
would be more likely to adopt regulations establishing minimum safety~ 
standards in the use of radiation sources than would the Department of 
Labor. It was noted earlier that the Public Service Commission has 
promulgat:!d employee health and safety regulations applicable to electric 
utility plants. If nuclear energy were used in such a plant in Michigan, 
iUs conceivable that the Public Service Commission would formulate 
health and safety regulations to cover the peculiar hazards incident to 
such operations. Moreover, "the investigation and prevention of haz-
ards associated with industrial operations is a function of the Division 
of Occupational Health," of the Michigan Department of Health, and 
that agency has recently promulgated comprehensive radiation safety 
rules, 61 Thus, in Michigan there is also the potentiality of at least three 
regulatory agencies having jurisdiction to regulate matters of radio-
logical health, and inconsistent action could create a regulatory "maze" 
for atomic power. installations. 
4: Missouri 
The Industrial Commission of Missouri, which controls and super-
vises the work of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, has 
authority to approve or disapprove all rules or regulations promulgated 
by any division ~ithin the department.62 One of these divisions is the 
ss Regulations with respect to workmen's compensation, employment of women and 
minors, steam boilers, and elevators do exist. Mich. Adm. Code (1954) R 4o8.201-
R 4o8473. 
so Mich. Stat. Ann. §17.25. 
60 /d., §17-33· 
61 On February 14, 1958, a very comprehensive set of regulations .governing the use 
of radioactive isotopes, X-radiation and all other forms of ionizing radiation published 
by this division, became effective in Michigan. Mich. Adm. Code (1954, Supp. No. 13). 
62 Mo. Rev. Stat. §286.o6o(4). 
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Division of Industrial Inspection.68 Within one month after the occu-
pancy of any factory, workshop, or mill, the Director of Industrial In-
spection must be notified thereof,64 and thereafter annual reports are 
required to be made to the director by every "factory, foundry or 
machine shop or other manufacturing establishment doing business 
within this state." 65 All machines and machinery used in "manufactur-
ing, mechanical, and other establishments" must be "safely and securely" 
guarded to prevent injury to employees. In the alternative, notice of 
dangers must be posted when it is not possible to guard the equipment. 
The director may order necessary alterations, additions, or repairs to 
enforce compliance.66 Any person operating any machine which gener-
ates poisonous gases in its operation (this might embrace radioactive 
gaseous wastes) must provide the machine with a hood connected to a 
blower or suction fan. 67 Apparently, the director does not possess spe-
cific authority to promulgate generally applicable safety regulations, but 
he can order necessary alterations or additions to protect the health and 
safety of employees "of any establishment." 68 In this respect the situa-
tion in Missouri is somewhat similar to that prevailing in Michigan. 
There are special provisions relating to the prevention of occupational 
diseases in the Missouri statutes which are more or less applicable to 
the hazard associated with radioactive' materials. Every employer carry-
ing on any "work, trade or process which may produce any illness or 
disease peculiar to the work or process carried on, or which subjects the 
employee to the danger of illness or disease incident to such work, trade 
or process ... "shall provide approved and effective devices or methods 
to prevent industrial or occupational diseases.69 This statute would 
seem to embrace the uses of radioactive materials which involve radia-
tion hazards. Certain processes are declared especially dangerous to the 
health of employees. Included among them is any process involving cer-
tain enumerated metals "or any poisonous chemicals, minerals, acids, 
fumes, vapors, gases, or other substances," in which these substances 
are "generated or used, employed or handled by the employees in harm-
ful quantities, or under harmful conditions, or come in contact with in 
a harmful way. " 70 If radioisotopes are considered a "poisonous 
68 /d., §286.uo. 
64 /d., §292.010. 
65 I d., §291.090. 
66 /d., §292.020. 
6T /d., §2!)2.120. 
68Jd., §292.18o. 
69Jd., §2l)2.JOO. 
70 /d., §2!)2.310. 
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chemical," their use by employees would be within the letter of the 
statute. Radioactive materials may and probably will be considered 
"poisonous substances." 71 If these special provisions apply to an ~­
ployer, he must provide working clothes and "adequate and approved 
respirators." Moreover, employees subject to the hazards must be ex-
amined monthly by a physician.72 Employers subject to these special 
provisions must also provide sanitary and adequate dressing rooms and 
lavatories/8 maintain working areas in a sanitary condition," take 
prescribed measures to prevent and remove dust,n and post prescribed 
notices.7_8 The extent of the applicability of these provisions will have to 
be worked out from time to time as occupational hazards result from the 
radioactive substances. 
5· New Jersey 
The statutes of New Jersey do not precisely define the extent of the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Industry, but apparently 
it is broad enough to include factories and other establishments as well 
as extending to the employment relationship, and the commissioner has 
a general rule-making authority to enforce provisions of the labor laws 
he administers. 11 Several statutes and regulations may possibly be rele-
vant to the use of radioactive materials. 
One New Jersey statute requires that every person "engaging in any 
productive industry within the supervision of the department" shall 
register with the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.78 An occupa-
tional disease statute provides : "Every employer shall, without cost to 
his employees, provide reasonably effective devices, means and methods 
to prevent the contraction by them of any illness or disease incident to 
the work or process in which they are engaged." 78 Certain special 
precautions are necessary with respect to especially dangerous processes, 
but these are so defined as to include only those relating to the manu-
71 See St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Jones, 70 F.2d 475 (1934) and Langeneckert v. St. 
Louis Sulphur & Chemical Co. (Mo. App. 1933) 65 S.W ..2d 648, for broad interpre-
tations of the word "poisonous." 
7 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. §292.330. 
TBJd., §292.J6o. 
u I d.~ §292.J8o. 
15 /d., §292.J90. 
16ld., §292420. 
11 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §34: 1-20, as incorporated by §34: 1A-6 (Cum. Supp. 1948-
1950). See also id., §34: 1A-3(e). 
18Jd., §34: 6-141. 
19 /d., §34: 6-48. 
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facture of certain lead compounds.80 Other statutes require proper ven-
tilation to render harmless any gases, vapors, dust, or other impurities 
injurious to health that may be generated in any manufacturing estab-
lishment,81 and for proper safeguards to be placed on all machinery.82 
Existing regulations of the New Jersey Department of Labor and 
Industry include a listing of "permissible concentration limits of vapors, 
gases, fumes, mists, dusts and radiant· energy" applicable to "all places 
of employment." 83 In these regulations, radiant energy is defined as 
"energy derived from radio-active substances or shortwave radiation 
which, upon exposure, may have a toxic and injurious effect on the 
body." These limits, which are discussed in Chapter V of this Part, do 
not conform with the current standards of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion or the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measure-
ment. In 1954 and 1955 the New Jersey Department of Labor and In-
dustry indicated that it was in the process of formulating comprehensive 
rules and regulations to cover all types of radiation hazards.84 These 
regulations were to follow the recommended standards of the National 
Committee on Radiation. Protection and Measurement, except that a 
qualifying board was to be appointed to review applicants for certifica-
tion. Furthermore, a substantial filing fee, based on the value of the 
installation, was to be exacted so that, in effect, the proposed New Jersey 
code would establish a licensing system for users of radiation sources. 
It does not appear that these regulations have. been promulgated. 
The Public Health Council of New Jersey, an official state agency 
having jurisdiction over general public health problems, has promul-
gated regulations relating to radiation. In the Sanitary Code, it is pro-
vided that "X-ray machines and all other sources of radiation shall be 
shielded, transported, handled, used and kept in such manner as to pre-
vent users thereof and all persons within effective range thereof from 
being exposed to excessive dosage of radiation." 85 Maximum expo-
sures, however, are not prescribed.86 
80 I d., §34 : 6-49. 
81/d., §34: 6-61. 
82 /d., §34: 6-62. 
sa State and Federal Labor Laws, New Jersey Edition, 434 (1953). 
84 Letters from J. Lyman Brown, Deputy Commissioner, N.J. Dept. of Labor & 
Industry, March 9, 1954, June I, 1955. 
85 N.J. State Sanitary Code, June 22, 1953, pamphlet, p. 22. 
se New Jersey labor regulations also require that safety committees be organized in 
plants under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Industry. These com-
mittees supervise safety inspection work, devise methods to avoid accidents, and insure 
that new employees are properly instructed as to hazards and that employees are 
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6. New York 
New York's Department of Labor, headed by an Industrial Commis-
sioner,87 contains the Board of Standards and Appeals 88 which has 
broad authority to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate various 
provisions of the labor laws.89 Rules may be made to minimize personal 
injuries and diseases and to require "reasonable and adequate" protec-
tion for the lives, health, and safety of employees.90 Rules adopted by 
the board constitute the Industrial Code.91 
New York statutes also require the registration of "factories" with 
the Industrial Commissioner.92 In addition, there are provisions requir-
ing the guarding of machinery in factories,93 and others requiring ade-
quate ventilation and removal of "gases, fumes, vapors, fibers or other 
impurities" from factories. 94 However, "power houses, generating 
plants and other structures owned or operated by a public service cor-
poration or a municipal corporation other than ·construction or repair 
shops, subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission" 
are excluded from the definition of factory. 95 Therefore, an atomic 
energy installation used exclusively to generate electrical energy would 
seemingly not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commis-
sioner over "factories." 
However, it seems probable that the Board of Standards and Appeals 
could make certain rules applicable to atomic energy power plants, even 
though such plants would not be subject to the provisions relating to 
"factories," for it is provided that: "Whenever the board finds that any 
industry, trade, occupation or process involves such elements of danger 
. to the lives, health, or safety of persons employed therein as to require 
special regulation for the protection of such persons . . . ," the board 
may make rules to guard against these dangers by requiring licenses, by 
educated in safety practices. Safety inspectors are required, and weekly safety inspec-
tions must be made. Slightly different regulations apply to three categories of plants: 
I to so employees, ISO to soo employees, and over soo employees. There are other 
requirements as to first aid facilities, emergency hospital, and a dispensary, including 
the items of equipment that must be on hand in each of these units. State and Federal 
Labor Laws, New Jersey Edition,.493-SOO (I9SJ). 
87 N.Y. Labor Law §10. 
88 /d., §12-a. 
89 /d., §Z?-a. 
90 /d., §28(1). 
91 /d., §§29. 200. 
92 /d., §2SO. 
93 /d., §2S6. 
94 /d., §299. 
95/d., §2(9). 
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requmng medical supervision of persons employed, and by "other 
appropriate means." 96 It is the opinion of tne counsel to the Labor 
Department that this provision authorizes the board to make rules ap-
plicable to power plants even though th~y are subject to the general 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. 97 
Under this provision, the Board of Standards and Appeals of the 
State Department of Labor has, in fact, issued regulations relating to 
radiation protection.98 The code, effective December 15, 1955, is very 
extensive, and its purpose is to offer reasonable and adequate protec-
tion in "every place where any employee in the course of his work may 
be exposed to radiation in excess of one tenth the permissible weekly 
dose" except medical, dental, veterinary, and educational institutions, 
clinics, and officers which are subject to the provisions of the Sanitary 
Code.99 The provisions of both the Labor and the Sanitary Codes, which 
apply to sources of radiation, are discussed and compared in Chapter V. 
Since the New York State Department of Health has also issued 
regulations covering ionizing radiation, it should also be noted at this 
point that the Division of Industrial Hygiene in the Department of 
Labor administers all laws relating to industrial hygiene for the De-
partment of Health.100 But when a condition resulting from the opera-
tion of a business, plant, or public utility constitutes a threat to the 
general public health, as distinguished from that of employees only, 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Health will probably be para-
mount.101 Furthermore, the regulations of the Labor Department do 
not apply to hospitals, medical clinics, dental offices, podiatry offices, 
veterinary clinics, educational institutions, and commercial, private, or 
research laboratories performing diagnostic procedures or handling 
equipment of material for medical use which are subject to the provi-
sions of the New York State Sanitary Code promulgated by the Health 
Department.102 
96Jd., §28(2). 
97 Quotation in letter from Irving R. Tabershaw, Director, Division of Industrial 
Hygiene, N.Y. Dept. of Labor, March 25, 1954-
98 N.Y. Industrial Code Rule No. 38. 
88 N.Y. Public Health Law, Appendix, State Sanitary Code, c. XVI. 
100 Federal Security Agency, "Directory of State and Territorial Health Authorities 
-1952," 39; letter from Earl W. Murray, Counsel, N.Y. Dept. of Health, Feb. 15,1954-
1o1 People ex rel. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Willcox, 200 N.Y. 
423. 94 N.E. 212 (I9II). 
102 N.Y. Industrial Code No. 38, Reg. JS-6. 
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7· Ohio 
The Ohio Department of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over 
"every employment and place of employment .... " 103 It has the duty, 
among others, to administer and enforce the general laws of Ohio re-
lating to "manufacturing" and "electrical" establishments and all other 
laws protecting the life, health, safety, and welfare of employees.'04 
Statutes require that the employer furnish safe employment; i.e., furnish 
and use safety devices, safeguards, methods, and processes which will 
protect employees. 106 
All shops and factories, which are defined to include manufacturing 
and electrical establishments/06 are subject to inspection by personnel 
of the Division of Workshops and Factories, and the division may or-
der the owners of these establishments to correct dangerous, unhealthy, 
or unsanitary conditions.107 Furthermore, numerous requirements are 
imposed on owners and operators of shops and factories relating to 
safety precautioils/08 accident reports/09 notices to be posted on dan-
gerous machinery,110 and additional safety rules.111 
Although independent of the Department of Industrial Relations, the 
key rule-making agency in matters of employee health and safety ap-
pears to be the Industrial Commission,112 which has broad authority to 
adopt rules and regulations prescribing safety devices, safeguards, or 
other means or methods to protect the life, health, and safety of em-
ployees.118 
It should be noted at this point that the Ohio Department of Health 
promulgated regulations in 1947 for the prevention and control of dis-
eases resulting from toxic fumes, vapors, mists, gases, and dusts ap-
plicable to every place of employment.m One regulation provides that 
"No employer shall use or permit to be used in the conduct of his busi-
1oa Ohio Rev. Code §4101.03. 
104 Jd., §4101.02(B). 
105 I d., §§4101.11, 4101.12. 
108 I d., §4107.01. 
107 ld., §4107-07· 
108 I d., §4107.23. 
109 I d., §4107.13. 
110 I d., §4107.25. 
111 I d., §4107.26. 
112 The Industrial Commission is not a part of the Department of Industrial Rela-
tions, Ohio Rev. Code §121.04, but apparently the Industrial Commission performs the 
rule-making functions for the department. See §§4101.o6, 4121.22. See also, §§4121.02 
to 4121.09 for establishment and organization of the Industrial Commission. 
113 I d., §4121.13. 
114 Mimeographed regulations of the Ohio Dept. of Health. 
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ness, manufacturing establishment or other place of employment, any 
process, material or condition known to have an adverse effect on health, 
unless reasonable provisions have been made to prevent injury to the 
health of the employees and of the public." 115 Radiation exposures are 
limited too. 1 roentgen per day,116 which was the old standard. Regula-
tions also exist with respect to ventilation,111 personal protective equip-
ment,118 isolation of hazardous operations,119 and posting notices and 
giving periodic instruction to employees regarding radiation hazards.120 
However, these Ohio Department of Health regulations do not contain 
the amplification of standards contained in detail in California and New 
York regulations. The failure to include standards in respect to h_an-
dling, storage, and disposal of radioactive materials and to provide a 
more detailed listing of permissible exposures can be attributed largely 
to the fact that the Ohio regulations were adopted when relatively little 
technological information was available. Nonetheless, the action of the 
Ohio Department of Health in respect to places of employment coupled 
with the seemingly broad jurisdiction of the Ohio Department of In-
dustrial Relations in respect to matters of employee health and safety 
further demonstrates the confusion in jurisdiction over atomic energy 
affairs among several state agencies. 
8. Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania the situation is somewhat confused by the existence 
of both a Department of Labor and Industry having broad rule-making 
powers and an Industrial Board 121 which not only has rule-making 
powers of its own 122 but also must approve or disapprove all regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Labor and Industry.128 
The most important legislation is the Health and Safety Act of 
1937,124 which grants the Department of Labor and Industry power 
to make rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of the act. 
The statute extends to every "establishment" in the state, which. is de-
115 I d., Reg. 247. 
110 Ibid. 
117 Jd., Reg. 248, 249. 
11s !d., Reg. 251. 
11s I d., Reg. 252. 
12o !d., Reg. 254-
121 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §§13, 63. 
122 !d., §§1442, 1443, 1444. 
128 I d., §§565, 574· 
124 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§25-1 to 25-15. 
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fined as "any room, building or place . . . where persons are employed 
... except farms or private dwellings .... " 125 All establishments 
must be "constructed, equipped, arranged, operated, and conducted as 
to provide reasonable and adequate protection for the life, limb, health, 
safety, and morals of all persons employed therein." 126 All toxic and 
noxious dusts, fumes, vapors, and other atmospheric impurities which 
create a condition of danger to employees must be removed, or if that 
is impractical, employees must wear personal protective devices.127 Rec-
ognizing hazards of ~adioactivity, in 1953 the Pennsylvania legislature 
added the underlined words to the following provision : 
When employees, due to the nature of employment, are 
subject to injury from flying particles, falling objects, sharp 
or rough surfaces or materials, hot, corrosive or poisonous 
substances, acids or caustics and injurious light rays or harm-
ful radioactive materials, they shall be provided with and shall 
wear goggles, other head and eye protectors; gloves, leggings, 
and other personal protective devices.128 
Other Pennsylvania statutes require proper ventilation, sanitation, 129 
and proper guarding of machinery 180 in all establishments within the 
state. Thus, in Pennsylvania, as in other states, there are several possi-
bly applicable statutes governing atomic energy health and safety prob-
lems, and at least two state agencies apparently have rule-making power 
so that inconsistent regulations may prove overly burdensome on the 
new atomic energy industry. 
In 1955 the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry indi-
cated that it intended to issue a comprehensive set of radiation health 
and safety regulations to protect persons within its jurisdiction,181 but 
it was subsequently decided to establish an "Interdepartmental Com-
mittee and prepare regulations in which both the Department of Labor 
and Industry will be vitally interested. . . . It is the intent of the Inter-
departmental Committee to have the Department of Health police the 
regulations and the Department of Labor and Industry enforce 
them." 182 As of February of 1958 no regulations had been promulgated 
by this committee. 
125fd., §25-1. 
126fd., §25-2(a). 
127 ld., §25-2(e). 
12Bfd., §25-2(h). 
1 29 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§19, 25-3. 
130 I d., §§ 19, 25-7-
131 Letter from John R. Torquato, Secretary of Labor and Industry, June 2, 1955. 
182 Letter .from William L. Batt, Jr., Secretary of Labor and Industry, Feb. 17, 1958. 
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9· Texas 
Texas has not created an industrial board or commission with au-
thority to adopt rules and regulations establishing health and safety 
standards for employees. There is, however, a Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, headed by a Commissioner 188 whose duties involve the gathering 
of data, making reports, and reporting to the appropriate authority the 
violation of any law with respect to employment.184 Under a chapter 
entitled "Protection of Female Employees" are found several pro-
visions which require that factories and establishments be kept free 
from poisonous or noxious gases and injurious dust arising from any 
process/85 and that wastes be removed and disposed of "in such manner 
as not to cause a nuisance." 186 The Commissioner of Labor Statistics 
is authorized to inspect any factory or other establishment where five 
or more persons are employed and to require the correction of any un-
sanitary or dangerous condition.181 But since the title of the statute 
embracing these provisions refers to the health, safety, and comfort of 
employees of establishments where females are employed, this statute 
may only be applicable to plants or establishments which employ women, 
even though the body of the statute does not seem thus to limit its ap-
plicability.188 Hence, the extent of the authority of the Commissioner 
of Labor Satistics is not clear from a study of the statutes. 
However, the Texas State Department of Health has general rule-
making authority to require that industrial establishments provide ade-
quate protection for the health and safety of workers.139 A statute 
administered by the State Department of Health provides that no em-
ployer shall use in the conduct of any place of employment "any process, 
material, or condition known to have any possible adverse effect on 
the health of any person . . . employed therein unless arrangements 
have been made to maintain the occupational environment to the extent 
that such injury will not result." 140 The Department of Health is re-
quired to make available information concerning maximum allowable 
concentrations of toxic gases and concerning environmental standards 
188 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 5144. 
184 /d., arts. 5145-5149. 
136 /d., art. 5174. 
186 /d., art. 5175. 
137 /d., art. 5179· 
188 See Texas Laws, Fourth Sess. 1918, p. 132. 
t89 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4477-1, §19(c), as interpreted in a letter from V. M. Ehlers, 
Director, Bureau of Sanitary Engineering, Tex. State Dept. of Health, March I, 1954. 
uo Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4477-1, §19(a). 
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which pertain to the health and safety of employees of industrial es-
tablishments.141 Pursuant to the above authority, the Department of 
Health issued Regulations on Radiation Exposure which became effec-
tive in September of 1956. These regulations, which are discussed in 
Chapter V, follow the recommendations of the National Committee on 
Radiation Protection and Measurement. 
10. Wisconsin 
In Wisconsin under the act which establishes the Industrial Com-
mission,142 it is made the statutory duty of every employer to furnish 
a safe place of employment and to do everything reasonably necessary 
to protect the "life, health, safety, and welfare" of employees and "fre-
quenters." 143 The terms "place of employment" and "employment" are 
defined broadly to include all activity wherein any person is, directly or 
indirectly, employed by another for direct or indirect gain or profit, 
except in private domestic services and agricultural operations.144 
The Industrial Commission has been given very broad rule-making 
powers to ascertain and determine reasonable safety devices and safe-
guards and to adopt standards to protect employees and "frequenters" 
of places of employment.w It is further provided that local regulatory 
bodies, such as city councils or boards of health, shall not be deprived 
of power over places of employment, but in case of conflict with an 
order of the Industrial Commission, the latter shall amend or modify 
the local order .148 
Unquestionably, the Industrial Commission would have jurisdiction 
over an atomic power plant built in Wisconsin. Moreover, the fact that 
such a plant would be subject to the Wisconsin Public Service Commis-
sion seemingly has no effect on the powers of the Industrial Commission 
over the same plant.147 As was noted earlier, the Industrial Commission 
and the Public Service Commission collaborate in the preparation and 
administration of regulations affecting electric utility plants. 
141 ld., §19(b). 
142 Wis. Stat. (1957) §§IOI.OI it seq. 
143 I d., §IoJ.(J6. A "frequenter" is a person other than an employee who may be in 
a place of employment "under circumstances which render him other than a trespasser." 
Jd., §101.01(5). 
W•Jd., §IOI.OI(l), (2). 
H5 /d., §§IOI.IO(J), (4), (5); §101.09. 
U6Jd., §IOI.I6(I). 
147 Letter received from 0, T. Nelson, Director of Safety and Sanitation, Wisconsin 
Industrial Commission, dated Feb. 19. 1954. 
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The Industrial Commission has adopted a .number of regulations 
relating to industrial safety which would be applicable to uses of radio-
active materials.148 An order prescribing maximum permissible expo-
sures, as amended April 2, 1954, stipulates 0.3 roentgen per week.149 
Uranium is included on the list of toxic dusts, fumes, and mists, and the 
allowable limit for uranium in soluble compounds is 0.05 milligrams 
per cubic meter and 0.2 5 milligrams per cubic meter in insoluble com-
pounds. m Other regulations require adequate ventilation, protection 
from dusts, proper disposal of exhaust materials, and personal protec-
tive devices. 151 Many other regulations are in force relating to specific 
operations or specific hazards.152 · 
As with other states it is apparent that more than one agency has 
jurisdiction to promulgate regulations governing the health and safety 
of atomic energy operations. However, the cooperation between the 
· Public Service Commission and Industrial Commission in Wisconsin 
has served to ameliorate potentialities of inconsistent or overlapping 
regulations that may have a' detrimental effect on growth of atomic 
energy industrial pursuits. 
I I. Conclusion 
The analysis of the foregoing statutory provisions concerning labor 
safety regulatory agencies reveals that the statutes and regulations 
applicable to an atomic energy industry vary considerably from state to 
state, but that in all the states covered by this study some type of regula-
tory agency has been granted sufficient power to have some authority 
over users of nuclear power and radioisotopes. A failure on the part 
of persons entering the atomic field to assess existing and prospective 
statutes and regulations may lead to wasteful expenditures if basic rede-
signing or supplemental equipment are required subsequently by order 
of a state labor agency. The establishment of an atomic energy industry 
where a state agency has regulatory power, but has not yet exercised the 
power, will be even more difficult to handle, since a later adoption of 
regulations may even cause temporary suspension of operations. There-
fore, consultation with appropriate agencies appears advisable to de-
termine in advance the permissible scope of activity. 
us These regulations are available in pamphlet and mimeographed .form from the 
Industrial Commission. They will be cited simply by number. 
uo Order 2002. 
no Ibid. 
151 Orders 2003 to 2021. 
u2 See General Orders on Safety, Orders I to 83. 
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Undoubtedly the most significant aspect of the present state regula-
tory pattern is the conflict of jurisdiction of state agencies in matters 
of employee health and safety. Not only do the public utility commis-
sions typically have regulatory powers, but also labor departments and, 
in some instances, health departments are authorized to issue regulations 
relating to employees and places of employment. Moreover, as we 
progress to an examination of ( 1) the general powers of health depart-
ments in respect to the health and safety of members of the general 
public and ( 2) the powers of other typical state agencies, the confusing 
and overlapping jurisdictions of the several agencies will appear to have 
even a greater possibility of seriously impeding the exploitation of 
atomic energy if unreasonable duplication of effort is required on the 
part of the atomic energy industry. 
C. Health Departments and Boards 
All ten states selected for study have established state health depart-
ments and, in addition, ·have provided for various local boards of health. 
In the past, it would appear that the health departments have been 
primarily concerned with standards and measures to protect the general 
public, leaving specific safety regulations for employees to appropriate 
labor agencies. However, recent experience indicates that this may not be 
the case with respect to radiation hazards : of the seven comprehensive 
state radiation health and safety codes in effect as of April 1958, only 
two were promulgated by labor agencies, and, of the five issued by health 
departments, four are designed to protect empl9yees as well as the 
general public. 
Of all the state agencies which may regulate radiation hazards, the 
powers of the state health departments and boards appear to be the most 
significant. For the most part, the regulations of the departments of 
labor and the public utility commissions are limited in their application 
to places within the control of the person subject to the regulations. 
Quite obviously these boundaries are not recognized by either direct 
radiation or by disseminated radioactive materials which may contami-
nate the surface and underground waters, sewage systems, and the 
atmosphere of the state. Adequate employee protection standards do not 
necessarily assure that the health of the general public outside the radia-
tion installation will be safeguarded against radiation hazards caused by 
products containing radioactive materials or radioactive stack gases, 
for example. While it appears that the state health departments have 
the broadest health and safety powers and, therefore, are in the best 
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position to give radiation hazards the sort of comprehensive attention 
required, it is unfortunately difficult to draw a clear line of demarca-
tion between those matters which may be regulated by state health 
agencies and those matters which fall into the regulatory sphere of other 
state agencies. As is indicated in Chapter V of this Part, only New York 
has made any attempt to solve the jurisdictional problem, and that solu-
tion is not altogether satisfactory. Moreover, since both local boards 
of health and local legislative bodies may possess general powers over 
public health and safety, the problems created by overlapping jurisdic-
tion are compounded. 153 It is desirabl~, therefore, to examine the gen-
eral scope of the existing statutory powers of state and local health 
agencies, together with possible limitations thereon, in order to form 
some appraisal of the extent to which they will bear upon atomic 
enterprise. 
I. State Health Departments 
The state health departments of the ten states studied typically ha.ve 
"general supervision of the interests of the health and lives of the 
people of the state," 1114 and are given power "to adopt, promulgate, re-
peal and amend rules and regulations consistent with law for the pro-
tection of the public health." 11111 Under the Ohio statute conferring 
rule-making power on the Public Health Council, the Attorney Gen-
eral of Ohio has ruled that the council has authority to adopt regulations 
establishing maximum allowable conc~ntrations for substances used in 
industry which are dangerous to public health.166 As indicated in the 
discussion of labor department regulation, the Ohio Department of 
ns See Zullo v. Bd. of Health of Woodbridge Tp., 9 N.J. 431, 88 A.2d 625 (1952), 
indicating that a local board of health and a municipality had concurrent jurisdiction 
to regulate trailer camps. 
164 111. Rev. Stat. c. 127, §55.02. See also Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949), §192.020; Ohio 
Rev. Code §3701.13; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §1403, tit. 73, §532; Wis. Stat. (1957) 
§140.05(1). 
155 Cal. Health & Safety Code §102. Substantially similar provisions: Ill. Rev. 
Stat. c. III I/2, §22; Mich. Stat. Ann. §147; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 192.020 (the 
Missouri statute extends only to "infectious, contagious, communicable or dangerous 
diseases." A letter from the Missouri Division of Health, dated March 17, 1954, 
written by L. E. Ordelheide, Director, Bureau of Public Health Engineering, indicates 
that the Division of Health feels that it has authority under this statute to adopt 
regulations prescribing maximum radiation exposures although they have not yet done 
so); N.J. Rev. Stat. §26:xA-7 (Cum. Supp. 1945-47); N.Y. Public Health Law 
§225(3); Ohio Rev. Code §3701.34; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §532; Tex. Civ. Stat. 
art. 441&1; Wis. Stat. (1957) §I40.05(3). 
111e 1945 Op. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) #009. 
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Health has in fact issued regulations governing places of employment.m 
In Michigan an inter-office memorandum to the Attorney General stated 
that the State Commissioner of Health has sufficient powers to issue 
"regulations concerning persons dealing in or operating with radioac-
tive or fissionable materials." 158 As a result the commissioner has re-
cently promulgated health and safety regulations pertaining to all 
sources of ionizing radiation in Michigan.159 While the memorandum 
considered it doubtful if a registration requirement could be sustained 
under the existing powers, the Michigan regulations nevertheless con-
tain such a provision. In contrast, it apparently was believed necessary 
to extend the powers of the health departments in Colorado, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota to 
authorize them to regulate radiation hazards, for the legislatures of each 
of these states have recently enacted appropriate statutes. The Colo-
rado Board of Health is authorized "to establish and enforce standards 
for exposure to environmental conditions, including radiation, that may 
be deemed necessary for the protection of the public health." 160 In 
Connecticut the State Department of Health may incorporate into the 
Sanitary Code regulations governing the operation of any source of 
ionizing radiation or the production, transportation, storage, possession, 
or disposition of radioactive materials.181 These regulations are to be 
based on the standards of the Atomic Energy Commission or, in lieu 
thereof, upon the latest recommendations of the National Committee on 
Radiation Protection and Measurement. Registration requirements are 
specifically authorized. Massachusetts conferred a more limited author-
ity upon its Department of Public Health in a statute which directs it 
to "prescribe and establish rules and regulations to control the trans-
portation, storage, packaging, sale, distribution, production and dis-
posal of radioactive materials which may affect the public health," 182 
but the statute does not authorize the promulgation of regulations con-
cerning the use of radioactive materials. Similarly, sources of radiation 
which do not consist of radioactive materials are not covered. Fur-
thermore, the act specifically states that the powers of the Department 
UT Supra note II4-
158 Inter-office Memorandum to Attorney General T. M. Kavanaugh from Assistant 
Attorney General R. A. Derengoski regarding the rule-making powers of the State 
Commissioner of Health, dated Nov. 8, I955· 
159 Mich. Adm. Code (I954, Supp. No. IJ). These regulations are examined in 
detail in Part III, Chapter V, infra. 
18o Colo. Rev. Stat. §66-I-7(2I). 
161 Public Acts of Conn. I957, Public Act IS4. 
162 Mass. Ann. Laws c. I I I. 
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of Labor and Industries to establish regulations for the protection of 
the health and safety of employees against radiation hazards are not 
impaired. In 1958 the New Jersey legislature enacted a "Radiation 
Protection Act" establishing a Commission on Radiation Protection 
within the Department of Health and empowering the Commission to 
adopt rules and regulations to prohibit and prevent "unnecessary radia-
tion." 163 The New York Public Health Law was amended in 1955 to 
authorize the Department of Public Health to regulate the "public 
health aspects of the use of ionizing radiation and the handling and dis-
posal of radioactive wastes." 164 Similarly, the Oregon Board of Health 
in 1957 was directed to promulgate regulations and standards for the 
safe use, handling, disposal, and control of all radiation sources within 
the state after it had conducted a two-year study of the problems.165 
Finally, the South Dakota Department of Health is authorized to "de-
velop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation and de-
termination of hazards associated with the use of radiation" and to 
"adopt, promulgate, and enforce such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary." 166 These statutes are analyzed in greater detail in Chapter V 
of this Part as are the regulations of the health departments of Con-
necticut and New York, which were promulgated pursuant to the above 
authorization. 
Another general power commonly given to state departments of 
health is the power to investigate complaints involving nuisances or po-
tential hazards to life and health and to require the abatement of any 
such nuisance.167 In some states the abatement of nuisances is left to 
local boards of health.168 
For illustrative purposes, two statutes may be noted. In Ohio it is 
provided that any industrial establishment which produces industrial 
wastes must submit plans for the treatment and disposal of such wastes 
to the State Department of Health. These plans must be approved be-
fore the plant may be constructed.169 Under the California statutes, 
the State Department of Health is empowered to abate "contamina-
168 N.J. Laws 1958, c. n6. 
164 N.Y. Public Health Law §201 (1)(s). 
163 Ore. Laws 1957, c. 399. 
166 S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. 826. 
167 Cal. Health & Safety Code §2o6; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §26: 2-43; N.Y. Public 
Health Law §2o1(o), §§1300, 1301; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §1403; Wis. Stat. (1957) 
§146.14(1). 
168 For detailed provisions, see below. 
169 Ohio Rev. Code §3701.19. 
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tion." 170 "Contamination" is defined as a condition which results from 
the disposal of industrial wastes of such a nature as to create an actual 
hazard to the public health.171 Contamination is also made a crime.172 
These two statutes illustrate the two different approaches to the prob-
lem; i.e., advance approval on the one hand and subsequent action on 
the other. 
Other states considered in this study have not yet adopted radio-
logical health regulations, but some of them use as a guide to determine 
the existence of possible health hazards the standards adopted by the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists or by 
official bodies such as the United States Public Health Service, the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards, or the Atomic Energy Commission.173 
2. Local Health Agencies 
Each of the ten states examined in this study has also established 
some form of health regulation at the city and county levels. In addi-
tion, many states have provided for the organization of township health 
boards and health districts which may be comprised of nearly any possi-
ble combination of political subdivisions. Usually these local health 
boards are invested with powers very similar to those of the state 
health departments, except that the territorial jurisdiction of the 
local health agency, of course, is limited, and the local health board is 
normally subject to the paramount authority of the state department 
of health.174 As might be expected, there is considerable divergence in 
the types of health boards authorized by the various statutes. However, 
the powers conferred on the agencies appear to be somewhat similar, 
whether the boards are established at the city, township, county, or a 
hybrid district level. 
a. Cities 
In some states incorporated cities and towns are given authority to 
pass such ordinances as may be deemed necessary fo-r the protection of 
the health of the inhabitants.175 Other states authorize the creation of 
110 Cal. Health & Safety Code §$412. 
171Jd., §S4IO(e). 
172Jd., §5461. 
173 Letter from L. E. Ordelheide, Director, Bureau of Public Health Engineering 
(Missouri) March 17, 1954. 
174 See, e.g., N .]. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) §26: 3-64; Pa. Code Ann. tit. 71, §14o6. 
176 Cal. Health & Safety Code §soo; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 24. §§23-81, 42-1 et seq.; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §§S.IJJI, s.IJJ7, 5·1757; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§7I.78o, 7J.IIO(Io), 
74.133(1), 77.56o; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §§38oo-II, 9673, 13329; Tex. Civ. Stat. arts. 
1015, 1072. 
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city health boards which are invested with powers to make rules and 
regulations necessary for the protection and preservation of the public 
health.176 It is possible that an industry located within the corporate 
limits of a municipality may even be subject to regulation both by mu-
nicipal ordinance adopted by the city council and by administrative regu-
lation promulgated by a local health board.177 Only detailed examina-
tion of the regulations applicable in any given area can resolve the 
complexities of the situation. 
b. Counties 
Again the statutory provisions are diverse. In Texas and Missouri 
health regulation at the county level is not very extensive. In Texas 
the statutes provide that a "City-County Health Unit" may be formed 
in any county containing an incorporated city which has a population 
of not less than 90,000 nor more than 120,000.118 The City-County 
Board of Health is authorized to make rules and regulations "to pro-
mote and preserve the health of the county." 179 Apparently, this is the 
only instance of county health regulation in Texas. In Missouri rule-
making power over public health matters is granted to the county court 
(a governing body) but only in counties having an assessed valuation 
of $3oo,ooo,ooo or more.180 
Each of the remaining eight states covered by this study provides for 
some form of health regulation either by a county health board or by 
the governing body of the county. In California and Illinois the gov-
erning body of each county is given power to adopt ordinances and 
regulations for the protection of the public health.181 In Ohio town-
ships and villages in each county constitute a general health district,182 
and the board of health of a general health district "may make such 
orders and regulations as are necessary for . . . the public health, the 
prevention or restriction of disease, and the prevention, abatement, or 
suppression of nuisances." 188 County health boards in Michigan, New 
176 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 24, §42-5; Mich. Stat. Ann. §5.1764; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) 
§26: 3-64; N.Y. Public Health Law §§3o8(e), 371; Ohio Rev. Code §3709.20; Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §12198-2307; Wis. Stat. (1957) §141.01(5). 
177 See Zullo v. Bd. of Health of Woodbridge Tp., supra note 153. 
us Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4436a-1, §1. 
179 ld., §2. 
18o Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §192.300. 
181 Cal. Health & Safety Code §450; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 34. §§25, 148, 149. 
182 Ohio Rev. Code §3709.01. 
188 /d., §37Q9.21. 
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Jersey, New York, and ·wisconsin are given authority to promulgate 
rules and regulations to protect the public health .. 184 
The power to abate or suppress nuisances is normally a corollary of 
th~ rule-making power. In 1951 Pennsylvania passed a rather elaborate 
"Local Health Administration Act." 185 This act, applicable to all but 
first-class counties/86 authorizes the creation of county or joint-county 
departments of health 187 which are given broad rule-making power to 
make regulations "for the prevention of disease, for the prevention 
and removal of conditions which constitute a menace to health, and for 
the promotion and preservation of the public health generally." 188 In 
1943 Illinois passed a somewhat similar act providing for county or 
multiple-county public health departments. 189 However, under this act, 
the county health board recommends to the county governing board the 
adoption of ordinances, rules, and regulations necessary to promote and 
protect public health, which latter board has power to promulgate the 
ordinances, rules, and regulations.190 
c. Townships 
In at least four states township boards of health may also exist. In 
Michigan each township board is a board of health,191 with authority 
to make regulations concerning nuisances or causes of sickness and to 
abate nuisances.192 Likewise in Illinois and New Jersey rule-making 
powers may be exercised by township boards of health.193 In Pennsyl-
vania the governing authorities of townships are empowered to make 
such regulations as may be deemed necessary for the health and safety 
of the inhabitants of the township.m 
d. Health Districts 
Many states also authorize the consolidation of political subdivisions 
into "hybrid" health districts. For example, California provides that a 
18• Mich. Stat. Ann. §§I4..I6I, 14..166; N.J. Rev. Stat. ( 1937) §26: 11-26; N.Y. Public 
Health Law §§Jo8(e), 347; Wis. Stat. (1957) §140.og(6). 
185 For a general discussion of this act, see Stahl and Earley, "The Pennsylvania 
Local Health Administration Law.of 1951," 13 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 232 (1952). 
186 This excludes only Philadelphia, id. at 248. 
187 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, §4205. 
188/d., §4211 (c). 
189 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III I/2, §§20e el seq. 
190 /d., §20e13; id., C. 34, §25.12. 
191 Mich. Stat. Ann. §14..61. 
192/d., §§14..63, 14.,68. 
193 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 34, §§148, 149; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§26 :3-9, 26:3-64, 26:3-47. 
1e• Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §19093-702 (XXIX). 
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local health district may be formed from either incorporated or unin-
corporated territory of one or more counties.195 Illinois authorizes 
towns or road districts to be combined to form "public health dis-
tricts." 196 Rule-making power is not given by express statutory pro-
vision to the governing boards of either of these types of districts, but 
by liberal statutory interpretation they may be deemed to have such 
power.191 In Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin political subdivisions may join· in the creation of a consolidated 
health district, consisting of two or more counties, two or more munici-
palities, or two or more existing health districts. 198 In New Y ark "part-
county health districts" may be established in counties containing one 
or more cities having a population of so,ooo or more. The cities them-
selves are excluded from such districts.199 These health districts which 
are merely combinations of other health districts or counties have the 
same powers as the component elements had before combination. 
3· Conclusion 
This somewhat cursory examination of state and local health agencies 
and their powers is sufficient to indicate that an atomic energy entre-
preneur will assuredly be confronted with a legion of health boards, 
commissions, and agencies when he embarks upon his atomic enter-
prise. He should consult with both state and local health agencies at the 
earliest possible planning stage. In spite of the fact that few of these 
agencies have established regulations governing the use of radioactive 
and fissionable materials, the legal power to do so exists. Therefore, 
the entrepreneur will necessarily have' to assume the burden of ascer-
taining to the best of his ability the probable scope of health regulation. 
As an initial proposition, it would appear advisable to err on the side 
of safety by installing all proved types of safety equipment designed 
for the protection of the public health. However, prohibitive costs may 
constitute a substantial deterrent to following that course of action, and 
the possibility will always remain that subsequent administrative regu-
lations may result in the necessity of expensive changes in equipment or 
manner of operation. . 
195 Cal. Health & Safety Code §903. 
198 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III I/2, §I. . 
197 Cal. Health & Safety Code §936; Ill. Stat.' Ann. c. Iii I/2, §17(3). 
1 9 8 Mich. Stat. Ann. §I4.I67; N.J. Rev. Stat. §26: 3A1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1951-52); 
Ohio Rev. Code §§3709.07, 3709.10; Pa. Code Ann. tit. 16, §4205; Wis. Stat. (1957) 
§140.09(I) (a). , · 
·199 N.Y. Public Health Law §340(2); 
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The burden thus placed on new atomic energy ventures to guess the 
extent of future health regulation suggests, of course, that the state 
and local health agencies should be induced to adopt extensive regula-
tions as promptly as feasible. However, a general unfamiliarity with 
atomic energy health hazards prevails among state and local officials, 
and reliable scientific data as to the effect of radiation on human life is 
not yet available. Moreover, the technical nature of the requirements 
of standards adequate to afford safety against radiation is not gen-
erally understood although knowledge is increasing rapidly. These 
factors would seem to necessitate an attitude of extreme caution on the 
part of state and local health officials. Unduly burdensome health regu-
lations may serve to delay or even prevent the establishment of a new 
industry in the community. On the other hand, too lax regulations· may 
result in serious impairment of public health and safety. This dilemma 
is not one that is easily resolved, but on balance. we are led to the con-
clusion that the wiser course is to avoid the promulgation of exhaustive 
health standards until such time as more reliable scientific data is avail-
able. Meanwhile, general regulations not only may provide a sufficiently 
definite pattern to justify industrial expenditures but they also may be 
adaptable to changing conditions. 
D. Summary of State Health and Safety Regulations 
The foregoing examination of the health and safety regulatory agen-
cies and powers of the ten selected states makes it evident that in each 
state at least one, and in most cases, two or more state or local agencies 
have been given by statute sufficient power to regulate health and safety 
conditions for atomic energy enterprises. It is true that the precise rea-
sons for conferring jurisdiction upon a labor department differ from 
those which result in the power being given to a health department or 
a public service commission .. The labor department is primarily con-
cerned with health and safety of employees; the health department is 
primarily concerned with the health and safety of the general populace; 
and the public service commission is responsible for the conservation of 
public interests in connection with public utilities and their operation. 
The regulations evolved by the different agencies for these separate pur-
poses may happen to be identical or they may be so divergent as to be 
absolutely impossible of simultaneous achievement. When the latter 
situation prevails, and it is very likely to happen unless proper coopera-
tive measures are taken, atomic energy enterprises will find themselves 
operating in violation of at least one set of valid regulations and as a 
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result becoming subject to consequent penalties. Then, too, there will 
be the very considerable waste of effort by the state and the regulated 
industry. Of course, the potentiality of inconsistent regulation by dif-
ferent state and local agencies already exists for industries other than 
atomic, but it generally has been avoided in fact by cooperative efforts 
among the several agencies. It is to be hoped, and perhaps expected, 
that the agencies will cooperate in a similar manner in regard to atomic 
affairs, and that they will adopt regulations which will be consistent 
and not impose insuperable burdens upon a new industry. 
Chapter IV 
MISCELLANEOUS REGULATION 
A. Disposal of Wastes 
Many industrial processes require the disposal of large quantities of 
noxious waste materials in the course of their operations. Since im-
proper disposal of industrial wastes may endanger the health, safety, 
or comfort of persons or may be detrimental to property rights, special 
types of governmental regulation have been evolved to control such 
action. In the interests of public health, many states have established 
water pollution control programs which may restrict the disposal of 
certain types of industrial wastes. Also, in the. interests of conserva• 
tion, laws are frequently enacted protecting fish and wildlife by pro-
hibiting the discharge of harmful or poisonous substances into waters 
of the state, and such laws may serve indirectly to regulate waste dis-
posal. The prevention and abatement of air pollution in some states, 
especially in metropolitan areas, is another type of regulation of dis-
posal of industrial waste products. Finally, the law of public and pri-
vate nuisance, affording remedies to. public officials as well as private 
individuals, may be invoked to restrict or prohibit the discharge of waste 
materials produced in industrial processes. 
Waste products created in operations involving the use of atomic 
energy are unique and potentially even more dangerous than ordinary 
industrial wastes since they may contain substantial amounts of radio-
activity. Radioactive wastes produced in reactor operation or in other 
utilization of atomic energy may be found in the form of either solids, 
liquids, or gases. Since either existing. or future regulation of indus-
trial waste disposal will no doubt embrace the disposal of radioactive 
wastes as well, an examination of the various types of regulation is 
desirable. 
The subject of radioactive wa.Ste disposal has received express legis-
lative or administrative attention in a number of states recently. In 
California "no person shall bury, throw away, or in any manner dis-
pose of radioactive wastes in such a manner as to endanger the lives 
or health of human beings." 1 The California Department of Public 
Health is authorized to issue written orders prohibitiitg dispositions in 
1 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§256oo to 25004. 
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violation of this statute and to seek injunctions against violators of 
these orders. Similarly, the South Dakota Department of Health is 
authorized to "issue, modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or abating 
the discharge of radioactive material or waste into the ground, air, or 
waters of the state." 2 Violations of these orders are deemed misde-
meanors upon each day in which they occur.8 Since the term "radio-
active materials" may be construed to include radioactive wastes under 
the laws of Connecticut,' Massachusetts,6 New York,6 and Oregon,7 
persons disposing of radioactive wastes in these· states are subject to 
the appropriate regulations of the respective health departments. In 
Wisconsin the county board of each county with a population of soo,ooo 
or more is authorized to regulate the discharge of radioactive materials 
into the open air.8 The problem of radioactive waste disposal has re-
ceived administrative attention in the health department regulations of 
Connecticut,9 Michigan/0 New York,11 Perinsylvania,12 and Texas.13 
The above· mentioned statute~ and regulations are discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter V of this Part. 
I. Water Pol~ution Regulation 
· Liquid radioactive wastes may result from several possible opera-
tions, including using water as a reactor coolant, u processing radioactive 
materials by chemical means, and .using radioisotopes in industry and 
laboratories.16 If these wastes find their way into streams, they may 
become potential health hazards by invading domestic water supplies or 
by affecting fish or vegetation. 
2 S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. 826, §4(7) • 
. 8 ld., §9. . 
' Conn. Public· Acts 1957, Public· Act I 54, §2. 
• s Mass. Ann. Laws. c. x1i, §5:8: : . 
- 6 N.Y. Public Health Law §2o1(1)(s).· 
'·ore. Laws I957, c. 399. §3. . 
s Wis. Stat. (1957) §59.07(53). . 
D Conn. Sanitary Code c. Ill, §18I-I-z87, §M. 
10 Mich. Adm. Code 1954, Supp. No. 13, R 325.1312. 
· n N.Y. Sanitary Code c. XVI, Reg. 9· 
12 Regulation 433, Radiation Protection, Pa. Dept. of Health, §14. 
1a Regulations on Radiation Exposure, Texas Dept. of·Health, §14. 
u Water used as a coolant becomes contaminated with radioactivity, creating a form 
of water pollution. At the Hanford AEC installation the water is held in a basin to 
permit decay of most of the radiation picked up by the soluble salts in the water before 
it is returned to the Columbia River. AEC, "Handling of Radioactive Wastes in the 
Atomic Energy Program," 7 (1951). 
16 Jd. at 15-17. 
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Because pollution of streams and lakes from sewage and industrial 
wastes has become a very serious problem, statutes regulating water 
pollution have been enacted in most states. Water pollution boards or 
commissions, often associated with the state health departments, have 
been created by many of the states covered by this study. Some of the 
boards are given administrative discretion to determine what constitutes 
"pollution." Some statutes apparently define industrial wastes broadly 
enough to encompass radioactive wastes. Many states require that per-
mits be obtained from the water pollution board before wastes of any 
kind may be discharged into waters of the state. Moreover, nearly every 
state has a statute which absolutely prohibits the discharge of "harm-
ful" or "poisonous" substances into the waters of the state. In the 
event that deleterious substances likely to injure fish or wildlife are dis-
charged into waters, conservation laws may be involved. Criminal sanc-
tions may attach, or perhaps permits from conservation commissions 
may be necessary. 
Solid radioactive wastes include the products of fission taken from 
atomic reactors together with such items as contaminated clothing, con-
taminated metals used as equipment, pipes, or shielding, contaminated 
buildings, and residues from the incineration of radioactive wastes. The 
control of many of these hazards lies within the sphere of state agencies 
having jurisdiction over matters of health and safety. However, several 
statutes, notably those of California, Ohio, artd Texas, cover industrial 
waste disposal irrespective of whether water pollution is involved. 
Because of the differences in the regulatory pattern of the ten states 
examined in this study with respect to the regulation of industrial waste 
disposal, water pollution, and the role o£ the conservation department, a 
state-by-state analysis will again be. necessary. 
a. NewYork 
In.1949 New York enacted a rather comprehensive program of water . 
p<;>ilution' control. T~e. Water Pollution Control Board, created within 
the ·Department of Health, is given wide administrative discretion with 
respect to fixing standards of water purity, the classification of vari-
ous waters, etc.16 A general prohibition against pollution· makes it un-
lawful to discharge any organic or inorganic matter into waters of the 
state .that· will cause or contribute to a condition in contravention 'Of 
standards adopted by the board.17 
te N.Y. Public Health Law §1209. 
17 /d., §1220. 
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A significant feature of the New York statute is the licensing power 
granted to the board. Subject to a few minor exceptions, it is neces-
sary to obtain a permit from the board before any person may: 
(a) make or cause to make any new outlet for the discharge 
of sewage, industrial waste or other wastes, or the effluent 
therefrom, into the waters of this state, or 
(b) construct or operate and use a new disposal system 
for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes 
or the effluent therefrom, into the waters of the state .... 18 
"Industrial waste" is defined as : "any liquid, gaseous, solid or waste 
substance' or a combination thereof resulting from any process of in-
dustry, manufacturing, trade, or business or from the development or 
recovery of any natural resources, which may cause or might reasonably 
be expected to cause pollution of the waters of the state in contravention 
of the standards adopted as provided herein." 19 
In addition to the license which must be obtained from the Water 
Pollution Control Board and 'even though the Commissioner of Health 
is a member of the board, 20 it will probably be necessary for businesses 
utiliz~ng nuclear energy also to obtain the written permission of the 
Commissioner of Health himself. 21 On this point the New York statute 
provides: 
No person, corporation . . . · shall place . . . or cause to 
be discharged into any waters of this state, in quantities in-
jurious to th~ public health, any . . . substance, chemical or 
otherwise, or any refuse or waste matter, either solid or liquid, 
from any . . . shop, factory, mill or industrial establishment; 
unless 'express permission to do so shall have been first given in 
writing by the commissioner .... 22 
This permission may be given to an industrial establishment "whenever 
the public health and purity of the waters shall warrant it," subject to 
conditions as the public health may require.28 Discharges into certain 
waters are absolutely prohibited. 2~ The provisions, requiring the per-
mission of the Commissioner of Health and prohibiting the discharge 
18 !d., §I2JO. 
19 I d., §1202(e). 
20 !d., §1205. 
21 /d., §1232 indicates that in certain cases permission of the Department of Health 
is not required, but this is only true when a permit is not required from the Water 
Pollution Control Board under §1230(4). 
22 I d., §uso( 1). 
23/d., §n6I(I). 
uSee id., §§IISI to nss. 
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of waste into certain waters, are, however, currently effective only until 
April, i959. 25 
In addition to the public health statutes, the New York conserva-
tion statutes prohibit the discharge of any deleterious or poisonous sub-
stance into the waters of the state which may be injurious to fish life. 
This is an absolute prohibition; i.e., no administrative authority to per-
mit deviations is conferred. Violation constitutes a public nuisance and 
is subject to abatement and possible criminal penalties.28 
b. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania also has adopted a comprehensive program of water 
pollution control, in many respects similar to that of New York. Under 
a ·water pollution control act enacted in 19.37, a Sanitary Water Board, 
a part of the Department of Health, is charged with the administration 
of the program.27 "Industrial waste" includes any liquid, gaseous, or 
solid substance which results from any industry and which cause5 pollu-
tion. 28 The Sanitary Water Board is empowered to determine when 
pollution exists and to establish ·standards to define pollution. 28 
As in New York, the Pennsylvania statute provides that it is unlaw-
ful to "erect, construct or open" any establishment which in its opera-
tion results in the discharge of industrial wastes causing pollution un-
less a permit is first obtained from the board approving the proposed 
process for treatment of the wastes.110 All plans for the proposed con-
struction of a plant or process to treat the wastes must be submitted to 
the board before construction.81 This requirement of advance con-
sultation with the Sanitary Water Board, before construction involv-
ing potential pollution is initiated, is burdensome but advantageous from 
both the standpoint of the public and that of the operator.82 
A Pennsylvania conservation statute provides that no person shall 
allow any substance of any kind or character which is deleterious, de-
structive, or poisonous to fish to be discharged into any waters of the 
u I d., §u68. 
211 N.Y. Conservation Law art. IV, §18o. 
27 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §§69I.I. et seq. 
28 I d., §691.1. 
ze Ibid. 
so Jd., §691.J07. 
81 I d., §691.Jo8. 
s2 See Note, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 225 (1951), for a discussion of Pennsylvania's 
water pollution regulation. See Commonwealth v. New York and Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 
79 A.2d 439 (1951), and Commonwealth v. Sonneborn, 164 Pa. Super. 49J, 66 A.zd 584 
( 1949) for prosecutions under this statute. 
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state unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Board of Fish Com-
missioners that every reasonable and practicable means has been taken 
to abate and prevent the pollution of the water.83 This prohibition is 
somewhat less severe than that set forth in the New York conserva-
tion statutes. 
c. Ohio 
In 1951 Ohio passed a comprehensive water pollution control act 
patterned on the Pennsylvania statute.84 Like the New York and Penn-
sylvania water pollution boards, Ohio's Water Pollution Control Board 
is within the Department of Health. 811 The board has power to issue 
and deny perll).its for the discharge of industrial wastes into waters of 
the state; 88 and in order to avoid a possible determination after installa.:. 
tion that an operation is polluting the waters of the state,87 it is necessary 
to obtain a permit in advance from the board. 88 
As in New York, it appears necessary to obtain the consent of the 
Director of Health before discharging industrial wastes into the waters 
of the stat~, despite the fact that he is also the chairman of the Water 
Pollution Control Board.39 The Department of Health is given gen-
eral jurisdiction over the disposal of industrial wastes, and it is neces-
sary to obtain the approval of this department relative to the ma~er of 
disposal of these wastes.40 It is important to note that the supervisory 
power is not confined to disposal of wastes into waters, as it is in New 
York and Pennsylvania, but includes disp<:>sal in any manner. Further-
more, the department is given specific power to prevent pollution by 
adopting and enforcing regulations relative to the discharge of in.: 
dustrial wastes into waters of the state!1 It also has the power to 
approve processes and plans for the treatment of such wastes!2 
The Ohio statutes· also create· a Water Resources Board in the De-
partment of Natural ReSources. This board has power to prevent the 
s8 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, §200. 
84 See 12 Ohio St. Law ]. 376 ( 1951), for a brief anaiysis of this act. 
8G Ohio Rev. Code §6111.02. 
86 /d., §6III.03(1). 
87 "Pollution" is defined very broadly, id., §61 11.01 (A). 
88 !d., §6n1.04. 
39 I d., §6~ I 1.02. 
•o /d., §§3701.19, 3701.20. 
u /d., §3701.21. 
42 /d., §3701.59. 
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contamination of underground waters,43 but its principal authority is 
concerned with water conservation, use, and supply.44 
Ohio has established still another sanction for the protection of the 
state's waters. A 1948 opinion of the Attorney General of Ohio 45 
indicates that when the habitat, food supply, and other environmental 
conditions of fish are threatened with injury or destruction by pollu-
tion of waters of the state, the Director of Natural Resources 46 may 
bring an action for an injunction or for damages. The statute upon 
which such an action would be based provides that no person shall 
corrupt or render unwholesome or impure a watercourse, stream, or 
water." 
Furthermore, various types of control districts may be formed under 
Ohio statutes to regulate nearly every conceivable aspect of water usage. 
At least three kinds of districts have control over the discharge of 
wastes and water pollution : conservancy districts, 48 sanitary districts, 49 
and regional water and sewer districts. 50 If any of these districts are 
in existence and embrace an area considered for the location of an 
atomic energy generating plant, it is essential that the board of directors 
or trustees be consulted and any necessary approval obtained from 
them. 
d. Wisconsin 
Like New York and Ohio, Wisconsin has a dual set of controls over 
water pollution. The State Board of Health is vested with general 
jurisdiction over the waters of the state, 51 and it is necessary to obtain 
the approval of this board before using streams to dispose of industrial 
wastes. 52 The State Health Officer is also a member of the Committee 
on Wa_ter Pollution. 53 This committee, having general jurisdiction over 
water pollution,. may require the submission and approval of plans for 
the installation of systems· and devices for disposing of industrial 
43 !d., §1521.04(F). 
44 /d., §1521.()4. 
45 l948 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. #4095. 
48 Ohio Rev. Code §1501.01. 
47 /d., §3767.13. 
48 /d., §§6101.01 et seq .. 
49 /d., §§6115.01 et seq. 
50 /d., §§6119.01 et seq. 
u Wis. Stat. (1957) §144-0J. 
52 /d., §144.04. 
58 /d., §144.52. 
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wastes. 64 It is unlawful to deposit any acids, wastes, or refuse arising 
from the manufacture of articles of commerce or any other substance 
deleterious to fish life into any of the waters of the state, unless it is 
done in compliance with the orders of the Committee on Water Pollu-
tion.55 The constitutionality of this regulatory scheme has been at-
tacked on the ground that parts of the statute are indefinite and uncer-
tain, there being no standard or guide set forth to govern the actions 
of the Committee on Water Pollution. The attack failed, and the 
statute was sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 56 
The powers of the State Board of Health and the Committee on 
Water Pollution overlap, but these agencies apparently cooperate and 
issue joint orders. In 1944 a joint order was held to be uJtra vires and 
hence invalid on the ground that different modes of judicial review 
were authorized for each of the two agencies. 57 However, a year later 
the legislature promptly remedied this defect by the addition of a statu-
tory provision expressly permitting the issuance of a joint order.58 Thus, 
the concurrent nature of the jurisdiction of the Health Department and 
the Committee on Water Pc;>llution is expressly recognized in Wiscon-
sin, 69 whereas the situation in New York and Ohio is somewhat more 
uncertain in this respect. However, the Wisconsin statutes retain indi-:-
vidual jurisdiction for both the Committee on Water Pollution and 
State Board of Health when either or both agencies assume jurisdic-
tion in a situation involving pollution. eo 
e. ·Illinois 
In 1951 Illinois passed a new comprehensive water pollution statute.61 
A Sanitary Water Board, with extensive regulatory powers, was cre-
ated, together with a Water Pollution Control Advisory Council.62 The 
statutory definition of "industrial waste" is nearly identical with the 
New York definition, quoted above. But it is interesting to note that 
64 /d., §144.53. 
65 [d., §29·29· 
56 State ex rei. Martin v. City of Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 300 N.W. 187 (1941). 
Other constitutional arguments made, including improper delegation of legislative and 
judicial powers to both the State Board of Health and the Committee on Water 
Pollution, were likewise rejected. , . 
57 American Brass Co. v. State Board of Health, 245 Wis. 440, 15 N.W.2d 27 Ci944). 
68 Wis. Stat. ( 1957) §144.565. . 
69 See id., §144.535. 
eo Ibid. 
61 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 19, §§145.1 et seq. 
62Jd., §145·3(e). 
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Illinois attempts a broad definition of "pollution" 63 whereas New York 
leaves the establishment of standards to the discretion of the Water 
Pollution Control Board. 
It is necessary to obtain a permit from the Illinois Sanitary Water 
Board before constructing, installing, or operating any establishment 
which will cause the discharge of wastes into the waters of the state.64 
In addition, river conservancy districts may be organized under the 
Illinois statutes for the purpose of preventing water pollution. 65 How-
ever, it is provided that the authority of the Sanitary Water Board shall 
not be superseded,66 which would seem to mean that if a permit is ob-
tained from the Sanitary Water Board to discharge waste into a stream, 
the trustees of a river conservancy district would have no power to 
interfere. 
Furthermore, sanitary districts, primarily concerned with sewage 
problems, may be organized under various Il.linois statutes. 67 The 
board of tmstees of a sanitary district has authority to prevent pollu-
tion of any waters from which any city or town obtains its water sup-
ply,68 and any person proposing to discharge industrial waste within a 
sanitary district must obtain a permit from the trustees of the district.69 
Finally, the Department of Conservation has general authority to 
take measures to prevent water pollution to preserve fish and ·game and 
to cooperate with other departments to prevent water pollution. 70 An-
other statute empowers the attorney general to bring an action to recover 
the reasonable value of any aquatic life destroyed by pollution of waters 
of the state.11 Moreover, it is a public nuisance to corrupt or render 
unwholesome or impure the waters of any stream to the prejudice of 
others. 72 
f. California 
A somewhat different water pollution regulation scheme is in effect 
in California. In 1949 the Dickey Water Pollution Act was passed 
which creates a State Water Pollution Control Board and nine re-
sa I d., §145.2(a). 
64 I d., §145.11. 
65 I d., c. 42, §§383 et seq. 
66 I d., c. 42, §409. 
6 7 Id., c. 42, §§299, 319.1, 320. 
68 I d., §326aa. 
69 I d., §326bb(J). 
10 I d., c. 127, §6Ja(6). 
a I d., c. s6, §16o. 
72 I d., c. 38, §466. 
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gional water pollution control boards. 78 The state board is concerned 
only with formulation of policy, research, and administration of the 
financial aspects of water pollution, 14 whereas the regional boards are 
charged with the abatement, prevention, and control of water pollu-
tion and nuisances.76 It is the appropriate regional board which must 
approve any proposed discharge of industrial waste and which prescribes 
requirements with respect to the treating of these discharges.76 Each 
regional board also has power to investigate any source of water pollu-
tion or nuisance within its region and to order an abatement thereof.71 
The act was designed to coordinate the actions of various state agen-
cies regulating water pollution.78 While power to regulate water pollu-
tion was not taken away from other state agencies, it is no longer 
necessary to secure a permit from the State Health Department in order 
to dispose of wastes, and this would see'? to be a thoroughly worthy 
achievement. 79 
The California Water Pollution Act-contains the usual definitions 
which are substantially similar to those of the other states discussed 
above·, except that the definition of "contamination" is somewhat unique 
in its breadth and scope : 
"Contamination" means an impairment of the quality of the 
waters of the State by sewage or industrial waste to a degree 
which creates an actual hazard to the public health through 
·poisoning or through the spread of disease. "Contamination" 
shall include any equivalent effect resulting from the disposal 
of sewage or industrial waste, whether or not waters of the 
State are affected. 80 
The matter of "contamination" is not mentioned elsewhere in the Water 
Pollution Act. However, the Health and Safety_ Code employs defini-
tions identical to those of the Water Pollution Act,81 and that code pro-
hibits the discharge of industrial waste which will result in contamina-
tion, pollution, or nuisance. 82 Contamination is also made a crime 83 
78 Cal. Water Code §§13000, 13010, 13040. 
74 !d., §§13022 to 13024. 
75 !d., §§13052, 13003. 
76 !d., §13054· 
11 !d., §§13055 to 13064. 
T8 I d., §13000. 
79 "California's Water Pollution Problem," 3 Stan. L. Rev. 649, 65o-52 (1951). 
80 Emphasis added. Cal. Water Code §13005. 
81 Cal. Health & Safety Code §5410. 
82 I d., §5411. 
83 !d., §5461. 
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and the Health Department is charged with the abatement of any con-
tamination, 84 although pollution and nuisance are referred to the appro-
priate regional water pollution board for action.85 
.Moreover, the California statutes make it unlawful to cause any sub-
stance or material deleterious to fish, plant life, or bird life to pass 
into waters of the state of California.86 The Fish and Game Commis-
sion is required to report any condition of pollution to the appropriate 
regional water pollution control board. 87 
g. New Jersey 
New Jersey has adopted a unique pollution control system. It has not 
created a specific water pollution board to regulate pollution. Rather, . 
the statutes leave this matter to the State Department of Health. 
Sprinkled liberally throughout the statutes are provisions which pro-
hibit the discharge of any kind of polluting matter into the waters of 
the state.88 It is necessary to obtain the consent of the State Department 
of Health before any "harmful" or "deleterious" matter may flow into 
the waters of the stafe.89 
Moreover, the persori responsible for the operation of any "factory, 
workshop or place for the manufacture of materials or goods" must 
obtain a written permit from the Health Department before it may be 
established in any watershed in the state above the point a~ which any 
public supply of potable water is taken. 90 The permit is required even 
though no discharge of wastes into. the waters of the state is contem-
plated. The Health Department must also be furnished with informa-
tion concerning any processes established or intended to be established 
for the purification or treatment of industrial wastes. 91 
Industrial establishments in New Jersey must also give consideration 
to the possible existence of sanitary sewer d~strict authorities. These 
may be established by any first- .or second-class. county when a stream 
flowing through the county is subject to pollution. 92 "Sewage" is defined 
to include industrial wastes and any other matter having a tendency 
84 /d., §§5412, 54(io. 
85 /d., §5413. 
86 Cal. Fish & Game Code §481 (1944). 
s7 Id., §481.5. 
88 See, e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§58: 10-1,58: 1()-5, 26:3B-4-
89 I d., §s&: 12-3. 
oo /d., §58: 1()-7. 
91 I d., §58: 1o-17. 
92 /d., §40:36A-1. 
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to pollute streams and watercourses.98 A 1953 amendment prohibits the 
disc~rge of any polluting n:tatter into the wat~rs of any stream or river 
incl1:1ded within the sewer district established by a county.9~ Finally, 
New Jersey has made it a crime to discharge into waters of the state 
any deleterious or poisonous substance which is injurious to or disturbs 
the habits of fish. 95 
h. Michigan 
In Michigan water pollution is subject to regulation by the Water 
Resources Commission. 9·6 The commission is empowered to establish 
pollution standards for the various. bodies of water in the state and has 
authority to "make regulations and orders restricting the polluting 
content of any waste material or polluting substance discharged or: 
sought to be discharged into any lake, river, stream, or other waters of 
the state.'' 97 The jurisdktion of the commission extends to both sur-
face and. underground waters as well as the Great Lakes. 98 It is 
unlawful to discharge any substance which is harmful to the public 
health, fish, and wildlife, or to lawful en~erprises.99 
The statutes make no , provision f()r obtaining a permit, but un-
doubtedly industrial managers should consult the Water Resources. 
CQmmission when an industry plans to use water from a stream or lake 
or to discharge wastes into such waters. 
In Michigan the Conservation Commission is given general power to 
prevent water pollution an:d to encourage the propagation of game and 
fish. 100 Again, there seems to be no requirement that a license be ob-
tained; rather, it is made a violation of the conservation statutes to dis-
charge wastes into the waters of the state if they will tend to "stupefy; 
injure or kill" any fish. 101 The State Health Department's broad powers 
over problems of general public health also extend to matters of water 
pollution, and therefore, as in· other states, overlapping jurisdiction in 
problems of water pollution presents unusual problems for atomic energy 
industries. 
98 /d., §40: 36A-19. 
94 N.J. Laws 1953. c. 389. 
95 I d., §23 : 5-28. 
96 Mich. Stat. Ann. §3.521. 
97 I d., §3.525. 
9s I d., §J.522. 
99 I d., §J.526. 
100 Jd., §IJ.J. 
101 /d., §IJ.I67I. 
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1. Texas 
Texas has not established an administrative agency with authority to 
regulate water pollution, although in 1953 a five-member water pollution 
council, without regulatory powers, was created.102 The function of 
this council is to collect and disseminate information relating to water 
pollution, its prevention, and abatement. 
However, water pollution is made a crime in Texas.108 The Penal 
Code defines pollution as rendering the water unfit "for one or more of 
the beneficial uses for which such water was fit or suitable prior to the 
introduction of such substance, material, or thing," or is detrimental 
to public health, game, birds, fish, etc.104 Insofar as fish are affected by 
pollution, enforcem·ent power is given to the Game and Fish Cominis-
sion.105 
Moreover, the State Board of Health has power to enjoin water 
pollution/0" and it is Unlawful tO StOre, dispOSe Of, Or depOSit WaSteS 
which will pollute surrounding land or contaminate well waters to the 
extent of endangering public'health.1o1 · · · · 
The Texas statutes also provide for the esta}?lishment of several 
types of districts which relate to vario~s .aspe~s of water use, supply, 
and control. These districts are normally established by counties or a 
combination of counties. "Water Co~trol and Improvem~nt Districts" 
may be organized to protect, presc:;rve, and restore the purity and sani-
tary condition of water 108 and to .control, process, and dispose of in-
dustrial wastes.109 "Water Control and Preservation Districts" may be 
organized to control and preserve the purity of the waters within the 
district.110 Other types of districts authorized in Texas include "Under-
ground Water Conservation Districts," 111 "Fresh Water Supply Dis-
tricts," 112 "Levee Improvement Districts," 113 "Drainage Districts," tu 
102 Tex. Laws 1953, H.B. No. 448, c. 353: 
103 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 7577. 
to4 Tex. Penal Code art. 698b. 
105/bid. 
106 Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4444-
107 /d., art. 4477-1, §4(c). 
tOBJd., arts. 788o-2, 788o-3. 
t09Jd., art. 788o-Ja. 
tto /d., art. 7&>9. 
111 /d., art. 788o-3c. 
112 /d., art. 7881. 
118 I d., art. 7972. 
114/d., art. &>97. 
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"Conservation and Reclamation Districts," 115 and "Navigation Dis-
tricts." 118 Industrial planners must consult the directors of these dis-
tricts, if they exist in the county, in connection with the planning of an 
irtdustry which may 'use water in any way. 
j. Missouri 
Missouri adopted a statute in I957 which establishes a program of 
-_water pollution. control similar to those of New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Ohio.117 .As in those states, the principal feature of the program is the 
establishment of a Water Pollution Board, organized within the De-
partment of Public Health and Welfare, which is empowered to issue 
and deny permits for the disposal of wastes into waters of the state. 
The statute directs that "No person, without first securing from the 
~oa~d a permit, shall construct, install or modify .;,tny system for .dis-
posal of sewage, industriat wastes, or other wastes . ~ . 'when the dis-
posal . . . ' constitute~ pollutio~ as defined in this act." ~is ' 
. The Water Pollution Board may requir~ t~e subinis~ion of such plans 
and sp~cifications as it dee111s rele~ant in cot;mection with the iss:uance 
of permits ·and is empowered to determine whether or: not the proposed 
discharge will "cause a condition contrary to· the public interest." 119 
The board is also given the power to determine wheri pollution exists 
and to establish standards of water purity for any waters of the state.120 
The Missouri statutes also contain a provision prohibiting the dis-
ch~rge of any deleterious substance which is injurious to fish life into 
any stream in the state; however, the State Conservation Commission 
has authority to grant exceptions to industries.121 
k. Conclusion 
Although the statutory and regulatory pattern concerning water pollu-
tion varies from state to state, it is dear that 'atomic ·energy industries 
will be required to meet some rather positive standards if waste products 
are to be discharged into the waters of any state. In fact, close super-
vision of the disposal of wastes seems imperative in the public interest 
115 !d., art. 8194. 
118 !d., art. 8198. 
117 Mo. Stat. Ann. §§204.010-204.170 (1957). 




MISCELLANEOUS REGULATION 927 
because both the toxic and radioactive nuclear wastes are highly dan-
gerous to the public health particularly where the streams constitute a 
source of water for human consumption. 
It should be noted that under certain types of statutes, some atomic 
energy activities may not be regulated at the present time under statutes 
governing water pollution. For example, where the statutes govern 
only industrial activity, research laboratories and hospitals may not be 
subject to regulation. Nonetheless, use of radioactive materials and 
their disposal through conventional sewerage and drainage systems may 
so pollute bodies of water as to constitute a definite health hazard. 
Therefore, in those states where discharges of certain radioactive ma-
terials into state waters are not controlled under present statutes, 
amendatory legislation appears advisable and will doubtless be forth-
coming as soon as the hazards become known in legislative halls. 
The foregoing review of the statutes. reveals that water pollution is 
in many states subject to regulation by several different agencies. This 
duplication of effort and overlapping of jurisdiction raises once again 
the problem of administrative conflicts. Obviously, coordination of the 
several health and safety regulations affecting atomic energy enter-
prises is desirable. This coordination can be achieved either by coopera-
tion among the agencies or by transferring all atomic energy health 
and safety regulatory powers including control of water pollution to one 
agency. The latter course has much to be said in its favor, especially 
if all types of specialization can be represented within the regulatory 
agency. In the absence, however, of the creation of a single authority, 
persons desiring to engage in atomic energy activities must consult with 
all regulatory agencies exercising health and safety powers. Certainly 
they should encourage cooperative efforts among those agencies. 
2. Regulation of Air Pollution 
Several types of operations which utilize atomic energy may produce 
radioactive particles which will create a hazard if discharged into the 
air. Radioactive gases may result from air-cooled reactor operations, 
chemical processing operations, refining operations of uranium ores, 
laboratory uses of radioisotopes, and incineration of radioactive wastes, 
byproducts, or contaminated apparel or materials.122 To prevent dan-
gerous atmospheric contamination near Atomic Energy Commission 
installations, high stacks have been utilized for the discharge of radio-
122 AEC, "Handling Radi<;>active Wastes in the Atomic· Energy Program," .11-15 
(1951). 
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active gases, thus causing them to be diluted with uncontaminated air. 123 
In addition, the Commission has engaged in meteorological surveys and 
has instituted a program of area monitoring in the vicinity of installa-
tions such as Brookhaven, where air-cooled reactors are in operation.124 
Insofar as employees may be adversely affected by the presence of 
radioactive gases in the place of employment, the powers of public 
utility commissions, labor departments, and health departments will be 
involved. However, if the atmospheric contamination extends outside 
the installation itself the public health may be endangered. Radioactive 
particles may be inhaled or deposited on plants which may in turn be 
eaten by animals or people. Notwithstanding the use of high stacks and 
the processing of the gases in connection with air-cooled reactors or 
chemical operations, adverse weather conditions may render hazardous 
otherwise satisfactory operations. Under the general authority granted 
to ·various state and local health agencies,· regulations may be promul-
gated which establish limits for permissible contamination of the atmos-
phere from smoke and other ·foreign substances.m Municipalities also 
have· broad powers to pass ordinances regulating matters of air pollu-
tion, such as smoke emission. These· powers can and doubtless will be 
used to regulate contamination by radioactive gases. 
In recent years, becaus~ of the "smog" conditions prevailing in many 
industrial communities, interest in air pollution control has grown. Be-
cause it was felt that the prevention and reduction of air ccmtamination 
could not be handled adequately by local legislative bodies, 126 the Cali-
fornia legislature in 1947 passed a comprehensive statute providing for 
the creation of air pollution control districts. In 1954 the New Jersey 
legislature also enacted comprehensive legislation for the control of air 
pollution.121 Detailed examination of the California and New Jersey 
statutes seems desirable.128 
Under the California statute, each county is declared to be an air 
12s !d., at 7-8. 
1 24 I d., at 12-13. 
126 In Bd. of Health of Weehawken Tp. v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 
5 II ( 1950), the defendant railroad was charged with the violation of a smoke ordinance 
passed by the Board of Health of the Township of Weehawken by the operation of its 
power plant. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a conviction under this ordinance, 
holding that local boards of health may regulate and control air pollution in the interest 
of public health and welfare by barring the excessive emission of smoke. 
126 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§24198 to 24341. 
121 N.J. Laws 1954, c. 212. 
12s In 1953 the Illinois legislature created a commission to study air pollution and 
recommend regulatory legislation. Ill. Laws 1953, S. 204. 
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pollution control district.129 Before a district can function, however, 
the board of supervisors of the county must hold a public hearing to 
determine the need of such a district.180 The board must find that two 
conditions exist prior to adopting a resolution activating the district : 
(I) that the air in the county is polluted with air contaminants so that 
it is injurious to health, or is an obstruction to the free use of property, 
or is offensive to the senses of a considerable number of persons; and 
( 2) that it is not practicable to rely on the enactment and enforcement 
of local county and city ordinances to prevent air pollution.181 "Air 
contaminant" is defined to include "smoke, charred paper, dust, soot, 
grime, carbon, noxious acids, fumes, gases, odors, or particulate matter, 
or any combination thereof." 132 Although the definition does not ex-
pressly include radioactively contaminated air, it appears to be suf-
ficiently b:·oad to encompass. this type of contamination. If a district 
is authorized to function, the following statutory prohibition is opera-
tive: 
A person shall not discharge from any source whatsoever 
such quantities of air contaminants or other material which 
cause injury, detriment, nuisance or annoyance to any con-
siderable number of persons or to the public or which endanger 
the comfort, repose, health or safety of any such persons or 
the public or which cause or have a natural tendency to cause 
injury or damage to business or property.133 
Any violation of this provision may be enjoined or punished crimi-
nally.184 It is expressly provided, however, that the legislature does not 
intend to occupy the entire field or to supersede any local rules and 
ordinances imposing higher standards.m 
The county board of supervisors constitutes the air pollution control 
board/36 but it is required to appoint an air pollution control officer.181 
The air pollution control board is granted broad rule-making author-
ity,188 including power to make and enforce orders directing the reduc-
tion of the amount of air contaminants 139 and power to require that 
129 Cal. Health & Safety Code §24200. 
130 I d., §24203· 
131 I d., §24205· 
132 I d., §24208. 
13S I d., §24243· 
134 I d., §§24252, 24253. 
135 I d., §§~47. 24248. 
136 I d., §2422(>. 
137 Id., §24222. 
us I d., §24200. 
139 I d., §2.¢)2. 
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a permit be obtained from the air pollution control officer before a 
structure is built or a contrivance is operated which may produce air 
containinants.140 This permit may be withheld unless it is shown that 
air contamination will not result.141 Any applicant for or holder of a 
permit may be required to furnish information disclosing the nature, 
extent, quantity, or degree of air contaminants which are or may be 
discharged from any source.ua However, the air pollution control 
board or a court, after hearing, may grant variances either from the 
regulations or from the statute itself when "necessary." 148 The board 
may "exercise a wide discretion in weighing the equities involved," a• 
and it may prescribe different requirements applicable to certain indus-
tries or persons.uG 
It may be concluded that California has a rather complete and far-
reaching system of regulating the air pollution, and since the discharge 
of radioactive particles is in all probability included in the definition of 
air contaminants, careful CO!Jlpliance by atomic energy users will be 
necessary if the contemplated use involves a discharge of radioactive 
gases into the atmosphere. 
In contrast to California, the problem of air pollution in New Jersey 
is handled on a state rather than a local basis. In 1954 the New Jersey 
legislature created an Air Pollution Control Commission within the 
Department of Health.146 The commission has power to promulgate 
rules and regulations controlling or prohibiting air pollution through-
out the state.u7 "Air pollution" is defined as "the presence in the out-
door atmosphere of substances in quantities which are injurious to 
human, plant or animal life or to property, or unreasonably interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property throughout the 
State ... and excludes all aspects of employer-employee relationship 
as to health and safety hazards." 148 Clearly, release of radioactive 
gases and substances into the atmosphere falls within this broad defini-
tion. Persons engaged in· operations which may result in air pollution 
may be required to register and file reports containing information 
HOI d., §2¢J. 
Hl Jd., §24264-
H2 I d., §242()9. 
148 I d., §24291. 
lH Jd., §24297· 
14G I d., §242¢. 
146 N.J. Laws 1954, c. 212. 
147 Id., §9. 
148 I d., §2. 
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"relating to location, size of outlet, height of outlet, rate and period of 
emission and composition of effluent .... " 149 
The New Jersey Air Pollution Control Commission is authorized to 
establish county air pollution control associations to which rules of 
strictly local application must be submitted for discussion and report.150 
However, the county associations act only in an advisory capacity.151 
Rules and regulations of the commission are enforced by the State 
Commissioner of Health/52 and the Department of Health may seek 
injunctive relief to prevent violations, and fines may be imposed for 
continuing violations.153 
Although none of the other states covered· by this study has com-
prehensive air pollution legislation/54 it should be noted that several 
cities have adopted ordinances concerning air pollution.m However, 
some of the ordinances refer only to smoke abatement, and they prob-
ably will be inapplicable to radioactive gases discharged ·into the air. 
Conclusion: State· agencies created especially for the control of air 
pollution are not yet as· commonly established as are agencies for the 
control of water pollution. However, a definite trend ·in the direction 
of the creation -of such agencies has resulted largely because of the in-
creasing recognition of the "smog" problem in industrial areas. More-
over, in many instances existing powers of state departments of health 
are sufficiently broad to embrace control of air pollution. Therefore, 
atomic energy enterprises which involve the release of radioactive gases, 
vapors, and dusts into the atmosphere can expect regulation by some 
state agency and perhaps by a local government agency as well, depend-
ing, of course, upon location of the plant facilities. 
Because the release of large amounts of radioactive materials into 
the atmosphere may be dangerous to surrounding populations and prop-
erty, strict precautionary safety measures are definitely indicated, and, 
indeed, industry will no doubt exert extraordinary efforts in this direc:-
tion. States which do not have agencies possessing authority to control 
149 I d., §8. 
150 Jd., §§II, 12. 
151 I d., §§II et seq. 
152 ]d., §17. 
153 Jd., §I!). , 
1H In Wisconsin counties having a population of 500,000 or more are specifically 
authorized to regulate air pollution by ordinance. Wis. Stat. (1957) §59.07(53). 
155 For a good discussion of city ordinances, see "Smog-Can Legislation Oear the 
Air?" I Stan. L. Rev. 452 (1949). For a recent conviction' under New York City air 
pollution control authority, ~ee People v. Tatje, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1953). From this 
case it appears that in 1952 the city created a Department of Air Pollution Control. 
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the discharge of dangerous substances into the atmosphere will no doubt 
be so equipped as soon as the legislature is informed of the existence 
of the problem. In states which have agencies with regulatory power 
as yet unexercised, the necessary investigation and study of air pollu-
tion problems will doubtless commence at an early date so that rules 
and regulations can be promulgated before atomic energy activities 
cause an extra-hazardous public health problem. 
3· Nuisances 
Thus far in this study, primary emphasis has been placed on state 
regulatory agencies which have been given statutory powers to regulate 
some of the aspects of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Now, however, 
we should turn briefly to an examination of the pertinent legal principles 
of the law of nuisance since under these principles some regulation of 
uses of atomic energy will 'be imposed by courts acting either at the 
instance of private individuals or of public officials. Even though ap-
plicable zoning ordinances and health regulations are complied with, a 
type of judicial zoning regulation may result from industrial operations 
which occasion harm or discomfort to individuals in the vicinity of the 
installation. Since radiation hazards may, and at the outset probably 
will, be greatly feared by those who live near plants utilizing atomic 
energy, account must be. taken of the fact that such persons may insti-
tute legal actions to restrict operations thought likely to .create these 
dangers. The law of nuisance will afford a basis for this type of action. 
It has been said that "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle 
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' " 156 
It is obvious that a subject so vast and confused cannot be examined 
in detail in this study. We can, however, suggest some of the prob-
lems that may arise under the application of the fundamental propo-
sitions which are a part of the law of nuisance. Abundant authority is 
available, but most cases provide little guidance since each case turns 
largely on its own fact situation. However, cases involving power plants 
and gas plants may have some special significance and will therefore be 
noted. 
Nuisances are usually divided into two somewhat unrelated and 
separate categories : public nuisances and private nuisances. As will be 
seen, these involve different ideas and require separate discussion. 
158 Prosser, Torts 549 (1941). 
MISCELLANEOUS REGULATION 933 
a. Public Nuisances 
Public nuisances are minor criminal offenses ansmg out of acts 
which cause interference with the public health, safety, morals, com-
fort, or qmvenience.167 To be considered public, the nuisance must 
affect an interest common to the general public in the exercise of public 
rights, rather than rights belonging and peculiar to one or more indi-
viduals.158 
Public nuisances are often defined by statutes, but definitions so 
given are often couched in very general terms. Violations of water 
pollution, smoke, or zoning ordinances are often made public nuisances. 
Statutes or ordinances also frequently declare that establishments which 
emit offensive odors are public nuisances.159 The New York statutes 
define a public nuisance as any act or omission which, among other 
things, "1. Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health 
or safety of any considerable number of persons. . . . 4· In any way 
renders a considerable number of persons insecure in life, or the use of 
property." 160 These provisions have been .held to be declaratory of the 
common law.161 Under the New York type of statute, the operation of 
an atomic energy establishment which discharges radioactive materials 
into the streams or gases into the atmosphere might be held to annoy 
or endanger the comfort, health, or safety of a considerable number of 
persons and hence to violate the statute. However, a public nuisance 
may be held privileged if it is authorized by the legislature.162 The 
crucial question, of course, is what conduct has been so authorized. 
Another defense that may be effective in certain unusual circumstances 
is the fact that the public has an overriding interest in the activity, such 
as in essential war production. In such event, the defendant is relieved 
of criminal though not civilliability.163 Remedies available to the state 
are either injunction or imposition of fines or other penalty. If a private 
individual can show special damage to. himself, he may have a cause 
of action for injury.m 
151 ld. at 566-573 (1941). 
158 !d. at 568. 
159 See· Anno., "Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance de-
claring plant or establishment which emits offensive odors to be public nuisance,'' 141 
A.L.R. 285 (1942). 
16o N.Y. Penal Code §1530. 
161 People v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N.Y. Supp. 547 
(1915); People .v. Gaydica, 122 Misc. 31, 203 N.Y. Supp. 243 (1923). 
16 2 See Note, "Nuisance and Legislative Authorization," 52 Col. L. Rev. 781 (1952). 
1ss See People v. Amecco Olemicals, 18o Misc. 1014. 43 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1943). 
164 Prosser, Torts 569 (1941). 
934 STATE REGULATION 
b. Private Nuisances 
A private nuisance is created when an unreasonable interference is 
inflicted upon an individual's use or enjoyment of land. There are two 
principal kinds of such interferences: { 1) actual physical injury to 
land, such as damage to a structure caused by vibration or blasting, 
pollution of water, or injury to buildings or plant life resulting from 
the discharge of harmful substances, and {2) disturbance of the com-
fort or convenience of the occupant of land, such as by unpleasant or 
harmful odors or gases, or storage in the vicinity of highly dangerous 
materials. 1611 An important feature of any liability incurred as a result 
of acts involving such interferences is the fact that the fault of the 
actor is immaterial; i.e., liability may result whether the act is inten-
tional, negligent, or entirely without fault. 168 In short, nuisance- giv-
ing rise to liability is a type of damage or injury, rather than a type of 
conduct. Most of the litigation involving private nuisance has dealt 
with the broad question of the reasonableness of the defendant's con-
duct, and the issue is essentially one of resolving the conflicting interests 
of landowners.167 In a sense, therefore, the law of private nuisance be-
comes a process of judicial zoning in which the nature of the locality 
and the public interest involved are two important factors weighed by 
the courts. 
The two types of legal relief available against a private nuisance are 
an action at law for damages and injunctive relief in equity.168 Under 
the latter remedy, a court may in rare instances completely restrain the 
operation of a plant which creates the nuisance. More often the court 
will require that the plant be shut down unless additional equipment is 
installed or care taken to eliminate the nuisance.169 In contrast to the 
public nuisance it should be noted that legislative authorization, such as 
the grant of a franchise or permit by a branch or agency of a govern-
ment, does not create a privilege in favor of a private nuisance, especially 
those that cause substantial injury, since this would amount to con-
demnation without payment of compensation.170 Neither is it any de-
1611 I d. at 573-575· 
166 I d. at 553-557· 
1 67 I d. at 58o. 
168/d. at sBS. 
1 69 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952) ; 
Price v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 310 Pa. 557, 165 Atl. 849 (1933). 
170 Churchill v. Burlington Water Co., 94 Iowa 89, 62 N.W. 646 (1895); Rosen-
heimer v. Standard Gas Light Co., 36 App. Div. I, 55 N.Y. Supp. 192 (1898); 37 
A.L.R. 801 (1925); Note, 52 Col. L. Rev. 781, 784 (1952). For a discussion of the 
possible effect of zoning ordinances on private nuisance actions, see Beuscher and 
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fense that the best available devices or equipment are being employed 
in the operation of a plant since liability is not based on fault but arises 
from the injury itsel£.171 
Private individuals, normally adjoining landowners, have brought 
numerous actions against public utility companies both for damages 
and for injunctive relief. In a substantial number of cases relief by 
way of damages for nuisance has been allowed,172 but courts have been 
reluctant to enjoin the operation of such plants. In reaching such con-
clusions, reliance has been placed on such factors as the quasi-public 
character of the industries, the adequacy of the damage remedy, the 
nature of the area where the plant was located, the cost required to 
move the plant if enjoined, and the fact that the best available devices 
to prevent injury to adjoining landowners were being used.173 
The ger.eral principle that an equity court will weigh the advantage 
to be gained by the plaintiff against the injury _suffered by the public 
before rest,·aining the operation of an industry is said to be especially 
applicable in the case of public utilities.174 However, in a few instances, 
courts have temporarily restrained the operation of gas or electric power 
plants, by requiring that additional protective devices be installed and 
that the plant be shut down unless these are installed.175 For example, in 
Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Company a decree enjoining the 
gas company "from conducting and operating the gasworks and manu-
factory . . . in such a manner as to cause or permit smoke, gases or 
offensive smells or fumes to be emitted therefrom or to be precipitated 
therefrom upon the property of the plaintiff" was affirmed.176 In Anstee 
v. Monroe Light and Fuel Co. the gas company was perpetually en-
joined from making further deposits of industrial waste that polluted 
neighboring soil, the gas company was required to alter its smokestack 
to abate a smoke nuisance, and in addition damages were awarded.117 
Morrison, "Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases," 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 440, 
453-457; Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1955). 
171 Rosenheimer v. Standard Gas Light Co., supra note 170; Pritchard v. Edison 
Electric Illuminating Co., 92 App. Div. 178, 87 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1904). 
1 72 See cases collected in 37 A.L.R. 8oo at 812-813 (1925). 
173 Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 At!. 345 (1924); 
Jedneak v. Minneapolis General Electric Co., 212 Minn. 226, 4 N.W.2d 326 (1942); 
Riedeman v. Mt. Morris Electric Co., 56 App. Div. 23, 67 N.Y. Supp. 391 (1900); 
Parker v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., so Cal. App. 264, 195 Pac. 6o (1920). 
174 37 A.L.R. 8oo at 802 (1925). 
175 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, supra note 16g; Price v. Philip 
Carey Mfg. Co., supra note 169 (power plant of a manufacturing company) ; English 
v. Progress Electric Light~ Motor Co., 95 Ala. 259. 10 So. 134 (18g1). 
176 157 Cal. 168, 173, to6 Pac. 581 (1910). 
177 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920). 
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In· the light of these decisions, careful consideration must be given 
to the location, construction, and operation of industrial plants utilizing 
atomic energy, for conceivably such a plant could be partially or wholly 
restrained as a nuisance if injury to landowners resulted. Furthermore, 
because of the exceptionally dangerous character of atomic energy ac-
tivities, a court would probably have less difficulty than in cases of 
conventional plants in holding the owners of an atomic energy plant 
liable for damages.118 
c. Conclusion 
Although a full development of the law of public and private nuisance· 
is beyond the scope of this study, the foregoing brief mention of its 
ramifications suffices to show that it may serve in some instances as a 
regulatory device effectuated by the courts under common law principles. 
Since nuisance law is invoked only through litigation involving specific 
factual settings, it is impossible to draw any but the most general con-
clusions. However, so far as atomic energy plants are concerned, it is 
clear that both public officials and private persons may commence liti-
gation with some likelihood of success, particularly if the atomic enter-
prise creates a hazardous or even an annoying condition in its vicinity. 
Atomic energy entrepreneurs undoubtedly will have to exercise excep-
tional prudence in selection of location especially since limited public 
knowledge of the subject coupled with the fears engendered by ·the 
mystery of atomic forces may easily precipitate troublesome litigation. 
Specific governmental authorization for a particular installation may 
provide a defense against the charge of committing a public nuisance, 
but the authorization will not provide a defense in respect to actions for 
private nuisance. Accordingly, sites embracing large exclusion areas 
well removed from populated centers seem advisable wherever possible, 
not only as a means of protection of the public against possible accidents, 
but also from the standpoint of avoiding monetary liability and regula-
tion through court orders. 
B. Diversion of Waters 
If a nuclear reactor or other atomic energy plant utilizes large quanti-
ties of water,179 diverted from regular watercourses, an additional 
problem arises. Many states have enacted statutes which restrict the 
11s See Part I of this volume. 
11e The .full-scale atomic power plant built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, by the 
AEC and Duquesne Light Company employs water as a coolant. 
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diversion of water, and, unauthorized diversion of substantial quantities 
thereof may constitute a public or private nuisance. Most of these 
statutes were enacted for other specific purposes; e.g., some of them are 
concerned with the building of dams or other obstructions in water-
courses, with impeding the navigability of streams, with preventing the . 
free passage of fish, or preserving water supply facilities. However, 
some of the language in these statutes may be broad enough to be ap-
plicable to the withdrawing of sizable quantities of water for industrial 
uses, even though it is subsequently returned to the body of water from 
which it is taken. 
Obviously, states which are faced with the problem of water scarcity 
are more likely to regulate_ the use of waters than are states that have 
no such problem. In varying degrees five of the ten states surveyed in 
this study fall within this category. 
Texas and California are among those western states which follow 
the law of "prior appropriation" with respect to water use. In these 
states it is necessary to obtain a permit from an appropriate state agency 
before water may be appropriated or diverted.180 These state agencies 
are given authority to reject an application if the use is detrimental to 
the public interest. Elaborate systems of priority are set up to obtain 
the most beneficial use from the available water. 
New Jersey requires that a permit be obtained from the Division of 
Water Policy and Supply if, in designated areas, water is to be taken 
from subsurface or percolating sources in excess of 100,000 gallons 
per day.181 In Pennsylvania it is necessary to obtain a permit from the 
Water and Power Resources Board in order to change, diminish, or 
appropriate water from any body of water in the state.182 This permit 
is required regardless of whether the stream is navigable or non-naviga-
ble. It is expressly made unlawful to divert water for use in the 
generation of electricity without such a permit.183 
Ohio is another state in the category of those which regulate the use 
of water rather closely, but it appears to do so on a local level only, 
through the granting of permission for the organization of various 
-types of local water control districts. In an area where one of these 
districts has been formed, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the 
18° In Texas the permit must be secured from the State Board of Water Engineers, 
Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 7492· In California the permit is obtainable from the Dept. of 
Public Works, Div. of Water Resources, Cal. Water Code §xzsz. 
181 N.J. Rev. Stat. §s8: 4A-z (Cum. Supp. 1945-47). 
182 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, §.468. 
18a Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. JZ, §594-
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governing board prior to making use of waters within the district. In 
addition, the board of directors of a conservancy district, the board of 
directors of a sanitary district, and the board of trustees of a regional 
water and sewer district are given the authority to "prescribe the 
permissible uses of the water supply provided by the district" by 
regulation.184 
The possible existence of various types of local water districts au-
thorized by statute must be checked and taken into account before an 
industry may select any given plant location. As was noted above in 
the discussion of pollution, both Texas and Illinois authorize various 
types of local water districts. Those authorized by the Illinois statutes 
seem primarily concerned with pollution problems, 185 but those author-
ized by Texas statutes are concerned as well with water usage.186 Cali-
fornia, too, provides for the formation of various types of local water 
districts.187 
It may be necessary to secure the consent of a state agency when 
water from a particular stream is desired for industrial use. For ex-
ample, the appropriation of water from the Delaware River is strin-
gently controlled by at least three states: New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania/88 as well as an interstate agency, as will appear below 
in the discussion of interstate compacts. 
Several different statutory objectives may be involved in the statutes 
under consideration. In several states it is deemed a public nuisance to 
obstruct or impede the passage of any navigable river or waters without 
legal authority.189 In others the statutes are apparently directed toward 
the maintenance of streams for navigable purposes. In at least two 
states there are provisions which prohibit the obstruction of streams so 
as to impede the free passage of fish. 190 Exceptions may be made by 
184 Ohio Rev. Code §6IOI.I9(4) (conservancy districts); §6II5.23(c) (sanitary 
districts); §6n9.o8(c) (regional water and sewer districts). 
1113 But see Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §§223-228, which authorize the establishment 
of "Water Authorities." The board of trustees appears to have some control over 
water use, although the act seems directed primarily at pollution of underground waters. 
1 B6 See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 7622 (water improvement districts), art. 788o-3c 
(underground water conservation districts), art. 7881 (fresh water supply districts).· 
187 See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§30,000 et seq. (county water districts) ; §§34,000 
et seq. (California water districts). 
1 88 N.]. Rev. Stat. §58: 18-r; N.Y. Conservation Law, §§ 501 et seq.; Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 32, §§815.1 et seq. 
189 Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 38, §466; Mich. Stat. Ann. §9.334; Mo. Rev. Stat. ( 1949) 
§236.240; Ohio Rev. Code §3767.13. 
190 Mich. Stat. Ann. §13.1657· 
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the Conservation Department in Michigan.191 The statutes of Missouri 
and Wisconsin seem primarily concerned with the construction of 
dams.192 In Wisconsin the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction 
over the level and flow of water in navigable streams, 193 and water 
declared surplus by this commission may be diverted.194 Missouri 
provides for a condemnation procedure to divert water when used in 
connection with the generation of electric power for sale to the public.195 
Whether this statute may be used for obtaining water for cooling 
purposes in an atomic reactor rather than in conjunction with hydro-
electric power is uncertain. 
Several unique Michigan statutes should also be noted. One provides 
that the stage of water in any watercourse shall not be altered without 
the written consent of the commissioner having jurisdiction over all the 
bridges and culverts passing over the watercourse. 198 Another statute 
gives authority to each county board of supervis.ors to "permit or pro-
hibit the construction of any dam or bridge over or across any navigable 
stream." 197 
Another possible source of restriction upon the use of streams stems 
from common law remedies available to riparian owners for an injury 
to their water rights. This type of remedy may take the form of 
either a suit for damages or an injunction against unreasonable use or 
pollution.198 It is important also to note that statutes which outlaw or 
regulate water pollution in all probability do not displace the common 
law rights to abate pollution.199 
The existing statutes do not cover the possible problem of substan-
tially increasing water temperature which may occur in the operation 
of a nuclear reactor. 
Conclusion: The consuming of large quantities of water in an atomic 
energy enterprise, such, for example, as a water-cooled nuclear reactor, 
may in several states necessitate approval by state and local govern-
mental authorities. Although the problems involved are not especially 
unique as applied to atomic energy industries, nevertheless state and 
191 Ibid. 
192Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §236.om; Wis. Stat. (1951) §31.02. 
193 Wis. Stat. (1957) §31.02. 
194 I d., §31.14-
195 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§236.010 to 236.28o. 
198 Mich. Stat. Ann. §9.1195. 
197 I d., §5.J44. 
198 See, e.g., Note, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 225 at 227-231 (1951), where Pennsylvania 
common law remedies are di~cussed. · 
199 Commonwealth ex rei. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., supra note J2. 
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local control of water diversion represents one more factor that must 
be considered by atomic entrepreneurs in determining the type of 
facility and its location. 
C. Regulation of Radioactive Materials as Drugs or Dangerous 
Substances 
The use of radioactive materials in medical therapy and industrial 
operations has increased rapidly and can be expected to continue to in-
crease as new applications and better techniques are discovered. Since 
radioisotopes can be produced as byproducts of any type nuclear reactor, 
it is probable that many owners of nuclear reactors will find themselves 
engaged in the sale of radioactive materials to medical, research, and 
industrial consumers. As a result, two additional types of state regu-
lation may be encountered : namely, regulation of sale of drugs and 
regulation of transportation of dangerous substances. 
At least four types of state statutes exist which may have some 
application to the manufacture, sale, and use of radioisotopes in con-
nection with the study and treatment of diseases. Since the California 
statute books contain all four of these types and since the scheme of 
regulation in California in respect to drugs and poisons is quite ex-
tensive, its statutes will be examined in some detail. Similar provisions 
in the statutes of the other nine states will be indicated, together with 
other pertinent provisions not found in the California statutes. 
California, as well as the other nine states covered in this study, has 
a statute regulating the pharmacy profession which provides for the 
licensing of pharmacists and pharmacies and establishes a State Board 
of .Pharmacy.200 In addition to regulating the sale of drugs at retail, 
the statute requires that any manufacturer of drugs obtain a permit 
from the State Board of Pharmacy.201 New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
and Wisconsin similarly require the registration of drug manufactur-
ers.202 The California statute also states that "Except as otherwise 
provided in this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture 
. . . any drug, poison, medicine or chemical . . . unless he is a regis-
2oo Cal. Business & Professions Code §§4000 et seq.; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 91, §§55.1 
et seq.; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§14.721 et seq.; Mo. Stat. Ann. c. 338; N.J. Rev. Stat. 
(1937) §§45: 14-1 et seq.; N.Y. Education Law §§6&n et seq.; Ohio Rev. Code c. 
4729; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, §§291 et seq.; Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 45~; Wis. Stat. ( 1957) 
§§151 et seq. 
2o1 Cal. Business & Professions Code §4084. 
2o2 N.Y. Education Law §68o5 (5) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §794; Tex. Civ. Stat. 
art. 45~, §17; Wis. Stat. (1957) §151.04(4). 
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tered pharmacist .... " 208 However, since a corporation cannot be a 
registered pharmacist, this provision must mean that a manufacturer 
of drugs must either be a registered pharmacist or comply with the pro-
vision requiring that a manufacturer obtain a permit from the State 
Board of Pharmacy. Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin require the 
supervision of a registered pharmacist "or other qualified person" in 
the manufacture of drugs.204 The State Board of Pharmacy is also 
given broad administrative authority to regulate the manufacture of 
drugs for the protection of the public. 205 In view of these statutes, it 
may be necessary for an atomic energy enterprise, if it produces byprod-
uct radioisotopes to be used_in medical diagnosis and therapy, to register 
with the state board of pharmacy and to comply with any applicable 
statutes or regulations governing the manufacture of drugs. 
A second category of statutes which must be taken into consideration 
are the pure drug acts, many of them patterned a:fter the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. These statutes commonly prohibit "adulter-
ation" and "misbranding" of drugs. Elaborate statutory definitions 
of these two terms are set forth, and drug manufacturers are required 
to comply.206 Another provision found in many of the pure drug acts 
relates to "new drugs," and typically a new drug may not be sold unless 
it has been approved under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
or approved by the state board of pharmacy.207 
A third category of state statutes establishes special regulations for 
"dangerous drugs." For instance, California statutes define a "danger-· 
ous drug" as any drug unsafe for self-medication. Certain specific drugs 
are listed as dangerous, with power given to the Board of Pharmacy 
to add others to the list.208 Certainly many, if not most, radioisotopes 
would fall within this definition. Manufacturers of dangerous drugs 
must be registered with the Board of Pharmacy and keep a record of 
sales of such drugs to wholesalers, pharmacies, and laboratories.209 
2oa Cal. Business & Professions Code §4030. 
20 4 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35. §795; Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4542a, §17; Wis. Stat (1957) 
§151.04(4). 
205 See, e.g., the rule-making power granted to the California State Board of 
Pharmacy, Cal. Business & Professions Code §4009. 
20& Cal. Health & Safety Code §§26200 to 26385; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 91, §55.1 1; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §14.781; Mo. Stat. Ann. §1g6.015; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §24:5-1; N.Y. 
Education Law §68o8; Ohio Rev. Code §§3715.o8, 3715.11 ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, 
§§781 to 8os; Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 4471; Wis. Stat. (1957) §97.25. 
207 Cal. Health & Safety Code §26288; Mo. Stat. Ann. §1g6.105; N.J. Rev. Stat. 
§24: 6A-1; N.Y. Education Law §68og. 
2os Cal. Business & Professions Code §§4211, 4240. 
20s I d., §§4217, 4227· Wisconsin also has a statute regulating the sale of dangerous 
drugs. Wis. Stat. (1957) §I5I.o7. 
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The fourth type of state statute which may have some significance 
to producers of radioisotopes is that relating to poisons. The California 
statute lists compounds and preparations which are deemed poisonous, 
and gives power to the Board of Pharmacy to add others to the sched-
ule when required in the interest of public health.210 Other statutes 
define a poison as any drug, chemical, or preparation which is likely to 
be destructive to human life in quantities of sixty grains or less,211 or 
for some purposes any substance likely to be destructive of human life in 
quantities of five grains or less.212 These statutes typically require that 
specified labels be attached to the container containing the poisonous 
substances and that records be kept of their ~ale. The probable applica-
bility of these statutes should be taken into account by concerns in-
tending to market radioisotopes. 
D. Transportation of Radioactive Materials 
The transportation of radioactive materials may also be regulated 
by several federal, state, and local agencies. Although the Atomic 
Energy Commission apparently has power to regulate the transfer of 
radioactive materials, the Commission has subordinated its authority 
to the federal agencies having jurisdiction over the various types of 
carriers. 218 As a result, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, the U. S. Coast Guard, and the Post Office Depart-
ment have issued detailed regulations governing the transportation of 
radioactive substances under their authority to regulate transportation 
of "explosives and other dangerous articles." 214 However, the authority 
of the federal agencies, other than the Post Office, is generally limited 
to interstate commerce· so that matters of intrastate commerce are 
governed by state and local laws and regulations. 
In each of the ten states studied, a state agency has general super-
visory powers over the railroad and motor vehicle common carriers. 
Typically, common carriers are denoted "public utilities" and are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the public utility commissions. However, in 
21o Cal. Health & Safety Code §§20703, 20&Jo. See also Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 38, §184; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §14-745; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §338.090; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) 
§45: 14-19; N.Y. Education Law §6813; Ohio Rev. Code §3719.32; Tex .. Penal Code 
art. 726; Wis. Stat. (1957) §15I.I0(1). 
2n Mich. Stat. Ann. §14.745; N.Y. Education Law §6801 ( 16) ; Ohio Rev. Code 
§4729.02(D); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §901. 
212 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §45: 14-19; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §902. 
21s BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 281.1. 
214 For a compilation of the .federal regulations, see AEC, Handbook of Federal 
Regulations Applying to Transportation of Radioactive Materials (1955). 
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some states the trucking industry is regulated by a separate agency. 
In California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania the public utility commissions have been granted sufficiently 
broad powers to establish health and safety standards for the transpor-
tation of radioactive materials by all types of common carriers. 215 In 
New Jersey the Public Utilities Board has broad rule-making powers 
in respect to railroad safety, 216 but the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles 
is given only a limited power in respect to the trucking industry to 
regulate the construction and equipment of vehicles. 217 In Texas only 
the State Highway Commission seems to have sufficiently broad powers 
to issue regulations covering transportation of radioactive materials.218 
In Wisconsin the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over 
both railroads and motor vehicles, but its power to make rules and 
regulations covering procedures to be followed in transporting radio-
active substances is not clear. For example, th~ commission is vested 
with power and authority to "supervise and regulate such common motor 
carriers in all matters affecting their relationship with the public . . . 
to the end that adequate service at reasonable rates shall be afforded." 219 
The power to regulate health and safety matters is thus not expressly 
granted, but probably is implicit since it is made the duty of every com-
mon motor carrier to "furnish reasonable, safe and adequate service and 
facilities." 220 Similarly, in respect to railroads in Wisconsin, every 
railroad is directed to adopt "reasonably adequate safety measures and 
install, operate and maintain reasonably adequate safety devices for 
the protection of life and property." 221 But this general terminology is 
followed by a sentence authorizing the commission to require the 
installation of a block system. This probably limits the authority of the 
commission to regulate only those safety matters connected with equip-
ment and practices in moving f-reight; the authority apparently does 
not extend to regulation of such matters as amount of material, pack-
aging, warnings, etc. 
Two statutes,222 enacted in New York and Pennsylvania, which are 
215 Cal. Public Utilities Code §761; Ill. Stat. Ann. c. III 2/3, §§32, 49, 61; id., c. 
95 I/2; §§282.4,· 282.14; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§22.53, 22.543; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) 
§386.310; N.Y. Public Service Law §49(2); Ohio Rev. Code §§4905.04, 4921.04; Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 66, §§1183, 1186. 
216 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §48: 2-23. 
217 I d., §39= 3-43· 
21s Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 911b, §4(a). 
219 Wis. Stat. ( 1957) §194-18(9). 
22o I d., §194.29. 
221 I d., § 195.26. 
222 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §16-c; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, §715. 
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substantially identical in nature and regulate the transportation of dan-
gerous articles· by motor vehicle, should also be mentioned. It is made 
unlawful to transport by motor vehicle over the highways of the state 
any dangerous article (which is defined to include radioactive materials) 
in a manner that will unreasonably endanger persons or property. The 
transporting motor vehicle must be conspicuously marked to indicate 
the danger, but an exemption is granted when applicable regulations of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission have been followed. 
In addition to the authority of state agencies having direct juris-
diction over common carriers, it should be noted that the labor depart-
ments and health departments typically are granted such broad powers 
in respect to the health and safety of employees and the public that 
they may also attempt to regulate the transportation of radioactive ma-
terials. 228 Furthermore, local governmental units may also have author-
ity to regulate transportation of radioactive substances. Therefore, 
we find once again an imposing array of state and local agencies poten-
tially capable of exercising jurisdiction in respect to the same activity. 
E. Regulation by Interstate Compact 
The interstate compact was little used until the 1920's,224 but recent 
years have seen' a great increase in the application of this device in 
various regulatory fields, including conservation of natural resources, 
control and improvement of navigation, civil defense, education, flood 
control, labor legislation, and stream pollution. 225 Both Congress and the 
Supreme Court have encouraged the use of the interstate compact as a 
means of solving problems essentially regional in character 228 which 
do not readily lend themselves to solution by the states acting 
individually. 
Several compacts recently entered into by two or more states have 
established interstate administrative agencies. The compacts of greatest 
significance with respect to the development of atomic energy for 
industrial uses are those relating to water pollution. However, the inter-
state compact may conceivably be used to regulate other activities affect-
ing the use of atomic energy in the future. Therefore, in addition to 
consulting and obtaining the necessary permission from appropriate 
228 See discussion of general powers of the labor and health departments, supra, 
Part III, Chapter III. 
224 Zimmerman, The Interstate Compact Since 1925, 3 (1951). 
225 Note, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 131 ( 1951) ; Book of the States 20 ( 1952-53). 
228 See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 2g6, 313, 41 S.Ct. 492 (1921); 
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 71 S.Ct. 557 (1951); Water Pollution Control Act of 
1948, 33 U.S.C.A. §466a(c); 36 Stat. g61 (1911). 
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state agencies, an industry planning a venture into this new field of 
activity should also investigate the existence of interstate agencies as 
another possible instrumentality of governmental regulation. 
Since the landmark Colorado River Compact, approved by Congress 
in 1928,227 the compact has been employed extensively in regard to 
water problems common to several states. In the western states, includ-
ing Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Wyoming, Idaho, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Kansas, numerous compacts have been 
formed relating to matters of water allocation since scarcity of water 
is a crucial problem in these states. 228 These compacts would assume 
significance if a nuclear reactor employing large quantities of water as a 
coolant were built in any of these states. 
In the eastern and midwestern states, a number of compacts directed 
toward the problem of pollution of interstate streams have been nego-
tiated between states and approved by Congress .. Various factors have 
accounted for the increasing use of the interstate compact in this area, 
including especially the increasing number of instances of pollution of 
interstate waters and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to enjoin 
pollution at the instance of one state suing another.229 
Some of the more significant water pollution compacts merit discus-
sion. Compacts to be examined will be primarily those involving the 
states selected for this study in connection with regulation at the state 
level. These compacts may be divided into two principal categories : 
(I) compacts which create administrative agencies, some of which have 
enforcement powers; and ( 2) compacts which create committees to 
collect and disseminate information and to make recommendations to 
the states. Since the second type does not involve regulatory powers, 
they are of little significance for present purposes, although action taken 
as a result of recommendations of the committees may have importance 
in the future. 
I. Compacts Creating Joint Administrative Commissions 
a. Commissions with Enforcement Powers 
The following are representative interstate compacts pursuant to 
which enforcement powers are conferred upon administrative com-
missions: 
(I) Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact. The Ohio River 
227 45 Stat. 1057 (1928). 
228 Zimmerman, supra note 224 at 16, contains citations to many of these compacts. 
229 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 26 S.Ct. 268 (1906); New York v. New Jersey, 
supra note 226. 
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Valley Water Sanitation Compact, drawn in 1936, became effective in 
1948 when the requisite number of states ratified it.230 The signatory 
states are Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. The compact creates the Ohio 
River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, which is authorized to 
adopt, prescribe, and promulgate rules, regulations, and standards for 
administering and enforcing provisions of the compact. All industrial 
wastes discharged into the Ohio River or its tributaries must be modified 
or treated to protect the public health or to preserve the waters for other 
legitimate purposes as determined to be necessary by the commission 
after investigation, due notice, and hearing. The commission is em-
powered to order a person to discontinue, modify, or treat any discharge 
of industrial waste, and the orders are enforceable in any court of gen-
eral jurisdiction. In addition, the commission is ordered to make surveys 
and recommendations and reports to the various signatory states. 231 
(2) Tennessee River Basin Water Pollution Control Compact. The 
purpose of the Tennessee River Basin Water Pollution Control Com,. 
pact is to promote the effective control and reduction of pollution in the 
waters of the Tennessee River basin.282 The signatory states are Ala-
bama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Virginia. The compact has not yet come into effect for it still requires 
enactments by certain state legislatures and approval by the Congress. 
When it comes into operation,Z38 it will give the commission established 
under the compact 284 powers in respect to the Tennessee River basin 
somewhat similar to those possessed by the Ohio River Valley Water 
Sanitation Commission over the Ohio River basin. 
(3) Delaware River Basin Water Commission Compact. The Dela-
ware River Basin Water Commission Compact involves New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Apparently, all states have 
approved except Pennsylvania.285 According to its terms, it is not to 
230 Zimmerman, supra note 224 at 7, n. 33· Dyer v. Sims, supra note 226, concerned 
the validity of this comp~ct, and the court's opinion contains background material as 
well as some of the provisions of the compact. 
281 The text of this compact may be found in Ohio Rev. Code §6II3.01; Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 32, §816.1; 54 Stat. 752 (1940). 
282 For text of the compact, see Tenn. Laws 1955, c. rsr. 
283 It enters into force when enacted into law by Tennessee and one other of the 
signatory states and approved by Congress. I d., art. XII. 
284 I d., art. II. 
285 See II Del. Code Ann. ( 1953) tit. 23, §901-904, annotation to §902. See also 
N.Y. Unconsolidated Laws §1581. 
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become effective until approved by all four states; 236 moreover, Con-
gress has not yet approved the compact. 
When it becomes effective, the Delaware River Basin Water Com-
mission will have power, among other things, to "exercise an essential 
governmental function of each of the signatory states, for the purposes 
of developing, utilizing, controlling, and conserving the water resources 
of the Delaware River Basin in order to insure an adequate water 
supply. . . ." Among the primary purposes is the assurance of an 
"adequate minimum flow in the Delaware River for the protection of 
public health, for the benefit of industry and of fisheries . . . , for 
recreation, for general sanitary conditions, for the dilution and abate-
ment of pollution, and for the prevention of undue salinity. . . ." 
It would seem imperative that an industry contemplating the use of 
large quantities of water consult this commission if and when the 
compact goes into effect. 
(4) Interstate Sanitation Commission. The Interstate Sanitation 
Commission was created by a tri-state compact, negotiated in 1935 
between New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.237 The boundaries of 
the Interstate Sanitation District established by the compact and the 
waters embraced by it are defined rather precisely in the agreement. In 
general, the compact is aimed at abating and reducing the pollution of 
harbor, coastal, and tidal waters and tributaries of tidal waters. 
The commission is given power to classify and establish standards of 
purity for the various bodies of water embraced within the district. 
Unless properly treated, sewage or other polluting matters may not be 
discharged into the waters in the district. Enforcement powers are 
granted to the commission, as well as authority to issue orders. These 
powers have been exercised in at least one instance, and a New Jersey 
court has enforced the commission order by a mandatory injunction 
directed against the discharge of sewage by a municipality.288 
The commission must be consulted in the event that coastal, estuarial, 
or tidal waters of any of the .signatory states are considered for use by 
an atomic energy establishmc:;nt. Moreover, the commission has recently 
been authorized to study air pollution in the New York-New Jersey 
area.239 
286/bid. 
237 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937), §§32:18-1 et seq. See also, 49 Stat. 932 (1935). 
288 Interstate Sanitation Commission v. Weehawken, 141 N. ]. Eq. 536, 58 A.2d 530 
(1!)48). 
2so N.Y. Laws 1954, c. 321. 
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b. Commissions without Enforcement Powers 
The following are representative interstate ·compacts conferring ad-
visory authority but not granting administrative enforcement powers: 
(1) New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact. 
The New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact em-
braces the states of Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York. Congress and all of the 
states have approved the compact.240 According to Article I, the compact 
shall apply to : 
... [S]treams, ponds and lakes which are contiguous to 
two or more signatory states or which flow through two or 
more signatory states or which have a tributary contiguous to 
two or more signatory states or flowing through two or more 
signatory states, and also shall apply to tidal waters ebbing and 
flowing past the boundaries of two states. 
The New England Interstate· Water Pollution Control Commission is 
given rule-making authority and is required to "establish reasonable 
physical, chemical and bacteriological standards of water quality satis-
factory for various classifications of use." 241 The commission is not 
authorized to issue permits or orders. However, appropriate state 
agencies (i.e., agencies regulating health and water pollution) are 
charged with establishing treatment programs to meet these standards. 
Each signatory state pledges itself to provide for the abatement of exist-
ing pollution and for the control of future pollution of the waters 
concerned. 242 Hence, all enforcement powers are retained by the indi-
vidual signatory states. Of course, there is a possibility that the United 
Sta.tes Supreme Court may enforce the compact obligations. 
(2) Bi-State Development District. The Bi-State Development Dis-
trict is the result of a compact between Illinois and Missouri. It was 
approved by Congress in 1950.248 The purpose of the compact is to 
establish a metropolitan development district, consisting of the city of 
St. Louis and several surrounding counties. The Bi-State Development 
Agency created pursuant to this interstate agreement is given power to 
"plan, construct, maintain, own and operate bridges, tunnels, airports 
and terminal facilities and to plan and establish policies for sewage and 
24o 6r Stat. 682 (1947). 
241 /d., art. V. 
242 I d., art. VI. 
248 64 Stat. s68 ( 1950) ; see also, Ill. Stat. Ann. c. I27, §6Jr- I ; Mo. Stat. Ann. 
§70.J70. 
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drainage facilities." 244 Apparently, this agency will act as a general 
planning agency for this area.245 
While the agency has no direct powers of enforcement with respect to 
matters of water pollution and use, nevertheless as a planning and rule-
making agency it has policy-forming authority, and it would seem 
advisable to consult it should an industry contemplate the use of waters 
in the area covered by the compact. 
(3) Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin. The Inter-
state Commission on the Delaware River Basin might be termed a 
"joint advisory commission," created pursuant to a compact between 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. 248 The compact 
outlines detailed requirements for the disposal of wastes in the Delaware 
River basin. The basin is divided into four zones, and it has been said : 
"For the bdustry operating in one of these zones or planning to build 
there, the agreement provides an exact pictur~ of what will be re-
quired." 247 No .enforcement powers are given to the commission, its 
powers being purely advisory. The Delaware River Basin Water Com-
mission Compact, discussed above, now in the process of being adopted 
by the same four states, will have enforcement powers and is a product 
of the recommendations of this older commission. · 
(4) Columbia Interstate Compact. The Columbia Interstate Compact 
was signed in 1955 by the states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washing-
ton, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. It will become effective when ratified 
by the first four states listed above and approved by Congress.248 Under 
the compact, the Columbia Interstate Compact Commission will have 
advisory powers in respect to the utilization of the water and other 
related resources of the Columbia River basin. It is of particular interest 
for the purposes of this study to note that specific power is given the 
commission to prepare and recommend plans for achieving the most 
efficient use of the hydroelectric power resources in the basin and for 
controlling pollution of waters of the Columbia River system. 249 
2. Compacts Creating Informal Advisory Commissions 
Several compacts establishing purely advisory commissions on water 
pollution have been entered into by different groups of states. These 
2H 64 Stat. 569 (art. III) (1950). 
2• 5 See Zimmerman, supra note 224 at 12. 
2• 8 for test, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. J2, §815.31. 
247 tomment, "Statutory Stream Pollution Control," 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 225, 237 
(1951). 
248 For the text of the compact, see Idaho Laws 1955, c. 185. 
249 Art. V, §C(J) and art. VIII, §B of the compact respectively. 
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compacts are of little significance at present, except insofar as they may 
lead to future compacts or statutes which may be recommended bythe 
respective commissions. These compacts typically embrace a particular 
river basin, and give the commission authority to make investigations, 
disseminate information, and make recommendations to their respective 
signatory states. The signatory states typically agree to cooperate in the 
abatement of existing pollution, to prevent future pollution, and to 
enact uniform legislation for the abatement and prevention of water 
pollution. 250 
Another type of agreement, even more informal, provides simply that 
departments of health of several states agree to cooperate with each 
other and with the United States Health Service in abating and pre-
venting water pollution. Apparently these agreements create a commit-
tee which meets periodically, discusses mutual problems of water pollu-
tion, and makes suggestions. Beyond this the committee cannot go. 251 
Illustrative of such agreements and the corresponding signatory 
states are: Upper Mississippi River Drainage Basin Sanitation Agree-
ment (Minn., Ind., Iowa, Wis., Ill., Mo.) ; Missouri River Basin Sani-
tation Agreement (Colo., Kan., Mo., Neb., Iowa, Minn., Mont., N.D., 
S.D., Wyo.); The Great Lakes Drainage Basin Sanitation Agreement 
(Minn., Wis., Ill., N.Y., Pa., Ohio, Mich., Ind.). 
Also to be mentioned are joint resolutions between water pollution 
commissions of two or more states. For example, Minnesota has joined 
with Wisconsin in at least two joint resolutions, one in 1952 and the 
other in 1953. By the terms of these resolutions each signatory state 
agrees to require certain minimum treatment of wastes to prevent water 
pollution. Another jojnt resolution was entered into by the states of 
Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin in 1952, with essentially the same pro-
visions as the resolutions between Wisconsin and Minnesota. 
3· Conclusion 
It will be important for any private industry contemplating the estab-
lishment of a plant utilizing nuclear .power or otherwise using nuclear 
energy in such manner as to affect interstate streams to take into con-
sideration any interstate compacts that may be applicable and to consult 
with the interstate commissions whether the commissions have enforce-
250 See, e.g., Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, 54 Stat. 748 (1940), 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §741. 
251 These compacts do not ordinarily get into the state statute books, but are matters 
of informal public record. 
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ment or merely advisory powers. If the particular commission has en-
forcement powers, then clearly an industry will be subject to them. In 
the case of a commission with only advisory powers, a private industry 
would nevertheless be well advised to follow its recommendations. The 
commission's proposals may be implemented by statutes of the states 
party to the compact. Moreover, good public relations will demand that 
the industry adopt the health and safety standards recommended by the 
interstate commission. Furthermore, a failure to adopt the recom-
mended standards may serve as evidence of negligence, if persons or 
property are injured, and actions are brought in the courts to recover 
damages. 
Chapter V 
RECENT STATE ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION 
AND REGULATION 
In recent years a number of states have recognized some of the prob-
lems inherent in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and have enacted 
legislation, promulgated regulations, or taken other executive action. 
Although this legislation and regulation cannot be easily classified, 
basically state action expressly concerned with atomic energy problems 
seems to fall into three categories : ( 1) legislation or executive action 
creating study commissions to investigate the problems involved and 
recommend solutions; ( 2) legislation to encourage atomic energy activ-
ities and establish eduf<ition programs; and (3) legislation and regu-
lations to control radiation hazards. 
A. Study Commissions 
Before a state invokes any of its powers, reason suggests that it first 
determine what problems are involved and in what directions solutions 
are most likely to lie. This is especially true where the state proposes 
to anticipate the development and effect of a new scientific, industrial, 
agricultural, and medical instrument and source of energy. Investiga-
tions of this magnitude require the concerted efforts of representatives 
of a number of disciplines. 
Recognizing the dimensions and complexity of the problem posed by 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, many states, either individually or 
as members of a geographic region with similar interests, have estab-
lished special investigating, study, and planning commissions to deter-
mine the scope and purpose of any state program. These commissions 
have been established by both legislative and executive action. All of 
them have sought to focus the minds of a representative group of ex-
perts upon the problems of promoting and integrating the utilization of 
atomic energy into the activities of the state or region. Most of them 
are of a temporary character, existing until such time as their recom-
mendations are tendered to the governor or to the legislature. 
Typical of this approach are the actions of Georgia, Illinois, New 
Jersey, and South Carolina. In 1955 the Illinois legislature established 
the Atomic Power Investigating Commission by statute.1 The commis-
1 Ill. Laws 1955, S.B. 577. 
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sian consists of the directors of public health, civil defense, and public 
welfare (who are members ex officio), three members from the General 
Assembly, three from labor, three from industry, and three from sci-
en~e. The commission was charged with the duty of making a thorough 
investigation and study of the economic and social impact of the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy upon the state and submitting a report of 
the results and recommendations to the governor and the General As-
sembly within two years. In 1957 another statute was passed to continue 
this organization for another two years.2 
A permanent Nuclear Advisory Commission, consisting of not less 
than twenty, nor more than forty, members (representing agriculture, 
power, medicine, public health, education, industry, labor, banking, 
insurance, law, government, and such other fields as the governor 
deemed ad_visable), was created by a resolution of the Georgia legisla-
ture in 1957.3 Its duties include making a study. as to the best possible 
means of achieving the social and economic benefits of nuclear energy, 
keeping itself advised on all phases of nuclear energy development, keep-
ing the governor informed and advised, and determining whether addi-
tional legislation is necessary. By virtue of a recommendation in the 
resolution that no legislation relating to nuclear energy be introduced or 
enacted unless first approved by the commission, it has been made, in 
effect, a clearing house for legislation. 
A fifteen member Atomic Energy Commission was authorized by a 
joint resolution of the New Jersey legislature in 1956 for the purpose 
of conducting a similar study.4 And in 1956 the New York legislature 
created the Joint Committee on State's Economy, which is authorized 
to make a thorough study of the effect of the advance in the civilian use 
of atomic energy upon the economy of the state and of the measures to 
be taken in relation thereto. The South Carolina Senate, by resolution, 
amended its rules to create a Committee on Atomic and Nuclear Energy 
for purposes similar to those of New York.D 
The governors of Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, and Washington have 
revealed an independent concern. with atomic energy problems by ap-
pointing study committees to assist them. 8 
2 Ill. Laws 1957, S.B. 65o; 2 CCH. Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,215. 
3 Ga. Laws 1957, H. Res. 24-5oa; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,191. 
4 N.J. Laws 1956, Jt. Res. 16; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,337. 
5 S.C. Laws 1957, S. Res. 455; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1[17,443. 
8 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., "State Activities in Atomic Energy," (mimeo. 
Feb. 1957). 
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In addition to the above state measures taken independently, several 
regional organizations have been established to make studies concerning 
the social and economic impact of atomic energy. Sixteen southern 
states, 7 through the Southern Regional Education Board, conducted a 
study program which resulted in the presentation of a report to the 
Southern Governors' Conference in I956. The report pointed out two 
principal areas of state action-to control and to develop the use of 
atomic energy. The report also recommended (I) that each governor 
appoint a special assistant for atomic energy matters, ( 2) that existing 
state agencies continue to exercise existing regulatory authority in their 
respective areas of activity, (3) that each state study its existing laws 
and regulations applicable to nuclear energy, and (4) that state develop-
ment and promotional agencies re-evaluate their practices and programs 
to include the atom. These recommendations covered the field of agri-
culture, atomic power, general industrial applications, manpower, edu-
cation, medicine, and public health. 8 
Having received this report and recommendation, the Southern 
Governors' Conference, in turn, recommended that individual states 
create a state nuclear energy advisory committee for the purpose of (I) 
reviewing the work conference report, ( 2) recommending state pro-
grams, and ( 3) advising the state governor on atomic energy matters. 
The Georgia Nuclear Advisory Commission, described above, is an 
example of the recommended organization. It also was suggested that 
the chairmen of the various state advisory commissions serve as mem-
bers to a regional advisory council. 9 
On February 8, 1954, the New England Committee on Atomic 
Energy was established by a resolution adopted at the New England 
Governors' Conference. It consisted of twelve members, selected by the 
chairman of the Conference from nominations submitted by the s1x 
New England governors, 10 and was to make a survey concerning : 
7 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mis~issippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. 
8 Supra note 6, p. 3· 
9/bid. At the request of the Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy of the 
Southern Governors Conference, the Southwestern Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas 
has undertaken a study to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of an interstate 
compact pertaining to nuclear energy among the sixteen states represented at the 
conference. On September 1, 1957 the Foundation published its interim report on "The 
Feasibility of a Southern Regional Compact on Nuclear Energy." The report contains 
a general discussion on the areas of state responsibility, plus tentative remarks re-
garding areas for interstate coordination and separate state action. 
1o Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 
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(I) The interests of New England in the development of 
atomic energy, present and potential, for peaceful purposes, 
particularly in the field of power generation; 
( 2) The extent and effectiveness of present efforts in this 
field on the part of the New England state governments, edu-
cational institutions, private associations, industrial and busi-
ness firms and individuals; 
(3) Measures appropriate for both public and private organ-
izations which would stimulate and enlarge New England's 
participation in the atomic energy program; and 
( 4) Such other matters relating to atomic energy as in the 
judgment of the Committee should be brought to the attention 
of the Conference.11 
955 
In July of I955 the committee submitted an extensive report in which 
it concluded that the effect of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act was to open 
a new phase of state and private atomic activity; that such activity called 
for " ... an industrial base in which scientific and engineering talent, 
supported by mechanical skills, is the indispensable element" ; that, while 
atomic power was not then economically competitive, since New England 
was a high power cost area, it should be in the forefront of atomic 
power development; that the new phase in atomic activity affects state 
governments in at least three of their traditional capacities: (I) "The 
exercise of the police power for the protection of the health, safety, and 
welfare of the citizen"; (2) " ... the exercise of ... [the police] 
power with respect to financial, insurance, and rate regulation as new 
atomic industries are financed and come into being" ; and ( 3) ". . . 
the capability of the state to encourage and enhance the development o£ 
new industrial activity through promotion, dedication of resources, and 
sound tax policy." 12 
Also included in the committee's report were its recommendations (I) 
to the states-that they undertake a legislative program similar in 
concept to that contained in a suggested state statute (discussed below 
in this chapter) ; ( 2) to Congress and the AEC-that some federal 
atomic energy installations, an AEC administrative office, and a library 
of classified technical information be located in New England; ( 3) to 
New England educational institutions-that they should undertake to 
construct research reactors and to institute appropriate training pro-
grams on all phases of atomic energy; and ( 4) to New England indus-
u New England Committee on Atomic Energy, "Atomic Energy and New England," 
app. (i) (1955). 
12 /d. at 2. 
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trial and business leaders-that atomic energy uses, opportunities, and 
enterprises should be aggressively pursued.18 
B. State Promotional Programs 
A number of states have acted to establish special administrative 
agencies charged primarily with the task of encouraging atomic energy 
development, and, in some instances, secondarily with some minor 
regulatory functions. In respect to these promotional efforts there is 
an understandable lack of specificity. It is doubtful if these states 
regard their actions as anything but tentative, and it is obvious that all 
of them desire to move with caution. There is a noticeable reluctance 
to adopt any measures which are as revolutionary in nature as atomic 
energy itself. None of the states appears much inclined toward fresh 
experiments in the business of covernment. Certainly their actions do 
not manifest anything like the magnitude of concern which caused 
Congress to establish the Atomic Energy Commission, with its extraor-
dinary powers, in 1946. Of cours_e, in justice to the states, it should 
be pointed out that this conservatism probably is due in large part to 
the existence of the AEC as well as to a justifiable perplexity as to 
just what areas of influence the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 leaves 
open to them. On the other hand, should the states desire to exercise 
their traditional prerogatives in the field of atomic energy, they will 
have to take a bolder line than has been taken thus far. 
Unlike Congress, none of the states has vested its promotional and 
control powers and duties with respect to atomic energy in one agency 
or treated both aspects of such a program in one statute. For the most 
part these subjects have been separately provided for, and, especially in 
regard to regulation, existing state agencies have been utilized. 
By far the most popular statutory scheme for state promotion (and 
some control) of atomic energy is that recommended by the New Eng-
land Committee on Atomic Energy. This committee's "Model Act to 
Coordinate Development and Regulatory Activities Relating to the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" a has been followed in Arkansas/11 
Connecticut, 18 Maine, 11 Massachusetts, 18 New Hampshire, 19 Ohio, 20 
1s Ibid. 
u /d., app. (iii); reprinted as Appendix B, Item 1. 
u Ark. Stat. Ann. §§82-1401 et seq. 
16 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§1933d et seq. 
17 Me. Rev. Stat. c. sz-A, §§1-7. 
18 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §§85-93. 
19 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B, §§r-6. 
2o Ohio Rev. Code §§4163: 01 et seq. 
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and Washington.21 Furthermore, recent enactments of Florida,22 
Rhode Island,23 South Carolina/• and Tennessee 25 indicate that they 
gave close attention to the recommendations of the New England Com-
mi.ttee. Because of the widespread legislative recognition afforded the 
New England Model Act, a discussion of its significant features is 
warranted. 
In an interim report, published on December 27, 1954, the New 
England Committee on Atomic Energy recommended to the attention 
of the member states an act which was designed : 
( 1) to provide the basis for a single harmonious system of 
atomic energy regulatory activity within each state through 
the exercise of coordinate federal and state regulatory powers, 
(2) to open the way for orderly and intelligent study, within 
each affected state administrative area, of the new problems 
pi:>sed by privately financed atomic energy enterprise . . . 
and 
(3) to provide a focus within the state for atomic energy 
matters-as well as a basis for regional and state coordina-
tion-by the creation, on the staff of each governor, of a Co-
ordinator of Atomic Energy Development.28 
In the first ·section of this statute the enacting state declares itself 
to be in accord with " ... the action of the Congress of the United 
States in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'' and that it intends 
to" ... cooperate actively in the atomic energy program" and exercise 
its police powers in a manner" ... so as to conform, as nearly as may 
be, to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued there-
under." 
Section 3 of the act directs a number of affected state departments and 
agencies, such as the departments of public health, labor, highways, etc., 
to" ... initiate and pursue continuing studies as to the need if any for 
changes in the laws and regulations administered by ... [them] ... 
that would arise from the presence within the state of special nuclear 
materials and by-product materials and from operation herein of pro-
duction or utilization facilities." This section also authorizes the gov-
ernor to direct other departments and political subdivisions of the state, 
which are not specified, to initiate similar studies. Pursuant to these 
21 Wash. Rev. Code c. 4J.J9. 
22 Fla. Stat. Ann. c. 290. 
2a R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, c. 27, §§1 et seq. 
2• S.C. Code 1.952, §§1-391 et seq. 
215 Tenn. Code Ann. §§53-3101 et seq. 
2& Supra note II at s. 
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studies, each department or agency is" ... to make such recommenda-
tions for the enactment of laws or amendment~ to laws administered by 
it, and such proposals for amendments to the regulations issued by it, as 
may appear necessary and appropriate." 
This section reflects the realization that the problems involved are not 
amenable to any one solution, since conditions may be expected to change 
rapidly and move in unexpected directions, and that the experience of a 
number of existing state agencies can be utilized advantageously in this 
continuing endeavor to maintain a flexible promotional program. Pre-
sumably, within the limitations of its budget and the qualifications of its 
personnel or those it can afford to hire, each department is free to con-
duct its investigation as it sees fit. It should be noted that all of the 
states which have enacted this statute apparently have assumed that the 
existing agencies were adequate to the task. None has expressly au-
thorized the establishment of specialized organizations within .the de-
partments and agencies for this purpose. As will be pointed out below, 
several states have created a special advisory board to which the depart-
ments and agencies have access, and a recent amendment to the Maine 
statute authorizes the advisory board to obtain technical advice from 
the AEC as well as to cooperate with the federal government in per-
forming functions relating to atomic energy.27 
A significant feature of the act in general, and Section 3 in particular, 
lies in the fact that none of the departments and agencies mentioned 
are given any new authority to promulgate regulations concerning 
atomic energy matters or to institute anything except a study program. 
However, the act apparently contemplates the issuance of regulations 
by state departments and agencies, under existing statutory authority, 
for, in Section 4 (c), it provides that : 
No regulation or amendment to a regulation applying specifi-
cally to an atomic energy matter which any such department or 
agency may propose to issue shall become effective until 30 
days after it has been submitted to the Coordinator [of 
Atomic Development Activities]. ... 
It should be noted, however, that whatever implication this provision 
carries with it is obscured by a noticeable absence of standards. The 
only thing offered by way of a guide is that the state intends to exercise 
its powers in such a manner as " ... to conform, as nearly as may be, 
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder." 
Although this standard will assist departments and agencies concerned 
27 Me. Rev. Stat. c. sz-A, §7. 
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with radiation safety regulation, it is not much help to those agencies 
which are charged with other types of regulatory activities. 
Section 4 of the act provides for the establishment in the state's ad-
ministrative hierarchy of the office of Coordinator of Atomic Develop-
ment Activities. The only qualifications for this officer are that he be 
a "citizen of this state." In New Hampshire he also must be selected 
from among the commissioners of the various departments and agen-
cies.28 Under the Model Act he is to be appointed by the "Governor and 
Council," while in Arkansas/9 Connecticut,80 and Washington,81 the 
governor alone may appoint, and in Ohio the advice and consent of the 
Senate is required. 82 
The duties of this official are: (I) to coordinate the studies, recom-
mendations, and proposals of the several departments and agencies 
". . . with each other and also with the programs and activities of the 
Department of Industrial Development of the State," and like activities 
in other states and with the policies and regulations of the AEC; ( 2) 
to ". . . keep the Governor and Council and the several interested de-
partments and agencies informed as to private .and public activit~es 
affecting atomic industrial development"; (3) to further such atomic 
industrial development " ... as is consistent with the health, safety, 
and general welfare" of the people of the state; and ( 4) to represent 
the state's interest in regional atomic activities and in cooperation with 
the federal government. 
Essentially, the coordinator has no appreciable powers unless he 
could be said to derive some as" ... deputy to the Governor in matters 
relating to atomic energy." Quite obviously, the success of this office 
largely depends upon the personal persuasiveness of the individual 
appointed. In this connection, the provision in Section 4 (c), requiring 
submission of all proposed regulations to the coordinator thirty days 
prior to their effective date (" ... unless, upon a finding of emergency 
need, the Governor by order waives all or any part of this 30 day 
period"), may prove of some assistance to the coordinator. Also, it 
should be noted that the several departments and agencies are directed 
to keep the coordinator fully and currently informed as to their activities 
relating to atomic energy. The New England Committee has likened 
these provisions to those contained in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act 
2s N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B, §4. 
29 Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-1404. 
30 Conn. Gen. Stat. §193&1. 
31 Wash. Rev. Code §43·39.050. 
32 Ohio Rev. Code §4163.04. 
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requiring advance notice of proposed AEC action to the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy in Congress. 
According to the New England Committee, Section 4 " ... is prem-
ised on the proposition that what is everybody's business is nobody's 
business and therefore seeks to make sure that atomic development and 
regulation is somebody's business." 83 One wonders just how much of a 
"somebody" this coordinator is in the states listed. None of the en-
acting states has seen fit to provide compensation for him on a full-
time basis. 
Sections 2 and 5 combine to form the only direct regulatory provi-
sions of this act. Section 2 simply provides that no persons within the 
state shall carry on any activity with respect to "special nuclear material, 
byproduct material, production facility or utilization facility," for 
which type of activity an AEC license or permit is required by federal 
law, without first obtaining the license or permit. Section 5 authorizes 
the state attorney general to apply to an appropriate court for an order 
enjoining any person who is violating, or is about to violate, Section 2. 
No criminal penalties for violation of Section 2 are provided. 
The drafters of this act have indicated that there may be some doubt 
as to whether, in the absence of a war emergency, the AEC's authority 
reaches as far as the licensing requirements of the 1954 Atomic Energy 
Act would extend it. Therefore, Section 2 is intended to remove the 
possibility of a jurisdictional "no-man's land," without imposing licens-
ing burdens and expenses upon the states, and, also, to discourage pos-
sible challenges of the federal licensing power.84 There may be some 
question as to whether a user of byproduct material (material not owned 
by the federal government), who is not in interstate commerce or in an 
activity affecting interstate commerce (assuming that this is possible 
any longer), is within the regulatory jurisdiction of the AEC. The 
fact cannot be ignored, however, that since the AEC is the principal 
supplier of byproduct materials today and practically all other sources 
of supply clearly come under federal regulation, should this intrastate 
user fail ~o comply with federal regulations, further supply of byproduct 
material could be denied to him. 85 Thus, it is doubtful if Section 2 
88 Supra note n at 66. 
u I d. at 64- On the extent of the congressional power to regulate in the atomic 
energy field see Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime 
Private Atomic Energy Activities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1955). 
85 The Radiation Products Company of Dallas, Texas, a licensed user of radioiso-
topes, has been ordered by the AEC to cease temporarily operations involving radio-
active materials, pending a public hearing on possible modification, suspension or revo-
cation of the company's license. AEC Release No. A-28, Feb. 10, 1958, indicated that 
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is necessary to sustain the federal licensing and regulatory provisions in 
even the shadow areas of federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is useful 
in that it authorizes a state authority, which is closer to the scene, to 
en.force a state law and thus to act directly in protecting the interests of 
the state and its citizens. 
If the combination of Sections 2 and 5 should ultimately prove neces-
sary, the question may arise as to whether Section 2 is an unconstitu-
tional delegation of state legislative power because the licensing require-
ments are subject to future changes by Congress and the AEC, thereby 
automatically effecting a change in state law. The drafters of the act 
have pointed out that "Section 2 seems reasonably safe from attack, 
however, since it merely uses the possession of a federal license as a fact 
indicating that the possessor is a fit person to engage in the activity to 
which the license applies." 88 
The federal constitutional question as to wh~ther a state, in effect, 
can enforce in this fashion a federal regulatory program where Con-
gress may have pre-empted the field will be considered at a later point 
in this chapter. 
The key terms used in Section 2-"special nuclear material, by-prod-
uct material, production facility ... [and] ... utilization facility"-
are defined in Section 7 in such a way as to keep their meaning con-
sistent with federal definitions under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. The 
scope of the act and the radiation hazard with which it manifests some 
concern is no broader than the federal program. Several sources of ra-
diation, which are fairly abundant, are not covered by the act: X-ray 
machines, various types of particle accelerators, radium, and source ma-
terial. It was felt that source material does not present a significant 
radiation hazard and . that its inclusion might embarrass activities 
involving ores containing small quantities of uranium. Recently, how-
ever, the Maine legislature amended its act to include source materiaJ.S7 
Commissio_n inspectors had discovered that the company had transferred at least two 
radioactive cobalt 6o sources, of approximately one curie each, to persons not licensed 
by the AEC to receive them. The hearing was scheduled for 10 :oo a.m., Feb. 24, 1958, 
in Dallas, but was postponed by the AEC. 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1T9517. 
88 /bid. Regarding the question .of state constitutional law, the New England Com-
mittee said: "Section 2 is like a statute conferring certain privileges on persons who 
have been admitted to the bars of other states. Statutes of this sort are not considered 
unconstitutional by the fact that the requirements for admission to the bar may be 
changed by other states in the future. And a state may condition the transport of 
intoxicating liquor through its territory on the fact that the consignee in another state 
may lawfully receive it. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, [64 S. Ct. 464] (1944)." 
87 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §§1-7. The term "source material" is defined and inserted 
between the terms "special nuclear material" and "byproduct material" wherever they 
occur in the Maine statute. 
962 STATE REGULATION 
Several of the states which have followed the recommendations of 
the New England Committee have made significant additions to . the 
Model Act. While creating the position of coordinator, Massachusetts, 
Ohio, and Washington have also established atomic energy advisory 
boards. Massachusetts' "Commission on Atomic Energy" consists of 
seven members (one of whom is the coordinator, who is also the chair-
man) appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the 
Council for five year terms. They are to be representative of industry, 
labor, and science. The duties of this commission are: (I) to keep 
fully and currently informed as to atomic energy developments and ac-
tivities ; ( 2) to consult with and advise the coordinator ; and ( 3) to 
render an annual report. There are to be at least four meetings of the 
commission annually.88 
Ohio's Atomic Energy Advisory. Board consists of eleven members, 
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. The co-
ordinator is a member; labor, management, and medicine are repre-
sented by one member each ; · two members are persons with scientific 
training in the atomic energy field ; and the five remaining members 
need not have any particular qualifications. This board is: (I) to review 
the studies, policies, and activities of the state departments and agencies; 
(2) to review atomic developments within the United States and else-
where; (3) to make recommendations to the governor; and (4) t~ 
furnish the coordinator, or any state department, such technical advice 
as may be required upon all matters relating to the production or use 
of atomic energy and the protection and welfare of persons employed in 
industries so engaged.89 
The Washington Atomic Energy Advisory Council consists of five 
members, appointed by the governor. No qualifications for these per-
sons nor duties for the council are stipulated. The coordinator is to act 
as executive secretary to the council. 40 
In Maine, in addition to being entitled to a thirty day notice of pro-
posed regulations, the coordinator may (within this time) notify the 
governor of his objections and reasons therefor. After discussion with 
the affected department or agency, and within fifteen days after receipt 
of objections from the coordinator, the governor may declare the pro-
posed regulation valid and effective or invalid and ineffective.41 This 
38 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §88. 
89 Ohio Rev. Code §4I63.05. 
40 Wash Rev. Code §4J.J9.o6o. 
41 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §,SI. 
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provision appears to be something of an improvement over that con-
tained in the Model Act. 
The Tennessee statute does not create the position of a coordinator, 
but establishes a seven to ten member "Advisory Committee on Atomic 
Energy," with duties identical with those of the coordinator under the 
Model Act. This committee is authorized to obtain full-time adminis-
trative and consultant staff assistance with the concurrence of the gov-
ernor. The statute also omits the injunction provision.~2 
:Promotion commissions have been established in Florida and Rhode 
Island by statutes which are conceptually similar to the New England 
Model Act. The Florida Nuclear Development Commission consists of 
nine members appointed by the governor for terms concurrent with his. 
It is authorized to appoint a salaried, executive director and to employ 
such personnel as may be necessary. Essentially, its duties are: ( 1) to 
coordinate all local and state nuclear energy activities ; ( 2) to promote 
and support programs of education, research, and information; (3) to 
provide for and work with groups in the state relative to ·problems of 
regulation, insurance, safety, and public health as related to nuclear 
energy; ( 4) to assist and attract nuclear energy industries; and ( 5) to 
advise and make legislative recommendations to the governor.43 
The Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission consists of five mem-
bers appointed by the governor for overlapping terms of five years. 
Basically this commission is to make a study of the need for changes 
in state laws and regulations, advise and make recommendations to the 
governor and the General Assembly, coordinate development and regu-
latory activities relating to industrial and commercial uses of atomic 
energy, and cooperate with the AEC and similar commissions of other 
states.44 
C. State Statutes and Regulations to Control Radiation Hazards 
A number of states have recently enacted statutes or promulgated 
regulations which are specifically designed to control some or all radi-
ation hazards. These warrant extended discussion because of the pre-
dominant concern of the states in respect to the health and safety of 
their citizens. The discussion of state laws in Chapter III of this Part 
concerned the general powers and duties of the public utility commis-
sions, the labor departments and industrial commissions, and the state 
~2 Tenn. Code. Ann. §53-3104. 
•a Fla. Stat. Ann. §290.o6 .. 
44 R. I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, c. 27, §§I, 2. 
964 STATE REGULATION 
departments of health, as they might affect sources of radiation. That 
material will be alluded to only when it · is ~ecessary to indicate . the 
authority for recent radiation health and safety regulations. It should be 
noted that where, for example, the departments or agencies of certain 
states have been granted specific powers under recent radiation hazard 
legislation, this' does not mean that the corresponding departments and 
agencies of states not mentioned do not have similar powers under 
general health and safety legislation; it merely means that the legisla-
tures of the other states have not bestowed those powers upon their 
respective state departments arid ·agencies· with radiation health and 
safety control specifically in mind.· 
It should also be noted that this discussion is limited to recent state 
regulatory action concerning radiation health and safety matters. State 
control.o;f atomic energy matters has broader connotations than mere 
health and safety regul(ltion; various f~rms of economic regulation also 
are likely to be imposed. The f~ct remains., however, that, to date, no 
state appears ,to. have inwlced it~ ·powers so as to .regulate specifically 
the economic aspects of atomic energy activities, with the exception of 
Massachus.etts. which recently amended. its. insurance ~ws in the matter 
of issuing and classifying poli~ie~. insuring against nuclear energy 
hjizards, 411 
Tht),actions .c?.n the part of the states with respect to radiation hazards 
range everywhere from no state action to the. issuance and .enforcement 
of very comprehensive .regulations by at least one, and in one case, sev-
eral state agencies .. At the present time slightly less than one-half of 
the states have taken no official action regarding the problem. 48 Some 
of these states, however, are in the preliminary stages of preparing 
legislative and administrative solutions. 47 
411 Mass. Ann. Laws §§175: So, 175: IliA. 
48 These states include Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maryl;md, Minne.sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
47 Indiana is ·reported to be regulating exposures to ionizing radiation .from shoe-
fitting fluoroscopes, and the State Board of Health indicated in December of 1956 that 
it was revising its hospital licensing regulation on radiation protection. In addition, the 
board reported that it had made several joint inspections of byproduct users with AEC 
officials. Supra note 6 at 8. 
The Kansas State Board of Health has indicated that it is carrying on "a small 
non-regulatory radiological health program" and that it has been making joint inspec-
tions with AEC officials. It also has established a "Radiological Health Advisory 
Committee," which is reported to be working upon a proposed bill to place control 
of radiation under the board. This bill is said to be modeled upon the recommendations 
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Affirmative and official action to protect the public against radiation 
hazards has been taken by both the legislatures and state agencies, pur-
suant to existing powers. Where the legislatures haveacted, some have 
vested radiation safety rule-making and enforcing powers in state agen-
cies, while others have acted only to impose certain duties upon radiation 
source users or possessors in the interests of public health and safety, 
and a number of legislatures have merely directed that studies be made 
regarding radiation hazards. As for administrative action, a few state 
agencies have issued very comprehensive radiation safety regulations, 
but the majority of those which have acted, have'iherely concerned them-
selves with limited aspects of the problem. 
I. Legislative Action 
~. Legislation Granting Rule-Making and Enforcing Powers 
The legi!'latures of Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jer-
sey, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota have recently enacted 
statutes to confer upon their respective public health agencies the power 
to promulgate and enforce radiation health and safety regulations of 
general application .. With maximum economy and Illinimum guidance 
the powers and duties of the Colorado State Board .of Beal$ were 
extended so as to authorize it" ... to establish and enforce standards 
for exposure to environmental conditions, i'n~luding radiation, that may 
be deemed necessary for the protection of the public health." 48 
In a somewhat less obvious fashion the Connecticut State Depart-
ment of Health appears to have been similarly empowered by a statute 
which specifies that: 
No person, firm, corporation, town, city or borough shall op-
erate or cause to be operated any source of ionizing radiation · 
or shall produce, transport, store, possess or dispose of radio-
active materials except under conditions which comply with 
of the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements, as published in 
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61. Supra note 6 at 8. .. 
The Minnesota Department of Health has reported its intention to ask the 19S7 
legislature to grant it specific authority to make and adopt regulations relating to the 
control of ionizing radiation. Supra note 6 at 10. 
While the Missouri Division of Health claims authority under existing law, it has 
not promulgated radiation safety regulations. It has employed, however, a radiological 
health physicist. Supra note 6 at 11. 
The New Mexico Department of Public Health has reported that a bill similar to 
that suggested by the NCRPM will be introduced to the legislature in 1957. Supra note 
6 at 12. 
48 Colo. Rev. Stat §66-1-7(21). 
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· regulations that may be incorporated in the sanitary code or 
with orders imposed by the state department of health for the 
protection of the public health.49 
The standards which are to be followed by the State Department of 
Health are specified in the succeeding sentence which reads : 
Such regulations or orders shall be based to the extent deemed 
practicable by the state department of health on the regulations 
of the United States atomic energy commission, ... entitled 
· "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," or, if such 
regulations of the United States atomic energy commission 
should be deemed inappropriate by the state department of 
health, on the latest recommendations of the national com-
mittee on radiation (protection and measurements), as pub-
lished by the United States department of commerce, national 
bureau of standards. 50 
Furthermore, this section specifies that radiation sources shall be utilized 
at the lowest practical level " ... consistent with the best use of the 
radiation facilities or radioactive materials involved." 51 The section 
also requires that proposed sanitary code regulations pertaining to radia-
tion sources be su~mitted to the Connecticut Coordinator of Atomic 
Development Activities thirty days before they are to become effective.62 
The sanitary code regulations which have been issued by the State De-
partment of Health pursuant to this authority are discussed later in 
this Chapter. . · 
In addition to authorizing the promulgation of radiation safety regu-
lations, the Connecticut statute also provides for registration by " ... 
each person, firm, corporation, town, city or borough conducting or 
planning to conduct any operation within the scope of this Act . . . 
with the state department of health." 58 The department may require the 
registr~nt to state" ... the qualifications of the supervisory personnel, 
the protective measures contemplated ... and such other information 
as it determines is necessary." 5' Re-registration is required where 
modifications are made which will increase the amount of radiation. A 
number of exemptions to the registration requirement are stated, the 
~ost significant of which is that for X-ray devices used by or under 
the supervision of persons licensed to practice the several healing arts. 
49 Conn. Public Acts 1957, Public Act 154, §2. 
50 Ibid. 
U[!Jid. 
52/bid. See also Conn. Gen. Stat. §1938d. 
58/d., §J. 
U[!Jid. 
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It is finally specified that the registration is not intended to imply state 
approval of the manner in which the radiation activities are carried out. 
Apparently, Connecticut has no desire to have its registration require-: 
ment construed as a licensing procedure; the State Department of 
Health has no discretionary authority to withhold a registration cer-
tificate. In this connection, however, it should be remembered that Con-
necticut law does necessitate the procurement of an AEC license or 
permit by those pers~ns intending to carry on atomic energy activities 
within the state for which licenses are required by federallaw. 55 
Shortly after the above statute was enacted the Connecticut Gen-
eral Assembly directed the Commissioner of State Police to make" ... 
reasonable regulations concerning the safe storage and transportation 
of hazardous chemicals," 56 which are so defined by the act as to include 
"radioactive materials." 57 "In adopting such regulations, said com-
missioner may be guided by recognized national ·standards for the pre-
vention of damage to property and injury to life." 58 While these 
regulations are not to apply to· "electric companies," 59 the authority, 
nevertheless, overlaps that of the State Department of Health, thus mak-
ing for a fruitful area of conflict, especially since this subsequent statute 
does not mention any requirement that the regulations first be sub-
mitted to the State Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities be-
fore they can become effective. Inspections to determine if there is 
compliance with the commissioner's regulations are to be made by the 
local fire marshal of each town, city, or borough.80 
In 1955 a somewhat narrower or more limited authority to issue ra-
diation health and safety regulations was conferred upon the Depart-
ment of Public Health by a Massachusetts statute which provides : 
The department shall, from time to time, after a public hearing 
and subject to the approval of the governor and council, pre-
scribe and establish rules and regulations to control the trans-
portation, storage, packaging, sale, distribution, production 
and disposal of radioactive materials which may affect the 
public health or the health of persons exposed to radioactivity 
or ionizing radiation .. · .. Nothing in these rules and regula-
tions shall be inconsistent with those now or hereafter estab-
55 Conn. Gen. Stat. §1935d. 
G6 Conn. Public Acts 1957, Public Act 353, §2. 
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lished by the National Burea,u of Standards relative to the 
handling and disposing of radioactive materials. 81 
The .omissions of the word "use" among the activities to be regulated 
and of "radiation installation" or "radiation source" among the ob-
jects to be controlled, obviously leaves a great deal uncovered by this 
regulatory .authority. Perhaps it was felt that the hazards not provided 
for would be regulated by other authority, for the statute further 
stipulates : 
Nothing in this section shall prevent the department of labor 
· and industries from establishing rules and regulations for the 
protection of the health and safety of employees against ioniz-
ing radiation in any place of employment. . . . 82 
Wpatever the rationale, as yet no radiation health and safety regula-
tions have been forthcoming from any Massachusetts agency, and in 
September of· 1957 the Department of Public Health was authorized 
and directed "to make a study and investigation of regulatory and pro-
tective measures pertaining to radioactive materials" with which "re-
lated departments and. agencies shall cooperate." 68 
Lik~ that of Connecticut, Massachusetts law requires the procure-
ment of an AEC license or permit by those persons intending to carry 
on atomic energy activities within the state for which licenses or permits 
are required by federallaw. 6' 
. Under a I9S8 act, New Jersey has created a Commission on Radia-
tion Protection within the State Department of Health empowered to 
formulate such rules and regulations "as may be necessary to prohibit 
and prevent unnecessary radiation." e•a "Unnecessary radiation" is de-
fined as the use of gamma rays, X-rays, alpha and beta particles, and 
other atomic or nuclear particles "in such manner as to be injurious or 
dangerous to the health of the people or the industrial or agricultural 
potentials of the State." 84b Regulations may be adopted by the com-
mission only after a public hearing preceded by thirty days notice and 
may not become effective until sixty days following adoption.6k No 
regulation concerning unnecessary radiation adopted by any local gov-
ernment agency shall be effective until submitted to the commission for 
8t Mass. Ann. Laws c. III, §sB. 
82 Ibid. 
8s Mass. Acts and Resolves 1957, c. Io6. 
8' Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §92. 
8•a N.J. Laws 1958, c. u6, §7. 
8•b !d., §2(c). 
8•e I d., §7. 
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approval.64d The Commission on Radiation Protection is limited to the 
rule-making function, and the duties of administration and enforce-
ment of rules promulgated by it are delegated to the Department of 
H~alth. The statute directs that the department, among other things, 
"Require registration of sources of radiation," and "Inspect radiation 
sources, their shielding and immediate surroundings and records con-
cerning their operation for the determination of any possible radiation 
hazard." 64e The department is also invested with broad powers to 
issue general and emergency orders to prevent violations of any regu-
lations of the commission and to obtain injunctions against violations 
of such orders.64t 
As was mentioned in Chapter III of this Part, the New York Public 
Health Law was amended in 1955 so as to add to the functions, powers, 
and dutie£. of the Department of Public Health the supervision and 
regulation of the ". . . public health aspects of the use of ionizing 
radiation a:1d the handling and disposal of radioactive wastes." 65 Pur-
suant to this authorization, the department has issued comprehensive 
regulations, which will also be discussed later. Apparently, this grant of 
power was not intended to preclude regulation by other agencies of the 
state having health and safety responsibilities, for, without any express 
authority to issue radiation health and safety regulations specifically, 
the New York Department of Labor also has incorporated such regu-
lations in its Industrial Code. These regulations, and the manner in 
which they conflict with those of the Department of Public Health, will 
be discussed under the heading of "Administrative Regulation." 
In July of 1957 the Oregon legislature directed the State Board of 
Health to promulgate regulations and standards for the safe use, han-
dling, disposal, and control of all radiation sources within the state, 66 
except. those " .... emitting nonhazardous quantities of radiation." 67 
To this authority, however, is added the rather curious condition that 
the board is to promulgate these regulations and standards only " ... 
after making a two-year study of the problem." 68 
In the matter of standards, it is indicated that " ... the public policy 
of this state [is] to encourage the constructive uses of radiation and 
64d I d., §17. 
Ue]d., §g. 
64f Id., §§II-IJ. 
65 N.Y. Public Health Law §201(1)(s). 
66 Ore. Laws i957, c. 399, §3. 
67 Id., §4-
6BJd., §J. 
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to control any associate harmful effects." 69 Any regulations promul-
gated must conform with this policy. 7° Furthermore, the act directs 
the board to appoint a Radiation Advisory Committee to advise it upon 
". . . matters relating to radiological health and radiation protec-
tion." 71 The committee is to consist of five persons who, by training 
and experience, are qualified to advise the board on such matters. 
No regulations have been or could be made effective, as yet, by the 
Oregon State Board of Health pursuant to this authority, but certain 
standards and regulations were recommended before the statute was 
enacted.72 
Pursuing a declared policy nearly identical to that of Oregon, 73 the 
South Dakota legislature has directed the State Department of Health to 
. . . develop comprehensive policies and programs for the 
evaluation and determination of hazards associated with the 
use of radiation, and for their amelioration/4 
and to 
adopt, promulgate, and enforce such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to implement or effectuate the 
powers and duties of the [Department] ... under this 
Act.70 
Other duties of the Department under this act are: ( 1) to" ... advise, 
consult, and cooperate" with local, state, interstate, and federal agen-
cies and with affected groups and industries; 76 ( 2) to ". . . collect and 
disseminate information relating to the determination and control of 
radiation exposure hazards"; 77 and (3) upon request, to " ... render 
opinions concerning such plans and specifications on the design and 
shielding for radiation sources as may be submitted before or after con-
struction, for the purpose of determining the possible radiation haz-
ard." 78 Furthermore, the department has the power: (I) to " ... en-
courage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigations, training, 
research, and demonstrations relating to the control of radiation haz-
69Jd., §I. 
TO I d., §J. 
71 I d., §5. 
72 Recommended Standards and Regulations for Occupational Health, Ore. Bd. of 
Health, Jan. I956, c. II, §2.9 and app. I. 
' 8 S.D. Laws I957, H.B. 826, §I; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!I7.557· 
14Jd., §4(I). 
10 !d., §4(6). 
To !d., §4(2). 
77 !d., §4(5). 
78 !d., §4(8). 
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ards"; 79 (2) to " ... issue, modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or 
abating the discharge of radioactive material or waste into ground, air, 
or waters of the state"; so and (3) to " ... make inspections of radia-
tion sources, shielding and. immediate surroundings for the determina-
tion of any possible radiation hazard." s1 
Like the Connecticut law discussed above, and the suggested act of 
the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement,s2 
from which much of its language was taken, the South Dakota statute 
makes it unlawful for any person: ( 1) " ... to produce radiation, or 
to produce, use, store, or dispose of radioactive materials, unless he 
registers in writing with the ... [Department]"; (2) " ... to mod-
ify, extend, or alter programs involving the production of radiation or 
the production, use, storage, or disposal of radioactive materials unless 
he notifies the . . . [Department]"; or ( 3) to do any of the fore-
mentioned " ... except in accordance with the·provision of this Act 
and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder." ss It also is un-
lawful " ... for any person to expose any other person to diagnostic 
or therapeutic radiation" unless he is, or is under the direction of, a 
person licensed to practice the "healing arts" or dentistry in South 
Dakota.s4 Apparently, the Department of Health may prescribe methods 
and amounts of diagnostic and therapeutic radiation even as to persons 
so licensed since the act does not contain any limitation which would 
prohibit it from doing so. 
Violations of the South Dakota statute, or orders or rules promul-
gated pursuant to it, are deemed misdemeanors upon each day in which 
they occur, and the Attorney General, at the request of the department, 
is directed to seek injunctions against such violations.s5 While this 
statute does not specifically so provide, it nevertheless implies that the 
State Department of Health is to have exclusive jurisdiction over radia-
tion hazards in South Dakota. 
While no general rule-making authority as to radiation hazards ap-
pears to have been bestowed specifically upon any state agency of Wis-
79/d., §4(4). 
so /d., §4(7). 
S1 Jd., §§4(9), 7, 8. 
S 2 See National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61, "Regulation of Radiation Ex-
posure by Legislative Means," at 27 (Dec. 9, 1955). 
ss S.D. Laws 1957, H.B. 826, §5. 
S4Jd., §6. 
S5Jd., §g. 
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consin, a recent enactment of that state authorizes the county board of 
each county, having a population of soo,ooo or more, to 
. . . regulate by ordinance within the territorial limits of 
such county the ejection, discharge or emission into the open 
air of smoke, and solids, liquids, gases, fumes, acids, burning 
embers, sparks, cinders, soot, particulate wastes or dusts, in-
cluding their radioactive fractions or counterparts, from any 
chimney, smokestack, vest, fuel burning equipment, open fire, 
apparatus, device, mechanism, substance, material or premises; 
. . . prescribe rules and standards in aid of such regulations ; 
... provide for commencing actions to enjoin acts, threats of 
acts and the procuring or suffering of acts to be done in viola-
tion of such ordinance. 88 
b. Legislation lmposing Certain Duties upon Radiation 
Source Users or Possessors but Not Conferring Rule-
Making Authority upon State Agencies 
State legislation imposing· a bare minimum of regulation is to be 
found in the laws of Arkansas,87 Maine,S8 New Hampshire,89 Ohio,90 
South Carolina,91 Tennessee,92 and Washington,98 which, following the 
New England Model Act, provide : 
No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, transfer, ac-
quire or possess any special nuclear material, by-product ma-
terial, production facility, or utilization facility, or act as an 
operator of a production or utilization facility wholly within 
this State unless he shall have first obtained a license or permit 
for the activity in which he proposes to engage from the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission if, pursuant to 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission requires a 
license or permit to· be obtained by persons proposing to 
engage in activities of the same type over which it has juris-
diction.9• 
These statutes, as well as similar laws in Connecticut and Massachu-
setts, have been discussed above. 
In addition to the previously discussed laws of Connecticut and South 
8&Wis. Stat. (1957) §59.07(53). 
87 Ark. Stat. Ann. §82.1402. 
8s Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §3. 
89 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B,. §2 .. 
so Ohio Rev. Code §4163.02. 
91 S.C. Code §1-394. 
92 Tenn. Code Ann. §53-3102. 
98 Wash. Rev. Code §43·39.030. 
94 Supra note 14 at 64-
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Dakota, statutes of Illinois, North Dakota, and Wyoming also impose 
upon the radiation source user or possessor the duty to register the 
source with a state agency. 
The effect of two recently enacted Illinois statutes is to authorize the 
Department of Public Health : 
To register and inspect locations or facilities where radiation 
machines are used or where radioactive material is being pro-
duced, transported, stored, disposed or used for any pur-
pose .... 95 
and to require: 
Every operator of a radiation installation ... [to] ... 
register such installation with the Director of the Department 
of Public Health . . . before said installation is placed in 
operation. 96 
Re-registration is required in the event that there is " ... any change 
in such imtallation which might increase or decrease the number of 
sources, source strength, output or ene~gy of radiation produced." 97 
Registration forms are prescribed by the department and are to contain 
the following information: "the name of the operator; the location and 
a designation of the confines of the installation; a statement of the type 
and strength of the sources of radiation expected to be produced, used, 
operated, stored or disposed of within the installation and the approxi-
mate total number of each type; and such other information as the 
Department may deem necessary." 98 Registration is not intended to 
imply approval of the installation. Operators of registered installations 
are required to notify the director within thirty days after discontinu-
ance of operations. 99 Specific provision is made for a number of exemp-
tions from the registration requirements for non-hazardous sources of 
radiation.100 
The Illinois Department of Health is authorized to inspect and in-
vestigate" ... the premises and operations of all radiation installations 
in . . . [the] state, whether or not such installations are required to 
be registered." 101 The operation of an unregistered radiation source 
is en joinable, and is made a misdemeanor on each da:y "such offense con-
96 111. Ann. Stat. c. xz;, §ss.J2. 
96 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. III I/2, §§194-200. 
97 /d., §I95· 
98/bid. 
99/bid. 
100 [d., §Ig6. 
101/d., §197. 
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tinues.102 The only express purpose of these Illinois statutes is to aid 
the Department of Public Health in " ... studying and evaluating the 
potential hazard to the health of the people of this state caused by the 
increasing use and operation of ... [radiation] machines and in-
stallations." 108 No new authority is granted to the Department to pro-
mulgate radiation protection rules and standards, nor is it authorized to 
refuse acceptance of registration by any source of which it does not 
approve. 
As for North Dakota and Wyoming, it is not entirely clear what was 
intended by the legislatures of those states, for, while they speak of 
registration, they appear to have provided for licensing. The North 
Dakota statute designates the State Department of Health as the "regis-
tration" agency/04 and further requires: 
Each manufacturer, processor, and refiner of radioactive iso-
topes and each hospital, clinic, manufacturing establishment, 
research or educational institution, experiment station, proc-
essing mill, or other institution or place of business or process 
where radiation is produced or radioactive materials are used, 
manufactured, processed, packaged, refined, produced, dis-
posed or concentrated shall register .105 
The State Health Officer is directed to issue a certificate of registration 
to the applicant, but it appears that he is only required to do so 
... upon satisfactory completion and submission of the reg-
istration form supplying the required information to deter-
mine whether the health of the public or persons working 
in such establishments may be adversely affected by using, 
manufacturing, processing, packing, refining, disposing, pro-
ducing, or concentrating of such radioactive isotopes and 
materials.108 
Apparently, if the information supplied by the registrant does not indi-
cate that the installation will be safe, the State Health Officer is under 
no obligation to issue a certificate. Since the act makes it a misdemeanor 
to operate without a certificate, it would appear that this statute has all 
the indicia of a licensing law. Notice, however, that the above provision 
only applies to " ... establishments ... using, manufacturing, ... 
[etc.] radioactive isotopes and materials." It does not speak of sources 
of radiatio-n involving no radioactive materials, and presumably, the 
State Health Officer has no discretionary authority to withhold a regis-
102 !d., §§x98, 199. 
1o8 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 127, §55·32· 
1o4 N.D. Laws 1957, c. 185, §3. 
105 !d., §4. 
108 I d., §5. 
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tration certificate regarding such sources. It seems doubtful that the 
distinction was made intentionally. 
The Wyoming statute appears to effect a licensing law in the same 
fashion as does that of North Dakota; however, it clearly applies only 
to places connected with radioactive materials, as distinguished from 
those producing radiation. The statute reads : 
Each hospital, clinic, manufacturing establishment, research 
or educational institution, experiment station, processing mill, 
or other institution or place of business or process where ra-
dioactive isotopes or materials are used, manufactured, proc-
essed, packaged, refined, produced, disposed or concentrated 
shall be registered with the State Department of Public 
Health.101 
The statute further provides : 
The Director of the Department of Public Health, upon re-
ceipt of a properly executed application for registration and 
upon satisfactory compliance by such applicant with regula-
tions and limits that are or shall be in effect governing the 
same exposure to such isotope or material, shall issue to the 
applicant a certificate of registration.108 
Operation of the above mentioned installations without a certificate of 
registration is deemed to be a misdemeanor; 109 therefore, the person 
can be prohibited very effectively from operating should his registra-
tion form fail to satisfy the director as to the safety of the operation. 
It is possible to argue that, in a rather backhanded way, the above 
statute authorizes the Wyoming Department of Public Health to issue 
regulations governing the exposure to radioactive isotopes and ma-
terials, though it would be difficult to conceive of a less precise manner 
of doing so. Apparently, none has been promulgated. 
c Legislation Directing That Studies Be Made as to Radia-
tion Hazards 
In addition to the above considered statutes of Arkansas,11° Connecti-
cut,111 Florida,112 Illinois/u Maine/14 Massachusetts/16 New Hamp-
107 Wyo. Comp. Stat. §63.1301. 
108 /d., §63.1302. 
109 /d., §63.1303. 
11o Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-1403(a). 
111 Conn. Gen. Stat. §1937d{a). 
112 Fla. Stat. Ann. §2go.o6(5). 
na Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 127, §55.32. 
114 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 52-A, §4(!). 
115 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 6, §91 ( 1) and Mass. Acts and Resolves 1957, c. ro6. 
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shire,116 North Dakota,111 Ohio,118 Rhode Island,119 South Carolina,120 
Tennessee, 121 and Wyoming, 122 legislative action in Georgia, New Jersey, 
and Virginia indicates that these states are concerned at the present time 
with the problems of protecting persons and property against radiation 
hazards, at least to the extent that the problems are being studied. 
While the Georgia Nuclear Advisory Commission seems to be more in 
the nature of an economic development commission, the resolution by 
which it has been established contains language which indicates that 
the governor and the General Assembly wish to be informed upon this 
subject " ... with a view toward determining whether any legislation 
is necessary or advisable for Georgia." 12,8 Similarly, the New Jersey 
Commission for Atomic Energy Study has been directed" ... to make 
studies of the need for changes in the laws and regulations administered 
by any department of the State that would arise from the presence 
withi,n the State of special nuclear material and by-product material and 
from the operation in the State of production or utilization facilities," 124 
and the Virginia Adviso~:y. Legislative Council also has received similar 
orders and authoi-ity;125 
2 .. Administrative Action 
· ~· C~mprehensive Radiation Health and Safety ,Regulation 
Government agencies . of. California, Coimecticut, Michigan, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas have issued comprehensive regulations 
to protect employees or both employees and the public from radiation 
ha~ards. It is interesting to notice that those of the CaHfornia Division 
of Industrial Safety,126the Mic}tigan Department of Health/27 the New 
York Department of Labor/28 . the Pennsylvania State Department of 
11a N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 162-B, §3(l). 
117 N.D. Laws 1957, c. 185. 
118 Ohio Rev. Code §4163.03. 
119 R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 42, c. 27, §2. 
12o S.C. Code §1-395(1). 
121 Tenn. Code Ann. §S3-3IOJ. 
122 Wyo. Comp. Stat: §63.1301. 
1 28 Ga. Laws 1957, H. Res. 24-5oa; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. Ur7,19I. 
1 2' N.J. Laws 1956, Jt. Res. 16; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. t[17,337· 
125 Va. Laws 1958, S. Res. 29. 
12a Cal. Adm. Code tit. 8, §§38oo-386r; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. UU 17,751-
17,766. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item 2. 
121 Supplement No. 13 to 1954 Mich. Adm. Code, pp. 41-70 (Feb. 14, 1958); 2 CCH 
Atomic Energy Law Rep. UU17,871-17,89I. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item s. 
12s N.Y. Industrial Code, Rule No. 38; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. UU17,901-
17,973. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item 3· 
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Health,129 and the Texas Department of Health 130 were issued pursuant 
to the general authority of these organizations, while only those of the 
Connecticut State Department of Health 131 and the New York Depart-
ment of Public Health 182 were promulgated pursuant to legislation au-
thorizing them to reguiate radiation hazards specifically. In none of 
these states, nor in any others for that matter, has a new agency been 
created for the purpose of enforcing radiation safety standards and 
regulations, and only in New Jersey has a new agency been created to 
promulgate such regulations. With the exception of New Jersey, in 
each of the above mentioned states the radiation regulations have been 
issued, and are being enforced, by existing agencies whose principal con-
cern is health and safety. However, especially in New York, it does not 
appear that these agencies have exclusive· authority within their respec-
tive states to regulate radiation hazards. Moreover, with the possible 
exception of Cotmecticut, 133 none of these state~ has established a sys-
tem wherehy the regulations of different agencies within the same state 
are to be made uniform and consistent with one another. Again with 
the exception of Connecticut,184 none of these states requires by stat-
ute conformity with the standards of the AEC, although a measure of 
conformity has been achieved. nevertheless, especially in Connecticut 
and Michigan which have issued regulations most recently. This matter 
of conformity with AEC standards is mentioned (and considered in 
greater detail beiow) for two reasons : (I)" most of the state radiation 
regulations· (and all of the comprehensive ones) apply to persons a~.d 
activities licensed by the AEC, and ( 2) this assertion of state powers 
in a federally regulated area obviously ra,ises a constitutional question 
upon which the conformity of state standards with those ofthe AEC 
will have some effect. Conflict~ and inconsistencies ~et~een state and 
federal regulations, as they apply to atomic energy activities, . should 
be avoided as much as possible since they cannot help but have an ad~ 
verse effect on the industry, and, except in the rare case, there is no 
129 Regulation 433, Radiation Protection, Pa. Dept. of Health; 2 CCH Atomic 
Energy Law Rep. UUI8,ooi-I8,oi8. 
1~0 Regulations on Radiation Exposure, Tex. Dept. of Health; 2 CCH Atomic 
Energy Law Rep. UUI8,351-I8,373. . 
13.1 Conn. Sanitary Code c. III, §I81-1-z87; 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 
UUI7,79I-17,8og. 
132 N.Y. Public Health Law, State Sanitary Code c. XVI; BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter z6s: 611-619. Reproduced in Appendix A, Item 4· 
133 Conn. Gen: Laws §1938d creates the position of coordinator of atomic. develop-
ment activities. 
·134 Supra note 49· 
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scientific or practical justification for them. Moreover, lack of uni-
formity between the states and variance from federal standards will 
tend to increase the possibility that the United States Supreme Court 
will declare an inconsistent state regulation to be an unconstitutional 
invasion of a federally pre-empted area of activity.185 
All of the comprehensive state regulations are a blend (in varying 
proportions, as between states) of "performance" and "specification" 
type provisions.186 As might reasonably be expected, these regulations 
tend to be of the performance type as to matters about which the least 
is known. For example, none of them attempts to specify how a nuclear 
reactor is to be shielded. This considerable problem is avoided by the 
simple expedient of establishing maximum permissible exposures of 
persons near the reactor and requiring that personnel and work areas be 
monitored to determine the extent of actual exposure. Thus, the physical 
arrangements by which· radiation is to be kept below the maximum 
limits are left to the discretion of the owner or user under penalty of 
violating the law should those arrangements prove insufficient. This 
burden, however, is preferable·to premature regulations that attempt the 
incredibly complex (if not impossible) task of 'specifying the dimen-
sions and design of containment barriers for all sizes and types of 
nuclear reactors under all conditions of operation ·and in all sorts of 
locations. 
Other matters, about which considerably· more is known or about 
which no doubt could exist, are covered by specification type provisions. 
All of these comprehensiv~ regulations, for example; contain detailed 
sections concerning standard warning labels, signs,· and signals, except 
those of California.· Some of them, .especially those. of Michigan which 
were published most recently, are fairly specific in connection.with the 
use and installation of sources of ~adiation, such as X-ray machines, 
which are relatively less complex than nuclear reactors .and have been 
.exhaustively studied over a longer period of time. 
laG The problem of federal pre-emption of atomic energy health and safety regula-
tiOns is discussed in the last part of this chapter. . 
tso For a detailed discussion of performance and specification type regulations in ~e 
atomic energy field, see: Blatz, "State and Federal Radiation Safety Regulations,'' an 
address delivered at the Nuclear Engineering and Science Congress at Cleveland, Ohio 
in December 1955, mimeographed by the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. ; Tabershaw 
and Harris, "Administrative Probl~ms in Radiation Protection,'' Nucleonics, Vol. 12, 
No. 12, pp. 8-13 (December 1954); Taylor, "State Control of Protection Against 
Ionizing Radiation," American Journal of Roentgenology, Radium Therapy and Nuclear 
Medicine, Vol. LXXI, No.4, pp. 691-702 (April 1954); Taylor, "The Achievement of 
Radiation Protection by Legislative and Other Means,'' Progress in Nuclear Power, 
Series VIII-The Economics of Nuclear Power, pp. 418-429 (1957). 
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A comparison of the regulations of California, which were last re-
vised in January of 1955, and of Michigan, which became effective on 
February 14, 1958, and those of the other states which were issued 
during the interim period, may justify the observation that there ap-
pears to be a trend toward greater specificity. Certainly, those of 
Michigan are considerably more detailed and comprehensive than are 
the regulations of California. Moreover, if the regulations of Con-
necticut and Michigan are any indication,_ the recent tendency appears 
to be toward adopting the general standards of the AEC, at least where 
the state regulations affect federallicensees. 137 
To give some indication of these trends, the comprehensive state 
radiation health and safety regulations are discussed in the order in 
which they have made their appearance-starting with California and 
ending with Michigan. 
( 1) California 
The California General Industry Safety Orders on "Radiation and 
Radioactivity" were promulgated to establish minimum standards for 
the protection of employees from injurious levels of ionizing radia-
tion.188 The general scheme of these regulations is to provide maximum 
permissible exposure limits for employees; to require radiation safety 
supervision by competent technical personnel and safety instruction of 
employees regularly or frequently exposed; to require radiation monitor-
ing of exposed employees and work locations containing sources of 
radiation and records of these surveys and measurements; and to pro-
vide certain operating rules relative to maintenance of protective de-
vices, handling and disposition of radioactive materials, and warning 
signs or signals. 
The California regulations contain repeated references to National 
Bureau of Standards handbooks and reflect an obvious desire to con-
form to the standards of the National Committee on Radiation Protec-
tion and Measurement.139 However, in this they are not altogether 
137 A recently proposed, but asyet ineffective, set of regulations for New York City 
would simply define "maximum permissible dose" as that "dose rate recommended by 
the National.Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement." 2 CCH Atomic 
Energy Law Rep. 1T17,974, §2IJ.OI(d). 
138 Supra note 126, §38oo. 
139 The National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRPM) 
was formed in 1929 as the Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection upon 
the recommendation of the International Commission on Radjplog\c;al Protection. It 
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successful, nor do they conform with AEC standards in all respects. 
Maximum ·permissible exposures are expressed in rads, whereas. the 
AEC and the NCRPM use the rem (or millirem) as the unit of meas-
urement.14~ Relative biological effect factors are included, howe~er, so 
that conversion from rads to rems may be made. Such a conversion in-
dicate~ that California may have been anticipating the apparent trend in 
the direction of lower permissible limits, for its weekly exposure stand-
ards are lower than the current weekly standards of the AEC and the 
has since expanded the scope of its concern to include all known sources and types of 
ionizing radiation. The NCRPM is sponsored by the National Bureau of Standards 
and governed by representatives of participating organizations. The reports and recom-
mendations of the NCRPM are published in National Bureau of Standards handbooks. 
14° The reader will recall, from the discussion in Part I, Chapter I, that there are a 
number of units in which quantities of various kinds of radiation may be expressed : 
the roentgen, the rep, the rad, and the rem. The roentgen is the quantity of X or 
gamma radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per 0.001293 grams. of 
air produces, in air, ions carrying one electrostatic unit of quantity of electricity of 
either sign. (National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 at 6.) It is not a unit of 
absorbed dose, but will result in the absorption of 83 ergs of energy in one gram of 
dry air at standard temperatUre and pressure or about 94 ergs of energy in one gram 
Qf soft tissue. The limitations of this unit are that it applies only to X and gamma 
ra~ation arid it d~?es not express the amount of energy absorbed ·by various types of 
target material. 
, The ·rep, or roentgen-equivalent-physical, is a unit of any nuclear radiation (alpha 
or. beta particles, neutrons, protons, etc.) that results in 93 ergs of energy being 
absor~ in one gram of soft tissue, and thus it is comparable to the roentgen. (National 
Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 at 6.) It shares one of the limitations of the 
roentgen in that it does not indicate the amount of energy absorbed by substances with 
a greater density than soft tissues. 
· The rad was adopted in 1953 to signify the unit quantity of absorbed dose due to 
anY kind of ionizing radiation that would cause one gram of any target material to 
abSorb ioo ergs of energy. It is a measure of the energy imparted to matter by 
ionizing particl~ per unit mass of irradiated material at. the place of interest. (National 
Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 at 6; National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 
at 38.) 
All three of. the above units are subject to a third limitation: they do not express 
the unit of radiation in terms of its biological effect upon the target material or, what 
is more important, in terms of its effect on various types of human tissue. While all 
kinds of ionizing radiation are capable of producing the same kinds of biological effect, 
their ability to do so is not the same. In producing some effects, certain radiations 
are more effective than others, in the sense that a smaller absorbed dose of these 
radiations is required to produce a given degree of effect. This "biological effectiveness" 
depends upon the type of result under consideration, the specific ionization of the par-
ticular type of radiation, the type of cell or tissue, the organism studied, the conditions 
of exposure, the time distribution of the dose, etc. Insofar as possible, "rehi.tive bio-
logical effectiveness" factors (relative to that of lightly filtered X-rays generated at 
potentials of 200 to 300 kilovolts) have been determined empirically, or estimated, for 
particular biological' systems and for various types and energies of radiation. 
In the protection problem it is sufficient to consider the effects of radiation on certain 
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NCRPM.141 Dose limits are prescribed for the "whole body" and the 
"hands," as measured in the basal layer of the epidermis, instead of 
following the more elaborate anatomical breakdown of the federal regu-
lations.142 As for allowed concentrations of radioactive materials in 
the atmospheres of workrooms, the California regulations express the 
maximum limits in much less precise terms than do the AEC regula-
tions or the NCRPM recommendations.143 Unlike the AEC, CalHornia 
makes no distinction as to employees under eighteen years of age/44 nor 
is the NCRPM recommendation allowing double doses for persons over 
critical organs, which are generally taken by the AEC and the NCRPM as the skin, 
blood-forming organs, gonads, and lenses of the eyes, and for certain potential effects 
on these organs under specified modes of exposure. 
The combination of RBE factors and the rad unit of absorbed dose (the rep before 
1953) has r~ulted in a fourth unit-the rem or roentgen-equivalent-man. The rem 
is defined as the quantity of any radiation such that the energy imparted to a biological 
system (cell, tissue, organ, or organism) per gram of liVing matter by the ionizing 
particles present in ·the region of interest, has the same biological effectiveness as an 
absorbed dose of I rad from lightly filtered X-rays generated at potentials of 200 to 300 
kilovolts. (National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 39-) Therefore, a dose in 
rems is equal to the dose in rads multiplied by the appropriate RBE factor, or, con-
versely, a dose in rads equals the dose in rems divided by the appropriate RBE factor. 
For particulate ionizing radiation, such as alpha and beta particles, neutrons, protons, 
and deutrons, both the-AEC and the NCRPM have elected to express exposure limits 
in rems or millirems (a one-thousandth part of a rem). As for X- and gamma radia-
tion, the NCRPM continues to express exposure limits in millirads. Due to the in-
accuracies implicit in arriving at a particular RBE factor, many scientists feel that it 
is best to do as the California Division of Industrial Safety has done, and specify 
exposure limits in rads and indicate the estimated RBE factor on which the particular 
limit is based. 
Hl For example, conversion (from rads to rems) of the California exposure limits, 
where the entire body is exposed and the absorbed dose is measured in the skin, indi-
cates that no more than 500 millirems is permitted. Under the same conditions, the 
regulations of the AEC and the recommended standards of the NCRPM would allow 
6oo millirems of any radiation to the skin and 1500 millirems of any low penetrating 
radiation (with a half-value-layer of less than one millimeter of soft tissue.) 10 Code 
Fed. Regs. §20.101. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 52. 
u2 The regulations of the AEC and the recommendations of the NCRPM break 
down weekly dose limits into three conditions: (1) type of radiation, (2) conditions 
of exposure, and (3) critical organs affected. Conditions of exposure include exposure 
of the whole body, the hands and forearms, feet and ankles, and head and rieck. Under 
these conditions of.exposure permissible doses are given for the skin, the blood-forming 
organs, the gonads, and the lenses of the eyes. 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, App. "A" 
and National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 56. 
us In the California regulations permissible concentrations of radioactive materials 
in the air of workrooms is expressed in the form of only two classes: alpha emitters 
and beta and gamma emitters. In the NCRPM recommendations such concentrations 
are expressed for each radioisotope. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 56. 
u• 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101 (c). 
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forty-five followed. 145 Finally, the California regulations do not limit 
the exposure of non-employees or regulate the amount of radiation in 
areas other than employment locations. 
To insure that the exposure standards are met, the California regula-
tions require that all radiation operations are to be under the supervi-
sion of competent technical personnel, who are described as persons 
capable of evaluating radiation hazards and specifying protection tech-
niques. Furthermore, employees must be under the supervision of a 
competent medical expert, and those who are regularly exposed must 
be instructed in radiation hazards and methods of protection. 146 
To determine whether radiation is being kept within the prescribed 
limits, workrooms and other locations containing radiation machines 
or radioactive materials are to be monitored and inspected periodically 
or according to a schedule established by the Division of Industrial 
Safety. Exposed employees are to wear monitoring devices as well, 
and permanent records of dosage measurements are to be kept.147 
Also included in the California regulations are certain general op-
erating rules. If monitoring indicates that protective devices are de-
fective, operations are to be terminated until the defects are remedied, 
and employees who have been exposed to excessive radiation are to be 
referred immediately to the medical supervisor.148 Wherever unsealed 
radioactive materials are handled, adequate ventilation must be pro-
vided, radioactive wastes are not to be allowed to accumulate, immediate 
decontamination is to be undertaken in the event of accident, eating is 
forbidden, and adequate protective clothing is to be worn.149 Radioac-
tive materials stored in workrooms are to be enclosed and shielded, and 
other storage areas are to be isolated by construction or location and 
ventilated if the material is not contained.150 General orders regarding 
the placement of warning signs at locations where radiation may be en-
countered and on containers of radioactive materials are provided.m 
Special orders for radium dial painting are provided which prohibit dry 
application and require ventilation hoods. Also included are specifica-
tions as to radium compound containers and brushes as well as rules 
regarding their use.152 
145 National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 52. 
146 Supra note 126, §§38o2(a) and (b), 3811, 3812. 
141 ld., §3&>4. 
usJd., §38os. 
149 I d., §38o6. 
tso I d., §38o7(a) and (b). 
Utfd., §§38o7(c), J8o8. 
tUJd., §3810. 
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The California regulations prohibit the operation of "totally protec-
tive installations" while employees are within· the confines of the barrier. 
Automatic interlocks are required on the entrances, at least one of which 
must operate from the inside, and visible or audible signals are required 
while ionizing radiation is being produced.153 
(2) New York 
New York is the only state which at the present time has more than 
one set of comprehensive radiation health and safety regulations. In 
September of 1955 Chapter XVI of the New York State Department 
of Health's Sanitary Code became effective. The following December 
Rule Number 38 of the New York Department of Labor Industrial 
Code also became effective; it applies "to every place where any em-
ployee in the course of his work may be exposed to radiation in excess 
of one tenth the permissible weekly dose" except medical, dental, veteri-
nary, and educational institutions, clinics, and offices, which are subject 
to the provisions of the Sanitary Code.154 Unfortunately, it is not en-
tirely clear whether the Sanitary Code may be applied to installations 
subject to the Industrial Code. (This matter i-s considered in more 
detail below.) 
The scheme of both sets of New York regulations is to establish 
performance standards, in the form of maximum permissible doses of 
~adiation to persons (other than persons receiving radiation diagnosis 
or treatment), and then to provide a system of safety and medical 
supervision, registration and reporting, monitoring and inspection, and 
operating rules and specifications to insure that the exposure standards 
are met. 
In essential respects the maximum permissible radiation dose limits 
of the two New York regulations are similar; however, sufficient di f-
ference does exist to cause difficulty. Both the Sanitary and the Indus-
trial Codes establish limits to radiation from sources which are outside 
and inside the body. The limits of radiation exposure to sources out-
side the body are very nearly identical with the current permissible 
exposure standards of the AEC 155 in that the same unit ( millirems), 
time period (week), conditions of exposure (whole body, hands and 
forearms, etc.), anatomical scheme (skin, blood-forming organs, gon-
153/d., §§38oi(d), JBog. 
154 Supra note 128, §38-1. See also the definition of "radiation installation" in the 
Sanitary Code, supra note 132, Reg. 1 (g). 
155 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101 and App. "A". 
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ads, and the lenses of the eyes), and amounts are specified. 158 The In-
dustrial Code, however, does appear to contain a drafting error or 
oversight. Under the heading "Permissible Weekly Dose Limit" it is 
provided that : 
For employees whose entire body or major portion thereof is 
exposed to radiation of very low penetrating power from ex-
ternal sources : 300 mrem in the lenses of the eyes; I 500 
mrem in any other part of the body. m 
It seems doubtful that this means what it says, for such a dose to the 
gonads or the blood-forming organs is not recommended. The pro-
vision probably was intended to read like that of the Sanitary Code: 
"1500 mrems in the skin" (of any other part of the body).158 
Both sets of New York regulations limit the exposure to sources of 
radiation inside the body by specifying the allowable concentrations of 
radioactive materials in air and water ingested by the persons to be 
protected. Included in the Industrial Code is a table which sets forth 
the maximum permissible average concentrations of inhaled or ingested 
radioactive materials in microcuries per unit of air or water,m which 
is identical with a table found in the federal regulations.180 No such 
table is included in the Sanitary Code, which simply refers to "na-
tionally recognized limits" and, more specifically, to National. Bureau 
of Standards handbooks, in stating permissible concentrations.161 Pre-
sumably, a change in these nationally recognized standard~ is expected 
to produce an automatic and corresponding change in the permissible 
concentration limits of the Sanitary Code. 
The Sanitary Code also differentiates between the exposure of per-
sons inside and persons outside of the radiation installation. Opera-
tions are to be carried on so that persons outside shall receive no more 
than one tenth the dose to which persons inside the installation may be 
subjected. Persons under eighteen years of age are to receive no more 
than one tenth of "inside" dose no matter where they are located.182 
The Industrial Code also observes this AEC rule 188 of limiting the dose 
to minors, and while theoretically these exposure limits are designed to 
156Supra note 128, §38-6; Supra note 132, Reg. 4. 
157 Supra note 128, §38-6.1 (2). 
158Supra note 132, Reg. 4(b)(2). 
uo Supra note 128, §38-6.1 (7) and Table I. 
18o xo Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, App. "B", Table I. 
181 Supra note 132, Reg. 4(c). 
182Jd., Reg. 4(e) and (i). 
18310 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101(c). 
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protect employees only, the AEC distinction between dose levels in "re-
stricted" and "unrestricted" areas is observed as well by a provision 
that commands the owners of all radiation sources so to shield, isolate, 
protect, or otherwise arrange and control them as to avoid exposure of 
their own or another's employees outside the installation to radiation in 
excess of ten per cent of the permissible inside dose.164 
Both the Sanitary and the Industrial Codes follow the AEC and the 
NCRPM practice of allowing weekly doses up to three times the basic 
limits if during the thirteen week period the total dose does not exceed 
ten times the general weekly limits.165 Only the Sanitary Code, however, 
is in accord with the NCRPM practice of authorizing double doses to 
persons forty-five and older in special cases.166 
Both New York codes require the registration of radiation installa-
tions, and the Industrial Code requires registration of "mobile sources" 
as well.167 By virtue of the fashion in which the term "installation" is 
defined by the two sets of regulations, however, double registration 
should not be required of any source. Registration under the Sanitary 
Code must include a summary of the radiation safety program, while 
the Industrial Commissioner merely need be informed as to the name 
and qualifications of the person in charge of radiation protection. A 
change in the character of the radiation installation Which might in-
crease exposure is considered a new installation and requires re-registra-
tion under the Sanitary Code, while, under the Industrial Code, the 
Commissioner is to be advised of such changes.188 
Radiation safety supervision, in the form of a person or persons re-
sponsible for all necessary precautions, is required by both sets of New 
York regulations. The Sanitary Code merely requires that "all radia-
tion installations shall be operated by or under the direction of a com-
petent person who shall be responsible for all necessary safety precau-
tions." 189 No qualifications are stated. The Industrial Code, on the 
other hand, contemplates more elaborate supervision: a "radiation 
safety supervisor" for each source and a "radiation safety officer" for 
sources creating a "high radiation area or a high airborne concentration 
area." High standards of technical competence are specified for the 
184 Supra note 128, §38-S-4-
185 I d., §38-6.2; supra note 132, Reg. 4(b) (4); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101 (a) (2); 
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 55· 
166 Supra note 132, Reg. 4(h); National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 52. 
187 Supra note 128, §38-4; supra note 132, Reg. 2. · 
188 Ibid. 
189 Supra note 132, Reg. s. 
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radiation safety officer, while the radiation safety supervisor only need 
be instructed and trained by an officer.110 
Radiation safety instruction of all persons working with radiation 
equipment or radioactive materials is required by both New York 
codes.111 The Industrial Code also requires that employees who work 
in radiation areas be informed of the presence of radiation and in-
structed in necessary measures for protection.172 
Monitoring of radiation installations is required by the Sanitary and 
Industrial Codes, as is personnel monitoring; however, the details of 
these surveys are treated somewhat differently under the two codes. 
The Sanitary Code requires surveys of radiation installations where 
radioactive material is present, but not contained in a sealed source, at 
least once a month. Other installations, where radiation equipment or 
sealed containers of radioactive materials are used, must be surveyed 
upon original establishment and whenever changes are made or physical 
condition; may cause changes. Records of these surveys and measure-
ments must be kept for a period of five years, and must be open to in-
spection by health officials.113 The Industrial Code does not specify when 
radiation surveys are to be made; however, the records of those which 
are made must be maintained indefinitely and may be inspected by the 
"attending physician of any person who may have undergone exposure" 
as well as by the Labor Commissioner.m The personnel monitoring 
required by both sets of regulations applies to all persons who may pos-
sibly·receive routinely a weekly radiation dose in excess of one fourth 
the maximum permissible dose.m In high radiation areas, the Indus-
trial Code also ,requires personnel monitoring of any employees when 
the dose rate may exceed 100 mrems in any one hour. Individuals may 
obtain a summary statement of their exposure records under either set 
of regulations. 
The Sanitary Code requires annual physical examinations of all per-
sons who might regularly ingest or inhale radioactive materials in con-
centrations exceeding one quarter of the maximum permissible amounts, 
and persons subject to external radiation are to be examined too, but 
the code does not specify how often.176 The Industrial Code apparently 
110 Supra note 128, §§38-5.2, 38-5.3. 
111 /d., §38-s.n; supra note 13Z, Reg. s(a) and (b). 
112 Supra note 128, §38-5.10. 
11a Supra note 132, Reg. 12. 
174 Supra note 128, §§38-7.1, 38-8.3. 
175 /d., §38-9; supra note 132, Reg. 6. 
11s Supra note IJ2, Reg. 7. 
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assumes that physical examinations will be given, since records of them 
must be maintained, 177 but the regulations do not specifically require 
such examinations. 
Reporting to appropriate officials in the event of excessive exposures 
to individuals is necessary under both sets of New York regulations, 
although the conditions are somewhat different. Under the Sanitary 
Code doses in excess of five times the maximum permissible weekly 
dose must be reported within three days to the health officer having juris-
diction, 178 whereas ingestion of "an excessive amount of radioactive 
material" or total thirteen week doses in excess of ten times the per-
missible weekly dose must be reported to the Labor Commissioner 
within seven days of discovery under the Industrial Code.179 The Sani-
tary Code also requires reporting, by telephone or telegraph, to the 
health officer having jurisdiction of the following events : the discharge 
of excessive amounts of radioactive wastes; the. spillage, loss, or theft 
of radioactive materials; incidents affecting the security of storage 
places ; and other circumstances giving rise to radiation hazards. This 
requirement must be observed by the person in charge of any radiation 
installation, irrespective of whether it is registered with the Department 
of Health. Furthermore, physicians are required to report all cases of 
radiation injury or illness, caused by non-therapy radiation, to the New 
York State Department of Health.180 Presumably, radiation injury or 
illness caused by diagnostic procedures do have to be reported. 
The Industrial Code contains a brief directive as to storage of radio-
active materials not in use, requiring that they "be stored in properly 
shielded and secured containers." 181 Such a requirement is only im-
plicit in the Sanitary Code, but the operator of a radiation installation 
is directed to maintain an accurate account of all radioactive ma-
terials.182 On the other hand, control of radioactive waste disposal is 
only implicit in the Industrial Code,183 whereas the Sanitary Code con-
tains specific provisions on this subject.184 Neither the standards of the 
AEC nor the recommendations of the NCRPM have been followed, 
however, for the provision of the Industrial Code merely prohibits the 
177 Supra note 128, §38-8. 
178 Supra note 132, Reg. 6. 
179 Supra note 128, §38-6.3. 
180 Supra note 132, Reg. 16. 
181 Supra note 128, §38-n. 
182 Supra note 132, Reg. 15. 
188 Supra note 128, §38-54 
tst Supra note 132, Reg. 9. 
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discharge of radioactive wastes into the environment in a manner that 
will lead any person to receive a dose in excess of one tenth the occu-
pational dose, Where waste discharges of two or more users into the 
same environment are additive, they must either enter into a mutual 
agreement, "each to limit his release, so that the total comes within the 
permissible limit specified," or the State Commissioner of Health will 
make the determination as to each. This provision of the Sanitary Code 
is not directed simply to radiation installations required to register un-
der Regulation 2. The question is whether it applies to installations 
subject to the Industrial Code. In view of the broad grant of authority 
to the New York State Department of Health to supervise and regulate 
the "public health aspects of the use of ionizing radiation and the han-
dling and disposal of radioactive wastes," 185 and the all inclusive phras-
ing of Regulation 9, the implication is that disposal of radioactive 
wastes by all users in New York comes under the Sanitary Code. 
Other provisions included in the Sanitary Code, but not in the In-
dustrial Code, are those whi'ch require the filtration equivalent of at 
least two millimeters of aluminum and automatic, four minute, shutoff 
timers on diagnostic X-ray equipment,188 automatic interlocks and signs 
or signals on radiation therapy rooms, 187 and prescribe installation and 
operation· specifications for shoe-fitting fluoroscopes. 188 Instead of 
simply banning shoe-fitting fluoroscopes (which seems to be the most 
sensible course), the New York State Department of Health has chosen 
so to burden and restrict their use and operation that it is difficult to 
see how anyone would find it profitable to use one. Finally, the Sanitary 
Code requires the identification of cadavers containing radioisotopes, 
specifying that a report accompany every cadaver containing more than 
five millicuries of radioactive material. Autopsies of such cadavers are 
not to be commenced without the consultation and advice of a hospital 
radiation safety officer.189 
(3) Pennsylvania and Texas 
The radiation health and safety regulations of Pennsylvania and 
Texas became effective in October and September of 1956, respectively. 
The departments of health of both these states closely followed the 
185 Supra note 65. 
186 Supra note 132, Reg. 8. 
187 ld., Reg. IJ. 
188/d., Reg. 19. 
189/d., Reg. II. 
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suggested regulations of the NCRPM 190 with the result that their 
regulations are very nearly identical. These regulations are applied to 
"the use of all radiation, radiation machines, and radioactive materials," 
and are intended "to insure the maximum safety to all persons at, or in 
the vicinity of, the place of use, storage, or disposal thereof." 191 The 
regulations, however, are not intended "to limit the kind and amount 
of radiation that may be intentionally applied to a person for diag-
nostic or therapeutic purposes by, or under the direction of, a physician 
or dentist," nor do they apply to radiation machines not in use and 
certain specified quantities of radioactive materials which are considered 
to be harmless. 192 
The general plans of these regulations are similar to those previously 
discussed in that they prescribe maximum permissible doses ; impose 
responsibility for radiation safety upon a designated person; require 
area and personnel monitoring, registration, keeping of survey and 
dosage records; and include operating rules relative to the storage of 
radioactive materials, disposal ·of radioactive wastes, radioactive con-
tamination controls, and information labeling. 
The maximum permissible doses allowed by the Pennsylvania and 
Texas regulations are identical with those suggested by the NCRPM in 
December of 1955.193 Exposures to external sources of radiation are 
specified according to type of radiation, conditions of exposure, and 
critical organs affected.194 Internal radiation exposures are controlled 
by limiting concentrations of radioactive materials in air and water used 
by individuals to those prescribed for each radioisotope.195 Maximum 
permissible radioisotope concentrations in air and water are given for 
occupational areas, in terms of an eight and a twenty-four hour work 
day, and for non-occupational environments into which radioactive 
wastes are discharged.196 These concentrations are nearly the same as 
those required by AEC regulations.197 Unlike the AEC standards, no 
distinction is made as to minors in occupation areas and double expo-
sures are allowed for persons over forty-five in certain situations. Like 
the AEC standards, however, exposures up to three times the basic 
1no National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 36. 
191 Supra notes 129 and 130, §1. 
192/d., §4. 
19S National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 41, 51-59. 
1 94 Supra notes 129 and 130, §§7b, 15d, and Table 2. 
t95fd., §7e and Table s. 
100/d., §§14d(1), 15g, and. Table 5· 
197 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, App. "B", Tables I and II. 
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weekly dose are allowed provided the total quarter-year dose does not 
exceed ten times the basic weekly limit.198 No yearly limits are specified. 
Sections entitled "Responsibility" require that "all work performed in 
an installation where radiation may be present shall be under the direc-
tion of a person responsible for the radiation safety therein." Imposed 
upon this person are the duties of : informing himself and persons who 
may be exposed as to radiation hazards, safe working practices, and 
necessary safeguards; accounting for radioactive materials; insuring 
adequate shielding; and conducting exposure surveys.199 It is interest-
ing to notice that in the NCRPM recommendations and the Texas regu-
lations the person responsible for radiation safety "shall insure beyond 
reasonable doubt" that certain things are done, while those of Pennsyl-
vania require that he "shall take all necessary precautions" that the same 
things are done.200 A second change and an addition found in the 
Pennsylvania regulations regarding "responsibility" indicate that a 
higher duty of care is imposed in this state. It is there provided that the 
person responsible for radiation safety 
. . . shall take all necessary precautions that every employee 
and authorized visitor shall use such safety devices as are 
furnished for his protection and carry out all radiation safety 
rules that concern or affect his conduct. 201 
Under the NCRPM recommendations and the Texas regulations, this 
is the responsibility of "every employee and authorized visitor" and not 
the safety officer alone. Furthermore, to this section the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health has appended the statement: 
The designation of a person responsible for radiation safety 
shall in no way relieve the owner, management, or user from 
responsibility for compliance with the provisions of this regu-
lation.202 
"Any person using or operating any radiation machine, or storing, 
manufacturing, using, or handling any radioactive material" in Penn-
sylvania or Texas must register with the state health department. In 
New York the installation or mobile source is to be registered by the 
owner or the organization conducting the business or activities carried 
on within the radiation installation. Obviously the Pennsylvania and 
198/d., §2o.ror(a) (2); supra notes 129 and 130, §rsd. 
199 Supra notes 129 and 130, §ro. 
2oo Ibid. 
201 Supra note 129, §rob(ro). 
2021 d., §rob( II). 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 991 
Texas regulations impose the duty to register on a considerably broader 
group of persons. The registration must include an estimate of further 
acquisitions during the year, and acquisitions causing radiation in ex-
cess of the estimate must be registered promptly. Acknowledgement of 
registration does not imply state approval of any feature of the radiation 
operation. 203 
Regularly scheduled radiation surveys are required for all accessible 
areas in the vicinity of a radiation-producing source where there is a 
reasonable possibility that a person could receive more than one quarter 
of the maximum permissible dose. Personnel monitoring is required 
for all persons who may possibly receive a dose in excess of the same 
amount.204 Records of these measurements are to be kept available 
indefinitely for health department inspection, and, upon termination of 
a person's employment, and at the request of the department, a sum-
mary record of the person's exposure is to be forwarded to the health 
department. In addition, accidental exposures in excess of five times 
the permissible amounts must be reported within seven days of their 
discovery. 205 
The provisions of the Pennsylvania and Texas regulations which 
concern the storage and handling of radioactive materials and the dis-
posal of radioactive wastes are more elaborate than those of California 
and New York. They are, nevertheless, performance type rules in that 
they establish operation and construction standards and do not specify 
dimensions or details of design. 206 
( 4) Connecticut 
The Connecticut radiation health and safety regulations were adopted 
by the State Department of Health in October of 1957, and were the 
first set of comprehensive state regulations that became effective after 
the AEC issued its "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." 207 
Under these regulations, "when the source of radiation is outside the 
body, the maximum permissible doses for persons occupationally en-
gaged in radiation work" are not to exceed "those established for the 
purpose by the United States Atomic Energy Commission." Similarly, 
"when the source of radiation is within the body, radiation dosages" 
2o3 Supra notes 129 and 130, §6. 
204 I d., §8. 
205 I d., §9. 
206 !d., §§n, 12, 14. 
207 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20 became effective on Feb. 28, 1957. 
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are to be controlled "by limiting the average rates at which radioactive 
materials are taken into the body by inhalation or by ingestions" and 
the average concentrations of radioisotopes are not to exceed "the 
maximum permissible concentration established by the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission." Persons under eighteen years of age 
and persons not occupationally engaged in radiation work are not to 
receive more than ten per cent of occupational dose. 208 Although it can 
be seen that the Connecticut Department of Health intended to follow 
the standards of the AEC, some variance exists, for they have applied 
a different distinction. Prescribing "occupational" and "non-occupa-
tional" doses (as the NCRPM has done) is not the same as prescribing, 
as does the AEC, doses for "restricted" and "unrestricted" areas. The 
term "restriCted area means any area access to which is controlled by 
the licensee," except residential space.209 The AEC, therefore, applies 
the same limits to all persons in the restricted area, whereas Connecticut 
applies two different limits depending upon whether or not the person 
exposed is "occupationally engaged in radiation work." The Connecticut 
standards also differ from those of the AEC in that they do not appear 
to allow any weekly doses in excess of the basic limits. 
Subsequent modification of the Connecticut standards, so as to con~ 
form with changes in AEC and NCRPM standards, is contemplated in 
a section which provides : 
Whenever the United States Atomic Energy Commission or 
the National Committee on Radiation Protection [and Meas-
urement] publish modifications in their respective standards 
or recommendations, such modifications shall be operative 
·within the scope of this regulation immediately upon the issu-
ance of an emergency order by the department to interested 
parties including registrants. 210 
Annual registration of radiation installations and mobile sources is 
required in Connecticut, as well as re-registration "when any increase is 
contemplated in the number of sources, the source strength, the output 
or .the types of radiation energy involved." 211 Only the owner of the 
installation or mobile source, however, is required to register.212 • 
The Connecticut regulations require personnel monitoring and regu-
larly scheduled area radiation surveys under conditions similar to those 
208 Supra note 131, §E. 
2o9 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.3,(a) (12) . 
. 210 Supra note 131, §N. 
2u I d., §C. 
212 Supra note 131, §F. 
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imposed by the Pennsylvania and Texas regulations.213 Individual per-
sonnel exposure records and records of radioactive materials released 
into the environment must be maintained. 214 "Any exposure of twenty-
five rems or more" is to be reported to the State Department of Health 
within twenty-four hours, and "an accidental exposure of a person to 
three rems or more" is to be "promptly reported." Loss or theft of 
radioactive materials is to be "immediately reported." 215 Supervision 
of all radiation installations and mobile sources, by a "person qualified 
to evaluate radiation hazards and to advise with respect thereto," is 
required, as is medical consultation service by a qualified, licensed 
physician. 216 
The operating rules of the Connecticut regulations are, for the most 
part, of the performance type. Storage of radioactive materials, for 
example, must be done in such a manner that "no person will inadvert-
ently receive a dose in excess of the limits" specified in the section on 
maximum permissible doses.217 No specifications are provided regard-
ing storage places or containers. Similarly, "all work with radioactive 
materials" is to be "carried out under such conditions as to minimize 
the possibility of any contamination that would result in any person's 
being subjected to radiation levels exceeding those specified" in the sec-
tion on maximum permissible doses. More specifically, however, where 
contamination of a person or his clothing is possible, " ( 1) both shall 
be monitored, ( 2) persons' bodies shall be decontaminated, [and] ( 3) 
clothing shall either be decontaminated or disposed of in a manner 
approved by the department." 218 
The section of the Connecticut regulations on "disposal of radioac-
tive wastes" is similar to the provisions of the AEC regulations 219 and 
allows the discharge of radioactive wastes into the air, water, or sewage 
systems and the burial of radioactive wastes under virtually the same' 
conditions as does the AEC. Where two or more owners are discharg-
ing radioactive wastes into the same environment, they must file a state-
ment of their agreed prorated releases for approval of the State Depart-
ment of Health, or the Department may arbitrarily assign quantities to . 
them severally. 
213 Supra notes 129 and 130 at §6. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 41. 
2a I d., §G(a) and (b). 
215/d., §G(c) and (d). 
210 Jd., §§H, 1. 
217 /d., §]. 
218/d., §K. 
219 I d., §M. 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§20.JOI-20.J04. 
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( 5) Michigan 
In November of 1957 the Michigan Department of Health adopted 
a comprehensive set of radiation health and safety regulations which 
became effective on February 14, 1958. While the Michigan regula-
tions are not to be construed as limiting "the intentional exposure of 
patients to radiation for the purpose of medical diagnosis, medical 
therapy, or medical research conducted by duly licensed members of the 
healing-professions," they apply "to all persons who receive, possess, or 
use materials or devices capable of emitting ionizing radiation," except 
certain exempted sources which have no significant effect on health.22~ 
By virtue of Part I of the Michigan regulations the State Health 
Commissioner is to appoint the members of the Commissioner's Radia-
tion Committee, which is to consist of nine members, each of whom is 
to be selected on the basis of his "recognized knowledge in the field of 
radiation." The purpose of this committee is to review "these regula-
tions at least once annually and at such other times, not to exceed four 
times a year, as may seem necessary." The Commissioner acts as chair-
man of the committee.221 
These regulations are to be enforced by personnel of the Michigan 
Department of Health, but the "Commissioner may delegate authority 
to county, city or district health departments to enforce" them.222 
Following the method of the AEC, the Michigan regulations estab-
lish permissive dose levels and concentrations in "controlled" and "un-
controlled" areas as well as allowed concentrations of radioactive 
effluents in "uncontrolled" areas. The permissible weekly exposure 
standards for persons in controlled areas are identical with the current 
sta~dards of the AEC for "restricted" areas as to units, amounts, con-
ditions of exposure, and critical organs affected. Also authorized are 
exposures up to three times the basic weekly dose if the quarter year 
dose does not exceed ten times the permissible weekly limit. Exposures 
of persons under eighteen in controlled areas must be kept to ten per 
cent of the basic dose. The AEC limits for allowed concentrations of 
airborne radioactive materials in controlled areas are followed. This 
220 Sufwa note 127, R. 325.1305. 
221 The function of the committee is advisory only. Committee approval of radiation 
health and safety regulations is not a condition precedent to effectiveness, however 
prior approval of a majority of the members of the State Council of Health is required. 
See Mich. Stat. Ann. §14-7. 
222 Supra note 127, R. 325.1304. It might be added that the local boards of health 
appear to have ample authority to issue their own regulations concerning radiation. 
See Mich. Stat. Ann. §§14.63, 14-64. 
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section also contains a rule limiting the "maximum permissible accumu-
lated dose, in rems . . . [to] 5 times the number of years beyond the 
age of 18." Moreover, no annual increment is to exceed fifteen rems.223 
Michigan, therefore, apparently is the first state to follow the recent 
recommendations of the NCRPM and the cumulative dose standard 
which the AEC is now applying in its own installations. 224 
Permissible levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas in Michigan are 
also identical with the current standards of the AEC.225 Registration 
of a radiation source is to include information on "anticipated average 
radiation levels and anticipated occupancy times for each uncontrolled 
area involved," and may include "proposed limits on levels of radiation 
in uncontrolled areas." Should it be demonstrated "that the proposed 
limits are not likely to cause any individual to receive a dose in any 
period of 7 consecutive days in excess of w%" of the basic dose for 
controlled areas, "the state health commissioner may approve the pro-
posed limits." 226 The succeeding subsection imposes limits on concen-
trations of radioactive materials released into the atmosphere of un-
controlled areas which are identical with AEC requirements. 227 Here, 
again, the registrant must include "information as to anticipated aver-
age concentrations and anticipated occupancy time for each uncon-
trolled area," and he also must include "proposed limits of concentra-
tions ... released into the air in uncontrolled areas." Curiously 
enough, "if the registrant demonstrates that it is not probable that any 
individual will be exposed to concentrations in excess of the limits 
specified," the Commissioner u1.uill approve the proposed limits." 228 
The reasons for this distinction are obscure. 
228 I d., R. 325.I309.1. 
224 The NCRPM proposal to limit the maximum permissible accumulated dose to 
five rems per year for any age beyond eighteen was announced in a preliminary state-
ment dated January 8, I957- I CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!4034. This rule was 
subsequently incorporated into the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 63, "Pro-
tection Against Neutron Radiation Up to 30 Million Electron Volts." A statement of 
the AEC, issued December IO, I957, announced the approval for use in its own facilities 
and those of its contractors the new maximum permissible accumulated doses of the 
NCRPM. It also announced that it was currently considering amending IO Code Fed. 
Regs. 20 to make this regulation consistent with the new recommendations. I CCH 
Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!4050. 
225 Supra note IZ7, R. 325.I3<>9.2.2. 
226 I d., R. 325.1309.2.1. The language of this provision is nearly identical with that 
of 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.102 except that the AEC "will approve the proposed limits" 
if the conditions are met. 
227 Jd., R. 325-1309·3· 
22s I d., R. 325.I309·3-I. Under the federal regulations "there may be included in any 
application .for a license or for amendment of a license proposed limits upon concen-
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While the Michigan Department of Health has taken practically all 
of the language of Section 9 on "basic standards" from the AEC regu-
lations, it also has deemed it necessary to add a paragraph which con-
tains rules and packaging specifications for radioactive materials which 
are transferred or moved through uncontrolled areas. 229 
Registration of "all sources of ionizing radiation" with the State 
Health Commissioner "by the legal owner, user or an authorized rep-
resentative" is required in Michigan. In addition to the name and 
address of the person registering, and the above mentioned items, the 
name, training, and qualifications of the individual responsible for 
safety, and the location, type, and capacity of the radiation source is 
to be included in the registration. Installation changes which materially 
increase the potential health hazard must receive the prior approval of 
the Commissioner. 280 
Except for the above reference in the registration section to the "indi-
vidual who will be appointed by the owner or user to see that the radia-
tion source is safely used arid stored," the Michigan regulations are 
silent on the subject of radiation safety personnel. Neither do these 
regulations mention medical supervision or required physical examina-
tions. 
In the event of excessive exposures, the rule of the AEC is fol-
lowed,281 and the subsequent exposure of the individual must be reduced 
to ten per cent of the basic limit until such time as the average dose 
over the period is within acceptable limits again. 282 In addition, the 
following incidents must be reported to the State Health Department 
by phone and telegraph : ( 1) within six hours--exposures of indi-
viduals to twenty-five rems or more or "the release of radioactive ma-
terials which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 
5,000 times" the limits specified for uncontrolled areas; ( 2) within 
twenty-four hours-exposure of an individual to three rems or more, 
or the release of radioactive materials which would exceed 500 times 
the limits specified for uncontrolled areas. Written reports of all inci-
dents involving exposures in excess of the specified limits are required 
within thirty days. 283 
trations of licensed and other radioactive material released into air or water in un-
restricted areas as a result of the applicant's proposed activities." 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§20.10J(a}. 
229 /d., R. 325.1309.2.3. 
280 /d., R. 325.13o6. 
281 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.105. 
282 Supra note 127, R. 325.1310.1. 
288 /d., R. 325.1310.2. 
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By way of precautionary procedures, the Michigan regulations re-
quire that "each registrant shall make or cause to be made such surveys 
as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations"; and that 
"each individual who enters a high radiation area" or "who enters a 
controlled area under such circumstances that he receives, or is likely 
to receive, a dose in excess of 25% of the limits specified in ... these 
regulations," shall have and use personnel monitoring equipment.234 
Radiation safety instruction is required for any "individual working in 
or frequenting any portion of a controlled area." 235 Registered ma-
terials stored in uncontrolled areas must be secured against unauthorized 
removal, and unattended X-ray apparatus must be secured against un-
authorized use. 236 Caution signs, labels, and signals, which are virtually 
identical with those employed by the AEC, are required. 237 
Radioactive waste disposal into sanitary sewage systems or by burial 
in the soil is allowed in Michigan under conditions identical with those 
imposed by the AEC. Registrants also may apply to the State Health 
Commissioner for approval of proposed disposal procedures which 
are not otherwise authorized in the regulations except for disposal to 
surface waters.288 
Parts VII through XI of the Michigan regulations establish oper-
ating procedures and detailed specifications for industrial radiographic 
installations, medical radiographic installations, dental radiographic in-
stallations, fluoroscopic shoe machines, and miscellaneous types of X-ray 
installations. Industrial radiographic installations are subdivided into 
four classes depending upon their capacity and amount of use. While 
the term "industrial radiographic installation" refers primarily to X-ray 
devices, it also includes those "utilizing high intensity sealed sources 
of radioactive materials" (in other words, "byproduct materials" which 
are licensed by the AEC). The most curious feature of these provi-
sions regarding industrial radiographic installations is that they contain 
234 /d., R. 325.1311.1 and .2. Except for "personnel occupationally exposed to ionizing 
radiation from diagnostic equipment,'' who must wear film badges "for at least 13 
consecutive weeks during each calendar year" and for whom records must be kept in 
a permanent file (R. 325.1318.1.8), the Michigan regulations are silent as to whether 
records must be kept of radiation surveys and personnel monitoring. 
235 /d., R. 325.1311-5. 
236/d., R. 325.1311.6 and .7. 
237 !d., R. 325.1311·3· 
2BS/d., R. 325.1312. Due to the fact that the Michigan Water Resources Commis-
sion controls the dumping of-contaminants into the surface waters of the state (Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §§3.521-3.533), the State Health Commissioner does not have the authority 
to allow a system which contemplates such disposition. 
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their own permissible dose levels for personnel working in or adjacent 
to the enclosure area. This dose level is 100 milliroentgens per week, 
which is considerably lower than the basic standards of Section 9· 1 and 
the current standards of the AEC for licensed byproduct material 
users. No distinction is made as to conditions of exposure or critical 
organs affected. It would appear that in Michigan, commercial users 
of byproduct materials in sealed containers (but not unsealed sources) 
must limit exposures of employees to one third the amounts allowed by 
the AEC. 
b. Partial Radiation Health and Safety Regulation 
Government agencies of Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin 
have issued regulations which impose some sort of radiation exposure 
limits. These regulations are characterized as partial since they cover 
only this limited aspect of radiation health and safety and are not con-
cerned with such problems as waste disposal, personnel monitoring, area 
radiation surveys, etc. Most of them are confined to industrial radiation 
hazards from X-rays, gamma rays, and atmospheric concentrations of 
radon and thorium. In addition to the above, regulations of Arkansas, 
Delaware, and Indiana indicate an intention by those states to control 
some phase of radiation hazards. 
Of the states having partial regulations concerning exposure limits, 
only those of Colorado and New Jersey purport to cover all forms of 
radiation. Colorado regulations limit exposures to X-rays, gamma rays, 
alpha and beta rays, and thermal neutrons to o.os rems per day. 239 By 
using the day, instead of the week, as the exposure period, and by fail-
ing to make appropriate refinements regarding conditions of exposure, 
critical organs affected, and the location or employment status of the 
person exposed, these regulations are, in general, at variance with the 
standards of the AEC and the current recommendations of the 
NCRPM. New Jersey, on the other hand, avoids the embarrassment of 
such variance by using a standard which is all but meaningless. The 
regulations of the New Jersey Health Department specify: 
... [All] sources of radiation shall be sealed, transported, 
handled, used and kept in such manner as to prevent all users 
thereof and all persons within effective range thereof from 
being exposed to excessive dosage of radiation. 240 
2su Regulations-Occupational Diseases Reportable in Colorado, Colo. Dept. of 
Public Health, Reg. J. 
240 Chap. VI-Radiation Regulations, New Jersey Public Health Council, eff. Dec. 
IS, 1952· 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 999 
"Excessive dosage" is not defined. However, in view of the fact that 
New Jersey has created a new rule-making commission, discussed 
earlier, the likelihood is great that more definite standards will soon be 
forthcoming. 
General variance from the current standards of the NCRPM is found 
in the regulations of Florida,241 New Hampshire,242 Oregon,243 West 
Virginia/44 and Wisconsin,245 which simply limit exposures to X-rays 
and gamma rays, under all industrial conditions, to 0.3 roentgens per 
week, as well as in Ohio, where the general exposure limit is o. I roent-
gens per day.246 Greater conformity with NCRPM standards is found 
in the regulations of the Kentucky Department of Health, which limit 
the occupational exposure to X-rays and gamma rays to 300 milliroent-
gens for the whole body, 450 milliroentgens to the lenses of the eyes, 
and I 500 milliroentgens to the skin of the hands, forearms, feet, an-
kles, head. and neck.241 The only Utah regulation which purports 
to regulate exposures limits the " ... atmospheric concentration of 
the immediate daughters of radon . . . [to] 300 micro-microcuries 
per liter," us which differs from the standard of the AEC. 
While the environmental sanitation regulations of Arkansas do not 
limit exposure to radiation, it is required that : 
In all places of employment where recognized health hazards 
exist from ... radiation ... [and] radioactive materials, 
. . . the employer shall provide pre-employment medical ex-
amination and periodic medical examination thereafter. The 
employer shall also provide warning signs . . . in prominent 
sites around the plant and shall periodically instruct all em-
ployees regarding the health hazards connected with their 
241 Regulation for Control and Prevention of Occupational Diseases, Fla. Industrial 
Commission, Reg. 8, revised 1957. 
242 Reg. 2-Maximum Allowable Concentrations of Toxic Materials, N.H. Dept. of 
Health, adopted July 16, 1954-
243 Recommended Standards and Regulations for Occupational Health, Ore. Bd. of 
Health, issued Jan. 1956 .. 
244 Regulations of the W.Va. Bd. of Health, c. 6, Industrial Hygiene. 
245 Wis. Adm. Industrial Code §20.02(4). 
246 Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Diseases Resulting from Exposure 
to Toxic Fumes, Vapors, Mists, Gases and Dusts in Order to Preserve and Protect 
the Public Health, Ohio Dept. of Health, Reg.· 254-47, adopted Feb. 16, 1946. 
247 Regulations for Control of Occupational Environments and the Prevention of 
Occupational Diseases, Ky. Bd. of Health, adopted May 1956. 
24 8 General Safety Orders, Reg. 2, Industrial Commission of Utah, adopted Aug. 25, 
1955· 
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duties and the best preventative measures and methods to 
protect themselves therefrom.u9 
In Indiana the only regulations regarding radiation hazards concern the 
operation of shoe-fitting fiuoroscopes. 250 
Pursuant to its general authority 201 the Delaware Board of Health 
has promulgated a curious regulation which will probably be more hin-
drance_ than help, for it specifies : 
No person shall manufacture, distribute, offer for sale, store, 
keep, install or dispose of any radioactive material or any 
device containing radioactive material which is capable of 
causing injury or death to human beings or animals without 
first securing a written permit from the State Board of 
Health. . . . The State Board of Health reserves the right to 
deny any permit when there is unsatisfactory proof that the 
material or device will not be a hazard to health. 262 
This regulation does not apply to hospitals, clinics, physicians, veteri-
narians, or dentists. 
D. Summary of State Atomic Energy Legislation and Regulation 
The foregoing examination of recent state atomic energy and radia-
tion hazard legislation and regulation reveals considerable state interest 
and activity in the field since the Atomic Energy Act was amended in 
1954. It is apparent from this examination that many states, after the 
example of the federal government, regard atomic energy as an appro-
priate subject for both governmental encouragement and control in the 
public interest. However, the promotional programs are, for the most 
part, still in only tentative form, They do little more than indicate a 
vague policy of encouragement, suggesting the need for further study 
of the problems involved. Some of the states have created commissions, 
either temporary or permanent, to conduct these studies and suggest 
fruitful courses of government action. While none of the states have 
responded to the impact of atomic energy upon society with anything 
like the political innovations of Congress, a few have recognized the 
need for intra- and inter-governmental coordination to assure consistent 
249 Ark. Bd. of Health, Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Environmental Sani-
tation in Manufacturing Establishments, §3.9. 
280 Supra note 6 at 8. 
281 Del. Ann. Code tit. 16, c. 1, §122. 
252 Del. Bd. of Health, Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Distribution, Sale, 
Storage, Installation, and Disposal of Radioactive Sources, Materials, or Devices, §II, 
adopted Dec. 5, 1955. 
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state action, establishing for this purpose the position of coordinator of 
atomic development activities. Beyond this, however, there is no indi-
cation that the states intend to concentrate and centralize state powers to 
d~l with matters affecting the development and utilization of atomic 
energy in one officer or agency. 
As might well be expected, the subject of radiation hazard control has 
received somewhat more comprehensive treatment by some of the states 
than has the subject of promotion. The need and the urgency for state 
action in this area is more obvious and more easily justified in terms of 
traditional political principles. It is encouraging to observe these states 
establishing programs to control radiation hazards at a time when sig-
nificant damage is yet to occur and the privately controlled atomic 
energy industry is still in its infancy. Not only does this serve to reduce 
the possibility of future injury,- but it also serves the interests of the 
regulated industries by informing them before their entry into the field 
as to the design and operational standards which will be imposed upon 
them, thus avoiding much of the expense of subsequent structural 
modifications. · 
It is somewhat less encouraging to observe the failure of the state 
legislatures to avoid multiple regulation of radiation hazards by several 
agencies within the state. None of the states has followed the advice of 
the NCRPM and bestowed exclusive authority to regulate radiation 
hazards on one agency. Neither has any state expressly subdivided the 
field among existing agencies or provided a means by which the regula-
tions of all agencies can be made uniform and consistent. Fortunately, 
the tendency seems to be to adopt the standards of the AEC or the 
NCRPM regardless of whether directed to or not, so that there probably 
will be less conflict between the regulations of various state agencies 
themselves, and between them and the AEC regulations, than might be 
feared. 
This last feature becomes especially important when it is evident that 
many of the states have every intention of concurrently regulating the 
activities of AEC licensees. The comprehensive state radiation health 
and safety regulations make no distinction between sources of radiation 
licensed and controlled by the AEC and those which are not. By and 
large, however, they impose no additional burden on licensed activities 
other than registration and reporting to designated state officials. If 
there are some dissimilarities between state and federal regulations, they 
are not of the sort which makes simultaneous observance of both stand-
ards impossible. It remains to be seen whether concurrent federal-state 
regulation is authorized. 
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E. The Problem of Federal Pre-emption 
1. Introduction 
The comprehensive nature of the powers granted the Atomic Energy 
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act in the field of radiation 
health and safety regulation raises the pivotal question of whether all 
or part of the field has been so occupied by the federal government as to 
preclude state action. In view of the fact that Congress has failed to 
clarify the matter of pre-emption and, to date, no court has ruled on 
the question, considerable uncertainty exists concerning the validity of 
state radiation health and safety regulations. Therefore the possible 
solutions to the question of the possibility and extent of federal pre-
emption must be sought by recourse to the principles employed by the 
courts in resolving the same type of question in analogous cases. 
If Congress had not asserted national powers and established a fed-
eral program to promote and control atomic energy, the states undoubt-
edly could regulate all radiation hazards created by others than the fed-
eral government itself. The mere existence of constitutional power in 
the federal government does not preclude the exercise of state police 
powers with respect to all matters which might be made subject to 
national powers. For example, regarding the commerce power, which is 
one of the principal powers upon which the Atomic Energy Act is 
based, the Supreme Court has said : 
Although the commerce clause conferred on the national 
government power to regulate commerce, its possession of that 
power does not exclude all stat(! power of regulation.258 
Where the commerce power is unexercised by Congress, the states may 
enforce laws for the protection and safety of society, although they 
affect interstate commerce, except "where the subject matter requires a 
uniform system as between the States." 254 
Even if Congress undertook the promotion and exclusive control of 
every phase of atomic energy development and utilization except that of 
public health and safety, there would be little doubt of the states' au-
thority to protect this interest as long as the regulation did not materi-
ally interfere with the federal program. It scarcely could be asserted 
that the national interest in promoting the development and utilization of 
atomic energy by private persons is so great as to preclude state regula-
tion of the very substantial hazards to life and property involved. 
268 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 76I, 766, 6s S. Ct. ISIS (I94S). 
254 Leisy v. Hardin, I3S U.S. 100, Io8-I09, IO S. Ct. 68I (IB9o). 
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The situation with respect to atomic energy hazards, however, is not 
as posed above. Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,255 has 
definitely asserted its powers to control atomic energy in the interest 
(among others) of public health and safety. As indicated in Section 
2 of the act, the constitutional bases of the federal health and safety 
program are the powers of Congress : ( 1) to provide for the common 
defense and security, 256 ( 2) to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce,257 and (3) to make all needful rules and regulations respecting 
the. territory or other property belonging to the United States.258 The 
phrase "health and safety of the public" and terms of similar import are 
used repeatedly throughout the act. 259 Of greater significance, however, 
is the elaborate and comprehensive program of radiation hazards con-
trol which Congress has created, for it raises the problem : to what 
extent ha~ ·Congress pre-empted the field of health and safety regula-
tion in connection with atomic energy activities? 
In exercising any one of the above mentioned powers, Congress, if it 
so desires, may pre-empt state regulation of matters within the scope of 
the national power. In discussing federal supremacy and the commerce 
power, the Supreme Court has said : 
Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of 
power over interstate commerce. It may either permit the 
states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would 
otherwise not be permissible . . . or exclude state regulation 
even of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless 
affect interstate commerce. 260 
Similarly, where Congress has undertaken to legislate pursuant to its 
defense powers, the Supreme Court has declared that state law in conflict 
therewith, which would be valid but for the congressional act, must 
give way to federal supremacy.261 Again, where a state has attempted 
255 Pub. L. 703, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §§2011 et seq. 
256 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cis. 11-14. 
257 Id., Art. I, §8, cl. 3· 
25s I d., Art. IV, §3, cl. 8. 
259 The phrase "health and safety of the public," or ·phrases of similar import, may 
be found in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 at §§2b, 2d, 2e, 3d, np, nv, Jla(S), 31c, 
41b, 53b, 53e(7), 63b, 81, 103b, IOJd, 1043, 104h, 104c, 104d, 144(a) (4), 161b, 161e, 
161i, 182:1, and 186c, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2012(b), 2012(d), 2012(e), 2013(d), 2014(t), 
2014(aa), 2051a(5), 2051(c), 2o61(b), 2073(b), 2111, 2133(b), 2133(d), 2134(a), 
2134(b), 2134(c), 2164(a)(4), 2201(b), 2201(e), 2201(i), 2232(a), and 2236(c). 
26o Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra note 253 at 769. 
261 In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 66 S.Ct. 438 (1946), the sale by the State of 
Washington of timber from school lands was held subject to the maximum price 
prescribed by the OPA under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 
World War II. Cf. Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U.S. 103. 66 S.Ct. 444 (1946). 
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to regulate the distribution of federally owned chattels to private per-
sons and exact the payment of inspection fees,_ the court has said: 
... [W]here, as here, the governmental action is carried on 
by the United States itself and Congress does not affirmatively 
declare its instrumentalities or property subject to [state] 
regulation or taxation, the inherent freedom continues.282 
It is clear that Congress has the power to regulate many aspects of 
radiation health and safety 283 and, when it desires to do so, may pre-
empt the field as to these matters. Our question is, therefore, twofold : 
(I) to what extent did Congress intend exclusive federal regulation, and 
( 2) to what extent are there any limits to the exclusiveness of federal 
regulation? In the light of analogous cases there is considerable un-
certainty as to pre-emption of regulation of non-federal activities. The 
bulk of this study, therefore, is devoted to pre-emption in this area. 
There are a few areas, however, where regardless of congressional 
intent there may be no power .to pre-empt, and these will be discussed at 
the end of the chapter. The one matter that warrants no discussion is 
the question of the power of the states to regulate the activities of fed-
eral agencies or of contractors carrying out the work of such agencies. 
because the answer is clearly that no such power exists. 28• 
2. The Permissible Limits of State Health and Safety Regulation 
of Atomic Energy Activities 
a. Explicit Provision Allowing State Regulation 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contains only one express reference 
to the problem of pre-emption. Section 271 provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the authority 
.or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with 
respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric 
power.285 
282 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 448, 63 S. Ct. 1137 ( 1943). In this case 
federal officers shipped federally owned .fertilizer into Florida for distribution to 
farmers there under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. The Supreme 
Court held that Florida could not enforce its statute requiring inspection of fertilizers, 
labeling, and payment of inspection fees. 
288 On the power of the federal government to control radiation health and safety 
see Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private 
Atomic Energy Activities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954). 
284 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 658 (189o); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 
51, 41 S. Ct. 16 (1920); Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 3o8 U.S. 21, 6oS. Ct. 
15 (1939); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941); City of 
Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 65 S. Ct. 28o (1945). 
286 §271, 42 U.S.C.A. §zo18. 
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It might be argued from this explicit, but limited, recognition of state 
regulatory power that Congress intended to exclude every other form of 
state action. Such an argument, however, would ignore the real basis 
of the provision. There appears to have been considerable concern in 
Congress lest the AEC become a super power administration. 266 The 
provision was clearly intended to avoid such an event. Senator Clinton 
P. Anderson, a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and 
a principal author of the act, pointed out to the Senate that: 
The Commission has no special competence in the field of 
electric energy distribution and seeks no responsibility in the 
field. Its functions should be limited, as the bill contemplates, 
to those areas in which the Commission does have special com-
petence or responsibility. These areas include the review of 
design criteria, the supervision of construction, and decisions 
on the technical qualifications of applications to operate nuclear 
plants, on health and safety standards, and on security safe-
guards.267 
Thus Section 271 apparently was intended as a limitation upon the 
powers of the Commission and not as the single exception to federal 
pre-emption. It may also be noted that the Senator did not specify 
exclusive Commission control within the areas of "special competence." 
There is nothing in the Congressional Record to suggest that his atten-
tion was directed in any way to the pre-emptive question. 
The whole pre-enactment legislative history of the "1954 act in fact 
is barren of any indication that Congress was even aware of the pre-
emption problem with respect to health and safety regulation. For what 
it is worth in determining the intent of Congress when the act was 
passed, however, there have been several subsequent manifestations of 
congressional concern with the problem in the form of bills or recom-
mendations to amend the act. On January 23, 1956, Representative 
Carl T. Durham introduced a bill to amend the act which would ( 1) 
authorize and direct the Commission "to cooperate with the States in 
the formulation of standards for regulating the health and safety aspects 
of the atomic energy field"; and ( 2) direct the Commission "to relin-
quish the jurisdiction of health and safety in the areas specified in the 
certificate" six months after the date upon which the "Commission 
receives from the governor of any State a certificate to the effect that 
266 See the Congressional Record for July of 1954 for debates on this subject. 
267 100 Cong. Rec. 10559 (July 15, 1954), quoting a statement by Chairman Strauss 
of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
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the State has an agency competent to exercise jurisdiction" in a specified 
field of radiation hazard regulation. 268 
A somewhat more cautious solution was offered by Senator Anderson 
in a bill introduced on July 26, 1956, which would ( 1) authorize and 
direct the Commission "to cooperate with the States in the formulation 
of standards regulating the health and safety aspects and other aspects 
of the atomic energy field" and ( 2) authorize the Commission "to 
negotiate compacts or agreements with the States relating to health and 
safety aspects ... of the atomic energy program prior to their sub-
mission to the Congress for approval." Pursuant to these compacts, 
"the Commission (would be) authorized to turn over such areas to the 
States for regulation as it finds the States are competent to assume such 
powers." 269 
While the AEC has declined to issue an administrative interpretation 
or adopt an official position on the extent to which Congress intended 
that it share its regulatory jurisdiction with the states, it has. estab-
lished a program to advise, consult, and cooperate with state officials. 270 
Furthermore, in June of 1957, the Commission transmitted a proposed 
amendment to the Joint Committee which was intended "to provide clari-
fication of the Commission's authority in dealing with the states in 
carrying out the Commission's regulatory functions, and, more impor-
tantly, to define the role of the states in regulating in those areas of radi-
ation, health and safety protection regarding which Congress has dele-
gated responsibilities to the Commission." 271 This amendment would 
authorize the AEC "to cooperate with any State or group of States in 
carrying out the Commission's responsibilities for protecting the health 
and safety of the public from radiation hazards incident to the process-
ing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material." 
It also provided that : 
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent the States from 
adopting, inspecting against, and enforcing standards, not in 
conflict with those adopted by the Commission, for protecting 
the health and safety of the public from radiation hazards 
incident to the processing and utilization of source, byproduct, 
268 H.R. 8676, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
269 S. 4298, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
21o AEC, Twenty-first Semi-Annual Report 128-129 (1957). 
271 Letter dated June 1957 (exact date not known) to Rep. Carl T. Durham, Chair-
man of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, from Chairman Lewis Strauss of the 
Atomic Energy Commission. The letter was accompanied by a copy of the Com-
mission's "Proposed Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 274 
Cooperation with the States," and an "Analysis" of .the proposed amendment. 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 
and special nuclear material, Provided, that this subsection 
shall not be deemed to authorize any State to exercise licensing 
responsibilities concerning those aspects of activities with 
regard to which the Commission has licensing responsibilities, 
and Provided further, that State radiation standards shall not 
apply to facilities operated by the Government or facilities 
operated under contract with and for the account of the 
Government. 272 
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An analysis, which accompanied the proposed amendment, pointed out 
that: 
By· "not in conflict with," we mean that the states cannot 
relieve anyone from compliance with the Commission's radia-
tion standards, but could impose, if they so chose, more restric-
tive standards.273 
To this was appended the pious hope that the states would consult with 
the AEC before imposing more restrictive standards. 
Inasmuch as Congress has not acted on any of these proposed amend-
ments, it may be claimed that pre-emptive effect was intended in the 
1954 act and, furthermore, that the inaction indicates that Congress is 
disinclined to change the situation. On the other hand, it may be 
claimed that the inaction suggests that no change is necessary, since 
the 1954 act was not intended to have pre-emptive effect in the first 
place. Legally, however, the use of either conclusion is not justified 
because congressional intent should be determined as of the time of 
enactment of the particular legislation. No more can be claimed for 
these unsuccessful amendments and congressional inaction than that 
they may suggest present intent which may be quite different from 
original intent. 2u 
The failure of these amendments to obtain congressional approval, 
however, does occasion the necessity for a fairly extended study of the 
pre-emption problem under the 1954 act. Apparently, Congress desires 
to evaluate more completely state attitudes and programs and the extent 
of the integration with the health and safety regulations of the AEC 
272 /d., §274(b). 
21s !d., "Analysis" at 2. 
274 Evidence of a failure by Congress to adopt amendments would seem to lack 
probative value. Moreover, to one concerned with the theory of interpretation, it 
seems completely unjustified to use such evidence as any indication of the earlier 
legislative intent and certainly silence is not the way to comply with constitutional 
methods of passing amendatory laws. See the related suggestion by Justice Rutledge 
in Cleveland v. United State.s, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S. Ct. 13 (1946). It is recognized, of 
course, that use has occasionally been made of such material by the court. 
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before acting definitively. Meanwhile the states and Commission licen-
sees are faced with uncertainties and must seek guidance from the 
decisions of the Supreme Court involving the most nearly similar 
circumstances to determine the implied permissible limits of state regula-
tion. In any event, none of the proposed amendments seems a satisfac-
tory solution, and it is to be hoped that Congress will not take action 
on the pre-emption problem without considering the many problems 
and policy questions that necessarily are involved. 275 
b. Implied Pre-emption and State Regulation 
Absence of express manifestation of congressional intent does not 
conclude the matter of federal pre-emption. In numerous situations, 
where Congress has undertaken to regulate in areas with which the 
states also are concerned, the Supreme Court has found or, if the reader 
prefers, has supplied an implied ·pre-emptive intent. In these situations, 
however, the court seldom :(inds complete federal pre-emption. The 
question of whether there has been implied pre-emption in a general 
area of regulation simply does not lend itself to categorical yes or no 
answers. The court has shown itself to be quite painstaking in applying 
a rather complex rationale to determine whether or not Congress 
impliedly intended to preclude the particular state action under con-
sideration. The purpose of this study is to determine what specific types 
of state health and safety regulation of radiation hazards and AEC 
licensees will be allowed under the I954 act if it is not amended in any 
of the ways discussed above. In the light of many analogous cases, it 
appears that, while definite limits may be anticipated, some types of state 
action will be permitted. 
( I) Analogous Cases Involving the Implied Pre-emption 
Question 
For purposes of illustrating the doctrine and methods developed by 
the Supreme Court to establish pre-emption wh_ere congressional intent 
is buried in the interstices of the statutory language, the following areas 
of analogy have been chosen: (I) labor-management relations and 
unfair labor practices in industries affecting interstate commerce; ( 2) 
health and safety regulation in connection with vehicles and products 
in interstate commerce; and ( 3) several miscellaneous cases having 
275 See Cavers, "Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory Powers 
over Atomic Energy," 46 Cal. L. Rev. 22 ( 1958), for a critical discussion of the 
proposals for amendment. 
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pertinency to the pr9blem. In each of these areas the Supreme Court 
has found exclusive federal control of some matters and allowed, or 
indicated that it would allow, concurrent exercise of state police powers 
with respect ~o others. 
(a) Labor Cases 
Over the last twenty years more cases involving the question of im-
plied federal pre-emption have arisen in the field of labor relations and 
unfair labor·practices than in any other. To avoid the industrial strife 
which was 'interfering with the normal flow of commerce as well as 
jeopardizing the "public health, safety, and interest" Congress enacted 
the National Labor Relations (or Wagner) Act in 193 5. 276 The declared 
purpose of the Wagner Act was to encourage the practice and procedure 
of collective bargaining and to protect the full freedom of workers to 
associate, 0rganize, and designate representatives of their own choos-
ing. The act gave the National Labor Relations Board the power 
to· prevent an employer from engaging in certain unfair labor practices, 
as that term was defined in the act, and the power to promulgate rules 
and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the act. In 
1947 ~ongress enacted the Labor Management Relations (or Taft-
Hartley) Act, which re-enacted most of the earlier law and gave to the 
NLRB additional powers to prevent labor organizations and their 
agent-s from committing enumerated unfair labor practices.277 
Several statements of the Supreme Court found in cases involving 
federal labor legislation may quite possibly be applicable in solving the 
problem of congressional intent in adopting the Atomic Energy Act. 
First, the court has said that the subject matter of federal labor legisla-
tion "is not so 'intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities 
of the national government' that its nature alone raises an inference of 
exclusion." 278 This remark seems equally applicable to the non-military 
aspects of atomic energy. Second, regarding express congressional in-
tent, the Supreme Court has said : 
Congress has not seen fit to lay d<;>wn even the most general 
of guides to construction of the [National Labor Relations] 
Act, as it sometimes does, by saying that its regulation either 
shall or shall not exclude state action. 279 
276 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1946). 
211 29 U.S.C.A. §§141 et seq. 
278 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board, 330 U.S. 767, 772, (YJ S. Ct. 1026 (1947), 
citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941), as authority for the 
proposition. 
279 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board, supra note 278 at 771. 
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The same may well be said of Congress in enacting the original Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 and the subsequent 1954 act. Third, when con-
fronted by this situation, the Supreme Court .declared: 
It long has been the rule that exclusion of state action may be 
implied from the nature of the legislation and the subject mat-
ter although express declaration of such result is wanting. 280 
Thus should the Supreme Court be confronted with a case in which an 
AEC licensee is charged with violating a state health and safety law, 
the labor cases may be examined as furnishing precedents. 
Several distinctions between labor-management regulation and radia-
tion hazard control require comment before the cases are examined. 
Unlike the federal program of radiation health and safety, which filled 
a regulatory vacuum and anticipated both the events it was designed to 
prevent and the growth of activities subject to its standards, the federal 
program of labor-management regulation entered a field of national 
chaos, characterized by confli~ting and anachronistic state laws and con-
sequent labor unrest. It may be argued that the historical background 
of labor legislation gives greater force to an assertion of pre-t!mption 
than do the circumstances out of which the AEC program arose. While 
it appears that federal labor legislation became necessary, in large part, 
because of state laws, it was partly because of the absence of effective 
controls and the scarcity of qualified personnel at the state level that 
the federal radiation health and safety program became necessary. Per-
haps the Supreme Court will find it more difficult to ascribe pre-emptive 
effect to an act of Congress, where, at the time of passage, there were 
no state regulations in competition or conflict with congressional poli-
cies.281 Contrawise, it may be argued that, since governmental action 
was urgently needed and the states had taken no action with respect to 
radiation hazards arising out of atomic energy activities prior to the 
1954 act, Congress felt compelled to pre-empt the field in its entirety. 
As a further cautionary note, it should be pointed out that the type 
and purpose of federal regulation of these two subjects are not the 
same. Federal labor legislation and the cases arising under it are con-
cerned primarily with rights and obligations of employers and em-
ployees. 282 Only occasionally does public .health and safety become a 
central issue in this area; when it does, as is pointed out below, the 
court is inclined to treat state action with exceptional solicitude. In the 
280 I d. at 772. 
281 See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 736, 6g S. Ct. 841 (1949). 
282 See Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S. Ct. 932 (1958). 
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protection and enforcement of economic rights and obligations, it may 
be argued that the national interests in uniformity and consistency de-
mand centralized administration. Where the public health and safety 
are in jeopardy, however, it may be argued that the national interests in 
uniformity and consistency are subordinate to the local interest in swift 
and effective action to eliminate the hazard. Furthermore, labor dis-
putes and unfair labor practices have a way of advertising themselves 
which assists centralized administration, whereas radiation hazards are 
far from obvious to either the persons who are causing them or those 
who are_ injured. To exclude the states entirely from seeking out and 
eliminating these hazards places a heavy burden upon the AEC, a bur-
den which scarcely seems justified by the advantages of exclusive federal 
control, absent affirmative showing of state incompetence and obstruc-
tion. It must be recognized to the contrary, however, that in the labor 
field Congress was not really concerned with physical health and safety, 
while in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 it was very much concerned 
with this very matter. This difference is discussed below. 
(i) Labor Cases Finding Federal Pre-emption 
The fundamental concern of the Supreme Court in considering state 
action within the labor-management relations regulation area is with 
conflict--conflict with federal standards, whether established by Con-
gress or the NLRB, and conflict with their application to a particular 
labor dispute. To illustrate, in Hill v. Florida 288 a state law provided 
that business agents of labor unions must be licensed, and no person was 
eligible for a license who had not been a citizen of the United States 
for more than ten years, who had been convicted of a felony, or who 
was not a person of good .moral character. Violation of the statute 
was deemed a misdemeanor. The Florida Attorney General invoked the 
statute against Hill and the union he represented since Hill had not 
applied for a license. In reversing the judgment of the state court 
against Hill and the union, the Supreme Court stated : 
The declared purpose of the Wagner Act ... is to encourage 
collective bargaining, and to protect the "full freedom" of 
workers in the selection of bargaining representatives of their 
own choice. . . . Congre~s attached no conditions whatsoever 
to their freedom of choice in this respect. Their own best 
judgment, not that of someone else, was to be their guide.· 
"Full freedom" to choose an agent means freedom to pass 
upon that agent's qualifications.284 
283 325 u.s. 538, 65 s. ct. 1373 (1945). 
28' I d. at 541. 
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Accordingly, since the state act imposed on the "full freedom" of em-
ployees to bargain collectively limitations which were in excess of those 
Congress thought necessary, the state law was found to be an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress. The court also pointed out that: 
... Congress did not intend to subject the "full freedom" 
of employees to the eroding process of "varied and perhaps 
conflicting provisions of state enactments." 283 
The court found the "intent" of Congress not from any language deal-
ing with pre-emption but from this very general policy of freedom to 
choose. 
A conflict between state and federal law was held to be fatal to a 
Michigan statute in Automobile Workers v. 0' Brien.288 Here the union 
struck against the Chrysler Corporation without conforming with pre-
strike procedures imposed by state law. The strike, which was called 
to obtain higher wages, was. conducted peacefully. Michigan law, in 
effect, delayed the time when a strike could be called beyond the time 
specified by the Taft-Hartley Act and, unlike the federal law, required 
majority authorization for any strike. These conflicts, plus the fact 
that the matter clearly was· within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and 
WaS covered by federal law, caused the tourt to decide that Congress 
had occupied the field and closed ·it to this type of state regulation al-
though the federal act said nothing about its provisions ex~luding state.> 
action. 
Where Congress has provided certain procedures to. deal with particu-
lar emergency situations, state attempts to deal with local emergencies 
for which no special provision is made by federal law may also be held 
to conflict with federal poliCy. In Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board 281 
the validity of the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law, which 
prohibited any group of public utility employees from engaging in a 
strike that would interrupt essential public services,' was at issue. Al-
though the Taft-Hartley Act contains special procedures to deal with 
strikes that might create national emergencies, it does not prohibit 
strikes by public utility employees for higher wages and says nothing 
about local emergencies. The Wisconsin statute, however, was held to 
be in conflict with federal labor legislation. 
The general principle illustrated by these three labor cases is that a 
283 I d. at 542· 
288 339 U.S. 454. 70 S. Ct. 781 (1950). 
287 340 U.S. 383, 71 S. Ct. 359 (1951). 
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state may not act where its action may constitute an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress as stated or implied in a statute, thus conflicting with federal 
policy. Precise opposition of the state act to the federal act or com-
plete frustration of the purposes and objectives of Congress is not re-
quired. The mere fact that it is possible for the person subject to both 
federal and state controls to comply with the requirements of both does 
not remove the implication of pre-emptive congressional intent. Ap-
parently state action that conflicts with federal policy will not be allowed 
even though the state law is not concerned with the same aspects of the 
regulated subject or even though Congress has not acted to occupy the 
entire field subject to regulation. The extent to which Congress has 
occupied a field of regulation, or authorized a federal agency to do so, 
is significant, however, in deciding if there is implied pre-emption, as 
we shall see in later cases. 
A second group of labor cases illustrates how far the Supreme Court 
will go to find a conflict and therefore pre-emption where the state acts 
within the quasi-legislative jurisdiction of a federal agency. 
_In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board 288 the New York Labor Re-
lations Board had certified a union as bargaining agent for the com-
pany's foremen at a time when the policy of the NLRB was to refuse 
certification of foremen's unions (even though it had the power to 
certify them). 2811 The NLRB had taken the position that to permit them 
would obstruct the purposes of the Wagner Act. The union had not 
petitioned the NLRB for certification as a bargaining agent. The court 
held the state action invalid since the federal statute was general and 
inclusive on the subject of union certification and, pursuant to its dele-
gated powers, the NLRB had promulgated comprehensive regulations 
effectively governing the subject. The failure of the NLRB to exercise 
affirmatively their full authority and certify foremen's unions was said 
to take on "the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appro-
priate or approved pursuant to the policy of the.statute." 290 The matter 
was within the rule-making jurisdiction of the NLRB. Thus the state 
could not act to authorize bargaining agents which the NLRB could, 
but did not, recognize. 
The Bethlehem rule is applicable even where the NLRB has not 
established a standard at all if the choice of standards is left to its dis-
288 Supra note 278. 
289 Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S. Ct. 789 (1947). 
290 Supra note 278 at 774- . 
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cretion. In La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board 291 the state 
law, under which the Wisconsin board acted, provided that a majority 
of the employees in a single craft, division, department, or plant of an 
employer might elect to constitute that group a separate bargaining unit. 
Since the Wagner Act left the matter of bargaining units to the discre-
tion of the NLRB, enforcement of the state law was not allowed even 
though the NLRB had not authorized different bargaining units for 
the company's employees. The court decided that Congress intended 
that the NLRB have exclusive authority to determine the nature of 
bargaining units. 
A third group of labor cases illustrates another refinement of the 
bases of federal pre-emption and demonstrates the Supreme Court's 
reluctance to allow the states to act within the quasi-judicial jurisdiction 
of a federal agency. The NLRB has been authorized to conduct inves-
tigations and hearings to determine whether certain "unfair labor prac-
tices" have been committed and to issue appropriate orders. Further-
more, the board may petition any United States Court of Appeals for 
the enforcement of its order or for an appropriate temporary relief or 
restraining order. As a result of the pre-emptive effect found to be 
implicit in this grant of power in Garner v. Teamsters Union/92 a state 
court was not authorized to issue an injunction, on the petition of an 
interstate trucking firm, against a union attempting to coerce the peti-
tioner into compelling or influencing his employees to join the union. 
The petitioner's grievance was cl~rly within the quasi-judicial jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB under the Taft-Hartley Act and, therefore, was 
impliedly outside state power. Similarly, a strike by a union as a result 
of a jurisdictional dispute with another union over competing work 
claims for their respective members could not be enjoined by a state 
court as a "restraint of trade" in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 298 
because the activity amounted to an unfair labor practice under the Taft-
Hartley Act and jurisdiction over such matters had been, though only 
by implication, pre-empted by the authority vested in the NLRB. The 
Weber case controlled in Teamsters Union v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co.294 
where respondent railroad brought an action in a state court to enjoin 
the union from interfering with its "piggy back" truck-trailer opera-
tions by persuading employees of trucking companies to refrain from 
291 336 U.S. 18, 69 S. Ct. 379 (1949). 
292 346 U.S. 48s, 74 S. Ct. 161 (1953). 
298 348 U.S. 468, 7S S. Ct. 48o (19SS). 
294 3SO u.s. ISS. 76 s. Ct. 227 (I9S6). 
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delivering loaded trailers to respondent's railroad yards. While re-
spondent's own labor relations were not subject to the provisions of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, the case was held to be within the exclusive jurisdic-
ti~n of the NLRB since the union's activities might be an unfair labor 
practice or protected by the act. In either case, it was for the NLRB, 
and not the state, to decide. Each of these cases was concerned with 
possible conflict-that is, the possibility that the state would enjoin a 
union act with respect to which the NLRB might take a different view, 
even though it had not done so yet. 
The recent case of Guss v. Utah Labor Board 295 shows the lengths 
to which the Supreme Court will go in finding pre-emption where a 
general and inclusive statute grants quasi-judicial power to a federal 
agency to decide specific cases. In that case the employer was doing 
interstate business but in an amount less than the ·jurisdictional mini-
mum required by the rules of the NLRB.298 The union filed a complaint 
with the :t-:LRB's regional director, alleging an unfair labor practice 
covered by federal law. Jurisdiction was declined on the ground that 
the employer's operations were predominantly local in character. The 
union thereupon filed the same complaint with the Utah board which 
granted relief. Section ro(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which authorizes 
the NLRB "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor 
practice . . . affecting commerce," provides : 
... [T]he Board is empowered by agreement with any 
agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency juris-
diction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, 
manufacturing, communications, and transportation except 
where predominantly local in character) even though such 
cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless 
the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to 
the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent 
with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or has re-
ceived a construction inconsistent therewith. 297 
Noting that the use of the term "affecting commerce" indicated that 
"Congress meant to reach the full extent of its power under the com-
295 353 u.s. I, 77 s. Ct. 598 (1957). 
296 Budgetary limitations and other considerations have prevented the NLRB from 
exercising jurisdiction over all cases in which interstate commerce is affected. In 1950 
the Board published standards, largely in terms of yearly dollar amounts of interstate 
inflow and outflow, that had to be met before jurisdiction would be assumed (26 
L.R.R.M. 50). These jurisdictional standards were revised upwards in 1954 (34 
L.R.R.M. 75). 
2er §toa, 29 U.S.C.A. §r6o.(a). 
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merce ciause;" 298 the Supreme Court emphasized the following uncon-
troverted fads: ( 1) the employer's business affected commerce within 
the meaning of the act, and the NLRB had jurisdiction even though it 
had dedined the exercise of its authority; ( 2) the act expressly covered 
the· alleged unfair labor practice; and ( 3) the NLRB had not ceded 
jurisdiction over the matter to the Utah Labor Board in the manner 
authorized ~y Section lo(a). In the Bethlehem Steel case the separate 
opinion of Justice Frankfurter had pointed out that the effect of the 
majority opinion was to deny that the NLRB could cede jurisdiction 
to the states under the Wagner Act to decide labor disputes. Since that 
decision iinrnediately preceded passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the 
court concluded that Congress must have known of this limitation. 
Therefore, it also concluded that Section 10( a) provided the exclusive 
means by which the· states could be given jurisdiction over labor cases 
falling within the quasi-judicial i>ower of the NLRB. While regretting 
the creation of this jurisdictional "no-man's-land," the court neverthe-
less set aside the action of the 'Utah board. 
In Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats 299 and San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon 800 the same result was reached in similar 
fact situations. In the Faif'lawn case, however, the court refrained from 
deciding whether a state might possibly frame and enforce an injunc-
tion aimed narrowly at a trespass by union pickets on land owned or 
leased by the employer. The Ohio court had based its injunction on the 
erroneous premise that it had the. power to reach the union's conduct in 
its entirety, but this power was impliedly precluded by the provisions of 
the federal statute. 
From these three cases we might fairly say that, where a general 
and inclusive federal statute delegates quasi-judicial power to a fed-
eral agency and contains a provision which specifies the manner in 
which the states can be given jurisdiction over matters falling within 
that of the federal agency, the state may not act unless jurisdiction is 
expressly ceded to. it, even though the federal agency decides not to 
exercise its full authority. 
(ii) Labor Cases Finding No Federal Pre-
emption 
Assuming that a state act affecting interstate labor matters is au-
thorized in the absence of any federal regulation, the first determination 
298 Supra note 295 at 3. 
299 353 U.S. 20, 77 S. Ct. 6o4 (1957). 
800 353 U.S. 26, 77 S. Ct. 6o7 (1957). 
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made by the Supreme Court, in a dispute in which pre-emption is as-
serted, is whether or not the specific subject of the state action is regu-
lated under federal law. To illustrate, in AUen-Bradley Local v. Wis-
consin Board 301 the Wisconsin board, pursuant to comprehensive state 
labor legislation, had ordered the union to cease and desist from mass 
picketing,· threatening employees desiring to work, obstructing entrance 
to and egress from the employer's factory, and picketing the homes of 
non-striking employees. The Supreme Court refused to invalidate the 
state action even though many provisions of the Wisconsin labor code 
were in conflict with the Wagner Act; it looked at oilly those provisions 
of the state law that authorized the specific order given .. Starting with 
the initial premise that an "intention of Congress to exclude States from 
exerting their police power must be clearly manifested," 802 the court 
determined that: ( 1) the Wagner Act did not delegate to the NLRB 
the authority to regulate the particular kind of union conduct in ques-
tion; (2) the federal scheme of control was not so pervasive as to sug-
gest exclusion of supplemental state regulation; and. (2) the board's 
order did not affect the status of employees; cause forfeiture of collec-
tive bargaining rights, or impair other rights protected by the Wagner 
Act. While the objectives of the union's actions were protected by fed-
eral law, its methods were neither protected nor prohibited. Since 
union violence could scarcely be deemed essential to the assertion of 
collective bargaining rights, the court concluded that it could be pro-
hibited by state action. 
An ·attitude of congressional indifference, rather than pre-emptive 
intent, was found in International Union, United Automobile Workers 
v. Wisconsin Board.303 During a period of deadlock in collective bar-
gaining negotiation, the Wisconsin board asserted the power under 
state law to order the union to cease and desist from its tactic of calling 
union meetings at irregular times during working hours without ad-
vance notice to the employer or informing the employer of the demands 
or concessions these tactics were meant to obtain. The court pointed out 
that neither the Wagner Act nor the Taft-Hartley Act permitted or 
forbade this type of harassing union conduct. The only union methods 
or tactics made illegal by the Taft-Hartley Act were those which re-
strained or coerced employees or employers in the exercise of rights 
protected by the act. Non-coercive union tactics could not be con-
301315 U.S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820 (1942). 
302 I d. at 749· 
303 336 U.S. 245, 6g S. Ct.· 516 (1949). 
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trolled by the NLRB. Policing of such conduct, therefore, remained 
with the states. 
These two cases illustrate the general proposition that the state may 
act where the federal statute leaves unregulated some aspects of the 
general field. The absence of specific federal controls of the particular 
subject ofstate action is said to imply a policy of congressional indif-
ference to the state action even though Congress has brought other 
subjects in the general field under federal control. Of course, this propo-
sition may not be cited in support of a state action which conflicts, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, with the federal policies 
reflected in federal statutes or administrative regulations in the same 
field. 
An exception to the rule of construction applied in the Garner, Weber, 
and Teamsters Union cases-"that the states may not assert their police 
powers with respect to matters within the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of 
a federal agency-is found in United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricul-
tural Implement Workers v. Wisconsin Board.80' In this case the union's 
activities and the Wisconsin board's order were similar to those de-
scribed in the Allen-Bradley decision. Subsequent co~gressional action, 
however, had placed a different complexion on the matter, for the Taft-
Hartley Act declared it to be "an unfair labor practice for a labor or-
ganization or its agents- ( I) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in 
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7·" 806 Section 7 pro-
tects such rights as that of employees to refrain from joining or assist-
ing a union. Thus, in contrast to the situation in Allen-Bradley, "the 
National Labor Relations Board might have issued an order similar to 
that of the State Board." 808 It had not done so, however. In holding 
that Wisconsin, nevertheless, might enjoin violent union conduct, the 
Supreme Court said : 
As a general matter we have- held that a State may not, in the 
furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct "which has 
been made an 'unfair labor practice' under the federal stat-
utes" . . . But our post-Taft-Hartley opinions have made it 
clear that this general rule does not take from the States 
power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of 
violence. The dominant interest of the State in preventing vio-
lence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is a matter 
of genuine local concern. Nor should the fact that a union 
commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in 
80'351 U.S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 794 (1956). 
SOD §8(b), 29 U.S.C.A. §Is8(b). 
808 Supra note 304 at 271. 
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violent conduct prevent the States from taking steps to stop 
the violence. . . . 
The States are the natural guardians of the public against 
violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the 
fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We 
would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them powerless 
to avert such emergencies without compelling directions to that 
effect.307 
1019 
Several facts which may narrow the scope of this exception to the gen-
eral rule of construction must be mentioned. The old Wagner Act de-
clared the power of the NLRB to prevent the enumerated unfair labor 
practices to be "exclusive." This term was omitted from the Taft-
Hartley Act although the old language, to the effect that the power of 
the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by 
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be 
established by agreement, law, or otherwise," 308 was retained in the 
new act. :W_oreover, Senator Taft had explained to the Senate that state 
action to prevent threats to public health and safety was not disturbed 
by the NLRB's authority to control coercive union methods.309 While 
these matters were mentioned by the court, the decision appeared to 
rest primarily upon considerations of the "dominant interest of the 
State" under the circumstances. 
To summarize, even where the federal labor act is general and inclu-
sive and delegates quasi-judicial power to a federal agency to prohibit 
labor activities which seriously threaten the public health and safety, 
the state also may act to prevent violent conduct in labor disputes which 
may cause personal injury or property damage. The court has thus 
demonstrated a greater reluctance to find implication of federal pre-
emption where matters of public health and safety assume significant 
proportions. How significant must the threat to public health and safety 
be? A comparison of the United Automobile Workers and Bus Em-
ployees 310 cases suggests that the threat of damage to person or prop-
erty must be of immediate and violent nature--that is, a situation call-
ing for quick intervention by officials close to the scene. The public 
inconvenience, discomfort, and more remote threat to health and safety 
occasioned by the strike of public utility employees in the Bus Em-
ployees case did not justify a similar exception. 
307 ld. at 274-275. 
308 §10(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §16o(a). , 
309 93 Cong. Rec. 4437 (May 2, '1947). 
310 Supra note 287. · 
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Lest the United Automobile Workers case be given greater sig-
nificance than it may be entitled to, one further thought needs to be 
mentioned. The federal labor laws are not primarily intended to pro-
tect public health and safety .. They do so collaterally, of course, but 
other considerations-principally economic, political, and social-are 
paramount. This feature may have caused the court to reach the con-
clusion that Congress did not intend to pre-empt state regulation of 
matters where the public health and safety are central. Faced with a 
federal act like the Atomic Energy Act, where health and safety is of 
central concern to Congress, the court may not feel justified in carving 
out a similar exception. 
A recent labor case, Automobile Workers v. Russell,311 helps to ex-
plain the criteria of implied pre-emption in this area of federal action. 
In this case Russell, a non-union electrician, had been prevented from 
working for a period of five weeks by the striking union. Mass union 
pickets, by .force of numbers and by threats of bodily injury to Russell 
and of damage to his property, denied him entrance to the employer's 
plant. The union.conduct was clearly an unfair labor practice under the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Alleging that the union wilfully and maliciously 
prevented him from working, Russell brought suit in an Alabama court 
for compensatory damages for his loss of earnings and mental suffer-
ing, plus punitive damages. He obtained a judgment in the amount of 
$w,ooo, of which roughly $500 was for lost wages. On appeal the 
union asserted that the jurisdiction of the state court had been pre-
empted by Congress and vested exclusively in the NLRB inasmuch as 
the union acts complained of were unfair labor practices under the Taft-
Hartley Act and Section w(c) of that act authorized the NLRB to 
award back pay to employees unable to work as a result of union dis-
crimination suffered by them, if the award effectuated the policies of 
the act.812 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Russell, 
pointing out that Section IO(c). power to order affirmative relief was 
merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress to stop and to 
prevent unfair labor practices. The court reasoned that ( 1) awards for 
back pay were purely discretionary and not compulsory, (2) only 
awards which would "effectuate the policies" of the act were authorized, 
and (3) Congress had not established a general scheme to award full 
compensatory damages. In response to the union's assertion that pre-
811 Supra note 282. Cf. International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 
617, 78 S. Ct. 923 (1958). 
au §ro(c), 29 U.S.C.A. §r6o(c). 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 1021 
emption is implied where there is a possible conflict of federal and state 
remedies, the court said : 
Our cases which hold that state jurisdiction is pre-empted are 
distinguishable. In them we have been concerned lest one 
forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which the other forum 
would find legal, or that state courts would restrict the exercise 
of rights guaranteed by the Federal Acts. 
In the instant case, there would be no "conflict" even if 
one forum awarded back pay and the other did not. There is 
nothing inconsistent in holding that an employee may recover 
lost wages as damages in a tort action under state law, and also 
holding that the award of such is not necessary to effectuate 
the purposes of the Federal Act.SlS 
Certain features of this case are important in considering its sig-
nificance. The ·first of these is the distinction drawn by the court be-
tween that which Congress directs and that which it merely authorizes 
a federal agency to do. Apparently the court is more apt to conclude 
that pre-emption was not intended as to matters which Congress has 
only authorized a federal agency to control. This distinction and the 
reasons for it are illustrated more fully in several of· the health and 
safety regulation cases discussed later. The second feature of this case 
which is important for our purposes is contained in the first of the 
above-quoted paragraphs. That statement emphasizes the court's ap-
prehension regarding possible federal-state conflict. Moreover, it speci-
fies the type of conflict-that is, the possibility that the state will pre-
vent that which the federal agency allows, and vice versa. Necessarily, 
the "unfair labor practices," which the Taft-Hartley Act prohibits, can-
not be defined or described with sufficient exactitude and precision to 
make enforcement of the law an automatic and mechanical process. 
Except in the extreme case, this is not the sort of matter with respect to 
which no two tribunals could reasonably differ. The carefully framed 
conditions in the proviso of Section 10( a), which allows the NLRB 
to cede jurisdiction over some matters to the states (discussed above 
in connection with the Cuss case), reflect congressional realization of, 
and concern with, this fact. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the 
Supreme Court declaring the jurisdiction of the NLRB to be exclu-
sive, except under circumstances where state action obviously does not 
conflict with congressional policy or impair administration of federal 
law. Finally, in the second paragraph quoted above we find a distinc-
tion which further illuminates the sort of conflict which implied pre-
sts Supra note 282 at 644-645. 
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emption seeks to avoid. The court has said, in effect, that there is 
nothing inconsistent in allowing a state to do what a federal agency 
may, but need not, do if the policies which each seeks to effectuate are 
different. The NLRB, in a situation such as that in the Russell case, 
could award back pay if this would effectuate the policies of the Taft-
Hartley Act-namely, to inhibit the occurrence of an unfair labor prac-
tice. The state act, on the other hand, might have been intended to 
effectuate any one or more of several policies which had little to do with 
labor peace: (I) to give compensation for. wrongful in jury; ( 2) to 
discourage and penalize intentional tortfeasors; or ( 3) to protect per-
sons and property from physical harm. 
(iii) Summary of Labor Case Pre-emption 
Principles 
The principles applied by the Supreme Court to find by implication a 
pre-emptive congressional intent in labor legislation are somewhat elu-
sive. Nevertheless, certain conclusions appear to be justified by the 
cases. The court's central -concern has been with conflict, or the possi-
bility of it, between federal policy and state action. That conflict can 
be one of statutory substance, in the sense that state and federal statu-
tory policies and standards regarding the same matter are not consistent, 
or it can be a conflict arising out of the exercise of powers granted to 
an administrative agency. The conflict need not be head-on, and it is 
not necessary that the state act be definitely incompatible with already 
formulated federal standards. The court has said that Congress in-
tends to exclude any state action that creates an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, 
even when the state law or other action will produce results probably 
incompatible with federal policy. Where Congress has granted quasi-
legislative powers to a federal agency, pre-emption is implied on the 
theory that Congress does not intend the· regulated activities to be bur-
dened by any substantive standards in addition to those which the fed-
eral agency is authorized to impose. Moreover, the grant to a federal 
agency of power to decide particular cases implies that in a situation 
where enforcement of federal standards by a multitude of state tri-
bunals might well produce inconsistent results, Congress has granted 
an exclusive power to the agency. The mere fact that Congress has 
established certain controls in a general field, however, does not raise 
a presumption of pre-emption as to all state action in the same field. 
Absent express congressional declaration of complete pre-emption, 
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where the federal statute leaves unregulated some aspects of its subject, 
Congress is deemed to have been indifferent to state action in the un-
regulated phases of the general field if the action does not otherwise 
conflict with federal policies. Even where the federal act is broad and 
inclusive and delegates quasi-judicial power over matters which affect 
public health and safety to the federal agency, the Supreme Court is 
reluctant to declare the state powerless to avert a local, immediate, and 
substantial hazard to persons and property in the area. If the state 
action does not make illegal what is legal under the federal act, or vice 
versa, and if the state acts in a fashion which is entirely consistent 
with what the federal agency would do under the circumstances, the 
court will not always find congressional intent to exclude state action 
to protect public health and safety. 
(b) Health and Safety Regulation Cases 
Congress has often invoked its commerce powers to regulate products 
and vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce in the inte.rest of public 
health and safety. It has done this for any one or more of several 
reasons: (I) because the mere existence of . the commerce power, 
though unexercised, severely limited the ability of the states to regulate 
effectively the matter independently; ( 2) because independent and un-
coordinated state regulation would, or had, produced conditions burden-
ing and frustrating commerce; or ( 3) because the states had not 
assumed the responsibility to regulate. To these we might well add 
another reason which appears to be applicable to federal health and 
safety regulation of atomic energy activities : ( 4) because, at the time 
regulation was deemed necessary, most of the activities were being 
conducted by the federal government, or its contractors, and most of 
the governmental experience in radiation health and safety regulation 
had been acquired by the federal government. 
In this area of regulation Congress frequently has neglected to specify 
what effect its statute is to have upon state regulation of the same or 
similar matters. As a consequence the Supreme Court has been obliged 
to determine congressional intent from the nature of the legislative sub-
ject, the purposes and objectives of Congress, the language, scope, and 
structure of the statute, the character, powers, and duties of the federal 
agency having enforcement responsibilities, and the action (or inaction) 
of the federal agency. Federal pre-emption, however, is not determined 
merely from consideration of the federal policy and action; the Supreme 
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Court also considers the nature and effect of the state action upon the 
federal scheme of regulation. 
The cases involving federal health and safety regulation probably 
furnish the closest analogy to the problems confronting the states in 
regulating atomic energy hazards, but one difference which may prove 
significant should be mentioned. All of these cases involve actual inter-
state movement of products or vehicles. Consequently, when the state 
attempts to regulate these products or vehicles it may be close to en-
croaching upon matters which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, 
require uniform national regulation if they are to be regulated at all 
because differing health and safety standards of the various states will 
unduly burden the interstate flow of goods. Congress has stated that 
"the processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special nu-
clear material affect interstate and foreign commerce," 814 but movement 
of goods across state lines is not an important factor, except in the 
shipment of radioactive materials and the atmospheric or hydrologic 
dispersal of radioactive effluents. While it is not asserted here that 
Congress lacks the power to pre-empt the regulation of matters which 
only "affect" commerce (indeed, the Supreme Court has stated in one 
case that, by using this term, "Congress meant to reach the full extent 
of its power under the Commerce Clause.") ,m it is possible that local 
interests in assuring adequate protection may be afforded more sig-
nificance by the Supreme Court where the subjects of health and safety 
re~lation merely "affect" rather than "move in" interstate commerce. 
In the health and safety regulation cases the Supreme Court has 
revealed a special solicitude for state action. In one case it has said: 
The principle is thoroughly established that the exercise by 
the State of its police power, which would be valid if not 
superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the re-
pugnance or conflict is so "direct and positive" that the two 
acts cannot "be reconciled or consistently stand together." 816 
The application of the principle is strongly fortified where the 
State exercises its power to protect the lives and health of its 
people.817 
814 §zc, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(c) [Emphasis added]. 
au Guss v. Utah Labor Board, supra note 295 at 3. 
816 Kelly v. Washington, 302 u.s. I, 10, s8 s. Ct. 87 (1937). 
SlT ld. at 13. 
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(i) Health and Safety Regulation Cases.Find-
ing Federal Pre-emption 
As in the labor cases, the fundamental concern of the Supre~e Court 
in·the health and safety cases is with actual or possible conflict-that is, 
conflict with health and safety standards specified by Congress or by a 
federal agency which is directed or authorized to set standards and 
conflict with the administration of the federal health and safety 
program. To illustrate, in Erie R.R. Co. v. New Y ark 318 the defendant 
railway had been convicted of violating the New York Labor Law 
which specified that telegraphers employed to space trains were not to 
be on duty more than eight hours per day. The violation took place 
on November I, I907· Eight months earlier Congress had approved the 
"Hours of Service" Act which authorized the employment of teleg-
raphers for nine hours, if employed during the day and night, and for 
thirteen hours when employed only during the day. The maximum 
hours prescribed by the federal act, however, were not to take effect 
until March of Igo8. In reversing the conviction, the court concluded: 
. . . [T]he "Hours of Service" law of March 4, I9<)7, is the 
Judgment of Congress of the extent of the restriction neces-
sary. It admits of no supplement; it is the prescribed measure 
of what is necessary and sufficient for the public safety and of 
the cost and burden which the railroad must endure to secure 
it. 819 
It should be noted that the state law conflicted with the federal statute 
in two senses : (I) the state standard was to be imposed during the 
period which Congress had given to the railroads to make necessary 
adjustments; and ( 2) the state standard was more strict than that 
which Congress felt necessary. The court specifically mentioned the 
first type of conflict, and the quoted statement seems to imply the 
second. 
At the very least, this case stands for the proposition that, where 
Congress itself specifies a health and safety standard for a matter af-
fecting interstate commerce, the Supreme Court will not allow the states 
to impose higher standards concerning the same matter, for the con-
gressional act is said to be accompanied by an intention that no greater 
burden will attend the matter than Congress has deemed necessary. 
Furthermore, where Congress has provided a period of grace to the 
318233 U.S. 671,34 S. Ct. 756 (1914). See also Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 
222 u.s. 370, 32 s. Ct. I6o (1912). 
sto I d. at 683. 
1026 STATE REGULATION 
affected activity, the states may not act to nullify its effect. Had Con-
gress not acted at all with respect to hours of service, the New York 
law would have been valid, but, Congress having acted, the states will 
not be allowed to frustrate the accomplishment and execution of its 
full purposes and objectives. Unanswered by this case is the question 
of whether a state "hours of service" law, identical in all respects with 
the federal law, could have been enforced after the federal standards 
became effective. 
Because of the complexities of health and safety regulation, Con-
gress usually directs or authorizes a federal agency to establish health 
and safety standards and delegates to it the authority to enforce them 
rather than set up the standards in the statute itself. Here, also, state 
action may be pre-empted. For example, the Agricultural Appropriation 
Act of 1917 directed and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to 
impose plant quarantines and to prevent or control the interstate ship-
ment of any class of nursery stock or any other class of plants, fruits, 
vegetables, roots, bulbs, seeds; or plant pre>ducts capable of carrying 
any dangerous plant disease or insect infestation whenever he deter-
mined such measures were necessary to prevent the spread of a danger-
ous plant disease or insect infestation. The Secretary was also author-
ized to issue rules and regulations providing for inspections, disinfection, 
certification, and the method and manner of delivery of any article 
capable of carrying plant diseases and insect infestation. Similar powers 
and duties were given as to importation of the same articles into the 
United States, and criminal penalties were specified for violations of 
the provisions of the act or the Secretary's orders and regulations. In 
Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington 820 the federal act was held to 
preclude an attempt by the Washington Director of Agriculture toes-
tablish a quarantine against alfalfa hay and meal from certain areas of 
Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Oregon, and Nevada which were infested 
with the alfalfa weevil. The court said : 
It is impossible to read this [federal] statute and consider its 
scope without attributing to Congress the intention to take 
over to the Agricultral Department of th~ Federal Govern-
ment the care of horticulture and agriculture of the States, 
so far as these may be affected injuriously by the transporta-
tion in foreign and interstate commerce of anything which by 
reason of its character can convey disease to and injure trees, 
plants, or crops. All the sections look to a complete provision 
for quarantine against importation into the country and quar-
820 :z7o U.S. 87, 46 S. Ct. 279 (1!)26). 
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antine as between the States under the direction and super-
vision of the Secretary of Agriculture.321 
1027 
In answer to the suggestion that the states might act in the absence of 
any action by the Secretary of Agriculture, the court replied: 
The obligation to act without respect to the State is put di-
rectly upon the Secretary of Agriculture whenever quaran-
tine, in his judgment is necessary. When he does not act, it 
must be presumed that it is not necessary. 822 
It might be inferred from the first statement quoted that, from the 
very pervasiveness of the scheme of federal regulation, the Supreme 
Court was compelled to reach the conclusion that Congress intended to 
pre-empt regulation of the matters covered bythe federal act. In only 
one of the cases in this discussion (a recent and highly controversial 
case involving sedition against the federal government) ,828 however, has 
the Supreme Court appeared to pose this as a separate and complete test 
of pre-emption. It is submitted that the second statement, rather than 
the pervasiveness of the federal scheme of regulation, contains the 
principal basis of the decision. The test implicit in that statement is 
the familiar one of conflict. The Secretary of Agriculture was directed 
to impose a plant quarantine should he determine that such a measure 
was necessary to prevent the spread of dangerous plant diseases or 
insect infestations across state lines. His power in this respect was 
quasi-legislative. If the Secretary did not impose a quarantine, it fol-
lowed (in the court's opinion at least) that none was necessary, and, if 
not necessary, it also followed that the state action was in conflict with 
federal policy. That being the case, the Supreme Court was compelled 
to conclude that state action of this sort was precluded. 
From this case we may fairly conclude that, where a general and all-
inclusive federal statute directs (not just authorizes) a federal agency 
to establish health and safety standards, as circumstances require, the 
Supreme Court will not allow the states to impose different or higher 
standards concerning matters within the scope of the federal grant of 
power. Where the federal agency has acted to establish the appropriate 
standard, a different or higher state standard constitutes an actual con-
flict; where the federal agency has not acted, any state standard con-
stitutes a possible conflict. Either situation is fatal to the validity of the 
state act. It may be worth while to mention that, following the Oregon-
821 /d. at 99· 
8 22 /d. at 102-IOJ. . 
8 23 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477 (1956). 
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Washington case; Congress promptly intervened by further amending 
the federal statute to permit the states to impose quarantines in situa-
tions overlooked by the Secretary of Agriculture. 824 Like the earlier 
Erie Railroad decision, this case did not throw any light upon whether 
the state might have supplemented federal law by making it a state 
offense to import the specified articles into the state in violation of a 
quarantine imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Not only may states be precluded from establishing health and safety 
standards different from those established by a federal agency pursuant 
to congressional directive, but they also may be prevented from doing so 
wh~re the federal agency is only authorized, but not obligated, to estab-
lish a particular safety standard. For example, in Penn. R.R. Co. v. 
Public Service Commission 825 the laws of Pennsylvania forebade the 
operation of any train consisting of U.S. mail or express cars without 
a railed platform, thirty inches in width, attached to the rear end of 
the rear car. The Postmaster General, with congressional authoriza-
tion, had issued regulations concerning the construction of mail cars 
when used as the end car. Furthermore, the ICC, pursuant to the 
authority granted it by the Safety Appliance Act, had issued elaborate 
regulations pertaining to "Caboose Cars without Platforms." In re-
versing the order of the state Public Service Commission requiring 
compliance with the state law, the Supreme Court noted that the specifi-
cations and equipment of the railroad's end cars on mail and baggage 
runs were: ( 1) matters calling for uniform laws; ( 2) covered by de-
tailed and comprehensive federal regulations; and (3) in compliance 
with those federal regulations. While it would have been possible for 
the railroad to comply with both federal and state regulations, the Su-
preme Court inferred from the detailed and comprehensive federal 
regulations that no more was necessary to assure safety than what the 
federal regulations required. Therefore, the state requirement indirectly 
conflicted with federal policy. 
A similar question was raised in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 828 
where the railroads claimed that the federal Boiler Inspection Act, as 
amended in 1915 and 1924, had occupied the field as to regulation of 
locomotive equipment used on interstate railways and therefore pre-
cluded enforcement of state laws requiring automatic firebox doors and 
cab curtains during the winter season. Amendments to the Boiler In-
824 44 Stat. 250 ( 1926). 
a25 2so u.s. s66, 40 s. Ct. 36 (1919). 
8 28 272 u.s. oos, 47 s. Ct. 207 < 1926 >. 
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spection Act gave the ICC authority to establish health and safety 
standards for the entire locomotive and tender. Pursuant to this au-
thority the ICC required a number of safety devices, but automatic 
firebox doors and cab curtains were not among them. The Supreme 
Court held the state laws to be unenforceable against the railroad. It 
was assumed that the state acts were a proper exercise of the police 
power, that there was no direct conflict between state and federal re-
quirements, and that the interference with commerce was only incidental. 
Nevertheless, since Congress had authorized the ICC to establish all 
safety features for interstate locomotives and tenders, and the ICC had 
exercised that power extensively, the court felt compelled to assume that 
Congress could not have intended the imposition of additional state 
safety requirements. 
The feature that distinguishes these two cases from the Oregon-
Washington decision is that appropriate action was merely authorized in 
the two railroad cases while it was obligatory in the quarantine case. 
The implication of pre-emptive intent becomes quite as strong, how-
ever, when the authorized federal agency has effectively exercised its 
power by establishing comprehensive and detailed safety standards. The 
significance of this distinction will become more readily apparent when 
we consider subsequent cases where the states have been allowed to es-
tablish safety standards within an area where the quasi-legislative au-
thority delegated to a federal agency has not been exercised as to the 
particular safety matter. 
One case which is apt to prove especially troublesome to a state seek-
ing to establish and enforce a radiation health and safety program is 
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson.827 Under federal law the produc-
tion of renovated butter was taxed and regulated by the federal gov-
ernment. This law authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to inspect 
places of manufacture and storage of both the ingredients (i.e., packing 
stock butter) and the renovated butter and to confiscate the finished 
product should it be found unwholesome or deleterious to health. State 
law conferred upon the Alabama Board of Agriculture and Industries 
the power to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations in regard 
to foods and drugs. Under this authority the Alabama commissioner 
condemned packing stock butter held by petitioners for renovation. 
Seventy-five per cent of petitioner's packing stock butter came from 
outside of the state, and ninety per cent of the renovated butter was 
shipped in interstate commerce. The action was brought to enjoin 
827 315 U.S. 148, 62 S. Ct. 491 ( 1941). 
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enforcement of the state law on the ground of federal pre-emption. In 
rev.ersing the judgment of the state court and ruling in petitioner's 
favor, a divided court ( 5 to 4) pointed out : 
... [The federal Act] left the states free to act on the pack-
ing stock supplies prior to the time of their delivery into the 
hands of the manufacturer and to regulate sales of the finished 
product within their borders. But, once the material was defi-
nitely marked for commerce by acquisition of the manufac-
turer, it passed into the domain of federal control. ... 
Confiscation by the state of material in production nullifies 
federal discretion over ingredients. 328 
The majority opinion also stated: 
Congress hardly intended the intrusion of another authority 
during the very preparation of a commodity subject to the 
surveillance and comprehensive specifications of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. To uphold the power of the State of 
Alabama to condemn tht: material in the factory, while it was 
under federal observation and while federal enforcement 
deemed it wholesome, would not orily hamper the administra-
tion of the federal act but would be inconsistent with its re-
quirements. Whether the sanction used to enforce the regula-
tion is condemnation of the material or the product is not 
significant. Since there was federal regulation of the materials, 
there could not be similar state regulation of the same sub-
ject.829 
While the fact was not cited in support of the majority opinion in this 
case, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged in his dissenting opinion that 
in proposing this legislation the Department of Agriculture " ... did 
ask Congress to make some restrictions upon the authority which had 
been exercised by the states in reguiating the manufacture and sale of 
butter for the protection of their citizens." 830 It is not unreasonable to 
assume that this legislative history and the attitude of the Department 
of Agriculture influenced the decision. Several cases considered later 
suggest that an intention upon the part of a federal agency to exclude 
or allow state action may affect the court's decision. 
Several other features of this case require comment. There was 
nothing hazardous, to either the employees or the public generally, in 
the renovated butter manufacturing process itself. Thus there was little 
local interest in the safety of the manufacturing process since the prod-
328 /d. at 168. 
829 !d. at 169. 
8So !d. at 177. 
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uct was only dangerous when consumed, and, by express limitation, the 
court's decision did not prevent the state from condemning unwhole-
some raw materials prior to the time they were acquired by an inter-
state manufacturer. Moreover, the decision did not prevent the state 
from regulating the sale of the finished product within the state's bor-
ders. It was not necessary, therefore, for the court to hold the state 
powerless to protect the health and safety of its people. It was only 
necessary for the court to conclude that the state could not regulate 
in a manner that might .possible conflict with or impair the administra-
tion of a comprehensive federal health and safety program. 
( ii) Health and Safety Regulation Cases 
Finding No Federal Pre-emption 
A careful study of the decided cases leads one to conch.tde that the 
Supreme Court is somewhat reluctant to declare that an act of Congress 
has pre-emptive effect, particularly where this would leave the states 
powerless as to health and safety matters where the local concern is 
great. Thus the fact that the federal government has entered a field of 
regulation does not alone lead the court to infer a pre-emptive con-
gressional intent as to the entire field of regulation. To illustrate, in 
Reid v. Colorado 331 the defendant had been convicted of violating a 
state law prohibiting any person from bringing or driving cattle or 
horses into the state, between April I and November I, from any place 
south of the 36th parallel, unless they had been held at a. place north 
of the parallel for at least ninety days prior to importation or unless 
the shipper obtained a certificate from the State Veterinary Sanitary 
Board indicating that the animals were free from all infectious or 
contagious diseases and had not been exposed to such diseases during 
the ninety days prior to inspection. The defendant appealed on the 
ground that the state law was repugnant to the Federal Animal In-
dustry Act of 1884, alleging that the animals had been inspected, 
found healthy, and certified by an inspector of the Federal Bureau 
of Animal Industry; Under the federal act the Secretary of Agriculture 
was authorized: (I) to conduct a study of livestock diseases and meth-
ods of suppression; ( 2) to frame appropriate rules and regulations for 
certification to the states; and (3) to control the export of diseased 
livestock from ports of the United States. Furthermore, the act made 
it unlawful to drive or transport in interstate commerce any livestock 
331 187 u.s. 137, 23 s. ci. 92 (1902). 
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known to be affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable 
disease. Pointing out that persons transporting livestock in interstate 
commerce might not know them to be diseased, the court concluded 
that the state and federal acts did not cover the same ground and, 
therefore, that. there could be no direct conflict between them. Because 
the federal act also contemplated state action, the state act did not 
indirectly conflict with federal policy. Apparently, the inspection and 
certification by the federal officer was gratuitous since the Animal 
Industry Act did not give to any agency the authority to issue a certifi-
cate that could be considered as authorizing transportation of livestock 
in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 
holding that the state was free to take reasonable steps to control im-
portation of diseased livestock and to determine whether disease was 
present. 
In Savage v. Jones 882 a Minnesota citizen sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of an Indiana statute regulating the sale, and requiring a 
statement of the ingredients formula, of concentrated commercial live-
stock food on the ground that it was repugnant to the Federal Pure Food 
and Drugs Act of 19o6. The federal act dealt with the subject of 
adultered and misbranded foods, making it unlawful to misrepresent 
the ingredients of foods, but did not require a disclosure of ingredients. 
The court concluded that Congress had not occupied the field and that 
the state law could be imposed without impairing the administration 
of the federal act. 
The subject of diseased cattle arose again in Mintz v. Baldwin 888 
where the plaintiffs, cattle importers, sought to enjoin the enforcement 
of an order of the New York Commissioner of Agriculture prohibiting 
the· delivery of certain cattle into New York from Wisconsin. The 
cattle were accompanied by a Wisconsin certificate indicating freedom 
from Bang's disease, but, as required by New York law, there was 
nothing to show that the herd from which the cattle came was simi-
larly free from disease. The plaintiff argued that two federal acts had 
pre-empted the field of cattle importation regulation. The Cattle 
Contagious Diseases Act of 1903 authorized and directed the Secretary 
of Agriculture to establish rules and regulations concerning interstate 
transportation from any place where he had reason to believe livestock 
diseases existed. Furthermore, the act specified that whenever an in-
spector of the Bureau of Animal Industry issued a certificate showing 
882 225 U.S. 501, 32 S. Ct. 715 (1912). 
888 289 U.S. 346, 53 S. Ct. 611 (1933). 
RECENT STATE LEGISLATION 1033 
that he had inspected any cattle from a diseased area and found them 
free of communicable disease, the cattle might be shipped, driven, or 
transported in interstate commerce without further inspection or the 
exaction of any fees. The Cattle Contagious Diseases Act of 1905 
authorized the Secretary to establish quarantine districts and to control 
livestock shipments from such areas. Wisconsin had not been quaran-
tined, and the plaintiff's cattle had not been inspected by a federal 
officer. The Supreme Court held that Baldwin's order did not conflict 
with the act of 1905 because the shipments were not made from a fed-
erally quarantined area. Moreover, that order did not conflict with the 
act of 1903 because no federal inspection had been made or certificate 
issued. Applying the principle of construction that specification of ex-
clusive federal actions negatives pre-emption in areas not specified, and 
finding that federal inspection and certification under the act of 1903 
were only exclusive if actually made, the court concluded that this act 
did not otherwise limit state powers. Th~ Oregon-Washington case 884 
was distinguished on the grounds that the Plant Quarantine Act 
involved in that decision covered the whole field and did not, "by speci-
fication of the cases in which action under it [should] be exclusive, 
disclose the intention of Congress that, subject to the limitations defined, 
state measures [might] be enforced." 385 In reality the scope and 
coverage of the two Cattle Contagious Diseases Acts seems no less 
pervasive than was the PlanF Quarantine Act in the earlier case; how-
ever, the second basis of distinction appears sound. To this we might 
add that in the earlier case the state officer ordered a complete prohibi-
tion against importation of the offending article into the state, whereas 
in the Mintz case the effect of the New York Commissioner's order was 
not so drastic; the cattle could be brought into the state if both the 
individual animals and the herd from which they came were certified 
to be free from Bang's disease. A further basis of distinction is to 
be found in the acquiescence of the Department of Agriculture to en-
forcement of state measures to suppress Bang's disease. This fact was 
mentioned by the court, and suggests that the administrative agency 
may make the decision to exclude or allow state action, at least in areas 
where it is authorized, but not directed, to act. 
In Kelly v. Washington 336 the owner of a fleet of motor-driven (non-
steam) tugs sought a writ of prohibition against enforcement of a state 
884 Supra note 320· 
835 Supra note 333 at 3,52 •. 
836 Supra note 316. 
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law providing for the inspection and regulation of every vessel operated 
by machinery but not subject to inspection under federal law. Federal 
acts and regulations regarding vessels on the navigable waters of the 
United States were detailed and elaborate, but they did not provide for 
inspection of the hulls and machinery of motor-driven tugs that did 
not carry passengers or freight for hire or had a gross tonnage of less 
than 300 tons. Therefore, it followed that inspection of the hulls and 
machinery of the plaintiff's vessels by state officials to insure safety and 
seaworthiness was not in conflict with any express provision of federal 
law or regulation. On the question of pre-emption by virtue of the 
negative implication of elaborate, but less than comprehensive, federal 
laws, the court said : 
It would hardly be asserted that when Congress set up its 
elaborate regulations as to steam vessels, it deprived the State 
of the exercise of its protective powers as to vessels not pro-
pelled by steam. The fact that the federal regulations were 
numerous and elaborate does not extend them beyond the 
boundary they established. 887 
It should be noted that the state officials were merely inspecting hulls 
and ma,chinery to determine safety and seaworthiness. The state law 
was not being applied in such a manner as to require the owners of the 
vessels to build, modify, or operate the vessels according to state 
specifications and rules. By way of dictum on this matter, the court 
said: 
If, however, the State goes farther and attempts to impose 
particular standards as to structure, design, equipment and 
operation which in the judgment of the authorities may be 
desirable but. pass beyond what is plainly essential to safety 
and seaworthiness, the state will encounter the principle that 
such requirements, if imposed at all, must be through the 
action of Congress which can establish a uniform rule.338 
From time to time each of these four cases has been cited to support 
the proposition or inference that, where federal acts leave some mat-
ters in a general field unregulated, a policy of federal indifference to 
state action is indicated, and the state may regulate if its action does 
not otherwise constitute an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. In each of these cases 
the court concluded that no conflict was indicated. And, in the Reid and 
Mintz cases, the court demonstrated a willingness to place the state 
887 I d. at IJ. 
8BB I d. at 15. 
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action outside of the scope of rather comprehensive schemes of federal 
regulation. 
Other cases also illustrate this willingness of the court to allow state 
action in areas covered by a general and inclusive federal statute which 
delegates quasi-legislative authority to a federal agency. In Welch v. 
New H a.mpshire 339 the State Public Service Commissioner had sus-
pended the appellant's state certificate to use state highways. It was 
shown that in 1937 the appellant violated a state law which forbade the 
operation of motor vehicle carriers by a driver who had been continu-
ously on duty for more than twelve hours. The Federal Motor Carrier 
Act of 1935 imposed upon the ICC the duty to regulate interstate 
common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. To this end the ICC 
was expressly authorized to establish reasonable standards with respect 
to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety 
of operation and equipment. Pertinent regulations specifying no more 
than ten hours of continuous duty were promulgated by the ICC in 
1937, but the effective date was postponed until January of 1939. The 
decision in this case, rejecting the appellant's assertion of federal pre-
emption and affirming the action of the state agency, is in striking con-
trast to Erie R.R. Co. v. New York 840 which was distinguished. As in 
the Erie case, the violations occurred after enactment of the federal 
law and promulgation of the federal hour standards but before those 
standards became effective. Unlike the situation in the Erie case, how-
ever, those hours standards were not established by Congress in the 
statute itself but by the ICC. Moreover, the ICC was authorized, but 
not directed, to establish the standards. The court stated that if the 
federal act had imposed a duty on the ICC to prescribe qualifications 
and hours of service the state law would have been pre-empted in 1935. 
Since it was only authorized to do so, however, the court would not 
infer that Congress intended to supersede a state safety measure prior 
to the taking effect of a federal measure found suitable to put in its 
place. One further distinction should be noted : the state law allowed 
more hours of continuous operation than did the deferred federal regu-
lation. In the Erie case, the drcumstances were reversed. 
Pursuant to the authority granted to it by the same statute, the ICC 
promulgated regulations establishing minimum qualifications for drivers 
of motor vehicles, including taxicabs, operating as carriers in interstate 
and foreign commerce. A San Diego County ordinance required taxi-
839 3o6 U.S. 79, 59 S. Ct. 438 (1939). 
840 Supra note 318. 
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cab drivers to make written application for an operator's permit to the 
sheriff and to pay a fee of $z.oo. Applicants were examined as to their 
knowledge of the ordinance, the Vehicle Code, traffic regulations, and 
county geography. The permit could be denied a person of "bad moral 
character," a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, an 
unsuccessful examinee, and a person who had violated any provision 
of the ordinance. In Buck v. California 341 the court held that the 
county ordinance could be applied to drivers of cabs making trips 
between Mexico and points in the county, pointing out that the ordinance 
did not conflict with any federal law, that the operation of taxicabs is a 
local business, and that commerce is affected only indirectly. Since the 
ICC had established only minimum driver qualifications, the court con-
cluded that : 
This does not prevent the state or a subdivision thereof, in the 
exercise of its police powers, from providing additional specifi-
cations as to qualifications, not inconsistent or in conflict with 
the regulations of the· Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Especially is this true since the regulations of the Commission 
are only minimum. 842 
In Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen s•s the Supreme Court sustained the 
order of the Illinois Commerce Commission requiring the appellant to 
.provide cabooses on all designated runs within the state in order to 
protect the lives and health of employees. Appellant was a corporation 
engaged in performing terminal services for a number of railroads in 
and around East St. Louis. It operated several yards for the sorting, 
classification, and interchange of cars. Appellant claimed congressional 
occupation of the field by virtue of the Boiler Inspection Acts, the 
Safety Appliance Acts, the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Railway 
Labor Act, in that they authorized the ICC to prescribe requirements 
as to the use of cabooses in the type of railroad activities being carried 
on by appellant. Despite this acknowledged authorization, however, the 
ICC had not established any requirements respecting the use of cabooses 
on switching and sorting runs. While the ICC could have regulated the 
matter and certainly had issued comprehensive regulations concerning 
other railroad activities, neither the general and inclusive power nor the 
extensive exercise of that power by the ICC implied pre-emptive intent 
as to local matters of public safety upon which no action had been taken. 
341 343 U.S. 99, 72 S. Ct. 502 (1952). 
842 /d. at 101-102. 
343 318 u.s. I, 63 s. Ct. 420 (194J). 
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On frequent occasions since the statement was made by Holmes in 
1915 in the case of Charleston & Car. R.R. v. Varnville Furniture 
Co., 844 the Supreme Court has said that when "Congress has taken the 
particular subject-matter in hand coincidence [of state law] is as 
ineffective as opposition." The statement, however, was dictum in that 
case, since the state law did not coincide with federal law, and it is 
believed that a careful study of the health and safety cases will bear out 
the assertion that it has been no less gratuitous when it has been 
repeated. In California v. Zook 845 the Supreme Court was presented 
with a situation in which state and federal law did coincide. A 1947 
California statute prohibited the sale or arrangement of any transpor-
tation over the public highways of the state if the carrier did not have 
an ICC permit. The Motor Carrier Act had substantially the same pro-
vision; however, until 1942, the ICC had declined to require permits of 
persons engaged in "casual, occasional, or reciprocal" transportation. 
In that year the ICC regulations were amended to require "share-the-
expense" passenger carriers to obtain a permit. Respondents operated a 
travel bureau in Los Angeles and admitted selling and arranging trans-
portation to Arizona on a "share-the-expense" basis in vehicles operated 
by drivers who did not hold ICC permits, but demurred to the criminal 
complaint on the ground that the law invaded an exclusive congressional 
domain. In support thereof they invoked the familiar phrase of the 
Varnville decision. A sharply divided court (5 to 4) refused to be per-
suaded by the "logic" of this argument and upheld the conviction for 
violation of state law. While state boundaries had been crossed on the 
trips for which respondents had made arrangements, the court con-
cluded that the state interest was not outweighed by the national interest. 
The theory that coincidence is as ineffectual as opposition and that state 
laws aiding enforcement of federal laws are invalid was specifically 
rejected. The court pointed out that the Varnville principle assumes 
that Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand to the 
exclusion of state law. Where the question to be answered by the court 
is whether Congress has prohibited state action, application of the 
principle would be unsound. The court said : 
The "coincidence" rationale is only an application of the first 
principle of conflict with national policy. The phrase itself 
simply states the familiar rule. If state laws on commerce are 
identical with those of Congress, the Court may find congres-
844 237 U.S. 597, 35 S. Ct. 715 (1915). 
at5 Supra note :281. . 
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sional motive to exclude the states. . . . But the fact of iden-
tity does not mean the automatic invalidity of state measures. 
Coincidence is only one factor in a complicated pattern of facts 
guiding us to congressional intent. 846 
Several factors appeared to be significant to the majority. (I) The 
state and federal laws did not collide or conflict, and enforcement of 
the state law would not impair administration of the federal law. To the 
contrary, the court said : 
It is difficult-to believe that the I. C. C. intended to deprive itself 
of effective aid from local officers experienced in the kind 
of enforcement necessary to combat this evil-aid of particular 
importance in view of the I.C.C.'s small staff. 347 
( 2) The state law pertained to a matter of great local interest; a tra-
ditional subject of state regulation. (3) No conflicting state laws on this 
subject existed in 1942 when the ICC amended its regulations. The 
court felt that "it would be startling to discover congressional intention 
to 'displace' state laws when there were no state laws to displace when 
Congress acted." 348 This absence of state law demonstrated the pur-
pose "to provide rather than displace local rules-to fill a void rather 
than nationalize a single rule." uo (4) The ICC did not express an 
intention to supersede state laws. The court pointed out that since the 
ICC's order requiring permits of "share-the-expense" passenger carriers 
was issued after the court had determined that California could regulate 
interstate passenger transportation in a similar fashion~ 8~0 it ". . . 
would expect the federal agency to be specific if it intended to super-
sede state laws." 861 
It must be recognized that to the state seeking to regulate the activities 
of AEC licensees in the interest of public health and safety the Z ook 
case offers but a slender and tenuous margin of authority. Of the ma-
jority group only Justice Black remains on the court in 1958, whereas 
two of the minority, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, still sit. It also 
must be added that the language in the opinion is in rather striking con-
trast to that of the court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,862 a later case which 
is discussed (and distinguished) below. 
846 I d. at 730. 
841 Id. at 737. 
848 !d. at 735· 
849 ld. at 736. 
8 5° California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930 ( 1941). 
851 Supra note 281 at 737. 
8G2 Supra note 323. 
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Through the Welch, Buck, Terminal Assn., and Zook cases there 
appears to run a common thread. In each of them the state had 
established and enforced a safety standard in an area covered by a 
general and inclusive federal law which delegated the authority, but did 
not impose the duty, to regulate the same general area to a federal ad-
ministrative agency. In each of them federal-state conflict was found to 
be absent in spite of schemes of federal regulation. On the basis of these 
four cases we may fairly conclude that the Supreme Court will not 
find implied congressional intent to exclude state action where a general 
and inclusive federal statute delegates the power (but does not impose 
a specific duty) to determine its specific application to a federal agency : 
( 1) if the federal agency has not established a safety standard similar 
to that which the state is imposing to alleviate a: local hazard ; ( 2) if the 
federal agency has established only minimum safety standards and the 
local need for additional standards is great; (3) even where extensive, 
similar, federal regulations have been issued, if the state action relates to 
what may be considered a separable or distinct segment of the matter 
which is within the scope of the federal act but which appears to have 
escaped the attention of the federal agency and is of substantial local 
interest; and (4) even where federal safety standards have been estab-
lished, if the state standard is identical and its enforcement will not ma-
terially interfere with the administration of the federal act. In every 
case, of course, the state action must not otherwise conflict with, or 
stand as an obstacle to, the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress. It als<:> is important to note that in 
several of these cases, in which the federal agency is authorized but 
not obligated to act, the Supreme Court appears to assume that Congress 
also authorized the federal agency to determine whether its regulation 
would be exclusive or not. 
(iii) Summary of Health and Safety Case 
Pre-emption Principles 
As in the labor cases, in determining whether Congress intended to 
exclude state health and safety regulation, the central concern of the 
Supreme Court is with conflict, or the possibility of it, between federal 
and state policies and actions. Moreover, in this area there are few 
substantive rules since the solution is essentially a task of statutory con-
struction. The one clear rule flows from the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution 853 and is manifested in the court's examination of the 
a5s U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. 
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particular situation for possible conflict. The remaining principles are 
simply inferences to be drawn from certain factual considerations. 
Among these considerations are : (I) the pervasiveness of the federal 
scheme of regulation; ( 2) the burden on interstate commerce imposed 
by local regulations as balanced against the local interest in the subject 
of regulation; ( 3) whether safety standards are prescribed by Congress 
in a statute or are to be issued by a federal agency; ( 4) whether Con-
gress has directed a federal agency to take appropriate action or merely 
authorized it to do so; (5) the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of 
federal agency action in the regulatory field generally; ( 6) whether the 
federal agency has acted upon the particular subject or, in the event that 
it has not acted, its reasons for not acting; ( 7) whether the federal 
agency, which has been authorized to act by Congress, has indicated that 
its regulations are to be exclusive; ( 8) the practical feasibility of ex-
clusive federal control; ( 9) whether state action preceded or succeeded 
federal action in the field; ( IO) whether state safety standards are 
higher, in addition to, or identical with those imposed by federal law; 
and (I I) whether enforcement of state standards will interfere with 
administration of federal law. 
(c) Other Pre-emption Cases 
The question of implied congressional pre-emption also has been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in. two cases involving alien regulation 
and national security and in three cases addressed to the rather narrow 
problem of the applicability of federal safety standards and licensing 
procedures for carrying on interstate activity as these affect property or 
action of a state or a subdivision thereof. 
( i) National Security and Alien Regulation 
Cases 
In 1941 the Supreme Court decided the case of Hines v. Davido-
witz 354 where the validity of the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act 
of 1939 was challenged. The assertion was made that the Federal Alien 
Registration Ad of 1940 and other federal laws dealing with aliens had 
pre-empted the field. Under the state act aliens, eighteen years or over, 
were required to register annually with the Department of Labor and 
Industry, to carry an alien registration card at all times, to show the 
card upon demand to any officer of the Department of Police, and to 
854 Supra note 278. 
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exhibit the card when applying for a driver's license or registering a 
motor vehicle. Discretionary authority to prescribe the information 
registrants were to supply was given to the department, which was to 
classify the registrants and furnish a copy of the classification ~o the 
Pennsylvania Motor Police. Violations of the state act could be pun-
ished by fine or imprisonment, or both. Under the federal act aliens, 
fourteen years or over, were required to register only once at a local 
post office. No registration card was issued or required to be carried. 
The registration and fingerprint records were forwarded to the Depart-
ment of Justice where the information was kept secret and confidential. 
It could be made available only to those persons or agencies authorized 
to receive it by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 
with the approval of the Attorney General. ·Only wilfull failure to 
register subjected the alien to criminal penalties. Other federal laws pro-
vided a comprehensive program to regulate the admission and deporta-
tion of aliens and the means by which they might acquire citizenship. 
While other issues were raised on the appeal, the case was decided on 
appellee's contention that "by its adoption of a comprehensive, integrated 
scheme for regulation of aliens-including its 1940 registration act-
Congress [had] precluded state action like that taken by Pennsyl-
vania." 855 The order of the federal district court enjoining enforce-
ment of the state law was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
Two features of this case were pointed out by the court which distin-
guish it from a case involving the competing interests of the federal 
and state governments to regulate health and safety matters. Referring 
to alien control laws, the court said : 
... [I]t is also of importance that this legislation deals with 
the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human beings, 
and is in an entirely different category from state tax statutes 
or state pure food laws regulating the labels on cans.856 
Referring to the subject of alien regulation, the court also said: 
. . . [T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and 
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government 
that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, 
"the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law 
of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not 
controverted, must yield to it." 857 
8 511 I d. at 61. 
856 I d. at 68. 
857 I d. at 66. 
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From the quoted premise it followed that Congress could establish 
an exclusive system of regulation-not that it had done so merely by 
acting. The court went on, however, to point out that : 
... [W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its 
superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme 
of regulation and has therein provided· a standard for the 
registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the 
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary 
regulations. 868 
Thus the court's analysis began with two questions: ( 1) did Congress 
establish a standard for the registration of aliens as a part of a com-
plete scheme of alien regulation?; and, ( 2) did "Pennsylvania's law 
[stand] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress?" 359 An examination of the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940 and the other federal laws mentioned above 
indicated to the court that Congress had established a uniform system of 
alien regulation. Congressional history, since repeal of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798, revealed a consistent opposition to laws requiring 
aliens to register annually, to carry identification cards, to exhibit such 
cards on demand, or to pay a registration fee. Therefore, since the fed-
eral act contained a minimum of such requirements, and since those not 
included had been rejected by Congress from time to time, it followed 
that the state act was inconsistent with the purposes and objectives of 
Congress. 
In Pennsylvania v. N elson/60 a 1956 case, the respondent, an acknowl-
edged Communist Party member, had been convicted in a state court 
for violation of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, in that he knowingly 
advocated the overthrow of the federal government. Under the state 
law indictment for sedition could be initiated upon an information made 
by a private person, and conviction could result in a fine of up to $10,000 
or imprisonment up to twenty years or both. Under the Smith Act of 
1940, as amended, knowing advocacy of the "duty, necessity, desira-
bility, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of 
the United States or the government of any State ... by force or 
violence," was made a federal crime, punishable by a fine of up to 
$10,000 or imprisonment up to ten years, or both.861 A Smith Act 
868[/Jid. 
uo !d. at 67. 
8ao Supra note 323. 
861 §I, 18 U.S.C.A. §2385. 
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indictment could be initiated only by federal officers acting in their 
official capacity. In addition to the Smith Act Congress had enacted 
several other laws to meet the Communist conspiracy. The Internal 
Security Act of 1950 required annual registration and reporting by 
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations, and the 
Communist Control Act of 1954 declared the Communist Party of the 
United States to be an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the 
government of the United States and that its role as an agency of a 
hostile foreign power rendered its existence a clear, present, and continu-
ing danger to natural security. Knowing members of the Communist 
Party were made subject to certain provisions and penalties of the 
Internal Security Act. It should be mentioned that, after his conviction 
in the state court, Nelson had been indicted, convicted, and sentenced in 
a federal district court for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act.362 "The 
acts proven in the Federal Court to effectuate the alleged conspiracy 
consisted of practically the same matter as was offered against Nelson 
in the trial in the State Court." 863 On review the Supreme Court. 
affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which had 
reversed the conviction, on the ground that federal law pre-empted the 
field. 
The Supreme Court's analysis of the pre-emption problem in this 
case is significantly different from that employed in the Hines case and 
other cases discussed above. The court's language appears to establish 
much more precise and strict criteria of federal pre-emption than had 
been applied in earlier cases. Before examining these tests of federal 
pre-emption, however, a word or two is necessary to indicate the limits 
of the decision. It is to be noted that Nelson was convicted under state 
law for knowingly advocating the overthrow of the federal government. 
No evidence was offered to show that he had committed any seditious 
acts directed against the state or local governments. In view of these 
facts the Chief Justice in his prefatory remarks carefully pointed out 
that: 
... [The decision in this case does not] limit the right of 
the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or 
attempted violence of all kinds. Nor does it prevent the state 
from prosecuting where the same act constitutes both a federal 
offense and a state offense under the police power. 364 
362 United States v. Mesarosh (Nelson}, u6 F. Supp. 345 (1953), aff'd 223 F.zd 
449 (1955), cert. granted 350 U.S. 922, 76 S. Ct. 218 (1955). 
s63 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 71, 104 A.zd 133 (1954). 
864 Supra note 323 at 500. 
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In other words, the holding that the state could not make criminal an 
act intended to further the overthrow of the federal government when 
federal law proscribed that act was not intended by the court to mean 
that the state was prevented from protecting itself from the same act if 
it was actually directed against the state as well, even though the Smith 
Act also made it a federal crime to attempt the violent overthrow of 
state governments. 
In the Nelson case the court appears to have taken the three factors 
discussed in the Hines case and made .separate and self-sufficient tests 
for pre-emption of each. The court said: 
In this case, we think that each of several tests of supersession 
is met. 
First, "the scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive 
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the St4tes to supplement it" ... 885 
Second, the federal statutes "touch a field in which the fed-
eral interest is so domina,nt that the federal system [must] be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws of the same 
subject" · ... 888 
. Third, enforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious 
danger of conflict with the administration of the federal 
program. 887 
To find the pervasive scheme of federal regulation, upon which an 
app~rently conclusive presumption of pre-emptive congressional intent 
wa~ based, the court examined the combined scope of the Smith Act, the 
Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of 1954. 
Apparently, where federal laws are in pari materia, the Supreme Court 
may find a pre-emptive effect in the earlier law by virtue of later enact-
ments establishing regulation in. tl:te general field if the consecutive 
increments add up to "pervasiveness." Having found in these three 
federal statutes " ... a congressional plan which [made] it rea.sonable 
to determine that no room [had] been left for the States to supple-
ment it," 888 the court quoted the familiar phrase of the Varnville case 
to conclude that coincidence was as ineffective as opposition. On its 
facts this case does not differ from others in which federal pre-emption 
has been found for the court did find conflict with federal law or 
impairment of its administration. It does appear to depart from the 
earlier cases, however, in the conclusively pre-emptive effect which the 
aor. Jd. at 502. 
see I d. at 504· 
ser I d. at sos. 
se8 I d. at 504-
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court assigns to pervasiveness of the federal scheme alone. While the 
congressional plan considered in this case is no more pervasive than 
that established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it likewise is no 
more pervasive than the system of laws under which the NLRB or the 
ICC operate. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that the court, in a sitn-
ation where its second and third tests are not met, would prohibit state 
action simply because Congress has been very active in the field. 
As authority for the second test applied in the Nelson case the court 
cited Hines v. Davidowitz. In that case, however, the dominant national 
interest in the subject of federal regulation was emphasized to support 
the proposition that .the states could not regulate the subject inconsist-
ently with the purposes and objectives of Congress. The mere fact that 
the federal interest was dominant did not inevitably lead to a conclusion 
of pre-emption, absent conflict. In any event, the very terms of this test 
limit its application to matters affecting national sovereignty or, at the 
least, to matters which require uniform national standards. To modify 
the court's own phrase, it would be difficult to imagine the court saying, 
"Congress having thus treated . . . [the radiation ha~rd] as a matter 
of vital national concern, it is in no sense a local enforcement 
problem." 86•9 
In the third test applied by the court in the Nelson case there is found 
the one clear case for implied federal pre-emption-that based on actual 
or possible conflict. On the facts of this case there was a serious danger 
of conflict between the enforcement of the state sedition act and the ad-
ministration of the federal program. In 1939 the federal government 
had asked local authorities not to intervene in matters of national secu-
rity and to turn over in formation regarding subversive activities immedi-
ately and unevaluated. It was recognized that the threat of subversion 
must be met on a coordinated, nationwide basis and not as isolated inci-
dents within the states. For purposes of broader strategy the federal 
government might not want to prosecute ·certain individuals in the hope 
of catching a larger group spread over a number of states. The laws of 
forty-two states on this subject were examined, and some of them were 
found to be vague and without fundamental safeguards. Moreover, 
the Pennsylvania statute was said to present a peculiar danger of inter-
ference in that it allowed initiation of indictment on the information of 
a private person, thereby presenting the opportunity for the indulgence 
of personal spite and hatred. The court concluded that Congress, which 
had provided other means for the initiation of an indictment, could not 
have intended the defense of the nation to be a private undertaking. 
ses I d. at sos. 
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It is difficult to ascertain the full import of the Nelson decision for 
the future, and it has been severely criticized by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 870 If the court intends to apply the "pervasive federal 
scheme" test of pre-emption in the manner indicated by Chief Justice 
Warren's language, little remains to the states in a large number of 
regulatory areas, including health and safety regulation of atomic 
energy activities. In view of the limitations recognized by the court in 
Nelson and the enormous difficulties which would attend such a result, 
however, it seems unlikely that the court will apply such a deceivingly 
simple rule of construction where the issue is almost always very com-
plex without a showing of actual or possible conflict between federal 
and state law. 
( ii) Vehicle Weight Regulation Cases 
The last three cases to be considered are treated separately from the 
health and safety regulation. cases because, while the federal acts or 
standards concerned health and safety, the state laws were concerned 
primarily with the conservation of state highways. In South Carolina 
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. 811 the Supreme Court held that, in. 
the absence of national legislation covering the subject in its relation 
to interstate commerce, a state might adopt regulations limiting the 
weight and width of vehicles that used its highways in order to conserve 
them and promote safety thereon if those regulations did not discrimi-
nate against interstate motor carriers. No question of federal pre-
emption as a result of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was 
raised, but in Maurer v. Hamilton 872 the interstate motor carrier ap-
pealed on the ground that the act impliedly pre-empted regulation of 
these matters by delegating such power to the ICC. For purposes of 
this study the case is chiefly interesting for the light it casts upon the 
question of whether or not Congress constitutionally can pre-empt 
regulation of a matter where the state has a proprietary interest and the 
effect of federal action is to deny to the state the power to conserve its 
870 The Nelson decision has inspired a number of bills in Congress which seek to 
disavow the congressional intent ascribed by the Supreme Court in connection with 
the Smith Act. Furthermore, many of these proposals would go so far as to prohibit 
the court from finding implied pre-emptive effect in any federal legislation (past, 
present, or future) unless such a result is expressly declared by Congress. At the 
urging of the Justice Department the Senate Judiciary Committee has been persuaded 
to omit the general pre-emption proposal. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1958, p. I, col. 3· 
871 303 u.s. 177, s8 s. Ct. sw (1938). 
s12 309 u.s. s98. 6o s. Ct. 726 (1940). 
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property by such regulations as it feels to be necessary. Unfortunately 
for our purposes the court avoided answering this question by finding 
that Congress had not intended to pre-empt although it did acknowledge 
th~ existence of the problem. One of the reasons for concluding that 
pre-emption was not intended, however, was that in testifying at the 
hearing on the act before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 
an official had expressed the ICC's doubts as to the power of Congress 
to authorize it to establish a minimum weight standard, below which the 
states could not go, in view of the states' ownership of highways and 
their interests in conserving them. 
In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines 373 a somewhat different question 
was presented to the court. The issue was whether Ilinois might bar an 
interstate motor carrier from using state roads for a specified time as 
punishment for repeated violations of state highway weight regulations. 
The respondent held a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by 
the ICC under authority of the Motor Carrier Act. While it had been 
determined earlier by the court that a state's regulation of weights and 
distribution of loads carried on interstate trucks did not conflict with the 
federal act, it was decided in the Castle case that no power remained 
in the states to determine what carriers could or could not operate in 
interstate commerce. The Motor Carrier Act authorized the ICC to 
revoke, suspend, or modify a certificate of convenience and necessity, 
but only after a hearing and finding that the carrier had willfully failed 
to comply with the provisions of the act or regulations promulgated 
under it. Presumably, the ICC could also do this for repeated violations 
of state laws. "Under these circumstances," the court said, "it would 
be odd if a state could take action amounting to a suspension or revoca-
tion of an interstate carrier's commission-granted right to operate." 874 
In response to the claim that without the power of suspension the state 
was without appropriate remedies to enforce its laws, the court said that 
the conventional forms of punishment appeared adequate. Furthermore, 
the state might petition the ICC for appropriate action regarding the 
carrier's right to operate. 
c. The Nature and Scope of the Federal Health and Safety 
Program 
The cases examined above make it clear that, in considering the pre-
emptive effect of federal legislation, the Supreme Court looks to the 
373 348 u.s. 61, 75 s. Ct. 191 (1954). 
814 /d. at 64. 
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purpose, nature, and scope of federal regulation to determine if there is 
any room left for state action and, if so, wh~ther the state action is 
within the limits indicated. It is necessary first, therefore, to consider 
briefly the salient features of the radiation health and safety provisions 
of the I954 act and the regulatory scheme adopted pursuant to them. 
In creating the AEC, Congress has established a federal agency with 
broad administrative, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative powers, among 
others, to promote, implement, and control the development and utiliza-
tion of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent con-
sistent with public health and safety. Congress obviously felt that, under 
the circumstances, federal regulation of health and safety matters 
generally was a necessary adjunct to the national atomic energy pro-
gram. In response to this necessity Congress directed the Commission 
to take certain steps to protect health and safety and authorized the 
Commission to undertake others. For purposes of analyzing the pre-
emption question this program must be separated into its two principal 
phases : (I) precautions taken to assure safety before operation of a 
radiation source or· commencement ·of an atomic energy activity; and 
( 2) measures taken to assure safety after construction or installation 
and during operation or use. Generally speaking, the Commission has 
been directed to provide the first type of precaution and authorized to 
provide the second. Also, with· respect to the fiTst type of precaution, 
the Commission has fashioned its standatdsto the requirements. of each 
proposed activity. or installation, whereas· the regnlations :providing fO"r 
operating safety are of a more general clia:racter; applying to all licensees 
or classes of licensees. There is, perhaps, some justifieation for finding 
a third distinction within the· federal health and safety program which 
may- prove significant. Congress has manifested greater concern as to 
the hazards associated with production and utilization facilities, where 
critical masses of special nuclear m:ateri"al are present; than in the case 
of hazards arising out of the use of byproduct materials. 
(I) Federal Precautions Preceding,Operation 
To. protect health and insure safety Congress has. "authorized" the 
Commission to issue licenses for speci;:tl nuclear material, source ma-
terial, byproduct material, production and utilization facilities, and 
facility operators. 876 The use of the term "authorized" is misleading, 
however, for the act definitely contemplates the pursuit of atomic energy 
875 §§53a, 63a, 81, 103, 104. 107,42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(a),·209J(a),~ln,·2IJJ!.2IJ4, 
2137· 
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activities by private persons for their own purposes, and such activities 
are declared unlawful unless a license has been issued.376 With minor 
exceptions, therefore, the net effect of the licensing provisions of the 
1954 act is to direct the Commission to license any non-federally owned 
or conducted atomic energy activity if the Commission decides to allow 
the activity at all. Furthermore, the act provides that" ... the Com-
mission shall establish, by rule, minimum criteria for the issuance ... " 
of source and special nuclear material licenses" ... depending upon the 
degree of importance . . . to the health and safety of the public," 877 
and "shall not permit the distribution of any byproduct material to any 
licensee . . . who is not equipped to observe . . . such safety stand-
ards to protect health as may be established by the Commission.'' 878 In 
respect to commercial or research and development licenses to operate 
production or utilization facilities, " ... no license may be issued to any 
person in the United States, if in the opinion of the Commission, the 
issuance of a license to such person would be inimical . . . to the 
health and safety of the public." 379 Both commercial facility and re-
search and development facility licenses have received special congres-
sional attention. The Price-Anderson amendment of 1957 gave statu-
tory status to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The 
Committee is directed to " ... review safety studies and facility li-
cense applications referred to it and . . . make reports thereon, . . . 
advise the Commission with regard to the hazards of proposed reactor 
safety standards, and ... perform such other duties as the Commis-
sion may request." 880 The preferred status of research and develop-
ment facility licenses, as opposed to commercial facility licenses, is 
illustrated in a provision which directs the Commission" ... to impose 
the minimum amount of regulation consistent with its obligations under 
[the] Act ... to protect the health and safety of the public." 381 In 
connection with license applications generally, the Commission may re-
quire the applicant to furnish such information as it deems necessary to 
determine " ... the technical and financial qualifications of the appli-
cant, the character of the applicant, the citizenship of the applicant, or 
any other qualification of the applicant . . . [deemed] appropriate for 
the license." 882 In addition, applicants for facility licenses must ". 
876 §§57a, 62, 81, 101, 42 _U.S.C.A. §§207(a}, 2092, 2111, 2131. 
877 §§53b, 63b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(b}, 2093(b}. 
878 §81, 42 U.S.C.A. §2111. 
879 §103d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2133d. 
88° Pub. L. 85-256, §s, Ssth Cong., 1st Sess., 42 U.S.C.A. §2039. 
a8t §104, 42 U.S.C.A. §21J4. 
382 §182a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(a). 
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state such technical specifications, including information of the amount, 
kind, and source of special nuclear material required, the place of use, 
the specific characteristics of the facility, and such other information as 
the Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to 
enable it to find that the utilization or production of special nuclear ma-
terial ... will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of 
the public. Such technical specifications . . . shall . . . be a part of 
any license issued." 883 
The above mentioned provisions of the act make it obvious that Con-
gress has charged the Commission with the responsibility of making as 
certain as is reasonably possible that each proposed private atomic energy 
activity, especially a production or utilization facility, will not be inimical 
to the public health and safety before the activity commences or the 
facility goes into operation. In response to these directives, the Com-
mission has promulgated regulations prescribing general licensing stand-
ards.884 These regulations do not attempt to spell out specific safety cri-
teria. Instead, the burden is on the applicant to prove safety to the Com-
mission's satisfaction. Basically, the licensing regulations require each 
applicant to furnish information that will enable the Commission to de-
termine that ( 1 ) the applicant, or his employees, are qualified by training 
and experience to use the material or facility for the purposes requested 
in accordance with the Commission's "Standards for Protection Against 
Radiation" ; 885 ( 2) the applicant's proposed equipment and facilities are 
adequate to protect health arrd minimize danger to life or property; and 
(3) the applicant's proposed procedures to protect health and minimize 
danger to life or property are adequate. 
In licensing of production and utilization facilities the Commission is 
especially painstaking. Prior to submission of the application informal 
discussions may be held to outline the broad objectives of reactor hazards 
analysis. A preliminary hazard report accompanies the application. This 
report must be submitted by the Commission to the Advisory Committee 
on Reactor Safeguards where the application is for a commercial facility, 
for one leading to the demonstration of the practical value of such a 
facility for industrial or commercial purposes, or for a testing facility. 888 
Before issuance of a construction permit, the Commission must have 
sufficient information to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of 
the general type proposed can be constructed and operated safely at the 
888 Ibid. 
884 ro Code Fed. Regs. Pts. 30, 40, so, 55, 70. 
885 ro Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20. 
s8e Pub. L. 85-256, §6, 8sth Cong., rst Sess., 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(b). 
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proposed location. From the time the construction permit is issued until 
initial operation, inspectors from the AEC's Division of Inspection are 
supposed to observe details of construction, tests of equipment, and pre-
operational integrated test runs. If, after completion of construction and 
review of the final hazards summary report, including the statement of 
proposed operating procedures, and only if the Commission finds the 
facility can operate safely, the construction permit may be converted into 
an operating license under such safety restrictions as the Commission 
deems necessary.387 
Ultimately, the Commission hopes to develop detailed standards, 
codes, and regulations for facilities, but, while the industry remains in 
its developmental stage, the Commission feels it undesirable to do so.388 
Under the present procedure, when a license is issued by the Commis-
sion, it amounts to a federal determination that the qualifications of the 
particular licensee, his equipment and facilities and their location, and 
his operating procedures offer assurance of radiation safety. 
(2) Federal Measures to Assure Safety During Oper-
ation 
The 1954 act does not contain any express directives to the Commis-
sion as to how it is to carry out its health and safety program once a 
license has been issued. In fact, the act does not even state that it must 
do so, although there is the implication throughout the whole act that 
Congress expects as much. If the duty is n~t clear, however, the author-
ity is, for Section 161 provides: 
In the performance of its functions the Commission is au-
thorized to--
b. establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards 
and instructions to govern the possession and use of special 
nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as 
the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote 
the common defense and security or to protect health or to 
minimize danger to life or property: 
i. prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem 
necessary ... (3) to ·govern any activity authorized pur-
387 AEC, Twenty-first Semi-Annual Report 120-125 (1957). Under §1700 of the 
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §22100, as added by Pub. L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess., financial protection may be required for the issuance of licenses for research 
reactors under §104c. Applications for licenses for research reactors under 104c are 
not required to be submitted to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for 
review unless so specified by the Commission. §182b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232b. 
388 AEC, Twenty-first Semi-Annual Report 121-122 (1957). 
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suant to this Act, including standards and restrictions govern-
ing the design, location, and operation of facilities used in the 
conduct of such activity, in order to protect health and to mini-
mize danger to life or property. 
p. require by rule, regulation, or order, .;uch reports, and 
the keeping of such records with respect to, and to provide for 
such inspections of, activities and studies of types specified 
in section 3 I and of activities under licenses issued pursuant 
to sections 53, 63, 81, 103, and 104, as may be necessary to 
effectuate the purposes of this Act .... 889 
This language makes it clear that the Commission has broad authority 
to prescribe operating standards and procedures, to require the keeping 
of records and the submission of reports pertinent to health and safety, 
and to inspect licensed activities and facilities. 
Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has issued performance 
type regulations on "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," 890 
which apply to all persons who receive, possess, use, or transfer source, 
byproduct, or special nuclear material under a general or specific license 
from the Commission. The regulations prescribe maximum permissible 
limits of radiation for persons in "restricted areas" (an area access to 
which is controlled. by the licensee) and "unrestricted areas." Also 
included are provisions for personnel monitoring and area radiation 
surveys, protective devices, records and reports, radiation safety instruc-
tion, safe handling of radioactive materials, caution signs and signals, 
and disposal of radioactive wastes. 
While the basic responsibility for safety. of operation is upon the 
licensees themselves, all licensees, from those operating major facilities 
to those using compa.ratively small quantities of byproduct materials, are 
subject to periodic inspections to assure compliance with regulatory 
standards and the terms and conditions of the licenses. Users of ura· 
nium, thorium, and byproduct materials are inspected by personnel of 
the inspection sections of the Commission's Operations Offices. Inspec· 
tion of licensed production and utilization facilities, however, is made 
by the Division of Inspection in Washington. 891 
(3) Enforcement of Federal Safety Standards 
The 1954 act contains a number of provisions specifying the manner 
in which its provisions and Commission regulations shall be enforced. 
ss9 §161, 42 U.S.C.A. §2201. 
89o 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20. 
ao1 AEC Rei. No. 1018, April 4, 1957. 
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The most obvious enforcement mechanism is the Commission's authority 
(and in some cases, duty) to deny, suspend, and.revoke licenses. The 
Commission may revoke a license (I) "for any materia~ false statement 
in the application," ( 2) for any reason that would have justified refusal 
to issue a license originally, (3) "for failure to construct or operate a 
facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or 
license or the technical specifications in the application," or (4) "for 
violation of, or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of 
[the] Act or of any regulation of the Commission." 892 Furthermore, 
upon revoqttion of the license, the Commission may take possession of 
all special nuclear material held by the licensee. 893 While the act does 
not declare byproduct material to be subject to recapture or seizure, this 
is implied since it does provide that : 
The Commission . . . shall recall or order the recall of any 
distributed [byproduct] material from any licensee, who is not 
equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety stand-
ards to protect health as may be established by the Commis-
• 8114 ston .... 
Apparently, this also is a condition of the byproduct material license.895 
Acts and practices which, in the judgment of the Commission, consti-
tute or will constitute a violation of the act or any regulation or order 
of the Commission may be enjoined by an appropriate court on the 
petition of the Attorney General,898 and severe criminal punishment may 
be imposed upon persons who wilfully violate, attempt to violate, or 
conspire to violate, any provision of the act or any regulation or order 
issued by the Commission under its general authority.897 
It is readily apparent that the federal program to protect health and 
maintain safety in connection with atomic energy activities is as com-
prehensive and pervasive as any confronting the Supreme Court in the 
cases considered earlier. What power, then, do the states retain to regu-
late atomic energy activities with r"espect to health and safety? 
892 §186a, 42 U.S.C.A. §22J()(a). 
893 §186c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2236(c). 
894 §81, 42 U.S.C.A. §2n1. Under this section, the Commission has acted to suspend 
or revoke licenses in two instances involving a Texas company. See "Temporary Order 
and Order to Show Cause," 23 Fed. Reg. noo (Feb. 19. 1958), BN A, Atonnc In-
dustry Reporter 4: 6o-61 ; Radiation Products Company, 23 Fed. Reg. 2817 (April. 26, 
1958). The actions of the Commission in these cases are discussed infra at Part IV, 
note 455. 
395 10 Code Fed. Regs. §30.52. 
896 §232, 42 U.S.C.A. §2~. 
a9r §§222, 223, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2272, 2273. 
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d. Permissible Limits of State Action 
The writers believe that the above question cannot be answered cate-
gorically. Because the solution appears to lie in determining what Con-
gress impliedly intended to pre-empt, we submit that the Supreme Court 
probably will apply those principles of statutory construction which will 
effect a result in the particular case which is most nearly consistent with 
the objectives of the 1954 act and with the regulatory scheme adopted 
under it. In reality there is not one pre-emption question but many-as 
many as there are types of state health and safety actions affecting 
federally regulated atomic energy activities. Each of these questions 
can only be answered by considering the particular .state action in 
relation to the system of federal law and administrativ~ action as well 
as the nature of the matter regulated. 
(I) State Regulation of Radiation Hazards Not Cov-
ered by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
The scope of the 1954 act and the Commission's health and safety 
progt;am is limited to activities involving "byproduct material," "source 
material," "special nuclear material," "production facilities," and "utili-
zation facilities," as these terms are defined in the act.898 Other sources 
of radiation, such as X-ray and fluoroscopic devices used in medicine, 
dentistry, and science generally, as well as in commerce and industry, 
are not controlled by the federal government regardless of whether or 
not they affect interstate and foreign commerce. Also not covered by 
the 1954 act are atomic particle accelerators, naturally occurring radio-
isotopes (other than sour~e materials), and isotopes made radioactive by 
processes· other than exposure to radiation in utilization or production 
facilities. Since these sources of radiation fall outside the scope of 
federal regulation established by the 1954 act, it follows that no limit 
upon the exercise of the state police power to regulate them is implied. 
We have seen in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board,899 Interna-
tional Union, United· Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board/00 
Reid v. Colorado,"01 Savage v. Jones/02 Mintz v. Ballhuin/08 and Kelly 
v. Washington/04 that, where federal law leaves some matters in a gen-
8os §u, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014 
899 Supra note 301. 
400 Supra note 303. 
401 Supra note 331. 
40 2 Supra note 332. 
403 Supra note 333· 
404 Supra note 336. 
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era! field (i.e., radiation health and safety regulation) unregulated, a 
policy of indifference to state action is indicated, and the state may act 
if its action does not otherwise constitute an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress or 
unduly interfere with interstate commerce. 
(2) State Regulation of Non-Radiation Health and 
Safety Hazards Connected with Federally Licensed 
Activities 
Congress has said, "The .processing and utili~tion of source, by-
product, and special nuclear material .must be regulated . . . to protect 
the health and safety of the public." 405 In its repeated references to 
the "health and safety of the public" Congress has not expressly limited 
the meaning of this term to radiation health and safety .. Obvio1;1sly, 
non-radiation hazards may be involved in many of the activi~ies and 
facilities licensed by the Commission. Does the "special competence" of 
the Commission described by Senator Anderson,406 and to which the 
Commission's functions are limited, extend this far? It should not be 
asserted seriously that the use of a radioactive thickness gauge would 
give the Commission the power to regulate, for example, the entire proc-
ess of rolling steel or manufacturing tires in the interests of public 
health and safety. In contrast, however, it is somewhat more plausible 
to say that the Commission has the power to control all the health and 
safety features of a production or utilization facility for the reason that 
in such a facility nearly all the features ultimately relate to some matter 
affecting radiation health and safety. In view of the legislative history 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Congress was concerned only 
with the uniquely hazardous characteristics of the specified materials 
and facilities. 
In any event, since the Commission has not construed its responsi-
bility to extend beyond radiation hazards, the question is largely aca-
demic. Cases such as Welch v. New Hampshire,401 Buck v. California/08 
and Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen 409 indicate that the states may act to 
control matters within the scope of a broad and inclusive federal statute 
which delegates to a federal agency the power to determine specific 
405 §2d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(d). 
406 Supra note 2&;. 
401 Supra note 339· 
408 Supra note 341. 
409 Supra note 343· 
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application, if the federal agency has not exercised its powers with re-
spect to the particular subject of state action, unless the federal agency 
believes the action to be unnecessary. It scarcely could be claimed that 
the Commission's failure to prescribe standards for non-radiation haz-
ards associated with licensed activities is tantamount to the decision that 
such hazards need not be regulated. Therefore, whether the AEC does 
or does not have the power to regulate non-radiation hazards associated 
with licensed activities, we may fairly conclude that the state and local 
governments may require licensees to comply with laws and regulations 
pertaining to electrical wiring, plumbing and sanitation, structural de-
sign and materials, fire prevention and equipment, elevator design and 
safety features, ventilation, safety features on non-radiation machinery 
and equipment, and other matters not directly related to radiation safety. 
Quite obviously some of these state and local laws could apply to 
objects for which the AEC has provided standards and specifications in 
the construction permit or license. The Commission may require, for 
example, the installation of a particular type of removable floor-covering 
material in places where there is a possibility of radioactive material 
spillage. Local building codes and industrial safety codes also may con-
tain specifications for floors in similar establishments. The building 
code may require floor joists of specified minimum dimensions, a speci-
fied distance apart, and flooring material of a particular thickness and 
strength. The industrial safety code may require the installation of a 
relatively permanent "non-skid" floor-surfacing material. · Despite the 
fact that they pertain to the same general object, no conflict would exist 
between the federal requirement and the building code specifications 
since they are intended to serve different purposes; and imposition of 
the· local requirement often will not prevent or hinder compliance with 
the Commission's specification. However, in some situations it is con-
ceivable that, even though the purpose of the state industrial safety re-
quirement is different from that of the AEC's regulations, the state 
requirements may constitute an obstacle to compliance with the federal 
safety feature. Cases such as Hill v. Florida,410 Automobile Workers 
v. O'Brien,m and Erie R.R. Co. v. New York m indicate that in such a 
situation the state industrial code requirement may not be imposed on 
the licensed installation. Other cases, such as Allen-Bradley Local v. 
Wisconsin Board,m International Union, United Automobile Workers 
uo Supra note 283. 
411 Supra note 286. 
n2 Supra note 318. 
413 Supra note 301. 
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v. Wisconsin Board,414 Reid v. Colorado,415 Savage v. Jones,416 Mintz v. 
Baldwin,411 Kelly v. Washington/ 18 Welsh v. New Hampshire,419 Buck 
v. California/20 and Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen,421 however, suggest 
that in this situation the federal pre-emption would be only partial. For 
example, the state still may require the installation of "non-skid" floor-
surfacing material to prevent slippage, if it is easily removable in the 
event of spillage, and otherwise meets the Commission specifications. 
The general position here asserted is that the states may specify design 
features, specifications, materials, and other safety features aimed at 
non-radiation hazards, even though they affect objects touched by fed-
eral specifications, if the state requirements do not prevent the licensee 
from complying with Commission requirements or make it unreasonably 
difficult to do so. In this sense, we believe that the state or local govern-
ment may require the submission of installation plans and specifications 
to an appropriate official and insist upon the issuance of a building per-
mit before construction. In similar fashion, the issuance of an AEC 
license to use byproduct materials for purposes of medical therapy 
would not excuse the physician from obtaining a state license to practice 
medicine. 
Since the only health and safety determination made by the Com-
mission at the present time is that a particular production or utiliza-
tion facility is radiologically safe for a proposed site, it seems entirely 
probable that the Supreme Court would not deny to the states, or local 
governments, the power to exclude the facility from the particular loca-
tion altogether, if the reason for doing so is not related to radiation 
health and safety and the facility is not owned by the federal govern-
ment. While the case is not likely to arise, inasmuch as the AEC has 
indicated that it would respect local zoning ordinances concerning mat-
ters other than radiation protection,422 the holder of a facility construc-
tion permit from the Commission could be prohibited by a state from 
4 H Supra note 303. 
415 Supra note 331. 
416 Supra note 332· 
417 Supra note 333· 
418 Supra note 316. 
419 Supra note 339· 
420 Supra note 341. 
421 Supra note 343. 
4 22 In the analysis accompanying the proposed amendment to the 1954 act which 
Chairman Strauss sent to Rep. Carl T. Durham in June of 1957, it was admitted that 
" ... the states have respons~bilities for zoning and use of water resources by industrial 
facilities." Supra note 271. 
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building in an area zoned against commercial and industrial establish-
ments. The issuance of a construction permit indicates no more than 
the fact, as determined by the Commission, that there is reasonable 
assurance of radiation safety. The issuance does not suggest that the 
Commission has determined that operation of the facility in the particu-
lar location will not affect the health and safety of the public in some 
other objectionable manner, such as by substantially increasing truck 
traffic on residential streets. The conclusion is not applicable, however, 
to establishment of such facilities owned by and operated for the fed-
eral government for its own purposes. Likewise, if the zoning ordi-
nance discriminates against production and utilization facilities, how-
ever, it falls within the scope of the federal health and safety program 
and different principles of pre-emption apply. This situation is dis-
cussed below. 
(3) State Regulation of Radiation Hazards Covered by 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
When the state undertakes radiation health and safety regulation of 
persons, materials, devices, facilities, and activities licensed or other-
wise regulated by the AEC, it clearly is acting within the scope of a 
general and all-inclusive federal statute which imposes certain regula-
tory duties and bestows even broader powers upon a federal agency. 
Furthermore, the AEC has issued comprehensive· radiation safety 
standards, by regulation or order, covering the subject of radiation 
health and safety. Nevertheless, we believe that some state regulation 
of radiation hazards remains permissible. 
(a) State Precautions Preceding Operation 
Essentially radiation health and safety precautions preceding opera-
tion, as indicated earlier, may be reduced to three official determinations 
by the AEC : ( I ) that the persons in charge of the atomic energy ac-
tivity are qualified to operate safely; ( 2) that their proposed operating 
and accident procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life 
and property are adequate; and ( 3) that the nuclear materials, devices, 
and facilities will be so disposed, designed, installed, constructed, and 
used as not to endanger life, health, or property. Each of these de-
terminations is associated with the federal program of licensing. Obvi-
ously, they are not absolute determinations. They are no more than 
scientifically informed predictions which are translated into installation 
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designs, specifications, and operating procedures. Starting with em-
pirically determined safe radiation dosage levels (which are largely pre-
dictions themselves and none too certain at this time), the engineer 
and the scientist attempt to incorporate those design features and ma-
terials into the radiation device or facility that will keep exposures of 
persons below the acceptable levels. The complexities of the situation 
are such that, at the existing level of the art or science, safety cannot 
be guaranteed. Every atomic energy activity involves a calculated risk, 
and approval for licensing merely indicates that the risks have been 
reduced to an acceptable percentage. 
There are a number of features of the federal licensing program 
which indicate that it probably will be found to have pre-empted the 
field, thus precluding a parallel state licensing program. Among these 
are the following : 
First. The federal licensing scheme to control the development and 
utilization of atomic energy, as established by Congress and implemented 
by the AEC, is extraordinarily pervasive, probably more pervasive than 
any regulatory scheme considered by the Supreme Court in analogous 
cases discussed above. Furthermore, the Commission's licensing sys-
tem is but a pari of an intensive program to promote the public and 
private development and utilization of atomic energy. The tendency of 
the court to regard the feature of "pervasiveness" as one manifestation 
of implied pre-emptive intent is illustrated in Bethlehem Steel v. State 
Board,428 La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board/24 Garner v. 
Teatmsters Union,425 Weber v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc./26 Oregon-Wash-
ington Co. v. Washington,421 Penn. R.R. Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,428 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line,429 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patter-
son,430 Hines v. Davidowitz/31 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson. 482 It is also 
significant that quite recently Congress has made the federal system of 
licensing production and utilization facilities even more pervasive than 
it was originally by giving statutory standing to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards!33 
423 Supra note 278. 
424 Supra note 291. 
425 Supra note 292. 
426 Supra note 293. 
4 2 7 Supra note 320. 
428 Supra note 325. 
429 Supra note 326. 
430 Supra note 327. 
431 Supra note 278. 
432 Supra note 323· 
433 Supra note JBo. 
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Second. By forbidding all non-federal atomic energy activities unless 
carried on under a Commission license and by authorizing the Commis-
sion to issue appropriate licenses, Congress, in effect, has directed the 
AEC to establish and administer a comprehensive licensing program. 
Automobile Workers v. Russel/,'34 Oregon-Washington Co. v. Wash-
ington, 435 and Welch v. New Hampshire 486 suggest that the Supreme 
Court finds stronger indication of pre-emptive intent in areas where 
Congress has directed a federal agency to act than in those where the 
agency is merely authorized to act. 
Third. The Commission has been directed to establish minimum cri-
teria for the issuance of source and special nuclear material licenses. 
These criteria are to be based, in part, upon considerations of public 
health and safety. Moreover, in connection with research and develop-
ment facility licenses, as opposed to commercial facility licenses, the 
1954 act directs the Commission to impose the minimum amount of 
regulation consistent with public health and safety. The context rather 
clearly suggests that, in the interest of promoting the study, develop-
ment, and utilization of atomic energy, Congress has cautioned the Com-
mission to avoid burdening the science and development of the industry 
with any requirements except those essential to public health and safety. 
Lest any essential requirements be overlooked, however, all· commercial, 
research and development, and testing facility applications must be re-
ferred to, reviewed by, and publicly reported on by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards. It seems evident, therefore, that any 
state licensing requirement which imposes a higher radiation safety 
standard than that which the Commission finds consistent with public 
health and safety would necessarily conflict with congressional policy as 
expressed in the 1954 act. In Hill v. Florida 431 a state licensing require-
ment, together with license qualifications which Congress had not 
thought it necessary to impose, were found to be in conflict with con-
gressional policy encouraging collective bargaining and thus invalid. 
Similarly, in Automobile Workers v. O'Brien 488 state imposed condi-
tions on the doing of an act allowed by a federal law which imposed 
less stringent conditions than those of the state were found to be 
pre-empted. 
Fourth. The 1954 act clearly reflects the realization by Congress that 
484 Supra note 282. 
435 Supra note 320. 
436 Supra note 339· 
437 Supra note 283. 
488 Supra note 286. 
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standard safety designs and specifications were not feasible at the time 
the act was passed. Therefore, while Congress directed that a licens-
ing program be established and that steps be taken to assure safety be-
fore operation, it left the details of this program to the informed discre-
tion of a federal agency it had created largely for the purpose. This is 
re-emphasized in the Price-Anderson amendment which raises the Ad-
visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to statutory status and pro-
vides for review by the ACRS of each facility license application. It 
scarcely need be mentioned that the Commission is far better qualified 
to establish and administer the essentials of a licensing program than 
any comparable state agency. Subsequent Commission action and the 
close attention it gives to each license application indicate· that the sort 
of standardized safety specifications which can be applied in a compara-
tively automatic or mechanical fashion are still a development of the 
future. In this type of atomic energy regulation, expert judgment is 
especially imperative. The AEC has even indicated in its proposed 
amendment to the 1954 act that an exclusive system of federal licensing 
is desirable.439 These facts may well lead the Supreme Court to conclude 
that the policy of Congress and the AEC is to maintain the sort of 
flexibility which centralized administration makes possible so as to en-
courage experimentation and variation in the part of licensees in the 
hope of obtaining both greater economy and safety. This does not ap-
pear to be the time, for example, for the state to specify the precise 
amount, design, and type of shielding material that is necessary to 
operate a nuclear reactor or other atomic energy device, and it is doubt-
ful that Congress intended the almost inevitable frustration of its poli-
cies by such state licensing specifications. The La Crosse Telephone 
case 440 suggests that the Supreme Court will find implied congressional 
intent to pre-empt any state act, the effect of which is to standardize 
matters left to the discretion of the AEC where the Commission has 
indicated flexibility and variation is desirable to effectuate the purposes 
of the act. 
Fifth. The AEC is exercising the full measure of its licensing power, 
and where it has exempted certain classes or quantities of byproduct and 
source material, or kinds of uses or users, from the requirements of a 
"specific" license, it has done so after a finding that no unreasonable 
risk to the health and safety of the public will result. Insofar as radia-
tion hazards are concerned, there do not appear to be any gaps in the 
439 Supra note 272. 
Ho Supra note 291. 
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Commission's licensing program. Those matters which are not covered 
by general radiation health and safety standards are covered by more 
detailed and individually tailored specifications in the license itself. Not 
only does the Commission study the proposed atomic installation itself 
and the radiation safety precautions within it, but it also gives due con-
sideration to all of the local geographic (i.e., population density, etc.), 
geologic, and meteorologic features as well. In short, when the license 
is issued, the Commission, pursuant to congressional directive, has de-
termined that the particular licensee is qualified to construct and operate 
a particular atomic energy installation in a specified location, for speci-
fied purposes, and in a specified manner. We have seen in Penn. R.R. 
Co:v. Public Service Commission and Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 441 
that the implication of pre-emptive intent becomes quite strong when 
the authorized federal agency has effectively exercised its power by es-
tablishing comprehensive and detailed safety standards. 
Sixth. That there is real efficacy and feasibility in an exclusive fed-
eral licensing program, at least at the present time, is especially seen in 
the case of an atomic energy production or utilization facility, the ex-
istence of which is not likely to escape the Commission's attention since 
the federal government owns all special nuclear material. As in the case 
of union certification and unfair labor practices which are brought to 
the attention of the NLRB by the parties involved, most proposed atomic 
energy activities, and therefore the potential hazards they entail, will be 
brought directly to the attention of the Commission either by the parties 
intending to act or by other parties possibly affected by the action!42 It 
is more likely that the Commission will receive notice of proposed haz-
ardous activities than of actual hazardous conditions after an atomic 
energy activity becomes operational. The AEC is not only the principal 
source of atomic energy materials but also is the best informed organiza-
tion in the nation on the subject of their use, and so it becomes ad-
vantageous for the person proposing to undertake a regulated activity 
to take his problems of installation design and other preliminary matters 
of radiation safety to the Commission. Furthermore, we may rely upon 
others, such as state health agencies, unions, and adjacent property 
owners, to bring these matters to the attention of the Commission should 
those who are required by law to do so fail in this respect, and there 
Ht Supra notes 325 and 326. 
'*2 An example of this is the intervention of the United Automobile Workers in the 
construction of a reactor by the Power Reactor Development Company. See In the 
Matter of Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16, "Notice of Hearing 
Order," 21 Fed. Reg. 78o9 (Oct. 12, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52:40. 
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is no public hazard in the pre-operation situation if we wait for action 
by the more expert federal agency. 
Seventh. Reason and experience both suggest that any parallel sys-
tem of state licensing, predicated on considerations of radiation health 
and safety, will inevitably conflict with the federal licensing program. 
Clearly, the Supreme Court is not likely to ascribe to Congress an atti-
tude of indifference toward state licensing requirements which might 
prevent activities authorized by the Commission because of possible 
radiation hazards which the Commission has found to be insignificant 
or non-existent. Hill v. Florida,448 Automobile Workers v. 0' Brien,444 
and Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board 445 suggest that any state radia-
tion health and safety licensing requirement in addition to, or in excess 
of, Commission requirements would be found to stand as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of the 1954 act and would not be allowed by the Supreme Court. Such 
independent state action would very likely tend to discourage activities 
which Congress clearly wants to encourage. Furthermore, we have seen 
in Erie R.R. Co. v. New York 448 that, where Congress imposes burdens 
on a regulated activity in the interests of health and safety, the implica-
tion arises that this is the prescribed measure of what is necessary and 
sufficient for the purpose as well as the cost which must be sustained 
to secure the degree of safety desired. In other cases, such as Oregon-
Washington Co. v. Washington 447 or Welch v. New Hampshire,448 
the court has indicated that a similar implication arises where Congress 
has directed a federal agency to establish the appropriate safety stand-
ard. Even if, for example, the state were to specify dimensions of 
shielding materials, basing those dimensions on radiation exposure 
limits identical with those of the AEC, the effect of the state action 
would be to standardize safety features left to the discretion of the 
Commission and which the Commission prefers to specify on a case-by-
case basis. There is not one but a variety of ways of building a nuclear 
reactor or a radiation device in order to obtain a desired degree of 
safety. There is considerable merit, which probably appealed to Con-
gress, in a system which allows the applicant and the Commission to 
agree on the alternatives to be employed without the intrusion of state 
448 Supra note 283. 
444 Supra note 286. 
445 Supra note 287. 
448 Supra note 318. 
447 Supra note J20. 
448 Supra note 339· 
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officials. To modify the court's phrase in the Cloverleaf case, state 
licensing requirements would nullify federal discretion over the designs, 
specifications, and other radiation safety features of atomic energy in-
stallations and devices.449 In the last analysis, then, any parallel state 
system of radiation safety precautions preceding operation probably 
would either conflict with the federal licensing system in a substantive 
sense or it would impair administration of the program. Either event, 
or the· possibility of either event, has generally been held fatal to the 
state action. At the very least, such a parallel state system would be 
superfluous expense to both the Commission licensee and the state. 
In the light of the above considerations, it seems reasonably safe to 
assume that the Supreme Court will hold that Congress has prevented 
any state or local government from requiring a person, who is licensed 
or otherwise authorized by the Commission, to obtain prior state or local 
permission to operate if the granting or denying of that permission is 
predicated upon an independent analysis or standards of radiation 
health and safety. This does not include, however, state or local action 
which is designed to alleviate an actual radiation hazard arising out of 
a federally licensed activity and also constituting a violation of the Com-
mission standards. This type of state action involves regulatory meas-
ures during operation and is considered below. It was pointed out 
previously that the statutes or regulations of several states appear to 
require prior approval by a state official. While the Jaws of North Da-
kota. 450 and Wyoming 451 require registration, they are so phrased as 
also to suggest that permission of state health officials is required. The 
regulations of the Delaware Board of Health definitely require a permit 
which may be denied " ... when there is unsatisfactory proof that the 
material or device will not be a hazard to health." 452 Although the 
Michigan Department of Health regulations requiring registration may 
not be construed as a licensing provision, the State Health Commis-
sioner has reserved discretionary authority to approve : ( I) proposed 
limits on levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas; ( 2) proposed limits 
on concentrations of radioactive materials released into the atmosphere 
of uncontrolled areas; (3) installation changes which materially in-
crease the potential health hazard ; and ( 4) radioactive waste disposal 
449 Supra note 327, quoted supra note 328. 
450 N.D. Laws 1957, c. 185, §§4, 5· 
451 Wyo. Comp. Stat. §63.1302. 
4n Del. Bd. of Health, Regulations Governing the Manufacture, Distribution, Sale, 
Storage, Installation, and Disposal of Radioactive Sources, Materials, or Devices, §II, 
adopted Dec. 5, 1955. 
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procedures not otherwise authorized by the regulations.453 In view of 
the foregoing discussion, these state requirements, as applied to Com-
mission licensees, are probably not valid . 
. Local zoning ordinances which clearly discriminate against atomic 
energy uses and facilities, merely because they constitute radiation haz-
ards deemed undesirable by the community, will probably suffer the 
same fate as state licensing requirements. Such an ordinance would 
obviously conflict with a determination by the Commission that a li-
censed use or facility will not create an unreasonable hazard in the 
particular location. A more difficult question is presented, however, by 
a zoning ordinance which discriminates against a production or utiliza-
tion facility for reasons which are not connected with health and safety. 
For example, in response to a policy which seeks to promote intensive 
industrial development in an area and thereby increase local property 
tax revenues and employmel).t possibilities, the local government may 
zone against commercial reactor facilities because the use of large tracts 
of land as exclusion areas around reactors, rather than as conventional 
industrial sites, would lower assessment value and the number of jobs 
available. While the Commission is not likely to license a facility for 
such a location, since its policy is to respect the desires of the community, 
the situation might arise. There appears to be nothing in the 1954 act 
which would preclude enforcement of such an ordinance if its revenue 
raising or job promoting purpose is bona fide. It is possible, of course, 
to frame such a discriminatory zoning ordinance without revealing the 
reason behind it upon which validity depends. The case of Village of 
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.454 suggests, however, that in such a case 
the Supreme Court will not hesitate to look behind the ordinance to 
determine its real purpose if its validity depends thereon. This state-
ment is not meant to imply in any way that the federal government 
could not condemn land free of local zoning restrictions in order to con-
struct a government facility if it so desired. 
Several other possibilities for state action are offered in the area of 
radiation regulation preceding operation. \Vhereas the state probably 
may not impose licensing requirements of its own, the Zook 455 case 
suggests that the state may make it unlawful for any person to do any 
of the things for which a Commission license, construction permit, or 
458 Supplement No. 13 to 1954 Mich. Adm. Code pp. 41-70 (adopted Feb. 14, 1958), 
Regs. J25.1309.2.1, 325-1309-3. 325.1300.2, J25.I3I2.2.I. 
454 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct.. 114 (1926). 
41>5 Supra note 281. 
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other authorization is required, without first obtaining the appropriate 
authorization from the Commission. The enforcement of such a pro-
vision, by injunction or by the imposition of criminal sanctions, would 
not conflict with the federal licensing program. There would be little 
or no likelihood of the state prohibiting that which the federal law 
authorizes. Unlike the situation in the Nelson case/56 violation of a 
state law to this effect definitely affects local as well as national in-
terests. Also, there is less justification for the claim that the threat 
must be met on a nationwide basis, for no national or international 
criminal conspiracy is involved. There would seem to be no need for 
secrecy or delay in prosecution as suggested in the Nelson case. Such 
a situation can be distinguished from that presented in the Cloverleaf 
case m where the state act was said to nullify federal discretion over the 
regulated process. Such a conclusion is necessary to sustain the validity 
of the New England type of statute and seems justified in the light of 
applicable Supreme Court cases. 
Further opportunity for state action is presented within the adminis-
trative procedures of the AEC. Section 189 of the 1954 act provides 
that: 
In any proceeding under this Act, for the granting, suspend-
ing, revoking, or amending of any license or construction 
permit, or application to transfer control, and in any proceed-
ing for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations 
dealing with the activities of licensees, . . . the Commission 
shall grant a· hearing upon the request of any person whose in-
terest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any 
such person as a party to such proceeding.458 
This section also requires that a hearing be held on each application for 
a commercial or research and development facility license, whether re-
quested or not. Under the act "person means . . . any State or any 
political subdivision of, or any political entity within a State." 459 Thus, 
should the state feel that the public health and safety are not served or 
adequately protected by a proposed activity or facility, it may petition 
the Commission for a hearing on the matter or petition to intervene in 
a facility license hearing.460 
In order to facilitate prompt state action notice to the state of the 
456 Supra note 323. 
457 Supra note 327. 
458 §189, 42 U.S.C.A. §2239. 
459 §nq, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014q. 
460 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.705. 
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existence and character of radiation activities and facilities within the 
state's borders is essential. While there appears to be sufficient pre-
emptive effect in the 1954 act to preclude state licensing or the imposi-
tion of state safety measures in excess of those provided by Congress 
and the AEC, this should not prevent the states from requiring the 
registration of radiation sources, activities, and persons so engaged. 
A state statute requiring registration only does not directly affect the 
right of any person to carry out activities authorized by the Commis-
sion, and it does not affect the manner of conducting federally author-
ized activities or the physical characteristics of the nuclear device or 
facility. It seems doubtful if the rationale applied in Hines v. Davido-
witz,461 or any other case discussed above, could be successfully invoked 
to defeat state registration, unless it is a disguised form of licensing. 
Obviously, the registration of radiation sources and activities is not so 
intimately blended with responsibilities of the national government as 
to give rise to an inference of pre-emption. Furthermore, it pertains to 
the very subject-matters of public health and safety-which Justice 
Black distinguished in the Hines case as being in "an entirely different 
category" for purposes of federal pre-emption/6~ and Congress cer-
tainly has never manifested a consistent opposition to state registration 
statutes in the interests of public health and safety. Lastly, whatever 
additional burden is imposed upon a Commission licensee, by reason 
of a state registration requirement, is only minimal. It should also be 
pointed out that a state radiation source registration requirement can 
be sustained for reasons not directly related to radiation hazard regula-
tion. State workmen's compensation commissions, water and wildlife 
conservation organizations, fire departments, and other state and local 
agencies may require the information for purposes of administering 
their respective programs. These clearly provide sufficient reason to 
justify a state placing such a minimal burden upon a licensee. 
(b) State Regulatory Measures During Operation 
The task of regulating the use and possession of nuclear materials and 
facilities during operation is essentially one of establishing operating 
standards and inspecting to determine whether the standards are met. 
To this end Congress has authorized, but not directed, the Commission 
to establish operating standards, instructions, and procedures, to require 
records and reports relative to radiation safety, and to inspect licensed 
461 Supra note 278. 
462/bid., quoted supra note 356. 
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activities and facilities. Manifestly, the establishment of any operating 
radiation health and safety standard, as it affects AEC licensees, falls 
within the scope of a general and inclusive federal statute which dele-
gates quasi-legislative power to the Commission. In this area of federal 
regulation there are no gaps in the congressional plan of control which 
might indicate to the Supreme Court a policy of congressional indiffer-
ence to state action. Similarly, there are few, if any, gaps in the Com-
mission's radiation health and safety standards. In short, Congress and 
the Commission have occupied the field of atomic energy safety stand-
ards, both before and during operation. Accordingly, cases such as 
Penn. R.R. Co. -v. Public Service Commission 468 and Napier v. Atlantic 
Coast Line 464 indicate that in this situation the states may not impose 
any operating radiation health and safety standards in addition to those 
imposed by the Commission. These cases stand for the proposition 
that where a general and inclusive federal statute confers quasi-legisla-
tive authority upon a federal agency and the federal agency has effec-
tively exercised its authority by establishing comprehensive safety stand-
ards, the states may not add refinements or impose a higher safety 
standard since to do so would conflict with the federal policy reflected' 
in the uniform national standard. State action of this nature imposes a 
heavier burden upon Commission licensees. The additional cost of: 
meeting the higher state standard tends to discourage developments in 
which Congress has affirmatively manifested an interest. Such being· 
the case, it seems reasonably certain that the states cannot establish and 
enforce radiation exposure limits against Commission licensees which 
are more strict than those of the Commission. An attempt by the state 
to do this indirectly would probably be just as futile. For example, 
while the Commission has not specified the number of hours per day 
or week that an employee may work in a radiation installation, exposure 
limits are expressed and are to be adjusted in terms of hours of employ-
ment.m Should a state impose a regulation establishing a twenty hour 
work-week in production and utilization facilities in order to reduce ex-
posures to below the Commission limit, the chances are that the Supreme 
Court would pronounce the state regulation invalid. 
At the present time the Commission has two systems of exposure 
limits in effect. One of them, the weekly and quarter-year limits set 
forth in the Commission's "Standards for Protection Against Radia-
463 Supra note 325. 
464 Supra note 326. 
46510 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101(b). 
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tion" applies to all licensees. The other applies to Commission activities 
and those of its contractors, but not to licensees.466 The second system 
of limits reduces annual permissible exposures to one third of that 
allowed under the earlier system. Ultimately the Commission intends 
to hold licensees to the newer limit, but it has postponed application for 
several years because of the substantial economic impact on existing 
installations and facilities. At least one state, Michigan, has anticipated 
the Commission and imposed the new accumulated annual dose limit 
upon users of federally licensed materials.467 This state act obviously 
conflicts with federal policy, and it is doubtful if Michigan can enforce 
the higher standard against a federal licensee, even though the Commis-
sion intends to do so eventually, for the effect of the Michigan action is 
to remove the period of grace offered by the Commission's postpone-
ment. The significance of this fact is indicated in Erie R.R. Co. v. New 
York. 468 The doctrine of the Welch decision 469 is not applicable for in 
that case there was no federal standard in effect at the time the state 
hour law was violated, the state standard was not as strict as that which 
the ICC intended to apply in the future, and the ICC had not delayed 
effectiveness to give interstate motor carriers time to make necessary 
adjustments.· 
One possible exception to the above limit on state operating standards 
exists as to disposal of radioactive wastes by release into sanitary sewage 
systems. Pursuant to its general authority, the Commission has specified 
the amount and manner of such disposition. It has even exempted 
excreta from individuals undergoing medical diagnosis or therapy with 
radioactive materials from any limitations.470 Conceivably Commission 
authorized discharges of radioactive wastes into publicly owned sewage 
systems may result in conditions which local sanitation officials deem 
unsafe and necessitate the enlargement, improvement, or other modifica-
tion of the system at local expense. The analogy between this situation 
and that where the state has imposed a lower weight limit for interstate 
motor carriers operating on state owned highways is obvious. The state 
or local government perhaps has an even stronger argument in connec-
tion with the sewers in that there is considerably less federal subsidy 
than in the case of interstate highways, and the public sewer is scarcely 
in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court's language in Maurer v. 
466 AEC Manual, c. 0524, "Permissible Levels of Radiation Exposure." 
467 Supra note 453, R. J25.IJOC).I.I (J). 
468 Supra note 318. 
469 Supra note 339. 
470 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.303. 
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Hamilton 471 at least suggests that state or local public ownership of a 
sewage system raises some question of whether Congress can pre-empt 
in this area. While it is entirely certain that the federal licensee could 
not release any greater quantity of radioactive wastes into a publicly 
owned sewage system than the Commission has specified, it is fairly 
arguable that the state or local government may impose a higher stand-
ard if federally authorized discharges will result in substantial expense 
to the state or a political subdivision. As in the Maurer case, there is 
a good possibility that the court would simply avoid the question by 
finding that Congress had not intended to pre-empt regulation of this 
matter. 
A determination that the states may not establish and enforce higher 
radiation health and safety standards, or fill the gaps in the AEC's pro-
gram does not conclude. the matter of state standards or enforcement, 
for the question of whether the states may establish and enforce iden-
tical operating radiation health and safety standards still remains. It is 
curious that this question has been litigated infrequently in the Su-
preme Court. Practically all of the cases have involved situations where 
state action differed in some essential respect from federal law or might 
produce a different result, either because the standards were irreconcil-
able or because the state presumed to tread upon matters over which a 
federal agency exercised discretionary authority on a case-by-case basis. 
The basic standards-that is the permissible doses and levels of radia-
tion and environmental concentrations of radioactive effluents-used by 
the AEC in operational regulation are the same as those used by its 
safety experts in analyzing a proposed use or facility and in requiring 
incorporation of appropriate safety features into its design. A distinc-
tion exists, however, in the manner in which the standards are applied 
before and after operation. Where the standards are applied in licens-
mg a proposed nuclear use or facility, they are applied affirmatively to 
determine what the applicant must do to assure future safety. By ex-
tremely complex calculations and estimates the standards are translated 
into facility designs, specifications, and materials, which become, in ef-
fect, regulations for the particular facility. In contrast, where the 
standards are applied to regulate activities during operation-after in-
stallation or construction-they are applied negatively to indicate what 
the licensee must not do, regardless of whether or not the facility or 
installation conforms with the license specifications. As an example, 
he must not expose the whole body of any person in the area subject to 
471 Supra note 372. 
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his control to more than 6oo millirems of any radiation with a half-
value-layer greater than one millimeter of soft tissue during any one 
week.472 The fact that he has furnished the radiation source with the 
specified type and amount of shielding material does not excuse him 
from complying with the standard. Since the basic standards are ex-
pressed in terms of measurable units, the calculations necessary to com-
pare actual radiation and concentration levels with permissible limits 
are fairly simple and straightforward; comparatively little scientific 
expertise is necessary in determining whether existing uses and fa-
cilities meet the basic standards. Even less expertise is necessary to 
determine whether the licensee is complying with safety standards pro-
viding for specified warning signs and signals, personnel monitoring 
devices, protective clothing, radiation safety instruction, personnel ex-
posure and radioactive material accounting records, and accident and 
injury reports. The point of this discussion is that once the operating 
radiation health and safety standardsare established by the AEC, there 
is no logical reason why any qualified state official should not be able to 
determine compliance. This is particularly true in the case of byproduct 
material uses, where the problems of regulation are less complex than 
in the case of a nuclear facility. Whether or not the state official would 
be qualified to order affirmative action to correct a hazardous condition 
in a nuclear reactor is, of course, a different matter, but, at least, he 
could order the cessation of activities and the evacuation of personnel 
until appropriate action has been taken. 
Unfortunately, "the life of the law is not logic," and, to make matters 
worse, Congress is even less circumscribed by logical considerations 
than are the courts. Pre-emptive intent is just as effective where the 
result is unreasonable as it is where reason supports it. The Supreme 
Court undoubtedly would prefer a sensible solution to a pre-emption 
problem, but anyone familiar with Guss v. Utah Labor Board 473 should 
know that it cannot supply one if it believes that Congress intended 
otherwise. It is necessary, therefore, to apply the doctrines of the 
analogous cases . 
. In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson 474 the Supreme Court said that 
state officials could not enter a factory to inspect and condemn the raw 
materials of a food manufacturing process, found to be unwholesome 
and deleterious to health, when that process was subject to federal 
supervision and a federal agency had authority to condemn the finished 
472 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.101. 
• 473 Supra note 295. 
474 Supra note 327. 
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product for the same reasons. Notice, however, that there was little 
local interest in the safety of the manufacturing process since there was 
nothing hazardous in the manufacturing proce.ss itself; the product was 
only dangerous when consumed, and, by express limitation, the court's 
decision did not prevent the state from condemning unwholesome raw 
materials prior to the time they were definitely marked for commerce 
by the manufacturer's acquisition. Neither did the decision prevent the 
state from regulating the sale of the finished product within the state's 
borders. In other words, the pre-emptive effect found by the sharply di-
vided court did not entirely prevent the state from protecting the health 
and safety of the local public. 
In California v. Zook>415 a later case and one in which the court was 
again divided five-to-four, the court, in effect, said that it would not 
presume federal pre-emption as against state enforcement of a law 
which prohibited precisely the same thing prohibited by federal ad-
ministrative regulations where (I) state enforcement would not im-
pair administration of the federal law, ( 2) the state law pertained to 
public health and safety, (3) neither Congress nor the federal agency 
had expressed any pre-emptive intent, and ( 4) federal action preceded 
state regulation of the same matters. The court also was influenced by 
the practical need for effective state aid to help enforce the federal re-
quirement. It might be added that under the Federal Motor Carrier 
Acts, Congress arid the ICC had established a system of regulation about 
as pervasive as the federal system of radiation health and safety 
regulation. 
It is submitted that, if a state establishes and enforces operating radia-
tion health and safety standards identical with those of the AEC, the 
rationale of the Zook case is likely to be applied in any case involving 
a challenge of the state action, though one should not forget that only 
one of the majority and two of the dissent on that case are now on the 
court. The second, third, and fourth of the above conditions would be 
satisfied in such a case, and the principal question would be whether 
state action impairs administration of the Atomic Energy Act by the 
Commission. In the Nelson case m any state action was held to impair 
administration of federal laws intended to meet the national emergency 
arising out of the Communist conspiracy. It was certainly arguable 
that it was to the nation's advantage that the threat be met by a co-
ordinated national program. In the labor area the standards are quite · 
475 Supra note 281. 
476 Supra note 323. 
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general and the disputes usually require quasi-judicial solution; the 
possibility for conflict between state and NLRB decisions, even where 
the same general standards are applied, is great. The Oregon-Washing-
ton case 477 presented a condition of possible impairment. The state was 
asserting the power to do precisely what federal law directed the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to do should circumstances, in his judgment, so 
required. Determination of the necessity for the specified action, how-
ever, involved an analysis of many complex facts and the exercise of 
considerable expert judgment. Even so, had the Washington law 
merely prohibited the importation into the state of alfalfa hay and meal 
from areas quarantined by the Secretary of Agriculture, without his 
certification, the result probably would have been different. In essence, 
the state was presuming to establish a regulation which the Secretary 
was directed to issue upon a finding of urgent need. Since he had not 
done so, the case turned on irreconcilability of standards, and not so 
much on impairment of federal administration of fixed health and 
safety standards. 
None of the above types of impairment of federal law administration 
need occur if the state ( 1) adopts and enforces operating radiation 
health and safety standards identical with the current standards of the 
Commission, (2) carefully refrains from adopting any standard in-
consistent with or stricter than those of the Commission, and (3) does 
not invade any area of regulation in which the Commission applies a 
flexible standard to the particular situation. The only safe course is for 
the state to cooperate with the AEC and aid in the enforcement of fed-
eral standards in every way, emphasizing maximum safety and avoiding 
futile assertions of state independence. 
(4) Enforcement of State Safety Standards 
While it is felt that the pre-emptive effect of the 1954 act probably 
does not prevent all state health and safety regulation of AEC licensees, 
there is some question remaining as to permissible methods of state en-
forcement of such standards. Obviously, the method least calculated to 
raise the issue of federal pre-emption would be a state petition or other 
request to the Commission to take appropriate action where state in-
spectors discover a violation of federal-state health and safety stand-
ards. This method seems especially desirable where the violation is of 
the sort that is not likely to cause immediate injury to persons or prop-
erty and the short delay occasioned by such a procedure is comparatively 
4 77 Supra note 320. 
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unimportant to public health and safety. Where a violation poses an 
immediate threat to safety, however, or where the licensee has wilfully 
violated radiation health and safety standards, the state may find it 
advisable and necessary to take more direct action such as by injunc-
tion and possibly criminal prosecution. 
In order to enforce its radiation health and safety standards, orders, 
and regulations, the Commission is empowered to deny, suspend, mod-
ify, or revoke its licenses, to seize byproduct and special nuclear ma-
terials in the possession of a violator, and, through the Attorney 
General, to seek injunctions or orders enforcing compliance against 
violators. Furthermore, under the direction of the Attorney General, 
willful violators may be prosecuted criminally. From this it could be 
argued that there is no room for duplicating state enforcement pro-
cedures. The Zook case suggests, however, that it would be permis-
sible where the activity is clearly contrary to federal standards. The 
local interest in the safety of the local public is more, and the impact 
on the federal program is much less, than when a state is trying to pun-
ish someone for attacking the federal government, as in the Nelson 
case. Therefore, an attempt by the states to enforce federal standards 
would seem well worth the try. 
There seems to the writers to be more than sufficient reason for the 
states to adopt a radiation hazards regulatory statute of the kind dis-
cussed in Chapter VI. There is sufficient radiation hazard from activi-
ties and sources which are not within the scope of the federal scheme to 
justify a comprehensive state program. In addition, there is every 
reason why a state should at least establish a registration center and 
collect that information which is necessary to permit the state to protect 
its own government personnel (e.g., fire fighters, industrial safety in-
spectors), to administer such programs as workmen's compensation, and 
to allow it to represent the interests of the state generally in proceedings 
before the federal agencies. Even more pertinent is the scope of state 
regulation which in our opinion is still permissible in spite of the per-
vasive federal regulations. Moreover, the states should act now to 
establish expert staffs and gain experience so that in the future they 
may represent fairly to Congress that Congress should re-delegate many 
radiation health and safety functions to the states. It is our belief that 
until the states demonstrate their capabilities through existing and 
efficient staffs and programs Congress will not revise the Atomic En-
ergy Act in respect to radiation health and safety, and perhaps even 
should not do so. Radiation hazards are too great to risk non-regulation 
or ineffective regulation. 
Chapter VI 
FUTURE STATE REGULATION OF ATOMIC 
ENERGY: A SUGGESTED STATE ACT 
A. General Observations 
The foregoing examination of state legislation and interstate com-
pacts makes it abundantly clear that atomic energy industry is destined 
to be subjected to comprehensive health and safety regulation at state, 
interstate, and local governmental levels. Considerable statutory au-
thority to regulate already exists although with varying degrees of com-
pleteness in the several states, and certainly with most unsatisfactory 
overlapping, indefiniteness, and multiplicity of jurisdiction. Order must 
be brought out of this statutory chaos. 
So far as administrative regulations are concerned, the states, with 
the notable exceptions of California, Connecticut, Michigan, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas, have not seen fit to adopt comprehen-
sive codes of regulations dealing specifically with the rather unique 
radiation hazards. To the extent that fede~al regulations issued by the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and 
other federal agencies provide an adequate safeguard for the general 
public, the cautious approach of the states toward establishing definitive 
regulations is commendable. This is particularly true in view of the 
fact that knowledge of atomic energy injuries at the present time is 
somewhat limited, and development of proper precautionary techniques 
has not as yet been possible. Hasty, ill-conceived standards may prove 
unduly burdensome, even to the extent of preventing or at least retard-
ing the establishment and growth of the new industry. However, if at 
some time in the future serious industrial accidents take place as a re-
sult of radiation, the responsible state agencies will be placed in a most 
embarrassing position unless proper and adequate health and safety 
regulations are adopted at the state level. Therefore, it can only be con-
cluded that the basic statutes will be amended to provide adequate ad-
ministrative authority and comprehensive health and safety codes will 
be forthcoming in the near future, at least in those states that are likely 
to be participating in the early development of atomic enterprise.1 
1 For a brief resume of state activities regarding radiation protection, see Atomic 
Industrial Forum, Inc., "State Governmental Activitie~ Relating to Radiation Protec-
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To the atomic energy entrepreneur the maze of statutes and prospec-
tive health and safety regulations imposed and to be imposed by numer-
ous state and local agencies presents a most foreboding picture. If 
such regulations are inconsistent with each other, as may easily prove 
to be the case when they are adopted by different state agencies with 
overlapping jurisdiction, it may even prove to be impossible for an 
atomic industry to comply faithfully with them. Moreover, the cost of 
compliance with unduly prolix and unnecessarily duplicating regula-
tions may even preclude economic utilization of atomic energy. The 
potentialities inherent in the atom appear to be very great indeed, and 
the prospective -benefits to mankind seem well worth attaining. Never-
theless it is a fact that in some of its applications at least, and especially 
in connection with the development of electric power through use of 
nuclear heat sources, the possibilities do not yet seem to be economically 
attainable in most portions of the United States. The new industry has 
a considerable distance to go before it can enter the market in the low 
cost power areas on a fully competitive basis. It is therefore little short 
of imperative that state and local regulation of atomic activities_ be 
reduced to the most economical possible basis consistent with proper 
safeguarding of employees and the general public. It is necessary that 
clear-cut, direct, and consistent regulatory schemes be adopted, taking 
full cognizance of the latest technology, and that they be no more strin-
gent than the necessities of health and safety demand.' Otherwise, 
peacetime uses of atomic energy may be unreasonably handicapped. 
How can inconsistencies, undue prolixity, and unnecessary duplication 
of effort be avoided? How can the latest and best technology be brought 
to bear on the state regulatory process? First of all, a comprehensive, 
competent, and properly integrated state administrative plan must be 
established by statute after careful consideration of the various- possi-
bilities. Several principal types of state administrative organization 
seem to be worthy of consideration. 
r. Utilization of Existing State Agencies 
There are many who will argue in favor of use of existing agencies 
to cover the atomic field, making arrangements through cooperating 
committees for informal interchange of ideas, and thus seeking uni-
formity and avoiding overlapping jurisdiction by cooperative solution 
tion," Dec. I, 1955 (mimeo.). For a compilation of all foreign, federal, and state laws 
and regulations concerning radiation protection, see World Health Organization, Na-
tional Laws and Regulations on Radiation Protection (July 1955). 
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of problems that affect two or more agencies. If this method is adopted, 
it will doubtless become necessary to amend state legislation to extend 
the powers of some or perhaps all of the agencies thus to include the 
new and unique problems raised by atomic enterprise that would other-
wise not be covered. Pursuant to this plan of utilizing existing agencies 
each agency would be responsible for preparing and promulgating the 
necessary regulations, and each would be empowered to issue the 
requisite orders to compel compliance with its own jurisdictional field. 
If this method of administrative control is utilized, it will be necessary 
for each of the several agencies, that is, the public utilities commission, 
the labor department, the health department, the water resources board, 
and perhaps others, to obtain the services of persons properly trained 
to deal with radiation health and safety problems. It will not be an easy 
matter to muster such personnel, for properly qualified candidates are 
in short supply; and this method will be relatively expensive from the 
standpoint of the state payroll. Moreover, the elimination of overlap-
ping jurisdiction and conflicting regulations by such informal cooper-
ative means will be only partially successful, and, therefore, although 
this scheme of administrative organization will preserve existing juris-
dictional boundary lines and possibly for that reason would prove to be 
more acceptable to existing state administrative authorities, it will 
nevertheless prove to be relatively cumbersome and expensive from the 
standpoint of the state and burdensome from that of industry. It is 
this plan which is at present operative in New York State, and it has 
already resulted in two comprehensive health and safety codes--one 
issued by the New York Department of Health 2 and the other by the 
New York State Department of Labor.3 
2. Utilization of an Official Coordinator 
The plan involving the use of existing agencies but adding to the 
payroll an official "coordinator," as proposed by the New England 
Committee on Atomic Energy, has been discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
As indicated there, a number of state legislatures have enacted legisla-
tion patterned on this proposal! There is much to be said in favor of the 
coordinator plan as it has been evolved by the New England Committee 
on Atomic Energy. It preserves the existing agency authority and 
2 N.Y. State Sanitary Code c. XVI, effective Sept. I, 1955. The code is set forth in 
Appendix A, Item 4· 
3 N.Y. Industrial Code No. 38, effective Dec. IS, I9SS· The code is set forth in 
Appendix A, Item 3· 
• See Part Ill, c. V, text at notes I4-25. 
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extends it wherever necessary to cover atomic activities. In addition, it 
makes full use of the principle of cooperation with the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission, which, of course, possesses the largest 
available amount of technical knowledge and understanding of the sub-
ject matter. There is much to be said for such cooperation. However, in 
view of the fact that the coordinator will have no powers of enforcement 
and no means of compelling agencies to adopt or refrain from adopting 
any particular policies or practices, his position will be far from enviable. 
Since his directing authority is nil, his effectiveness will be dependent 
upon his personal powers of persuasion, backed to whatever extent is 
feasible by the chief executive of the state. This is a dubious device for 
carrying on complex day-by-day administrative functions. 
3· Utilization of a Central Agency Plan 
This plan would involve the creation of a new central agency to deal 
with atomic energy problems .wherever they may arise within the juris-
diction of the enacting state. Such a plan has in fact been proposed by 
the National Committee on Radiation Protection. The report of that 
committee has been published as a National Bureau of Standards hand-
book.5 In the recommended draft of a bill contained in this report, 
Section 3 provides for the establishment of an independent State Radia-
tion Control Agency in charge of a director assisted by a State Radia-
tion Technical Advisory Board of five members. 
By Section 4 of the proposed bill, the agency is given the power "to 
develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation and 
determination of hazards associated with the use of radiation and for 
their amelioration." It is further given the power and the duty of con-
sultation and cooperation with the other agencies of the state and those 
of the federal government and other state and interstate agencies. It is 
given authority "to adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as 
may be necessary to further the purposes of the act," and it is expressly 
given authority to incorporate by reference the recommended standards 
of nationally recognized bodies in the field of radiation protection such 
as the National Committee on Radiation Protection and the American 
Standards Association. The agency is also given authority "to issue, 
modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or abating the discharge of radio-
active material or waste into the ground, air, or waters of the state." 
5 National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 61, "Regulation of Radiation Ex-
posure by Legislative Means," Dec. 9, 1955. The recommended legislation is set forth 
in Appendix B, Item 2. 
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It is authorized to render opinions upon plans and specifications relative 
to the design and shielding of radiation sources. It is empowered to 
make inspections of radiation sources and to report known or suspected 
deficiencies. 
By Section 5 it is required that every person who generates or pro-
duces ionizing radiation or who produces, uses, stores, or disposes of 
radioactive materials must register in writing with the agency, thus 
giving the agency the requisite information concerning the existence 
and utilization of radioactive sources within the state. 
By Section 6 the agency is authorized to classify and identify radio-
active sources, exposures, and hazards, and to adopt standards of pro-
tection. Sections 7 and 10 provide authority for the making of inspec-
tions and giving notice of deficiencies, and Sections 8, 9, and 12 are 
concerned with such matters as proceedings before the agency in the 
case of violations, the notice that must be given, and the opportunity for 
a fair hearing before the entry of the order. Suitable provisions are 
made for review of agency decisions by courts of competent jurisdiction. 
A centralized agency such as that proposed by the National Commit-
tee on Radiation Protection apparently would cut across the jurisdic-
tional areas of numerous existing state agencies (something that the 
agencies are not likely to welcome), and the fact that industrial estab-
lishments throughout the state would be subject to an additional regula-
tory agency would create additional problems from the standpoint of 
industry. Furthermore, the creation of an additional agency with ex-
tensive enforcement powers, including the necessity for carrying on a 
system of inspections, would entail substantial expense and require 
sizable appropriations from the state treasury. On the other hand, with 
but a single agency responsible for atomic matters, a maximum of 
technical expertness would result, and the concentration of authority 
over atomic energy in such agency would minimize or eliminate the 
necessity of other state agencies obtaining the services of the all too 
rare technical experts in the atomic field. Although the National Com-
mittee plan has both advantages and disadvantages, it would seem that, 
everything considered, the latter outweigh the former and the likelihood 
of such an agency being actually established in any state is remote indeed. 
4. A Proposed Specialized Rule-Making Agency Plan 
A consideration of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in each 
of the foregoing plans for the promulgation and enforcement of atomic 
regulations leads to another proposal-one which will divide the neces-
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sary functions into two categories, namely, rule-making in the atomic 
regulatory field on the one hand, and inspection and enforcement on the 
other, each in the hands of a separate administrative organization. The 
task of prescribing and promulgating rules and regulations in the field 
of atomic energy will involve comprehensive and detailed knowledge 
of a new field of technology which is changing rapidly and is only partly 
understood at the present time. Such a task might well be delegated to 
a small, specially constituted body of experts, selected because of knowl-
edge of atomic energy and skill in working out appropriate rules and 
regulations to protect employees and the general public from radiation 
injuries. After- promulgation, such regulations could fairly readily be 
enforced by the existing agencies which already exercise jurisdiction 
over specified areas of industrial activity within the state, that is, the 
department of labor, with respect to the health and safety of employees, 
the department of public health, with respect to matters affecting the 
general public, the public service commission, with respect to transpor-
tation of radioactive materials and other phases of its specialized 
jurisdiction, the conservation commission, with respect to its areas of 
interest, and other state and local agencies according to their specified 
powers and duties. 
Some such bifurcation of the functions of state administration in the 
atomic energy field would, like all of the other plans, have both advan-
tages and disadvantages. On the favorable side, it can be said that the 
formulation of regulations would be carried on by a specialized, techni-
cally competent group, and since only one agency would be exercising the 
rule-making power, the inconsistencies rendered likely by a multiple 
rule-making plan would be eliminated. With respect to inspection and 
enforcement, the utilization of existing agencies, personnel, and pro-
cedures would minimize the impact upon the state payroll and would also 
minimize the number of inspection visits to be received each year by 
industry subject to inspections. The inspectors of the existing agencies 
would not be required to possess high technical qualifications in the 
atomic energy field. Certain rules of thumb and mechanically obtained 
measurements would suffice for most purposes and a small amount of 
inservice training would take care of the necessities of the situation. In 
short, this bifurcation plan would seem to have a considerable number 
of advantages, not the least of which is it does not disturb the vested 
interests of existing agencies, a real political fact of life. 
On the other hand, uncertainties may result in the interpretation of 
regulations because of the fact that the agency which makes the regula-
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tions is not engaged in the enforcement process. Although there are 
disadvantages to this plan, we believe it is the best possible approach, at 
least at this stage of development of atomic energy technology, to the 
creation of sound methods of handling the governmental problems which 
are destined to arise from peacetime applications of this new and 
unique type of energy. 
a. Registration versus Licensing 
A comprehensively drafted statute setting up an organization for the 
handling of the regulatory problems of atomic energy will include many 
items. Among others, it will include a statement of policy. It will cer-
tainly include definitions--definitions of radiation, radioactive material, 
radiation producing equipment, and other items. It will create any 
necessary new agency and provide for its organization and staff. It will 
set forth the powers and duties of the agency, including the necessary 
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority. It will establish requisite 
procedures pursuant to which agency business is to be handled. 
Among the most important items for consideration, however, is the 
question of utilizing registration or licensing as the method pursuant to 
which the agency will acquire the requisite information concerning 
the individual radioactive operations in progress throughout the state. 
There is, of course, a third possibility-i.e., neither registration nor 
licensing, but instead reliance may be placed upon the adoption of regu-
lations, the establishment of an adequate inspection scheme, and the use 
of the injunction and criminal sanctions for enforcement. However, 
in view of the fact that this third named possibility imposes an undue 
burden upon state administration, it is likely that legislation in the field 
will resort to either registration or licensing as a means of placing in the 
hands of the agency the names, locations, and details of the activities of 
the various industries subject to regulation. 
Registration merely requires the filing of a document stating the 
facts; licensing requires the issuing of a permit to operate. The former 
is the less cumbersome device; the latter is by far the more undesirable 
procedure, for it is necessary for the agency to establish arrangements 
pursuant to which applications for licenses can be reviewed, hearings 
held, if necessary, and decisions reached in individual cases. This is 
burdensome and expensive. Accordingly, both the New England Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy and the National Committee on Radiation 
Protection recommend registration rather than licensing, and all argu-
ments seem to favor this conclusion. 
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b. Uniformity of Regulation 
There is one other substantive feature of the regulatory legislation 
under consideration which should be mentioned. This is the very great 
desirability of uniformity of regulation, not only within each state but 
between states, at least states within a given region, and between the 
states and the United States. It is a fact that the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission possesses a more complete understanding of the 
necessities in the field than does any other agency in the country. Ac-
cordingly, it should provide leadership, and state agencies should accept 
this leadership in connection with the establishment of the standards of 
health and safety. The states can well afford to take advantage of fed-
eral experience and understanding, and in so doing they will not in any 
sense be surrendering state sovereignty. Indeed, they will be exercising 
such sovereignty in a wise and effective manner, always with the full 
recognition of the fact that any state which desires to do so, can depart 
from the federal standard, either by imposing more stringent require-
ments, or by way of relaxation, except in cases where federal control has 
pre-empted the field. 
In order to conform with this principle of uniformity, state legisla-
tion should authorize state agencies in adopting the detailed health and 
safety codes to take advantage of United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission regulations, either by incorporating by reference or adopting 
their substance if that be deemed preferable. 
c. Public Utility Rate Regulations 
The foregoing discussion has been concerned primarily with health 
and safety regulations to be adopted by state agencies. Different con-
siderations apply when dealing with public utility rate and service regu-
lation. In regard to these matters, it is clear that the state public utility 
commission must have plenary control over such matters as the kind and 
quality of service to be rendered, accounting for capital expenditu.res, 
operating costs, fixed charges, depreciation and obsolescence allowances, 
rate bases, rate schedules, and all of the rest of the apparatus of utility 
regulation. 6 These matters must be left in the hands of the same agency 
as that which is given responsibility for the regulation of the rates and 
services of utilities deriving their energy from conventional sources. 
This study of state regulatory measures likely to affect atomic utili-
6 See remarks of John H. McCarthy, Chairman, Michigan Public Service Commis-
sion, "Atomic Energy from the Regulator's Point of View," made before the Section 
of Public Utility Law, American Bar Association (Aug. 23, 1955). 
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zation for peaceful purposes is revealing in several significant respects. 
It reveals the almost incomprehensible maze of existing statutes and 
regulations. It indicates the need of bringing order out of chaos to 
protect the public and at the same time facilitate the rapid development 
of a new and useful area of industrial enterprise. It suggests that 
imaginative and careful constructive work lies ahead, both in the draft-
ing of the basic statutes to handle the subject matter and in the prep-
aration and promulgation of the detailed codes of regulation that within 
the near future will be necessary for the protection of public health and 
safety in this new and unique field of endeavor. 
B. A Suggested State Act 
1. Introduction 
Be~use the utilization of atomic energy is destined to become 
increasingly important in the American industrial complex, and radia-
tion sources will be more exhaustively employed in medical and research 
installations, the states are faced with the questions of what phases of 
this new force warrant state governmental regulation; what should be 
the nature of the regulation; and what should be the governmental 
organizational pattern to accomplish the objectives of any desired regu-
latory pattern. The answers to these questions are not easily resolved 
because of the singularly unique manner in which atomic energy has 
been developed as a military, scientific, technological, industrial, and 
research instrument under the aegis of the federal government during 
World War II as a military project and since then by the Atomic 
Energy Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic 
Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954. 
Setting aside temporarily the purely legal problem of federal pre-
emption, as a practical matter the states are not equipped to engage in 
the production of special nuclear material, military research and produc-
tion, large scale reactor research, and major basic scientific research of 
the type now carried on by the Atomic Energy Commission. To the 
extent that there remains a need for these types of activities, it would 
appear that the federal government is the logical repository for these 
functions. Nor are the states likely in the immediate future to be in a 
position of being able to cope adequately with the problem of reactor 
technology and safeguards. Even if the states were able to maintain 
competent staffs, there ·probably would be a wasteful duplication of 
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effort at the individual state leveP Despite these observations, however, 
there remain significant areas of activity, predominantly in the field 
of health and safety, which are of legitimate state concern. At this 
juncture it appears that the states must accept certain responsibilities 
on their own initiative. Otherwise, the federal government will assume 
the activities with the resulting diminution of the role of the states in the 
federal system. It is not necessary here to reiterate the arguments 
against further centralization of regulatory functions in Washington 
which the states are capable of handling themselves. It is our opinion, 
however, that these arguments validly apply to certain phases of govern-
mental regulation of atomic energy, and we therefore propose the 
enactment of comprehensive state legislation to deal with those problems 
created by atomic energy which the states as a practical matter can 
assume effectively at this time. 
In Chapter V the question of federal pre-emption of health and safety 
regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was examined at 
length. In the absence of judicial determinations, it is impossible to 
state precisely those areas of state health and safety regulation of atomic 
energy activities which will be sustained as a matter of constitutional 
law. Nonetheless, the expansion or clarification of the role of the states 
by federal amendatory legislation probably will be achieved only upon 
demonstration by the states of their willingness to accept their responsi-
bilities, so definitive action by the states is called for at an early date. 
The powers of the Atomic Energy Commission under existing legisla-
tion appear sufficiently broad so that the states could act with AEC 
approval without raising the question of constitutionality. Section 161 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides in part: 
In the performance of its functions the Commission is 
authorized to-
... f. with the consent of the agency concerned, utilize or 
employ the services or personnel of any Government agency 
or any State or local government . . . to perform such func-
tion on its behalf as may appear desirable. . . . 8 
The AEC has already expressed its desire to receive the cooperation of 
the states with the ultimate goal of turning over to the states at least a 
portion of its inspection responsibilities. As explained by Curtis A. 
Nelson, director of the AEC's Division of Inspection: 
It is the Commission's plan to assist the states in every way 
possible in the training of personnel, particularly those used 
T The interstate compact device might be a method of establishing practical, economic 
staffs for this function. 
842 U.S.C.A. §2201(£). 
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in the inspection field dealing with health radiology. We have 
a number of training programs and expect to have more. 
Some of the states are themselves setting up training pro-
grams. Further, we plan to contact the governor of each state, 
or his designee, in due course of time, to seek agreement as to 
how the state and the Commission can productively cooperate. 
Ordinarily we would hope to end up by designating a group 
of isotope licensees to be inspected by the appropriate state 
agency. This obviously could be done only after the state was 
equipped with the necessary technical resources. 
In order for these plans to work properly and in order to 
avoid duplication of effort, it would be necessary for the state 
inspection agency to inspect against federal standards and 
regulations. It would be necessary that the Commission re-
ceive copies of the reports prepared by the state inspectors in 
the case of each inspection made. 
In the event a licensee was found to be in noncompliance 
with his license, the. Commission would expect to take appro-
priate action. We do not expect to accomplish this type of 
cooperation overnight, but to plan ahead for a working agree-
ment as each interested state is adequately prepared to take on 
the additional burden. 8 
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In 1956 a bill was introduced in Congress whereby greater power would 
be given to the states in respect to regulation of health and safety. The 
bill proposed the addition of a new section of the Atomic Energy Act 
to read as follows : 
The Commission is authorized and directed to cooperate 
with the States in the formulation of standards for regulating 
the health and safety aspects of the atomic energy field within 
those areas in which the Commission is now authorized. . . . 
Whenever the Commission receives from the governor of any 
State a certificate to the effect that the State has an agency 
competent to exercise jurisdiction in any portion of the health 
and safety aspects of the Atomic Energy Commission, then 
the Commission is directed, on the day six months after the 
date of the receipt of that certificate, to relinquish the juris-
diction of health and safety in the areas specified in the 
certificate.10 
Undoubtedly, this bill would receive more favorable consideration if 
the states had already taken positive action to enter the field of health 
and safety regulation. 
Elsewhere in this volume,11 the unusual nature of the radiation hazard 
8 Address before Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy, Atlanta, Ga., Feb. 2, 
1957; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 265.5 ( 1957). 
to H.R 8676, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
11 Part I, c. I. 
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created by atomic energy has been explained. It cannot be disputed that 
governmental health and safety regulation i? essential in the public 
interest. Traditionally, the state has been the governmental unit re-
sponsible for the health and safety of its citizens. As atomic energy 
becomes more commonplace than it is today, there appear to be no prac-
tical obstacles to the states' undertaking their traditional role in the field. 
Some may argue that only the federal government can obtain the staff 
essential for the task because of the shortage of trained scientific and 
technical personnel. In respect to reactor technology and hazard evalu-
ation, this argument has validity today and may continue to have validity 
in the relatively near future. However, in respect to the uses of radio-
active materials and routine reactor safety measures the states should 
be able to acquire as adequate staffs for inspection as can the federal 
government. If the activity remains largely federal, the AEC will have 
several field offices for the function as any effective inspection system 
requires almost continuous activity at the installations creating radiation 
hazards. These staff organizations could be as easily maintained at the 
state level. On balance, it appears desirable to treat the health and safety 
aspects of atomic energy in accordance with conventional federal-state 
lines of authority as rapidly as possible. 
Aside from those radiation hazards over which the Atomic Energy 
Commission exercises health and safety jurisdiction, there are three 
major radiation sources over which the federal government today 
exercises no control. These are the radiation hazards created by the 
utilization of X-ray machines, particle accelerators, and radium. The 
health problem created by these sources are of utmost importance in the 
whole radiological health field, and even though the states were to 
relinquish all regulatory power in those areas covered by federal legisla-
tion, it is eminently desirable that the states exercise more complete con-
trols over these radiation sources. In fact, it appears that the greatest 
health hazards are currently created outside the arena of activities of 
the Atomic Energy Commission and its licensees. The nature and extent 
of these hazards have only recently been fully appreciated as a result of 
the extensive research in problems of radiological health stimulated by 
the advent of atomic energy. Because only the states today can regulate 
these hazards, affirmative state action is necessitated. Thus, the states 
must equip themselves to handle those radiological health problems of 
sole state concern, thereby making it even more practicable for the states 
also to take the responsibility for the health and safety of their citizens 
in relation to those activities licensed and regulated by the AEC. 
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In addition to the radiation health and safety problem, the states also 
have a legitimate interest in promoting the development and utilization 
of atomic energy within their borders and in continually studying exist-
ing state laws and regulations with the view of recommending revisions 
whenever unusual problems arise adversely affecting atomic energy 
activities. At the present time, it does not appear that any radical inno-
vations will be necessary for the satisfactory accommodation of atomic 
energy into the legal structure. However, minor but nonetheless signifi-
cant changes may be required, and the states should have an established 
organization examining the various potential solutions and recommend-
ing the precise nature of desirable revisions of legislation or administra-
tive rules. 
As indicated previously in this chapter, any number of state govern-
mental organizational patterns may be employed to accomplish the 
objectives of an atomic energy state regulatory program. On balance, 
after full consideration of the purpose of any state program and the role 
of existing state governmental agencies, we believe that the most ade-
quate state structure would be attained by : ( I ) creating an office of 
Director of Atomic Energy Activities; ( 2) establishing a Radiation 
Safety Standards Board composed of the Director and the heads of 
existing state agencies concerned with atomic energy developments; and 
(3) establishing a Scientific Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy 
composed of scientifically trained personnel having considerable ex-
perience in atomic energy affairs. The Director would be a full-time 
state official charged with the duties of : (I) acting as adviser to the 
governor; ( 2) advising and consulting with the federal government, 
interstate agencies, other states, and state and local governmental 
agencies; (3) developing comprehensive state policies and programs for 
developing atomic energy and for evaluating and determining radiation 
hazards; ( 4) acting as chairman and chief administrative officer of the 
Radiation Safety Standards Board; ( 5) acting as a non-voting secre-
tary of the Scientific Advisory Committee; and ( 6) submitting reports 
to the governor and legislature. In addition, the Director would be 
authorized to train personnel in matters relating to the promotion of 
atomic energy and the control of radiation hazards and to utilize the 
services of other governmental agencies to carry out his duties upon 
the consent of the agencies involved. The Radiation Safety Standards 
Board would be charged with the responsibility of adopting radiation 
safety rules and regulations, developing state policies and programs, 
making continuing studies, and submitting reports to the governor and 
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legislature. The Scientific Advisory Committee, to be composed of part-
time personnel, would. have the duties of reviewing all proposed rules 
of the Safety Board and submitting written opinions concerning their 
desirability, and of reviewing policies and programs and providing sci-
entific and technical guidance upon request of the Director. In adopting 
safety rules, the Safety Board would designate the appropriate state 
agencies to be charged with the enforcement of the rules. 
This recommended organization has the advantages of making atomic 
energy the major responsibility of a state official, utilizing existing state 
officials concerned with atomic energy in the rule-making process, 
affording scientific personnel in an area where expertise is essential, and 
utilizing existing state agencies to enforce radiation safety rules. More-
over, the cost of establishing such an organization would be minimal 
since the only full-time personnel required is the Director and such 
enforcement personnel as may have to be added to existing staffs. The 
costs of the program could be recovered by the state in the form of regis-
tration fees paid by persons utilizing atomic energy and radiation 
sources. Because the preparation of an appropriate fee schedule requires 
·careful study, the Radiation Safety Standards Board should report its 
recommendati~ns on the matter to the legislature as soon as possible 
after the establishment of the agency. 
In addition to establishing a state organization charged with general 
promotional programs in respect to atomic energy and with establishing 
and enforcing radiation safety rules, state legislative enactments should 
include appropriate provisions for registration and reporting so that the 
government is kept fully informed of all hazards within the state and 
for enforcement of the statutory requirements and any radiation safety 
rules, Furthermore, existing state agencies should be charged with the 
responsibility of reporting to the governor and legislature recommended 
revisions of other laws of the state that may be affected by atomic 
energy developments. · 
For the purpose of accomplishing what the authors believe to be a 
desirable program for state action at this time and in accordance with 
the conclusions explained previously, the authors have drafted the fol-
lowing Model State Act to Promote Atomic Energy and Control 
Radiation Hazards.12 
12 The model act was drafted in 1957 by Dean E. Blythe Stason, Prof. Samuel D. 
Estep, Prof. William J. Pierce, and Charles D. Olmsted (research assistant) of the 
University of Michigan Law School at the request of the Governor of the State of 
Michigan. After the Governor's Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy made certain 
changes, the bill was introduced in the Michigan 6gth Legislature on Feb. 13, 1958, by 
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2. Model State Act to Promote Atomic Energy and Control 
Radiation Hazards: Text and Comments 
Section 1. Declaration of policy; purpose 
{a) The State of desires to encourage widespread 
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the public 
health and safety and declares the policy of the state to be: 
(I) to cooperate actively in the program established under the 
United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and through the exercise of 
state powers, to encourage and effect the optimum orderly utilization of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes consistent with the public health 
and safety; and 
( 2) to the extent that the presence of radiation sources within 
this state constitute a hazard to the public health and safety, to provide 
for the exercise of the authority of the state so as to establish a uniform 
and harmonious system of regulation consistent with the standards of 
the federal government and other recognized bodies in the field of 
radiation safety. 
{b) The State of recognizes that the impact of atomic 
energy has resulted in new conditions calling for changes in the laws of 
the state, and rules issued thereunder, with respect to the public health 
and safety, working conditions, workmen's compensation, transporta-
tion, public utilities, industry, insurance, agriculture, education, and the 
conservation of natural resources, and therefore declares the purpose of 
this act to be : 
( 1) to establish and coordinate responsibility within the state 
government for the state's part in promotion and control of public and 
private atomic energy affairs ; 
( 2) to provide technical atomic energy advisory services for the 
executive and legislative bodies of this state and its political subdivi-
sions; 
(3) to provide for promulgation of uniform radiation safety rules 
and for their coordination with the corresponding regulatory program 
of the federal government and the recommended standards of nationally 
recognized bodies in the field of radiation safety; 
{4) to provide for the regulation of public and private use and 
Reps. Phillips and Copeland, as House Bill No. 303 and referred to the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the HQuse of Representatives. The bill was not enacted during 
the 19.s8 session. 
1090 STATE REGULATION 
possession of radiation sources within this state in the interest of the 
public health and safety; 
(5) to provide penalties for violations _of radiation safety rules 
and orders ; and 
( 6) to provide for continuing studies as to the need for changes in 
the law of the state to encourage the optimum development of the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy. 
Comment 
This general purpose section has a twofold purpose : 
( I) to establish a general legislative policy ; and ( 2) to declare the 
public interest in atomic energy and to indicate the desirability of 
regulation of radiation hazards consistently with standards employed 
by the federal government and other recognized bodies in the field of 
radiation safety. 
Section 2. Definitions 
As used in this Act-
( a) "Advisory Committee" means the Scientific Advisory Committee 
on Atomic Energy established by Section 5 of this Act. 
(b) "Atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course 
of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. 
(c) "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except 
special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to 
the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special 
nuclear material. 
(d) "Director" means the Director of Atomic Energy Activities ap-
pointed under the authority of Section 3 of this Act. 
(e) "Government agency" means any political subdivision or any 
officer, department, bureau, division, board, authority, agency, com-
mission, or institution of this state or any political subdivision, except 
the judicial branch and the legislature. 
(f) "Operator" means any individual who manipulates the controls of 
a utilization or production facility. 
(g) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, joint-
stock company, public or private corporation, or government agency. 
(h) "Production facility" means any equipment or device capable of the 
production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of 
significance to the common defense and security of the United States, 
or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public. 
FUTURE STATE REGULATION 1091 
(i) "Radiation" means gamma rays and X-rays, alpha and beta parti-
cles, high speed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles 
or electromagnetic radiations capable of producing ions directly or 
indirectly in their passage through matter, but does not include sound 
or radio waves, or visible, infra-red, or ultra-violet light. 
(j) "Radiation safety rule" means every rule, regulation, or order of 
general application, including any amendment or repeal thereof, adopted 
and promulgated by the Safety Board pursuant to this Act. 
(k) "Radiation source" means any radioactive material or any instru-
ment, equipment, machine, installation, or other device used for the 
production of radiation. 
(I) "Radioactive material" means any material, solid, liquid, or gas, 
that emits radiation spontaneously. 
(m) "Safety Board" means the Radiation Safety Standards Board 
established by Section 4 of this Act. 
(n) "Source material" means uranium, thorium, or any other material 
which the Safety Board declares by rule to be source material after the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has made a 
similar determination ; or ores containing one or more of the foregoing 
materials, in such concentrations as the Safety Board declares by rule 
after the United States Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has 
made a similar determination. 
( o) "Special nuclear material" means ( 1) plutonium and uranium en-
riched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material 
which the Safety Board declares by rule to be special nuclear material 
after the United States Atomic Energy Commission by regulation has 
made a similar determination; or ( 2) any material artificially enriched 
by any of the foregoing. 
(p) "Utilization facility" means any equipment or device, except an 
atomic weapon, capable of making use of special nuclear material in such 
quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security of 
the United States, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety 
of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy in 
such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security 
of the United States. 
Comment 
The meanings of the terms used in this act are identical or consistent 
with those of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or, where additional 
terms are included, with those used by the National Committee on Radi-
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ation Protection and Measurement. Consistency is particularly impor-
tant because atomic energy affairs have such broad interstate and inter-
national ramifications and are subject to both federal and state control. 
The definition of "atomic energy" is taken from the federal statute ; 13 
however, for purposes of this act, it is used primarily in connection with 
the promotional program and not with health and safety regulation. It 
should be noted that while the meaning of this term is sufficiently broad 
to include both fission and fusion processes, it does not include all 
forms of energy which can give rise to harmful radiations. 
The key terms used in connection with the health and safety program 
are "special nuclear material," "byproduct material," "source material," 
"production facility," "utilization facility," "operator," "radiation," 
"radiation source," and "radioactive material." The first six terms are 
used in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954/' and the federal definitions 
have been followed insofar as possible, or necessary. However, because 
these terms are not entirely s.atisfactory, in light of the state's broader 
radiation health and safety problem, they are only used in Section S(a) 
which prohibits activities for which an AEC license is required unless 
such a license is obtained. It was necessary to modify the definitions of 
several of these terms to avoid the possibility of an unconstitutional 
delegation of state power to the AEC.13 
The definition of the term "radiation" follows the NCRPM defini-
tion; 16 however, certain changes were deemed advisable to avoid pos.: 
sible omission. The definition is sufficiently broad to cover the possible 
discovery of new types of injurious radiation. 
Because of the fact that some sources of radiation, such as radium 
and other spontaneous radiation emitters, may constitute hazards to 
heaJth irrespective of how or whether they are being used, and whether 
they are stationary or in transport, it was necessary to include both a 
general term, "radiation source," which includes both materials and ma-
chines, and a more limited term, "radioactive material." As defined, 
18 68 Stat. 923 (1954), 42 u.s.c.A. §2014(c). 
H 68 Stat. 922-4 (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §2014. 
u Under the terms of this act, the Safety Board has the power (within prescribed 
limits) to determine what is "source material" and "special nuclear material." It is 
believed that the imposition of a limitation on this power, which would first require a 
similar determination by the AEC, does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of 
state power to a federal agency. 
16 The term "radiation" is defined by the NCRPM as "gamma rays and X-rays, 
alpha and beta particles, high-speed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear 
particles; but not sound or radio waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light." 
National Bureau of Standards Handbook 61 at 27. 
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"radiation source" provides broader coverage than would be achieved 
by using only those terms defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 
Section 3· Director of Atomic Energy Activities: appointment, quali-
ficat£ons, term, salary, duties, and powers 
(a) The Governor, with the approval of the Senate, shall appoint a per-
son having training and experience in radiation protection, or a related 
science, to be Director of Atomic Energy Activities. In submitting any 
nomination for the position of Director to the Senate, the Governor 
shall set forth the training, experience, and other qualifications of the 
nominee. The Director shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor, and 
he shall receive an annual salary of $ .. The Director shall not 
engage in any business, vocation, or employment other than that of 
serving as Director of Atomic Energy Activities. The Department of 
-------shall provide suitable office facilities for the Director. 
(b) The Director shall-
( 1) act as adviser to the Governor on all atomic energy matters 
and, as deputy to the Governor, advise, consult and cooperate with 
the federal government, interstate agencies, other states, government 
agencies of this state, and other persons and groups, public and private, 
in furtherance of the purposes of this Act; 
( 2) with the consent of the Governor, represent the interest of the 
state in communications, negotiations, transactions, and other dealings 
with the federal government, interstate agencies, and other states con-
cerning atomic energy and radiation safety matters; 
(3) submit reports at least once each year, and at such other times 
as the Governor may direct, to the Governor and to the Legislature con-
cerning developments in atomic energy and radiation safety matters and 
make such recommendations as should be considered by them ; 
(4) serve as a member of (e.g., the commission of economic 
development) ; 
( 5) serve as chairman and chief administrative officer of the 
Safety Board; 
( 6) serve as secretary, without vote, of the Advisory Committee; 
( 7) develop comprehensive policies and programs-
( a) for the evaluation and determination of radiation hazards 
to guide the Safety Board and government agencies charged with the 
enforcement of radiation safety rules; and 
(b) for the development and utilization of atomic energy for 
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peaceful purposes to guide (e.g., the commission of economic develop-
ment) and other government agencies ; 
(8) receive and maintain the following records, reports, and writ-
ten opinions, and disseminate the information therein contained to any 
interested and affected government agency in accordance with the rules 
issued by the Safety Board : 
(a) registration records required by Section 8 of this Act 
and the rules promulgated by the Safety Board; 
(b) other reports required to be submitted to the Director by 
Section 8 of this Act and the rules promulgated by the Safety Board; 
and 
(c) written opinions of the Advisory Committee required to 
be submitted by Sections 4 and 5 of this Act; and 
( 9) collect and disseminate information relating to the promotion 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and radiation protection to any 
government agency and to any interested person or group. 
(c) The Director may- · 
( 1) accept and administer loans, grants, or other funds and gifts 
from the federal government and from other sources, public and private, 
for carrying out the purposes of this Act; 
( 2) encotirage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigations, 
research, and demonstrations deemed necessary and desirable to further 
the purposes of this Act; 
(3) employ, train, and prescribe the powers and duties of such 
persons as may be deemed necessary and desirable to assist him in carry-
ing out the provisions of this Act; and 
(4) train and instruct the personnel of other government agencies 
in matters relating to the promotion of atomic energy and the control of 
radiation hazards upon the request of the government agencies con-
cerned. 
(d) The Director shall utilize the services and personnel of other 
government agencies to assist him in carrying out his duties under this 
Act insofar as practicable and with the consent of the government 
agencies concerned. 
Comment 
Section 3 creates the office of Director of Atomic Energy Activities 
to be filled by a person who is experienced in radiation protection or a 
related science and who will devote his full energies and time to the 
duties of the office. Atomic energy is of sufficient importance to the 
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state to warrant making the problems of radiation protection and pro-
motional programs the responsibility of a state official. Moreover, 
coordination of state activities is desirable in at least three senses : (I) 
coordination of the policies, regulations, and actions of the several inter-
ested state agencies and officers; ( 2) coordination of the state program 
with those of the federal government and other states; and (3) coordi-
nation of the promotional and regulatory phases of the state program. 
Essential coordination can be achieved through the creation of the office 
of the Director. 
The duties imposed under Section 3 (b) and designed to establish his 
position as the state official primarily responsible for state atomic energy 
affairs include : (I ) acting as adviser to the governor and, as deputy 
to the governor to advise, consult, and cooperate with the federal gov-
ernment, interstate agencies, other states, and state and local govern-
mental agencies and private groups ; ( 2) representing the state, with 
consent of the governor, in negotiations with agencies outside the state; 
(3) reporting to the governor and legislature; (4) serving as a member 
of the state's economic or industrial development commission; (S) serv-
ing as chairman of the Radiation Safety Standards Board; ( 6) serving 
as secretary of the Scientific Advisory Committee; ( 7) developing com-
prehensive state policy and programs for the determination and evalua-
tion of radiation hazards and for atomic energy promotional programs; 
(8) receiving and maintaining records, reports, and opinions required 
under the act; and ( 9) collecting and disseminating information relative 
to atomic energy affairs. 
The most important duty of the Director is that of chairman and 
chief administrative officer of the Radiation Safety Standards Board. 
As the only full-time member and the only member required to have ex-
perience in radiation protection, it is contemplated that the Director will 
play a major role in the development and promulgation of radiation 
safety rules and standards. Although enforcement of the rules is the 
responsibilty of other state agencies. under the act, the general powers 
are sufficiently broad to assure that the Director will be informed of 
enforcement problems so that whatever additional action is called for 
can be taken by either the Director or the Radiation Safety Standards 
Board. Knowledge of new problems will be available by reason of the 
fact that the Director is responsible for receiving and maintaining all 
records, reports, and opinions required under other sections of the act. 
At this time one of the most compelling needs is the availability of a 
state official to represent the state in negotiations with the AEC. When-
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ever problems of state-federal relations arise today, the AEC is faced 
with the task of negotiating with several state officers, none of whom 
may represent all state and local agencies. As a result, the AEC may 
avoid negotiations merely because of the complexities involved. With 
the approval of the governor under Section 3 (b) ( 2) the Director can 
act as representative of the state in negotiations. It should be noted, 
however, that the Director cannot commit the state to any particular 
program affecting another state agency without that agency's approval 
or definitive legislative or executive action. 
The discretionary powers of the Director include : (I) accepting and 
administering loans, grants, or gifts; ( 2) participating in or conducting 
studies, investigation, and research; and ( 3) employing and training 
personnel to assist him in carrying out his duties. Since the enforce~ 
ment of radiation safety rules is the responsibility of other state 
agencies, it is. expected that the Director will be assisted by a rather small 
staff organization. 
Section 4· Establishment of the Radiation Safety Standards Board; 
composition, powers, and duties 
(a) There is hereby established a Radiation Safety Standards Board 
consisting of (I) the Director of Atomic Energy Activities, who shall 
be chairman, (2) (e.g., the state health commissioner), (3) (e.g., the 
public service commissioner), (4) (e.g., the labor commissioner), and 
(S) (e.g., the state police commissioner). The members shall have equal 
responsibility and authority. The powers and duties of the Safety Board 
shall be exercised only in accordance with a majority vote of the entire 
membership. 
(b) The Safety Board shall-
( I) develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evalua-
tion, determination, and control of radiation hazards in this state; 
( 2) adopt and promulgate, in accordance with Section 6 of this 
Act and as may be deemed necessary and advisable to protect persons 
and property, all radiation sa'fety rules relating to (a) radiation safety 
standards, (b) enforcement of radiation safety standards, (c) registra-
tion, keeping of records, and submission of reports in connection with 
radiation sources, and (d) dissemination of information contained in 
the records and reports to government agencies ; 
(3) make continuing studies and submit reports, from time to 
time, to the Governor and to the Legislature concerning radiation dis-
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aster problems and the need for changes in the laws of the state to 
protect persons and property ; and 
( 4) make a study and submit a report to the Governor and to the 
L~gislature concerning the establishment of a schedule of gradual 
annual registration fees for radiation sources to defray the costs of the 
administration and enforcement of this Act, including the radiation 
safety rules promulgated by the Safety Board. 
(c) The Safety Board may-
( I) order the Director to encourage, participate in, or conduct 
studies, . investigations, training, research, and demonstrations relating 
to the control of radiation hazards, the measureme?t of radiation, the 
effects on health of exposure to radiation, and related problems; 
( 2) render opinions, upon request, concerning such plans and 
specifications on the design and shielding of radiation sources as may be 
submitted before or after construction, for the puq~ose of determining 
the possible radiation hazard ; and 
(3) order the Director to convene the Advisory Committee or to 
request written opinions from its members in connection with any mat-
ter relating to radiation safety. 
Comment 
Section 4 creates the Radiation Safety Standards Board which is 
charged primarily with the task of promulgating radiation safety rules. 
Aside from purely political or economic considerations, it appears desir-
able that the heads of other state departments or agencies having en-
forcement responsibilities under the act should have the power to adopt 
radiation rules. These representatives of other agencies will be able to 
assess the capabilities of their agencies and are more qualified to deter-
mine the respective jurisdictions of the state agencies concerned with the 
various radiation safety problems. Although these officers may not be 
trained specifically in radiation safety, their broader regulatory experi-
ence is invaluable. The task of training is offset by the presence of the 
Director of Atomic Energy Activities and the availability of the Sci-
entific Advisory Committee for consultation and recommendations con-
cerning the content of specific rules. Although all state agencies having 
an interest in atomic energy affairs are not included in the recommen-
dations, it is believed that the membership should not exceed five in 
order to prevent the Board from becoming unwieldy as an administra~ 
tive body. 
Section 4(b) imposes upon the Board the duties of: (I) developing 
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comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation, determination, 
and control of radiation hazards; (2) promulgating rules relating to 
radiation safety standards, enforcement of radiation safety standards, 
registration, maintenance of records and reports, and dissemination of 
information; (3) making studies and reports to the governor and legis-
lature concerning radiation disaster problems; and ( 4) studying the 
problem of registration fees and reporting thereon. 
The Safety Board is authorized to direct one or more state agencies 
to be responsible for the enforcement of specific radiation safety rules. 
It is expected, of course, that unnecessary duplications will be avoided, 
not only in the ·interest of economy, but also to minimize the burdens 
imposed on the persons using radiation sources. Although the Director 
is charged with the responsibility of receiving and maintaining records 
and reports, the Safety Board is given the power to adopt regulations 
affecting this responsibility. 
The "radiation disaster" problem, including both war disaster and 
major reactor mishaps, requires careful study and perhaps the enactment 
of new legislation or even constitutional revision. Among the possible 
types of action that may be necessary in the event of a radiation disaster 
are mobilization of the state's mili~ry and police forces, large-scale 
evacuation efforts, seizure and destruction of contaminated private 
property, and decontamination of property and persons. To date, the 
radiation disaster problem has not received careful deliberative efforts 
at either the federal or state levels, and it appears desirabie that some 
state agency should undertake the task of studying the problems involved 
and making recommendations as to feasible courses of action. 
In view of the fact that many states have fiscal problems in estab-
lishing new governmental agencies, some method of financing of a state 
atomic energy program is essential. Since the users of radiation sources 
may be in a position of being able to pass the costs of a radiation safety 
program to the consumer of the products, it appears feasible that a 
major percentage of the costs to the state could be recovered through 
registration fees. The precise form the fee schedule should take, how-
ever, cannot be accurately ascertained until the nature of radiation 
sources within the state is compiled. The registration requirements under 
the act will provide essential information as to the potential hazard 
created by each radiation source and the probable scope of state supervi-
sion and inspection. On the basis of this information the Safety Board 
will be capable of making explicit recommendations concerning the 
establishment of an equitable fee schedule. 
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Under Section_4(c) the discretionary powers of the Safety Board are 
set forth. Because existing governmental agencies will enforce radiation 
safety rules, those agencies will require considerable assistance from 
qualified persons to instruct personnel in procedures and measurements. 
Furthermore, as new uses of radiation emerge, a qualified person should 
make an investigation to determine the best method of protecting the 
public health and safety against possible hazards. It is therefore suitable 
for the Director, as a qualified person in radiation safety, to undertake 
the$e tasks at the request of the Board which is representative of the 
state agencies. 
Although the Board is not a body of radiological safety experts, it 
has the necessary means available to render opinions, upon request, con-
cerning plans and specifications of installations employing radiation 
sources. Although the recommended statute of the National Committee 
on Radiation Protection and Measurement makes this requirement man-
datory, in some instances, particularly in respect to new reactor designs, 
the state personnel will not be qualified to render opinions. The opinions, 
although purely advisory and not binding, in respect to installations 
where the radiation problems are well understood would, of course, be 
helpful to the potential user of a radiation source in that expensive alter-
ations to conform to state standards may be avoided. Two arguments 
have been advanced in opposition to the creation of even a discretionary 
power to render opinions. First, it has been contended that during the 
initial phases of a state program that the state officials involved will be 
so burdened with other duties that it is inadvisable to assign even a dis-
cretionary power. Secondly, the question of the possible effect on 
litigation regarding injuries to persons and property in the event of a 
failure to seek an advisory opinion has been raised. On balance, it has 
been concluded that the discretionary power should be granted to the 
Board in the belief that some major assistance could be rendered users 
even during the earlier period of the state program and that the impact 
upon tort litigation will be relatively insignificant. 
Section S· Establishment of the Scientific Advisory Committee on 
Atomic Energy; composition, qualifications, appointment, 
term, compensation, functions, and duties 
(a) There is hereby established a Scientific Advisory Committee on 
Atomic Energy to consist of five persons, who each have training and 
experience m a science related to the development and utilization of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and representing, as a group, 
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the broadest possible range of training and experience in atomic energy 
matters. The members of the Advisory Committee shall be appointed by 
the Governor for terms of five years, except that initial appointments 
and filling of vacancies shall be so made that the term of one appointed 
member expires each year. The members of the Advisory Committee, 
while engaged in the work of the Advisory Committee, shall be entitled 
to receive compensation at$ per diem and reimbursement for 
actual and necessary traveling and subsistence expenses. The Advisory 
Committee shall meet or submit written opinions, or both, at the request 
of the Director. 
(b) Within thirty days after submission of a proposed radiation safety 
rule by the Safety Board, as provided in Section 6 of this Act, the 
Advisory Committee shall submit a written opinion to the Director as 
to the desirability of the rule. When requested by the Director, the 
Advisory Committee also shall ( r) review the policies, programs, and 
rules developed and promulgated pur-suant to this Act; ( 2) make such 
recommendations a:s are deemed necessary and desirable; and ( 3) give 
technical advice and assistance on matters relating to the promotion and 
control of atomic energy in this state. 
Comment 
Section 5 creates the Scientific Advisory Committee on Atomic En-
ergy, composed of five persons trained in sciences related to the de-
velopment and utilization of atomic energy. The Committee is to be 
composed of part-time personnel paid on a per diem basis so that highly 
qualified persons can be attracted to accept the positions. 
Section S(b) requires the Advisory Committee to submit written 
opinions on proposed safety rules within thirty days after their sub-
mission by the Radiation Safety Standards Board. Through this device, 
technologically competent review of proposed rules will be achieved. 
The Safety Board, however, has final authority in deciding the precise 
nature of radiation safety rules. Upon request by the Director, the 
Advisory Committee also is directed to review the state policies and 
programs, to make suitable recommendations, and to give technical 
advice and assistance on atomic energy matters. 
While the act bestows final authority upon the Safety Board to 
promulgate relations, this subsection is designed to assure that they 
are necessary and adequate. In effect, the Advisory Committee is an 
entirely independent board of technical experts which not only advises 
and assists the Safety Board in establishing radiation safety standards 
FUTURE STATE REGULATION 1101 
and issuing regulations, but also must publish its opinions on the de-
sirability of each rule before it becomes effective. These opinions are 
received and kept on file by the Director, and are intended to indicate 
how well the regulations conform with current scientific thought. 
It should be noted that the Advisory Board is not limited to giving 
advice and assistance on radiation safety matters. Through the Director, 
this body is available to give technical advice and assistance on any 
atomic energy or radiation matter to any agency of the state govern-
ment. 
Section ·6. Promulgation of radiation safety rules 
(a) The Safety Board shall have the exclusive authority in this state to 
adopt and promulgate radiation safety rules relating to ( 1) radiation 
safety standards, (2) enforcement of radiation safety standards, (3) 
registration, keeping of records, and submission of reports in connection 
with radiation sources, and (4) dissemination of information con-
tained in the records and reports to government agencies. In adopting 
and promulgating a radiation safety rule, the Safety Board shall desig-
nate the government agency or agencies which shall enforce the rule. In 
making the enforcement agency selection, the Safety Board shall give 
due consideration to the technical qualifications and to the enforcement 
powers and jurisdiction of the individual government agencies. 
(b) Except where the rules and standards of federal agencies or nation-
ally recognized bodies in the field of radiation safety are deemed inade-
quate for this state, the Safety Board, in the interest of uniformity, shall 
make its radiation safety rules consistent with federal rules or, in the 
case of radiation hazards not regulated by federal agencies, with the 
recommended rules and standards of nationally recognized bodies in the 
field of radiation safety, such as the National Committee on Radiation 
Protection and Measurement or the Ameriean Standards Association. 
(c) In promulgating radiation safety rules the Safety Board shall com-
ply with the provisions of (e.g., the state administrative procedure act). 
Not less than thirty days before final approval of a proposed radiation 
rule, the Safety Board shall submit the proposed rule to the Advisory 
Committee for its review and recommendations, except that, upon his 
finding of emergency need, the Governor may waive all or any part of 
the thirty day period. 
Comment 
Section 6 (a) establishes the jurisdiction of the Radiation Safety 
Standards Board in respect to radiation safety rules and authorizes the 
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Safety Board to determine enforcement agencies by rule. The Safety 
Board is given exclusive jurisdiction within . the state to promulgate 
radiation safety rules relating to radiation safety standards, to enforce 
radiation safety standards, registration, record maintenance, and sub-
mission of reports, and dissemination of information contained in rec-
ords and reports to government agencies. In selecting the enforcement 
agency, the Safety Board is to consider the technical qualifications of 
the state agencies and the powers and jurisdiction of the state agencies. 
However, the section does not impose any rigid requirements in select-
ing enforcement agencies so that complete flexibility is possible. 
Section 6(b) recognizes the desirability of uniformity in the field 
of radiation safety standards and therefore directs the Safety Board to 
adopt, whenever possible, regulations consistent with standards em-
ployed by the federal government or nationally recognized bodies in the 
field of radiation safety. 
Section 6 (c) requires the Safety Board to comply with the provisions 
of the state administrative pr'ocedure act in relation to rule-making. In 
addition, the Safety Board is required to submit its proposed rules to the 
Scientific Advisory Committee for review and recommendations thirty 
days before final approval. The governor is given the power to waive 
all or part of the thirty day period. If a state does not have a state ad-
ministrative procedure act, it may be desirable to add provisions relating 
to the rule-making process including notice of proposed rule-making to 
interested persons, opportunities for interested persons to submit written 
opinions, and hearings. 
Section 7· Enforcement of radiation safety rules; powers and duties 
of enforcing government agencies 
(a) Only those government agencies authorized by the Safety Board, 
pursuant to Section 6(a) of this Act, shall have the power and the duty 
to enforce the radiation safety rules of this state. The enforcing govern-
ment agencies shall receive from the Director such information and tech-
nical advice and assistance as he is capable of providing and as is neces-
sary for the enforcement of radiation safety rules. 
(b) The enforcing government agency shall have the power to enter at 
reasonable times upon any public or private property wherein a radiation 
source exists for the purpose of inspecting and investigating conditions 
and examining records relative to the purposes of this Act and the radi-
ation safety rules the government agency is authorized to enforce. If 
such inspection and examination indicates that the radiation source does 
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not constitute a hazard to persons and property and is in compliance 
with radiation safety rules, the owner, operator, or user shall be so noti-
fied in writing by the government agency. 
( c_) When, in connection with a radiation source within its enforcement 
jurisdiction, a government agency finds that an emergency exists re-
quiring immediate action to protect persons and property from radia-
tion hazards, it shall, without notice or hearing, issue an order reciting 
the existence of such emergency and requiring that such action be taken 
as it deems necessary to meet the emergency. Any person to whom such 
order is issued shall comply immediately. On application to the govern-
ment agency, the person to whom the emergency order has been issued 
shall be afforded a hearing by the government agency within thirty days 
and in accordance with the provisions of (e.g.; the state administrative 
procedure act). On the basis of such hearing the government agency, in 
its final order, may continue such emergency order in effect, revoke it, 
or modify it. 
(d) When, in connection with a radiation source within its enforce-
ment jurisdiction, a government agency finds that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a radiation hazard exists or that there is a con-
tinuing violation of radiation safety rules, but which does not constitute 
an emergency requiring immediate action to protect persons and prop-
erty, it shall give written notice to the alleged violator or violators speci-
fying the grounds of the complaint and the action to be taken to correct 
the alleged violation. This notice shall require that the alleged violations 
be corrected or that the alleged violator or violators appear before the 
agency at a time and place specified in the notice. The notice shall be 
delivered not less than thirty days before the time set for the hearing. 
Before any order issued under this subsection shall become final, the 
government agency shall afford the alleged violator or violators an op-
portunity for hearing, and, on the basis of evidence produced at the hear-
ing, shall enter such final order as will best effectuate the purposes of 
this Act and the radiation safety rules it is authorized to enforce. 
Written notice of such final order shall be given to the alleged violator 
or violators and to such other persons as may have appeared at the 
hearing and made written request for notice of the order. The notice 
and hearing required by this subsection shall conform to the provisions 
of (e.g., the state administrative·procedure act). The final order of the 
government agency under this subsection shall become binding on all 
parties to the hearing within thirty days after notice of it has been sent 
to the parties, unless it· shall be appealed to the courts as provided in 
(e.g., the state administrative procedure act). 
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(e) In the event of a violation of an emergency order or a final order, 
the government agency shall immediately apply to the circuit court of 
the county wherein the violation occurs for an order to restrain and 
enjoin the persons responsible for such violation. In any action for an 
injunction brought pursuant to this subsection, any findings of the gov-
ernment agency after hearing or due notice shall be prima facie evidence 
of the fact or facts found therein. No bond shall be required when such 
injunctive relief is sought upon the application of the government 
agency, the attorney general, or the prosecuting attorney of any county. 
(f) Any person aggrieyed by a final order issued by a government 
agency authorized to enforce radiation safety rules is entitled to judicial 
review thereof in the circuit court in the county wherein the person 
resides or has a place of business in the state or in the circuit court for 
------County, within thirty days after personal service of the 
final decision of the government agency or within thirty days after 
the mailing thereof, if notice is given by mail. Judicial review of this 
final decision shall be controlled by the provisions of (e.g., the state 
administrative procedure act). 
(g) Government agencies acting under the authority of this section 
shall give written notice to the Director of all emergency and final 
orders within days after issuance and of all applications for 
injunction within days after filing with the court. 
(h) Except as specifically provided in this section, nothing in this Act 
shall be construed as extending any government agency's jurisdiction 
over persons, property, or activities within this state. 
Comment 
Section 7' establishes the procedures and methods for the enforcement 
of radiation safety rules. Subsection (a) defines the jurisdiction of the 
enforcing governmental agencies and provides that the Director shall 
render technical advice and assistance to the agencies. Subsection (b) 
authorizes the enforcing agency to inspect and investigate facilities. 
In addition, the agency is to give written notice to the owner, operator, 
or user of a radiation source if -it finds that the radiation source does 
not constitute a hazard and that there is compliance with the radiation 
safety rules. 
Section 7 (c) authorizes the enforcing agency to enter emergency 
orders whenever immediate action is necessary to protect persons and 
property. Although the emergency orders may be issued without notice 
and hearing, a hearing within thirty days is required upon application 
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of the affected person. Meanwhile, compliance with the order is re-
quired. The hearing procedure is governed by the applicable provisions 
of the state administrative procedure act. After the hearing, the gov-
ernment agency may enter a final order continuing, revoking, or modify-
ing the emergency order. 
Section 7(d) authorizes the enforcing agency to give written notice 
of alleged violations whenever an emergency situation does not exist. 
The notice is to specify the nature of the hazard or violation and· the 
action deemed necessary by the agency to correct the violation. A hear-
ing is required before the entry of a final order, and after entry thereof, 
judicial review may be obtained in accordance with the provisions of the 
applicable state administrative procedure act. If the state does not have 
general legislation covering administrative procedures, the statute should 
be amended to include basic provisions relating to notice, hearing, and 
judicial review. 
Section 7 (e) authorizes the government agency to apply to the appro-
priate state court for necessary injunctions whenever there is a contin-
uing violation of an emergency or final order. The findings of the 
government agency are made prima facie evidence of the facts, and the 
government agency is relieved of any bonding requirements when seek-
ing injunctive relief. Section 7 (f) assures that any aggrieved person 
may receive judicial review of agency action which. is final. Section 
7(g) requires the enforcing government agency to give written notice 
of any emergency or final order to the Director so that he may be kept 
currently informed of all enforcement problems. The Director will be 
able to inform the Safety Board of any problems requiring revision of 
rules or statutes. Section 7(h) assures that the statute will not be con-
strued as extending the jurisdiction of any government agency except 
as specifically provided. 
Section 8. United States licenses or permits required; registration of 
radiation sources required; compliance with radiation safety 
rules required 
(a) No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, use, transfer, 
acquire, or possess any source material, byproduct material, special 
nuclear material, production facility, or utilization facility, or act as an 
operator of a production or utilization facility within this state unless 
he shall have first obtained a license or permit for the activity from the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission, if pursuant to the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, a license or permit is required. 
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(b) No person shall produce radiation or produce, use, transport, store, 
or dispose of radioactive materials, or modify, extend, or alter such 
activities, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the 
radiation safety rules promulgated thereunder, or emergency or final 
orders issued to such person by a government agency authorized to 
enforce radiation safety rules. 
(c) Subject to exceptions provided by the rules of the Safety Board, 
every person who produces radiation or produces, uses, transports, 
stores, or disposes of radioactive materials, shall register annually in 
writing with the Director in accordance with rules established and on 
forms provided by the Safety Board. If the person modifies, extends, or 
alters such activities, he shall amend his registration accordingly. The 
Safety Board may by rule exempt from the requirements of registration 
persons who produce minimal quantities of radiation or who produce, 
use, transport, store, or dispose of minimal quantities of radioactive 
materials which· the Safety Board determines have no substantial effect 
on the public health and safety. 
Comment 
Section 8 requires compliance with the licensing and permit provisions 
of. the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, compliance with radiation safety 
rules and lawful orders entered in accordance with the provisions of the 
act, and registration of radiation sources. Section 8 (a) is similar to 
Section 2 of the New England Model Act, and, while perhaps not es-
sential, the provision may serve a useful purpose in the event that con-
stitutional difficulties prevent enforcement of existing AEC licensing 
practices. Section 8{b) establishes the positive requirement that each 
person producing radiation or producing, using,, tra.nsporti!lg,, storing, 
or disposing of radioactive materials comply with radiation safety rules 
and emergency or final orders issued in accordance with the I>rovi~ion.s 
of the act. 
Section 8 (c) requires the same persons to register annually with the 
Director and to amend registrations if activities are modified. The 
Radiation Safety Standards Board is empowered to exempt persons 
from the registration requirements if the Board determines that there 
is no substantial public health and safety problem involved. The regis-
tration requirement assures that the Board will have knowledge of all 
radiation hazards. Although the AEC now informs state officials of 
the issuance of federal licenses, the registration requirement is essential 
to ascertain the natute of radiation hazards not covered by federal legis-
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lation. The Safety Board is to establish rules for registration and, in 
respect to a single radiation source, more than one person may be re-
quired to register if the Board finds such a requirement beneficial. This 
may be particularly desirable whenever, for example, the owner of the 
radiation source has no control over the utilization of the source. 
Section 9· Penalties 
(a) Any person who violates any provision of Section 8 of this Act 
or any radiation safety rule promulgated pursuant to this Act shall, upon 
conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $b----
(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of Section 8 of 
this Act or any radiation safety rule promulgated pursuant to this Act 
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $~>---­
or imprisonment for not more than , or both. Each day on 
which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation. 
(c) Any person who violates any emergency or final order issued pur-
suant to Section 7 of this Act by a government agency authorized to 
enforce radiation safety rules shall, upon conviction, be subject to a 
fine of not more than $ , or imprisonment for not more than 
---, or both. Each day on which such violation occurs shall con-
stitute a separate violation. 
Comment 
Section 9 establishes criminal penalties for three types of offenses : 
( 1) simple violations of radiation safety rules, (2) willful (i.e., know-
ing and intentional) violations of radiation safety rules, and (3) viola-
tions of emergency or final orders. As to the second and third types, 
each day on which a violation occurs constitutes a separate offense. 
While the amount of the fines and the duration of the imprisonments 
is not specified, it is felt that the penalties should increase in the order 
in which the offenses are listed. On this matter, however, it should be 
pointed out that the state, in prescribing the magnitude of the penalties, 
would pe well advised to consider those established by the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, for the Supreme Court has indicated that state 
penalties in excess of those provided by federal laws concerning the 
same offense are a factor to be considered in deciding in favor of federal 
pre-emption.11 Under federal law a willful violation, or conspiracy to 
violate, a radiation safety regulation of the AEC may " ... be pun-
17 See the dissenting opinion in California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 S. Ct. 841 
(1!)4.8). 
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ished by a fine of no more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more 
than two years, or both." 18 
Section 10. Conduct of studies concerning changes in laws and rules 
with a view to the promotion of atomic energy uses 
The following state agencies are directed to initiate and to pursue 
continuing studies as to the need for changes in the laws and rules ad-
ministered by them in order to encourage the optimum development of 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy in this state, and, on the basis of such 
studies, to make such recommendations to the Governor and to the 
Legislature for the revision of laws as may appear necessary and 
appropriate : 
(a) The department of economic development, particularly as to 
opportunities for atomic energy industries. 
(b) The department of public instruction, particularly as to the need 
and facilities for scientific instruction and training. · 
(c) The department of agriculture, particularly as to the uses of atomic 
energy in agriculture. 
(d) The department of insurance, particularly as to the insurance of 
persons and property from hazards to life and property resulting from 
atomic energy development. 
(e) The department of workmen's compensation, particularly as to the 
time and character of proof of claims of radiation injuries and the 
extent of compensation allowable therefor. 
(f) The public service commission, particularly as to the participation 
by public utilities in projt:cts and research looking to the development 
of production and utilization facilities of commercial and industrial use. 
(g) Such other government agencies as the Governor may direct and 
for the purposes specified by him. 
Comment 
With respect to a similar provision the New England Committee on 
Atomic Energy stated : 
This section is premised on the supposition that study will 
disclose a need for a number of changes in existing laws and 
regulations to take care of new conditions created by atomic 
development for peaceful uses. The statutory directive will 
justify the use by the several departments and agencies of 
their personnel in making the studies thus called for, a step 
that some of them might otherwise be reluctant to make.19 
1s 68 Stat. 958 ( 1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §2273. 
19 Atomic Energy and New England 65 (1955). 
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Section I I. Non-applicability of this Act 
(a) Nothing in this Act, or in the radiation safety rules promulgated 
pursuant to this Act, shall be construed to apply to installations owned 
or operated by the federal government or to radiation sources operated 
by the federal government, unless such application is specifically author-
ized by the federal government. 
(b) Nothing in this Act, or in the radiation safety rules promulgated 
pursuant to this Act, shall be construed to limit the kind or amount of 
radiation that may be intentionally applied to a person for diagnostic or 
therapeutic purposes by, or under the direction of, a duly licensed 
member of the healing professions. 
Comment 
Section II (a) recognizes the overriding power of the federal gov-
ernment in relation to its own activities and property. Radiation sources 
owned and operated by other than the federal government but for the 
federal government are not exempted, but federally owned installations 
operated by private contractors are exempted. 
Section I I (b) prevents any restriction upon the kind or amount of 
radiation intentionally employed for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes 
by persons duly licensed under state law. However, radiation safety 
rules may be established for medical radiation sources in respect to 
shielding, the storage of radioactive isotopes, exposure to personnel, 
and other matters. Only the exposure to which a patient may be sub-
mitted for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes is exempted. 
Section I2. E.~isting rules preserved; pending proceedings 
(a) Until a superseding radiation safety rule has been promulgated by 
the Safety Board, all health and safety laws or rules concerning radia-
tion shall remain in effect and shall be enforced in the same manner as 
if this Act had not been adopted. 
(b) AU proceedings pending and all rights and liabilities existing, 
acquired, or incurred, at the time this Act takes effect, are hereby saved, 
and such proceedings shall be consummated under and according to the 
law in force at the time such proceedings are or were commenced. This 
Ad shall not be construed to alter, affect, or abate any pending prosecu-
tion, or prevent prosecution hereafter instituted under such repealed 
section, chapters, or acts for offenses committed prior to the effective 
date of this Act; and ail prosecutions pending at the effective date of 
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this Act, and all prosecutions instituted after the effective date of this 
Act, for offenses committed prior to the effective date of this Act, shall 
be continued or instituted under and in accordance with the provisions 
of the law in force at the time of the commission of such offenses. 
Section 13. Effective date; exception 
(a) This Act shall take effect ------
(b) The provisions of Section 8(c) of this Act shall not be effective 
until sixty days after the effective date of this Act as to persons engaged 
in activities requiring registration at the effective date of this Act. 
Appendix A 
ITEM 1 
ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMISSION 
10 Code Fed. Regs. Part 20 
STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 20.1 Purpose. (a) The regulations in this part establish standards for 
protection against radiation hazards arising out of activities under licenses 
issued by the Atomic Energy Commission and are issued pursuant to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919). 
(b) The use of radioactive material or· other sources of radiation not 
licensed by the Commission is not subject to. the regulations in this part; 
However, it is the purpose of the regulations in this part to control the pos-
session, use, and transfer of licensed material by any licensee in such a 
manner that exposure to such material and to radiation from such material, 
when added to exposures to unlicensed radioactive material and to other un-
licensed sources of radiation·in the possession of the licensee, and to radia-
tion therefrom, does not exceed the standards of radiation protection pre-
scribed in the regulations in this part. 
§ 20.2 Scope. The regulations in this part apply to all persons who re-
ceive, possess,·use or transfer byproduct material, source material, or special 
nuclear material under a general or specific license issued by the Commission 
pursuant to the regulations in Part 30, 40, or 70 of this chapter. 
· § 20.3 Definitions. (a) As used in this part: 
{i) ·"Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919) includ-
ing any· amendments thereto ; 
( 2) "Airborne radioactive material" means any radioactive material 
dispersed in the ·air in the form of dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, or gases ; 
(3) "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except special 
nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation 
incident to the process of produci~g or utilizing special nuclear material; 
(4) "Comm~ssion" ~ean's the Atomic Energy Commission or its duly 
autliorized representatives ; . · 
(5) "Governnient agency" means any executive department, commis-
sion, independent ~stablishment, corporation, wholly or partly owned by the 
United -States of Americci.which is an instrumentality of the United States, 
llll 
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or any board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administra-
tion, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government; 
(6) "Individual" means any human being; · 
(7) "Licensed material" means source material, special nuclear material, 
or byproduct material received, possessed, used, or transferred under a 
general or specific license issued by the Commission pursuant to the regula-
tions in this chapter ; 
(8) "License" means a license issued under the regulations in Part 30, 
40, or 70 of this chapter. "Licensee" means the holder of such license; 
(9) "Person" means (i) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, 
association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, Government 
agency other than the Commission, any State, any foreign government or 
nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nations, or 
other entity; and (ii) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency 
of the foregoing; . 
( 10) "Radiation" means any or all of the following: alpha rays, beta 
rays, gamma rays, X-rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed pro-
tons, and other atomic particles; but not sound or radio waves, or visible, 
infrared, or ultraviolet light; 
( 1 1) "Radioactive material" includes any such material whether or 
not subject to licensing control by the Commission; 
( 12) "Restricted area" means any area access to which is controlled by 
the licensee. "Restricted area" shall not include any areas used as residential 
quarters, although a separate room or rooms in a residential building may 
be set apart as a restricted area ; 
( 13) "Source material" means any material except special nuclear ma-
terial, which contains by weight one-twentieth of one percent ( 0.05 percent 
or more of (i) uranium, (ii) thorium, or (iii) any combination thereof; 
( 14) "Special nuclear material" means (i) plutonium, uranium 233, 
uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other 
material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51 
of the act, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include 
source material; or (ii) any material artificially enriched by any of the fore-
going but does not include source material ; 
( 15) "Unrestricted area" means any area entry into which is not con-
trolled by the licensee, and any area used for residential quarters. 
(b) Definitions of certain other words and phrases as used in this part 
are set forth in other sections, including ; 
( 1) "Airborne radioactivity area" defined in § 20.203 ; 
( 2) "Radiation area" and "high radiation area" defined in § 20.202 ; 
(3) "Personnel monitoring equipment" defined in § 20.202; 
(4) "Survey" defined in § 20.201; 
( 5) Units of measurements of dose ( rad, rem) defined in § 20-4; 
( 6) Units of measurement of radioactivity defined in § 20.5. 
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§ 204 Units of radiation dose. (a) "Dose," as used in this part, is the 
quantity of radiation absorbed, per unit of mass, by the body or by any por-
tion of the body. When the regulations in this part specify a dose during 
a period of time, the dose means the total quantity of radiation absorbed, 
pei: unit of mass, by the body or by any portion of the body during such 
period of time. Several different units of dose are in current use. Definitions 
of units as used in this part are set forth in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section. 
(b) The rad, as used in this part, is a measure of the dose of any ionizing 
radiation to body tissues in terms of the energy absorbed per unit mass of 
the tissue. One rad is the dose corresponding to the absorption of 100 ergs 
per gram of tissue. (One millirad (mrad) =0.001 rad.) 
(c) The rem, as used in this part, is a measure of the dose of any ionizing 
radiation to body tissue in terms of its estimated biological effect relative 
to a dose of one roentgen (r) of X-rays. (One millirem (mrem) =!M>OI 
rem.) The relation of the rem to other dose units depends upon the biologi-
cal effect under consideration and upon the conditions of irradiation. For 
the purpose of the regulations in this part, any of the following is con-
sidered to be equivalent to a dose of one rem : 
(I) A dose of I r due to X- or gamma radiation; 
( 2) A dose of I rad due to X-, gamma, or beta radiation ; 
(3) A dose of 0.1 rad due to neutrons or high energy protons; 
(4) A dose of 0.05 rad due to particles heavier than protons and with 
sufficient energy to reach the lens of the eye ; 
If it is more convenient to measure the neutron flux, or equivalent, than 
to determine the neutron dose in rads, as provided in subparagraph (3) of 
this paragraph, one rem of neutron radiation may, for purposes of the regu-
lations in this part, be assumed to be equivalent to I4 million neutrons per 
square centimeter incident upon the body; or, if there exists sufficient in-
formation to estimate with reasonable accuracy the approximate distribution 
in energy of the neutrons, the incident number of neutrons per square centi-
meter equivalent to one rem may be estimated from the following table: 
Number of neutrons 
per square centimeter 
equivalent to a dose 
Neutron energy of 1 rem 
Thermal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g6o X 10" 
0.0001 mev ................................ 4Bo X 10" 
o.oi mev. . ................................ 48o X 10" 
0.1 mev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¢X 10" o.s mev. . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . • . . • . • . . . . • . . . . . . . 38 X 10" 
1 mev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 X 10" 
2 mev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 X I08 
3 mev. and higher.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 X 108 
§ 20.5 Units of radioactivity. (a) Radioactivity is commonly, and for 
purposes of the regulations in this part shall be, measured in terms of dis-
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integrations per unit time or in curies. One curie (c) = 3·7 X 1010 disintegra-
tions per second (dps)=2.2XIo12 disintegrations per minute (dpm). A 
commonly used submultiple of the curie is the microcurie (p.c). One p.c= 
0.000001 c=3.7X I04 dps=2.2X 106 dpm. 
NoTE: Many radioisotopes disintegrate into isotopes which are 
also radioactive. In expressing maximum permissible concentra-
tions in air and water of these materials, as in Appendix B of this 
part, the activity stated is that of the parent isotope. In some cases, 
the fact that daughter products may contribute to the total dose 
has been taken into account in the determination of the maximum 
permissible concentration of the parent isotopes. In the tables of 
Appendix B of this part this is indicated by writing Ba140 +La140, 
Sr90 + Y90, Rn222 +dr, Ra226 +! dr, etc. 
ExAMPLE. In Column I, Table I, Appendix B, the maximum 
permissible concentration of Ba140 in air for occupational use is 
2 X 10-7 p.cjm!. This is the maximum permissible concentration re-
gardless of whether or not any of the La140 which may have re-
sulted from the decay of the Ba140 is present or not. However, the 
value given for BA140 is less than it would be if La140 were a stable 
isotope, not only because of the possibility of La140 in the air but 
principally because, if the Ba140 is inhaled, its radioactive decay 
in the body will result in the production of La140 in the body. 
(b) Radon. Airborne radioactivity of radon and its decay products may 
be determined by measurement of the activity of one or more decay products 
on dust filtered from the air. For purposes of the regulations in this part, 
the limit prescribed here will be considered to be met if the measured radio-
activity of one or more decay products (for example, RaC') does not exceed 
that which would result from the occurrence, at the time of sampling, of 
I X 10-7 microcuries, per. milliliter of air, of RN222 and each of its short-lived 
decay products, RaA, RaB, RaC, and RaC'. For this purpose, due allow-
ance shall be made for changes in the radioactivity of the measured decay 
products from time of sampling through the period of measurement. 
(c) Natural uranium and natural thorium. Natural uranium and natural 
thorium occur as mixtures of isotopes of the respective elements. In the 
case of uranium or of thorium, the number of microcuries shall be deter-
mined by dividing the total rate, in dpm, of alpha emissions from the 
mixture by 2.2 X 106 dpm per p.c. 
§ 20.6 Interpretations. Except as specifically authorized by the Com-
mission in writing, no interpretation of the meaning of the regulations in 
this part by any officer or employee of the Commission other thah a written 
interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized to be binding upon 
the Commission. 
§ 20.7 Communications. All communications and reports concerning the 
regulations in this part, and applications filed under them, should be ad-
dressed to the Atomic Energy Commission, 1901 Constitution Avenue NW., 
Washington 25; D. C., Attention: Division of Civilian Application. 
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PERMISSIBLE DosES, LEVELS, AND CoNCENTRATIONS 
§ 20.IOI Exposure of individuals in restricted areas-(a) Exposure to 
radiation. (I) Except as provided in subparagraph ( 2) of this paragraph, 
no. licensee shall possess, use, or transfer licensed material in such a manner 
as to cause any individual in a restricted area to receive in any period of 
seven consecutive days from radioactive material and other sources of radia-
tion in the licensee's possession a dose in excess of the limits specified in 
Appendix A of this part. 
(2) A licensee may permit an individual in a restricted area to receive a 
dose in excess of the limits established in subparagraph (I) of this para-
graph : Provided, ( i) That the dose during any period of 7 consecutive days 
does not exceed three times the limits specified in Appendix A of this part, 
and (ii) that the dose during any period of I3 consecutive weeks does not 
exceed IO times the limits specified in Appendix A of this part. 
(b) No licensee shall possess, use or transfer licensed material in such a 
manner as to cause any individual in a restricted area to be exposed to air-
borne radioactive material possessed by the licensee in an average concentra-
tion in excess of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, of this part. 
The limits given in Appendix B, Table I of this part, are based upon 
exposure to the concentrations specified for forty hours in any period of 
seven consecutive days. In any such period where the number of hours of 
exposure is less than forty, the limits specified in the table may be increased 
proportionately. In any such period, where the number of hours of exposure 
is greater than forty, the limits specified in the table shall be decreased 
proportionately. 
(c) Exposure of minors. No licensee shall possess, use, or transfer 
licensed material in such a manner as to cause any individual under IS years 
of age within a restricted area to receive in any period of seven consecutive 
days from radioactive material and other sources of radiation in the 
licensee's possession a dose in excess of IO percent of the limits specified in 
Appendix A of this part, or to be exposed to airborne radioactive material 
possessed by the licensee in a concentration in excess of the limits specified 
in Appendix B, Table II, of this part. For purposes of this paragraph, con-
centrations may be averaged over periods not greater than a week. 
§ 20.I02 Permissible levels of radiation in unrestricted areas. (a) There 
may be included in any application for a license or for amendment of a 
license proposed limits upon levels of radiation in unrestricted areas result-
ing from the applicant's possession or use of radioactive material and other 
sources of radiation. Such applications should include information as to 
anticipated average radiation levels and anticipated occupancy times for 
each unrestricted area involved. The Commission will approve the proposed 
limits if the applicant demonstrates that the proposed limits are not likely 
to cause any individual to receive a dose in any period of seven consecutive 
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days in excess of 10 percent of the limits specified in Appendix A of this 
part. 
(b) Except as authorized by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (a) 
of this section, no licensee shall possess, use, or transfer licensed material 
in such a manner as to create in any unrestricted area from radioactive rna~ 
terial and other sources of radiation in his possession: 
( 1) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present 
in the area, could result in his receiving a dose in excess of two millirems in 
any one hour, or 
(2) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in 
the area, could result in his receiving a dose in excess of 100 millirems in 
any seven consecutive days. 
§ 20.103 Concentrations in effluents to unrestricted areas. (a) There may 
be included in any application for a license or for amendment of a license 
proposed limits upon concentrations of licensed and other radioactive ma-
terial released into air or water in unrestricted areas as a result of the ap-
plicant's proposed activities. Such applications should include information 
as to anticipated average concentrations and anticipated occupancy times 
for each unrestricted area involved. The Commission will approve the pro-
posed limits if the applicant demonstrates that it is not likely that any indi-
vidual will be exposed to concentrations in excess of the limits specified in 
Appendix B, Table II, of this part. For purposes of this paragraph, con.." 
centration may be averaged over periods not greater than one year. 
(b) Except as authorized by the Commission pursuant to § 20.302 or 
paragraph (a) of this section, no licensee shall possess, use, or transfer 
licensed material in such a manner as to release into air or water in any unre-
stricted area any concentration of radioactive material in excess of the limits 
specified in Appendix B, Table II of this part. For purposes of this para-
graph, concentrations may be averaged over periods not greater than one 
year. 
(c) For purposes of this section, determinations as to the concentration 
of radioactive material shall be made with respect to the point where such 
material leaves the restricted area. Where the radioactive material leaves 
the restricted area in a stack, tube, pipe, or similar conduit, the determina-
tion may be made with respect to the point where the material leaves such 
conduit. 
(d) The provisions of this section do not apply to disposal of radioactive 
material into sanitary sewerage systems (see § 20.303). 
§ 20.104 Medical diagnosis, therapy, and research. Nothing in the regula-
tions in this part shall be interpreted as limiting the intentional exposure 
of patients to radiation for the purpose of medical diagnosis or medical 
therapy. 
§ 20.105 Measures to be taken after excessive exposures. In the event 
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that any individual in a restricted area receives a dose or is exposed to con-
centrations of radioactive material in excess of the permissible limits estab-
lished in § 20.IOI, the licensee shall limit the weekly dose or exposure of the 
individual to 10 percent of such permissible limit until such time as the 
average weekly dose or exposure to the individual for the period beginning 
with the week in which the excessive dose or exposure occurred is less than 
the permissible limit established in § 20.101. 
PRECAUTIONARY PROCEDURES 
§ 20.2(H Surveys. (a) As used in the regulations in this part, "survey" 
means an evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the production, use, 
release, disposal, or presence of radioactive materials or other sources of 
radiation under a specific set of conditions. When appropriate, such evalua-
tion includes a physical survey of the location of materials and equipment, 
and measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive 
material present. 
(b) Each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be 
necessary for him to comply with the regulations in this part. 
§ 20.202 Personnel monitoring. (a) Each licensee shall supply appropri-
ate personnel monitoring equipment to, and shall require the use of such 
equipment by : 
(I ) Each individual who enters a restricted area under such circum-
stances that he receives, or is likely to receive, a dose in excess of 25 percent 
of the limits specified in Appendix A of this part ; 
( 2) Each individual who enters a high radiation area. 
(b) As used in this part, 
( 1) "Personnel monitoring equipment" means devices designed to be 
worn or carried by an individual for the purpose of measuring the dose 
received (e. g., film badges, pocket chambers, pocket dosimeters, film rings, 
etc.); 
(2) "Radiation area" means any area, accessible to personnel, in which 
there exists radiation, originating in whole or in part within licensed ma-
terial, at such levels that a major portion of the body could receive in any 
one hour a dose in excess of 5 millirem, or in any 5 consecutive days a dose 
in excess of I so millirem ; 
(3) "High radiation area" means any area, accessible to personnel, in 
which there exists radiation originating in whole or in part within licensed 
material at such levels that a major portion of the body could receive in 
any one hour a dose in excess of 100 millirem. 
§ 20.203 Caution signs, labels, and signals-(a) General. (I) Except 
as otherwise authorized by the Commission, symbols prescribed by this 
section shall use the conventional radiation caution colors (magenta or 
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purple on yellow background). The symbol prescribed by this section is the 
conventional three-bladed design: 
RADIATION SYMBOL 
r. Cross-hatched area is to be magenta or purple. 
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(2) In addition to the contents of signs and labels prescribed in this sec-
tion, licensees may provide on or near such signs and labels any additional 
information which may be appropriate in aiding individuals to minimize 
exposure to radiation or to radioactive material. 
· (b) Radiation areas. Each radiation area shall be conspicuously posted 
with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words : 
CAUTION 1 
RADIATION AREA 
(c) High radiation areas. (1) Each high radiation area shall be con-
spicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol 
and the words : 
CAUTION 1 
HIGH RADIATION AREA 
( 2) Each high radiation area shall be equipped with a control device 
which shall either cause the level of radiation to be reduced below that at 
which an individual might receive a dose of 100 millirem in one hour upon 
1 Or "Danger." 
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entry into the area or shall energize a conspicuous visible or audible alarm 
signal in such a manner that the individual entering and the licensee or a 
supervisor of the activity are made aware of the entry. In the case of a 
high radiation area established for a period of 30 days or less, such control 
device is not required. 
(d) Airborne radioactivity areas. (I) As used in the regulations in this 
part, "airborne radioactivity area" means ( i) any room, enclosure, or operat-
ing area in which airborne radioactive materials, composed wholly or partly 
of licensed material, exist in concentrations in excess of the amounts speci-
fied in Appendix B, Table I, Column I of this part; or (ii) any room, en-
closure, or operating area in which airborne radioactive material composed 
wholly or partly of licensed material exists in concentrations which, averaged 
over the number of hours in any week during which individuals are in the 
area, exceed 25 percent of the amounts specified in Appendix B, Table I, 
Column I of this part. 
(2) Each airborne radioactivity area shall be conspicuously posted with 
a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words : 
CAUTION 1 
AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY AREA 
(e) Additiona! requirements. (I) Each area or room in which licensed 
material is used or stored and which contains any radioactive material (other 
than natural uranium or thorium) in an amount exceeding IO times the 
quantity of such material specified in Appendix C of this part shall be con-
spicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution symbol 
and the words : · 
CAUTION 1 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL(S) 
(2) Each area or room in which natural uranium or thorium is used or 
stored in an amount exceeding one-hundred times the quantity specified in 
Appendix C of this part shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs 
bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words : 
CAUTION 1 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL(S) 
(f) Containers. (I) Each container in which is transported, stored, or 
used a quantity of any licensed material (other than natural uranium or 
thorium) greater than the quantity of such material specified in Appendix C 
of this part shall bear a durable, clearly visible label bearing the radiation 
caution symbol and the words : 
1 Or "Danger." 
CAUTION 1 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
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( 2) Each container in which natural uranium or thorium is transported, 
stored, or used in a quantity greater than ten times the quantity specified in 
Appendix C of this part shall bear a durable, cleai:-ly visible label bearing the 
radiation caution symbol and the words : 
CAUTION 1 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs {I) and (2) a 
label shall not be required : 
(i) If the concentration ofthe material in the container does not exceed 
that specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 2 of this part, or 
(ii) For laboratory containers, such as beakers, flasks, and test tubes, 
used transiently in laboratory procedures, when the user is present. 
(4) Where containers are used for storage, the labels required in this 
paragraph shall state also the quantities and kinds of radioactive materials 
in the containers and the date of measurement of the quantities. 
§ 20.204 Exceptions from posting requirements. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of § 20.203, 
(a) A room or area is not required to be posted with a caution sign be-
cause of the presence of a sealed source provided the radiation level twelve 
inches from the surface of the source container or housing does not exceed: 
five millirem per hour. 
(b) Rooms or. other areas in hospitals are not required to be posted with 
caution signs because of the presence of patients containing byproduct ma-
terial provided that there are personnel in attendance whoshall.take the pre-
cautions necessary to prevent the exposure of any individual to radiation or 
radioactive material in excess of the limits established in the regulations in 
this part. 
(c) Caution signs are not required to be posted at areas or rooms con-
taining radioactive materials for periods of less than eight hours provided 
that ( I) the materials are constantly attended during such periods by an 
individual who shall take the precautions necessary to prevent the exposure 
of any individual to radiation or radioactive materials in excess of the limits 
established in the regulations in this part and ; ( 2) such area or room is 
subject to the licensee's control. 
§ 20.205 Exemptions for radioactive materials packaged for shipment .. 
Radioactive materials packaged and labeled in accordance with regulations 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be exempt from the labeling 
and posting requirements of § 20.203 during shipment, provided that the 
inside containers are labeled in accordance with the provisions of § 20.203 
(f). 
1 Or "Danger." 
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§ 20.206 Instruction of personnel. All individuals working in or frequent-
ing any portion of a restricted area shall be informed of the occurrence of 
radioactive materials or of radiation in such portion, and shall be instructed 
in the hazards of excessive exposure to such materials or radiation and in 
precautions or procedures to minimize exposure. 
§ 20.207 Storage of licensed material. Licensed materials stored in an un-
restricted area shall be secured against unauthorized removal from the place 
of storage. 
WASTE DISPOSAL 
§ 20.301 General requirement. No licensee shall dispose of licensed ma-
terial except : 
(a) By transfer to an authorized recipient as provided in the regulations 
in Part 30, 40, or 70 of this chapter, whichever may be applicable; or 
(b) As authorized pursuant to § 20.302 ; or 
(c) As provided in § 20.303 or § 20.304, applicable respectively to the 
disposal of licensed material by release into sanitary sewerage systems or 
burial in soil, or in § 20.103 (Concentrations in Effluents to Unrestricted 
Areas). 
§ 20.302 Method for obtaining approval of proposed disposal procedures. 
Any licensee or applicant for a license may apply to the Commission for ap-
proval of proposed procedures to dispose of licensed material in a manner 
not otherwise authorized in the regulations in this chapter. Each application 
should include a description of the licensed material and any other radio-. 
active material involved, including the quantities and kinds of such ma-
terial and the levels of radioactivity involved, and the proposed manner and 
conditions of disposal. The application should also include an analysis and 
evaluation of pertinent information as to the nature of the environment, 
including topographical, geological, meteorological, and hydrological char-
acteristics ; usage of ground and surface waters in the general area ; the 
nature and location of other potentially affected facilities ; and procedures to 
be observed to minimize the risk of unexpected or hazardous exposures. 
§ 20.303 Disposal by release into sanitary sewerage systems. No licensee 
shall discharge licensed material into a sa,nitary sewerage system unless : 
(a) It is readily soluble or dispersible in water ; and 
(b) The quantity of any licensed or other radioactive material released 
into the system by the licensee in any one day does not exceed the larger of 
subparagraphs ( 1) or ( 2) of this paragraph: 
(I) The quantity which, if diluted by the average daily quantity of 
sewage released into the sewer by the licensee, will result in an average con-
centration equal to the limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 2 of 
this part ; or 
(2) Ten times the quantity of such material specified in Appendix C of 
this part ; and 
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(c) The quantity of any licensed or other radioactive material released in 
any one month, if diluted by the average monthly quantity of water released 
by the licensee, will not result in an average concentration exceeding the 
limits specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 2 of this part; and 
(d) The gross quantity of licensed and other radioactive material re-
leased into the sewerage system by the licensee does not exceed one curie 
per year. 
Excreta from individuals undergoing medical diagnosis or therapy with 
radioactive material shall be exempt from any limitations contained in this 
section. 
§ 20.304 Disposal by burial in soil. No licensee shall dispose of licensed 
material by burial in soil unless : 
(a) The total quantity of licensed and other radioactive materials buried 
at any one location and time does not exceed, at the time of burial, 1 ,ooo 
times the amount specified in Appendix C of this part; and 
(b) Burial is at a minimum depth of four feet; and 
(c) Successive burials are separated by distances of at least six feet and 
not more than 12 burials are made in any year. 
RECORD, REPORTS, AND NOTIFICATION 
§ 20.401 Records of surveys, radiation monitoring, and disposal. (a) 
Each licensee shall maintain records showing the radiation exposures of all 
individuals subject to per5onnel monitoring control under § 20.202 of the 
regulations in this part. 
(b) Each licensee shall maintain records showing the name of each indi-
vidual exposed to radiation pursuant to § 20.101 (a) (2) and the weekly 
dose of each such individual for the 13 consecutive weeks of highest cumula-
tive weekly dose. 
(c) Each licensee shall maintain records in the same units used in the 
appendices to this part, showing the results of surveys required by § 20.201 
(b), and disposals made under §§ 20.302, 20.303, and 20.304. 
§ 20.402 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material. Each licensee shall 
report by telephone and telegraph to the Manager of the nearest Atomic 
Energy Commission Operations Office listed in Appendix D, immediately 
after its occurrence becomes known to the licensee, any loss or theft of 
licensed material in such quantities and under such circumstances that it 
appears to the licensee that a substantial hazard may result to persons in 
unrestricted areas. 
[22 F. R. 3389, May 14, 1957] 
§ 20-403 Notifications and reports of incidents-(a) Immediate notifica-
tion. Each licensee shall immediately notify the Manager of the nearest 
Atomic Energy Commission Operations Office listed in Appendix D by. tele-
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phone and telegraph of any incident involving licensed material possessed 
by him and which may have caused or threatens to cause : 
(I) Exposure of any individual to 25 rems or more of radiation, includ-
ing any radioactive material taken into the body ; or 
{2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if 
averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5000 times the limits speci-
fied for such materials in Appendix B, Table 2; or 
(3) A loss of one working week or more of the operation of any facilities 
affected ; or 
(4) Damage to property in excess of $Ioo,ooo. 
(b) Twenty-four hour notification. Each licensee shall within 24 hours 
notify the Manager of the nearest Atomic Energy Commission Operations 
Office listed in Appendix D by telephone and telegraph of any incident in-
volving licensed material possessed by him and which may have caused or 
threatens to cause : 
(I) Exposure of any individual to 3 rems or more of radiation, including 
any radioactive material taken into the body ; or 
(2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if 
averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 500 times the limits speci-
fied for such materials in Appendix B, Table 2 ; or 
(3) A loss of one day or more of the operation of any facilities affected; 
or 
(4) Damage to property in excess of $I,OOO. 
(c) Thirty-day reports. Each licensee shall make a report in writing 
within 30 days to the Director, Division .of Civilian Application, United 
States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington 25, D. C., of each incident 
involving licensed material possessed by him which appears to have resulted 
in the exposure of an individual to radiation or to concentrations of radio-
active material, or to have resulted iti levels of radiation or concentrations 
of radioactive material, in excess of any applicable limits set forth in these 
regulations or in the licensee's license. Each report required under this 
paragraph shall describe the nature of the incident, the extent of exposure of 
persons to radiation or to radioactive material, the levels of radiation and 
concentrations of radioactive material involved, the cause of the incident, 
and corrective steps taken or planned to assure against a recurrence of the 
incident. A copy of each report shall be transmitted to the Manager of the 
nearest Atomic Energy Commission Operations Office listed in Appendix D. 
[22 F. R. 3389, May I4, I957] 
EXCEPTIONS AND ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT 
§ 20.501 Applications for exemptiOtJs. The Commission may, upon ap-
plication by any licensee· or upon its own initiative grant such exemptions 
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from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are 
authorized by law and will not result in undue hazard to life or property. 
§ 20.502 Additional requirements. The Commission may, by rule, regu-
lation, or order, impose upon any licensee such requirements, in addition to 
those established in the regulations in this part, as it deems appropriate or 
necessary to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property. 
ENFORCEMENT 
§ 20.6o1 Violations. An injunction or other court order may be obtained 
prohibiting any violation of any provision of the act or any regulation or 
order issued thereunder. Any person who willfully violates any provision 
of the act or any regulation or order issued thereunder may be guilty of a 
crime and, upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment or 
both, as provided by law. 
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PERMISSIBLE WEEKLY DOSE 
Dose in critical organs (mrem) 
Skin at 
Conditions of exposure basal 
layer of 
Parts of body Radiation epidermis 
Whole body . . . . . . . . Any radiation with half- 1 6oo 
value-layer greater than 
I mm of soft tissue .... 
Whole body ........ Any radiation with half- 1,500 
value-layer less than I 
. mm of soft tissue ..... . 
Hands and forearms Any radiation . . . . . . . . . . . • I,500 
or feet and ankles 
or head and neck. 
·Blood Lens 
forming of 
organs Gonads eye 
1 300 1 300 1 300 
300 300 300 
1 For exposures of the whole body to X or gamma rays up to 3 mev, this condition 
may be assumed to be met if the "air dose" does not exceed 300 mr, provided the dose 
to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem. "Air dose" means that the dose is measured 
by an appropriate instrument in air in the region of highest dosage rate to be occupied 
by an individual, without the presence of the human body or other absorbing and 
scattering material. 
• Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions does not alter 
the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the bloodforming organs in the main 
portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the lens of the eye. 
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Ag"' ····················· Am111 •••••••••••••••••••• 
As ........................ . 
AF .................... . 
Au,. .................... . 
Au,. .................... . 
Ba""+ La' ............... . 
Be' ...................... . 
C" ..................... .. 
eaca ······················ Cd1110 +Ag1110 •••••••••••••• 
Ce'" + Pr'" ............. . 
Cl"' .................... .. 
Cm102 ................... .. 
Co111 •••••••••••••••••••••• 
Cr"' .................... .. 
Cs ... + Ba ................ . 
Cu" .....•................ 
Eu'"' .................... . 
F"' ...................... . 
Fe• ..................... . 
Fe"" ..................... . 
Ga" ..................... . 
Ge" ..................... . 
H" (HTO or T.O) ...... .. 
Ho,. .................... . 
J"'l ..................... .. 
If'IO .................... .. 
Ir'"" ••............•......• 
Ku ······················· La"" .................... . 
Lu'" ····················· Mn• .................... . 
Mo• •••....••.....•.•....• 
Na ...................... . 
Nb111 ..................... . 
Ni"" ..••....•••........... 
pi" ..................... .. 
Pb- .................... . 
Pb,.. + RhlD> ............ .. 
Pm111 ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Po010 (soluble) ........... . 
Po""' (insoluble) ......... . 
Pr',. .................... . 
P!fD (soluble) ........... . 
P!fD (insoluble) ........ .. 
Ra-+! dr ...•........... 
Rb10 ..................... . 
Re ....................... . 
Rh ....................... . 
Rh ... +dr ............... . 
Ru1110 +Rh1110 •••••••••••••• 
s• ...................... . 
Sc ....................... . 
Column I 1 
Air (2) 
1.6 X IO ... 
3.6X IO.., 




3·4 X 10 ... 
8X IO ... 
2X 10 ... 
I.3 X IO ... 
1.4 X 10 ... 
9X 10 ... 
2X IO ... 
2X 10 ... 
I X 10 ... 
5 X Io-10 
34X 10 ... 
24X IO.., 
6X 10 ... 
:ZX IO"" 
2X 10"" 
3-5 X Io ... 
1.8 X 10 ... 
5 X IO ... 
I X 10 ... 
I X 101 
7X 10 ... 
I X 10 ... 
9X 10 ... 
2.2 X IO"" 
1.5 X 10 ... 
6X 10 ... 
4 X 10 ... 
1.5 X IO"" 
8 X 1o• 
5 X 10 ... 
5 X 10° 
1.3 X 10• 
5 X IO"" 
4 X JO-T 
2X IO"" 
2X 10"" 
6 X 10_, 
6 X 10-m 
2 X 10-m 
2.3 X IO"" 
6X 10-'" 
6 X 10-'" 
24 X IO-n 
1.1 X 10..., 
24 X 10 6 
3X 10..., 
I X 10 ... 
8X 10 ... 
3 X IO"" 
2 X 10_, 
See footnotes at end of table. 
Column:z• 
Water (3) 





6X 10 ... 
9X 10 ... 
2X 10 ... 
6X 10 ... 
3 
I X 10 ... 
1.5 X 10 ... 
2 X Io-• 
I X 10""1 
7X 10-a 
2.7 X 10 ... 
SX 10 ... 
14 
4-5 X to ... 
2.5 X I0-1 
I X 10-1 
2.6 
1.3 X 10 ... 
3-3 X 10 ... 
:z6 
27 
5 X 10-J. 
70 
9X 1o ... 
4 X 1o-" 
2.7 X 10-a 
4 X 104 
34 
70 
5 X Io-• 
40 
2.4 X 1o ... 
I.2X 10 ... 
7 X 10-• 
6X 10 ... 
4 X Io~• 
2X 104 
3 
9X 1o ... 
I 
4-5 X IO"" 
1.2 X 10 ... 
9X 10-a 
24 X 10-• 
sx 10_, 
6X10"" 
4 X 10-• 





5 X IO"" 
1.6 X Io-• 
4 X I0-1 
I.J X 10 ... 
2X 104 
ZX IO"" 
3X 10 ... 
7X IO_. 
zx 101 
I X 10-1 
J.6 X IO ... 
5 X to ... 
7X 10 ... 
J.6x 10 ... 
24 X 10 ... 
I X 10 ... 
1.8 X 10 ... 
5X 10 ... 
1.5 x 10 ... 
8X 10 ... 
3 X 10 ... 
9X 10 ... 
4X 10 ... 
1.1 X 10 ... 
9X 10-a 
9 X J0-1 
1.6x 10 ... 
2.J 
3X 10 ... 
1.3 X 10 ... 
9X 10 ... 
1.4 X 10-a 
1.1 X I0-1 
24 
1.5 X 104 
14 
8X 10 ... 
4X 10 ... 
2.5 X 10 .... 
2X 10 ... 
14 X 104 
I X 10 ... 
I X 10-1 
3X 10"" 
3.6X 10_. 
1.5 X 10 ... 
4X 10 ... 
3 X w-• 
8X 10 ... 
1.6 X 10 ... 
2X1o-" 
1.3 X I0 1 
s X 10 ... 
3.6 X 10_. 
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sr- ..................... . 
Sr"" + Y"" •...•......•.•.• 
Tc" ..................... . 
Te ....................... . 
Te119 ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Tha. ... · .......•.......... 
Th-natural (soluble) •..... 
Th-natural (insoluble) .... 
Tm110 •••••••••••••••••••• 
U-natural (soluble)" ..... . 
U-natural (insoluble)" .... . 
U'"" (soluble) .•.•......... 
u- (insoluble) •.......... 
V'" ····················'·· Xe .................. -..•.. 
Xe
111 
••••••••••••••••••••• Y"' ...................... . 
Zn"" ................• ; •..• 
Unidentified beta or gamma 
emitters or any undeter-
mined mixtures of beta or 
gamma emitters ........ . 
Unidentified alpha emitters 
or any undetermined mix-
tures of alpha emitters ... 
Table I 
Column I 1 
Air (2) 
4 X Io-e 
1.7 X 10-e 
6X 10-e 
6 X I0-1D 
8 X 10-e 
3X Io-r 
1.2 X Io ... 
2X IO'"' 
5 X 10-11 
5 X 10-11 
1.5 X IO ... 
5 X 10-11 
5 X 10-11 
4 X 10-10 
5 X 10-11 
3 X Io-e 
1.3 X 10-e 
5 X 10-e 
1.2 X Io-r 




5 X I0-1 
2X JO"" 
2.4 X Io-e 
. 8 X Io .. 
8X IO ... 
3·3 X w .. 
IO 
I.5 X IO""' 




I.3 X IO ... 
'4X IO'"' 
6 X 10-1 
.2X I0""1 
Table II 
Column J 1 
Air (2) 
I.3 X IO"'" 
6 X 10-e 
2 X IO"'" 
2 X I0-11 
3 X Io ... 
I X IO-e 
4 X IO"'" 
6 X 10-e 
1.7 X IO""u 
1.7 X IO-U 
5 X Io ... 
1.7 X IO-U 
1.7 X IO-U 
I X 10-11 
1.6 X IO-U 
I X IO ... 
4X 10 ... 
1.7 X Io-r 
4X Io• 
2X 10 ... 




I.6 X 10 ... 
7 X xo-e 
8 X Io-a 
3 X Io-a 
3 X Io-a 
I.I X xo-a 
3 X 10""1 
5 X Io-a 
2.5 X 10-a 
7 X xo-a 
1.5 X 10-a 
5 X IO-• 
4X 10"' 
I4X IO"" 
2X 10 ... '' 
6 X 10-a 
I X 10 ... 
I X IO-" 
1 Air concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of air. 
1 Water concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of water. These figures 
also apply to foodstuffs in microcuries per gram (wet-weight) . 
. • For enriched uranium the same radioactivities per unit volume as those for natural 
uranium are applicable. It should be noted that the contribution of U-234 to the gross 
activity of enriched uranium is 20-40 times that of the U-235. 
Material 
Af!!I"' ...................... . 
Agm ..................... . 
As••, As ................... . 
Au""' ...................... . 
Au""' ...................... . 
Ba140 +La"" ............... . 
Be• ....................... . 
c• ....................... . 
Ca'" ...................... . 
Cd100 +Ag""' .............. . 
Ce'"+ Pr'" ............... . 
Cl00 •••••.••••••••••••••••••• 
Co"' ······················· 
Cr"' ...................... . 
Cs137 + Ba137 ............... • 
Cu"' ...................... . 
Eu'"' ...................... . 
P ........................ . 
Fe"" ....................... . 
Fe ........................ . 
Ga ........................ . 
Ge11 •••••••••••••••••••••• 
H"(HTO or H".O) ......... . 
Illll ....................... . 
Inn• ...................... . 
Ir""' ...................•.... 
K'" ························ La"" ...................... . 
Mn ........................ . 
Mn ........................ . 
Mo"" ....•.............•.... 
Na ........................ . 
Na10 ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Nb"' ...................... . 
Ni ......................... . 
Ni"" .....•.................. 
p ......................... . 






































Pd101 + Rh101 • • • • • • • • • • so 
Pd100 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • Io 
Pm1.. • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • ... • • • • IO 
Po210 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • O.I 
Pr141 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... • • • • IO 
Pu ................... . 
Ra... ..... ..... .. ... ...... .. o.I 
Rb.. ....................... IO 
Re'"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . IO 
Rh""' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . Io 
Ru100 + Rh100 • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • I 
S85 ••••••••••• ········.. ••• • so 
Sb110 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • • I 
Sc'" ....................... . 
Sm,.. .. ... . .. ...... .... .... IO 
snua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . IO 
Sr"" ....................... . 
Sr"" + Y"" .. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . o.I 
Ta182 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • IO 
Tc"" ...................... . 
Tc"" ...................... . 
TeU7 . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. .. . ... IO 
Te120 ••• ••• ... .............. I 
Th (natural) . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . so 
Tl"" ....................... so 
Tritium. See H". . . . . . . .. . . . . 2SO 
U (natural) . :.. . . . . . .... .. . so 
U""" ... ............... ..... I 
u--u-ao . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . so 
V'" ························ I 
w= ················· ..... IO 
yoo ...................... . 
Y"' ....................... . 
Zn"' . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . IO 
Unidentified radioactive mate-
rials or any of the above in 
unknown mixtures . . . . . . . . O.I 
NoTE: For purposes of §§ 20.203 and 20.304, where there is involved a 
combination of isotopes in known amounts the limit for the combination 
should be derived as follows: Determine, for each isotope in the combina-
tion, the ratio between the quantity present in the combination and the limit 
otherwise established for the specific isoptope when not in combination. 
The sum of such ratios for all the isoptopes in the combination may not 
exceed "1" (i.e., "unity"). 
ExAMPLE: For purposes of § 20.304, if a particular batch contains 2,000 
p.e of Au128 and 25,000 p.e of C14, it may also include not more than 3,000 p.e 
of P 31• This limit was determined as follows: 
2 ooo .. r Au198 25 ooo .. r C14 3 ooo .. r P 81 ' ,.... + ' ,.... + ' r- =I 
10,000 p.C 50,000 p.C 10,000 p.C 
The denominator in each of the above ratios was obtained by multiplying the 
figure in the table by 1000 as provided in § 20.304. 
1128 STATE REGULATION 
APPENDIX D 




fice .................... P. 0. Box 5400, Albuquer-
que, N. Mex ............. Albuquerque, N. Mex. 
Chicago Operations Office .. P. 0. Box 59, Lemont, III... Lemont, Ill. 
Grand Junction Operations 
Office .................. Grand Junction, Colo ....... Grand Junction, Colo. 
Hanford Operations Office .. P. 0. Box 550, Richland, 
Wash ................... Richland, Wash. 
Idaho Operations Office .•.• P. 0. Box I22I, Idaho Falls, 
Idaho .................. (Telegram), 550 Second St., 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
(Teletype), Idaho Falls, 
New York Operations Of- Idaho. 
fice .................... 70 Columbus Ave., New 
York 23, N. Y .......... (Telegram), 70 Columbus 
Ave., New York 23, N.Y. 
Oak Ridge Operations Of- (Teletype), New York, N.Y. 
fice .................... P. 0. Box E, Oak Ridge, 
Tenn. . ................. Oak Ridge, Tenn. 
San Francisco Operations 
Office .................. sr8 17th St., Oakland 12, 
Calif; ................... 518 17th St., Oakland 12, 
Savannah River Operations Calif. 
Office .................. P. 0. Box A, Aiken, S. C. .. Augusta, Ga. 
Schenectady Operations Of-
fice .................... P. 0. Box ro69, Schenec-
[22 F. R. 3389, May 14, 1957] 
tady, N. Y ............... (Telegram), Knolls Atomic 
Power Laboratory, Sche-
nectady, N. Y. 
(Teletype), Schenectady, 
N.Y. 
NOTE: The record keeping and reporting requirements contained herein have been 
approved by the Bureau of the Budget in accordance with the Federal Reports Act of 
1942. 
ITEM 2 
CALIFORNIA GENERAL INDUSTRY SAFETY ORDERS 
Title 8, Group 6 
Article 53· Radioactivity and Ionizing Radiation 
38oo. Purpose. Article 53 sets up minimum standards for the protection 
of employees exposed to potentially injurious levels of ionizing radiation or 
potentially injurious quantities of radioactive materials but does not include 
such ionizing radiation or radioactive materials as cosmic radiation or normal 
radon or thoron in the. atmosphere. 
3801. Definitions. (a) "Roentgen" (r) is the international unit of quan-
tity of x-rays or gaffillla rays. 
(b) "Milliroentgen" (mr) is one thousandth of a roentgen. 
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(c) "Rad" is the unit of absorbed dose, defined as 100 ergs per gram of 
tissue. 
(d) "Totally protective installation" is one where the radiating equip-
ment or material is surrounded by barriers such that no person has access 
to· any place where exposure can be more than seven milliroentgens in an 
hour. If the radiation is not properly measurable in roentgens, then the 
biological effect shall be no greater than that from seven mr ~!;~-rays in an 
hour. 
(e) "Sealed container" means one from which radioactive contents can-
not escape whether the radiations from them do or not. 
(£) "Shielded container" means one such that the radiations produced 
by the equipment or materials within it will measure no more than 200 milli-
roentgens in an hour at any point on the outside surface of the container 
and no more than 10 milliroentgens in an hour at a distance of one meter 
from the container. In the case of radiations not properly measurable in 
roentgens, the biological effect shall be no greater than that from x-rays in 
the above named amounts. 
(g) "Curie" is the international unit of radioactivity. 
(h) "Integral absorbed dose" (total body dose) is the total energy ab-
sorbed throughout a given body or region of interest. The unit is the 
gramrad (equal to 1/100,000 joule). 
38o2. Supervision and Instruction. (a) All operations involving exposure 
to potentially injurious levels of ionizing radiation or potentially injurious 
quantities of radioactive materials shall be under the supervision of compe-
tent technical personnel. A competent technical person is one who is capa-
ble of evaluating the radiation exposure to employees and specifying such 
protection as required by these orders. 
(b) Every employee who may be regularly or frequently exposed to 
ionizing radiation shall be instructed in the hazards he may encounter in the 
course of his duties and in methods of protecting himself and others against 
them. 
38o3. Ma.rimJim Permissible Exposures. (a) No employee shall be 
exposed to more than 0.3r of x-rays or gamma rays, or other ionizing radia-
tion producing equivalent biologic effect, in a week. Measured or presumed 
exposure of any employee of more than 0.3r in any week shall be reported 
to the medical supervisor. See Section 38II. 
N ole: The maximum allowable exposures set forth in 38o3 
are derived from best available authorities on the subject. How-
ever, since it is probable that further experience may lead to re-
vision of some of these figures, the Division of Industrial Safety 
plans to hold hearings on revisions of 38o3 periodically. The fol-
lowing handbooks should be consulted for a more thorough and 
detailed discussion of the subject of radiological health safety, 
including more details on the maximum allowable exposures in 
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the table in 38o3(b). Reference: National Bureau of Standards 
Handbooks Nos. 23, 27, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, so, sr, 52, and 55· 
(b) For the purpose of these orders the followi~g table gives the biologi-
cal effect of other ionizing radiations equivalent to unit x-ray exposure, and 
the permissible limits for whole body exposed .and for hands only exposed. 
(See table below.) 
(c) Concentrations of radioactive substances in the air of workrooms or 
other locations in which employees are regularly or frequently present shall 
not be greater than : 
(I) 5 X xo-12 microcuries per cubic centimeter for alpha 
emitters. 
(2) w-9 microcuries per cubic centimeter for beta and gamma 
emitters. 
Maximum Permissible 
Absorbed Dose as Measured 
Relative in Basal Layer of Epidermis 
Type of Biological 
Radiation Effect Exposure Entire Body Hands Only 
X-rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O.Jr 0.5 rads 1.5 rads 
Gamma rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. I O.Jr 0.5 rads 1.5 rads 
Beta rays .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . I 0.5 rads 1.5 rads 
Proton rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 0.05 rads O.I5 rads 
Alpha rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 0.025 rads 0.075 rads 
Fast neutrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 0.05 rads O.I5 rads 
Thermal neutrons . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ._ o.I rads O.J rads 
For more detailed maximum permissible amounts of radioisotopes in the 
human body and maximum permissible concentrations in air and water, 
see National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 52. 
38o4. Monitoring. (a) Workrooms or other locations in which material 
giving rise to ionizing radiation is used or handled shall be inspected for 
hazardous amounts of radiation at scheduled intervals. The Division of 
Industrial Safety may prescribe a monitoring schedule for a particular 
operation but such a schedule is subject to an immediate change if it is in-
dicafed by personnel monitors or other means that more frequent inspections 
are necessary to maintain exposures below those set forth in 38o3. When 
such materials are received, transferred, or used for different operations, 
they shall be monitored to assure safe handling. Radioactive materials in 
sealed containers shall be inspected for leaks at least yearly. 
Note: National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 51, Radio-
logical Monitoring Methods and Instruments, should be consulted 
for details of radiological monitoring. 
(b) Equipment, machines or totally protective installations giving rise 
to ionizing radiation shall be surveyed to determine the stray radiation level 
when first installed and thereafter whenever any change is made in the 
installation or its use which would affect its protective features, but in no 
case shall monitoring be done less often than yearly. Where such equip-
ment, machines or installations are in such locations or are so constructed 
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that vibration or other physical conditions may cause changes in the pro-
tective features, inspection of protective devices and check for stray radia-
tion shall be made at least every six months and also whenever it is indicated, 
by personnel monitors or other means, that more frequent inspections are 
necessary to maintain exposures below those set forth in 38o3. 
(c) The monitoring and inspections required by (a) and (b) shall be 
done by a competent person with instruments adequate to d~"-.:c·.-er hazard-
ous amounts of whatever radiations the machines or materials are produc-
ing. Records of such inspection shall be reviewed by the competent technical 
person and shall be filed as a permanent record available to representatives 
of the division. These records shall show the dates and results of the 
monitoring and the observations, recommendations or comments of the 
competent technical personnel. 
(d) Employees who may be subjected to ionizing radiation which could 
potentially exceed the exposures referred to in 38o3 shall wear appropriate 
indicating or monitoring devices to show the amount of ionizing radiation 
to which such employees have been subjected. Persotinel monitoring devices 
shall be worn on that part of the body expected to receive the greatest ex-
posure. Records of exposure as recorded by these devices shall be reviewed 
by the competent technical person and shall be filed as a permanent record 
available to representatives of the division. 
38o5. Maintenance of Protective Devices. (a) Whenever it is found, 
by monitoring or otherwise, that any shielding or other protective device is 
defective, insufficient or inoperative, such. shielding or device shall be 
promptly repaired or augmented as may be needed, and operations in 
volving productions of ionizing radiation shall not be resumed until adequate 
repairs or changes are completed. 
(b) Whenever it is found, by personnel monitoring or otherwise, that any 
employee is exposed to a weekly dosage of ionizing radiation greater than 
that specified in 38o3, immediate steps shall be taken to locate the condition 
giving rise to such exposure, and the operation giving rise to the exposure 
shall be discontinued until such condition is corrected. The employees who 
have been exposed to excessive radiation shall be immediately referred to 
the medical supervisor. 
38o6. Handling of Radioactive Materials. Wherever radioactive ma-
terials are handled except in sealed containers : 
(a) General or local exhaust ventilation shall be provided adequate to 
prevent concentrations of radioactive substances in the air greater than 
those set forth in 38o3 and National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 52. 
(b) Spillage or other contamination of floors, walls or workbenches 
shall be removed promptly and monitored for adequate decontamination. 
In the event of a spill of a significant quantity of long-lived material the 
employer shall immediately notify the Division of Industrial Safety. Cloth-
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ing contaminated by spillage shall be changed promptly and persons 
monitored for adequate decontamination. Contaminated clothing shall be 
decontaminated by special decontamination facilities equipped to safely cope 
with the problem. See National Bureau of Standards Handbooks Nos. 42 
and 48. 
(c) Radioactive wastes shall not be allowed to accumulate in sufficient 
amounts to cause hazardous exposures and shall be disposed of in such 
manner as will not cause harmful concentrations of radioactive material in 
either the atmosphere or other environment. See Bureau of Standards 
Handbooks Nos. 42, 48, and 49· 
(d) Surfaces shall be designed and used as to afford easy and safe 
decontamination.- See National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 48 for 
details. 
(e) Smoking or eating shall not be permitted in workrooms. Food, 
tobacco, or personal effects such as purses, combs or cosmetics shall not 
be set down in such rooms, 
(f) At the close of each work period, workers' faces, hands, hair and 
clothes shall be inspected for contamination by radioactive material. Such 
inspeCtion shall be made by a competent person. Unsafe garments shall be 
decontaminated or adequately disposed of. Skin surfaces shall be decon-
taminated. Protective clothing or other protective devices, which may in-
clude gowns, coats or overalls, shoes or overshoes, caps, hoods, or respiratory 
protection, shall be provided by the employer and used by the employee. 
Such personal safety devices or safeguards shall be suitable and adequate 
to provide protection against exposure to the radioactive materials being 
handled. If contamination of clothing or any part of the body is pos-
sible, both shall be monitored before leaving the work area, and suitable 
action (disposal or decontamination) taken. When skin surfaces have be-
come contaminated the medical supervisor shall be notified. See National 
Bureau of Standards Handbooks Nos. 42, 48, and 52, and Sections 38o3 and 
381 I in these orders for more details. 
(g) Where monitoring indicates contamination, floors and benches shall 
be cleaned by a process which will prevent the dispersion of radioactive 
dust. Dry sweeping with broom or brush is prohibited. 
(h) All working surfaces where radioactive materials are handled shall 
be provided with illumination of not less than 50 foot-candles. 
38o7. Storage of Radioactive Materials. (a) Radioactive materials stored 
in a workroom or other location where employees are regularly or frequently 
present shall be enclosed in containers of such thickness and construction 
that employees will not be exposed to radiation in amounts greater than 
those set forth in 3803. 
(b) Vaults or rooms in which substances giving rise to ionizing radiation 
are stored shall be so isolated by construction, location or a combination of 
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the two that no employee shall in the course of his employment be exposed 
to radiation in quantities greater than those set forth in 38o3. Such rooms 
or vaults shall be ventilated as required by 38o6 (a) unless all radioactive 
materials are stored in sealed containers. 
·(c) Each container of radioactive materials in storage shall be labeled to 
indicate: 
( 1 ) That the material is radioactive. 
(2) The chemical name of the material or the isotope. 
(3) The amount or quantity of the radioactive material. 
( 4) The date received and the person responsible for the 
material. 
(d) Radioactive materials should be housed in fireproof containers and 
preferably placed in a fireproof room or enlosure for storage purposes.· 
38o8. Warning Signs or Signals. (a) All locations or installations where 
ionizing radiation from radioactive materials may be encountered in in-
jurious amounts shall be marked or posted with warning signs, signals 
or lights. Purple shall be the basic color for the radioactive warning symbol, 
and the background should be yellow. 
(b) All locations where machines may produce injurious amounts of 
ionizing radiation shall be provided with warning signals or lights activated 
when the machine is producing such radiation. 
3&>9. Totally Protective Installations. (a) No employee shall be per-
mitted to remain within the confines of such an installation while ionizing 
radiation is being produced or generated. 
(b) Every entrance to such an installation shall be provided with an elec-
trically contacted or interlocked door or gate so arranged that no person or 
part of body can enter the enclosure while the source of ionizing radiation 
is in operation. Visible or audible signals shall be provided in each such 
enclosure and shall be so arranged as to be in continuous operation while 
the source of ionizing radiation is producing radiation. 
(c) At least one door shall be provided with knobs or handles on the in-
side of the door so that anyone who may have been locked in accidentally 
can leave the enclosure without delay. 
3810. Special Orders for Radium Dial Painting. (a) All pertinent pro-
visions of 38oo to 38o9 inclusive shall apply to radium dial painting opera-
tions. See National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 27 for additional 
details. 
(b) All radioactive luminous compounds shall be mixed with adhesive 
before being applied; no dry method of application of powder shall be used. 
Mixing and painting shall be done under a mechanically ventilated hood. 
(c) When in use, radioactive luminous paint shall be kept in a porcelain 
or other impervious container of proper size to avoid spillage and shall be 
set in a lead block. Not more than one container shall be on any work bench 
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at any time, and no container shall contain more than one gram of mixed 
luminous compound. The container shall provide at least one inch of lead 
protection and shall be covered when the paint is not in use. 
(d) Brushes in use for radium dial painting shall be kept on racks in 
the ventilated hood so that the bristle part does not touch the table top. 
Solvents and small wiping papers shall be used to clean brushes. Wiping 
papers shall be discarded after a single use and placed in covered containers, 
and they shall be disposed of as radioactive waste material. 
(e) Brushes shall never be pointed in the mouth. 
(f) Removal of radioactive paints from dials shall be done under liquid. 
Dry scraping or removal of luminous compounds by buffing is prohibited. 
(g) Drying racks in the workroom shall be equipped with exhaust 
ventilation which will remove radon and prevent its dispersal in the work-
room. Finished work shall be placed in the drying racks promptly and 
shall not be allowed to accumulate on work benches. 
3811. Medical Supervision. (a) Each employee exposed to ionizing 
radiation shall be under the supervision of or in consultation with a compe-
tent medical expert experienced in the diagnosis of the harmful effects of 
ionizing radiation. Such supervision shall include an examination prior to 
starting work with a source of ionizing radiation and again at intervals not 
less than once yearly while so employed. Certification of such supervision 
shall be kept current and shall be posted conspicuously in the place of em-
ployment. Such notice shall contain (I) the name of the competent medical 
expert providing the medical supervision and ( 2) the number and names of 
the employees under supervision and their occupation. The employer shall 
be responsible for the provision of the necessary medical supervision. 
(b) When in the opinion of the medical supervisor continued exposure 
to ionizing radiation is likely to injure an employee's health, such employee 
shall be removed from the exposure. See Section 3803(a) in these orders. 
38I2. Devices Containing Radioactive Materials That Are Used as 
Hand Tools or Worn on the Per son. (a) The employer shall not require or 
permit the use of such devices unless a complete set of instructions is sup-
plied with the device. The instructions must contain at least the following 
information: 
(I ) A statement that the device has been tested and is free from 
radioactive contamination on its external surfaces. The name of 
the person who made the test and the date on which it was made 
shall be included in the statement. 
(2) Instructions for operation and use, with specific reference 
to the nature of the danger if the device should become defective, 
permitting the escape of sources of ionizing radiation. 
(3) Detailed instructions giving proper methods of decontami-
nation in the event of contamination. 
(4) Instructions for safe disposal of damaged or wornout 
devices. 
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(b) Each device must be legibly tabled with words or phrases equivalent 
to the following: 
WARNING: Contains Radioactive Material 
Handle With Care 
DO NOT DISMANTLE 
Note: The division may require additional warning words or precaution-
ary statements on the label where the potential exposure justifies such ad-
ditional precautions. 
J8IJ. Radioactive Luminous Compounds. The container of every radio-
activ~ lu~inous compound shall be labeled or tagged as follows: 
DANGER ! Contains radioactive substance. 
POISON 
(Name substance) 
Do not take internally. 
A void contact with skin. 
Do not breathe dust, vapors, or gas. 
ITEM 3 
NEw YoRK INDUSTRIAL CoDE RuLE No. 38 
RADIATION PROTECTION 
Finding of Fact 
The Board finds that every industry, trade, occupation and process involv-
ing the use or presence of radioactive material or radiation-producing 
equipment involves elements of danger to the lives, health and safety of 
persons employed therein. The Board further finds that special regulations 
are necessary for the protection of such persons, in that such material and 
equipment may emit invisible and imperceptible rays or particles having the 
property of producing deleterious or fatal effects, immediate or deferred, 
upon and within the human body. 
J8-I APPLiCATION 
This rule applies to every place and every operation where any employee 
in the course of his work may be exposed to radiation in excess of one 
tenth the permissible weekly dose as set forth in this rule except the follow-
ing places and installations which are subject to the provisions of the New 
York State sanitary code relating to ionizing radiation, to wit: 
I. Hospitals, institutions, medical clinics, medical offices, dental offices 
and podiatry offices. 
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2. Veterinary clinics and veterinary offices. 
3· Educational institutions. 
4· Commercial, private or research laboratories performing diagnostic 
procedures or handling equipment or material for medical use. 
38-2 ExEMPTIONS 
Except as herein specifically provided, every operation involving only the 
following devices, appliances and materials are hereby exempted from the 
application of this rule : 
1. Small lots of timepieces, instruments, novelties or devices containing 
self-luminous elements during the course of retail sale, during industrial 
use or during repair. The repair and refinishing of the self-luminous ele-
ments themselves, however, are not exempted. 
2. Naturally radioactive materials of a degree of specific radioactivity 
approximately equivalent to that of potassium as it occurs normally. 
3· Electrical equipment having thermionic conduction current and 
operated at voltages less than 16 kilovolts which is not primarily intended 
to produce radiation. · 
4· Domestic television receivers except during production testing. 
S· Potentially radiation-producing equipment which is not being used or 
operated in such manner as to produce radiation, e.g., during storage or 
shipping or during the course of .retail sale. Such equipment is not, how-
ever, exempted from the labeling requirements of this rule. 
6. Any radioactive material being transported by common carrier and 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission or other 
governmental agency having jurisdiction.· 
7· Total quantities of the following radioactive material not exceeding 




Antimony 124 (Sb 124)..................... 1 
Arsenic 76 (As 76).......................... 10 
Arsenic 77 (As 77).......................... 10 
Barium 14o--Lanthanum 140 (Ba La 140)..... 1 
Beryllium (Be 7)............................ so 
Cadmium 109-Silver 109 (Cd Ag 109)....... 10 
Calcium 4S (Ca 4S)......................... 10 
Carbon 14 (C 14)........................... so 
Cerium 144-Praseodymium 144 (Ce Pr 144).. 1 
Cesium 137-Barium 137 (Cs Ba 137) ........ . 
Chlorine 36 (Cl 36)......................... 1 
Chromium 51 (Ch 51)....................... so 
Cobalt 6o (Co 6o) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Copper 64 (Cu 64).......................... so 
Europium 154 (Eu IS4)..................... 1 
Fluorine 18 (F 18).......................... so 
Gallium 72 (Ga 72).......................... 10 
Germanium 71 (Ge 71)...................... so 



























Gold 199 (Au 199).......................... IO 
Hydrogen 3 (Tritium) (H 3)................ 250 
Indium 114 (In 114)......................... I 
Iodine 131 (I 131)........................... 10 
Iridium 192 (lr 192)......................... IO 
Iron 55 (Fe 55)............................. so 
Iron 59 (Fe 59)............................. I 
Lanthanum (La 140)....... •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Manganese 52 (Mn 52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Manganese 56 (Mn 56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so 
Molybdenum 99 (Mo 99).................... IO 
Nickel 59 (Ni 59). . · ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Nickel 63. (Ni 63) ............... · .. · · · · · · · · · 
Niobium 95 (Nb 95)........................ 10 
Palladium 109 (Pd 109).... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to 
Palladium 103-Rhodium 103 (Pd Rh 103).... 50 
Phosphorus 32 (P 32)....................... 10 
Polonium 210 (Po 210)...................... 0.1 
Potassium 42 (K 42)........................ IO 
Praseodymium 143 (Pr 143) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
Promethium 147 (Pm 147)................... IO 
Radium 226 (Ra 226)........................ 1 
Rhenium 186 (Re 186)......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Rhodium 105 (Rh 105)...................... 10 
Rubidium 86 (Rd 86)........... . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Ruthenium tOO-Rhodium 1o6 (Ru Rh 106)... I 
Samarium 153 (Sm 153)..................... IO 
Scandium 46 (Sc 46).. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Silver 105 (Ag 105) ....................... . 
Silver111 (Ag111)......................... 10 
Sodium 22 (Na 22)......................... 10 
Sodium 24 (Na 24)....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Strontium 8g (Sr Sg)....................... 1 
Strontium go-Yttrium 90 (Sr Y go)......... 0.1 
Sulfur 35 (S 3S)............................ so 
Tantalum 182 (Ta 182)..................... 10 
Technetium g6 (Tc g6)...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Technetium 99 (Tc 99).......... . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Tellurium I27 (Te 127) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Tellurium I29 (Te 129) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Thallium 204 (TI 204)...................... so 
Tin 113 (Sn 113)........................... IO 
Tungsten 181 (W I8I)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
TWigsten t8S (W t8S)...................... 10 
Vanadium 48 (V 48) ....................... . 
Yttrium go (Y go) .................•.......• 
Yttrium 91 (Y 91) ......................... . 
Zinc 6s (Zn 6s)..................... . . . . . . . . 10 
Natural Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 






















































Such materials however, are not exempted from the labeling requirements 
of this rule. 
8. Any other radiation-producing device or radiation appliance incorpo-
rating either radioactive materials or radiation-producing equipment which 
the Board finds, either by variation or by approval, to be exempt from the 
application of this rule. · 
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38-3 DEFINITIONS 
As used herein and for the purposes of this rule, the following terms 
mean: 
38-3.I Airborne Radioactive Material. Airborne radioactive material in 
any form such as dusts, fumes, mists or gases. 
38-3.2 Approved. In compliance with a subsisting resolution of approval 
adopted by the Board. 
38-3.3 Board. The Board of Standards and Appeals of the New York 
State Department of Labor. 
38-3.4 Commissioner. The Industrial Commissioner of the State of 
New York. 
38-3.5 Controlled Area. Any area access to which is restricted by the 
owner. 
38-3.6 Dose. Radiation received by an individual during exposure thereto 
expressed in "mrem." The dose for an individual includes all doses to the 
region of interest from all types and energies of radiation. 
38-3.7 Dose Rate. The dose per unit of time. 
38-3.8 Employee. A person employed; one who works for wages or 
salary in the service of another. 
38-3.9 Exposure. The presence of an individual in a field of radiation. 
38-3.10 High Airborne Concentration Area. Any room, enclosure or 
area of operation accessible to employees in which airborne radioactive rna-· 
terial exists in excess of the amounts specified in 38-6.I, Table I, at any one 
time or in excess of 25 percent of the amounts specified in 38-6.1, Table I, 
averaged over a period of one week. 
38-3.1 I High Radiation Area. A radiation area accessible to employees 
in which there exists a radiation level in excess of 100 millirem in any one 
hour. 
38-3.12 Installation. A location where for a period of more than 30 
days one. or more sources of radiation are used, operated or stored. The 
confines of an installation shall be as designated by the owner. A part of a 
building, an entire building or a plant may be designated ·as an installation. 
38-3.13 Mobile Source. A source of radiation used or operated outside 
an installation. 
38-3.14 Owner-of an Installation. The person or organization having 
by law the administrative control of a source or radiation located within 
the confines of the installation, whether as proprietor, lessee, or otherwise. 
Of a Mobile Source. The person or organization having by law the ad-
ministrative control thereof, whether as owner, lessee, contractor or other-
wise. 
38-3.15 Personnel Monitoring Equipment. Devices designed to be worn 
or carried by an individual for the purpose of measuring radiation received 
by him. Examples of personnel monitoring equipment include film badges, 
pocket chambers, pocket dosimeters and film rings. 
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38-3.I6 Radiation. Alpha and beta particles, electrons, protons, neutrons, 
gamma and x-rays and all other radiations which produce ionizations di-
rectly or indirectly but not electromagnetic radiations other than gamma and 
x-rays. 
38-3.I7 Radiation Area. Any part of an installation accessible to em-
ployees in which there exists a radiation level over 5 millirem in any one 
hour or over ISO millirem in any seven consecutive days. 
38-3.I8 Radiation Worker. A person entrusted with or put in charge 
of a source of radiation by the owner of such source for the purpose 
of actually using the radiation thereof for a prescribed purpose. 
38-3.I9 Radiation of Very Low Penetrating Power. Radiation whose 
half value layer is less than one millimeter of soft tissue. 
38-3.20 Radiation-Producing Equipment. Any equipment producing 
radiation by the application of electrical energy. · 
38-3.2I Radiation Safety Physician. A duly licensed physician who has 
had training or experience in the biological or physiological effects of radia-
tion. 
38-3.22 Radiation Safety Officer. A person qualified by training and 
experience in radiological science and the control of the health hazards of 
radiation to perform dependable radiation protection surveys and to assume 
all responsibilities required of him under this rule. 
38-3.23 Radiation Safety Supervisor. A person employed at supervisory 
level who has been sufficiently instructed and trained to manage the applica-
tion of all protective techniques applicable to the radiation areas within an 
installation to the satisfaction of a radiation safety officer. 
38-3.24 Radioactive Material. Any material either solid, liquid or gas, 
which emits radiation spontaneously. 
38-3.25 Sealed Source. Radioactive material that is encased in and is to 
be used in a container in a manner intended to prevent leakage of the radio-
active material. 
38-3.26 Shall. The word "shall" is always mandatory. 
38-3.27 Survey. An evaluation of the radiation hazards associated with 
each source of radiation under normal use or storage conditions. Such an 
evaluation may include a physical survey of the location of each source and 
the measurement of the dose rate of radiation therefrom. 
38-3.28 Weekly Dose. The total dose received by an individual in any 
period of 7 consecutive days. 
38-3.29 Weekly Intake. The total amount of radioactive material taken 
into an individual's body in any period of seven consecutive days. 
38-4 REGISTRATION 
38-4.I Installations. The owner of every installation shall register the 
same or cause it to be registered with the Industrial Commissioner. Such 
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registration shall be in a form acceptable to the Commissioner, and shall 
include the following: 
(a) The name and address of the owner. 
(b) A designation of the confines of the installation. 
(c) A designation of the type or types of sources of radiation expected 
to be in the installation. (For example, x-ray machines, particle accelerators, 
sealed radioactive sources, unsealed radioactive material.) 
(d) For each type of source designated in (c), an estim11ote of the maxi-
mum number of sources of radiation expected to be in the installation at any 
one time, and an estimate of the maximum size or rating of such sources of 
radiation. (For example, s x-ray machines, maximum rating 2SO kilovolts, 
S milliamperes; 75 sealed gamma ray sources, IS millicuries each ; so milli-
curies of unsealed radioactive material.) 
(e) The name, address, qualifications and signature of the radiation 
safety officer or other person in charge of radiation protection for the 
installation. 
38-4.2 Mobile Sources. Every mobile source shall be registered by its 
owner with the Commissioner. 
Such registration shall be in a form acceptable to the Commissioner and 
shall include the following : 
(a) Name and address of owner. 
(b) Type of source and its size or rating. (For example, 2 x-ray ma-
chines, 2 so KV, S milliamps.) 
(c) Name and address and the qualifications and signature of the radia-
tion safety officer or other person in charge of radiation protection for the 
source. 
38-4.3 Time of Registration. Existing installations and mobile sources 
shall be registered within ninety (go) days after the effective date of this 
rule and every new installation and mobile source shall be registered before 
it is placed in operation. 
38-4.4 Changes in Installations. The owner of every registered installa-
tion or mobile source shall advise the Commissioner forthwith of all changes 
which may substantially increase the potential hazard to any employee. 
38-s CoNTRoL oF ExPosURE 
38-s.I Control-General. The owner of every source shall shield, protect 
or isolate the same or arrange and control exposure thereto so that no 
employee in the course of his work receives a dose in excess of the permis-
sible limits specified in 38-6. 
38-s.2 Supervision Required-General. The owner of every installation 
and every mobile source shall provide or cause to be provided the safety 
measures required by this rule and shall designate a radiation safety super-
visor who shall maintain such safety measures in accordance with this rule. 
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38-5.3 Supervision Required-High Hazards. The owner of a source 
creating a high radiation area or a high airborne concentration area shall 
designate a radiation safety officer as herein defined. Such officer shall 
cause to be provided the required safety measures with respect to such areas. 
38-5-4 Control Outside an Installation. The owner of every source shall 
shield, isolate, protect or otherwise arrange and control the same so that 
radiation cannot penetrate walls, partitions, floors, ceilings c,. "'ther enclos-
ing structural portions delimiting the source as a whole to an extent capable 
of exposing employees of himself or another outside the installation to radia-
tion in excess of 10% of the permissible weekly dose as specified in 38-6. 
38-5.5 Maintenance. The owner of protection devices required by this 
rule shall maintain them in good repair and proper operating condition. 
38-5.6 Control of Airborne Radioactive Material. Airborne Radioactive 
Material shall be controlled by means of local exhaust ventilation, isolation 
of the process, approved respiratory equipment or other effective means as 
may be necessary to maintain the average concentration of inhaled or in-
gested radioactive material within the limits specified in 38-6.1, paragraph 7, 
Table I, of this rule. 
38-5.7 Mobile Sources. The placing in storage, the transportation and 
the use of every mobile source shall be _under the supervision of a radiation 
safety supervisor. 
38-5.8 Doors from Shielded Enclosures. Shielded enclosures of radiation 
areas with access openings large enough for the entry of personnel shall have 
at least one exit door easily and quickly openable manually from the inside. 
38-5.9 Warning Signals-High Radiation Areas. Within and at the en-
trance to all high radiation areas conspicuous warning signs shall be posted 
or signals shall be installed and arranged to operate whenever the dose rate 
exceeds 100 mrem per hour except as provided in 38-10.5. 
38-5.10 Instruction of Employees. No employer shall suffer or permit an 
employee of himself or another to work in a radiation area unless such em-
ployer has first informed the employee of the presence of radiation, in-
structed him as to the safe means and methods of performing his work 
during such exposure, and taken all necessary measures for his protection. 
38-5.11 Training of Radiation Worker. No employer shall employ any 
person as a radiation worker unless such person is sufficiently informed, in-
structed and trained by a radiation safety supervisor or radiation safety 
officer to handle, use or operate the source of radiation with which he works 
so that the exposure to radiation is maintained within the limits prescribed 
by this rule. 
38-5.12 Radiation Safety Supervisor-Qualifications. No employer shall 
employ or designate any person as a radiation safety supervisor unless such 
person has been instructed and trained by a radiation safety officer in the use 
of all protective measures that may be necessary for all radiation sources 
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that may be in his charge. The qualifications of the radiation safety super-
visor shall be in writing and shall be signed by the qualifying radiation 
safety officer. · 
38-5.I3 Minors Under I8. No employer shall suffer or permit an em-
ployee under I8 years of age to be exposed to radiation in excess of 10% 
of the permissible weekly dose limits as specified in 38-6.1. 
38-5.I4 Leakage. Every sealed source shall be so maintained that the 
concentration in any area accessible to employees, as a result of leakage, will 
not exceed the limits specified in 38-6.I, paragraph 7, Table I. 
38-5.I5 Eating Places. No person shall use any part of a high airborne 
concentration area for eating purposes. 
38-6 DosE LIMITS 
38-6. I Permissible Weekly Dose Limit. Except as below provided no 
employer shall suffer or permit an employee to receive in the course of his 
work a weekly dose greater than the following: 
1. For employees whose entire body or major portion thereof is exposed 
to radiation from external sources : 300 mrem in the blood-forming organs, 
in the gonads and the lenses of the eyes ; 6oo mrem in the skin. 
2. For employees whose entire body or major portion thereof is exposed 
to radiation of very low penetrating power from external sources : 300 
mrem in the lenses of the eyes; 1500 mrem in any other part of the body. 
3· For employees whose hands and forearms only are exposed to radia-
tion from external sources: 1500 mrem in the skin area receiving the highest 
dose. 
4· For employees whose feet and ankles only are exposed to radiation 
from external sources: 1500 mrem in the skin area receiving the highest 
dose. 
5· For employees whose heads and necks only are exposed to radiation 
from external sources: 1500 mrem in the skin area receiving the highest 
dose ; 300 mrem in the lenses of the eyes. 
6. For employees exposed to radiation from both external sources and 
ingested or inhaled radioactive material simultaneously or successively ; an 
aggregate weekly dose not exceeding any of the appropriate weekly doses 
specified above. 
7· For employees who are exposed to radiation from ingested or inhaled 
radioactive material only: 300 mrem in any part of the body. 
For the purpose of this rule continuous inhalation or ingestion during a 
work week of 40 hours of concentrations of radioactive material set forth 
in Table I below are deemed to produce a weekly dose equivalent to 300 
mrem in some part of the body. 
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TABLE I 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS OF INHALED OR INGESTED 
RADIOACfiVE MATERIALS 
Col. (I) Effective half life in body in days. 
Col. (2) Inhaled concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of air. 




Af![ll ............................ . 
Amw •........................... 
As"· ............................. . 
AtD' ............................ . 
Au,. ... ; ........................ . 
Au,. ............................ . 
Ba""+La"" ..................... . 
Be~ ...•.......................... 
C" .............................. . 
Ca'" ............................. . 
Cd100 + Ag""' ..................... . 
Ce1" +PI"" ..................... . 
c1• ............................. . 
em- ............................ . 
Co., ...•....•..................... 
Cr"' •............................ 
esm+Ba.., ..................... . 
Cu"' ........•.................•... 
Euw .......•...........•......... 
Fu .............................. . 
Fe"" .....••....•..•..•............ 
Fe"" ............................. . 
Ga"' ..............•••............. 
Gen ······························ H" or T(HTO or H.'O) .......... . 
Ho ............... ; .............. . 
!'"' .............................. . 
Ir"'" .....•........................ 
Ires ............................. . 
K"* .............................. . 
La"" ····························· Lu'" ............................ . 
Mn"' ............................ . 





Pb .............................. . 
Pd100 + Rh103 ••••••••••••••••••••• 
Pm1" •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Po""' (sol.) ...................... . 
Po""' (insol.) .................... . 
Pr'" ............................ . 
Pu• (sol.) ...•................... 
Ptt- ( insol.) .................... . 
Ra ... +! dr ...................... . 
Rb"" .••........................... 
Re281 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Rh""' ............................ . 
Rn..,+dr ....................... . 



























































I X I0-4 
8 X to-n 
7 X to .. 
9 X to-10 
3·4 X to_, 
8 X to_, 
2 X Io_, 
1.3 X 10 ... 
t-4 X Io ... 
9X to.., 
2 X to_, 
2X to.., 
I X IO""" 
5 X 10-10 
34 X to""" 




3·5 X to ... 
1.8 X IO""" 
5X 10 ... 
I X 10 ... 
I X 10 ... 
7X IO""" 
I X 10 ... 
9X IO""' 
2.2 X IO""" 
1.5 X Io_, 
6X to .. 
4X to.., 
1.5 X IO""" 
8X 10 ... 
5X IO .. 
5X IO .. 
1.3 X 10 ... 
5X 10 .... 
4 X Io_, 
2X to..., 
2X to .. 
6 X Io_, 
6 X 10·10 
2 X 10-10 




J.I X 10 ... 
2-4 X to..., 
3X to.., 
1 X to-" 
8X 104 
Col. (3) 
14 X to .. 
5 
I.J X 10 
4X to-< 
6 X 10-1 
6X Io .. 
9X Io ... 
2X IO-o 
6X Io ... 
3 
I X IO ... 
1.5 X Io .. 
2 X 10-1 
I X 10-1 
7X 10 ... 
2.7 X Io ... 
5X IO ... 
I-4 
4-5 X Io ... 
2.5 X 10-1 
I X 10-1 
2.6 
I.J X IO ... 
3-3 X 10 ... 
2.6X IO 
2.7 X Io 
5 X 10-' 
7X IO 
9X to..., 
4 X 10-• 
2.7 X to..., 
4 X 10-• 
34 
7X to 
5 X I0-1 
4X IO 
2-4 X 10_, 
1.2 X to ... 
7 X I0-1 
6X 10 ... 
4X 10·1 
3X Io ... 
3 
9 X Io..., 
I 
4·5 X to .. 
1.2 X Io-" 
9X to ... 
2-4 X 10-1 
5 X to-• 
6X to.., 
4 X 10·1 
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TABLE !-Continued 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS OF INHALED OR INGESTED 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS . 
Col. (I) Effective half life in body in days. 
Col. (2) Inhaled concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of air. 
Col. (3) Ingested concentrations in microcuries per milliliter of water. 
Material Col. (I) 
s.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IS 
Sc"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . I3 
Sm101 ••• ; • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 39,000 
Snw ..... ......... .. .. .. . . . . ...... 44 
Sr"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Sr"" + Y"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,7oo 
Tc"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.I 
Te..., . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I3 
Te120 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • Io 
Th... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-I 
Tm"" ...................... · ... · · · 59 
U-natural (sol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
U-natural (insol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I20 
U210 (sol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 
U181 (insol.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I20 
V"' ............................... I2 
Xe""' .......•.•...•............. :. 5-27 
Xe1111 •• • •• • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 0.38 
Y"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5I 
zn• . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .:ii 
All other beta or gamma emitters .. 
All other alpha emitters .......... . 
Col. (2) 
3 X Io..., 
2X Io-"· 
4X 10..., 
1.7 X Io..., 
6X 10..., 
6 X I0-1o 
8X IO .... 
3 X 10-" 
1.2 X 10-1 
2X IO .... 
1.5 X 10-1 
5 X IO-U 
5 X IO-U 
4 X I0-10 
5 X IO-U 
3 X Io..., 
I-3 X IO ... 
5 X IO .... 
I.2 X IO-" 
6X IO .... 
3 X IO .... 
I.5 X IO-U 
Col. (3) 
I.5 X IO-· 
I 
6 X I0-1 
5 X I0-1 
2 X Io ... 
2.4 X IO .... 
8X IO-o 
8X IO ... 
3-3 X IO-• 
1 X 10 
8 X I0-1 
2X IO ... 
4·5 X IO ... 
I.5 
1.3 X IO .... 
4X IO .... 
6 X 10-1 
:z X I0-1 
3 X IO-" 
3 X IO-" 
38-6.2 Quarter Year Dose Limits. Notwithstanding the provisions of 
38-6.1, an employer may, during any quarter-year period, suffer and permit 
an employee over 18 years of age to receive a weekly dose greater than a 
permissible weekly dose subject to the following requirements: 
I. Personnel monitoring equipment and a proper method of determining 
the dose shall be provided and used. 
2. During such quarter-year period the employer shall not suffer or per~ 
mit the employee to receive a weekly dose or intake exceeding three times the 
weekly limits specified in 38-6.1. 
3. The employer shall not suffer or permit an employee to receive a total 
dose or intake throughout such quarter-year period exceeding ten times the 
weekly limits specified in 37-6.1. 
38-6.3 Repeated Excessive Dose. When.ever personnel monitoring, physi-
cal examination by a radiation safety physician or appropriate tests indicate 
that any employee may have received an excessive amount c;>f radioactive 
material or received during a period of 13 consecutive weeks more than IO 
times the permissible weekly dose specified in 38-6.1, the employer shall 
report the fact to the Commissioner within 7 days after such finding. Such 
report shall describe the nature and extent of the exposure and the reason 
therefor and a description of corrective measures instituted. 
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38-7 SuRVEYs 
38-7.1 General. Every employer shall cause such sur\reys to be made by a 
radiation safety officer as may be necessary to determine whether the dose to 
any employee is maintained within the limits prescribed by this rule. 
38-7.2 Report. A report shall be made of each survey and shall be signed 
by the person by or under whose direction it was made and shall show the 
date when the survey was completed. 
38-7.3 Radiation Instruments. Every owner of an installation wherein 
radiation areas associated with radioactive .materials, other than sealed 
sources, are present shall provide or have readily available instruments and • procedures suitable for detecting and measuring radiations or contamination 
in accordance with the requirements of this rule and said instruments shall 
be maintained in proper calibration. 
38-8 RECORDS 
38-8.1 Retention of Reeords. The owner of every installation shall keep 
in his possession a copy of all reports of surveys, dosimeter readings and 
physical examinations or tests. 
38-8.2 Record of Use-Sources Outside Installations. The owner of 
every source of radiation used outside an installation shall keep a written 
record of each such use setting forth the following information: 
I. The specific identification of each source. 
2. The place or site of use. 
3· The date and time of the removal of the radiation source from its 
installation or place of storage. 
4· The date and time of its return thereto. 
5· The name of the radiation worker by whom each source was used and 
the name of the radiation safety supervisor in charge. 
38-8.3 Availability and Destruction of Records. No person shall damage 
or destroy any required radiation records, or suffer or permit the same to be 
destroyed without first having obtained the written consent of the Commis-
sioner. All pertinent radiation records or copies thereof shall be readily 
available to the attending physician of any person who may have undergone 
exposure in connection with the installation to which such records relate and 
they shall also be available to the Commissioner. 
38-8-4 Commissioner to Receive Records. The Commissioner shall re-
ceive all radiation records of a discontinued radiation installation which are 
voluntarily presented to him by the owner of such installation and acknowl-
edge the receipt thereof in writing. The delivery of such records to the 
Commissioner relieves the owner from all subsequent responsibility in re-
spect thereto. The Commissioner may keep or destroy such records in his 
discretion. 
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38-9 PERSONNEL MoNITORING 
38-9. I General. Any employee who in any week receives or is likely to 
receive a radiation dose which is more than 25% of the limits set forth in 
38-6. I shall be supplied with and shall use appropriate personnel monitoring 
equipment. 
38-9.2 High Radiation Areas. Every employee having any occasion to 
enter a high radiation area shall be supplied with and shall use appropriate 
personnel monitoring equipment when the dose rate may exceed Ioo mrem 
in any one hour. 
38-IO CAUTION LABELS AND SIGNS 
38-IO.I General. Except as provided in 38-ro.s, the owner of every 
installation or mobile source shall indicate the presence of each source of 
radiation by conspicuous labels on the source or container thereof or by 
conspicuous signs in their immediate vicinity, or both. 
Each label or sign shall bear the standard radiation warning symbol speci-
fied in 38-I0.3 and appropriate explanatory wording, such as "radiation," 
"radioactive," "airborne radioactivity" or "X-ray." The printing of any 
further matter upon such label shall not obliterate or obscure the symbol or 
the said words. 
38-Io.2 Special Provision. Where,. in the judgment of the radiation 
safety officer, personnel monitoring or the use of respiratory equipment is 
required for employees entering a high radiation area or high airborne con-
centration area, the posted signs shall conspicuously indicate such require-
ment. 
38-I0.3 Standard Radiation Warning Symbol. The following described 
standard radiation warning symbol is hereby adopted : 
1. Upon a yellow background there shall be the design shown in purple. 
2. The design in purple must be centered within a sufficient area of yellow 
background to make it conspicuous. 
* * * 
(Reproduction of Symbol Deleted) 
38-Io-4 Use of Symbol Restricted. No person shall affix, post or display 
any sign or label bearing said standard radiation warning symbol or any 
closely similar symbol to, upon or in any thing or location in any place to 
which this rule applies except for the purpose of warning of the presence 
of radiation. 
38-10.5 Exception from Posting Requirements. Caution signs are not 
required to be posted at areas or rooms containing sources of radiation for 
periods of less than twenty-four hours provided such sources are attended 
by a radiation worker during such periods. 
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38-II STORAGE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
Radioactive material not in use shall be stored in properly shielded and 
secured containers. 
38-I2 SEVERABILITY 
If any provisions of this rule or the application thereof tc :-"~} person or 
circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions 
or applications of this rule which can be given effect without the invalid pro-
vision or application, and to this end the provisions of this rule are declared 
to be severable. 
ITEM 4 
NEw YoRK STATE SANITARY CoDE 
Chapter XVI 
IONIZING RADIATION 
REGULATION 1. DEFINITIONS (a) The term "radiation" or "ionizing 
radiation" as used in this chapter shall refer to electromagnetic radiations 
(x-rays and gamma rays, etc.) or particulate radiations (electrons or beta 
particles, protons, neutrons, alpha particles, etc.) usually of high energy, 
but in any case it includes all radiations capable of producing ions directly 
or indirectly in their passage through matter. 
(b) The term "roentgen" (r) shall mean the quantity of x-radiation or 
gamma radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per o.o01293 
grams of a.ir produces, in air, ions carrying an electrostatic unit of quantity 
of electricity of either sign. Milliroentgen (mr) equals I/Iooo of a 
roentgen. 
(c) The "rad" is the unit of absorbed dose and is equal to IOO ergs per 
gram of matter irradiated. Millirad (mrad) is equal to xjxooo rad. 
(d) The term "rem" is that quantity of any type of ionizing radiation 
such that the energy imparted to a biological system (cell, tissue, organ or 
organism) per gram of living matter by the ionizing particles present in the 
region of interest has the same biological effectiveness as an absorbed dose 
of 1 rad of lightly filtered x-radiation generated at potentials of 200 to 300 
kilovolts. Millirem (mrem) is equal to I/IOOO rem. 
(e) The term "Relative Biological Effectiveness" ( RBE) is the ratio of 
the absorbed dose of lightly filtered x-radiation generated at potentials of 
200 to 300 kilovolts, to the absorbed dose of any other type and/or energy of 
radiation that is required to produce the same biological effect on a particular 
biological system, when the conditions under which the radiation is received 
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are the same. A dose in rems is equal to the dose in rads multiplied by the 
appropriate RBE. 
(f) The term "curie" as used in this chapter shall mean that quantity of 
any radioactive material in which the number of disintegrations per second 
is 3·7 x 1010• Millicurie (me) equals I/Iooo of a curie. Microcurie (uc) 
equals I/IOoo of a millicurie. 
(g) The term "radiation installation" shall mean a location or facility 
where radiation equipment is used or where radioactive material is produced, 
transported, stored or used for any purpose. The limits of the radiation 
installation area shall be as designated by the operator. (See regulation 4 (e) 
and 5.) As used in this chapter, "radiation installation" shall refer only to 
those installations located i~ a hospital ; institution ; medical clinic ; medical 
office ; dental clinic ; dental office ; veterinarian clinic ; veterinary office ; po-
diatry office; educational institution; commercial, private or research labora-
tory performing diagnostic procedures or handling equipment or materials 
for medical use ; shoe store; trucking, storage, messenger or delivery service 
establishment; or any industrial or commercial establishment not subject to 
supervision by the New York State Department of Labor in accordance with 
the Laws of New York State. "Radiation installation," as used in this chap-
ter, shall include, vyl}ether or not it is specifically stated above, any facility 
where radiation is applied intentionally to a human. "Radiation installation," 
as used in this chapter, shall not include facilities subject to the regulations 
adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, United States Coast 
Guard, United States Post Office or Civil Aeronautics Board. 
(h) The term "radiation equipment" as used in this chapter, unless other-
wise specified, shall include any device which emits or may emit ionizing 
radiation, except that radiation equipment shall not include equipment op-
erated at less than 15 Kilovolts and which is not designed primarily to pro-
duce useful radiation; or, except for the repair and servicing thereof, equip-
ment operating normally at higher voltages, but which, by nature of design, 
does not produce radiation at the point of nearest normal approach at a 
weekly rate higher than one-tenth the appropriate basic minimum per-
missible total weekly dose for any criticai organ exposed. It shall not include 
equipment in storage, in transit or not being used, or equipment operated in 
such a manner that it .cannot produce radiation. 
(i) The term "radioactive material" as used in this chapter is any solid, 
liquid or gaseous substance containing radioactive atoms which undergo 
spontaneous disintegration resulting in the emission of one or more types of 
radiation. As used in this chapter, radioactive material shall not include: 
( 1) Natural radioactive materials having an equivalent specific radio-
activity not exceeding that of natural potassium. 
( 2) Small lots of time pieces, instruments, novelties or devices contain-
ing self-luminous elements, except during manufacture or repair of the self-
APPENDIX A 1149 
luminous elements themselves. Such time pieces, instruments; novelties or 
devices shall be included, however, if they are stored, used or handled in 
such quantity or fashion that any person might receive within a week a 
radiation dose exceeding I/10 the maximum permissible total weekly dose. 
(3) Radioactive material of such quantity that if the total amount were 
taken internally by a person, no serious harm would be likely to result. 
(Column 3-Table 3-N ational Bureau of Standards Hanc~J.Jk 52 can be 
used as a guide.) 
(j) The term "radioactive waste" as used in this chapter shall include any 
solid, liquid or gaseous substance containing radioactive material, regardless 
of its source, which is discharged into the environment. 
(k) The term "competent person" as used in this chapter shall mean an 
individual who has received training or instruction in radiation hazards and 
their control, sufficient to specify protection for himself and others in the 
vicinity. 
(1) The terms "hazard," "radiation hazard," or "hazardous amounts of 
radiation" when used in relation to external radiation exposure, shall refer 
to any exposure rate, which may result in a person receiving within a period 
of one week a total radiation dose exceeding the maximum permissible total 
weekly dose. When used in relation to internal exposur.e, they shall refer 
to concentrations of radioactive material in air, food .or water, which e?'ceed 
the maximum permissible concentrations in air, food or water for continuous 
exposure. 
(m) The term "sealed source" as used in this chapter shall mean any 
device containing radioactive material to be used primarily as a source of 
radiation which has been constructed in such a manner as to prevent the 
escape, under normal conditions, of any radioactive material. 
( n) The term "survey" as used in this chapter shall mean the evaluation 
of the potential radiation hazard in the vicinity of a radiation source. 
( o) The term "personnel monitoring equipment" as used in this chapter 
shall mean devices or equipment which are capable of indicating or record-
ing with reasonable accuracy the radiation dose a person has received during 
a specific period. 
(p) The term "operator" as used in this chapter shall mean an individual, 
group of individuals, partnership, firm, corporation or association conduct-
ing the business or activities carried on within the radiation installation. 
( q) The term "health officer" as used in this chapter shall mcim the 
county or part-county health officer, the health officer of a city of so,ooo 
population or over or the state district health officer. 
REGULATION 2. REGISTRATION. Every operator of a radiation installation 
as defined in this chapter shall register such installation with the health 
officer having jurisdiction, prior to March I, 1956. All new installations as 
defined in this chapter made on or after September I, 1955. shall be regis-
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tered with the health officer having jurisdiction, before the installation is 
placed in operation. Such registration shaH be made on a form prescribed 
by the state commissioner of health. The follo~ing information shaii be 
provided by the operator at the time of registration: The name of the op-
erator; a designation of the confines of the installation; a statement of the 
type of sources of radiation expected to be used, operated or stored within 
the installation and of the approximate total number of each type; a sum-
mary of the radiation safety program. 
A central committee (such as an isotope committee) having supervision 
for radiological safety over two or more radiation installations may register 
such installations in lieu of registration by the individual operator. 
Registration shall not imply approval of manufacture, storage, use, han-
dling or operation, but shaH serve merely to notify the health officer having 
jurisdiction, of the location and character of radiation sources. 
Any change in the character of the radiation instaiiation which might in-
crease the radiation exposure; such as addition to number of sources, in-
crease in source strength, increase in output, increase in energy of radiation 
produced, shall be considered a new installation and shall be registered with 
the health officer having jurisdiction. 
If the registration of each device or each change in the character of the 
installation would be impractical, the state commissioner of health, upon 
request of the operator or central committee, may approve blanket registra-
tion of the installation. 
Radioactive materials in quantities not exceeding the amounts shown in 
Table I shaH be exempt from registration. 
REGULATION 3· CoNSTRUCTION MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION. Every 
radiation instailation shall be constructed, maintained and operated in such 
a manner as not to create a hazard. 
Note: As a general guide to compliance with Regulation 3, the 
recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Protec-
tion, as published in Handbooks 4I, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59 of the National Bureau of Standards, 
and such other recommendations as may be made by that Com-
mittee, may be foiiowed. 
The applicable regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, Civil Aeronautics Board, United States Coast Guard and 
United States Post Office may be used as a general guide to com-
pliance with this regulation in relation to the proper storage and 
intrastate shipment of radioactive materials. [See Chapter 28I: · 
TRANSPORTATION.) 
REGULATION 4· MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DosEs. (a) The radiation ex-
posure of a person or persons shaH always be kept at the lowest practical 
level, in accordance with the current recommendations of the National Com-
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Co..,_ •••••••••••••••••••••••• IO 
Sr"" .. . .. .•. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . Io 
Ru""' .... -.................... IO 
AglllO........................ IO 
Te,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
JUl • . . . • • • • • . . • • . . . . • • • . • . • • IO 
Cs117 • • •• •• • •• • • • •• ••• • •• • • IO 
Ce'" ........................ Io 
Eu15ol •••••••••••••••••••••••• IO 
ww- ·················· ...... IO 
Re183 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO 
Ir"'" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
P"" . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . . . . . . . • . . . 100 
Cl"'" ....•.•.•..•.......•.... 100 
Ca"' . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . IOO 
Sc41 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 100 
Sc'". .. . . .......... .. .. .. . . . . IOO 
V48 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO 
Fe.. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IOO 
Zn"" . . . . .. • ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 100 
Ga.. ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . 100 
As•• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
Rb"" .•. •. .. ..•...... .. .. •. . . IOO 
Sr"" . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
yn ................ : ........ 100 
Nb'"' .. .• .•. .. . .••... .. ... ... 100 
Tc"" . . . . . .•.• .. .. •.. . . . ..... 100 
Rh:tm... .. . . .. .. . . ... . . . . . . . . Ioo 
Cd100 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO 
Ag'll ........................ Ioo 
Upper Limit 
Element Microcurie 
Snua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 100 
Tem ... .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . 100 
Ba"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
La"" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
Pr'" . . . .. . . . ... . . . . ... . . . . . . 100 
Sm161 ••••••••••••••••• • •• IOO 
Ho""' . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. .. . IOO 
Tm170 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO 
Lu177 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO 
Ta182 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO 
Pt'"'- . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . • • . . . . . . IOO 
Pt100 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Ioo 
Au108 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IOO 
Au"'" . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . 100 
Tl""' ........................ 100 
Tl"" . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ioo 
Pb.,. ...•.......•........•... 100 
Th"" ........................ 100 
H" ......................... Iooo 
Be7 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• IOOO 
C" ......................... IOOO 
Na"' ........................ 1000 
s• .......................... Iooo 
K'" ......................... 1000 
Cr"l ........................ Iooo 
Fe"" ......................... 1000 
Mn"" ....•..........•......• IOOO 
Ni .......................... Iooo 
Cu"' ........................ 1000 
Ge" ........................ IOOO 
Mo• ........................ 1000 
Pd101 •••••••••••••••••••••••• IOOO 
Pm' ......................... 1000 
Ir""' ........................ 1000 
Au100 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 1000 
Tl"" ........................ 1000 
Tl1111 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 1000 
Natural U .................. 1000 
Natural Th ................. 1000 
mittee on Radiation Protection, as published in the handbooks of the 
National Bureau of Standards. 
(b) When the source of radiation is outside the body, the maximum 
permissible total weekly dose under the conditions noted shall not exceed the 
following: _ 
( 1) Entire body or major portion thereof exposed to penetrating radia-
tion (half-value layer greater than I mm of soft tissue). The maximum 
permissible total weekly dose shall be 6oo mrems in the skin ; and 300 mrems 
in the blood-forming organs, gonads and lens of the eye. For exposure of 
the whole body to x-rays or gamma rays with an energy up to 3 million 
electron volts, this condition may be assumed to be met if the "air dose" 
does not exceed 300 milliroentgens. 
(2) Entire body or major portion thereof exposed to radiation of very 
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penetrating power. (Half-value layer less than I mm of soft tissue.) The 
maximum permissible total weekly dose shall be I 500 mrems in the skin and 
300 mrems in the lens of the eye. · 
(3) Hands and forearms or feet and ankles or head and neck exposed 
to any radiation. The maximum permissible total weekly dose shall be I 500 
mrems in the skin. 
· (4) Exposures Exceeding Basic Permissible Weekly Doses. In excep-
tional cases, it may be necessary for a person to receive in one week a radia-
tion dose exceeding the basic permissible total weekly dose, outlined in Regu-
lation 4 (b) : I, 2, & 3· This shall be allowable provided that the basic 
permissible dose during any seven consecutive days is not exceeded by more 
than a factor of three ; and provided further that the total dose in any organ 
accumulated during a period of thirteen (I3) consecutive weeks does not 
exceed ten ( IO) times the basic permissible weekly dose. 
(5) Accidental or Emergency Exposure to Radiation. Accidental or 
emergency exposure of the whole body or parts thereof to x-rays or gamma 
rays with photon energy less than 3 million electron volts occurring only 
once in a lifetime of a person shall be assumed to have no effect on the radia-
tion tolerance status of that person provided that the total exposure of the 
whole body or major portion thereof does not exceed 25 roentgens measured 
in air and provided also that the exposure to the hands, forearms, feet and 
ankles does not exceed 100 roentgens in addition to the whole body exposure. 
Accidental or emergency exposure to radiation of other types and ener-
gies· occurring once in a life-time of a person shall be assumed to have no 
effect on the radiation tolerance status of the person provided _that the total 
tissue doses resulting therefrom in the different tissues and organs of the 
body (expressed in rems) do not exceed numerically the respective tissue 
doses in rads resulting from exposure to x-rays with photon energy less 
tha~ . 3 million electron volts. 
Planned emergency exposure shall be carried out on the basis that a 
person will not receive doses higl;ler than one-half the tolerable accidental 
o.r emergency dose. 
(c) When the source of radiation is radioactive materials within the 
body, the dose rates to the tissues of the body shall be controlled by limiting 
the average rates at which radioactive materials are taken into the body 
either by inhalation or by ingestion. The maximum permissible concentra-
tions of radioactive material in air and water shall be in accordance with 
nationally recognized limits (Table 3 and Appendix 3-National Bureau of 
Standards Handbook #52). 
(d) The maximum permissible dose for any person shall include all doses 
from all types and energies of radiation, whether delivered simultaneously 
or successively, during the period of measurement, to the region of interest. 
(e) The radiation dose delivered to any person outside the installation 
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shall be limited to 1/10 the maximum permissible amounts stated in Regula-
tion 4(b): (1), (2), & (3) and 4(c). 
(f) Nothing in this regulation shall be construed to limit the kind and 
amount of radiation that a physician, dentist, or other licensed practitioner 
may intentionally apply to a person in diagnosis or treatment. 
(g) The limitations expressed in this regulation shall not apply to ex-
posure received by persons being fitted for shoes in a sho;: f.~tlng fluoro-
scope, provided such fluoroscope installation is constructed, operated and 
maintained in compliance with Regulation 19 of this Chapter. 
TABLE 2 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE TOTAL WEEKLY DOSES IN CRITICAL ORGANS UNDER VARIOUS 
CONDITIONS OF EXPOSURE 
Conditions of Exposure 
Part of Body Radiation 
Whole Body Any Radiation with 
Whole Body 
Hands and Fore-
arms or Feet and 




1 mm. of soft tis-
sue 
Any Radiation with 
Half-value layer 
less than I mm 
of soft tissue 
Any Radiation 

















• For exposures of the whole body to x-rays or gamma rays up to 3 Mev, this con-
dition may be assumed to be met if the "air dose" does not exceed 300 mr, provided the 
dose to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem. "Air dose" means that the dose is meas-
ured by an appropriate instrument in air in the region of highest dosage rate to which 
an individual might be exposed without the presence of the human ·body or other 
absorbing and scattering material. 
b Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions does not alter 
the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the blood-forming organs, the main 
portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the lens of the eye. 
(h) In special cases, exposure in excess of the values outlined in this 
regulation may be permitted for individuals over 45 years of age. This will 
be allowable if such exposures are in accordance with nationally recognized 
standards (National Bureau of Standards Handbook #59). 
· (i) The radiation dose delivered to any person less than 18 years of age 
shall be limited to a maximum of I/Io the maximum permissible total 
weekly amounts specified in Regulation 4(b): 1, 2, & 3 and 4(c). 
REGULATION S· SuPERVISION. All radiation installations shall be op-
erated by or under the direction of a competent person who shall be re-
sponsible for all necessary safety precautions. 
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The operator of a radiation installation shall be responsible for: 
(a) Insuring beyond reasonable doubt that all persons working with ra-
diation equipment or radioactive materials are properly and adequately in-
structed in the hazards associated with and the safe methods of handling or 
operation and use of the radiation equipment or radioactive materials. 
(b) Insuring beyond reasonable doubt that all persons working with ra-
diation equipment or radioactive materials are properly and adequately in-
structed in the purpose and proper use of any protective and monitoring 
equipment provided. This shall also apply to visitors to areas under his 
control. 
(c) Insuring beyond reasonable doubt, by means of radiation surveys, 
that any space normally occupied by persons not primarily engaged in radia-
tion or associated work is not subjected to radiation levels which would re-
sult in a person receiving a dose exceeding one-tenth the maximum permis-
sible amounts indicated in Regulation 4(b) : I, 2, & 3 and 4-c of this chapter. 
(d) Controlling the discharge of radioactive wastes so that any person 
outside the installation is not subjected to radiation levels exceeding one-
tenth the maximum permissible levels specified in Regulation 4-c of this 
chapter. · 
REGULATION 6. PERSONNEL PROTECTION. The operator of a radiation 
installation shall provide personnel monitoring equipment, properly cali-
brated, for every individual who may possibly receive routinely, a weekly 
radiation dose in excess of one-fourth the maximum permissible amounts 
specified in Regulation 4(b) : I, 2, & 3 of this chapter. Summary records 
shall be kept of all exposures indicated or recorded on personnel monitoring 
equipment and shall be filed by the operator; (I) for the length of the em-
ployment of the exposed individual plus 5 years, or (2) until two years 
following the death of the exposed individual, or (3) until, upon application, 
specific instructions have been given by the state commissioner of health for 
the-disposition of the records. These records shall be open to inspection by a 
duly authorized representative of the health officer and/or the state com-
missioner of health. The operator shall on request furnish any person with 
a summary statement of his radiation exposure record. 
Personnel monitoring equipment shall be worn on the torso. If it is de-
termined that the head and neck or extremities might receive exposures 
greater than I/ 4 the maximum permissible amounts specified for these areas 
of the body, personnel monitoring equipment shall be worn also on the body 
area likely to be so exposed. 
Protective equipment such as interlocked tube screen, leaded rubber 
aprons and leaded rubber gloves, shall be available to and used by the op-
erator of fluoroscopic equipment. Protective equipment shall be without 
defects. 
Radiation shields, including protective windows or other visualization de-
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vices or their equivalent, which will provide protection for the person op-
erating the equipment, shall be supplied for all radiographic equipment. 
When it is known or believed that the exposure of an individual during 
any one week may have exceeded five times the maximum permissible total 
weekly amounts specified in Regulation 4(b): I, 2, & 3 of this chapter, the 
person shall be notified and all known facts relative to its occurrence shall 
be reported to the health officer having jurisdiction, within ;"? burs of the 
discovery thereof and a copy of the report shall be put into that person's 
personnel file. Immediate corrective measures leading to the elimination of 
the recurrence or continuance of the overexposure shall be undertaken by 
the operator. 
REGULATION 7· MEDICAL ExAMINATIONS. All persons who might regu-
larly ingest or inhale radioactive materials in concentrations exceeding one-
quarter of the maximum permissible amounts specified in Regulation 4 (c) 
shall be examined by a physician at least once each year to determine the 
presence of radioactive material in the body. Such examinations shall in-
clude, according to the physician's judgment, pertinent laboratory examina-
tions such as urinalysis, expired air analysis or other laboratory tests or aids 
which will give data of value bearing on the person's state of health. 
All persons who might be exposed accidentally or under emergency con-
ditions to external radiation exceeding the maximum outlined in Regula-
tion 4(b) (5) shall be examined by a physician for evidence of radiation 
injury or for any physical condition which would tend to predispose to radia-
tion injury. Such examination shall include, according to the physician's 
judgment, pertinent laboratory examinations, such as blood counts. 
Records shall be kept of physical examinations and shall be filed by the 
operator; (I) for the length of the employment of the exposed individual 
plus five years, or ( 2) until two years following the death of the exposed 
individual, or (3) until, upon application, specific instructions in writing 
have been given by the state commissioner of health for the disposition of 
records. 
REGULATION 8. PROTECTION OF PATIENT. Filtration equivalent to at least 
a total of 2 millimeters of aluminum shall be used with all diagnostic x-ray 
equipment. 
Fluoroscopy equipment installed after September I, I955 shall not be 
operated for the examination of a patient unless an automatic timer is in-
stalled, so set and functioning as to interrupt the x-ray exposure at the end 
of four minutes' total exposure. The timer shall be so installed that the 
equipment may not be reactivated without resetting the equipment controls. 
Focal skin distance for all fluoroscopes shall be not less than twelve inches. 
The dosage rate at table top shall not exceed ten roentgens per minute. 
REGULATION 9· DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES. Radioactive wastes 
discharged to the environment shall not be released in such manner that they 
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will accumulate in the environment in concentrations that may lead to any 
person receiving a dose exceeding that specified in Regulation 4(e) of this 
chapter. If several users are discharging wastes in such way that the radio-
activities are additive~ they shall enter into a mutual agreement each to 
limit his release, so that the total comes within the permissible limit specified 
in Regulation 4(e). If no agreement is reached, then the amount of maxi-
mum discharge for each user shail be· set by the State Commissioner of 
Health. · 
Radioactive wastes shall not be disposed of by dumping on the surface of 
the ground or by burial in the soil, except in areas specifically approved by 
the state commissioner of health. Controlled surface or subsurface storage 
in such·a· fashion that radioactive material cannot mix with the soil or enter 
the ground water shall not be considered disp(>sal by dumping or burial. 
. Note: The contamination of soil resulting from the use of ra-
. dioactive materials in. plant, animal .and similar studies shall not 
be considered as contamination by radioactive waste. It is recom-
. mended, however, that the health officer having jurisdiction be 
consulted prior to the initiation of such studies. · 
REGULATION 10, RADIATION INSTRUMENTS. Every operator of a radia-
til;)l1 installation. where radioactive materials, not in sealed sources, are pres-
ent shall provide or have immediately available instruments suitable for 
detecting and .. measuring radiation. and radioactive contamination. Such 
instruments shall be maintained in proper calibration. 
REGULATION 11. HANDLING OF CADAVERS CoNTAINING RADIOISOTOPES. 
The identification of a particular patient as radioactive shall be the responsi-
bility of the physician in charge of the case or his designated representative. 
If such a patient dies in a hospital, the doctor who pronounces him dead 
shall notify the physician in charge of the case or his designated representa-
tive at once. 
An autopsy shall not be commenced on a body that contains more than 
five·millicuries of radioactivity without the consultation and advice of the 
radiation safety officer of the hospital or; if he is not available, of the 
physician responsible for the administration of the radioactive material. If 
neither is available, their designated representative may serve. 
Note: An official radiation safety officeris required by the Iso-
topes Division of the Atomic Energy Commission in institutions 
equipped for treatment with radioisotopes obtained from Atomic 
Energy Commission or secondary suppliers. 
A radioactivity report on every cadaver containing more than 5 millicuries 
of radioactivity shall be completed by the radiation safety officer or the 
physician responsible for the administration of-the radioactive material or 
their designated representatives. This report shall accompany the body 
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(whether autopsied or not) when it is surrendered to the funeral director. 
This report shall contain the following information: 
(a) Name of hospital 
(b) Name of deceased 
· {c) A statement, "This certifies that the remains of ................. . 
. . . . ' ........... has been examined this date by ....................... . 
· (person certifying) 
Radioactivity close to the surface of the body, as determined by ........ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . (is) (is not) below the rate of 30 mr /hr 
(state instrument or method) 
that is acceptable for embalmers during their work. This maximum per-
missible dose per hour will not be exceeded, if rubber gloves are worn, and 
further precautions are observed as listed below." 
(d) Statement of precautions to be taken 
(e) Date 
(f) Signature of Radiation Safety Officer or physician. 
Note: As a general guide to compliance with Regulation I I, the 
recommendations of the National Committee on Radiation Pro-
tection, as published in Handbook 56 of the National Bureau of 
Standards, may be followed. 
REGULATION I2. MONITORING OF RADIATION INSTALLATION. It shall be 
the responsibility of the operator of a radiation installation to make certain 
that surveys of the radiation installation are made by a· competent person 
with appropriate, properly calibrated monitoring equipment. 
Records shall be made of such surveys and shall be filed by the operator 
for: (I) five years following the date of the survey, or, (2) until, upon 
application, specific instructions have been given by the state commissioner 
of health for the disposition of such records. Such records shall be open to 
inspection by a duly authorized representative of the health officer and/or 
the state commissioner of health. The operator shall keep the radiation in-
tensity in any occupied space below that which would result in any person 
receiVing more than the maximum permissible total weekly dose during the 
time the space is occupied by that person during the week. 
· Surveys of radiation installations shall be made at the intervals outlined 
below: 
(a) Installations where radioactive materials not contained in a sealed 
source are handled shall be surveyed at least once a month. Such surveys 
shall be made more often if it is indicated by personnel monitoring equip-
ment or other means that more frequent surveys are necessary to limit radia-
tion intensities or contamination below the permissible maximum. Regularly 
scheduled radiation monitoring of the air shall be required where there is 
any reasonable possibility that concentrations of radioactivity in inhaled air 
may exceed the amounts ·specified in Regulation 4-c of this chapter. 
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(b) Installations where radiation equipment is used or where radioactive 
materials in a sealed source are handled or installed on or after September I, 
1955 shall be surveyed when originally installed." 
All radiation installations of this type, regardless of the date of installa-
tion, shall be surveyed whenever any change is made in the installation or 
its use that might increase the radiation to which a person could be exposed. 
When vibrations or other physical conditions exist which may cause 
changes in the protective features, inspection of protection devices and sur-
veys for radiation rates shall be made at least every six months or at more 
frequent intervals if required by the health officer having jurisdiction. 
REGULATION 13. THERAPY RooMs. No person other than the patient and 
those who may be required to hold the patient, shall be allowed to remain 
within a therapy room during irradiation. No person who is habitually near 
radiation producing equipment or materials shall hold a patient during ir-
radiation. The person holding the patient shall not be in the useful beam 
and shall be protected as much as practicable from scattered radiation. 
Every entrance to an x-ray therapy room in which equipment is operated 
at a potential above 1 so KV and every entrance to a teletherapy room shall 
be protected by interlocks so that no person can enter without turning off 
the radiation equipment or adequately shielding the radiation source. It shall 
be so arranged that irradiation equipment cannot be started again, or the 
radiation source unshielded again, without resetting the controls. 
In addition to the interlocking controls, signals shall be installed which are 
visible or audible inside the therapy room. These signals shall be installed 
so that they will be activated whenever irradiation is proceeding. It shall be 
possible for a person to escape from a therapy room at all times. 
REGULATION 14. WARNING SIGNS. (a) Standard Symbol. A standard 
symbol for designating any radiation hazard has been adopted . . . 
[Symbol Omitted] 
(.b) Radiation Areas-The operator of a radiation installation shall post 
conspicuous warning signs to indicate the area where a radiation hazard 
exists. Such warning signs shall contain the standard symbol and the words 
"Danger" and "Radiation Area." 
(c) Radiation Sources-The operator of a radiation installation shall 
label conspicuously all radioactive material as follows : 
( 1) Containers for sealed sources of external hazard only: A label 
containing the standard symbol and the words "Danger-Radiation." Where 
a time limit is specified, it shall be posted. 
(2) Containers for storage or shipment of loose bulk or unsealed 
sources primarily of an internal hazard: A label containing the standard 
symbol and the words, "Danger-Radioactive Material." 
(3) Additional Precautions: The printing of further precautions and 
instructions on the warning labels for radioactive materials shall not obscure 
the standard symbol and required precautionary words. 
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(d) Removal of signs and labels-All radiation labels or signs which may 
have been posted at a time when a radiation hazard existed shall be removed 
when there is no longer a need for such warning. 
REGULATION 15. AccouNTING FOR RAmoACTIVE MATERIALS. The op-
erator of a radiation installation shall maintain an accurate account of all 
radioactive materials in a radiation installation. Such records shall show 
amounts and form of the radioactive materials received, purpose for which 
used, amounts of wastes and such other information as may be necessary to 
account for the difference between the amount of radioactivity received and 
the amount on hand. Such records shall be open to inspection on request by 
the state. commissioner of health and/or the health officer having jurisdic-
tion, or their authorized representatives. 
The state commissioner of health, or his authorized representative, upon 
application, may modify this accounting requirement under special circum-
stances. 
REGULATION 16. RADIATION ILLNEss, INJURIES, EMERGENCIES, Acci-
DENTS. Accidents involving the serious overexposure of personnel ; the 
discharge of radioactive wastes in a concentration above an acceptable limit; 
the spillage, loss or theft of radium, or other radioactive materials ; fire ; 
flood or other catastrophe affecting places using or storing radioactive ma-
terials ; or other incidents, which will or are likely to expose people to hazard-
ous quantities of radiation ; whether it occurs at an installation as defined 
in this chapter or in any other place, shall be reported immediately by the 
person in charge by telephone or telegraph to the health officer having juris-
diction. Such reporting shall not relieve the operator of the responsibility 
for instituting and performing such corrective and preventive measures as 
are necessary to reduce the hazard. Following the receipt of notification, the 
health officer having jurisdiction shall investigate the incident promptly and 
determine that the operator has taken all necessary corrective and preventive 
measures. 
For the purpose of this regulation, "the serious overexposure of person-
nel" shall mean the exposure of a person to a quantity of external radiation 
exceeding that specified in Regulation 4(h-5) of this chapter, or to a quan-
tity of internal exposure which would result from the ingestion or inhalation 
of radioactive material in such quantities as to exceed so times the maximum 
permissible amount (Handbook 52, National Bureau of Standards). 
For the purpose of this regulation, "acceptable limit" shall mean that con-
centration of radioactive material which will not constitute a hazardous 
external or internal exposure to a person. 
It shall be the duty of every physician to report in writing to the state 
department of health the full name, address and age of every patient who . 
is suffering from radiation illness or injury from exposure to ionizing 
radiation. 
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Radiation received by a patient for therapy under the supervision of a 
physician or the effects of such radiation shall not come within the intent of 
this regulation. 
REGULATION I7. ELECTRICAL HAZARDS. All x-ray equipment installed in 
a radiation installation after September I, I955, shall, where applicable, bear 
the seal of approval of the Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., or shall be re-
quired to meet an equivalent 5afety standard. All equipment installed prior 
to September I, I955, if not bearing such seal, shall be altered to comply 
with the pertinent requirements of the standard of the National Board of 
Fire Underwriters' (The National Electrical Code) prior to September I, 
I956. 
Certification by a duly constituted local authority that the installation is 
free of electrical hazards shall be acceptable. 
REGULATION I8. VACATED PREMISES. Upon vacating any radiation in-
stallation handling radioactive materials, the operator shall decontaminate it, 
if necessary. If decontamination is not possible, the operator shall inform 
the owner and l?e health officer having jurisdiction. The owner shall inform 
the future occupants of any residual potential hazard. 
Note: As general guide to decontamination, the recommenda-
tions of the National Committee on Radiation Protection as pub-
lished in Handbook 4B of the National Bureau of Standards may 
be followed. . 
REGULATION I9. SHOE-FITTING FLUOROSCOPES. (a) No fluoroscopic or 
x-ray equipment for fitting shoes shall be operated unless it is equipped with 
an automatic timer which will cut off each x-ray exposure at . the end of a 
five-second interval. 
(b) All establishments which use a shoe-fitting fluoroscope shall display 
at all times, in a location where all users can see it, a warning sign furnished 
by the state department of health. 
(c) Exposure to the useful beam measured on the base of the foot open-
ing in fluoroscopic shoe-fitting machines installed after September I, I955, 
shall not exceed I .o roentgen per five-second exposure. 
Exposure to the useful beam measured on the base of the foot opening 
of fluoroscopic shoe-fitting machines installed prior to September I, I955, 
shall not exceed two roentgens per five-second exposure. After January I, 
I¢0, no shoe-fitting fluoroscope shall be operated if the exposure to the 
useful beam measured on the base of the foot opening exceeds I .o roentgen 
per five-second exposure. 
(d) The base of the foot opening shall be covered with a sheet of alu-
minum at least 2 mm. thick and of dimensions equal to or greater than the 
base. This aluminum filter shall be protected from wear by a covering layer 
of other material and shall be installed in such a fashion that its thickness 
can be conveniently determined. 
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(e) Only salespersons shall be permitted to operate a shoe-fitting fluoro-
scope. The starting mechanism shall be so designed and located as to pre-
vent operation by customers. 
(f) The fluorescent viewing screen shall be covered with leaded glass 
having a lead equivalent of at least 1 ·5 mm. 
(g) Customers should be required to have shoes on both feet during a 
fluoroscopic examination. 
(h) Customers should be questioned regarding dates and numbers of 
previous shoe-fitting fluoroscopic examinations and may not be allowed such 
fittings in excess of 12 five-second viewings per year or in excess of three 
per day .. 
(i) Salespersons shall operate the device for their own customers only. 
(j) Salespersons shall not use their own feet or hands for demonstrating 
x-ray fluoroscopy. Children's feet shall not be held in position by any person 
while the machine is in operation. 
(k) Salespersons shall report any defects in the machine to the person 
in charge of the establishment wherein such machine is installed. Defective 
machines shall not be operated until repairs are made. 
(1) Machines shall be located as far as possible from frequently occu-
pied areas. X-ray tubes shall be shielded and cabinets constructed so that 
stray radiation is reduced to less than 10 milliroentgens per hour at all 
positions six inches from the cabinet surface and at viewing ports at eye 
level, except at the foot opening. Foot openings shall be so oriented and 
shielded that scattered radiation from the openings is not directed toward 
areas which are continuously or frequently occupied unless suitable protect-
ing screens are interposed. Scatter radiation from the foot opening shall not 
exceed a rate of 10 milliroentgens per hour at a distance of ten feet. 
( m) All metal non-current carrying parts shall be properly grounded. 
( n) An interlocking switch shall be provided on any door or panel giving 
access to high voltage components. This switch shall operate to break the 
electrical current whenever the door or panel is opened. 
( o) Cabinet doors or panels shall be kept locked at all times except when 
making necessary repairs. 
1162 STATE REGULATION 
ITEM 5 
MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Michigan Department of Health 
Division of Occupational Health 
REGULATIONS GovERNING THE UsE OF RADIOACTIVE IsoTOPES, 
X-RADIATION AND ALL OTHER FoRMS oF IoNIZING RADIATION 
PART I. ADMINISTRATIVE RuLES AND PRocEDURES 
R 325.1301. Radiation protection advisory committee. 
Sec. r. The state health commissioner shall appoint a radiation protection 
advisory committee to be known as the commissioner's radiation committee 
which will serve to advise him on all matters pertaining to radiation protec-
tion and the rules and regulations promulgated for this purpose. 
R 325.1302. Same; qualification of members, chainnan. 
Sec. 2. The state health commissioner shall appoint 9 members to serve 
on the commissioner's radiation committee. 
2.1 Members shall be appointed on the basis of their recognized knowl-
edge in the field of radiation and the committee shall be so consti-
tuted as to be a fair representation of all interested groups of users 
of ionizing radiation. 
2.2 The state health commissioner or his representative shall act as 
chairman of the committee. 
2.3 Members shall be appointed for 3-year periods. Of the original ap-
pointees, 3 shall be appointed for r year, 3 for 2 years, and 3 for 3 
years. 
2-4 The committee shall meet for review of these regulations at least 
once annually and at such other times, not to exceed 4 times a year, 
as may seem necessary. Meetings may be called by the state health 
commissioner on his own initiative or at the request of 5 or more of 
the members. 
R 325.1303. Technical committees or consultants, appointment. 
Sec. 3· The state health commissioner may appoint such technical com-
mittees or consultants as may be indicated from time to time. 
R 325.1304. Local health departments, enforcement of rules. 
Sec. 4· The state health commissioner may delegate authority to the 
county, city or district health departments to enforce these rules and regula-
tions. 
PART 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND DEFINITIONS 
R 325.I305. Sec. 5· Scope of regulations. 
5.I These regulations apply to all persons who receive, possess or use 
materials or devices capable of emitting ionizing radiation as de-
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fined in these regulations except the sources or uses cited in sec-
tion 7, exemptions. 
5.2 Person includes any municipality, industry, public corporation, co-
partnership, firm or any other entity whatsoever. 
S·3 Nothing in these regulations should be interpreted as limiting the in-
tentional exposure of patients to radiation for the purpose of medi-
cal diagnosis, medical therapy, or medical research conducted by 
duly licensed members of the healing professions. 
R 325.1300. Sec. 6. Registration of users and sources of radiation. 
6~1 Within 10 days after receipt or completion thereof all sources of 
ionizing radiation shall be registered with the state health com-
missioner by the legal owner, user or authorized representative. 
Registration information shall include the name and address of the 
owner or user, the name of the individual and the training and/or 
qualification of the individual who will be appointed by the owner 
or user to see that the radiation source is safely used and stored, 
location in which the radiation source shall be used or stored, type 
of radiation source, and the quantity in curies or the energy and 
capacity of the radiation source. Existing sources of ionizing radia-
tion shall be registered within go days of the effective date of these 
rules and regulations. The owner of every registered source of 
ionizing radiation shall advise the state health commissioner and 
receive prior approval for all changes which may materially increase 
the potential health hazard. 
6.2 A written exemption to the notification of changes, which may 
materially increase the potential health hazard in an existing installa-
tion, or the registering of each individual source or use may be 
granted by the state health commissioner, provided that the legal 
owner, user or authorized representative of the registered source is 
registered with the state health commissioner and the registrant 
meets the health and safety requirements specified and prescribed in 
these regulations for such registrant by the state health commis-
sioner. 
R 325.13<>7. Sec. 7· Exemptions. 
7.1 The following materials, sources and uses are exempted from 
registration : 
7.1.1 Natural radioactive materials of an equivalent specific radio-
activity not exceeding that of natural potassium. 
7. 1.2 ( 1) Radioactive materials in such total quantity that if the 
entire amount were taken internally, at any one time by a 
single person, no harmful effects would be likely to result. 
A listing of the upper quantities of radioactive material that 
shall not require registration are given in appendix D. Up to 
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10 quantities of material listed in this appendix may be pos-
sessed by any person provided that no 2 or more quantities 
are combined in any way so as to increase the amount of 
radioactive material in any one quantity. 
(2) Radioactive materials in air, water, or food in con-
centrations not exceeding those listed in appendix B, table II, 
columns I or 2 of these regulations, or radioactive materials 
in non-edible liquids and solids in . such concentrations that 
they would not result in contamination of air, water, or 
edibles in excess of the limits in appendix B, table II, 
columns I or 2 of these regulations. 
7.1.3 Electrical equipment that is primarily not intended to produce 
radiation and that, by nature of design, does not produce radi-
ation at the point of nearest approach at a rate higher than 
I/10 of the appropriate permissible limit for any critical 
organ exposed. The production testing or production servic-
ing of such equipment shall not be exempted only if the dose 
to the gonads is 'less than I/IO of the appropriate maximum 
permissible limit. 
7.1.4 Timepieces, instruments, novelties, or devices containing self-
luminous elements. However, all persons engaged in the 
manufacture or repair of self-luminous elements and pos-
sessing amounts of radioactive materials in excess of the 
limits prescribed in appendix B, table II, column 2, of these 
regulations shall register such sources. 
7.1.5 Radiation devices not being used in such manner as to 
produce radiation.· 
7.1.6 Radioactive material being transported in accordance with 
specific ·radiation safety regulations of a state or federal 
agency having jurisdiction over such transport. 
7.1.7 Any other special research devices or nuclear devices so speci-
fied by the state health commissioner. 
R 325.I3o8. Sec. 8. Definition of terms. 




Air-borne radioactive material means any radioactive ma-
terial dispersed in the air in the form of dusts, fumes, mists, 
vapors, or gases. 
Air-borne radioactivity area means any· area in which air-
borne radioactive materials are accessible to persons in 
concentrations of which 
( 1) Values at any time are in excess of respective· values 
stated in appendix B, table I, column 1; or 
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(2) Values averaged over a week of working time are in 
excess of 251o of the respective values stated in ap-
pendix B, table I, column I. 
8.1 ·3 Authorized recipient means any person licensed by the 
Atomic Energy Commission to possess radioactive ma-
terials, and if resident in Michigan, registered under these 
regulations. 
8.1.4 Controlled area means any area in which the activities of oc-
cupants are subject to control or supervision by the regis-
trant and which is designated by the registrant as a potential 
radiation hazard area. (A controlled area shall not include 
space in use as residential quarters, although a room or 
rooms in a residential building may be set apart as a con-
trolled area.) 
8.1.5 Diagnostic-type housing. A type of x-ray tube housing that 
reduces the leakage radiation to at most O.Io rjhr at a 
distance of I meter from the tube target when the tube is 
operating at its maximum continuous rated current for the 
maximum rated voltage. 
8.1.6 Dose is a quantity of radiation measured at a certain point 
expressed in roentgens, rems or rads. 
Absorbed dose of any ionizing radiation is the amount of 
energy imparted to matter by· ionizing particles per unit 
mass of irradiated material at the place of interest (ex-
pressed in rads). 
Exposure dose is a quantity of radiation measured in 
air in roentgens without back scatter at a given point. 
Dose rate is dose J)er unit time. 
8.1.7 Film badge is an appropriately packaged and calibrated 
sensitive film for detecting and measuring ionizing radiation 
received by persons. It is usually dental-film size and 
worn/or carried on the person. 
8. I .8 High radiation area means any area accessible to personnel, 
in which there exists radiation at such levels, that a major 
portion of the body could receive in any I hour a dose in 
excess of IOO millirems. 
8.1.9 Installation is a location where for a period of more than 30 
days I or more sources of radiation are used, operated, or 
sto·red. The confines of an installation shall be designated 
by the owner. A part of a building, an entire building or a 
plant may be designated as an installation. 
· 8.1.10 Ionizing radiation means any or all of the following forms 
of ionizing radiation: alpha rays, beta rays, gamma rays, 
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x-rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed protons 
and other atomic particles; but not sound or radio waves, or 
visible, infra-red, or ultraviolet light. 
8.1.11 Leakage radiation is all radiation coming from within the 
tube housing except the useful beam. 
8.1 .12 Maximum permissible dose is that dose of ionizing radiation 
which, in the light of present knowledge, is not expected 
to cause bodily injury to a person during his lifetime. 
8.1.13 Normal operating conditions for x-ray machines. Operating 
conditions under which the x-ray apparatus is normally 
used with respect to the following : 
(a) Maximum tube voltage 
(b) Maximum tube current 
(c) Total weekly operational time 
(d) Direction of the useful beam 
(e) Minimum radiographically usable distance from the 
tube to personnel barrier 
(f) Occupancy of adjacent areas 
8.1.14 Occupancy factor (T) is the factor by which the work load 
should be multiplied to correct for the degree or type of 
occupancy of the area in question. 
8.1.15 Occupied area is an area that may be occupied by persons or 
radiation sensitive materials. 
8.1.16 Personnel barrier is a barrier which restricts the movements 
of personnel in the vicinity of an x-ray apparatus. 
8.1.17 Potential radiation area. That area surrounding a radiation 
source such that the radiation source may produce a radia-
tion field in the area, if it is operated under maximum con-
ditions, which exceeds I/IO of the maximum permissible 
dose based on 13 weeks of continuous occupancy. 
8.1.18 Primary radiation is radiation coming directly from the 
target of an x-ray tube or from other radiation sources. 
8.1.19 Protective apron is an apron made of attenuating materials 
used to reduce radiation hazards. 
8. I .20 Protective barrier is attenuating material used as shield to 
reduce radiation hazards. 
Primary protective barrier is a barrier sufficient to attenuate 
the useful beam to the required degree. 
Secondary protective barrier is a barrier sufficient to attenu-
ate the stray radiation to the required degree. 
8.1.21 Protective glove is a glove made of attenuating materials 
used to reduce radiation hazards. 
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8.1.22 Rad is that quantity of any radiation which produces an 
absorbed dose of 100 ergs per gram. 
8.1.23 Radiation area. Any part of an installation accessible to 
employees in which there exists a radiation level of 7·5 milli-
rem in any I hour or over I so millirem in any 7 consecutive 
days. 
8.1.24 Radiation field is the region in which ionizing radiation is 
propagated. 
8.1.25 Radiation hazard is any situation where persons might be 
exposed to radiation in excess of the maximum permissible 
dose. 
8.1.26 Radiation monitoring is the periodic or continuous determi-
nation of the dose rate in an occupied area (area monitor-
ing) or of the dose received by a person (personnel moni-
toring). 
8. I .27 Radioactive material means any compound or element which 
may emit any or all of the following : alpha and beta 
particles, electrons, photons, neutrons and gamma and all 
other emissions which produce ionization directly or in-
directly. 
8.1.28 Relative biological effectiveness (RBE) is the biological 
effectiveness of I type and energy of radiation, relative to 
that of lightly filtered x-rays, generated at potentials of 200 
to 300 kv, for the particular biological system and biological 
effect, and for the conditions under which the radiation is 
received. 
8. I .29 Rem is the quantity of any radiation such that the energy 
imparted to a biological system (cell, tissue, organ, or organ-
ism) per gram of living matter by the ionizing particles 
present in the region of interest, has the same biological 
effectiveness as an absorbed dose of 1 rad from lightly 
filtered x-rays generated at potentials of 200 to 300 kv. A 
dose in rems is equal to the dose in rads multiplied by the 
appropriate RBE. 
8. I .30 Roentgen is the quantity of x or gamma radiation such 
that the associated corpuscular emission per o.ooi293 grams 
of air produces, in air, ions carrying I electrostatic unit of 
quantity of electricity of either sign. The roentgen is ap-
plicable only to x- and gamma radiation of quantum energies 
up to 3,000,000 electron volts. 
8.1.3I Scattered radiation is radiation that has been deviated by 
substances in its path. 
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8. I .32 Sealed source means any radioactive material that is encased 
in and is to be used in a container in a manner intended to 
prevent leakage of the radioactive material. 
8.I.33 Secondary radiation is radiation emitted by any matter being 
irradiated with x-rays, gamma rays, etc. or with any high 
energy rays or particles. 
8. I ·34 Source of ionizing radiation is any material that is emitting 
ionizing radiation spontaneously or as a result of impinge-
ment of energy upon it. 
8.1.35 Stray radiation is radiation not serving any useful purpose. 
It includes leakage and secondary radiation. 
8.1.36 Survey means an evaluation of the radiation hazards in-
cident to the production, use, release, disposal, or presence 
of radioactive materials or other sources of radiation under 
a specific set of conditions. 
8.1.37 Therapeutic-type housing. An x-ray tube housing that re-
duces the leakage radiation to at most 1.0 r/hr at a distance 
of I meter from the tube target and 1.0 r/min. at any point 
on the surface of the housing when the tube is operating 
at its maximum continuous rated current for the maximum 
rated voltage. 
8.1.38 Uncontrolled area means any area not designated as a con-
trolled area. 
8.I ·39 Use factor (U) is the fraction of the work load during 
which ·the useful beam is pointed in the direction under 
consideration. 
8.1.40 Useful beam is that part of the primary radiation that passes 
thru the aperture, cone or other collimator. 
8.1.4I (1) Workload (W) is the working activity of an x-ray 
machine measured in milliampere minutes per week. 
(2) Workload (W) is the total exposure measured in 
roentgens per week in the useful beam at I meter from a 
teletherapy source. 
8.1.42 X-ray apparatus shall mean any source of x-ray and its high 
voltage supply, including high energy betatron. 
PART 3· PERMISSIBLE DosE LEVELs AND CoNCENTRATIONs 
R 325.I309· Sec. 9· Basic standards. 
These basic standards are designed to be in general conformance with re-
quirements. of recognized authorities, are based on current knowledge of 
biological effects of radiation, and subject to change with the development 
. of new information or with substantial increase in the average exposure of 
the whole population to radiation. 
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9.1 Exposure of individuals in controlled areas. 
9.1.1 Exposure to radiation: 
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( 1) Except as provided in subparagraph ( 2) of this para-
graph no registrant shall possess, use or transfer radio-
active material in such a manner as to cause any indi-
vidual in a controlled area to receive in any period of 7 
consecutive days from radioactive material and other 
sources of radiation in the registrant's possession a dose 
in excess of the limits specified in appendix A. 
( 2) A registrant may permit an individual in a controlled 
area to receive a dose in excess of the liinits established 
in sub-paragraph ( 1) of this paragraph provided (a) 
this dose accumulated during any period of 7 consecutive 
days does not exceed 3 times ·the limits specified in ap-
pendix A, and (b) that the dose accumulated during the 
period of any 13 consecutive weeks does not exceed 10 
times the limits specified in appendix A. 
(3) It is further provided that the maximum permissible ac-
cumulated dose, in rems, at any age, shall not exceed 5 
times the number of years ·beyond· the age 18, and that 
no annual increment shall exceed 15 rems. 
9.1.2 No registrant shall possess, use, or transfer registered ma-
terial in such a manner as to cause any individual in a con-
trolled area to be exposed to air-borne radioactive material as 
specified by the registrant in an average concentration in 
excess of the limits specified in appendix B, table I. The 
limits given in appendix B, table I are based on exposure to 
the concentrations specified for 40 hours in any period of 7 
consecutive days. In any such period where the number of 
hours of exposure is less than 40, the limits specified in the 
table may be increased proportionately, provided the number 
of hours of work in any period of 7 consecutive days is less 
than 40. In any such period where the number of hours of 
exposure is greater than· 40, the limits specified in the table 
shall be decreased proportionately. 
9.1.3 Exposure to minors: No registrant shall possess, use or 
transfer registered material in such a manner as to cause any 
individual under 18 years of age within a controlled area to 
receive in any period of 7 consecutive days from radioactive 
material and other sources of radiation in the registrant's 
possession a dose in excess of the 10% of the limits specified 
in appendix A or to be exposed to air-borne radioactive ma-
terial possessed by the registrant in a concentration in excess 
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of the limits specified in appendix B, table 2. Concentrations 
may be averaged over a period of not greater than a week. 
9.2 Permissible levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas. 
9.2.I There may be included in any registration proposed limits on 
levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas resulting from the 
registrant's possession or use of radioactive material and 
other sources of radiation. Such registration should include 
such information as anticipated average radiation levels and 
anticipated occupancy times for each uncontrolled area in-
volved. The state health commissioner may approve the pro-
posed limits if the registrant will demonstrate that the pro-
posed limits are not likely to cause any individual to receive 
a dose in any period of 7 consecutive days in excess of the 
Io% of limits specified in appendix A. 
9.2.2 Except as authorized by the state health commissioner pur-
suant to paragraph 9.2. I no registrant shall possess or use 
registered material in such a manner as to create in any un-
controlled area from radioactive material and other sources 
of radiation in his possession : 
(I) Radiation levels which if an individual were continu-
ously present in the area could result in his receiving an 
exposure dose in excess of 2 mr in any I hour. 
(2) Or radiation levels which if an individual were continu-
ously present in an area could result in his receiving an 
exposure dose in excess of IO mr in any 7 consecutive 
days. · 
9.2.3 . Except for radioactive materials· being transported as con-
templated by section 7.1.6 all radioactive materials which are 
. transferred or moved through uncontrolled areas shall be 
packaged in tightly sealed unbreakable containers. Absorbent 
materials sufficient to absorb the liquid contents of any radio-
. active 'liquids shall be wrapped around the . container inside 
any shieiding present if the radioactivity is transferred in 
liquid form. In addition the radioactive material must be 
packaged so that: 
(I) The radiation field on any acceptable surface of the con-
. tainer is less than 200 mr per hour. 
(2) The radiation field I meter from the center of the con-
tainer is less than 10 mr per hour. 
(3) The outside dimensions of the container are equal to or 
greater than 4 x 4". 
In the process of transferring or moving radioactive ma-
terials in such containers they shall not be allowed to remain 
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in any I uncontrolled area longer than 2 working days. All 
containers shall in addition be labeled as specified in section 
II.3.6. 
9.2.4 An exemption may be granted by the state health commis-
sioner if it can be shown that an unwarranted hardship is 
caused by the requirements in section 9.2.2. 
9·3 Concentrations of effluent to uncontrolled areas. 
9·3· I There must be included in any registration, proposed limits 
of concentrations of registered radioactive material released 
into the air in uncontrolled areas as a result of the registrant's 
proposed activity. Such registration should include informa-
tion as to anticipated average concentrations and anticipated 
occupancy time for each uncontrolled area involved. The 
state health commissioner will approve the proposed limits if 
the registrant demonstrates that it is not probable that any 
individual will be exposed to concentrations in excess of the 
limits specified in appendix B, table II, column 1. For pur-
poses of this section concentrations may be averaged over 
periods not greater than I year. 
9.3.2 Except as authorized by the state health commissioner pursu-
ant to paragraph 9·3· I no registrant shall possess, use or 
transfer registered material in such a manner as to release 
into air in any uncontrolled area any concentration of ra-
dioactive material in excess of the limits specified in appen-
dix B, table II, column 1. For purposes of this section 
concentrations may be averaged over a period not greater 
than I year. 
PART 4· ExcESSIVE ExPOSURES 
R 325.I3I0. Sec. IO. Excessive exposures. 
IO.I Measures to be taken in event of excessive exposures. 
IO.I.I In the event that any individual in a controlled area receives 
a dose or is exposed to concentrations of radioactive ma-
terial in excess of the permissible limits established in 
part 3, section 9.I, the registrant shall limit the weekly dose 
or exposure of the individual to 10% of such permissible 
limits until such time as the average weekly dose or ex-
posure to the individual for the period beginning the week 
the excessive dose or exposure occurred is less than the 
permissible limit established in part 3, section 9.I. 
I0.2 Emergency exposure for firemen, policemen and other emergency 
personnel. 
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I0.2.I Emergency work involving high level exposure to radia-
tion from external sources with photon energy less than 
3,000,000 electron volts shall be carried out on the basis that 
the person will not receive doses higher than the following: 
(I) Exposure of the whole body-any adult-total dose 
measured in air up to 25 r. 
(2) Local exposure-any adult--dose measured in air and 
additional to whole-body doses : 
Hands and forearms, up to IOO roentgens 
Feet and ankles, up to IOO roentgens 
I0.2.2 The responsibility for monitoring of the area or the per-
sonnel subjected to emergency exposure shall be assigned 
to a person designated by the registrant to be responsible 
for the radiological health phase of the operation and said 
person shall not be assigned other duties during the emer-
gency. 
10.2.3 Women shall not be subjected to emergency exposure un-
less physically' incapable of reproduction. 
I0.2-4 The following incidents shall be reported to the state health 
department within 6 hours by phone and telegram of any 
incident involving registered material possessed by him 
and which may have caused or threatens to cause: 
(I) Exposure of any individual to 25 rems or more, in-
cluding any radioactive material taken into the body ; 
or 
(2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations 
which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would 
exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such ma-
terials in appendix B, table II. 
I0.2.5 The following incidents must be reported to the state health 
department within 24 hours by phone and telegram of any 
incident involving registered material possessed by him and 
which may have caused or threatens to cause: 
(I) Exposure of any individual to 3 rems or more, includ-
ing any radioactive material taken into the body, or 
(2) The release of radioactive materials in concentrations 
which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would 
exceed sao times the limits specified for such materials 
in appendix B, table II. 
I0.2.6 Those incidents requiring 30 day reports 
(I) Each registrant shall make a report in writing within 
30 days to the state health department of each incident 
involving a registered facility owned or leased by the 
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registrant, which has caused an exposure of an indi-
vidual to radiation or concentrations of radioactive 
material or have resulted in levels of radiation or con-
centrations of radioactive material in excess of ap-
plicable limits set forth in these regulations. 
PART 5· PRECAUTIONARY PROCEDURES 
R 325.I3I 1. Sec. I 1. Precautionary procedures. 
I I. I Surveys. 
I I. I. I Each registrant shall make or cause to be made such sur-
veys as may be necessary for him to comply with the regu-
lations. 
I I .2 Personnel monitoring. 
I 1.2. I Each registrant shall supply appropriate personnel moni-
toring equipment to, and shall require the use of such 
equipment by : 
(I) Each individual who enters a controlled area under 
such circumstances that he receives, or is likely to re-
ceive, a dose"in excess of 25% of the limits specified 
in appendix A of these regulations. 
(2) Each individualwho enters a high radiation area. 
I I ·3 Caution signs, labels, and signals. 
I I ·3· I Except as otherwise authorized by the state health com-
missioner, symbols prescribed by this section shall use the 
conventional radiation caution colors (magenta or purple 
on yellow background). The symbol prescribed by this 
section is the conventional 3-bladed design : 
. Radiation Symbol 
(I) Cross-hatched area is to be magenta or purple. 
( 2) ·Background is to be yellow. 
11.3.1.I In addition to the contents of signs and labels 
prescribed in this section, registrants may pro-
vide on or near such signs and labels any addi-
tional information which may be appropriate in 
aiding individuals to minimize exposure to radia-
tion or to radioactive material. 
I I .3.2 Radiation area. Each radiation area shall be conspicuously 
posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution 
symbol and the words (medical installations may be ex-
empted from this posting): 
Caution-Radiation Area 
I I ·3·3 High radiation areas. 
I 1.3.3.I Each high radiation area shall be conspicuously 
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posted with a sign or signs bearing the radiation 
caution symbol and the words : 
Caution 
High Radiation Area 
I I ·3·3·2 Each high radiation area shall be equipped with 
a control device which shall either cause the level 
of radiation to be reduced below that at which an 
individual might receive a dose of IOO millirem 
in I hour upon entry into the area or shall ener-
gize a conspicuous visible or audible alarm signal 
in such a manner that the individual entering and 
the registrant or a supervisor of the activity are 
made aware of the entry. 
I I ·3-4 Air-borne radioactivity areas. 
I 1.3·4-I Each air-borne radioactivity area shall be con-
spicuously posted with a sign or signs bearing 
the radiation caution symbol and the words : 
Caution 
Air-borne Radioactivity Area 
I I ·3· 5 Additional requirements. 
u.j.5.t Each area or room in which registered material 
is used or stored and which contains any radio-
active material (other than natural uranium or 
thorium) in an amount exceeding 10 times the 
quantity of such material specified in appendix C 
of this part shall be conspicuously posted with a 
sign or signs bearing the radiation caution sym-
bol and the words : 
Caution 
Radioactive Material ( s) 
I 1.3.5·2 Each area or room in which natural uranium or 
thorium is used or stored in an amount exceeding 
100 times the quantity specified in appendix C 
shall be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs 
bearing the radiation caution symbol and the 
words: 
I I .3.6 Containers. 
Caution 
Radioactive Material ( s) 
I 1.3.6. 1 Each container in which is transported, stored, 
or used a quantity of any registered material 
(other than natural uranium or thorium) greater 
than the quantity of such material specified in 
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appendix C shall bear a durable, clearly visible 




I I .3.6.2 Each container in which natural uranium or 
thorium is transported, stored, or used in a quan-
tity greater than 10 times the quantity specified 
in appendix C shall bear a durable, clearly visible 




I 1.3.6.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of subpara-
graphs (I ) and ( 2) a label shall not be required : 
(I) If the concentration of the material in the 
container does not exceed that specified in 
appendix B, table I, column 2 or 
(2) For laboratory containers, such as breakers, 
flasks, and test tubes, used transiently in 
laboratory procedures, when the user is 
present. 
I 1.3.6.4 Where containers are used for storage, the labels 
required in this paragraph shall state also the 
quantities and kinds of radioactive materials in 
the containers and the date of measurements of 
the quantities. 
11.4 Exceptions from posting requirements. (Notwithstanding the pro-
visions of I I .3.) · 
11:4-I A room or area is not required to be posted With a caution 
sign becaus~ of the presence of a sealed· source provided 
the_ radiation lev~l I2 inches from the surface of the source 
container or housing does not exceed 5 millirem per hour. 
I 1.4.2 Rooms or other areas in hospitals are not required to be 
posted with caution signs because of the presence of pa-
tients containing byproduct material provided that there 
are persomid in attendance who shall take the precautions 
necessary to prevent the exposure of any individual to 
radiation or radioactive material in excess of the limits 
established in the regulations. 
I I ·4·3 Caution signs are not required to be posted at areas or 
· rooms containing radioactive materials for periods of less 
than 8 hours provided that (I) the materials are constantly 
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attended during such periods by an individual who shall 
take the precautions necessary to prevent the exposure of 
any individual to radiation or radioactive materials in ex-
cess of the limits established in the regulations, and, ( 2) 
such area or room is subject to the registrant's control. 
11 ·5 Instruction of personnel. 
I 1.5.I All individuals working in or frequenting any portion of 
a controlled area shall be informed of the presence of ra-
dioactive materials or of radiation in such area, and shall 
be instructed in the hazards of excessive exposure to such 
materials or radiation and in precautions or procedures to 
minimize exposure. 
II.5.2 Each registrant shall have on file and available I or more 
copies of these regulations and of the appropriate national 
bureau of standards radiation protection handbooks. 
I I .6 Storage of registered material. 
I r.6.I Registered material stored in an uncontrolled area shall be 
secured against unauthorized removal from the place of 
storage. 
I 1.7 No x-ray apparatus shall be left unattended without locking the 
apparatus itself, or the room or building in some manner which will 
prevent its use by unauthorized persons. 
PART 6. wASTE DISPOSAL 
R 325.I3I2. Sec. 12. Waste disposal. 
I2.I General requirements--No registrant shall dispose of registered 
waste material except : 
I2.I.I By transfer.to an authorized recipient, or 
12.1.2 As authorized pursuant to I2.2, or 
12.1.3 As provided in 12.3 or I2.4 applicable respectively to the 
disposal of registered material by release into sanitary 
sewerage systems or burial in soil, or in 9·3· 
12.1.4 In accordance with Act 245, Public Acts of I929 (CL I948, 
§ 323.I et seq.), as amended by Act 117, Public Acts of 
1949· 
12.2 Method for obtaining approval of proposed disposal procedures. 
I2.2.1 Any registrant may apply to the state health commissioner 
for approval of proposed procedures to dispose of regis-
tered material in a manner not otherwise authorized in the 
regulations except for disposal to surface waters. Each 
application should include a description of the registered 
material and any other radioactive material involved, in-
cluding the quantities and kinds of such material, the levels 
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of radioactivity involved, and the proposed manner and 
conditions of disposal. The application should also include 
an analysis and evaluation of pertinent information as to 
the nature of the environment, including topographical, 
geological, meteorological, and hydrological characteristics ; 
usage of ground and surface waters in the general area; the 
nature and location of other potentially affected facilities ; 
and procedures to be observed to minimize the risk of un-
expected or hazardous exposures. 
I2.3 Disposal by release into sanitary sewerage systems. 
12.3.1 No registrant shall discharge registered material into a 
sanitary sewerage system unless : 
(I) It is readily soluble or dispersible in water ; and 
(2) The quantity of any registered material released into 
the system by the registrant in any I day does not 
exceed the larger of subparagraphs (a) or (b) of this 
paragraph. 
(a) The quantity, which if diluted by the average 
daily quantity of sewage released into the sewer 
by the registrant, will result in an average con-
centration equal to the limits specified in appendix 
B, table I, column 2, or 
(b) Ten times the quantity of such material specified 
·in appendix C, and 
(3) The quantity of any registered material released in 
any I month, if diluted by the average monthly quan-
tity of water released from the premises of the regis-
trant, will not result in an average concentration ex-
ceeding the limits specified in appendix B, table I, 
column 2, and 
(4) The gross quantity of registered material released into 
the sewerage system by the registrant does not exceed 
1 curie per year. 
12.4 Disposal by burial in soil. No registrant shall dispose of registered 
material by burial in soil unless : 
12.4.1 The total quantity of registered materials buried at any I 
location and time does not exceed, at the time of burial, 
1,000 times the amount specified in appendix C of these 
regulations, and 
12.4.2 Burial is at a minimum depth of 4 feet, and 
12-4.3 Successive burials are separated by distances of at least 6 
feet and not more than 12 burials are made in any year. 
I 2-4.4 Burial of registered materials in amounts exceeding 1,000 
times the amounts specified in appendix C may be per-
1178 STATE REGULATION 
mitted in a controlled and posted area at the discretion of 
and with the express permission of the state health com-
missioner. Applications for the establishment of controlled 
burying grounds must be reviewed by the advisory com-
mittee. 
1245 Burial sites shall be approved and registered with the state 
health commissioner. Burial shall be in a controlled area. 
PART 7· INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHIC INSTALLATIONS 
R 325.1313. Sec. 13. Industrial radiographic installations; classification. 
For the purpose of registering and approving industrial radiographic in-
stallations all industrial installations shall be classified as either class A, 
class B, class C or class D. This section is to include isotopic sources in 
which case appropriate requirements under each installation class shall be 
applied. 
13.1 Class A installation requirements for unlimited use at maximum 
capacity. 
13.1.1 The x-ray source and objects exposed thereto must be con-
tained within a permanent enclosure. 
13.1.2 The enclosure shall be constructed 
(I) So that the primary and secondary x-rays are attenu-
ated to a dose rate as measured in air at any accessible· 
external point not to exceed 7 mr/hr when the x-ray 
beam is adjusted to give maximum dose rate with the 
x-ray generator running at maximum operating con-
ditions and the x-ray tube placed in the shortest "tube 
to wall" radiographically usable position. Mechanical 
or electrical limiters may be placed on the x-ray ap-
paratus to rest~ict the movement of the beam to an 
area which will result in a dose rate not in excess of 
7 mr/hr measured in air at any accessible point. Per-
sonnel working adjacent to the enclosure area shall 
not be exposed to a dose greater than 100 mr/week. 
( 2) With reliable interlocks which will either prevent any-
one from entering the enclosure while the x-ray gen-
er;ttor is in operation or will terminate the generation 
of x-rays should anyone enter: the enclosure. 
(3) So that persons may at all times be able to escape from 
within the enclosure. 
(4) With visible and/or audible signals within the en-
closure which are actuated a minimum of 5 seconds 
before the generation of x-rays. 
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(S) When the ceiling barrier does not meet the dose rate 
as indicated in the part above, a barrier such as a 
fence may be used to restrict access to the area on the 
roof. 
I3.1.3 No person is to be permitted to remain within the enclosure 
while the x-ray generator is in operation. 
I3.1.4 All protective enclosures and equipment shall be kept in 
good repair. 
I 3.2 Class B installations for unlimited use under normal operating con-
ditions as specified by the registrant at the time of registration . 
. IJ.2.I The x-ray source and objects exposed thereto must be con-
tained within a permanent enclosure. 
I 3.2.2 The enclosure shall be constructed 
(I) So that the primary and secondary x-rays are attenu-
ated to a dose rate as measured in air at any accessible 
external point not to exceed 7 mr fhr when the x-ray 
beam is adjusted to give maximum dose rate with the 
x-ray generator running at normal operating condi-
tions and the x-ray tube placed in the shortest "tube to 
wall" radiographically usable position. Mechanical or 
electrical limiters may be placed on the x-ray ap-
paratus to restrict the movement of the beam to an 
area which will result in a dose rate not in excess of 
7 mrfhr measured in air at any accessible point. Per-
sonnel working in the immediate enclosure area shall 
not be exposed to a dose greater than IOO mr/week. 
(2) With reliable interlocks which will either prevent any-
one from entering the enclosure while the x-ray gen-
erator is in operation or will terminate the generation 
of x-rays should anyone enter the enclosure. 
(3) So that persons may at all times be able to escape 
from within the enclosure. 
(4) With visible and/or audible signals within the en-
closure which are actuated a minimum of 5 seconds 
before the generation of x-rays. 
(S) When the ceiling barrier does not meet the dose rate 
as indicated in the part above, a barrier such as a fence 
may be used to restrict access to the area on the roof. 
I3.2.3 The controls for the kilovoltage and milliamperage shall 
be limited by mechanical or electrical means so as not to 
exceed the normal operating conditions as specified by the 
registrant at the time of registration. 
I3.2-4 No person is to be permitted to remain within the enclosure 
while the x-ray generator is in operation. 
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I3.2.5 All protective enclosures and equipment shall be kept in 
good repair. 
I3.3 Class C installations for limited use under conditions specified by 
the registrant at the time of registration. 
I3.3.I The x-ray source and objects exposed thereto must be con-
tained within a permanent enclosure. 
I 3.3.2 The enclosure shall be constructed 
(I) So that the primary and secondary x-rays are attenu-
ated to a dose rate as measured in air at any accessible 
external point not to exceed 50 mr /hr when the x-ray 
beam is adjusted to give a maximum dose rate with 
the x-ray generator running at its maximum rated ca-
pacity and the x-ray tube placed in the shortest "tube 
to wall" radiographically usable and/or limited posi-
tion. 
(2) With reliable interlocks which will either prevent any-
Oile from. entering the enclosure while the x-ray gen-
erator is in operation or will terminate the generation 
of x-rays should anyone enter the enclosure. 
(3) So that persons may at all times be able to escape from 
within the enclosure. 
I3·3·3 The workload of the machine. shall be restricted so that the 
dose at any accessible point outside the protective enclosure 
does not exceed IOO mr /week with the x-ray generator 
running at its maximum capacity. 
I3·3·4 The number of hours per day or week for permissible op-
eration shall be established for the x-ray generator by the 
state health commissioner under the conditions established 
by the registrant at the time of registration. 
I3·3·5 Warning signs should be posted in those areas outside the 
protective barriers in which the dose rate in air at any ac-
cessible external point exceeds 2 mr jhr with the generator 
operating at its maximum rated capacity and the x-ray 
beam adjusted to give its maximum dose rate and the x-ray 
tube placed in the shortest "tube to· wall" usable and/or 
limited radiographic position. 
I3.3.6 Mechanical or electrical limiters shall be placed on the 
x-ray apparatus to restrict its movement to an area which 
will result in a dose rate not in excess of so mrjhr mea-
sured in air at any accessible point. 
13·3·7 All protective enclosures and equipment shall be kept in 
good repair. 
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I3.3.8 No person is to be permitted to remain within the enclosure 
while the x-ray generator is in operation. 
I 3·3·9 Film badges or other permanent recording instruments 
shall be provided and required to be worn continuously by 
persons in the area at all times. 
I3-4 Class D installations for limited use and for temporary operation 
(to include portable or mobile industrial x-ray installations). 
I3-4-I An x-ray installation not meeting the conditions and speci-
fications as described as class A, class B, or class C may 
be operated for a period not to exceed 30 days ·or when it 
is impractical or when an undue and unnecessary hardship 
is involved, it may be extended by the state health commis-
sioner for a period longer than 30 days. In either case such 
installation and operation of such installation shall have 
the approval of the state health commissioner and shall be 
classified as a class D installation. 
I3.4.2 All such installations shall have the radiation area in excess 
of 5 mrfhr barricated by a fence, a rope or other suitable 
barriers erected along the 5 mr jhr contour line. 
I343 The area described by the temporary barricade shall be 
suitably posted with caution signs. 
I344 Film badges or other permanent recording instruments 
shall be provided and required to be properly used on a 
continual basis for personnel in the area at all times. 
I3-5 Industrial radiographic installations utilizing high intensity sealed 
sources of radioactive material shall meet all appropriate require-
ments for radiological safety specified for x-ray installations of 
class A, B, C, or D, whichever may be applicable. 
I3·5·I The source when not in use shall be enclosed within a pro-
tective housing such that the dose rate does not exceed an 
average of 2 mrfhr or a maximum of IO mrfhr at I meter 
from the source. 
I3.5.2 If the source is permanently mounted in a housing with a 
beam control device or extended from and retracted into 
a housing, this device shall be of positive design capable of 
acting in any position of the housing. It shall also be pos-
sible to move the source to a shielded position manually 
with a minimum risk of exposure in the event of the failure 
of the automatic mechanism. There shall be on the housing 
and on the control panel, a warning device which plainly 
indicates whether the apparatus is "on" or "off." 
I3·5·3 If the apparatus is of a type in which the source is removed 
from the shield when in use, transfer shall be accomplished 
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by a remote control mechanism. Transfer mechanisms 
shall be so designed as to minimize the possibility of dam-
age to the source in transit. 
PART 8. MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS 
(Not Reproduced) 
PART 9· DENTAL RADIOGRAPHIC INSTALLATIONS 
(Not Reproduced) 
PART IO. FLUOROSCOPIC SHOE X-RAY MACHINES 
(Not Reproduced) 
PART II. MISCELLANEOUS TYPES OF X-RAY INSTALLATIONS 
(Not Reproduced) 
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APPENDIX .. A" 
PERMISSIBLE TOTAL WEEKLY DOSES IN SIGNIFICANT VOLUMES OF CRITICAL ORGANS UNDER 
VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF EXPOSURE 
Conditions of Exposure 
Part of Body Radiation 
Whole Body Any radiation with 
half-value-layer 
greater than · 
Whole Body 
Hands and Fore-
arms or Feet and 
Ankles or Head 
and Neck 
I mm of soft tis-
sue 
Any radiation with 
half-value-layer 
less than 1 mm 
of soft tissue 
Any radiation 



















• For exposures of the whole body to X or gamma rays up to 3 Mev, this condition 
may be assumed to be met if the exposure dose does not exceed 300 mr, provided the 
dose to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem. 
b Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions does not alter 
the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the bloodforming organs in the main 
portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the lens of the eye. 
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APPENDIX "B" 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE O)NCENTRATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN 
AlB AND WATER 
Note: In applying table I, exposures in any week should be averaged over 40 hours. 
In applying table II, concentrations of radioactive material should be averaged over 
I year. 
Controlled (40 hrs.-week) Uncontrolled 
Half-
Table I Table II 
Life(I) Column I Column2 Column I Column2 
Material (Days) Air(2) Water(3) Air(2) Water(3) 
A" ················· 0.074 1.6 X IO .... 1.4 X Io .. 5 X Io .. 5 X IO.., 
A~ .... · ............ 2.8 3.6 X Io.., 5 I.2 X IO"" 1.6 X 10-• 
Ag"' ................ . 2.I I X IO ... I3 3 X Io ... 4 X 10-• 
Am2" ............... 890 8 X IO-n 4X IO ... 3 X Io-u 1.3 X Io ... 
As78 ................ 1.01) 7 X ro-e 6 X Io~· 2X ro-" 2X IO"" 
At= ················ 0.3I 9 X 10-m 6X ro..., 3 X I0-
11 2X 10-" 
Au- ................ 2.6 34 X 10-" 9X IO"" I.I X IO"" 3X 10 ... 
Au190 ••••••••••• · ••••• 3.1 8X IO-" 2X I04 2.5 X IO"" 7 X 10 ... 
Ba"0 + La"0 ••••••••• I2 2X IO-" 6X 10"" 6X IO"" 2X 10 ... 
Be• 0 •••••••••••••••• 48 1.3 X IO"" 3 4X IO-" I X 10-1 
C' ················· I8o 1.4 X Io..., I X IC1
1 5 X IO"" 3.6X 10 ... 
Ca'" ················ I5I 9X Io..., 1.5 X IO"" 3 X IO"" 5X IO .... Cd ... + AglDO .. ······ 77 2X ro-" 2 X 10-• 7 X 10"" 7 X Io-a 
Ce"' + Pr'" ......... I8o 2X 10 .... I X Io-• 7 X 10-m 3.6 X IO-a 
Cl80 ................. 29 I X IO-e 7 X Io-a 4 X Io..., 2.4 X 10 ... 
Cm ... ··············· I20 5 X 10-m · 2.7 X ro .. 1.8 X Io-
11 I X 10 ... 
Co.., ................ 8.4 3·4 X Io..., 5 X 104 I.2 X IO-" r.8 X Io-a 
c~ ................ 22 2.4 X Io..., I4 8X IO-" 5 X 10-• 
Cs111 +Ba121 ········· I7 6X IO-" 4-5 X 10..., 2X ro"" 1.5 X 10 ... 
Cu"' ................. o.53 2X I0-6 2.5 X 10-• 6X IO-" 8 X 10-a 
EulM ··········•••(>•• 820 2 X Io-a I X 10-
1 6 X 10-m 3 X ro-a 
p ················· . Q78 3·5 X Io ... 2.6 I.2 X ro.., 9 X IO-• 
Fe05 ••••••••••••••••• 6I 1.8 X IO..., 1.3 X ro ... 6X IO"" 4X 10 ... 
Fe ................... 27 5 X Io-a 3-3 X 10 ... 1.5 X Io-e I.I X Io..., 
Ga .. ................ 0.59 I X I0-6 z6 3·4 X 10-• 9 X 10-• 
Ge ... ................ 3·9 I X IO ... 27 J.6X IO"" 9 X 10-• 
H" (HTO or ToO) ... I9 7X Io..., 5 X IO-• 2.5 X Io ... 1.6 X Io-• 
Houe ............... I. I I X IO ... 70 3 X IO-" 2.3 
1 ... ················· 7-7 9 X Io-e 9X ro..., 3 X IO-m 3 X IO"" 
Ir'"" ................ 7-3 2.2 X 10..., 4 X IO-• 7X IO"" 1.3 X Io ... 
lr182 ••••••••••••••••• 17 I.5 X IO-" 2.7 X Io ... 5 X IO"" 9 X ro..., 
K'" ................. 0.51 6X IO..., 4 X 10-• 2X 10-" 14 X 10-a 
La''" ················ 1.6 4 X IO..., 34 1.4 X ro-• 1.1 X 10-• 
Lu177 ················ 3-2 1.5 X IO..., 70 5 X IO-" 2.4 Mn"" ················ 0.100 8X 10 .... 5 X IO-• 3 X IO-" 1.5 X IO-• Mo00 ................ 2.8 5 X ro-a 40 r.8 X ro ... 1.4 
Na"' ................ o.61 5 X 10..., 24 X ro ... 1.6 X ro-" 8X 10 ... 
Nb"" ................ 2I 1.3 X 10 .... 1.2 X IO-a 4 X ro .... 4X ro ... 
Ni"" ................. 8 5 X ro..., 7 X IO-• 1.6 X ro"" 2.5 X IO"" 
P"" ................. 14 4X IO-" 6X ro ... 14 X ro-a 2X ro..., 
Pb'"'" ················ 2.16 2X 10-6 4 X IO-• 6X w-" 14 X ro ... Pd100 + Rh101 ········ 44 2X 10 ... 3X ro ... 7X IO"" I X IO-a Pm'" ··············· 140 6X IO-" 3 2X 10 .... 1 X w-• Po010 (sol.) .......... 40 6 X I0-10 9X ro..., 2 X IO-n 3 X IO..., 
Po010 (insol.) ........ 31 2 X I0-10 7 X IO-U 
Continued 
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APPENDIX "B"-Continued 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN 









Pr"" . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . II 
Pu""' (sol.) . . . . . . . . . . 43000 
Pu... ( insol.) . . . . . . . . 36o 
Ra..., + ! dr. . . . . . . . . 16ooo 
Rb88 • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • 7.8 
Re188 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0.5 
Rh105 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1.4 
Rn122 +dr .......... . 
Ru108 + Rh108 •••••••• 
saa ·················· Sc"' ................ . 
sm= ··············· Sn118 •••••••••••••••• 
Sr"" ···········•····· Sr""+ Y"" ..•........ 
Tc"" .•..•........... 
Te"" .............•.. 
Te"" ............... . 
Th .................. . 
Th-natural (sol.) ... . 
Th-natural (insol.) .. 
Tm110 ••••••••••••••• 
U-natural (sol.)* .... 
U-natural (insol.)* .. 
U""" (sol.) ......... . 
u- ( insol.) ....... . 
V"' ················· xeua ............... . 
xeua· ............... . 
yn ................ . 
zn• ............... . 
Unidentified beta or 
gamma emitters or 
any undetermined 
























2.3 X Io ... 
6 X IO-U 
6 X IO-U 
24 X I0-11 
. I. I X Ici ... 
2.4 X IO""" 
3X IO"" 
I X IO ... 
8X IO""" 
3X IO ... 
zX 10-" 
4X ro ... 
I.7 X IO""" 
6X IO .... 
6 X w-10 
8X IO"" 
3X IO..., 
I.2 X ro..., 
2X IO""" 
5 X 10-u 
5 X I0-11 
I.5 X Io..., 
5 X 10-u 
5 X 10-u 
4 X I0-10 
5 X IO-n 
3X IO"" 
I.3 X Io""" 
5 X ro ... 





4-5 X ro ... 
1.2 x ro .... 
9X 10""". 
2.4 X 10-1 
5 X 10-• 
6X 10""" 
4 X ro-1 
1.5 X 10-· 
I 
6 X·I0-1 
5 X I0-1 
zx 10 ... 
24 X ro ... 
8X I0-1 
8 X w-• 
3·3 X ro-o 
IO 
1.5 X IO"" 
1.5 
I.3 X 104 
4 X ro-a 
6 X I0-1 
2 X 10-1 
Column I 
Air(2) 
7 X IO .... 
2 X IO-U . 
2 X IO-U 
8 X IO-U 
4X Io..., 
8X IO-" 
I X IO-" 
3-3 X IO .. 
2.6X IO .. 
I X IO-" 
7X Io ... 
I.3 X IO .. 
6X Io..., 
2X IO .. 
2 X I0-11 
3X IO-" 
4X Io..., 
4X IO .. 
6X Io..., 
I-7 X IO-U 
I.7 X IO-U 
5 X 10.., 
I.7 X IO-U 
I.7 X IO-U 
I X 10-11 
I.6 X IO-U 
I X IO-" 
4X IO-" 
1.7 X Io..., 
4 X Io ... 
2X IO..., 
gamma emitters . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I X 10 ... 
Unidentified alpha · 
emitters or any un-
determined mixtures 
of alpha emitters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 X ro-u 
(I) Effective half-life in body. 
(2) Air concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of air. 
Columnz 
Water(3) 
3·6 X IO ... 
I.5 X ro-" 
4X ro-o 
3 X 10 ... 
8X IO""" 
1.6 X Io-a 
zx ro-" 
1.3 X Io ... 
5X 10 ... 
3.6 X IO_, 
2 X ro-a 
I.6 X Io-• 
7 X ro-o 
sx 10 ... 
3X ro ... 
3X ro-<~ 
1.1 X Io-a 
3 X I0-1 
5 X ro-<~ 
2.5 X ro-a 
7 X ro-a 
I X IO ... 
I X IO ... 
(3) Water concentrations are given in microcuries per milliliter of water. Those 
figures also apply to foodstuff in microcuries per gram (wet weight). 
* For enriched uranium the same radioactivities per unit volume as those for natural 
uranium are applicable. It should be noted that the contribution of U ... to the gross 
activity of enriched uranium is 20-40 times that of the U .... 
APPENDIX A 1185 
APPENDIX "C" 
PERMISSIBLE LEVELS FOR BURIALS AND LABELLING REQUIREMENTS 
Micro- Micro-
curies curies 
Agw. ... . . . . . . . . . . I Ir192 • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO 
Ag111 • • • • • • • • • • • • Io K42 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO 
As18, As11 • • • • • • • • IO Lauo . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Au108 •••••••••••• IO Mn52 •••••••••••• 
Au190 • •• • • • •••• •• IO Mn"" ........... . 




Be• .............. so Na22 • • • • • • • • • • •• IO 
C" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so Na.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Io 
Ca'" . . .. . .. .. . . . . Io Nb"" . .. . . . . . . .. .. IO 
Cd""+Ag""' ..... 10 Ni"" ............ . 
Ce"'+Pr"' ..... Ni08 ••••••••••••• 
Cl ...... ·....... .. I P"" ............. . 
Com . . . . . . . . . . . . . I Pd108 + Rh108 ••••• 




Cs"" + Ba"" . . . . . I Pm"' . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
Cu"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so Po210 • • • • • • • • • • • • o.I 
EulJW . . . . . . . . . . . . I Pr"" . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
F18 •••••••••••••• so Pu280 •••••••••••• 
Fe"" ·............. so Ra""" . . . . . . . . . . . . o.I 
Fe"" . .. . .. . .. .. . . I Rb'"' . . . . . . . . . .. . . IO 
Ga72 • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO RelJIO ... ·......... IO 
Ge71 • • • • • • • • • • • • • SO Rh""' . . . . . . . . • . . . IO 
H 1 (HTO or Ru""' + Rh""' . . . . . I 
H".O) . . . . . . . . . 2so S85 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • so 
1'11 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO Sb'"' . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
ln116 • • • • • • • • • • • • • I Sc'" . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
Micro-
Sm""' ........... . 
Snu" ........... . 
Sr"" ............ . 
s r"" + Y"" . . . . . .. 
Ta .............. . 




Th (natural) ... . 
Tl .............. . 
Tritium-See H" .. 
U (natural) .... . 
u- ............ . 
U""'-U .......... . 
V"' ·············· W"" ........... . 
yoo ......•.....•• 
Y"' ............ . 
Zn .............. . 
Unidentified radio-
active materials 

























Note: For purposes of paragraphs IO.J and II-4 where there is involved a combina-
tion of isotopes in known amounts the limit for the combination should be derived as 
follows: 
Determine for each isotope in the combination, the ratio retween the quantity present 
in the combination and the limit otherwise established for the specific isotope when not 
in combination. The sum of each ratios for all the isotopes in the combination may not 
exceed "I" (i.e. "unity"). . 
Example: For purposes of paragraph II-4, if a particular batch contains 2,000 p. of 
Auuo and 2S,OOO p. of C", it may also include not more than 3,000 p. of 1131• This limit 
was determined as follows : 
2,000 p. Auuo + 2S,OOO p. C" + 3,000 p. 1111 
IO,OOO p. > so,ooo p. IO,OOO p. 
The denominator in each of the above ratios was obtained by multiplying the figure 
in the table by I,OOO as provided in paragraph 114 
Limits listed are for radiological health reasons only. Other considerations such as 
chemical toxicity may require lower limits. 
APPENDIX "D" 
'UST OF MAXIMUM QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXEMPTIONS 
Column No. I Column No. II 
Not as a Sealed As a Sealed 
Byproduct Material Source Source 
( Microcuries) ( Microcuries) 
Antimony (Sb,..) . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I IO 
Arsenic 76 (As"").... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO IO 
Arsenic 77 (As")... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO IO 
Barium I4o-Lanthanum I40 (BaLa140)................ I IO 
Beryllium (Be7 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • so so 
Cadmium IQ9-Silver 109 ( CdAg""') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 10 IO 
Calcium 4S ( Ca'") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO IO 
Carbon 14 (C")..................................... so so 
Cerium 144-Praseodymium (CePr"')................. I IO 
Continued 
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APPENDIX "D"-Continued 
LIST OF MAXIMUM QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXEMPTIONS 
Column No. I Column No. II 
Not as a Sealed As a Sealed 
Byproduct Material Source Source 
( Microcuries) ( Microcuries) 
Cesium-Barium 137 (CaBaU7)........................ I 10 
Chlorine -36 (018)................................... I 10 
Chromium 51 (Cr"') .... ... .. .... .. .. .. . .. .... ....... so so 
Cobalt 6o (Co'"') ................... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 10 
Copper 64 (Cu"')......... .... .... ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. so 50 
Europium 154 (Euw)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 10 
Fluorine 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . so 50 
Gallium 72 (Ga11 ) ••••••••••••••••••• ; • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10- 10 
Germanium 71 (Gen).-.... ....... ................... so so 
Gold· 198 {Au""'). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 
Gold 199 {Au""')..................................... 10 10 
Hydrogen 3 (Tritium) (H")........................ 250 250 
Indium 114 (Inw)... . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. I 10 
Iodine -131 (P11 ) •••• -................................. 10 10 
Iridium 192 {Ir""').................................. 10 10 
Iron 55· (Fei!B)...................................... so 50 
Iron 59 (Fe"")...................................... 1 10 
Lanthanum I40 {La14").. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 IO 
Manganese 52 {Mn .. ) ..•........ ; ............... :... 1 10 
Manganese 56 (Mn88)................. .. .. .. • .. .. .. • so so 
Molybdenum 99 (Mo"") ........... , .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. Io Io 
Nickel· 59 (Ni"")........................ ............. 1 10 
Nickel 63 {Ni01).... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 10 
Niobium 9S (Nb"") ...................... ,........... IO 10 
Palladium I09 (Pd"'")............................... 10 10 
Palladium 103-Rhodium 103 (PdRh...,)............... so so 
Phosphorus 32 (P"")................................ to 10 
Polonium 210 (Po.,.)............................... 0.1 I 
Potassium 42 (K .. ) ...... ~.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 IO 
Praseodymium 143 ( Pr .. ) . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . 10 10 
Promethium I47 (Pm14')............................. 10 Io 
Radium 226 (Ra-)................................. 0.1 1 
Rhenium 186 {Re180 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 10 
Rhodium 105 (Rh""')............................... 10 10 
Rubidium 86 {Rb88). .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. • • 10 10 
Ruthenium Io6-Rhodium 1o6 (RuRh""')............... I 10 
Samarium IS3 {Sm'"")............................... 10 10 
Scandium 46 ( Sc40 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 10 
Silver I05 ( Ag""') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I IO 
Silver III {Ag"') .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . IO 10 
Sodium 22 (Na"")................................... 10 10 
Sodium 24 (Na"').................................. 10 IO 
Strontium 89 ( Sr"") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I IO 
Strontium 90-Yttrium 90 (SrY"").................... 0.1 I 
Sulfur 35 (S•)..................................... so so 
Tantalum I82 {Ta181). • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • IO to 
Technetium 96 {Tc"").... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I to 
Technetium 99 (Tc00).. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 10 
Tellurium I27 (Te"") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 10 
Tellurium 129 {Teuo)...................... . . . . . . . . . I 10 
Thallium 204 (TI""'). .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . so so 
Thorium (natural) . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . . .. so so 
Tin II3 ( Sn111 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 10 
Tungsten I85 (W""') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 10 
Vanadium 48 (V .. ).................................. IO 
Yttrium 90 (Y""} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Yttrium 91 (VV')................................... 10 
Zinc 6s (Zn"").... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 
Beta and/or Gamma emitting byproduct material not 
listed above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1188 STATE REGULATION 
APPENDIX "F" 
PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 1 FOR FLUOROSCOPIC INSTALLATIONS 
Work-
loadx Lead thickness required for sec- Concrete thickness required for 
Tube occu- ondary barrie~ at a target-to- secondary barrie~ at a talet-
po-
kct~ occupied~area distance of- to-occupied-area_ distance -ten-
tial• (WT) 3ft. s ft. 8ft. 10ft. IS ft. 20ft. 3ft. s ft. 8ft. 10ft. IS ft. 20ft. 
ma.-
min./ 
kvp wk. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. in. in. in. in. in. in. 
IOO 4.000 0.8 o.s O.J 0.2 O.I 0 2.6 1.9 I.J o.S 0.2 0 
I,OOO .s .2 .I 0 0 0 I.6 0.8 0.2 0 0 0 
2SO .2 0 0 0 0 0 o.s 0 0 0 0 0 
I2S 4.000 I.I o.8 o.s 0.3 0.2 0 3.6 "24 I4 1.0 04 0 
I,OOO 0.7 4 .2 0 0 0 2.0 I.O O.J 0 0 0 
2SO .J 0 0 0 0 0 o.8 0 0 0 0 0 
ISO 4.000 1.3 I.O 0.7 o.s 0.2 0 4-3 3·3 24 1.7 04- 0 
1,000 0.9 o.s .2 0 0 0 2.9 I.7 04 0 0 0 
250 4 0 0 0 0 0 I.2 0 0 0 0 0 
• As the useful beam is always intercepted by the protective fluoroscopic screen cover, 
only secondary barriers are required. · 
1 Constant potentials may require IS to.25% larger thicknesses of lead and S to ISo/o 
larger thicknesses of concrete than those given here for pulsating potentials. These dif-
ferences were estimated from the data of Miller and Kennedy at 27S to 525 kvc_p and 
from the data of Trout at SO to 2SO kvp. As these experimenters used very different 
filtrations, the differences indicated here may be high, especially for concrete. 
• Note that a target-to-skin distance of so em is assumed. 
Note: 1.5 hvl should be added for controlled areas and 5 hvl outside the controlled 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































REPORT OF THE NEw ENGLAND CoMMITTEE ON ATOMIC 
ENERGY TO THE NEw ENGLAND GovERNORs' CoNFERENCE 
Draft of an Act to Coordinate Development and Regulatory Activities 
Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
Be it enacted by, etc. 
Section I. Declaration of Policy 
a. The State of .............. , .... endorses the action of the Congress 
of the United States in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to institute 
a program to encourage the widespread participation in the development and 
utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent 
consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and 
safety of the public; and therefore declares the policy of the State to be-
l. To cooperate actively in the program thus instituted; and 
2. To the extent that the regulation of special nuclear materials 
and by-product materials, of production facilities and utilization 
facilities, and of persons operating such facilities may be within the 
jurisdiction of the State, to provide for the exercise of the State's 
regulatory authority so as to conform, as nearly as may be, to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and regulations issued thereunder, 
to the end that there may, in effect, be a single harmonious system 
of regulation within the State. 
b. The State of. .................. recognizes that the development of 
industries producing or utilizing atomic energy may result in new condi-
tions calling for changes in the laws of the State and in regulations issued 
thereunder with respect to health and safety, working conditions, workmen's 
compensation, transportation, public utilities, life, health, accident, fire, and 
casualty insurance, the conservation of natural resources, including wildlife, 
and the protection of streams, rivers, and airspace from pollution, and there-
fore declares the policy of the State to be-
l. To adapt its laws and regulations to meet the new conditions 
in ways that will encourage the healthy development of industries 
producing or utilizing atomic energy while at the same time pro-
tecting the public interest; and 
2. To initiate continuing studies of the need for changes in the 
relevant laws and regulations of the State by the respective depart-
ments and agencies of the State which are responsible for their 
administration ; and . 
J. To assure the coordination of the studies thus undertaken, 
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particularly with other atomic industrial development activities of 
the State and with the development and regulatory activities of 
other States and of the Government of the United States. 
Section 2. United States Licenses or Permits Required 
No person shall manufacture, construct, produce, transfer, acquire or 
possess any special nuclear material, by-product material, production fa-
cility, or utilization facility, or act as an operator of a production or utiliza-
tion facility, wholly within this State unless he shall have first obtained a 
license or permit for the activity in which he proposes to engage from the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission if, pursuant to the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954, the Commission requires a license or permit to be obtained 
by persons proposing to engage in activities of the same type over which it 
has jurisdiction. 
Section 3· Conduct of Studies Concerning Changes in Laws and Regula-
tions with a View to Atomic Industrial Development 
Each of the following departments and agencies of the State Government 
is directed to initiate and to pursue continuing studies as to the need, if any, 
for changes in the laws and regulations administered by it that would arise 
from the presence within the State of special nuclear materials and by-
product" materials and from the operation herein of production or utiliza-
tion facilities, and, on the basis of such studies, to make such recommenda-
tions for the enactment of laws or amendments to law administered by it, 
and such proposals for amendments to the regulations issued by it, as may 
appear necessary and appropriate. 
a. The Department of Public Health, particularly as to hazards, if any, 
to the public health and safety. 
b .. The Department of Labor, particularly as to hazardous working con-
ditions, if any. 
c. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, particularly as to the 
time and character of proof of claims of injuries and the extent of the 
compensation allowable therefor. 
d. The Department of Public Highways, particularly as to the transporta-
tion of special nuclear materials and by-product materials on highways of 
the State. 
e. The Public Utilities Commission, particularly as to the transportation 
of special nuclear materials and by-product materials by common carriers 
not in interstate commerce and as to the participation by public utilities sub-
ject to its jurisdiction in projects looking to the development of production 
or utilization facilities for industrial or commercial use. 
f. The Department of Insurance, particularly as to. the insurance of 
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persons and property from hazards· to life and property resulting from 
atomic development. 
g. The Department of Conservation, particularly as to the hazards, if any, 
to the natural resources of the State, including wildlife, and as to the pro-
tection, if necessary, of rivers, streams, and airspace from pollution. 
h. Such other departments and agencies (including departments and 
agencies of political subdivisions of the State) as the Governor may direct 
and for the purposes specified by him. 
Section 4· Coordination of Studies and Development Activities 
a. The Governor and Council shall appoint a citizen of this State to serve 
as adviser to the Governor with respect to atomic industrial development 
within the State ; as coordinator of the development and regulatory activities 
of the State relating to the industrial and commercial uses of atomic energy ; 
and as deputy of the Governor in matters relating to atomic energy, includ-
ing participation in the activities of any committee formed by the New 
England States to represent their interest in such matters and also coopera-
tion with other States and with the Government of the United States. The 
person so appointed shall have the title of Coordinator of Atomic Develop-
ment Activities. 
b. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall have the 
duty of coordinating the studies, recommendations, and proposals of the 
several departments and agencies of the State (and its political subdivisions) 
required by Section 3 of this Act with each other and also with the pro-
grams and activities of the Department of Industrial Development of the 
State. So far as may be practicable, he shall coordinate the studies con-
ducted, and the recommendations and proposals made, in this State with like 
activities in the New England and other States and with the policies and 
regulations of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. In carrying 
out his duties, he shall proceed in close cooperation with the Department of 
Industrial Development. 
c. The several departments and agencies of the State (and its political 
subdivisions) which are directed by Section 3 of this Act to initiate and 
pursue continuing studies are further directed to keep the Coordinator of 
Atomic Development Activities fully and currently informed as to their 
activities relating to atomic energy. No regulation or amendment to a regu-
lation applying specifically to an atomic energy matter which any such de-
partment or agency may propose to issue shall become effective until 30 days 
after it has been submitted to the Coordinator, unless, upon a finding of 
emergency need, the Governor by order waives all or any part of this 3o-day 
period. 
d. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall keep the 
Governor and Council arid the several interested departments and agencies 
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informed as to private and public activities affecting atomic industrial de-
velopment and shall enlist their cooperation in taking action to further such 
development as is consistent with the health, safety and general welfare of 
this State. 
e. The Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities shall be paid a 
salary of $ per annum. 
Section S· Injunction Proceedings 
Whenever, in the opinion of the Attorney General, any person is violating 
or is about to violate Section 2 of this Act, the Attorney General may apply 
to the appropriate court for an order enjoining the person from engaging 
or continuing to engage in the activity violative of this Act and upon a 
showing that such person has engaged, or is about to engage in any such 
activity, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or the 
other order may be granted. 
Section 6. Funds Provided 
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $ for the 
salary of the Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities and for secre-
tarial, travel, printing, and other necessary expenses incurred by him in the 
performance of his duties. 
Section 7· Definitions 
As used in this Act, 
a. The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the 
course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. 
b. The term "by-product material" means any radioactive materials (ex-
cept special nuclear materials) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure 
to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special 
nuclear materials. 
c. The term "production facility" means (I) any equipment or device 
capable of the production of special nuclear material in such quantity as to 
be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner 
as to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important com-
ponent part especially designed for such equipment or device. 
d. The term "special nuclear material" means (I) plutonium and. uranium 
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material 
which the Governor declares by order to be special nuclear material after 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission has determined the ma-
terial to be such ; or ( 2) any material artificially enriched by any of the 
foregoing. 
e. The term "utilization facility" means (I) any equipment or device, 
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except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of special nuclear ma-
terials in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and 
security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public, 
or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy in such quantity as 
to.be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner 
as to affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any important 
component part especially designed for such equipment or device. 
f. The term "operator" means any individual who manipulates the con-
trols of a utilization or production facility. 
ITEM 2 
A SuGGESTED STATE RADIATION PROTECTION AcT 
From the National Bureau of Standards Handbook No. 61, 
"Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means." 
(December 9, 1955) 
"AN ACT for the Control of Radiations from Machines and Radio-
active Materials, for the Purpose of Protecting Health." 
Short Title. This Act may be referred to as the . . . . . . . . . . Radiation 
Hygiene Act. (State) 
Section 1. Statement of Policy. Whereas, radiation can be instrumental 
in the improvement of health, welfare, and productivity of the public if 
properly utilized, and may impair the health of the people and the industrial 
and agricultural potentials of the State if improperly utilized, it is hereby 
declared to be the public policy of this State to encourage the constructive 
uses of radiation and to control any associated harmful effects. 
Section 2. Definitions. For the purposes of this Act, the following 
words and phrases are defined : 
(a) Radiation is gamma rays and X-rays, alpha and beta particles, high-
speed electrons, neutrons, protons, and other nuclear particles ; but not 
sound or radio waves, or visible, infrared, or ultraviolet light. 
(b) Radiation machine is any device that produces radiations when the 
associated control devices are operated. 
(c) Radioactive material is any material, solid, liquid, or gas, that emits 
radiation spontaneously. 
Additional definitions may be included. 
Section 3· Creation and Organization of Agency: Advisory Board, 
Meetings, Employees. 
(a) There is hereby created and established a State Radiation-Control 
Agency hereinafter. referred to as the Agency. The Agency shall be an 
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organizational component of the State Department of ......... (Alternate: 
There is hereby created and established an independent State Radiation-
Control Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Agency.) 
(b) The Governor shall appoint a Director of the Agency (hereinafter 
called the Director) who shall perform and carry out all functions and 
duties given to the Agency under this Act, and shall direct, carry out; and 
enforce all radiation safety control activities and measures vested in the 
Agency. The Director shall be a person having extensive training and ex-
perience in the field of health and of radiation protection. 
(c) In accordance with the laws of the State, the Agency may employ, 
compensate, and prescribe the powers and duties of such persons as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. However, technical, legal, 
and other services shall be performed, insofar as practicable, by personnel 
of existing State departments, agencies, and offices. 
(d) The Director may delegate to officers and employees of the Agency 
such function, duties, and authority as are vested in the Agency by this 
Act ; except the authority to adopt and promulgate standards, rules, and 
regulations, and to issue or modify orders. 
(e) There is hereby established within the Agency a State Radiation 
Technical Advisory Board, hereinafter referred. to as the "Board," con-
sisting of five members. The Director of the Agency shall be a member of 
the Board. The other four members shall be persons with scientific training 
in one or more of the following fields : health, agriculture, medicine, radiol-
ogy, radiation physics, biology, industry, labor, atomic energy. The 
Governor shall appoint these four members after seeking recommendations 
of established authorities or organizations in the above-specified fields. The 
members' term of office shall be four years, except that the terms of those 
first appointed shall expire as follows: 
I at the end of I year after such date, 
I at the end of 2 years after such date, 
I at the end of 3 years after such date, and 
I at the end of 4 years after such date 
as designated by the Governor at the time of appointment. If a vacancy 
occurs, the Governor shall appoint a member for the remaining portion of 
that term. The Director of the Agency shall be Chairman of the Board. The 
Board shall hold four regular meetings each calendar year, and special meet-
ings as deemed necessary by the Board or the Director. It shall be the duty 
of the Board to review the policies and program of the Agency as developed 
under authority of this Act; to make recommendations thereon to the 
Agency ; to provide the Agency with such technical advice and assistance as 
may be required relative to permissible exposure levels, standards of prac-
tice, radiation instrumentation, and other technical matters. Members of 
the Board, other than the Director, shall be entitled to receive compensation 
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at ........ dollars per diem and reimbursement for actual and necessary 
traveling and subsistence expenses while engaged in the business of the 
Board. 
Section 4· Po·wers and Duties of the Agency. The Agency shall have the 
following powers and duties : 
(a) Shall develop comprehensive policies and programs for the evaluation 
and determination of hazards associated with the use of radiation, and for 
their amelioration ; 
(b) Shall advise, consult, and cooperate with other agencies of the State, 
the Federal Government, other States and interstate agencies, and with 
affected groups, political subdivisions, and industries in furtherance of the 
purposes of this Act ; 
(c) May accept and administer loans, grants, or other funds or gifts from 
the Federal Government and from other sources, public or private, for 
carrying out any of its functions ; 
(d) May encourage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigations, 
training, research, and demonstrations relating to the control of radiation 
hazard, the measurement of radiation, the effects on health of exposure to 
radiation, and related problems as it may deem neCessary or advisable for 
the dis~harge of its duties under this Act ; 
(e) Shall collect and disseminate in formation relating to the determina-
tion and control of radiation exposure and hazard ; 
(f) Shall adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to further the purposes of this Act; such rules and regulations 
may incorpOrate by reference the recommended standards of nationally 
recognized bodies in the field of radiation protection such as the National 
Committee on Radiation Protection or the American Standards Association ; 
(g) Shall devise, modify, repeal, promulgate, and enforce rules and 
regulations as necessary to implement or effectuate the powers and duties of 
the Agency under this Act; 
(h) May issue, modify, or revoke orders prohibiting or abating the dis-:-
charge of radioactive material or waste into the ground, air, or waters of the 
State in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules and regula-
tions adopted thereunder; 
( i) Upon request, shall render opinion concerning such plans and specifi-
cations on the design and shielding for radiation sources as may be sub-
mitted before or after construction, for the purpose of determining the pos-
sible radiation hazard ; 
(j) May make inspections of radiation sources shielding, and immediate 
surroundings for the determination of any possible radiation hazard; and 
shall provide the owner, user, or operator thereof with a report of any 
kriown or suspected defiCiencies ; 
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(k) May exercise all incidental powers necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this Act. 
Section 5· Registration 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to produce radiation, or to 
produce, use, store, or dispose of radioactive materials, or to modify, ex-
tend, or alter such activities, unless he registers in writing with the Agency 
in accordance with the procedures prescribed by such Agency, except that a 
period of go calendar days shall be allowed for such registration after the 
effective date of this Act. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to produce radiation, or to pro-
duce, use, store,· or dispose of radioactive materials, except in accordance 
with the provisions of this Act and rules and regulations promulgated there-
under. 
Section 6. Classification of Sources and Hazards and Standards of Pro-
tection 
(a) The Agency is authorized, w_ith the concurrence of the Board, to 
classify radiation sources, exposures, and hazards for the purpose of 
(1) making inspections, .(2) determining the competence of the radiation 
users, (3) determining the adequacy of radiation-protective devices and 
procedures, and (4) other purposes compatible with the present and future 
utilization of all forms of radiation, taking. into account the protection of 
the health of the people of this State. 
(b) Prior to the establishment of a system of classification of sources or 
uses, or setting standards of protection, or modifying such classifications or 
standards, the Agency shall conduct public hearings in connection therewith. 
Notice shall be given of time, date, and place of public hearing and shall 
specify the technical area in which a classification is sought to be made or 
for which standards are sought to be adopted. Such notice shall be published 
at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area affected, and 
shall be mailed at least 20 days before such public hearing to the chief execu-
tive of each political subdivision of the geographical area affected, and may 
be mailed to such other persons as the Agency has reason to believe may be 
affected by such classification and the setting of such standards. The Agency 
shall utilize the assistance of the Board in connection with such hearings. 
(c) The adoption of standards · of protection and the classification of 
radiation sources, or any modification or change thereof, shall, upon ap-
proval of the Board, be issued as an order of the Agency and shall be pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation in the area affected. In classify-
ing sources and setting radiation-protection standards, or making any 
modification thereof, the Agency shall permit and announce a reasonable 
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time for: the persons or users involved to comply with such classification 
and standards;: if their operations create a: known hazard to health; except 
that a user ma:y be directed to abate ·withOut delay a serious known hazard 
to health. · · 
Section 7. Examination for Complia_nce: ~tatement of Non-compliance 
(a) The Agency shall itself, or by its duly designated representatives; 
inspect and examine such sources of radiation as it desires, in order to de-
termine their compliance with the adopted classification and radiation-pro-
tection standards of the Agency. 
(b)· If such inspection and examination indicates that the source of radia-
tion is not in. compliance with the adopted classification and radiation-pro-
tection standard~, the owner, operator, or user shall be so notified in 
writing, with full particulars regarding any deficiencies. 
Section 8. Proceedings Before Board 
(a) Whenev.er the Agency determines there are reasonable grounds to 
~lie:ve that ther.e has been a viol~tion of any of the provisions of this Act 
or of any order of the Agency, it may· give written notice to the alleged 
violator or violators specifying the causes of complaint. Such notice shall 
require that the alleged violations .be· corrected or that the alleged violator 
appear before the Agency· at a time and place- specified in the notice, and 
answer the charges .. The.notice shall be delivered to the alleged violator or 
violators in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of this section 
not less than ..... days before the time set for the hearing . 
. (b) The Agency shall afford the alleged violator or violators an oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing in accordance with the provisions of section9 at the 
time and place,specified in the. notice or any modification thereof.·On the 
basis of the evidence produced at the hearing the Agency shall make find-
ings of fact and conclusions· of law and enter such·order as in its opinion will 
best further the purposes of this Act and shall ·give written notice of such· 
order to the alleged violator and to such other persons as shall have ap-
peared at the hearing and· made written request for notice of the order. 1f 
the hearing is held before any person other than the Agency itself, such 
person shall transmit the record qf the hearing together with· recommenda-
tioO:s· for findings of fact and conclusions -of law to the Agency, which shall 
thereupon enter its order on the basis of such record and recommendations. 
The order of the Agency shall become final and binding on all parties.unless 
appealed to the courts as provided in section 12 within .... days after notice 
has been sent to the parties. · · · 
(c) Whenever the Agency finds that an emergency exists requiring 
immediate action to protect the public health or welfare; it may, without 
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notice or hearing, issue an order reciting the existence of such an emergency 
and requiring that such action be taken as it deems necessary to meet the 
emergency. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, such order shall be effective immediately. Any person to whom such 
order is directed shall comply therewith immediately, but on application to 
the Agency shall be afforded a hearing as soon as possible. On the basis of 
such hearing the Agency shall continue such order in effect, revoke it, or 
modify it. 
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided, any notice, order, or other 
instrument issued by or under authority of the Agency may be served, 
personally or by publication, on any person affected thereby, and proof of 
such service may be made in like manner as in case of service of a summons 
in a civil action, such proof to be filed in the office of the Agency; or such 
service may be made by mailing a copy of the notice, order, or other instru-
ment by registered mail, directed to the person affected at his last known 
post office address as shown by the files or records of the Agency, and proof 
of such service may be made by the affidavit of the person who did the 
mailing, such proof to be filed in the office of the Agency. 
(e) Every certificate or affidavit of service made and filed as herein pro-
vided shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and a certified 
copy thereof shall have like force and effect. 
Section 9· Hearings. The hearings herein provided may be conducted by 
the Director, or the Director may designate hearing officers who shall have 
the power and authority to conduct such hearings in the name of the Agency, 
at any time and place. A record or summary of the proceedings of such 
hearings shall be made and filed with the Agency, together with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law made by the Agency. A member of the Agency 
or a hearing officer, designated by the Agency, shall have the power to issue 
in the name of the Agency notice of the hearings or subpoenas requiring 
thetestimony of witnesses and the production of evidence relevant to any 
matter involved in such hearing, and to administer oaths and examine 
witnesses during such hearings. Witnesses who are subpoenaed shall re-
ceive the same fees and mileage as in civil actions. In case of contumacy or 
refusal to obey a notice of hearing or subpoena issued under this section, 
the . . . . . . . . . . . . Court shall have jurisdiction, upon application of the 
Agency or its representative, to issue an order requiring such person to ap-
pear and testify or produce evidence as the case may require, and any failure 
to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as contempt 
thereof. 
Section 10. Inspections and InvestigaJions: Maintenance of Records. 
The Agency or its duly authorized representative shall have the power to 
enter at reasonable times, and after prior notice of at least 2 days, upon any 
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private or public property for the purpose of inspecting and investigating 
conditions relative to the purposes of this Act ; except that such entry into 
security areas under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of the Federal 
Government shall he permitted only by and with the concurrence of the 
Federal Government Agency or its duly designated representative. 
Any authorized representative of the Agency may examine any records 
or memoranda pertaining to the operation of radiation machines and radio-
active materials. The Agency may require the maintenance of records re-
lating to the operation of disposal systems. Copies of such records must 
he submitted to the Agency on request. 
Section 11. Penalties: Injunctions 
(a) Any person who violates any of the provisions of, or who fails to 
perform any duty imposed by, this Act, or who violates any order of the 
Agency promulgated pursuant to this Act, shall he guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and in addition thereto may he enjoined from continuing such violation. 
Each day upon which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate viola-
tion. 
(b) It shall he the duty of the Attorney General on the request of the 
Agency to bring any action for an injunction against any person violating 
the provisions of this Act, or violating any order of the Agency. In any 
action for an injunction brought pursuant to this section, any findings of the 
Agency after hearing or due notice shall be prima facie evidence of the fact 
or facts found therein. 
Section 12. Review 
(a) An appeal may he taken from any final order, or other final deter-
mination of the Agency, by any person who believes himself adversely af-
fected thereby, or by the Attorney General on behalf of the State of the 
............... · .... Court of ................... Within 30 days after 
(Seat of Government) 
receipt of a copy of the order, or other determination, or after service of 
notice thereof by registered mail, the appellant or his attorney shall serve a 
notice of appeal on the Agency through its (Director) provided that during 
such 3o-day period the court may, for good cause shown, extend such time 
for an additional period not to exceed 6o days. The notice of appeal shall 
refer to the_ action of the Agency appealed from, shall specify the grounds 
of appeal, including both points of law and fact which are asserted or 
questioned by the appellant. A copy of the original notice of appeal with 
proof of service shall he filed by the appellant or his attorney with the clerk 
of the court within 10 days of the service of the notice and thereupon the 
court shall have jurisdiction of the appeal. 
(b) The appellant and the Agency shall in all cases he deemed the original 
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parties to an appeal. The State, through the Attorney General or any other 
person affected, may become a party by intervention, as in a civil action, upon 
showing cause therefor. The Attorney General shall represent the Agency, 
if requested, upon all such appeals unless he appeals or intervenes in behalf 
of the State. If the Attorney General or a member of his staff is not avail-
able to represent the Agency in any particular proceeding, the Agency is em-
powered to appoint special counsel for such proceeding. No bond or deposit 
for costs shall be required of the State or Agency upon any such appeal or 
upon any subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court or other court proceed· 
ings pertaining to the matter. 
(c) The appeal shall be heard and determined by the court upon the 
issues raised by the notice of appeal and the answer thereto according to the 
rules relating to a trial in the nature of an appeal in equity of an administra-
tive determination. All findings of fact by the Agency are to be deemed 
final, unless it is shown that such findings were not supported by sub-
stantial evidence produced before the Agency at the hearing. In any appeal 
or other proceeding involving any order, or other determination of the 
Agency, the action of the Agency shall be prima facie evidence reasonable 
and valid and it shall be presumed that all requirements of the law pertain-
ing to the taking thereof have been complied with. A copy of the pro-
ceedings before the Agency shall be certified to the court in connection with 
each appeal. 
(d) A further appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the State in 
the same manner as appeals in equity are taken. 
Section 13. Conflicting Laws. This Act shall not be construed as repeal-
ing any laws of the State relating to radiation sources, exp<)sures, radiation 
protection, and professional licensure, but shall be:: held and construed as 
auxiliary and supplementary thereto, except to the extent that the same are 
in direct conflict herewith. 
Section 14. Existing Rights and Remedies Preserved. It is the purpose 
of this Act to provide additional and cumulative remedies to evaluate, con-: 
trol, and prevent impairment to health from radiation and to encourage the 
constructive use of radioactive materials and radiation machines. Nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to abridge or alter rights of action or 
remedies in equity or under the common law or statutory law, criminal or 
civil, nor shall any provision of this Act, or any act done by virtue thereof, 
be construed as estopping the State, or any municipality or person; in the 
exercise of their rights in equity or under the common law or statutory law 
to protect the public health and encourage commerce and industry. 
Section 15. Severability. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, 
phrase, or word of this Act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, 
such decree shall not affect the validity of any remaining portion of this Act. 
PART IV 
FEDERAL STATUTORY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS 
UPON ATOMIC ACTIVITIES 
Federal Statutory and Administrative Limitations 
Upon Atomic Activities 
CouRTs OuLAHAN * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scientific and technological considerations heretofore have dominated 
the interest and work of the United States government and private 
American business in the field of atomic energy. This major preoccu-
pation with research and engineering problems in the development of a 
new source of energy for peacetime uses is understandable. The product 
of the exigencies of World War II and the post-war arms race between 
the Soviet bloc and the United States and its allies, the atomic bomb and 
its proliferations as a hydrogen and cobalt weapon constitute an im-
portant factor in the present balance-or imbalance-of world power. 
Adopting a new source of energy developed in the context of conflict 
and of government monopoly to the peacetime needs of medicine, public 
utilities, and industry may well comprise the beginning of a new indus-
trial revolution of which the scientist and engineer are the principal 
architects. 
A. Scope and Policy of AEC Regulation 
In their preoccupation with technology, private industry and the 
American public have tended to overlook the problems of, and the 
present justification for, government regulation which covers every facet 
of the field of atomic energy.1 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 2 estab-
lishes the broadest control ever exercised by the federal government over 
any one industry in the United States.3 The statutory provisions en-
*B.S., Haverford College; LL.B., Yale University Law School; member, Ohio and 
D.C. bars; formerly Lecturer in Law, Western Reserve University Law School. This 
manuscript was completed at the end of September, 1958. 
1 " .•• [T]he dictatorship of the technically competent" must not over-shadow "the 
importance of developing procedural formalities as a means of assuring just administra-
tion." Plaine, "Atomic Energy-A New Body of Administrative Law,'' 24 D.C. Bar 
A.J .. 71, 75 (1957). 
2 68 Stat. -921 (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. §§2011 et seq. 
a The Civil Aeronautics Board is "[n]ext to the AEC ... perhaps the administrative 
agency with the widest and most complex range of responsibility," Joint Committee on 
Energy, "A Study of AEC Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor 
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acted by Congress are the framework of this control, which is, in turn, 
implemented and effected by the administrative regulation and policy of 
the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,4 otherwise known as the McMahon 
Act, was enacted to substitute civilian for military control over the 
application of atomic energy largely to the field of warfare. The "pri-
mary purpose" of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was "to make our 
Nation's legislative controls better conform with the scientific, technical, 
economic, and political facts of atomic energy as they exist today," prin-
cipally in the field of its peaceful uses.5 Thus, the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 states: 
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as 
military purposes. It is therefore declared to be the policy of 
the United States that-
a. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be 
directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the gen-
eral welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of 
making the maximu~ contribution to the common defense and 
security; and 
b. the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be 
directed so as to promote world peace, impro'l.te the general 
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free 
competition in private enterprise. (Emphasis supplied.) 8 
Of course, the 1954 statute was not enacted without wide differences 
of opinion between both major political parties. The debate continues; 
especially concerning the extent to which government should participate 
in the process of industrial exploitation of atomic energy.7 Indeed, tech-
Facilities,'' Ssth Cong., Ist Sess. 4I (I9S7) (hereafter cited as Joint Committee Staff 
Study). This document is perhaps the most useful and comprehensive ever published 
by the Joint Committee with respect to administrative law problems of the atomic 
energy field. Findings of the Staff Study are summarized in BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter 3: us. 
4 6o Stat. 755 ( I946), 42 U.S.C.A., §§I8oi et seq. 
5 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. I (I954). 
8 42 U.S.C.A. §201 I. See Cole, "The Power and the Prize-Development of Civilian 
Nuclear Power in the United States," 25 Geo. Wash. L.. Rev. 471, 475, 478 (1957). 
7 Spokesmen for opposing points of view with respect to the means whereby Ameri-· 
can development of atomic energy for peaceful uses shall be fostered have disclaimed 
any desire to plunge this field of regulation into the controversy between so-called "pub-
lic" and "private" power policy adherents. See remarks of Rep. Holifield (Dem., Cal.), 
Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Development, Growth and State 
of the Atomic Energy Industry,'' 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 65 (1957) (hereafter cited as 
I957 Section 202 Hearings) ; and remarks of AEC Chairman Strauss, Nov. 9, I9SS. 
claiming the Commission "bas no philosophy as regards the issue of Public versus 
Private Power" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter I: 187). However, the issue clearly 
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nological and scientific developments, with attendant economic effects, 
may well require a reappraisal from time to time of the respective roles 
of government and private business. However, the fact is that Congress 
has enacted a statute, and the Commission is bound by a policy, which 
stresses that 
... the goal of atomic power at competitive prices will be 
reached more quickly if private enterprise, using private funds, 
is now encouraged to play a far larger role in the development 
of atomic power than is permitted under existing legislation. 
In particular, we do not believe that any developmental pro-
gram carried out solely under governmental auspices, no mat-
ter how efficient it may be, can substitute for the cost-cutting 
and other incentives of free and competitive enterprise.8 
Prior to 1956 only a limited recognition had been given to the effect 
of the statutory and administrative restraints imposed under atomic 
was raised in the 85th Congress with the introduction of S. 151 and H.R. 2154, intro-
duced, respectively, by Sen. Gore (Dem., Tenn.) and Rep. Holifield, requiring the 
Commission to launch an accelerated program of reactor building for the generation 
of electrical energy, by means of government construction, ownership, and operation 
of plants. See, e.g., Report of the Standing Committee on Commerce concerning "Fed-
eral v. Private and Local Atomic Power for Civilian Use," 82 A.B.A. Rep. 426 (1957); 
Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on "Atuhorizing Legislation," 
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 594-595 (1957) (hereafter cited as 1957 Authorizing Legislation 
Hearings); Cole, suPra note 6 at 477-478; remarks of Rep. Holifield, Hearings before 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on "Congressional Review of Atomic Power Pro-
gram," 85th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1957) (hereafter cited as 1957 Congressional Review 
Hearings); Winsbrough, "A Partnership Plan for Atomic Power Development," 59 
P.U. Fort. 217, 219 (1957). The principal attack upon the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion program to date was made by Rep. Cannon (Dem., Mo.), Chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee, April 16, 1957, charging that "[t]he Commission's atomic 
electric power program is in some respects in contravention of the law," "[t]he program 
from a factual viewpoint is practically nonexistent," "[t]he atomic giveaway under the 
independent industrial program is not authorized by law," and "[t]he whole power-
demonstration program is nothing but paper hopes" (103 Cong. Rec. 5188, 5189, 5195, 
and 5196 (1957)). 
8 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 3· The majority report on H.R. 9757 to amend 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 further stated (p. 9) : "It is our firmly held convic-
tion that increased private participation in atomic power development, under the terms 
stipulated in this proposed legislation, will measurably accelerate our progress toward 
the day when economic atomic power will be a fact .... We do not believe that the 
efforts of free enterprise, using its own resources and money, are by themselves ade-
quate to achieve the speediest possible attack on the goal of peacetime power. Neither 
do we believe that maximum progress toward this objective will be afforded by an 
effort relying exclusively on governmental research and development, using the public's 
moneys. We believe, rather, that teamwork between Government and industry-team-
work of the type encouraged by these amendments-is the key to optimum progress, 
efficiency, and economy in this area of atomic endeavor .... " 
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energy legislation upon the hopes and expectations of the American 
public with respect to the benefits realizable from the peaceful uses of 
this energy, as clearly intended by the Congress when it enacted the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.9 Early in 1956, in its important report 
on the "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" to the Joint Congressional 
Committee on Atomic Energy, the McKinney Panel on the Impact of 
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy pointed out that "the role of the 
Federal Government in this field [atomic energy] could strongly influ-
ence, if not control, the rate of future development" of its peaceful 
uses.10 Indeed, with respect to the administrative controls exercised by 
the Atomic Energy Commission through its licensing and rule-making 
powers and its ownership of special nuclear material, the Panel found: 
One of the consequences of regulatory systems is a tendency 
toward overregulation. This is particularly true where all ini-
tiative for making determinations rests with the regulatory 
body.11 
The Atomic Energy Commission has, to a certain extent, recognized 
the dangers inherent in "overregulation" and claims that it "has sought, 
within the limits required for the protection of the public, to impose no 
unnecessary restrictions upon the developing industry." 12 In a major 
statement of policy contained in its semiannual report to Congress for 
the last six months of 1957, the agency said: 
Development of the atomic energy industry necessarily has 
depended primarily upon the initiative of private enterprise 
organizations. The Commission has played a principal role also 
because of the peculiar nature of the special nuclear material 
on which the industry rests; its military importance, the Gov-
ernment activities and industry based on its processing and 
9 See, e.g., Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., "A Growth Survey of The Atomic In-
dustry 1955-1965" (1955) (hereafter cited as AIF Growth Survey) (p. 10): "Further, 
in using the data presented in this report, . . . it is suggested that the reader take into 
account, as they may affect his own situation, such factors as ... [t]he possible effect 
of future . . . federal regulatory actions. . • ." 
1o "Report of the Panel on Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy," 84th Cong., 2d Sess. xi (1956) (hereafter cited as McKin-
ney Panel Report). The panel consisted of Robert McKinney,· Chairman, Ernest R. 
Breech, George R. Brown, Sutherland C. Dows, John R. Dunning, Frank M. Folsom, 
T. Keith Glennan, Samuel B. Morris, and Walter P. Reuther. 
11 I d. at 129. 
12 AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 175 ( 1958). See also id. at 138: "It 
has been the policy of the Commission to encourage industry to carry on the various 
phases of industrial participation in atomic energy with a minimum of Governmental 
financial assistance and controls." 
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use, the secrecy that necessarily surrounded so much of the 
technology and cost data, and the possible hazards to public 
health and safety created by radioactivity. Much of the Com-
mission's efforts . . . have been directed tO'l1Jar& helping pri-
vate enterprise groups to overcome the obstacles created by 
Federal dominance of the field and by the continuing para-
mount position of national defense considerations.18 [Empha-
sis supplied.] 
B. . Encouragement of Private Industrial Development 
1211 
In carrying out what it conceives to be its mandate under the 1954 
act, the Commission has established several programs for the develop-
ment of civilian power reactors, utilizing the resources and experience 
of private industry but assuring the cooperation of government in con-
nection with certain important phases of research and development. The 
Commission has summarized the general principles governing the re-
actor programs, as follows: 
I. Developing economically competitive nuclear power for 
civilian use will be aided by maximum practical utilization of 
the financial incentive common to business ventures in order to 
stimulate ingenuity and imagination and the assumption of 
calculated technical and economic risks. 
2. The Commission's role should be to develop advanced 
technology at Government expense and to stimulate outside 
groups to undertake developmental or demonstration power 
projects primarily with non-Commission financing. 
In general, the application of these principles has involved : 
(a) Financing almost entirely by the Commission of ex-
perimental reactors and studies whose primary aim is to de-
velop and prove out basic technology; 
(b) Limited financial help by the Commission to indus-
trial, cooperative, or public power groups in construction and 
operation of reactor demonstration projects which build on the 
technology developed in the experiments. and add ·operational 
and economic data. 
(c) Complete financing by industry of certain independent 
projects which also contribute further to technology and add 
operational and economic data.14 
The first of these three branches of the power reactor program, which 
is concerned with Commission-financed development of basic reactor 
18 [d. at 161. 
u AEC Statement Feb. I9S7 to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra 
note 7 at 113. 
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types, has produced twelve reactor experiments, with four under con-
struction and one planned. 13 
Of more direct importance to private and public power groups has 
been the power demonstration reactor program inaugurated in January, 
1955, and involving three so-called "rounds" or invitations to negotiate 
with the government.16 This program has the principal aim of develop-
ing joint participation by "private, cooperative, and public power groups 
and the Commission . . . to develop prototype power reactor plants to 
·demonstrate technical and economic feasibility of various reactor 
concepts." 17 
Und~r the first round invitation, issued in January, 1955/8 the Com-
mission called for proposals from private industry without limitation 
as to size of plant and has approved three proposals as bases for con-
tracts.19 The second round invitation, issued in September, 1955,20 pro-
posed the development, design, and construction of smaller reactors 
ranging from 5,000 to 40,000 kilowatts of electricity, which program 
has been confined to date to proposed publicly and cooperatively owned 
facilities. 21 It has produced seven proposals, four of which initially 
were approved by the Commission as bases for contract negotiations. 
1~ AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report IOI-123, 358 (1958); see AEC, Twenty-
second Semi-Annual Report 49-54 (1957); 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra. note 7 
at 114-117. 
16 AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 16, 99-100 (1958); AEC, Twenty-second 
Semi-Annual Report 54 (1957); 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 117; Cole, 
supra. note 6 at 479. 
17 AEC Statement Feb. 1957 to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra 
note 7 at 117; AEC, Twenty-second Semi-Annual Report vii, 49 ( 1957) ; Cole, supra 
note 6 at 472-48o; statement cif W. K. Davis, Director, AEC Division of Reactor De-
velopment, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 158: " ... [W)e 
have a rather unique situation where the Governnient, through AEC, is developing an 
industry which in the end has to be supplied to the utilities by private industry. There 
is no way the Government is going to supply the reactors themselves to the utilities 
who are going to use them ... "; statement of K. E. Fields, AEC General Manager, 
id. at 143-144, 146-148. 
18 AEC Press Rei. No. 589 (Jan. 10, 1955); 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, 
supra note 7 at 512. 
19 Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Rowe, Mass., contract signed June 6, 1956; Con-
sumers Public Power District, Hallam, Nebraska, Sept. 20, 1957; and Power Reactor 
Development Co., Monroe, Michigan, Mar. 26, 1957. See 1957 Section 202 Hearings, 
supra. note 7 at 117. 
20 AEC Press Rei. No. 695 (Sept. 21, 1955); 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hear-
ings, supra. note 7 at 513-515; see Statement of K. E. Fields, AEC General Manager, 
id. at 144-146, 148-152. 
21 These projects are "almost entirely a Government program," since the Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA) furnished loans for each such project; state-
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As the result of strong representations to the Joint Committee in 
1957/2 Congress included special provisions in the appropriations act 
for fiscal year 1958 with respect to contracting for such publicly and 
cooperatively owned projects. 23 This legislation also contained pro-
vision, at an initial cost of $18,ooo,ooo, for the institution of a proto-
type power reactor facilities program by the AEC itself involving the 
construction of a natural uranium, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled 
power reactor facility and a plutonium recycle experimental reactor. 2• 
ment of Sen. Gore, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 145. For 
a list of the projects accepted and the three rejected, see 1957 Section 202 Hearings, 
supra note 7 at II7-II8. In May 1958, the Commission announced that, "in and be-
cause of 'little or no early economic promise,' consultation with Wolverine's manage-
ment" the agency had decided to discontinue consideration of the aqueous homogeneous 
power reactor·project submitted by Wolverine Electric Cooperative, Big Rapids, Michi-
gan (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 165). 
22 Section 202 of the 1954 act, 42 U.S.CA. §2252, requires the Joint Committee dur-
ing the first 6o days of each session of Congress to "conduct hearings in either open 
or executive session for the purpose of receiving information concerning the develop-
ment, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry." 
23 This is the so-called "cooperative power reactor demonstration program," provided 
in Section III of Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Under this program, 
$129,915,000 initially was authorized for use in a program not to exceed $149,915,000 for, 
among other purposes, "arrangements for projects sponsored under the second round 
of the Commission's power reactor demonstration programs by cooperatives and publicly 
owned agencies under which the reactor is financed in major part by the Government." 
In connection with these projects, the Commission is required to contract directly with 
the private manufacturers of facilities, rather than have the utility make the contract. 
After operation for five years by the Commission under contract with the utility, the 
latter has the option to purchase the plant ; if such a purchase is not made, the plant 
must be dismantled. This special treatment for publicly or cooperatively owned utili-
ties was held warranted by the policy consideration that "the need for advancing the 
small or intermediate reactor art should be the AEC's primary interest and negotia-
tions with cooperatives and publicly owned organizations should take into consideration 
basic differences in their size, financial structures, and capacity for participation" with-
out "jeopardizing the financial integrity of cooperatives and publicly owned organiza-
tion" (Sen. Rep. No. 791, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 16-17 (1957) ). In its authorization 
legislation for fiscal year 1959, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy increased the 
amounts authorized for the next 12 months from $129,915,000 to $155,113,000 and in-
creased the over-all program totals from $129,915,000 to $155,113,000; H.R. Rep. 
No. 21o8, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1958). 
u Sections 101 (e) (14)-(15) and no, Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957); 
see Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 21-33. This program is based on the Joint Com-
mittee contention that the Commission has not "been making sufficient progress in the 
development of prototype power reactors to test and demonstrate the practical problems 
of achieving economic nuclear power," id. at 21. In a statement issued when he ap-
proved Pub. L. 85-162, Aug. 21, 1957, President Eisenhower stated that, while he was 
"not opposed to such projects [for natural uranium and plutonium production reactors] 
as studies by the Commissio11, ... I will oppose the expenditure of public money for 
the construction and operation by the Government of any large-scale power reactor, or 
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The third round announced by the Commission on January 7, 1957, 
and requiring proposals by December 31, 1958 (later extended to 
June 30, 1959), placed no limitation on the types or sizes of plants 
which may be proposed, except that "they should make significant con-
tributions toward the achievement of commercial utilization of nuclear 
power and that construction will be completed by June 30, 1962," which 
date apparently will be extended in the case of individual proposals. 25 
The third round contemplates assistance in the form of: 
any prototype thereof, unless private enterprise has first received reasonable opportunity 
to bear or share the cost" (N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1957). In a letter to Rep. Cole, Aug. 
3, 1957, prior to enactment of the legislation, AEC Chainnan Strauss charged that the 
provision for reactor prototypes in the appropriation legislation "would constitute a 
substantial start toward a program for Government-owned atomic power facilities" 
and that "a congressional direction to the Commission to proceed with particular re-
actor concepts would set an unwise precedent" (103 Cong. Rec. A63I9-2I (Aug. s, 
19S7) ). Sections IOI (e) and no of Pub. L. 8s-162 represented considerably diluted 
versions of continuous attempts in recent years to require the Commission to develop 
a prototype reactor program with an initial expenditure of as high as $4oo,ooo; see I9S7 
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 41, s8; s. lSI, 8sth Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 7. 
19S7); Winsbrough, supra note 7 at 219; BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: I7I-I79 
and 2 : 2II ; Cole, supra note 6 at 487-488. 
n AEC Statement, I9S7 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at n8-II9- See BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 3 : I I, 13 and IS; statement of AEC General Manager Fields, 
I9S7 Authorization Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at I4S-I46, IS2-IS3; Cole, supra 
note 6 at 4Bo-482. As of Jan. I, I9S8, four utilities or groups of utilities had submitted 
proposals under this round, one of which (Northern States Power Co., Sioux Falls, 
Iowa) signed a contract with the AEC on Nov. I9, I9S7; AEC, Twenty-third Semi-
Annual Report IOI (I9S8). Extension of the termination date of this round from Dec. 
3I, I9S8, to June 30, I9S9, was agreed to by the Joint Committee in its proposed ap-
propriation legislation for fiscal year I9S9, H.R. 13121, Section I09; see H.R. Rep. 
No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 2I and 31. The Commission itself early recognized the diffi~ 
culty of meeting the completion deadline of June 30, Ig62 (BNA, Atomic Industry Re-
porter 4 : I 9) and has sought extension of the deadline with respect to two particular 
projects. These are (1) the proposal of East Central and Florida West Coast Nuclear 
Groups for a gas-cooled reactor, to be completed by June 30, 1g63, the basis for the ar-. 
rangement for which the Joint Committee approved in the I9S9 authorization legislation 
(H.R. 13121, Section 109 Pub. L. 8S-S90, 8sth Cong., 2d Sess. (I9S8); see H.R. Rep. 
No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 2I and 31, and BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 7S and 
4: 94) and (2) the proposal of Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. for a homogeneous reactor project, with no firm construction date. The 
latter proposal was the subject of critical concurrent resolutions introduced in April 
I9S8, by Sen. Anderson (Dem., N.M.) and Rep. Holifield (Dem., Cal.), S. Con. Res. 
78 and H. Con. Res. 307, Ssth Cong., 2d Sess., and an adverse decision by the Comp-
troller General, April 8, I9S8, Dec. B-I3S649. BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4:123 
and 221:827. The Commission thereupon made a specific submission of the proposed 
contract, in restricted form, to the Joint Committee, which approved such submission 
as the basis for an arrangement in the proposed appropriation legislation for fiscal 
year I9S9 (Sec. I09, Pub. L. 8S-S90, supra; see H.R. Rep. No. 2Io8, svtra note 23 at 
21-22 and 32). 
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(I) Waiver of established Commission charges for use of 
source and special nuclear materials over a specified period of 
time; ( 2) performance either without cost or at less than full 
cost in Commission laboratories of mutually agreed-upon re-
search and development not reasonably available elsewhere; 
and (3) support of research and development required to ad-
vance the technology of projects which promise to make a sig-
nificant contribution toward achieving cheap, abundant, and 
safe nuclear power.26 
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Criticism of the Commission's program, which became particularly 
acute in the 1957 session of Congress/7 resulted in the amendment of 
the appropriations provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Un-
der Section 26x 28 of that statute as then amended, any arrangement 
between the Commission and a private party must be reviewed and 
specifically authorized by the Joint Committee.29 This provision con-
ceivably <:Ould permit congressional review of all expenditures heretofore 
made under the first and second rounds,80 a development which has been 
termed an attempt to effect ex post facto application of a statute.81 
26 AEC Statement, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at I x8. 
27 A principal criticism has been that the third round invitation would permit appli-
cants under the other two roux1ds to "get more money even though it previously had 
been limited to a fixed amount" (Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 5195-5196 (1957) ). 
Sen. Gore characterized this invitation as a Commission attempt "to further feather 
the bed of private concerns in order to entice them to submit proposals" and "to add 
feathers to the bed of those with whom you [AEC] entered into contracts even as far 
back as 1956" ( 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 35-36). In its report au-
thorizing appropriations for the AEC in accordance with Section 261, as amended in 
1957, the Joint Committee stated (Sen. Rep. No. 791, suPra note 23 at 20): "During 
the hearings it was also brought out that the language of the third round might make 
availaqle third round funds to the first and second round participants and to other re-
actor projects already under construction. The committee does not approve the im-
plications of this language. Such language would permit the transference of funds 
authorized by Congress for specific future projects retroactively to past projects which 
were proposed under different terms and conditions .... Provision is made in the third 
round for postconstruction research and development assistance which, if attempted to 
be applied as proposed in the second round . . . could result in outright subsidies to 
the operators of private reactors." 
28 42 U.S.C.A. §2017. 
29 Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1St Sess. (1957). In ·the AEC authorization legisla-
tion for fiscal year 1959, Congress provided that, "[b)efore the Commission enters into 
any arrangement the basis of which has not been previously submitted to the Joint 
Committee ... , it shall make public announcement of each partic:ular reactor project 
it considers technically desirable for construction and shall set reasonable dates for 
submission, approval of the proposal and negotiations of the basis of the arrangement, 
and commencement of construction" (Section 109, Pub. L. 85-590, supra; see H.R. Rep. 
No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 22 and 32). . 
80 See statement of Rep. Holifield, 1957 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 
7 at 6g. 
8l See statement of AEC Chairman Strauss, supra note 7 at 69-
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C. Development of Private Industry 
Although confronted with numerous technical and financial prob-
lems 82 which may presage "lean and trying years" in the foreseeable 
future,S8 the private industry regulated by the I9S4 statute is no mere 
economic fledgling. Even prior to I9S4 approximately $so millions 
were spent by private sources for nuclear research and development. 84 
Between I9S4 and I9S8, it is reliably estimated that some $300 millions 
of non-government funds will have been spent for such research and 
development, sa of which approxima~ely $1 IS millions will g9 into capital 
facilities. 88 · 
As the peaceful·l!ses of atomic energy are expanded, private industry 
should assume anincr~asingly important role. In I9S2, for example, the 
research institutions spent $1.2 millions, and industry $4.8 millions, for 
facilities and equipment and operations in the field. During I9S6-I9S8, 
however, such industrial expenditures are expected to reach $44.1 mil-
lions annually, compared with $3.7 millions for the institutions.81 These 
efforts are believed capable of producing ~uclear power on a nearly 
commercial basis sometime between 1965 and 1970.88 
82 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 58-59; 1957 Authorizing Legislation 
Hearings, supra note 7 at 203, 331-339; SelL Rep. No. 2¢, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1957). See AEC Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 7 (1958): "Late in 1957, some 
readjustment was going on in that part of the 'atomic energy industry concerned with 
civilian power reactors. Some firms had dropped out, or reduced their undertakings. 
Current economic trends undoubtedly were a partial factor in some cases. While this ad-
justment may temporarily deter new firms from entering the industry, the hard core of 
the atomic energy business is already established and growth is steady .... " For a dis-
cussion of technological and economic factors affecting industry, including reduction in 
capital, fuel, and maintenance costs, see id. at 94-98; for the point of view of industry 
concerning retrenchment during 1957, see Hearings Before Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy on "Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry," 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 218, 270 (1958) {hereafter cited as 1958 Section 202 Hearings). 
8a C. L. Wilson, President, Metals & Controls Corp., BNA, Atomic Industry Re-
porter 3: 51. 
u AIF Growth Survey, supra note 9 at 6. 
&tJ /d. at u. 
88 /d. at 26. According to former AEC Chairman Strauss, "industry's share ..• 
represents about one-third of the total national effort to develop economic nuclear 
power" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 21). 
aT AIF Growth Survey, supra note 9 at 14-
ss See id. at 35; Cole, supra note 6 at 475-476. The McKinney Panel Report, supra 
note 10 at 2, states that ,;[b]y 1975 atomic power could amount to 20 to 40 per cent of 
presently installed electric generating capability in the United States. If this occurs, 
however, it will be in the context of a total generating capability of 3 to 4 times present 
levels." The goal of the AEC itself is achieving "competitive nuclear power in the 
United States during the next ten years,'' according to a statement by the Commission 
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Progress in the atomic energy industry is, in the opinion of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, "without precedent," due to the fact that 
"[n]o other major scientific discovery has ever before been applied so 
qu,ickly to so many practical uses." 39 The Commission has thus de-
scribed the condition of this industry at the end of 1957: 
Since 1953, an atomic energy industry has come into being, 
though still on [a] relatively small scale for a major industry 
in the United States, and a foundation has been laid for 
healthy growth and expansion. 
Basically, the industry has two main divisions-that which 
purchases and uses atomic energy products, such as the com-
panies processing radioisotopes, and the manufacturers of such 
devices as thickness or density gauges that incorporate radio-
isotopes; and the section which designs, constructs, and oper-
ates or sells research and power reactors, plus the suppliers of 
materials, components, and services for Federal or private re-
actors. The radioisotope part of the industry is older and 
better developed, and still is rapidly expanding. The reactor 
part, a composite of Federal and private activities, is mostly 
new since 1953, but already has attracted considerable risk 
capital. 
Private companies have entered many phases of the reactor 
part of the industry, particularly where there was a promising 
market for products or services. Industry has assumed heavy 
outlays in designing, building, and operating nuclear reactors 
to produce electric power. A foreign market is developing for 
United States built research and power reactors. Heavy ex-
pense has been incurred in nuclear research, development, and 
engineering. 
submitted June 4,-1958, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (BNA, Atomic In-
dustry Reporter 54: 39). This statement was made in connection with a program for 
projecting the civilian power reactor development effort through fiscal year 1963 and 
clearly was formulated in the light of continuous criticism of the AEC for its alleged 
failure to prepare and announce a long-range program in the civilian power reactor 
field. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 21o8, supra note 23 at 9-10; 1958 Section 202 Hearings, 
supra note 32 at 209- As of January 1, 1958, actual or potential electrical capacity of 
civilian nuclear power projects aggregated 1,3o6,5oo kilowatts, of which 65,000 kilo-
watts were being produced by plants then in operation, 689,000 kilowatts were planned 
to be produced by plants then being built, and 552,500 kilowatts were proposed for 
plants then being planned. AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 77, 357 (1958). 
The two plants in operation at the end of 1957 were the Vallecitos boiling water reac-
tor at Pleasanton, Cal., operated by Pacific Gas & Electric Co., which achieved criti-
cality in Oct. 1957 and has a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts, and the pressurized water re-
actor operated by the AEC and Duquesne Light Co. at Shippingport, Pa., which 
achieved criticality Dec. 2, 1957, and has a capacity of 6o,ooo kilowatts. 
so AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 3 ( 1958). 
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Private organizations and Government were constructing 
89 reactors as of the end of I957· Including 7 critical assem-
blies, there were 43 research, training, and test reactors (I I of 
them for the foreign market). The 46 power reactors, of 
which 36 were military machines, included IO civilian power-
plants, I for overseas sale. 
Expenditures or obligations by the Federal Government for 
research and development and construction of civilian and 
military power and propulsion reactors are estimated at more 
than $500 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958. 
Estimates were that private industry was spending about $64 
million on civilian power reactors during the same period!0 
D. Role of Administrative Law 
Federal administrative law includes those statutes and regulations 
governing the departments, agencies, and regulatory commissions of the 
Executive Branch of the Government, as well as those rules made by 
such organizations to govern,private activity. This branch of the law 
can and does have a widespread impact upon citizens and businesses in 
every state of the Union.u The field is as broad as the field of national 
government. By enacting the Atomic Energy Acts of I946 and 1954, 
Congress brought the control of the peaceful uses of atomic energy into 
an area where the established agencies and the courts have been guided 
by fairly well-defined concepts of administrative due process consistent 
with the needs and powers of government. 
Except for unique scientific, technological, and economic problems 
which will be solved by the passage of time, the atomic energy field is 
no different from any other area of government regulation. The Atomic 
Energy Commission uses traditional forms of administrative controls, 
such· as rule-making and licensing, to carry out its powers. In addition, 
that Commission has utilized conditions in contract awards as a means 
of industry control to a very great extent, probably more than hereto-
fore used by any other federal agency. 
Although special problems concerning atomic energy must be given 
due consideration in establishing a system of administrative regulation, 
a moratorium should not be declared in that area on Congressionally 
enacted and judicially developed concepts of due process and delegated 
40 I d. at 6 ; for a detailed list of the reactors and projects involved, see I 958 Section 
202 Hearings, supra note J2 at 36ff. 
u Cooper, The Lawyer and Administrative Agencies 1-2 (1957); Cragun and de 
Seife, "A Skeptic Views 25 Years of Administrative Process," 16 Fed. Bar }. 556 
(1956); Oulahan, "A Challenge to the American Bar," 51 The Brief 101, IOJ-104 
(1956). 
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power otherwise applicable to an agency of the United States govern-
ment. In passing the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, Congress, 
instead of conferring a special status upon administrative procedures 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, expressly made applicable thereto 
the provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.42 
As Congress has recognized in passing atomic energy legislation, the 
Administrative Procedure Act 
... was enacted by the Congress in 1946 to regulate and 
make uniform, where practicable, the administrative process, 
particularly in the control of private and property rights by 
agencies of the executive branch. That statute represented the 
culmination of nearly two decades of effort on the part of the 
Congress, the executive branch, members of the Judiciary, and 
the organized bar to meet the numerous problems of procedure 
and substantive rights which have arisen out of the multipli-
cation of Federal administrative agencies and the expansion of 
their functions. 48 
However, Congress took cognizance of situations where so-called 
Restricted Data or defense information was involved in connection with 
atomic energy. As more fully discussed hereafter, special provision was 
made in the 1954 statute for parallel non-public procedures in such 
cases." 
In this study, the procedures used by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion will be considered with particular regard to the philosophy and pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act and to the special problems 
of administrative law which have arisen under the atomic energy statutes 
of 1946 and· 1954· Rule making (the procedure whereby the Commis-
sion largely effects and implements controlling legislation) and licensing 
and contracting (the administrative means for enforcing the rules) 
comprise the three major categories of administrative activity carried 
on by the Atomic Energy Commission. Accordingly, these three sub-
jects are treated separately. 
42 6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. §§IOc>I et seq. 
48 Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force 
Report on Legal Services and Procedure, 137 (1955) (hereafter cited as Hoover Com-
mission Legal Task Force Report). See Statement of Chairman of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1946): " ... I do not 
believe a more important piece of legislation has been or will be presented to the Con-
gress of the United States ... because it deals with something which touches the most 
lowly as well as the most elevated and lofty citizen in the land. It touches every phase 
and form of human activity .... " 
44 Section 181, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231. For a summary of the legislative history of this 
section, see Joint Committee. Staff Study, supra note 3 at 67-6g. 
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II. RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 
A. Rule Making in Administrative Law 
Rule making, sometimes called subordinate legislation, results from 
a delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency to imple-
ment the basic law established by Congress. Although "a normal fea-
ture of Federal administration ever since the Government was estab:. 
lished," n the rule-making process has assumed its present importance 
only with the development of numerous federal regulatory agencies and 
the increasingly common practice of Congress "to establish legislative 
standards [for agency rule making] in broad, vague and general 
terms." 46 
The power of agencies to issue rules is in many respects more im-
portant than the legislative authority of the Congress in creating the 
rule-making power. Rules, no less than statutes, establish standards of 
conduct for all to whom their terms apply.47 It was in recognition of 
this important role of rule making in the federal administrative proc-
ess 48 that Congress in 1946 included special provisions with respect 
thereto in the Administrative Procedure Act. ' 9 
This statute establishes two categories of rule making, formal and 
informal. It specifies procedures applicable to rule making except where 
"there is involved any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the 
United States or ... any matter relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." 50 
Informal rule making is required to be effected by publishing notice 
thereof in the Federal Register 111 and by giving interested persons an 
opportunity to submit written or oral views with respect to the subject 
4D Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies-Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 
78 (1941). 
46 Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 259 (1951). For a discussion of 
legislative delegations of authority, see Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, 
supra note 43 at 133-136. 
41 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942). 
48 Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 18, 194-195, 251-252, 304-305, 353-354, and 
358. See Cooper, supra note 46 at 253-302. 
49 Sections 2(c), 4, and 7(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §§IOoi (c), 1003, and Ioo6(c). 
50 Section 4(1) and (2), 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(I) and (2). These exceptions assume 
importance in the light of the military and international aspects of the Atomic Energy 
Commission's authority and of its powers with respect to leasing atomic materials, pro-
viding grants for research and development by contract or otherwise, and making con-
tracts to implement the Government's atomic energy program. 
51 Section 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo3(a). 
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matter under consideration.52 Notice of proposed rule making may be 
omitted, however, where "the agency for good cause finds ... that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest." Except where the agency otherwise 
provides "upon good cause found and published with the rule," pro-
posed rules must be published at least thirty days before their effective 
date. 53 
In addition to informal rule making, the Atomic Energy Commission 
is authorized, together with nine other federal agencies and depart-
ments/Hto engage in formal rule making. Such rule making is involved 
wherever the statutes require that regulations be made on the record 
after opportunity for agency hearing in an adjudicatory proceeding.55 
Under such procedure, an opportunity for a hearing must be afforded 
before the agency, a member thereof, or a hearing examiner 56 appointed 
in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.57 The presiding officer is authorized to issue a recommended de-
cision based on the evidence; or the agency may issue a tentative de-
cision or order the record certified to it for immediate final decision 
when it finds "upon the record that due and timely execution of its 
functions imperatively or unavoidably so requires." 58 The parties to 
n Section 4(b), S U.S.C.A. §I003(b). 
58 Section 4(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §I003(c). 
54 These agencies are the Department of Argiculture, 7 U.S.C.A. §§I8I et seq. (rate 
making under Packers and Stockyards Act), 7 U.S.C.A. §§6oi et seq. (marketing 
orders under Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act), and 7 U.S.C.A. §§IIIS(a) and 
II3I (c) (sugar quotas and wage standards under Sugar Act of I948); Food and Drug 
Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 2I U.S.C.A. §§30I 
et seq. (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); Department of Labor, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§20I et seq. (wage orders under Fair Labor Standards Act) and 4I U.S.C.A. 
§3S (wage determinations under Walsh-Healey Act); Army Corps of Engineers, De-
partment of Defense, 33 U.S.C.A. §§503 and so4 (reasonableness of bridge tolls) ; 
Civil Aeronautics Board, 49 U.S.C.A. §486 (mail rate proceedings) and 49 U.S.C.A. 
§642(d)-(h) (rates, fares, and charges); Federal Communications Commission, 47 
U.S.C.A. §§204. 20S, and 222(e) (3) (charges, classifications, and practices) and 
§303(£) (frequencies and authorized power); Federal Power Commission, I6 U.S.C.A. 
§824a(b) and IS U.S.C.A. §7I7f(a) (interconnection of facilities), I6 U.S.C.A. §§8:z4d-
8:z4e and IS U.S.C.A. §§7I7C-7I7d (fixing rates), I6 U.S.C.A. §S:zs and IS U.S.C.A. 
§7I7g (accounting entries), and I6 U.S.C.A. §8:zsa and IS U.S.C.A. §7I7h (deprecia-
tion and amortization); Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.C.A. §§IS(I), 
3I6(e), 3I8(b), 907(b), 907(h), 9I5(b), and Ioo6(b) (rates and practices); Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, IS U.S.C.A. §§77a, 78a, 79, 77aaa, 8oa-I, and &ob-I 
et seq. (corporate and financial structures and practices). 
55 Administrative Procedure Act, Section 4(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §Ioo3(b). 
56/d., Section 7(a), S U.S.C.A. §Ioo6(a). 
57 /d., Section 11, 5 U.S.C.A. §1010. 
58 /d., Section 8(a)(I)-(z), s U.S.C.A. §I007(a)(I)-(2). 
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the proceeding are afforded opportunity for the submission of evidence 
and the taking of exceptions to the decisions of the hearing officer 
equivalent to that afforded in formal adjudication.~9 
B. Rule Making under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 contained few statutory references 
to the rule-making authority of the Atomic Energy Commission. 60 In-
deed, provision for general rule-making authority was not made in that 
statute until 1953.61 However, a number of regulations of wide scope 
and importance were developed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.62 
In order to assure continuity of regulation, the transition from the 
1946 to the 1954 statute required special action by the Commission 
when the President signed the present legislation on August 30, 1954. 
This was effected the same day by a "note . . . promulgated as a rule" 
in which the Atomic Energy Commission announced: 
Until further order of the ... Commission, all provisions 
of rules, regulations and notices, published . . . under the 
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and in effect im-
mediately prior to the effective date of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954, are continued in force and effect to the extent that 
they are not inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954·68 
Thus, a possible inconsistency between the definition of "fissionable 
material," the term used in the 1946 statute,84 and "special nuclear 
material," the equivalent term used in the 1954 statute,65 as well as the 
regulatory hiatus which might have otherwise resulted, were avoided. 
The Commission resorted to provision in the Administrative Procedure 
~ 9 I d., Sections 7(c) and 8(a) and (b), 5 U.S.C.A. §§mo6(c) and I007 (a) and (b). 
eo Sections 5(a)(4), 5(c)(2), 7(c), and I2(a}(2), 42 U.S.C. §§I8o5(a)(4), 
I8o5(c} (2}, I8o7(C), and I8I2(a) (2) (I946). 
61 Section I2(a) (10), as added by Pub. L. I64, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (I953). 
62 E.g., "Control of Source Material," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 40. 
68 The Commission filed this "Note" on September 2, I954· It was published in the 
Federal Register the following day, 19 Fed. Reg. 5628. 
84 Section 5(a) (I), 42 U.S.C.A. §I8os(a) (I) (I946), which provided, in part, that 
" ... the term 'fissionable material' means plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 
235, any other material which the Commission determines to be capable of releasing 
substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material, or any 
material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing. . . ." 
6~ Section ny, 42 U.S.C.A. §20I4(y): "The term 'special nuclear material' means 
(I) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other 
material which the Commission ... determines to be a special nuclear material ... 
or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing .... " 
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Act authorizing adoption of a rule without resort to public rule-making 
procedures on the ground that such procedures "would be contrary to 
the public interest by reason of the fact that the public health and safety 
and the national defense necessitate the uninterrupted continuation of 
the effectiveness of all existing controls." 66 The Commission indicated 
its intention in the future to secure wide public and industry participa-
tion in rule making when it stated that the provisions of the "Note" 
were considered "interim" only and that "comments by all interested 
parties are invited." 67 
C. Rule Making under Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
I. General Authority 
The rule-making authority of the Atomic Eriergy Commission under 
the 1954 legislation is one of the keystones of the system of controls 
contemplated by that statute.68 Under Section 161q of that act, the Com-
mission is given general authority to "make, promulgate, issue, rescind, 
and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
the purposes of this Act." 69 Seven other sections of the 1954 statute 
confer specific authority upon the Commission with respect to rule mak-
ing in matters of safety,70 issuance of licenses,71 and definition of 
materials. 72 
66 Section 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(a). 
6 7 By additional rule announced September 3, 1956 (19 Fed. Reg. 5628) and made 
effective Aug. 30, the Commission also amended its prior rules (10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§50.2) to make the term "production facility" under Section np of the new act (now 
Section I It, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014t) include all facilities for the production of "fissionable 
material." Such rule making also was effected without notice and public procedure 
"for good cause found by the Commission on the ground that such are impracticable by 
reason of the fact that due and timely execution of the Commission's functions in giv-
ing effect to the Atomic Energy Act would be impeded by such notice and procedure." 
As in the case of the "Note" published Aug. 30, 1954, this rule was stated to be 
"interim" only, and comments by interested parties were invited. 
68 See McKinney Panel Report, supra note 10 at 21: "This sweeping revision [the 
1954 Act] replaced a relatively simple Government monopoly with a complex struc-
ture for regulation of private activities. At the same time, it gave wide discretionary 
authority to the Commission to stimulate and aid private development .... Many new 
provisions required Commission interpretation and action before industry could tell 
what it could or could not do. . . ." 
69 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(q), which section is identical with Section 12(a)(IO) of the 
1946 act, added by Pub. L. 164, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953). 
70 Section 53e(7), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(e) (7) (distribution of special nuclear ma-
terial "only pursuant to such safety standards as may be established by rule . . . to 
protect health and to minimi~e danger to life or property"). 
71 Sections 53b and 63b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(b) and 2093(b) (establishing "by 
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Although an improvement in degree of specificity over the 1946legis-
lation, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 exemplifies a tendency of Con-
gress at times to give administrative agencies unusually broad latitude 
in effectuating Congressional policies, without providing clear and pre-
cise standards to channel and govern administrative implementation of 
such policies.78 With a few exceptions the formulation of Commission 
rules is limited only by vague and general concepts of "common defense 
and security" or "health and safety of the public." 14 The statute, how-
ever wise its administration has been to date, represents an extreme 
example of so-called "skeleton legislation," which must be clothed by 
· executive regulations. 75 
2. Informal Rule-Making Procedures 
Section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 applies the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 "to all agency action taken under 
this [Atomic Energy] Act," except where Restricted Data and defense 
information are involved.76 In the latter event, "parallel procedures" are 
permitted, preserving administrative due process but at the same time 
precluding unauthorized disclosure of secret information. 
Although the Commission has, by regulation and in apparent good 
faith, sought to implement these requirements with respect to rule mak-. 
ing, the regulations governing rule making clearly emphasize informal 
procedures and do not encourage an opportunity for oral hearing. In-
deed, it is Commission policy that 
Informal hearings will normally be held for the purposes of 
obtaining necessary or useful information, and affording par-
rule, ·minimum criteria for the issuance of . . . licenses for the distribution of . . . 
[special nuclear material and source material respectively] depending upon the degree 
of importance to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the 
public of ... [its] physical characteristics ... , the quantities . . . to be distributed 
... , and ... [its] intended use ... "); and Section IOJa, 42 U.S.C.A. §2133(a) 
(commercial licenses to be issued "subject to such conditions as the Commission may 
by rule or regulation establish to effectuate the purpOses and provisions of this Act"). 
12 Sections IIx, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x) (formerly Section ns); Section ny, 42 
U.S.C.A. §2014(y) (formerly Section nt); Section 51, 42 U.S.C.A. §2071; and Sec-
tion 61, 42 U.S.C.A. §2091. 
1s See Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, mpra note 43, at 133-136. 
14 E.g., Sections 53b and 63b, supra note 71. 
75 Sen. Doc. No. 8, sufWa note 45, at gS. 
7il 42 U.S.C.A. §2231, comparable to Section 14 of the 1946 act, 42 U.S.C. §1814 
(1946). 
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ticipation by interested persons, in the formulation, amend-
ment, or rescission of rules and regulations. 77 
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Thus, in the case of "informal hearings," the procedure to be followed 
. . . shall be such as will best serve the purpose of the hearing. 
For example, an informal hearing may consist of the submis-
sion of written data, views, or arguments with or without oral 
argument, or may partake of the nature of a conference, or 
may assume some of the aspects of a formal hearing in which 
the subpoena of witnesses and the production of evidence may 
be permitted or directed.78 
Informal public rule-making procedure is further covered in the Com-. 
mission's Rules of Practice,79 which relate to "the issuance, amendment, 
or rescission of substantive rules in which participation by interested 
persons is prescribed under Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act." 80 This procedure for "substantive rules" conforms to the pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act concerning hearing re-
quirements for such rules.81 
Under the Commission procedure, rule making is commenced by an 
"initiation petition" made upon the agency's own motion, the recom-
mendation of another federal agency, or the request of "any other in-
7 7 IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.7o8. See Plaine, "Rules of Practice of Atomic Energy 
Commission," 34 Tex. L. Rev. &n, 8I8 (I956): "Because hearings for rule-making 
under the Atomic Energy Act are not 'on the record,' trial-type hearings, but are hear-
ings in the legislative sense, the public rule-making procedure will normally be an in-
formal hearing. Thus interested persons will be provided the opportunity, as the Com-
mission determines and states in the notice, to submit written views or arguments, or 
to participate in a conference, or in an oral hearing as the case may be. . . ." House 
Committee on Government Operations, "Survey and Study of Administrative Organi-
zation, Procedure, and Practice in the Federal Agencies--Agency Response to Question-
naire," Part II A-Independent Agencies ( I957) (hereafter" cited as AEC Response to 
Questionnaire), in which the AEC stated (p. ro8I): " ... [E]ven if an oral hearing. 
[for rule making] were held, it would be most likely to be informal, in the nature of 
a conference so that formal procedures would not be necessary .... " 
78 IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.720. 
79 IO Code Fed. Regs. §§2.78o-2.787. 
80 IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.78o. 
81 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency rule is considered "substan-
tive" unless it relates to "any military, naval or foreign affairs function of the United 
States," "any matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public prop-
erty, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," "interpretative rules," "general statements 
· of policy,'' and "rules of agency organization, procedure or practice." See Section 4 (I), 
(2), and (a), 5 U.S.C.A. §I003 (I), (2), and (a); Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 
at I99·200. The Commission believes that "public participation in these matters [non-
substantive rule making] to !he extent of commenting on proposed regulations is gen-
erally desirable" (AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77, at 1o82). 
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terested person." 82 Petitions by such persons for the issuance, amend-
ment, or rescission of AEC rules are required ( 1) to state "the sub-
stance or text of any proposed rule or regulation, or amendment thereof" 
or to "specify the rule or regulation the rescission of which is desired," 
and (2) to "state the basis for the request." Such petitions are to be 
given "a docket or other identifying number" and to become a matter of 
public record,88 except where Restricted Data or defense information is 
involved. 84 In the latter event the Commission presumably will resort to 
"parallel procedures." 
A hearing on a petition filed by an interested person is not held "unless 
the Commission deems it advisable," in which event notice of public rule 
making is given. Where "the Commission determines that the petition 
does not disclose sufficient reasons to justify instituting the public rule 
making procedure," the petitioner is so notified "with a simple state-
ment of the grounds" for the agency's failure to act.85 
The notice provisions of the Commission's rules with respect to insti-
tution of public rule-making proceedings 86 conform to those of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. 81 The latter statute does not contain a 
provision with respect to the minimum time required for the giving of 
such notice. However, the Commission in its rules specifies a Is-day 
82 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.781. See Section 4 (d) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.c.A: §tooJ(d), which provides: "Every agency shall accord any interested 
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule." 
83 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.782. See notice of petition requesting amendment of 10 
Code Fed. Regs. §2.301 concerning the definition of a "patent owner," assigned Docket 
No. PRM-1, 22 Fed. Reg. 524 (Jan. 26, 1957). The docket number indicates that this 
petition either is the first ever to be formally filed with the Commission or is the first 
document to be considered by the agency as falling within the meaning of "petition for 
rule· making,'' as set forth in §2.782. However, the Commission ordered no hearing on 
the petition but merely stated that it could be examined in the public document room. 
Changes in the Commission's rules to date apparently have been made as the result of 
conferences between the agency and interested parties, rather than by petition, see State-
ment of AEC to Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 1957 Section 202 
Hearings, supra note 7 at 148. 
84 As defined in Sections uh, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(h), and IIW, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(w) 
(formerly Section ur) of the 1954 act. 
85 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.783. 
86 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.784. 
87 Section 4(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §tooJ(a), which states: "General notice of proposed 
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register (unless all persons subject 
thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof 
in accordance with law) and shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and na-
ture of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the authority under which 
the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substances of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved." 
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notice "provided that a lesser time may be prescribed upon good cause 
found and incorporated with a brief statement of the reasons in the 
notice." 88 
As noted previously, the hearing itself may not necessarily include the 
taking of testimony before a designated Commission officer but may be 
limited merely to the submission of views in writing.89 However, the 
interests of participating parties appear to be adequately protected by 
provisions in the rules that "opportunity to participate may include an 
opportunity to comment upon or respond to the data, views, or argu-
ments submitted by others" and that additional time therefor may be 
granted at the discretion of the Commission.90 
Adoption of a rule under Commission procedure, as provided in the 
Administrative Procedure Act,91 requires consideration of relevant in-
formation by the Commission and publication of the rule with "a concise 
general statement of its basis and purpose." 92 Such publication must 
be made at least 30 days before the effective date of the rule "unless the 
Commission may provide otherwise upon good cause found and pub-
lished with the rule." 93 
3· Formal Rule-Making Procedures 
Under Section 189a of the 1954 act, the Commission must, "upon the 
request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding," 
grant a hearing "in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of 
rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees." 9* The 
term "dealing with the activities of licensees" relates clearly to those 
rules and regulations which prescribe the terms and conditions imposed 
88 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.784-
88 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.720 and 2.785. 
90 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.785. According to the Commission, its practice is "to pub-
lish all regulations, procedural or otherwise, as notices of proposed rulemaking with a 
request for comments" ; however, in actual practice, the Commission has used in rule 
making ''the professional knowledge of the AEC staff and the knowledge and experi-
ence which AEC has acquired since its establishment in 1946 ... supplemented by 
comments of advisory groups and the public (and by studies of independent experts 
when available)" (AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77, at 108o). 
91 Section 4(b) and (c), 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo3(b) and (c). 
02 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.786; see, to the same effect, Section 4(b) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(b). 
93 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.787. 
94 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(a). 
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upon licensees, 95 and also, it is believed, to those which set forth the 
grounds for suspending, revoking, or amending any license. 96 
Although Section 189a does not specifically prescribe either a 
"formal" hearing or one "on the record" for rules affecting licensing, 
the section undoubtedly applies to such rule-making procedures where 
regulations involving licensing are concerned, particularly in view of 
Section 189b which provides for judicial review of "any final order 
entered in any proceeding" under Section 189a.97 In order for court 
review to be effected under Section 189b, there must be a record made 
under Section 189a. For the Commission to take any other position 
would be to open the door to possible use of rule making by informal 
procedure without hearing to affect the substantive rights of existing 
licensees, where a formal licensing proceeding would otherwise be. re-
quired by Section I 89a. 98 
As provided under the Administrative Procedure Act 99 and the pro-
95 E.g., maintenance of records and making of reports by licensees of production and 
utilization facilities, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.71. 
96 E.g., grounds for revocation, suspension, or modification of a license, 10 Code Fed. 
Regs. §70.6 1 (b). 
97 Although the issue has not yet arisen, the Commission may well take a position 
restricting the application of formal hearing procedures to the second clause of Section 
189a of the 1954 statute requiring a "hearing" upon request of any party "in any pro-
ceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the ac-
tivities of licensees." See Plaine, supra note 77 at 811 : "Section 189a of the Atomic 
Energy Act is the provision governing the grant of hearings by the Atomic Energy. 
Commission, in particular affecting licensing. It provides opportunity for hearings in 
both adjudicative cases (e.g., the granting or revoking of licenses) and sublegislative 
matters (e.g., the issuance of rules dealing with the activities of licensees). It is silent 
respecting an 'on the record' requirement for hearings. Nothing in the text or his-
tory of Section 189 indicates that Congress intended to depart from the dichotomy 
under the Administrative Procedure Act between adjudication and sublegislation. The 
AEC has therefore quite properly followed the accepted interpretation that an 'on the 
record' requirement is implied in adjudicative proceedings, but not in sublegislative pro-
ceedings involving rule-making." 
98 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 2II F. 2d 629, 
633-634 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (" ... Such an established statutory right [to a license] 
requires adjudicatory disposition, and the procedure which is sufficient for the rule mak-
ing is not sufficient for that purpose .... ") The fact that Section 189a of the 1954 act 
does not contain the words "on the record" should be immaterial in the context of the 
provisions for adjudication and judicial review contained therein and the broad inter-
pretation placed upon Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004. 
prescribing opportunity for a hearing in cases of adjudication "required by statute to be 
determined on the record" and upon Section 4(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §1003(b), requiring a 
formal hearing for rule making "required by statute to be made on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing" (Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48 
(1950), as modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)). 
99 Sections 7, 8, and 10, 5 U.S.C.A. §§wo6, 1007, and 1009. 
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cedure of the Commission/00 a "formal" rule-making proceeding in-
cludes the use of a hearing officer or of the agency itself, the conduct 
of the hearing along lines of judicial procedure where practicable, and 
the rendering of a decision by such presiding officer, with appropriate 
review by the agency and by a court. 101 
The inclusion of the requirement for "formal'' rule making in areas 
in which that process closely resembles adjudication 102 represents a 
salutary legislative policy. This policy does much to protect the interests 
of atomic energy licensees in administrative due process, as well as to 
advance_ the interests of the Commission in orderly procedures which 
inspire public confidence. 
4· Public Rule-Making Hearings 103 
On only one occasion has the Commission announced and held public 
hearings in connection with rule making. Notice of this proceeding was 
given February 26, 1955, for the purpose of obtaining the views of all 
interested persons with respect to procedures and methods for awarding 
leases for the mining of uranium on federal lands under the control of 
the Atomic Energy Commission.104 In commenting on this proceeding, 
the Commission has stated : · 
No oral hearing has ever been requested on proposed rules 
nor has the Commission ever felt it desirable to initiate such a 
hearing. In one case, oral hearings were held to determine the 
advisability of changing our source material purchasing 
practices.105 -
5· Written Submissions 
On numerous occasions the Commission has published a notice of 
"contemplated" rule making without public hearing but requesting that 
100 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.78o-2.787. 
1o1 These procedures are described in detail in .Section C, "Licensing," infra. 
1o2 "To assert that formal rule making is, unlike adjudication, not an adversary pro-
ceeding is to have regard only to the form of the proceeding and to ignore realities. 
In many respects, where rules are promulgated on the basis of a record made at a 
formal hearing involving sharply contested issues of fact, the agency is, in effect, prose-
cuting the proceeding against private parties to be affected in the future by the rules" 
(Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 164). 
1o3 The rule making described in subsections d-i generally covers the period through 
June 30, 1957. 
104 20 Fed. Reg. 1227 (Feb. 26, 1955). ·The hearings were to be held Mar. 29-31, 
1955, at Grand Junction, Colorado, under the supervision of the AECs Manager, Grand 
Junction Operations Office. 
tos AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77 at 108o-1081. 
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"[i]nterested persons ... submit their views or other relevant infor-
mation" concerning proposed changes in rules within thirty days 106 or, 
in one instance, within fifteen days.107 With respect to the licensing of 
by-product material 108 and also in connection with so-called "parallel 
procedures" for licensing involving classified information,109 the Com-
mission has promulgated rules to be effective within thirty days but 
requested written submittals thereon in the meanwhile. Such comments 
and submittals usually are directed to be sent to the chief of the division, 
branch, or field office of the Commission which will administer the rules 
involved. 
6. Promulgation of Rules 
As a general, although not necessarily a uniform, policy, the Com-
mission gives thirty days' notice of the promulgation of final rules as 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.110 However, no such 
notice has been given in a number of cases. 
1os See, e.g., "Notice of Proposed Rule Making-General Rules of Procedure on 
Applications for Determination of Reasonable Royalty Fee, Just Compensation, or 
Grant of Award for Patents, Inventions, or Discoveries," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. So, 
20 Fed. Reg. 2I93 (April 7, I95S). Similar procedure has been utilized with respect 
to "Standard Specifications for Granting of Patent Licenses," IO Code Fed. Regs. 
Pt. 8I, 20 Fed. Reg. 2283 (April 8, I955) ; "Control of Facilities for the Production 
of Fissionable Materials," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. so, 20 Fed. Reg. z4B6 (April IS, 
1955); "Definition of Fissionable Material," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 70, 20 Fed. Reg. 
249I (April IS, 1955); "Safeguarding of Restricted Data," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9S, 
20 Fed. Reg. 249S (April IS, 1955); "Access to Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. 
Pt. 2s, 20 Fed. Reg. 3634 (May 24, 1955); "Operators Licenses," IO Code Fed. Regs. 
Pt. 55, 20 Fed. Reg. 4658 (June 30, 19SS); "Standards for Protection Against Radia-
tion," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, 20 Fed. Reg. SIOI (July I6, 1955); "Rules of Prac-
tice,•• Io Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, 20 Fed. Reg. 5786 (Aug. Io, I955); "Priorities Regu-
lations," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. I30, 20 Fed. Reg. 86o8 (Nov. 22, I955); "Waiver 
of Patent Rights," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 83, 2I Fed. Reg. 7007 (Sept. 18, I956); 
"Rules of Practice," IO Code Fed. Regs. §2.I02, 22 Fed. Reg. 2433 (April II, I957); 
and "Intervention in Proceedings on Application for Facility Export License," 10 Code 
Fed. Regs. §2.705, 22 Fed. Reg. 4054 (June 8, 1957). 
1o1 "Public Records," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9, 21 Fed. Reg. 8464 (Nov. 3, I956). 
10s "Licensing of Byproduct Material," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30, 2I Fed. Reg. 213 
(Jan. II, I956). 
109 "Rules of Practice," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, Subpt. H, 2I Fed. Reg. 8594 
(Nov. 8, I956). 
no "Control of Facilities for Production of Fissionable Materials," IO Code Fed. Regs. 
Pt. so, 20 Fed. Reg. 6676 (Sept. 10, I955), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 
2486 (April 15, 1955) ; "Operator's Licenses," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 55, 2I Fed. 
Reg. 6 (Jan. 4, 1956), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 4658 (June 30, I955); 
"Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 50, 2I 
Fed. Reg. 355 (Jan. I9, 1956), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2486 (April 
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Promulgation of regulations on the date of the notice of final formu-
lation or prior thereto has been justified by the Commission on the 
grounds that such rules involved non-substantive or security matters not 
required to be developed according to the Administrative Procedure 
Act.111 In such cases the Commission usually has found merely that 
"good cause exists why the regulations ... should be made effective 
without the customary thirty-day period of notice." 112 "Good cause" 
for dispensing with the thirty-days requirement of the Administrative 
Procedure Act also has been found where rules are needed in pending 
proceedings 113 or because of safety considerations.114 Also, the Com-
IS, I9SS); "Licensing of Byproduct Materials," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30, 2I Fed. 
Reg. 2I3 (Jan. 11, I9S6); "Priorities Regulation," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. I30, 21 
Fed. Reg. 100S (Feb. 14, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 86o8 (Nov. 
22, I9SS); "Rules of Practice," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, 2I Fed. Reg. 8o4 (Feb. 4. 
I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. S786 (Aug. IO, I9SS); "Special 
Nuclear Material," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 70, 2I Fed. Reg. 764 (Feb. 3, I9S6), pub-
lished in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2491 (April IS, I9SS) ; and "Standard Speci-
fications for Granting of Patent Licenses," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 8I, 2I Fed. Reg. 6o6 
(Jan. 27, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2283 (April 8, I9SS); mis-
cellaneous amendments to "Priorities Regulations," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. I30, 2I 
Fed. Reg. I0267 (Dec. 2I, 1956) ; "Procedures on Declaring Patents Affected with 
.the Public Interest and Licensing of Patents," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, Subpt. C, 
2I Fed. Reg. 9764 (Dec. 11, I956); and "Standards for Protection Against Radi-
ation," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 20, 22 Fed. Reg . .548 (Jan. 29. I957). Proposed rules 
for Part 20 previously were published for comment July I6, I9SS, supra note 106. 
111 E.g., "General Rules of Procedure on Applications for Determination of Reason-
able Royalty Fee, Just Compensation, or Grant of Award for Patents, Inventions, or 
Discoveries," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. So, 20 Fed. Reg. 393I (June 7, I95S), published 
in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2I93 (April 7, I9SS); "Unclassified Activities in For-
eign Atomic Energy Programs," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 110, 2I Fed. Reg. 4I8 (Jan. 
20, I956), not published in proposed form except as a "Determination and Authoriza-
tion" under Section 57a(3) (B) of the I954 Act, 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (Oct. 5, I95S); 
"Safeguarding of Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 95, 2I Fed. Reg. 7I8 (Feb. 
2, I9S6), published in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 2495 (April IS, I9SS) ; "Access to 
Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 25, 2I Fed. Reg. 8Io (Feb. 4, I9S6), pub-
lished in proposed form, 20 Fed. Reg. 3634 (May 24, I9SS); amendment to "Access 
to Restricted Data," IO Code Fed. Regs. §25.II(b)(7), 2I Fed. Reg. S733 (Aug. I, 
I9S6); and "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Security Clear-
ance," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 4. 2I Fed. Reg. 3IOJ (May Io, I9S6), as amended, 
2I Fed. Reg. 7I47 (Sept. 20, I956). 
112 E.g., IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 110, 2I Fed. Reg. 4I8 (Jan. 20, I9S6), supra note 
III. 
11a "Public Records," IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9, 21 Fed. Reg. 9743 (Dec. 8, I9S6), 
as corrected 22 Fed. Reg. 2005 (Mar. 27, 1957). Fifteen days' notice has been given 
for the same reason where the Rules of Practice have been amended, 10 Code Fed. 
Regs. Pt. 2, 2I Fed. Reg. 8594 (Nov. 8, I956) and 2I Fed. Reg. 974I (Dec. 8, I956). 
114 Amendments to "Standl!.J"ds for Protection Against Radiation," IO Code Fed. Regs. 
Pt. 20, 22 Fed. Reg. 3389 (May I4. 1957). 
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mission has utilized the exceptions contained in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 115 permitting promulgation, without notice, of rules "rec-
ognizing exemption or relieving restriction" 116 and dealing with public 
property and personne1.117 
Where the Commission publishes an advance statement of the pro-
posed rules, which rules are later ·promulgated without thirty days' 
notice, interested persons have some degree of prior notice. However, 
this is not the case where the rules are not published in proposed form 
but are nevertheless made immediately effective. 
7- Special Non-Public Procedures 
Under the 1954 statute, the Commission is authorized to promulgate 
certain rules by special non-public procedures involving the President 
and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. These pro-
cedures are used when the Commission desires to add "other material" 
to the categories of "special nuclear material" 118 or "source material." 118 
Pursuant to these procedures, the Commission is required to make 
findings· (I), with. respect to "special nuclear material," that the ma-
terial to be added to that category "is capable of releasing substantial 
quantities of atomic energy"; and ( 2), with respect to "source ma-
terial," that such additionai material "is essential to the production of 
special nuclear material." In both cases, the Commission also must find 
that its determination "is in the interest of the common .defense and 
security.,., Express Presidential assent to each such determination then 
is required, whereupon 
The Commission's determination, together with the assent of 
the President, shall be submitted to the Joint Committee and 
1u Sections 4(2) and 4(c), 5 U:S.C.A. §§1003(2) and 1003(c). 
116 Amendments to "Licensing of Byproduct Material," 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§§3o.22(c), J0.71-30.72, 21. Fed. Reg. 7265 (Sept. 25, 1956) and 21 Fed. Reg. 7503 (Oct. 
J, 1956); amendments to "Operators' Licerises," 10 Code Fed. Regs. §5s.1o(d), 21 
Fed. Reg. 7265 (Sept. 2s, 1956); and amendments to "Control of Source Materials," 
10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.12, 22 Fed. Reg. 1318 (March 2, 1957). 
111 See,· e.g., "RadioisOtope Research Support Program," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 37, 
20 Fed. Reg. 4712 (July 2, 1955) and 20 Fed. Reg. 66o4 (Sept. 9, 1955); "Uranium 
Leases on Lands Controlled by the Commission," 10 Code Fed. Regs. §6o.8, 21 Fed. 
Reg. 5259 (July 14, 1956) and 10 Code Fed. Regs. §6o.9, 22 Fed. Reg. 1326 (March 5, 
1957); and "Advisory Boards," 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 7, 20 Fed. Reg. 6515 (Sept. 3, 
1955) and 21 Fed. Reg. 4271 (June 19, 1956). 
us Section ny, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(y) (formerly Section IIt) and Section 51, 42 
U.S.C.A. §2071. 
uu Section IIX, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x) (formerly Section IIs) and Section 61, 42 
U.S.C.A. §2091. 
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a period of thirty days shall elapse while Congress is in session 
. . . before the determination of the Commission may become 
effective : Provided, however, That the Joint Committee, after 
receiving such determination, may by resolution in writing, 
waive the conditions of all or any portion of such thirty-day 
period.120 
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These special procedures represent an innovation in the 1954 statute 
as compared with the 1946 act. They were intended to permit the Com-
mission "to enlarge the traditional scope of materials covered under 
the [ 1954] Act, but only after appropriate safeguards are provided for 
careful review." 121 The first such determination by the Commission 
under Section 51 was announced on June 30, 1955/22 when, effective 
that date, Uranium 233 was declared to be "special nuclear material." 128 
The fact that these highly important definitions of "special nuclear ma-
terial" and "source material" can be expanded by essentially secret rule-
making procedures, without notice to interested persons who might 
comment thereon, has been criticized.12• 
8. Miscellaneous Rule-Making Procedures 
a. Policy Determinations 
The Commission has published, by notice effective immediately, im-
portant policy decisions affecting the civilian reactor program. Thus, 
on March 3, 1956, the agency announced a classified schedule of guar-
anteed fair prices for special nuclear material lawfully produced under 
1 2 0 Sections 51 and 61, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2071, 2091. 
121 Statement of Mr. William Mitchell, former AEC General Counsel, Oct. 13, 1954, 
1 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. 1!so8. See H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 15: 
"In view of the potentially great impact any future declaration of the addition of fur-
ther materials to the category of special nuclear material [under Section 51 of the 1954 
act] could have on the economy of the Nation, these statutory steps were deemed to 
be necessary .... It is believed that this provision gives the Commission the statu-
tory basis it needs for including new materials within this category, and stiii provides 
adequate safeguards to assure that this power is not abused .... " 
122 20 Fed. Reg. 4664- The notice stated that the Commission's determination, with 
Presidential approval, was submitted to the Joint Committee on April 12, 1955. This 
indicates considerable negotiation between the Commission and the Committee before 
the latter gave its approval. The 3o-day limitation in the statute appears meaningless, 
because the Committee could take adverse action prior to the expiration thereof, to. 
forestall a promulgation of the determination by the Commission without the Commit-
tee's complete approval. 
123 Section IIy(I), 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(y) (I) (formerly Section nt(I) ), merely 
defin~s "special nuclear material" as including "uranium enriched in the isotope 233." 
124 I CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter 1[n7sa. 
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license, such prices to take effect July I, I95S, and to be effective until 
June 30, I¢2.m The basis for the determination was not disclosed and 
the schedule was at that time classified.126 On November I7, I956,121 
and June 6, I957/28 the Commission announced nonclassified guaran-
teed fair prices to be paid for plutonium and uranium 233 produced in 
licensed reactors and delivered to the Commission for one year after 
July I, I¢2.129 
Other policy decisions affecting the domestic reactor program also 
have been announced by notice rather than by rule.130 The Commission 
has indicated that the practice of making such decisions by automatic 
notice without opportunity for rule-making procedures might be 
changed.181 
b. Interpretations 
The Commission has recognized as rules certain interpretations of the 
Atomic Energy Act. This has been effected by the creation of a special 
Part 8 of its regulations "to contain interpretations of the . . . Act of 
I954 ... and of regulations ... issued thereunder." 182 Only one 
such interpretation, however, has been issued.183 
c. Special Determinations and Authorizations 
Under the I954 act, before proposing or receiving written submittals 
with respect to draft regulations, the Commission has adopted the prac-
125 21 Fed. Reg. 1421 (Mar. 3, 1956). 
12& See Section C, "Licensing,'' infra. 
1 27 AEC Press Rei. No. 930 (Nov. 17, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 
223:16. 
12s 22 Fed. Reg. 3985 (June 6, 1957). 
129 See Section C, "Licensing," infra. 
180 Extension of access permits for two years, 21 Fed. Reg. 2389 (April 12, 1956); 
fuel reprocessing by Commission, 22 Fed. Reg: 1591 (March 12, 1957); and work ex-
perience program for civilian application, 22 Fed. Reg. 2139 (Mar. 30, 1957). 
181 See Statement of former AEC General Counsel Mitchell, June 10, 1957, before 
Joint Committee, 1957 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 7 at 47: "Repre-
sentative HOLIFIELD: ... [W]ould you consider publishing in the Federal Reg-
ister such fair prices and such guaranteed fair prices, as a part of your criteria? There 
has been some criticism ... that in the establishment of criteria you have established 
it by notice rather than by rule published in the Federal Register .... Mr. MITCH-
ELL: I think a more formal statement, by publishing in the Federal Register, would 
be desirable, and we do propose to do that." 
1s2 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 8. 
1 88 "Interpretation of Section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act," IO Code Fed. Regs. 
§8.1, 2I Fed. Reg. 1414 (Mar. 3, 1956). 
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tice in a few instances of announcing a policy determination preliminary 
to public rule making. 
This was first done by the Commission to meet the need for clarifying 
and regularizing the status of American consultants who were called 
upon to advise concerning atomic energy projects and plants abroad.134 
OnOctober 5, 1955,135 the Commission announced that "any activity 
which . . . constitutes directly or indirectly engaging in the production 
of special nuclear material in any [friendly] foreign country" and which 
did. not "involve the communication of Restricted Data or other classi-
fied defense information" or the "violation of other provisions of law" 
would not be considered a violation of Section 57a(3) (B) of the 1954 
act_l36 The agency also announced its intention to incorporate and imple-
ment the foregoing "determination and authorization" in regulations, 
which were subsequently promulgated on January 20, 1956.187 
9. General Content and Form of Rules 
Rules and regulations promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion generally show careful and clear draftsmanship and are cast in a 
form which makes their content readily ascertainable by the person con-
sulting them. Thus, each part of the rules usually begins with para-
graphs which set forth the purpose/58 basis/39 and scope 140 of the rules. 
In some cases, policy "findings" upon which the rules are based, are 
included.141 "Definition" sections often are included where required or 
appropriate.142 
The Commission apparently has sought to find a practical solution to 
two problems which often face regulated persons or businesses. The 
first of these problems arises from the fact that rules of procedure often 
seem to conflict whenever two or more rules or sets of rules are appli-
134 See Section C, "Licensing," infra. 
1 35 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (Oct. 5, 1955). 
1 3 6 42 U.S.C.A. §2077(a) (3) (B): "It shall be WIIawful for any person to ... di-
rectly or indirectly engage in the production of any special nuclear materials outside 
of the United States except ... upon authorization by the Commission after a deter-
mination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States." 
137 21 ·Fed. Reg. 418 (Jan. 20, 1956). 
138 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §7.1 ("Advisory Boards"). 
139 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.1 ("Control of Source Material"). 
140 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.1 ("Rules of Practice"). 
141 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §6.10 ("Security Policies and Practices Relating to La-
bor Management Relations"). 
142 E.g., 10 Code Fed. Regs. §8o.2 ("General Rules of Procedure on Applications 
for the Determination of Reasonable Royalty Fee, etc."). 
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cable to a given situation. Under the C01;nmission's Rules of Practice, 
where there is any conflict between a general procedural rule applicable 
to every type of agency proceeding "and a special rule in another sub-
part applicable to a particular type of proceeding, the special rule will 
govern." 148 
More important, however, has been the Commission's attempt to deal 
with the problem of reliance by private parties upon official interpreta-
tions of its rules. To provide some protection for the private party who 
seeks an interpretation of the meaning and applicability of a rule and 
desires to rely upon such interpretation, each of eleven parts of the 
Atomic Energy Commission's regulations provide, with respect to the 
subject matter of that part, that · 
Except as specifically authorized by the Commission in writ-
ing, no interpretation of the meaning of the regulations in this 
part by any officer or employee of the Commission other than 
a written interpretation by the general counsel will be recog-
nized to be binding upon· the Commission. 1u 
It is to be hoped that the above type of provision will be extended to all 
parts of the Commission's rules. 
Only in a few cases throughout the entire federal government does 
the private party have such a right to rely in good faith upon an inter-
pretation of an administrative rule or its application to the facts of a 
particular case.m In most cases, the party acts at his peril in so relying, 
particularly where the application of a rule is controversial and subject 
to the vicissitudes of changes in agency policy. 
us ro COde Fed. Regs. §2.3. 
1u 10 Code Fed. Regs. §20.6 ("Standards for Protection Against Radiation"); §2S4 
("Access to Restricted Data"); §JO.s ("Licensing of Byproduct Material"); §4o.so· 
("Control of Source Material"); §so.J ("Licensing of Production and Utilization Fa-
cilities"); §ss.s (Operators' Licenses"); §70.6 ("Special Nuclear Material"); §81.4 
("Standard Specifications for Granting of Patent Licenses") ; §95.7 ("Safeguarding of 
Restricted Data"); §no.s ("Unclassified Activities in Foreign Atomic Energy Pro-
grams"); and §1404, ("Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agree-
ments"). For an example of a similar rule adopted under the 1946 act, see §so.6o 
("Control of Facilities for the Production of Fissionable Material"), now obsolete. 
u·D By statute, an advisory agency opinion may be relied upon from the Office. of 
Alien Property, so U.S.C. App. §s(b), and the Department of Labor under the "Portal-
to-Portal" Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §259. These two statutes, as well as the Defense Produc-
tion Act of I9SO, 64 Stat. 818, so U.S.C.App. §2IS7, and the six regulatory statutes 
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, IS U.S.C.A. §§77s(a), 
nsss(c), 78w(a,), 79t(d), 8oa-37(c), and 8ob-n(d), permit reliance in good faith 
upon a rule or regulation of the agency concerned. See Hoover Commission Legal 
Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 189: "By practice and precedent, letters of ad-
vice and staff opinions are given limited validity by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, 
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D. Conclusions 
By the end of 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission had developed 
the major framework of rules implementing the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954.146 Criticism of the agency's delay in developing and promulgating 
these rules, particularly under the impetus of a pending administrative 
proceeding,141 has been countered by the claim that the Commission 
"went about its job slowly and deliberately so that there would be an 
opportunity for industry to comment on what the AEC proposed and 
for the AEC to think carefully about its regulations before they were 
issued."· 148 Consultation with advisory groups, rather than resort to pub-
lic rule-making proceedings, seems to have been the primary reliance of 
the Commission in developing its regulations.149 This policy, while not 
apparently abused to date, is vulnerable to imputations of ex parte influ-
ence in the eyes of the public and could be so abused in the future. 
In general, the Atomic Energy Commission would appear to have 
exercised its rule-making authority under the 1954 statute in accordance 
with both the letter and the spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946.150 A desire to improve public policy and relations with the 
Department of Commerce, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, by the Post Office Department, and by the Office of Mu-
nitions Control, Department of State. This excellent practice ... has been most effec-
tively used by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which issues several thousand 
such opinion letters annually." 
146 See 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 18, 147; Trowbridge, "Licensing 
and Regulation of Private Atomic Energy Activities," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 842 (1956). 
HT In the Matter of Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16. This 
proceeding was inaugurated on Aug. 31, 1956, by the filing of a petition of interven-
tion to oppose the conditional granting of a construction permit to the applicant, 
awarded to the applicant by the Commission on Aug. 4, 1956. 
148 Trowbridge, supra note 146. 
149 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 149; AEC Response to Questionnaire, 
supra note 77 at 1o81. 
150 See McKinney Panel Report, supra note 10 at 130: "The Commission has se-
lected a complex and time-consuming technique for developing its regulations. It has 
conducted conferences with representatives of diverse organizations on each aspect of 
regulations .... While some points of view may not be fully reflected by this tech-
nique, opportunity for comment is also afforded after publication of proposed regula-
tions in the Federal Register. The logic of this course of Commission action appears 
sound and is not being vigorously opposed by any interests or groups so far as can 
be observed." The only substantial attack to date upon the Commission in the field 
of rule making has come from intervenors United Automobile Workers and AFL-
CIO in AEC Dkt. No. F-16, in the matter of Power Reactor Development Company. 
The intervenors did not specifically attack the licensing rules involved in that proceed-
ing but argued that the Comt:nission, "in granting the conditional construction permit," 
violated 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§50.35, 50.40, and 50.45; see "Petition for Intervention 
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industries and individuals subject to regulation might have dictated 
uniform resort to public rule-making procedures and to notice of pro-
mulgation of rules, even where non-substantive matters traditionally 
have been exempt therefrom under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Particularly commendable, so far as the practice goes, has been the 
adoption of the regulation for interpretation of rules by the Commis-
sion's General Counsel, upon which good-faith reliance can be placed. 
This procedure should be extended to all parts of the agency's rules, 
which step could be effected by an appropriate amendment to Part 8 of 
the Commission's rules. 
Largely untested is the 1954 statute's provision for review of certain 
rules by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which 
rules relate to changes in the definitions of "special nuclear material" 
and "source material." The Committee's authority thus conferred tends 
to give the Committee "a very substantial role in the atomic energy 
program." 151 This review procedure affords a relatively speedy means 
for amending Sections I IX and I Iy of the I954 act by a quasi-legislative 
process. However, the power exercised by the Joint Committee in this 
connection conceivably could be used in the future to affect the adminis-
tration of the ~tomic energy law by the Executive Department.152 
III. LICENSING 
A. Licensing in Administrative Law 
In its report published in I94I, the Attorney General's Committee on 
Administrative Procedure referred to licensing by federal agencies as a 
distinguishing characteristic of the "trend toward preventive legislation" 
in the United States. Indeed, the report stated: 
Licensing of any activity may be one of the most burdensome 
forms of regulation, since all who engage in the activity must 
and Request for Formal Hearing" 4-13 (Aug. 31, 1956); Notice of Hearing Order, 
21 Fed. Reg. 78o9 (Oct. 12 1956). 
In May 1958 the AEC informed the Joint Committee that "informal" public rule-
making procedures would be utilized in connection with consideration of that agency's 
regulations on "Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements," 10 
Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 140, issued initially Sept. 11, 1957, with only 15 days' public 
notice (22 Fed. Reg. 7223, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 625). Industry ad-
visory conferences on the subject occurred in Dec. 1957, and Jan. 1958, but the Com-
mission felt the need for further industry advice concerning, and public support for, 
the regulations in this field; see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 100 and 4: 157. 
1n 1 CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter 1fs68. 
u 2 See, e.g., Letter of AEC Chairman Strauss to Rep. Cole, Aug. 3, 1957, concern-
ing the Commission authorization bill for fiscal year 1958, 103 Cong. Rec. A6319-
A6320 (Aug. 5, 1957). 
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be licensed in order that the persons who would probably act 
improperly may be controlled. But it is also one of the most 
effective [means of control], and it is particularly likely to be 
resorted to where the effort to effectuate policies is made with 
conviction.158 
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More than a decade later another governmental body, after a survey of 
federal administrative functions, observed that the "power to license is 
in effect the power to control the business and commercial life of the 
community." 154 
In no field of regulation affecting American private industry has the 
Congress used licensing more extensively to assure governmental con-
trol than in that of atomic energy. The major areas of private indus-
trial and research activity permitted under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 were severely circumscribed by restrictions upon the licensing 
process. One of these areas-the manufacture or production of any 
device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy, or the utilization 
of such forms of energy-was never exploited. Under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, expanded private use of atomic energy is governed 
by licensing requirements which give the Presidel).t, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, and even the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, greater 
control over industry than is the case in any other area of federally regu-
lated activity. 
In enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 155 and the statute which 
superseded it in 1954,156 Congress had the foresight to require that the 
licensing authority of the Atomic Energy Commission be subject to 
safeguards of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Provisions 
of that legislation affecting the licensing process clearly were enacted by 
Congress in 1946 "because of the very severe consequences of the con-
ferring of licensing authority upon administrative agencies" and "to 
remove the threat of disastrous, arbitrary, and irremediable administra-
tive action." 157 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, licensing covers "any form 
153 Sen. Doc. No. 8, supra note 45 at 14. 
154 Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government, Report on 
Legal Services and Procedure 58 (March 1955) (hereafter cited as Hoover Commis-
sion Legal Ser-Vices Report); see Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, 
supra note 43 at 172-174 
1511 Section 14 42 U.S.C.A. §1814 (1946). 
15& Section 181, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231. 
ts7 Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 368. 
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of required official permission." 158 Agencies are required to proceed 
with reasonable dispatch to conclude and decide proceedings on applica-
tions for licenses.159 No license may be withdrawn without the agency's 
first giving the licensee notice thereof in writing and an opportunity to 
demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements. In 
business of a continuing nature, no license can expire until timely appli-
cation for a new license or for a renewal thereof is determined by the 
agency, except in "cases of willfulness or those in which the public 
health, interest, or safet;y requires." In the latter cases, an agency can 
summarily suspend or revoke a litense.160 
B. Licensing Under Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
Licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was rigorously cur-
tailed by Congressional policy, even though the Commission was re-
quired to carry out a program "directed toward improving the public 
welfare, increasing the standard of living, [and] strengthening free 
competition in private enterprise." 161 Particularly restrictive was the 
direction of the statute for a "program for Government control of the 
production, ownership, and use of fissionable material to assure the 
common defense and security and to insure the broadest possible exploi-
tation of the fields." 162 This policy was further effectuated in Sec-
tion 4 (e) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,163 which provided that 
uBJd. at 3o6; see 197, 254. Under Section 2(d), 5 U.S.C.A. §Iooi(d), licensing 
constitutes a form of agency "adjudication" and is always the subject of an "order." 
Under Section 2(e), a license is defined as including "the whole or-part of any agency 
permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or 
other form of permission" ; and "licensing" as including "agency process respecting the 
grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation amend-
merit, modification, or .conditioning of a license." Under Section 2(f), an agency "sanc-
tion" "includes the whole or any part of any agency ... requirement, revocation, or 
suspension of a license" ; and agency "relief' includes "any agency . . . grant of . . . · 
license." Under Section 2 (g), an "agency proceeding" includes licensing, and "agency 
action" includes an agency license. 
u& See Section 6(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §1005(a): " ... Every agency shall proceed with 
reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it except that due regard shall 
be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives. . . ." 
Although this provision was intended by Congress to assure a speedy decision with 
respect to matters before any agency, consistent with the public interest in a full and 
complete record, "The Administrative Procedure Act provides no remedy for failure 
of agencies to proceed with reasonable dispatch" (Hoover Commission Legal Task 
Force Report, supra note 43 at 183-186). 
16o Section 9(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo8(b). 
161 Section 1 (a), 42 U.S.C. §1801 (a)(1946). 
162 Section I (b) (4), 42 U.S.C. §1801 (b) (4) (1946). 
16842 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946). 
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licenses for the manufacture of production facilities for fissionable 
material 104 were to be issued "in accordance with such standards and 
upon such conditions as will restrict the production and distribution of 
such facilities to effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act." 
I. Types of Licenses 
Licensing activities of the Atomic Energy Commission under the 
I946 act were limited to four major categories. These included licenses 
(I) for facilities (including important component parts thereof) for 
the production of fissionable material/65 ( 2) for the transfer of source 
materials,166 and (3) for the distribution and use of by-product ma-
terials (radioisotopes) .167 A fourth licensing activity, never imple-
mented, covered the manufacture or production of any equipment or 
device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy.168 
In controlling facilities for the production of fissionable material, the 
Commission under the I946 act issued both specific licenses for domestic 
and foreign activities and also general licenses for domestic activities.169 
The general licensing device was especially convenient because of the 
fact that the definition of facilities for the production of fissionable 
material was broad enough to encompass an extensive list of articles in 
common use.170 These included Geiger counters and mass spectrometers 
and spectrographs. The production and utilization of these articles, to-
gether with those of some twenty other devices, were controlled by 
general licenses 171 subject only to reporting requirements.172 
The same division of licenses into general and special categories 173 
was made with respect to the licensing of source material transfers. 
This was effected by the use of a detailed list of exempted products 174 
164 Defined in Section 5(a) (1) generally as "plutonium, [and] uranium enriched in 
the isotope 235,'' 42 U.S.C. §18o5 (a) (I) ( 1946). 
165 Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946). 
16& Section 5(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. §xSos(b) (2) (1946). 
167 Section 5(C) (2), 42 u.s.c. §I8os(c) (2) (1946). 
168 Section 7(a), 42 U.S.C. §18o7(a) (1946). 
16P1o Code Fed. Regs. §§50.1o-.I3 and 50.30 (repealed). 
170 Section 5(a)(1), 42 u.s.c. §18o5(a)(I)(19¢). 
1 71 Under Schedule B, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.71 (repealed). 
172Io Code Fed. Regs. §§50.12(b) and so.4o-.41 (repealed). 
11a 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.23. 
174 10 Code Fed. Regs. §4o.6o, listing "Schedule I" which covered incandescent man-
tles, ceramic products, refractories, glass products, photographic supplies, certain rare 
earth metals, and vacuum tubes, and certain types of thoriated tungsten. Section 40.61, 
containing "Schedule II" and §40.28 prohibit the use of source material, containing by 
weight uranium in excess of o.oso/o, in the manufacture of ceramic, glass, and photo-
graphic products. 
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and transactions protected by general license. m A similar program for 
general and special licensing was in effect promulgated to regulate the 
distribution of byproduct material by exempting from the AEC's rules 
therefor certain categories of items and quantities thereof.176 
2. Standards and Conditions 
It is perhaps fortunate that licensing under the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946 did not assume the importance that this function has under 
current legislation. The statutory standards under which the Atomic 
Energy Commission exercised its authority under the 1946 legislation 
were sketchy, if not entirely non-existent from a practical point of view, 
with the "licensing power . . . left to the virtually uncontrolled discre-
tion of the Commission." 177 Except in the case of authorizations for 
radioisotope procurement, licensing regulations issued by the agency 
failed to provide specific standards for licenses and the conduct of 
licensees. 
The tone of the regulations under the 1946 act was, of course, set by 
the statute itself. Under that act, licenses for the manufacture, produc-
tion, transfer, or acquisition of any facilities for the production of 
fissionable material were to "be issued in accordance with such stand-
ards and upon such conditions as will restrict the production and distri-
bution of such facilities to effectuate the policies and purposes of this 
[ 1946] Act." 178 The standards and conditions with respect to transfers 
of source materials were only slightly more specific and required that 
licenses should not impair an adequate supply of source materials or per-
mit "the use of such materials in a manner inconsistent with the national 
welfare." 179 More exact and readily ascertainable standards and condi-
tions were stated with respect to authorizations for the use of radioiso-
topes.180 Licensing of fissionable and source materials was prohibited 
under the 1946 act "if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance 
17G 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.62,. containing "Schedule Ill." 
176 10 Code Fed. Regs. §30.71 (repealed) containing "Schedule A" for exempt items, 
and §30.72 (repealed), containing "Schedule B" for exempt quantities. 
177 Report of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Atomic Energy 
to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 12 (Mimeo Nov. 20, 1953) (hereafter cited as 
ABA Committee Report). 
178 Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946). 
179 Section s(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(b) (3) (1946). 
180 Section s(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(c) (2) (1946), set forth the authorized uses for 
byproduct materials. Further, authorization was to be denied to "any applicant, who is 
not equipped to observe or who fails to observe such safety standards to protect health 
as may be established by the Commission." See 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 30 (repealed). 
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of a license to such person . . . would be inimical to the common de-
fense and security." 181 A similar vaguely-worded condition was applied 
to licenses for the manufacture, production, or export of any equip-
ment utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy.182 
The regulations issued with respect to licenses for facilities for the 
production of fissionable material 183 and for transfers of source ma-
terial184 followed the statute and permitted the Commission to impose 
"such conditions as it deems appropriate and in accordance with law." 
Regulatory standards incorporated in the rules were as indefinite as those 
of the statute itself. They included such terms, capable of varied inter-
pretation, as "assurance of the common defense and security," 185 "assur-
ance of adequate" supplies of the materials or facilities concerned,186 
"prevention of the use of source materials in a manner inconsistent with 
the national welfare," 187 "preservation of health and safety," 188 "inimi-
cal to the common defense and security," 189 and "effectuating the policies 
and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946." 190 Since compliance 
with all regulations of the Commission was a condition of every license 
and since the Commission reserved the right to change its regulations, 191 
there existed no clearly ascertainable standards and conditions with 
respect to licenses for facilities to produce fissionable materials and to 
transfer source material. 
Only in the case of regulations with respect to authorization for uti-
lization of radioisotopes did the Commission set forth standards and 
conditions which could be readily ascertained with reasonable cer-
181 Section 5(d), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(d) (1946). The phrase "common defense and se-
curity,'' nowhere explained in the Act, also appeared in Section l(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§18o1 (a) (1946) ("Findings and Declaration") and Section 1 (b) (4), 42 U.S.C. 
§18o1 (b) (4) (1946) ("Purpose of Act"). 
182 Section 7(c), 42 U.S.C. §18o7(c) (1946). 
18a 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.21 (repealed). 
184 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.21. 
185 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§4o.22(a) and 50.22(a) (repealed). 
1 86 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§4o.22(b) and 50.22(b) (repealed). 
1 87 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.22(c) and 50.22(c) (repealed). 
188 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.22(d). 
189 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.22. 
190 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.22(d) (repealed). 
191 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.25: "Nothing in this section [on revocation, suspension, 
and modification of licenses] shall limit the authority of the Commission to issue or 
amend its regulations in accordance with law." See, to the same effect, §50.32 (re-
pealed). The open-end nature of the licenses issuable under the 1946 Act also arises 
under the 1954 act; see Section 187 of the latter statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §2237 and 10 
Code Fed. Regs. §7o.J2(b), more fully discussed hereafter .. 
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tainty.192 Thus, requirements for approval of an authorization for the 
use of radioisotopes required specified uses for the byproduct material, 
suitable equipment for health and safety, and suitably trained personnel. 
3· Licensing Procedures 
Although subject to the requirements of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, procedures for licensing under the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946 193 were not otherwise defined or marked out by Congress.194 
However, except in the case of appeals from denials or revocations of 
licenses, licensing procedures complied generally with those required 
by the Administrative Procedure Act.195 
Appeals procedure was clearly deficient in the case of licenses for the 
manufacture of facilities for the production of fissionable material and 
transfer of byproduct materials. In each case, the only procedure pro-
vided was for an applicant to file a "petition" in letter form with the 
Commission "stating the reasons why the petition should be granted." 198 
Although the General Counsel of the Commission at one time held the 
view that these regulations in effect authorized an intra-agency appeal 
when desired by an applicant,19't such a construction depended more 
upon the practice of the agency itself than upon the actual language of 
the regulations involved. 
10210 Code Fed. Regs. §Jo.:zi(a)(l)-(2) (repealed). Special requirements were 
listed for human uses by institutions (§J0.24(a)) and by individual physicians 
(§J0.24(b)), for human use of sealed sources (§J0.24(c)), for use in research andj 
development (§30.24(d)), and for processing (§30.24(e) ). 
1ua Section 14. 42 U.S.C. §1814 (1946). 
194 Thus, Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(e) (1946), stated that licenses for the manu-
factUre of facilities for the production of fissionable material "shall be issued in ac-
cordance with such procedures as the Commission may by regulation establish." Sec-
tion s(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(b) (3) (1946), was to same effect with respect to licenses 
for the transfer of source materials. Section 5(c) (2), 42 U.S.C. §18o5(c) (2) (1946), 
covering authorizations for distribution of radioisotopes, contained no provision what-
saver for licensing procedures. 
m See 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§JO.JO (repealed), 40.20, and 50.20 (repealed) dealing 
with license applications ; §§30.34 (repealed), 40.25, and 50.32 (repealed) dealing with 
license revocation, suspension, or modification ; and §4o.:z6 dealing with license renewals. 
196 IO Code Fed. Regs. §§40-SI and so.6I (repealed). 
101 Answers of Atomic Energy Commission to Questionnaire Submitted by Task 
Force on Legal Services and Procedure, Commission on Organization of Executive 
Branch of the Government (1954): "As indicated in §40.51 and 50.61 of the regula-
tions, an appeal may be made by filing a letter with the Commission, stating the rea-
sons for the appeal. If reason therefor appears, the action may be modified by the 
Licensing Controls Branch. Otherwise the appeal and the related file data are re-
ferred to the General Manager for consideration and response to the applicant." 
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C. Licensing Under Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
Licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is the means whereby 
the government not only regulates the atomic energy industry but also 
effects the development of that industry in accordance with the aims 
of that legislation. "[A] comparative newcomer among the Commis-
sion's many other functions," licensing constitutes a fairly "narrow but 
highly significant area of the Commission's overall responsibilities for 
atomic energy development" which is "closely linked with the AEC's 
nortregulatory responsibilities." 198 
The overriding national defense policy of the Congress in enacting 
the 1946 Act set the tone of licensing thereunder. In enacting the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, however, Congress manifested a compelling 
intention to take advantage of the potentialities of private industry in 
the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses. Accordingly, "the 
development, use, and control of atomic energy ... to [among other 
.things] strengthen free competition in private enterprise," 199 as pro-
vided in the 1954 act, should and must guide the Commission in enact-
ing regulations to implement the legislation. Further, Congress intended 
that Commission programs for assistance to research. and development 
:!lnd the "dissemination of unclassified scientific and technical informa-
tion" should "encourage scientific and industrial progress." 200 Indeed, 
one of the specific purposes of the present statute, clearly designed to 
set the administrative tone of the licensing function thereunder, is the 
stated policy "to encourage widespread participation in the development 
and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum 
extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the 
health and safety of the public." 201 
Licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is subject to two 
controlling factors that did not exist under the earlier legislation. First, 
the Commission acts "in the dual capacity of encouraging as well as 
regulating private activity," with the result that "considerations of 
Government promotion and assistance were more closely interrelated 
with those of regulation than is the case in most other regulatory 
agencies." 202 Second, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic 
Energy acts, under a 1957 amendment to Section 261 of the 1954 stat-
198 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 2-3. 
199 Section xb, 42 U.S.C.A. §20II (b). 
2oo Section Ja and b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(a) and (b). 
2o1 Section 3d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(d). 
2o2 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 4 
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ute, 208 in a reviewing capacity with respect to all major licenses where 
federal government assistance in any form is involved. These two fac-
tors vitally affect the development of private atomic enterprise under the 
I954 act, as amended. 
The Atomic Energy Act of I954 establishes a complex system of in-
tegrated licensing controls. Thus, where a public utility or research 
institution desires to build and operate on atomic reactor, it must obtain 
(I) a construction permit to build the reactor; ( 2) a facility license to 
operate the reactor ; ( 3) depending on the reactor design, a license to 
acquire, possess, and use source material; ( 4) a license to possess and 
use special nuclear material; and ( 5) a license for each person operating 
the reactor. 
Several statutory features promote the integration of licensing func-
tions. For example, the licensing provisions of the I954 act are, for 
the most part, contained in a single chapter of the statute. 204 An appli-
cant for a so-called "commercial" 205 or "non-commercial" 206 license for 
a facility utilizing or producing special nuclear material is encouraged 
to develop the information which will be required by the Commission by 
prior consultation with the agency and to submit its application for each 
type of license required in connection with the operating permit, insofar 
as possible, at the same time.207 Further, Section 16Ih of the present 
statute authorizes the Commission to 
. . . consider in a single application one or more of the activi-
ties for which a license is required by this Act, [and] combine 
in a single license one or more of such activities. . . . 208 
The licensing system now administered by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission requires the following types of authorizations before a private 
person or business can act : 
1. Special Nuclear M a.terial-License to receive, possess, 
use, and transfer special nuclear material, as provided in Sec-
tions 53 and 57a(I)-(2): for the conduct of research and de-
velopment activities under Section 3 I ; for use in conduct of 
research and development activity or in medical therapy, under 
2oa Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
204 Chapter 10, "Atomic Energy Licenses," Sections 101-110, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2131-
2140. 
2os Under section 103, 42 U.S.C.A. §2133. 
206 Under section 104, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134. 
2o1 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 11-15 and IOI-IOS; Upton, "Licens-
ing and Services to Licensees and Others Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'' 24 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 488, 489 (1956). 
2o8 42 U.S.C.A. §2201 (h). 
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non-commercial licenses pursuant to Section 104; and for use 
under commercial licenses pursuant to Section 103. 
2. Source Material-License to transfer, deliver, receive, 
possess, import, or export source materials after removal from 
the place of deposit in nature, as provided in Sections 62 and 
63 : for use in the conduct of research and development activi-
ties under Section 31 ; for use in research and development 
activities or in medical therapy under non-commercial licenses 
pursuant to Section 104; for use under commercial licenses 
pursuant to Section 103; or for "any other use approved by 
the Commission as an aid to science or industry." 
3· Byproduct Material-License to transfer, manufacture, 
produce, acquire, own, possess, import, or export byproduct 
material, as provided in Sections 81 and 82, for use in re-
search and development, medical therapy, industrial uses, agri-
cultural uses, and "such other useful applications as may be 
developed." 
4· Activity Abroad-Authorization for activity involving 
the production of special nuclear material outside the United 
States, as provided in Section 57a(3) (B), where United 
States has no agreement for cooperation with a foreign 
country pursuant to Sections 54 and 123. 
s. Commercial Utilization or Production Facility-License 
for commercial utilization or production facility using special 
nuclear material as provided in Section 103. 
6. Non-Commercial Utilization or Production Facility-
License for non-commercial utilization or production facility 
using special nuclear material as provided in Section 104 for 
medical therapy, research and development activities for indus-
trial or commercial purposes, and research and development 
activities for non-commercial purposes. 
7· Construction Permit-Construction permit for construc-
tion prior to licensing, or alteration after licensing, of utiliza-
tion or production facility licensed under Sections 103 and 
104, as provided in Section 185. 
8. Operator's License-License to operate, as provided in 
Section 107, various classes of utilization or production activi-
ties otherwise licensed under Sections 103 and 104. 
9. Access Permit-License authorizing access, subject to 
personnel security clearances, to confidential or secret Re-
stricted Data, as developed by Commission regulation under 
Sections 3b, 141, 145, and 161i. 
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With respect to the domestic distribution of special nuclear ma-
terial, 209 the transfer of source material in interstate or foreign com-
209 Section 53b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(b); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§70.11-.14. 
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merce, 210 the domestic distribution of byproduct material, 211 and the 
domestic production or use of component parts of utilization and pro-
duction facilities,212 the Commission is authorized to issue either a spe-
cial or general license. The authority of the Commission in this respect 
is considerably expanded under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
compared with the situation under the 1946 statute. 
1. Standards and Conditions 
The statutory standards established by the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 for Commission licensing, and also the conditions and terms im-
posed on licensees under Commission regulations, constitute only a 
minor improvement over those of the 1946 legislation and rules issued 
thereunder. For example, the completely vague and meaningless stand-
ard of "national welfare," so commonly used in the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946, appears infrequently in the 1954 legislation 218 and survives in 
the present regulations only ·as a licensing condition for source ma-
terials.214 However, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, particularly with 
respect to licensing, provides "only the vaguest 'standards' to guide the 
hand of the Commission." 215 
The indefinite standard of "common defense and security" 218 appears 
21o Sections 62 and 63b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2092 and 2093(b); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§§40.11, 40.23, 40.6o, and 40.62. 
211 Section 81, 42 U.S.C.A. §2111; see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.71-.72. 
212 Section 109(a}, 42 U.S.C.A. §2139(a). 
2 18 Under Section 1a, 42 U.S.A. §zon (a) ("Declaration"), it is "the policy of the 
United States that ... the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be 
directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare .... " Under 
Section JC, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(c), the Commission is directed to carry out, among 
others, "a program for Government control of the possession, use; and production of 
atomic energy and special nuclear material so directed as to make the maximum con-
tribution to ... the national welfare." See also Section zg, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(g), 
concerning the use of funds "to promote general welfare," and Section 2i, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§zo1zi, concerning government indemnity in the interest of the general welfare. 
214 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.1 and 40.22(c). 
215 Stason, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy 4 (1956) (hereafter 
cited as Atomic Energy Workshops); see "Report of Workshop III" at 58-59. See 
also statement of Rep. Holifield concerning Section 53 of the 1954 act with respect to 
licenses for special nuclear material, 1957 Congressional Review Hearing, Sttpra note 7 
at 16: "Under Section 53 ... of the act, you [the AEC] have wide latitude to make 
administrative judgments in the granting of a license. You can, in effect, include in 
this granting of the license every kind of a term and condition that you want. . . ." 
21a This is nowhere defined in the new act except in Section IIg, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§2014(g), which merely states, "The term 'common defense and security' means the 
common defense and security of the United States." 
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frequently throughout the present statute m and the regulations issued 
thereunder. 218 Further, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, any 
license may contain "such terms and conditions as the commission may, 
by rule or regulation, prescribe to effectuate the provisions of this 
Act." 219 This language confers on the Commission almost unlimited 
discretionary authority over licenses in the atomic field. · This broad 
authority also is written into the regulations by the provision that a 
license shall be issued "in such form and upon such conditions as it 
[the Commission] deems appropriate and in accordance with law." 220 
Of even more doubtful regulatory justification is the statutory 221 and 
regulatory 222 provision under the 1954 act that licenses may be, ipso 
facto, modified or amended by subsequent changes in legislation or regu-
lations.228 This is particularly true in view of the fact that a hearing on 
21r Section 1a, 42 U.S.C.A. §20n (a) ("Declaration"); Section :za, b, d, e, g, and 
i, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(a), (b), (d), (e), (g), and (i) ("Findings"); Section 3c, d, 
and e, 42 U.S.C.A. §2013(c), (d), and (e) ("Purpose"); Sections 53b and 57b(2), 
42 U.S.C.A. §§2073(b) and 2077(b) (2) ("Domestic Distribution of Special Nuclear 
Material" and "Prohibition"); Sections 63b and 69. 42 U.S.C.A. §§2093(b) and 2099 
("Domestic Distribution of Source Material" and "Prohibition"); Section 81, 42 
U.S.C.A. §2n1 ("Domestic Distribution of Byproduct Material"); Sections 103b and 
d and 104a, c, and d, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133(b) and (d) and 2134(a), (c), (d) ("Atomic 
Energy Licenses"); and Section 182a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(a) (general licensing 
standards). 
21s 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.31b(1) and 30.33(c) ("Licensing of Byproduct Ma-
terial"); §40.22(a) ("Control of Source Material"); §70. 32(b) (1) ("Special Nuclear 
Material"); §§50.12 and 5040(c) ("Licensing of Production and Utilization Fa-
cilities"). 
219 Section 183, 42 U.S.C.A. §2233 ;·see, to the same effect, Section 103<1, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§2133(a), with respect to commercial licenses. 
22o 10 Code Fed. Regs. §40.21 ; see, to the same effect, §§30.31 (b), 50.50, 55.30, and 
70.31 (a). 
221 Sections 183d and 187, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2233(d) and 2237. "Section 183d would 
seem to imply that while licenses are subject to the hazard of a change in the act, they 
are not subject to the hazard of a change in regulations without a change in the act"; 
but "section 187 indicates that license terms are subject to modification by subsequent 
regulations". and to revocation for failure to observe such subsequent regulations, 
Upton, supra note 207 at 496, 497· 
222 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.32(a), 40.25, 50.54(h), 5540(a), and 70.61(a). 
223 Section 1700 of the 1954 act, 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(a), added by Congress in 1957, 
requires that, as a condition of their licenses, certain classes of licensees ''have and 
maintain financial protection" in the form of liability insurance or otherwise, as deter-
mined by the Commission under Section 17ob, 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(b). It is a further 
condition of such licenses that the licensee enter into an indemnity agreement with the 
AEC, Section 17oc, 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(c). With respect to these conditions imposed 
upon persons licensed by the Commission prior to enactment of the 1957 legislation, 
the Joint Committee has stated, H.R. Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess~ 21 (1957): 
"In view of the provisions ~ section 187 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, making 
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changes in the licensing regulations usually is held only upon the request 
of any licensee affected thereby. 224 
2. Types of Licenses 
a. Use and Production of Special Nuclear Material 
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the United States retains 
title to all special nuclear materiaF25 The Atomic Energy Commission 
is authorized to distribute such material at a reasonable charge to per-
sons licensed to possess it. The statute also requires that the Commis- . 
sian purchase from licensees at a fair price special nuclear material pro-
duced by licensees in the course of their operations. 
Section 31 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 226 authorizes assistance 
by the Commission to private or public institutions or persons for re-
search and development activities relating to nuclear processes, the 
theory and production of atomic energy, utilization of special nuclear 
material, and the protection of health and the promotion of safety. 
Under Section 104,227 licenses are authorized for medical therapy and 
for research and development for industrial or commercial purposes. 
Where special nuclear material is licensed by the Commission for activi-
ties authorized under Sections 3 1 and 104, the Commission may, but is 
not required to, make a reasonable charge for the tJSe of such material, 
the charge to be based upon established criteria, "considering, among 
other things, whether the licensee is a nonprofit or eleemosynary institu-
tion and the purposes for which the special nuclear material will be 
used." 228 
On the other hand, the Commission is required to make a reasonable 
charge for special nuclear material for use by commercial licensees 229 
under Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.23° Further, with 
respect to charges for such material to be used by both Section 104 non-
all licenses subject to later amendment of the act, there is no need to incorporate lan-
guage here amending the licenses where this financial protection may be required. . . ." 
For a discussion of the insurance and indemnity provisions of the 1954 act, see infra, 
text at note 495. 
224 Section 189b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(b). 
2 25 Sections zb and 52, 42 U.S.C.A. §§zo12(b) and 2072. 
226 42 U.S.C.A. §2051. 
227 42 U.S.C.A. §2134. 
22s Section 53b(1)-(2) and c, U.S.C.A. §zo73(b) (1)-(z) and (c). 
2 29 Section 53b(3) and c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(b) (3) and (c). 
23o 42 U.S.C.A. §2133. 
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commercial licensees and Section 103 commercial licensees, the Com-
mission must take into consideration 
(I) the use to be made of the special nuclear material; 
( 2) the extent to which the use of the special nuclear ma-
terial will advance the development of the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy; [and] 
(3) the energy value of the special nuclear material in the 
particular use for which the license is issued. . . . 231 
Where a Section 103 commercial license is involved, the Commission 
must, ''insofar as practicable, make uniform, nondiscriminatory 
charges" for special nuclear material used in connection with such a 
license.232 In addition, 
. . . with respect to special nuclear material consumed in a 
facility licensed pursuant to section 103, the Commission shall 
make a further charge based on the cost to the Commission, as 
estimated by the Commission, or the average fair price paid 
for the production of such special nuclear material as deter-
mined by Section 56, whichever is lower. 238 
Section 56 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 deals with the "fair 
price" to be paid by the Commission for special nuclear material pro-
duced in licensed private facilities. 234 Such a price must be applicable to 
all producers of the same type of material and must reflect the value of 
the material for its intended use by the United States, and the Com-
mission "may give such weight to the actual cost of producing that ma-
terial as the Commission finds to be equitable." Further, Section 56 
provides that 
. . . the Commission may establish guaranteed fair prices for 
all special nuclear material delivered to the Commission for 
such period of time as it may deem necessary but not to exceed 
seven years. 
By the middle of 1957 the Commission had made available to private 
industry for domestic use so,ooo kilograms of contained uranium 235.235 
281 Section 53d(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d) (1)-(3). 
282 Section 53d(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d) (4). 
283 Section 53d(5), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(d) (5). 
2u 42 U.S.C.A. §2076. 
235 Twenty thousand kilograms were made available Feb. 22, 1956, and an additional 
30,000 kilograms July 3, 1957. At the same time, equal amounts were released for use 
by cooperating foreign nations. See AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report, 19, 
23 (1958); AEC Twentieth Semi-Annual Report vii-ix (1956); Atomic Energy Facts 
3 (GPO 1957). . 
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Subsequently, the Commission by regulation established guaranteed fair 
prices for special nuclear material lawfully. produced under license 
through June 30, 1963.236 The agency also has sought to waive the use 
charge for special nuclear material in connection with certain projects 
under the civilian reactor program. 237 In addition, the Commission, at 
a fixed unit charge to the licensee, recovers in Commission-owned facili-
ties source and special nuclear materials from spent reactor fuel or 
blanket materials of licensees under Sections I03 and I04 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954.238 
Opponents of the 1954 legislation have attacked these sale and pur-
chase provisions, as administered by the Commission, as a "built-in sub-
sidy feature" to industry. 289 As a result of this criticism, a new Section 
58 was added to the statute by Congress in July 1957, providing: 
Before the Commission establishes any fair price or guar-
anteed fair price period in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 56, or establishes any criteria for the waiver of any 
charge for the use of special nuclear material licensed or dis-
tributed under section 53, the proposed fair price, guaranteed 
fair price period or criteria for the waiver of such charge shall 
be submitted to the Joint Committee .... 240 
The Commission-proposed price must lie before the Joint Committee for 
a period of forty-five days prior to its effective date. This provision 
was aimed directly at curbing the future exercise of Commission discre-
236 21 Fed. Reg. 1421 (Mar. 3, 1956), AEC Press Rei. No. 930 (Nov. 18, 1956), 
22 Fed. Reg. 3985 (June 6, I957), and 22 Fed. Reg. rog6s (Dec. 28, 1957). 
237 Under the first, second, and third round invitations; see statement of AEC Gen-
eral Manager Fields, I957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, Sti/Jra note 7 at IS3-I54-
In its request for authorization of funds for fiscal year 1958, the AEC asked authoriza-
tion· for a total of $23,II5,000 for waiver of fuel-use charges under the three rounds, 
but Congress authorized only $20,000,000 to be used under the third round invitation 
(Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 39). Waiver of use charges aggregating $1,325,000 
under the first round invitation and $1,790,000 under that of the second round, as re-
quested by the Commission, were disallowed by Congress. 
238 Section r6rm(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(m) (I); 22 Fed. Reg. 1591 (Mar. 12, 1957). 
239 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, Slipra note 5 at 13o-131; Adams, "Atomic Energy: the 
Congressional Abandonment of Competition," 55 Col. L. Rev. ISS, 168-I6g (1955); 
Rep. Holifield, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 183; Rep. Can-
non, 103 Cong. Rec. 5192 (1957). In his report on a review of AEC contract 
No. AT(30-3)-22 with Yankee Atomic Electric Co. executed in Nov. 1956, the Comp-
troller General charged that the Commission's announced policy of waiving fuel-use 
charges up to an agreed-upon amount of money was not fully complied with in the 
Yankee contract "since it provides that AEC will waive its use charge, without limita-
tion, for all special nuclear material used during the contract period" ( 1957 Section 
202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 758). 
240 Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. §2078. 
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tion with respect to prices for special nuclear material used in the 
civilian reactor program. 241 
As a matter of law, ownership of special nuclear material by the 
U~ited States is not nece-ssary to adequate regulation of the atomic 
energy industry. 242 As long as the Commission remains the major pro-
ducer of special nuclear material and as long as the number of private 
users of such material ·for energy producing purposes is limited, the 
need for private ownership is not particularly pressing. However, as 
the number of private reactm'.s increases, the availability of an assured 
source of enriched reactor fuel at reasonably foreseeable prices will 
become a requisite. to financial and operational stability of the industry. 
The more the industry is subject to normal competitive mar}{et condi-
tions, the healthier it will be, and the greater will be the benefit to the 
public welfare ,from a thriving private atomic energy production base. 
The Commission appears conscious of these factors. As it has em-
phasized to the Joint Committee : 
The AEC policy .. on pricing materials and services which it 
makes available, and on establishing fair prices which it will 
pay for s~ial nuclear materials produced in licensed facili-
ties is recognized as being of major importance to the growth 
and development of the i,ndustry, both here and abroad. 
The influence of these prices. on the industry depends not 
only upon their actual level, but almost equally upon their sta-
bility, for without some assurance that these prices will remain 
reasonably stable, industry will be unable to make the long-
range plans essential to the procurement of the financing nec-
essary to proceed with its projects.248 
A.t th~ pre~ent.tim~, ind~~try has no guarantee that it can obtain a rea-
sonably assured quantity of special nuclear material at prices which will 
: ..... . 
241•H.R. Rep. No. 571, Sst!i Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1957): "It is intended tha.t the pro-
visions of section 58 shall' apply ·to changes by the Commission to any presently es-
tablished fair price, gtiaranteed fair price period, or criteria for the waiver of charge 
period, as well as to the establishment of such matters in the future." 
· 242 Estep, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Private 
Atorruc Energy Activities," 52. Mich. L. Rev. 333 (1954); see "Report of Workshop 
III,'' Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 56-57: " ... [A]uthority for ade-
quate regulation of such industry exists under the several clauses of the Constitution, 
including, for example, the commerce power and the war power and established regu-
latory power's thereunder." 
24S 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 107. See 1958 Section 202 Hear-
ings, supra note 32 at 62, 67, and 127 (" ... the Government's price for fissionable 
material and associated proc~ssing operations is potentially one of the most significant 
factors that determine the course and speed of power reactor development."). 
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be set by supply and demand rather than by administrative or congres-
sional fiat, possibly based on political, not economic, considerations. zH 
The McKinney Panel has urged that Congress re-examine the policy 
of federal ownership of special nuclear material. In the meantime, prob-
lems created by such ownership confront the industry. 
Federal ownership does create some problems which may tend 
·to grow with the growth of a private atomic industry. The 
most critical of these is the role of the Federal Government in 
the pricing of special nuclear materials, hence its role in the 
economics of private licensed operations. . . . 
In most prospective near-term commercial atomic power reac-
tors, the "buy back" price could make or break the economies 
of the plant. By law, the Commission can only guarantee "buy 
back" prices for 7 years, while plants able to produce such ma-
terial must run for 25 to 40 years to amortize their costs. 
Thus, private investors have no way of forecasting when they 
may suddenly be thrown into a losing operation as a result of 
changes in future Commission-guaranteed prices. It is true 
that all licensees receive the same prices, but all licensees will 
not have the same types of plants and may have differing 
economic break-even points. 
During the period when there are relatively few atomic 
power-plants in operation, there are advantages to the prin-
ciple of Federal ownership [i. e., assured buyer of byproduct 
materials and stability of prices]. . . . 
As the number of atomic power-plants increases, a market for 
the byproduct plutonium or uranium 233 for use as reactor 
244 10 Code Fed. Regs. §so.6o(a); see Upton, supra note 2fY7 at 493-94: "How bind-
ing is this [Commission] allocation? The difficulty is that Section 161m of the act, 
which permits the Commission to make long-term agreements to sell source material, 
expressly denies similar authority for the distribution of special nuclear material. Thus, 
one could argue that the Commission's assurances would be meaningless and that the 
licensee would not have any legal remedy if the Commission failed to honor its assur-
ances." See also statement of AEC to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, 
supra note 7 at lfYl: "The Commission's prices [for enriched uranium] ... are not 
guaranteed, but ... it is the intention of the Commission to maintain the price 
schedule on as stable a basis as is possible. • . ." On the other hand, Section 56, 42 
U.S.C.A. §2fY76, authorizes Commission-guaranteed fair prices for special nuclear ma-
terial produced in private facilities for up to 7 years, which presumably have the bind-
ing force of a contract between the government and private parties acting in reliance 
upon the guarantee, provided Joint Committee approval of such guarantee has been 
given under Section 58, 42 U.S.C.A. §2fY78. Under Section 161m(2), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§2201(m) (2), the Commission may sell or lease source or byproduct material to Sec-
tion 103 or 104 licensees, subject to cancellation by the licensee; this section specifi-
cally excludes special nuclear material from the provisions thereof. Special nuclear 
material may be recaptured by the AEC during a war or national emergency declared 
by Congress (Section roB, 42 U.S.C. §2138). 
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fuel will undoubtedly develop, thus a degree of inherent 
market stabilization will come into existence. . . . When that 
time does arrive, the policy of Federal ownership should be 
re-examined. 245 
b. Use of Source and Byproduct Materials 
1255 
The transfer, receipt, delivery, or possession of source materials 246 
and byproduct materials 247 are subject to Commission licensing.248 Such 
materials may be sold, leased, or otherwise made available by the Com-
mission to its licensees 249 at reasonable charges and upon written cri-
teria established by the Commission,250 without, however, the necessity 
of obtaining Joint Committee approval as in the case of special nuclear 
material. 261 
Licenses for the transfer, delivery, or possession of source and by-
product material are issued pursuant to regulations which establish gen-
eral conditions with respect to the common defense and security, the 
preservation of health and safety, the furnishing of reports, and the 
keeping of records.252 Prior to May 1957, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission did not require immediate reporting of incidents involving 
possible radiation hazat:ds from the use of byproduct materials. This 
2u McKinney Panel Report, swpra note 10 at Vol. 1, p. 131; see also 13 and 134-
246 Defined as uranium, thorium, and their refined counterparts after removal from 
the place of deposit in nature (Section ux, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x), formerly Section 
us, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(s)). 
241 Defined as "any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded 
in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of produc-
ing or utilizing special nuclear material" (Section ne, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(e) ). 
us Section 62 (source material) and Section 81 (byproduct material), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§2092, 21 II. 
249 Section 161m(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(m)(2). 
250 Section 63c (source material) and Section 81 (byproduct material), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§2093(c), 2111. 
25t Section s8. 42 U.S.C.A. §2078. 
252 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.21-.22 and 40.30 (source material) and 30-ZJ-..24, 
30.31 (b)--32, and J0-41-43 (byproduct material). As of the end of 1957, the AEC 
had issued 1,200 licenses to use radioisotopes for industrial purposes to about I,f:J&! 
industrial organizations, AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 25 (1958). In ad-
dition, 7 commercial firms have received licenses to dispose of low-level radioactive 
byproduct and source material wastes (id. at 151). On March 8, 1958, the AEC for 
the first time gave notice of its intention to issue a byproduct and source material 
license to provide radioactive waste disposal service, 23 Fed. Reg. 1663, BNA, Atomic 
Industry Reporter 4: 88. As of March 1958, the AEC had denied 4 applications for 
licenses for source materials and 46 applications for licenses for byproduct materials, 
while 21 applications of the _latter type were withdrawn, 1958 Section 202 Hearings, 
supra note 32 at 91. 
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serious omission in the agency's regulations was corrected by amend-
ment to the rules 263 governing licensees of such materials as the result 
of an accident reported to the Commission more than a month after its 
occurrence. 2H For both source and byproduct material, the Commission 
has exempted certain types of uses from the requirements of a specific 
license and provided instead a general license iri such situations.255 
c. Operators 
Although its statutory authority with respect to operators' licenses is 
practically unfettered, 256 the Commission has exercised restraint in re-
stricting to the minimum . the classes of persons required to obtain 
licenses.257 Licenses for individual operators of utilization and produc-
tion facilities have been generally controlled by reasonable conditions of 
health and proficiency.258 
263 IO Code Fed. Regs. §20.403, 22 Fed. Reg. 3389 (May I4, I957). This regula-
tion requires that (I) each byproduct material licensee "immediately" notify the near-
est AEC Operations Office by telephone and telegraph "of any incident involving li-
censed material possessed by him and which may have caused or threatens to cause" 
serious exposure to individuals and the suspension of work in the facility involved· Jor 
one week or more; (2) each such licensee notify the AEC within 24 hours of any inci-
dent involving minor exposure to individuals and the suspension of work in the facility 
involved for less than one week; and (3) each such licensee submit to the AEC a writ-
ten report of any of the above types of incidents within 30 days thereafter. At the time 
these additions to the regulations affecting byproduct material licenses were issued, 
the Commission also added a regulation requiring such licensees to report "immedi-
ately" any theft or loss of licensed material, IO Code Fed. Regs. §20.402. 
25• This involved Byproduct Material License Nos. 3I-246-I and 3I-246-2 issued to 
M. W. Kellogg Company, infra note 454. The incident involving byproduct material 
occurred on March I3, I957, but was not reported to the Commission until April I9, 
I957, acording to the AEC General Manager (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 
265: 206). 
zu 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§40.23, 40.6o, and 40.62 (source material) and 30.20-.2I and 
30.7I-.72 (byproduct material). On June 27, I958, the AEC announced that depleted 
uranium (containing less than .007 percent by weight of uranium 235) would be sold 
by the Commission on an unclassified basis to domestic buyers for such goods as 
ceramics, glass products, coloring agents, and photographic supplies ; such sales and 
transfers of the material involved would continue to be subject to the Commission!s 
licensing procedures; AEC Press Rei. No. A-I 58. 
256 Section I07, 42 U.S.C.A. §2IJ7. 
257 For example, licensing is not required of persons who may manipulate controls 
but who do so in the presence and under the direction of a licensed operator. As. of 
the end of I957, only I48 operators' licenses had been issued, AEC, Twenty-third Semi-
Annual Report I95-I99 ( I958) ; see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 85I-857. 
As of March I958, only one application for an operator's license had been denied by the 
AEC ; I958 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at 91. 
268 ro Code Fed. Regs., Pt. 55, particularly §ss.r I. 
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d. Foreign Activity, Imports, and Exports 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established several categories of 
regulated activity concerning the export, import, or use abroad of atomic 
materials or of atomic information. These activities are controlled by 
the requirement of a license. 
Section 62 of the present legislation 259 requires a license for the 
import into, or export from, the United States of any source material. 
Section 82c contains a similar requirement with respect to byproduct 
material. 260 The export or import of special nuclear material by private 
individual is, of course, impossible under the 1954 act, since title to such 
material is vested in the United States government.261 
Persons under the jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited 
from directly or indirectly engaging "in the production of any special 
nuclear material outside of the United States" except in two circum-
stances. 262 In the first circumstance, such activity is authorized where 
carried on pursuant to an agreement for cooperation between the United 
States and a foreign country,263 which requires the approval of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Defense, the President, 
and the Joint Committee. 264 In the second circumstance, the activity may 
be authorized by the Commission if it determines that "such activity 
will not be inimical to the interest of the United States." As an imple-
mentation of this authority, licenses are required by the Commission 
for. private concerns and persons to engage in certain unclassified activi-
ties in foreign atomic energy programs, outside of the scope of agree-
ments for cooperation. 265 
2so 42 U.S.C.A. §2092. 
26o 42 U.S.C.A. §2n2(c); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §30.33. 
261 Section 52, 42 U.S.C.A. §2072. 
282 Section 57a(3), 42 U.S.C.A. §2077(a) (3). 
263 Section 123, 42 U.S.C.A. §2153; see also Section 144 42 U.S.C.A. §2164. 
264 Thirty-nine such agreements with 37 countries were in effect at the end of 1957. 
AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 195-199 (1958); ·see BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter 287 : 203. Once such an agreement is reached, the Commission issues an 
authorization letter to the private concern or individual to act under the agreement ; 
see AEC authorization letter to Westinghouse Electric Corporation dated April 2, 
1956, under an agreement with Belgium; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 287 : 401. 
265 10 Code Fed. Regs., Pt. no. Section 110.7(a) of the regulations states the de-
termination by the Commission that "any activity which . . . (I) Constitutes directly 
or indirectly engaging in the production of special nuclear material in any foreign 
country [other than countries or areas within the Soviet or Communist Chinese bloc] 
... ; and (2) Does not involve the communication of Restricted Data or other classi-
fied defense information; and (3) Is not in violation of other provisions of law ... 
will not be inimical to the interests of the United States and is authorized by the 
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The principal difficulty which arises in the international field derives 
from the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission is not the only 
federal regulatory body concerned with exports and imports. The Com-
mission is a member of the Advisory Committee on· Export Policy 
created by the Secretary of Commerce in 1950 268 to administer the 
Export Control Act of 1949.267 This Committee advises the Secretary 
of Commerce with respect to "export measures required from the stand-
point of national security, foreign policy, and short supply," which 
measures are administered under Department of Commerce regulations. 
Under this system, import certificates are required from the Depart-
ment for source materials or for facilities for the production or utiliza-
tion of special nuclear material. 268 Export licenses issued by the Depart-
ment of Commerce also are required for components of facilities for 
the production or utilization of special nuclear material,269 isotopes for 
which procurement authorization previously has been obtained from the 
Atomic Energy Commission, 270 unclassified technical data/11 and certain 
types of unpublished technical data. 272 Validated licenses are required 
for the export of certain metals such as beryllium and boron 278 to all 
foreign countries except Canada. 274 Special licensing restrictions apply 
to the exportation of certain materials to the Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist bloc. 216 
Although diffuse exercise of federal regulatory power by different 
agencies of the government is ordinarily objectionable, over-all control 
of exports and imports by the Department of Commerce appears justi-
fied in view of the aspects of foreign policy involved. The burden im-
posed on the private or business interest by having to deal with two 
Atomic Energy Commission." Prior to the promulgation of Part 110 in 21 Fed. Reg. 
418 (Jan. 20, I9S6); the Commission issued a notice of Commission policy identical 
with Section no.7(a) of the regulations, 20 Fed. Reg. 7399 (Oct. S, I9SS). 
266 Dep't of Commerce Order No. I2S (Oct. s, I9SO), as amended, 20 Fed. Reg. 
s269 (July 2I, I9Ss). 
287 so U.S.C.A. App. §§202I et seq. 
268 IS Code Fed. Regs. §§368.I(a)(3), (b)(I), and (e). 
269 IS Code Fed. Regs. §J70.4(d). 
21o IS Code Fed. Regs. §373-SS(b). 
211 Granted by general license, IS Code Fed. Regs. §38S.I-.2. 
272 Granted by special license, IS Code Fed. Regs. §38S·3· 
21a So-called "RO" commodities appearing on the Department of Commerce's "Posi-
tive List of Commodities," IS Code Fed. Regs. § 399.1, app. A. 
2Hrs Code Fed. Regs. §§37I.3(a)(I) and 399-I(f). 
27G So-called "R" commodities, such as naphthenates of metals, for which no license 
is required for export to countries outside this bloc, IS Code Fed. Regs. §§371.3(a) (2) 
and 399-I(f). 
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different agencies-that department and the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion-is, to a certain extent, outweighed by the need for centralized 
control of strategic exports and imports. 
e. Access Permits 
To make "available to private enterprise classified scientific and tech-
nical information relating to the civilian uses of atomic energy" under 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,276 the Atomic Energy Commission in 
1955 instituted its information access permit program. No such pro-
gram existed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, although that 
statute stated the policy, never implemented, that 
. . : the dissemination of scientific and technical information 
relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged 
so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism 
which is essential to scientific progress.277 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 sought to raise, consistent with na-
tional security, the paper curtain imposed by the earlier statute. Congress 
therefore laid down the policy for the Commission that 
The dissemination of scientific and technical information re-
lating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so 
as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticism 
which is essential to scientific and industrial progress and 
public understanding and to enlarge the fund of technical 
information. 278 
The dissemination of information under atomic energy legislation is 
complicated by the existence of a special category of information created 
under the 1946 statute, Restricted Data.279 Such information is defined 
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as 
... all data concerning ( 1) design, manufacture, or utiliza-
tion of atomic weapons; ( 2) the production of special nuclear 
276 AEC Statement to Joint Committee, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 
at 92; see AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 165-66 (1958). 
277 Section 10a(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §I2IO(a) (2) (I946); see, to the same effect, Sec-
tion I (b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §IBm (b)(2)(I946). 
278 Section I4I b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2I6I (b); see, to the same effect, Section 3b, 42 
U.S.C.A. §20I3(b), authorizing the Commission to engage in "a program for the dis-
semination of unclassified scientific and technical information and for the control, dis-
semination, and declassification of Restricted Data, subject to appropriate safeguards, 
so as to encourage scientific and industrial progress." Section I42, 42 U.S.C.A. §2I62, 
provides for classification and declassification procedures. Under Section 146b, 42 
U.S.C.A. §2I66(b), "[t]he Commission shall have no power to control or restrict the 
dissemination of information other than as granted by this or any other law." 
279 Section 10(b) (I), 42 U.S.C.A. §1810(b) (1) (1946). This definition does not 
substantially differ from that under the 1954 legislation. 
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material; or ( 3) the use of special nuclear material in the pro-
duction of energy .... 280 
Persons employed by private concerns in connection with Commission 
contracts or commercial or non-commercial licenses under Sections 103 
and 104 of the 1954 act must receive permission from the Commission, 
after investigati~n, to have access to Restri~ted Data.281 Since adminis~ 
tration of an atomic energy license or operation of an atomic energy 
reactor pursuant to license will in all cases require the use of such data, 
the access permit is an absolute necessity for the private concern 
involved. 282 
Access permits are issued by the Commission for periods of two years 
for three separate categories of Restricted Data. These are ( 1) an "L" 
clearance for Confidential Restricted Data, ( 2) a "Q" clearance for 
Secret or Top Secret Restricted Data in areas outside the controlled 
thermonuclear field, and (3) a special "Q" clearance for access to infor-
mation involving the controlled fusion process. For an "L" clearance, 
the applicant must demonstrate to the Commission that he has "poten-
tial use" for the information desired.288 For a "Q" clearance involving 
access to Secret or Top Secret Restricted Data not related to the con-
trolled thermonuclear field, the applicant must demonstrate to the agency 
a specific need for the information desired. 284 A "Q" clearance for access 
280 Section IIw, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(w) (formerly Section ur). 
2 81 Under Section 161i(1) of the 1954 Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §2201(i)(1), the Com-
mission· is authorized to issue regulations necessary "to protect Restricted Data re-
ceived by any person in conneetion with any activity authorized pursuant to this Act." 
Section 145a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2165(a), further provides that "[n]o arrangement shall be 
made under section 31, no contract shall be made or continued in effect under section 
41, and no license shall be issued under section 103 or 104, unless the person with whom 
such arrangement is made, the contractor or prospective contractor, or the prospective 
licensee agrees in writing not to permit any individual to have access to Restricted Data 
until the Civil Service Commission shall have made an investigation and report to the 
Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual, and the 
Commission shall have determined that permitting such person to have access to Re-
stricted Data will .not endanger the common defense and security." Similar clearance 
is required for Commission employees, Section 145b, 42 U.S.C.A. §z165(b). Investi-
gation procedures are covered by Sections 142e-e, 143, and 145c, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§216z(c)-(e), 2163, and 2165(c), and criminal penalties concerning misuse of Re-
stricted Data are prescribed in Sections 221 and 224-227, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2271 and 
2274-2277. Effective July 1, 1958, issuance of access permits became the authority of 
the AEC's field offices; AEC Press Rei. No. A-152 (June 23, 1958). 
282 See Green, "The Atomic Energy Information Access Permit Program," 25 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 548, 553 (1957). 
283 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§25.11(b)(7), 25.15(a), and 95.3(d). 
284 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§25.11(b)(7), 25.15(b)(x), and 95.3(g). 
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to Secret or Top Secret Restricted Data related to controlled thermo-
nuclear processes will not be granted unless the applicant is, among other 
things, "directly engaged in a substantial effort to develop, design, build 
or operate a fission power reactor that is planned for construction and 
is making or proposes to make a comparative evaluation of fission and 
controlled thermonuclear processes for production of power." 285 
Although an. access permit is probably a license within the meaning 
of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,286 the Atomic Energy 
Commission has refused to recognize that such a permit is protected by 
the licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However, 
the Commission has followed a liberal, rather than a restrictive, policy 
in issuing such permits, 287 and the denial of permits has not been up to 
the present time, in any event, a serious factor adversely affecting the 
atomic energy program.288 
The only major criticism of the access permit program has been made 
in connection with the application by Power Reactor Development Com-
pany for a construction permit. 289 In that proceeding counsel for cer-
tain intervenors moved the Commission to grant access, "without im-
position of any security requirements," to information relevant to the 
proceeding. The motion alleged that the information required by 
counsel had been "published" within the .meaning of Section 142a of 
the 1954 Act by its being "made available or offered by the Commission 
to many hundreds of persons· under the Commission's access permit 
program, and to many thousands of the employees of such persons." 
The motion concluded that (1), "[t]o the extent that the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 requires Intervenor's attorneys to submit to the 
security regulations of the Commission as a condition of access to any 
information essential and pertinent to the preparation and trial of this 
proceeding, the Act abr~dges freedom of speech and violates due process 
of law contrary to the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. 
. . . " ; and ( 2) due process of law and the Fifth Amendment would be 
285 10 Code Fed. Regs. §25.15(b} (2), as amended, 22 Fed. Reg. 6568 (Aug. 15, 
1957). 
286 Section 2(e), s U.S.C.A. §IOOI(e), made applicable to AEC functions by Sec-
tion 181 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231. 
287 At the end of 1957, 1.404 access permits were in force, involving 22,352 persons 
cleared for access to classified documents in 26 major categories of American industry; 
57 percent of the permits allowed access to secret and confidential Restricted Data, 
and the remainder to confidential Restricted Data alone. AEC, Twenty-third Semi-
Annual Report 138, 166 ( 1958). 
288 Green, supra note 282 at sss-ss6. 
2so AEC Dkt. No. F-16. 
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violated as to the intervenors "for the Commission to condition Inter-
venors' ability effectively to pursue their rights and privileges under law 
upon their attorneys' submission to the Commission's security require-
ments." The motion of intervenors was opposed by Commission counsel, 
and the Commission denied the motion March 5, 1957.290 The ir{ter-
venors claimed that Commission refusal to grant the motion constituted 
"denial of a fair hearing." 291 · 
f. Commercial and Non-Commercial Facilities 
The most important category of atomic energy licenses are those P-re-
scribed in Chapter 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This cate-
gory covers licenses for the construction and operation of facilities 
utilizing or producing special nuclear material either for medical therapy 
and research and development {a Section 104 292 "non-commercial" 
license) or for private industrial uses (a Section 103 298 "commercial" 
license) .. Even though Section 103 or Section 104 licenses are used 
for different purposes, both types of licenses were intended to be subject 
... to the same general conditions ... , namely, ownership 
and control in United States citizens, and operation to be con-
sonant with the common defense and security and with the 
health and safety of the public.m 
( 1 ) Construction Permits 
An integral part of the licensing system is the sa:-called construction 
pel'tnit provided for under Section 185 285 of the 1954 statute. A con-
struction permit is a form of intermediate licensing issued prior to the 
21io BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3: 12, 3: 85, and 246: 739-743· Considerations 
of public policy probably favor the Commission's making access to Restricted Data as 
easy as possible for intervenors' counsel within the requirements established by Con-
gress. However, the extreme position on the motion would, if sustained, have weak-
ened the entire Information security program ; see id. at 2 : 379. 
291 Post-Hearing Brief of Intervenors with Proposed Findings and Conclusions 
28-35. The intervenors conceded that -40 out of the 73 documents requested in the 
motion were declassified by the Commission without any deletions. The applicant in 
the proceeding argued to the Commission that the question raised by the intervenors 
was "utterly without merit" and claimed that "[n]o classified evidence has been offered 
by any party to this proceeding, and there has been no indication that any informa-
tion still classified is directly relevant to any issue in the proceeding'' (Reply Memo-
randum for Applicant 2-3 (Nov. 19, 1957) ). 
292 42 U.S.C.A. §2134 
293 42 U.S.C.A. §2133. 
294 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 20. 
295 42 U.S.C.A. §2235· 
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granting of a Section 103 or 104 license.296 This two-step procedure for 
licensing an atomic energy facility was based on that contained in the 
Federal Communications Act of 1952.297 The standards and conditions 
attached to a construction permit are generally the same as those for 
the license eventually desired by the permit applicant. 298 
As of June 30, 1958, the Commission had issued construction permits 
for five facilities 299 to conduct research and development activities for 
industrial or commercial purposes under Section 104b of the 1954 act.300 
By that time the agency also had issued construction permits for thirty-
two facilities 801 to conduct research and development activities for nu-
296 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.23. 
297 47 U.S.C.A. §§153(dd) and 3o8; see Hollis, "Atpmic Energy and Lawyers,'' 
24 D.C. Bar Assn. J. 76, 79 (1957). An. excellent. description of the negotiations and 
procedures whereby application is made to the Commission for a construction permit 
and its conversion to a license is to be found in the Joint Committee Staff Study, 
supra note 3 at 11-15 and App. 4 at Ioo-Io8; see also remarks of F. K. Pittman, 
Deputy Chief, AEC Division of Civilian Application, Dec. 12, 1955, BN A Atomic 
Industry Reporter 51: 105. In its Brief filed in the PRDC proceeding, AEC Dkt. 
No. F-16, the so-called "separated staff" of the Commission claimed that the "legisla-
tive history [of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954] indicates that the concept of a con-
struction permit was patterned in some measure on that contained in the Federal Com-
munications Act'' (p. 16). · 
29810 Code Fed. Regs. §§50.45 and ·50.55(c). 
299 Consolidated Edison Co., CPPR-1 (May 4. 1956); Commonwealth Edison Co., 
CPPR-2 (May 4, 1956); General Electric Co., CPPR-3 (May 14, 1956); Power 
Reactor Development Co. (PRDC), CPPR-4 (Aug. 4, 1956); and Yankee· Atomic 
Electric Company, CPPR-5 (Nov. 4, 1957). The PRDC permit has been the subject 
of a formal AEC hearing. 
·aoo Providing for facilities "involved in the conduct of research and development 
activities leading to the demonstration of the practical value of such facilities for in-
dustrial or commerdal.purposes." 
ao1 Research reactor construction permits: University of Michigan, CPRR-1 (Feb. 
17, 1955); Armour Research Foundation, CPRR-2 (Mar. 28, 1955); U.S. Naval Re-
search Laboratory, CPRR-3 (April 29. 1955) ; Battelle Memorial Institute, CPRR-4 
(Aug. 5, 1955); Massachusetts Institute of Technology, CPRR-5 (May 7, 1956); 
Aerojet-General Nucleonics, CPRR-6 (Aug. 16, 1956) ; AMF Atomics, Inc., CPRR-7 
(Jan. 22, 1957); Westinghouse Electric Corp., CPRR-8 (July 3, 1957); Aerojet-
General Nucleonics, CPRR-g (Feb. 22, 1957); North Carolina State College, CPRR-10 
(Mar. 7, 1957); Curtiss Wright Corp., CPRR-11 (June 20, 1957); Aerojet-General 
Nucleonics, CPRR-12 (July 8, 1957); Aerojet-General Corp. and Aerojet-General 
Nucleonics, CPRR-13 (July 8, 1957); North American Aviation Inc., CPRR-14 (Aug. 
2; 1957); University of Virginia, CPRR-15 (Sept. 13, 1957) ; Ordnance Materials 
Research Office, CPRR-16 (Oct. 2, 1957); Daystrom, Inc., CPRR-17 (Oct. n, 1957); 
Utlion Carbide Corp., CPRR-i8 (Oct. 31, 1957); General Electric Co., CPRR 19 (Oct. 
26, 1957); and American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., CPRR-20 (Oct. 31, 
1957). -
Critical experiment constr~tion permits: Babcock and Wilcox, CPCX-1 (Dec. 9, 
1955) and CPCX-9 (Oct. 2, 1957); Battelle Memorial Institute, CPCX-2 (Dec. 28, 
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clear processes and for the theory and production of atomic energy 
under Sections 31 802 and 104c 808 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.804 
Two problems are presented in connection with construction permits. 
The first, which has not yet arisen but which nevertheless deserves con-
sideration, concerns the conversion of a permit into a license upon con-
struction of a facility, in the absence of "good cause." 805 The phrase 
"good cause" as used in this context is not defined by the act or regula-
tions 806 and creates considerable uncertainty as to the right of a per-
mittee to receive a license. 307 
The second problem presented with respect to a construction permit 
arises under the regulation which authorizes the Commission to issue a 
provisional permit in cases where 
. . . an applicant is not in a position to supply initially all of 
the technical information otherwise required to complete the 
application. . . . If the Commission is satisfied that it has 
information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a 
facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and 
operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the 
19SS); Nuclear Development Corp. of America, CPGX-3 (June II, 19s6); General 
Electric Co., CPCX-4 (July s. 19S6); Lockheed Aircraft Corp., CPCX-s (Mar. IS, 
19S7); Martin Co., CPCX-6 (May IJ, I9S7); General Dynamics Corp., CPCX-7 
(June 18, 19S7); General Electric Co., CPCX-8 (Sept. 20, 19S7); Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., CPCX-10 (Oct. 17, 19S7) and CPCX-I2 (June 16, I9S8) ; and Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, CPCX-II (Jan. 22, I9S8). 
802 42 U.S.C.A. §20SI, providing for AEC research assistance. 
803 Providing for facilities "useful in the conduct of research and development activi-
ties of the types specified in Section 31 and which are not facilities of the type speci-
fied in subsection IQ4b.'' 
804 One application for a license for a research reactor was denied by the Commis-
sion prior to I9S8. On Dec. JI, I9S7, the Commission by notice advised that the appli-
cation of The Prosperity Company, Syracuse, N.Y. had been denied "with the con-
sent of the applicant and without prejudice to submittal of a new application." 22 Fed. 
Reg. uo88 (Dec. JI, 19S7); see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: I6. 
805 Section ISS, 42 U.S.C.A. §223s; see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §so.s6. 
8 06 "Good cause" for the purpose of extending the completion date of a permit is 
defined in the regulations as including "developmental problems attributable to the 
experimental nature of the facility or fire, flood, explosion, strike, sabotage, domestic 
violence, enemy action, an act of the elements, and other acts beyond the control of 
the permit holder." (Io Code Fed. Regs. §so.ss(b)). 
807 See Upton, supra note 207 at 492: " ... [A] permit does not mean very much 
under present circumstances. The unsolved technological problems are such that any 
permit must be stated in terms so general to be of questionable value as assuring the 
issuance of a subsequent facility license." It is the opinion of the Chairman of the AEC's 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards that "it is impossible to give a construc-
tion permit which can be guaranteed to be converted into an operating license in my 
view" ( I9S8 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at I20). 
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health and safety of the public and that the omitted informa-
tion will be supplied, it may process the application and issue a 
construction permit on a provisional basis without the omitted 
information subject to its later production and an evaluation 
by the Commission that the final design [of the facility] pro-
vides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the 
public will not be endangered. 808 
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The regulations also provide for certain "common standards" for both 
construction permits and licenses 309 and for the granting of a construc-
tion permit to an applicant for a license "if the application [for a con-
struction permit] is in conformity with and acceptable under the cri-
teria :· •. and standards" applicable to a license.310 
The issuance of a provisional construction permit to Power Reactor 
Development Co: (PRDC) 311 to build a fast-neutron breeder reactor at 
Monroe, Michigan, for the production of electrical energy developed the 
opposing points in view c~ricernirig the Commission's authority to issue 
such a· permit under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.312 The view 
308 IO Code. Fed. Regs. §50.35. 
809 u> Code I:ed. Regs. §5040. 
81o IO Code Fed. Regs. §50.45. 
811 CPPR-4 (Aug: 4, i956), 2I Fed. R~g. 5974 (Aug. 9, I956). The conversion of 
the construction permit into a license is subject to two general conditions, namely: 
(I) "Unless, within twelve months from the date of this construction permit, PRDC 
submits sufficient information relating to its financial resources to enable the Commis-
sion to make a finding that the Company has adequate financial resources to meet the 
requirements of the law and the regulations, this permit shall expire; provided that 
the Commission may for good cause shown extend the time for the submission of such 
data:"; and (2) "The conve~sion of this permit to a license is subject to submittal by 
PRDC to the Commission (by amendment of the application) of the complete, final 
Hazards' Summary Report (portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from 
time to time). The final Hazards· Summary Report must show that the final design 
provides reasonable assurance to the satisfaction of the Commission that the health 
and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation of the reactor in ac-
cordance with the specified prOcedures." (Ed. Note: On December IO, I958, the Com-
mission issued its Opinio~ and Initial Decision in the PRDC case and continued the 
proVisional construction permit in effect, subject to further conditions to establish com-
plete safety and financial qualifications.) 
812 See Petition for Intervention and Request for Formal Hearing, AEC Dkt. No. 
F-I6, filed Aug. 3I, I956, by three unions and their officials; BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter 2: 283 and 2: 294. The princiPal contentions were that (I) the Commission 
failed to make the requisite findings of "Reasonable Assurance" of safety required 
by Section I85 of the act and §50.35 of the regulations, particularly in View of a gen-
erally adverse report dated June 6, I956, by the Commission's Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safeguards (Petition, pp. 4-n); and (2) the Commission could not issue a 
permit conditional upon the satisfaction of "financial qualifications" at a later date (id. 
at II-I3). See a'tso statemt;nt of Rep. Cannon, I03 Cong. Rec. 5I¢-5I98 (I957); 
statements of W. P. Reuther, President, United Automobile Workers, AFL-CIO, 
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taken by the intervenors in that proceeding against the validity of the 
provisional construction permit issued to PRDC was that no section of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, including Section 185, 
. . . provides for the issuance of conditional or provisional 
construction permits. There is nothing in this section [ 185], 
nor in any other section of the Act, which indicates that there 
may be inconsistent criteria for the issuance of construction 
permits. 
It is true that Section 185 does enumerate, as one of the 
conditions for the issuance of an operating license, that the ap-
plicant file "any additional information needed to bring the 
original application up to date.". . . It was not contemplated 
that the kind of construction permit to be issued would depend 
on the amount of information filed with the application. In 
other words, Congress did not contemplate that the filing of 
additional information was one of the requirements that make 
the application acceptable to the Commission .... [A]ccepta-
bility must be determined at the beginning, when the construc-
tion permit is granted. . . . 
It seems quite clear that Sections 50.45 and 50.40 [ 10 Code 
Fed. Regs.] were based on this interpretation of the Act .... 
This means that there must be a present determination that the 
information supplied to the Commission gives reasonable as-
surance that the health and safety of the public will not be 
endangered by the construction and operation of the reactor. 818 
The view supporting the validity of a provisional construction per-
mit stresses the necessity for such a device under a broad interpretation 
B. C. Sigal, counsel, UAW, and Leo Goodman, staff member, UAW, 1957 Authoriz-
ing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 597-633; statement of A. J. Biemiller, Legis-
lative Director, AFL-00, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 440; state-
ments of Sen. Anderson and Rep. Holifield, Joint Committee Staff Study, st~Pra note 3, 
App. 7.B and C, at 125-127. The standing of intervenors to intervene in the proceed-
ings was questioned by PRDC, which stated, however, that it was willing to have the 
issues involved in the granting of the construction permit heard in a proper hearing 
( BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 307 (Sept. 26, 1956)). "Notice of Hearing, 
Order and Memorandum" were .issued by the Commission Oct. 8, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 
78o9 (Oct. 12, 1956) and Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 7.D. at 
128-132. After prehearing conferences held Oct. 29 and Nov. 29, 1956, the hearing 
commenced Jan. 8, 1957, with the introduction of testimony in narrative form by the 
applicant, PRDC. Witnesses were examined May I3, June 10, Aug. I, and Aug. 7, 
I957· Briefs were submitted by Nov. 29, I957, and the record was certified to the 
Commission without decision by the hearing examiner appointed in the case. Procedural 
and other issues presented in these proceedings are discussed where appropriate else-
where in this chapter. 
818 Reply Brief of Intervenors 9 (Nov. 19, I957). See, to the same effect and 
arguing that the legislative history of Section ISS supported this position, Post-Hear-
ing Brief of Intervenors, supra note 29I at 16-17. 
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of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Commission's regulations. 
In the light of Section 185, 
. . . the Commission was thus faced with the very practical 
problem of determining what showing is to be required at the 
construction permit stage, especially by applicants for licenses 
for developmental projects. The construction of a large power 
reactor and associated generating facilities necessarily takes 
approximately four or five years. Yet the entire history to 
date of the peaceful application of nuclear energy comprises a 
span of only a little over a decade, and at least for the next 
few years relatively brief periods undoubtedly will continue to 
witness vast accretions of knowledge in this field. The Com-
mission was therefore aware that if the basic policies of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 were to be effectuated, and if the 
United States is not to fall far behind in this rapidly moving 
field, the construction of developmental projects ... must 
not only be permitted but must be encouraged to be started 
without waiting for all of the technological problems associ-
ated with them to be definitively solved. 
Thus it was clear that if the Commission required appli-
cants for licenses to submit at the outset all of the technical 
information required ·to be included in the final Hazards Sum-
mary Report, it would effectively defeat the purposes of the 
Act by seriously delaying if not utterly eliminating most de-
velopmental projects, and particularly those which will lead to 
substantial technological advances.814 
Regardless of the issues involved in the PRDC proceeding, the pro-
visional construction permit represents one of the means whereby private 
industry can carry out its role in the atomic energy field in the present 
fluid state of the technology involved. An alternative to legislation and 
regulations which permit industry to construct reactors on the basis of 
sH Brief for Applicant 34-35 (Oct. 29, 1957). In its Brief filed with the Hearing 
Examiner in the PRDC proceeding, the so-called "separated staff" of the AEC, repre-
sonted by the Acting General Counsel of the Commission and two other AEC attor-
neys, argued (p. 21): "Thus, the legislative history of Section 185 reflects both the 
desire of industry for maximum assurance that conversion of a construction permit to 
a license will be semi-automatic, and the concern by at least some members of Con-
gress that once a construction permit is granted and substantial funds are expended, 
the pressures for conversion of the permit into a license may become overwhelming. 
Both considerations serve to emphasize the importance of the determinations made 
at the construction permit stage." PRDC took the position that "there is no legal, 
moral or other commitment of any sort to convert this [construction] permit into an 
operating license unless and until the full showing required by the law and the regu-
lations to be made at that time has been completed to the satisfaction of the Commis-
sion .... The only risk involved in going forward with this project ... is a financial 
om; and a financial one to PRDC alone .... " (Brief for Applicant 87). 
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continually expanding knowledge of science and engineering is, of 
course, a government monopoly of all such developmental work. 
( 2) Non-Commercial Licenses 
Non-commercial licenses issuable under Section 104 of the 1954 act 
are used for medical therapy,815 research and development for indus-
trial or commercial purposes, 316 and research ·and development of a 
theoretical and purely scientifi~ nature. 817 Through the end of June 1958, 
forty-two licenses had been issued, and one proposed, for reactors in 
the last-named category.318 
Standards and conditions applicable to non-comm'ercial licenses relate 
primarily to considerations of health and safetyand the value of the 
research involved. 819 The principal adrtiinistrative problem with respect 
to non~commercial licenses arises not so. much Ul).<f.e.r these r~gulations 
815 Section 104a and d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(a) and (d); see 10 Code FCQ.. Regs. 
§§50.21 (a) and 5041 (a) and (b) .. 
816 Section 104b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(b); see 10 Code !'"~d. Regs. §§.So.zi(b) and 
50.41 (c). 
317 Section 104c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(c); see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.21 (c). 
818 North Carolina State College of Agriculture, R-1 (Oct. i, 1955) ·; Pennsylvania 
State University, R-2 (July 8, 1955); Armour Research Foundation, R-3 (June 12, 
1956) ; Battelle Memorial Institute, R-4 (Aug. 10, 1956) ; Naval Research Labora-
tory, R-s (Sept. 14, 1956); Aeroiet-Ge11eral Nucleonics, R-6 (Oct. 19; 1956), R-7 
(Feb. 23, 1957), R-9 (Mar. 14. 1957), R-10 CMar. 29. 1957), R-13 (July II,<1957), 
R-14 (July 11, 1957), R-17 (Aug. I, 1957), R-20 (Aug. 23, 1957), R-21 (Aug. 23, 
1957), R-29 (Sept. 20, 1957), R-32 (Oct. 28, 1957), R-34 (Jan, 22, 1958), R-35 (Feb. 
12,1958), R-39 (May 16, 1958), and R-42 (June 3, 1958); Aerojet-General Corp., R~8 
(Mar. 12, 1957), R-12 (June 19, 1957), R-15 (July 16, 1957), R-·16 (July 16, 1957), 
R-18 (Aug. 6, 1957); U.S. Naval Post-graduate School, R-11 (April29, 1957); North 
American Aviation, Inc., R-19 (Aug. 2, 1957), R-40 (May 17, 1958); Oklahoma ·State 
University of Agriculture, R-22 (Aug. 26, 1957); Texas Agricultural and Mech;mi-
cal College System, R-23 (Aug. 26, 1957); University of Akron, R-24 (Sept. 5, 
1957); University of Utah, R-25 (Sept. 12, 1957); Colorado State University, R-26 
(Sept. 12, 1957); U.S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Md., R-27 (Sept. 13, 1957); Uni-
versity of Michigan, R-28 (Sept. 13, 1957) ; University of California, R-30 (Nov. 19; 
1957) ; Catholic University, R-31 (Nov. 15, 1957) ; General Electric Co., R-33 (Oct. 
21, 1957); Curtiss Wright Corp., R-36 (April 29, 1958); Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, R-37 (June 9, 1958); General Dynamics Corp., R-38 (May 3, 1958); 
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., R-41 (May 21, 1958); and Uni-
versity of Delaware, proposed. As of June 30, 1958, the AEC also had issued 11 criti-
cal experiment licenses, as follows: Babcock & Wilcox Co., CX-1 (Mar 20, 1957) 
and CX-10 (Jan. 22, 1958) : General Electric Co., CX-2 (July 29, 1957). CX-4 (Aug. 
30, 1957), and CX-5 (Oct. 16, 1957); General Dynamics Corp., CX-3 (June 26, 1958); 
Westinghouse Electric Co., CX-6 (Nov. 25, 1957) and CX-11 (June 17, 1958): Mar· 
tin Co .. CX-7 !June 1.1. •QS8); Nuclear Development Corp .. CX-8 <Jan. 2'.1, 19581. 
and Batte1lt> Memorial Lnstitute, CX-Q (Jan. 16, 1958) 
aoo F..g ''' ( ·odt> Ft>d Regs §§50.34 and 50.41. 
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as under another statutory requirement which must be met before a 
reactor, developed under Section 104b and shown to have the necessary 
safety and operational features, 320 can be licensed for commercial use 
under Section 103. 
Under Section 102 321 of the act, whenever the Commission has made 
"a finding in writing that any type of utilization or production facility 
has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value" under Section 
104, a Section 103 license therefor may be issued upon appropriate ap-
plication.322 "Practical value" appears to embrace both technical and eco-
nomic considerations, and up to the end of 1958 the Commission never 
had issued such a finding. This probably is due in part to the economic 
uncertainties in private atomic enterprise at this beginning stage of 
development and also to the failure of the statute and regulations to 
permit a private citizen to request, and provide the evidentiary basis for, 
a determination of "practical value" and to set forth the standards for 
such a finding. 323 Indeed, until these deficiencies in Section 102 are 
corrected, the section can be used as "a barrier of Commission discre-
tionary authority" to the issuance of Section 103 licenses.m 
Further, a problem arises in connection with the transition from a 
"developmental" to a practically useful stage of reactor development. 
The private operator has no statutory assurance that his Section 104b 
license will be permitted to remain in effect for its prescribed term after 
the Section 103 license is issued, thus protecting the investment and 
research of the licensee. 325 It is true that the Commission has adopted a 
. 32.o A Section 1041> license is essentially a "demonstration" license; Upton, supra 
note 2CY7 at 490· 
. 32142 U.S.C.A. §2132 . 
. 322 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 19: "This finding [under Section 102] sepa-
~ates the issuance of research and development licenses for any facility under Section 
104b, and the issuance of conunercial licenses under Section 103 .... " 
823. The McKinney Panel has reconunended that the statute be amended to permit 
private citizens to initiate a proceeding for a finding of "practical value" and to limit 
the definition thereof to "technical considerations" (Report, supra note 10 at 13). 
The Panel further stated (id. at 132-133) : "The Conunission's interpretation of sec-
tion 102 ••• particularly strains our concepts of private enterprise. As yet undefined 
tests of economic feasibility are to be applied by the Commission in arriving at such 
findings. While the Federal Government does frequently require applicants for other 
licensed activities to prove economic feasibility of proposed activities, this is the first 
time, so flj.I" as can be determined, that the Federal Government has set itself up to 
decide on its own initiative when private licensees can profitably embark on regulated 
activities, denying private investors the right to proceed before that time. . . ." 
824 Jd. at IJ2. 
s25 See Upton, supra note 2rY; at 490. 
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rule that seemingly covers the situation,826 but a rule can always be 
changed. 
( 3) Commercial Licenses 
Although the Commission has sought to develop 827 some semblance of 
regulatory order out of the hodgepodge of provisions contained in Sec-
tion 103 and related sections, particularly Section 105,828 the result does 
not inspire confidence that the regulatory authority can maintain a 
proper balance between the public and private interests involved. 829 
Under Section 7 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,880 the licensing 
of atomic power for commercial use was made practically impossible 
by statutory strictures. Under the procedure therein provided, the Com-
mission was required to report to the President and through him to 
Congress that industrial, commercial, or non-military use of atomic 
energy had been developed to a point where such use was practicable. 
No license for such use could be issued by the Commission until the 
report had been submitted to Congress while in session and ninety days 
had elapsed after such submission.881 
Due to the strictures of Section 7 and the prevailing governmental 
sentiment prior to 1954 towards the development of atomic energy for 
peaceful uses, Section 7 was never utilized. Moreover, much of the 
restrictive philosophy of the section has crept into Section 103 of the 
present act. Indeed, it is the conflict between these restrictions and the 
826 Effective November 30, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 9354, a new §50.24 was added to the 
licensing regulations, which provided that "[t]he making of a finding of practical 
value pursuant to section 102 of the act will not be regarded by the Commission as 
grounds for requiring: (a) The conversion to a Oass 103 license of any Class 104 
license prior to the date of expiration contained in the license; or (b) The conver-
si(;m to a Class 103 license of any construction permit, issued under section 104 of the 
act, prior to the date designated in the permit for expiration of the license." Imple-
menting a policy adopted more than a year previously by the Commission, the regu-
lation "may serve to set at rest, at least for the time being, one possible uncertainty 
facing those companies engaged in proving out power reactor concepts through con-
struction of full-scale prototypes" ( BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 389). 
827 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. so. 
a2s 42 U.S.C.A. §2135 ("Antitrust Provisions"). 
329 McKinney Panel Report, supra note 10 at 13: "Despite recognition of the fact 
that there is no evidence of anyone now being injured by the licensing provisions of 
sections 103 and 104, the principles involved in these sections ... conflict with the 
principles of private enterprise which the 1954 act has been represented as advanc-
ing." See also 132-134. 
sso 42 U.S.C. §1&>7 (1946). 
S31 For a favorable view of Section 7, see H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 107-
roS. For a criticism thereof, see ABA Committee Report, supra note 177, at 15-21. 
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underlying philosophy of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to encourage 
investment of private capital in atomic energy facilities which creates 
the problem for industry. In this connection it is significant that Sec-
tion 104 of the present act specifically states that licenses issued there-
under should be "subject to the minimum amount of regulation" con-
sistent with the regulatory duties of the Commission.832 No such policy 
statement is contained in Section 103, although the inference to be 
drawn from its absence is far from clear.388 
(a) Section 182 Restrictions 
Restrictions imposed upon Section 103 licensees concern notice re-
quirements, priorities, the right of the Commission to require informa-
tion, and antitrust provisions. Under Section 182c of the present stat-
ute, 834 notice prior to the issuance of such a license is required to be 
given to "such regulatory agency as may have jurisdiction over the 
rates and services of the proposed activity, to municipalities, private 
utilities, public bodies, and cooperatives within transmission distance 
and which are authorized to engage in the distribution of electric 
energy." 833 The effective date of the license is further delayed by a 
requirement of notice for four consecutive weeks in the Federal Reg-
ister, followed by another period of four weeks before the license be-
comes effective. 
332 Section 104a, b, and c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2134(a), (b), and (c). 
333 The applicant PRDC in AEC Dkt. F-16 argued that "Section 104.b enjoins the 
Commission not to impose in the way of developmental projects any administrative 
road blocks that are not absolutely essential from the standpoint of security and safety, 
and it requires that priority be given to those activities most likely to lead to 'major 
advances' in the industrial application of nuclear energy" (Brief for Applicant, supra 
note 314 at 34). The policy of the section was urged in support of the PRDC posi-
tion that, .in order to qualify for a provisional construction permit, the applicant need 
only establish "a reasonable probability under all the circumstances that ... the pro-
posed [PRDC] reactor ... can in due course be proved safe for operation at the pro-
posed site" (id. at 36) and "is reasonably assured under all the circumstances of 
obtaining the financial resources that it will probably need,'' taking into consideration 
"the determination of its [PRDC's] member companies to see the project through" 
(id. at 16 and 12). The contrary view, advanced by the intervenors in that proceeding, 
was that, notwithstanding Section 104b, "nothing takes priority over the twin ele-
ments of. (1) common defense and security and (2) health and safety of the public. 
The encouragement of private participation in the atomic energy industry is a means 
to these ends, not a qualification of them" (Reply Brief of Intervenors, supra note 313 
at 3). 
a34 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(c). 
885 See 10 Code Fed. Regs. §so.43(a). The Joint Committee Staff Study, supra 
note 3 at 69-70, outlines bri~fly the legislative history of Section 182. 
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Licensing of activities involving interstate as well as intrastate com-
merce by joint action of a federal and state regulatory body is not an 
uncommon practice under administrative law.336 The provisions of Sec-
tion 182c go further, however, and can only be regarded as a means of 
prolonging for a period of eight weeks the licensing of an otherwise 
qualified private commercial facility. During that period application 
can be made to a court to enjoin the license, or Congress, if in session, 
can take action by legislation to reverse the performance of Executive 
Department functions. 881 However, other than the delay involved, this 
particular restriction raises no insuperable problems for private industry. 
Section 182d of the present act also establishes a system of priorities 
to be given to license applicants. That section provides : 
The Commission, in issuing any license for a utilization or 
production facility for the generation of commercial power 
under section 103, shall give preferred consideration to appli-
cations for such facilities which will be located in high cost 
power areas in the United States if there are conflicting appli-
cations for a limited opportunity for such license. Where such 
conflicting applications resulting from limited opportunity for 
. such license include those submitted by public or coopera-
tive bodies such applications shall be given preferred 
consideration. 888 
As summarized by the Commission in its regulations, such priorities 
among "conflicting applications for a limited opportunity for such 
license" are as follows : 
1. Applications submitted by public or cooperative bodies 
for facilities to be located in high cost power areas in the 
United States. 
2. Applications submitted by others for facilities to be lo-
cated within such high cost power areas in the United States. 
3· Applications submitted by public or cooperative bodies 
for facilities to be located in other high cost power areas. 
4· All other applications. 339 
8ils See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Commission use of "joint boards" composed of 
representatives of the agency and state regulatory bodies, 49 U.S.C.A. §305. 
837 Representatives Holifield and Price have charged that these notice requirements 
lack "specific recognition of those interests whose rights may be affected by Commis-
sion action or whose participation may be in the public interest," H.R. Rep. No. 2r8r, 
supra note 5 at 122. 
33s 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(c). 
339 ro Code Fed. Regs. § 50.43 (b). 
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Section 182d raises several questions which are not satisfactorily 
answered by its legislative history.340 The term "limited opportunity" 
is susceptible of varying interpretations, although a reasonable mean-
ing would seem to be "limited availability of special nuclear material." 341 
Moreover, what constitutes a "high cost power area" is an exceedingly 
difficult question to answer because of very slight differences in the cost 
of generating electricity from conventional sources among several areas 
within the United States.842 
Both the Commission indirectly, and the Joint Committee directly, 
have implemented the preference provisions of the 1954 statute with 
respect to cooperatively and public-owned utilities. The Commission's 
second round invitation in September 1955, under the civilian power 
reactor program encouraged application by seven utilities of the pre-
ferred publicly or cooperatively owned type to develop, design, construct, 
and operate nuclear power plants with generating capacities of between 
5,000 and 40,000 kilowatts.348 
However, the limitations on funds available to such groups of utili-
ties have tended to prevent their full-scale participation in the civilian 
atomic energy program.8u Although recognizing that this preferred 
840 See H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 28: " ... [W]here all other condi-
tions are equal and there are conflicting applications for a limited opportunity for a 
license, the Commission is required to give preferred consideration to facilities which 
will be located in high-cost power areas." See Joint Committee Staff Study, n1Pra 
note 3 at 69-70. 
BU·Upton, supra note 2CYJ at 491. 
842 See Atomic Energy Facts 78 (GPO 1957); Rep. Cole has characterized Section 
185c as "this fear and apprehension [in private industry] which I call a roadblock" 
(1957 Section 202 Hearings, n1pra note 7 at 6g). After agreeing with Sen. Pastore 
(Dem., R.I.) that New England "certainly is a high cost area," Mr. E. L. Lindseth, 
Vice Chairman, Committee on Atomic Power, Edison Electric Institute, told the Joint 
Committee in the 1957 Section 202 Hearings, id. at 268-26g: "Our industry takes no 
exception to that portion of the act which relates to preference in favor of high cost 
fuel areas .... " 
843 See AEC Twenty-fourth Semi-Annual Report 335 (1958); four of those have 
been accepted as bases for negotiation of contracts, statement of AEC, 1957 Section 
202 Hearings, supra note 7 at II7-II8. These four proposals "are all entitled to prefer-
ence under the Atomic Energy Act" (Statement of AEC Division of Reactor De-
velopment Director, 1957 Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 186). 
One public body, Consumers Public Power District, of Columbus, Nebraska, has ap-
plied for a contract under the first round invitation, Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 
at ro-n. 
844 Cole, supra note 6 at 4&>: " .•. [A]ll three invitations for proposals under the 
demonstration program have emphasized the specific types of available government 
assistance and have stressed that the Conunission's obligations would be limited or 
'closed end.' There is one dilemma which is posed by the Commission's desire to 
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class of utilities showed no "particular competence or experience" with 
respect to atomic reactors, the Joint Committee in 1957 recommended, 
and Congress enacted, legislation which specifically directed the Com-
mission to give such utilities a highly preferred position under the 
civilian power reactor program, 84~ with advantages not available to pri-
vately owned utilities.846 
(b) Section 105 Restrictions 
Another type of restriction imposed on Section 103 licenses is created 
by Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 coqcerning antitrust 
problems.847 Previously, under Section 7(c) of the 1946 act: 
Where activities under any license might serve to maintain 
or to foster the growth of monopoly, restraint of trade, unlaw-
ful competition, or other trade position inimical to the entry 
of new, freely competitive enterprises in the field, the Com-
mission is authorized and directed to refuse to issue such 
license or to establish such conditions to prevent these results 
as the Commission, in consultation with the Attorney General, 
may determine. The Commission shall report promptly to the 
Attorney General any information it may have with respect to 
any utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy which 
appears to have these res~lts. . . . us 
. Under the present legislation, the restrictions imposed under the 1946 
legislation have been broadened by new statutory provisions which were 
"in large part, the product of compromise." 849 
The antitrust provisions of the 1954 act have three principal effects 
upon the regulated atomic energy industry. Each of these is presumably 
based on the intended policy of strengthening "free competition in pri-
vate enterprise." 850 
limit commitments and this is a result of a preference clause contained in the Atomic 
Energy Act of I954· ·The very limited funds generally available to such 'preference' 
groups . . . for assumption of technological risk make it difficult, in a practical sense, 
for these groups to assume responsibility for excessive costs. Thus difficulty is en-
countered in making contractual arrangements containing strong incentives for cost-
reduction except as these groups may be able to make favorable arrangements with 
reactor manufacturers." 
84~ Sen. Rep. No. 79I, supra note 23 at I6. 
846 These preferred contractual arrangements were contained in Section II I (a) (I) 
of Pub. L. 85- I62, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (I 957), and are discussed in detail, infra. 
847 42 U.S.C.A. §2I35. . 
348 42 U.S.C. §I8o7(c) (I946): 
849 Attorney General Brownell, I957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 63I-635. 
sso Section Ib, 42 U.S.C.A. §2011 (b) ; see Jacobs and Melchoir, "Antitrust Aspects 
of the Atomic Energy Industry," 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 508 (I957). The authors 
were listed as members of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice. 
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The first, and most important, is the mandate that no provision of the 
act "shall relieve any person from the operation" of the antitrust laws.351 
These laws may well be applied not only to actual violations thereof, but 
also, and of more practical significance to the industry, to "incipient 
practices which could ultimately lead to Sherman Act violations." 352 
Moreover, in the event a license is found by a court of competent juris-
diction to have violated any provision of the federal antitrust laws, then 
the Commission "may suspend, revoke or take such other action as it 
may deem necessary with respect to any license issued by the Commis-
sion under the provisions of this Act." 858 
As under the 1946 act, Section 105b of the 1954 act requires the 
Commission to report to the Attorney General any information coming 
to its attention with respect to license activity "which appears to violate 
or to tend toward the violation of any of the [antitrust] ... Acts, or 
to restrict free competition in private enterprise." 854 Further, under 
851 Further designated in the Atomic Energy Act as the Sherman Act of I89o, IS 
U.S.C.A. §§I-7; the Wilson Tariff Act of IB94, IS U.S.C.A. §§8-11; the Clayton Act 
of I9I4. IS U.S.C.A. §§I2-27; and the Federal Trade Commission Act of I9I4. IS 
U.S.C.A. §§4I-46 and §§47-sB. 
852 Jacobs and Melchoir, supra note 3SO at sog; see Brownell, I9S7 Section 202 
Hearings, supra note 7 at 63I: " ... In this evolving [atomic energy] industry, we 
[the Federal Government] attempt preventive measures to foster competition, rather 
than remedial litigation to undo the effect of anticompetitive action already taken." 
Critics of the current AEC program have emphasized the alleged danger from in-
cipient violations of the antitrust laws. Rep. Cannon, IOJ Cong. Rec. SI97-Sig8 (I957} 
has referred to "serious antitrust implications" in the PRDC project because it was 
being undertaken by "two separate combinations of companies." Some witnesses in 
the Joint Committee I9S7 Section 202 Hearings charged that the I954 act was being 
administered in such a fashion as to effect "monopolization of the atomic energy field" 
by major power companies, which were accused of engaging in "a form of legalized col-
lusion" to violate the antitrust laws, sr~pra note 7 at 452-4s6; see, to the same effect, 
id. at 28s-28g and 46o-462. 
858 Jacobs and Melchior, srtpra note 3SO at SII-I2: "Should the Federal Trade Com-
mission find a violation of section s of its act and the respondent not seek court re-
view, the [Atomic Energy] Commission could not under this section [105a of the 
Atomic Energy Act] cite the finding as a basis for suspension, as this would not 
constitute a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction .... Thus, considerable im-
portance attaches to what might be an accident of procedure, i.e., whether an action 
for violation of one of the antitrust laws is brought in the first instance by the Depart-
ment of Justice or by the Federal Trade Commission." The opposite position would 
be that Congress intended an atomic energy licensee to have its alleged violation of 
the antitrust laws adjudicated in a federal court, either at the District Court level in 
an original proceeding or at the Court of Appeals level on review of a Federal Trade 
Commission order, rather than have the atomic energy license jeopardized by merely 
an administrative determination. 
854 Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 3SO at SI2: "The obligation will require the 
application of a degree of antitrust expertise at an early stage, to make possible the 
detection of anti-competitive practices in their incipience." 
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Section IOSC, when the Commission proposes to issue a Section 103 
license, the Attorney General must be notified, and he must give an 
opinion within 90 days, to be published in the Federal Register, "whether 
insofar as he can determine, the proposed license would tend to create 
or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws." This sec-
tion empowers the Attorney General to request, and the Commission to 
furnish or "cause to be furnished, such information as the Attorney 
General determines to be appropriate or necessary to enable him to give 
the advice called for by this section." It should be noted that Sec-
tion IOSc has application only to proposed Section 103 commercial 
licenses. It does not apply to construction permits for either Section 103 
or 104 licenses, nor does it reach to Section 104 licenses, a fact which 
has occasioned some controversy. 355 
Indeed; Section 105 was one of the most controversial portions of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The theory underlying the section is de-
rived from certain other adm~nistrative powers and duties delegated by 
Congress with respect to government ownership, regulation, or disposal 
of war industries and materials. 856 As originally proposed in Congress, 
this section would have permitted a licensee to purge itself of any viola-
tion of the antitrust laws in connection with any atomic energy activity, 
before the Atomic Energy Commission could take any action with re-
spect to the license.m The legislation reported out by the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy would have provided "for hearings [before 
355 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7, at 285, 288-289, 292; Jacobs and Mel-
chior, supra note 3SO at SI3-5I4; Rep. Cannon, I03 Cong. Rec. SI98 ( I9S7). 
356 Section 20 of the Surplus Property Act of I944, reenacted as Section 207 of the 
Federal Property and Administrative Service Act of I949, 40 U.S.C.A. §488 (when-
ever an executive agency begins negotiations for the disposition of plant or property 
which cost the United States at least $I million or of patents, processes, and inven-
tions, the Attorney General must advise within 6o days whether "the proposed dis-
position tend to create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws") ; 
Section 708 of Defense Production Act of I950, so U.S.C.A. App. §2IS8 (requiring 
submission of "voluntary agreements and programs" within an industry to the 
Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission, publication thereof in the Federal 
Register, and formal approval thereof by the Attorney General before the President 
can put any such agreement or program into effect) ; Rubber Producing Facilities Dis-
posal Act of I9S3, so U.S.C.A. App. §I94Ia (before submission of proposed disposal of 
rubber plant to Congress, Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission must 
obtain, but need not follow, advice of Attorney General with respect to antitrust prob-
lems in connection with such disposal). See Austern, "Memorandum of Collateral 
Antitrust Enforcement," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 2IS at I6S-I66; Jacobs 
and Melchoir, supra note 3SO at SIS-SI6. 
an Austern, "Legislative History of Sections IOS and ISS of the Atomic Energy Act 
of I9S4," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 2IS at ISS· 
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the Federal Trade Commission] and judicial review in case there is any 
claim by the Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission that a 
proposed license of any production or utilization facility would violate 
the antitrust laws." 358 A Senate amendment to the bill passed by the 
House, which was rejected by the conference committee, would have 
. . . required that the Commission follow the advice of the 
Attorney General unless the President made a finding that the 
issuance of such a license was essential to the common defense 
and security and the finding was published in the Federal 
Register. This amendment in effect made the advice of the 
Attorney General a decision binding upon the Commission 
and the applicant without hearing. . . . 859 
As finally enacted, Section 105 does not require the denial of a license 
because of a possible antitrust violation as was the case under the 1946 
statute. The Commission merely takes "due account" of the Attorney 
General's opinion.860 It would, however, take a foolhardy Commission 
to disregard the Attorney General's opinion.861 
Thus, the atomic energy industry faces the possibility of adverse 
decisions based upon administrative interpretation and the application 
of the antitrust laws without an opportunity for administrative hearing 
or judicial review.862 However, it is to be hoped that the Commission, 
8~8 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 20. 
8~9 H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954). The amendment rejected was 
proposed by Sen. Humphrey (Dem., Minn.), see Adams, supra note 222, 55 Col. L. Rev. 
169-170. 
880 10 Code Fed. Regs. §5042(b); see also §50.54(g); Austern, supra note 339 at 
165. Concerning this provision, Attorney General Brownell has stated, 1957 Section 
202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 633 : "This provision, patterned after earlier surplus of 
property disposal laws, makes available to the [Atomic Energy] Commission analysis 
of any special anticompetitive considerations presented. Antitrust advice, however, 
need not be controlling. For the Commission must also weigh the necessities of de-
fense and security and public health and safety. Nonetheless such a procedure provides 
an effective means to insure that knowledge of possible antitrust difficulties required 
to foster competition." 
881 See Adams, supra note 239 at 170. It is possible that, where the Attorney Gen-
eral either gives adverse or favorable advice concerning a Section 103 license appli-
cation to the Commission, he would not be precluded from. proceeding by ·appr~priate 
antitrust proceedings against the licensee for future violations of these laws or for viola-
tions unknown and undisclosed to the government at the time the application was 
processed. See Attorney General Brownell, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7, 
at 633; Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 350 at 517-518. Probably the Attorney Gen-
eral's position would not be binding upon a private party seeking treble damages or 
other relief under the antitrust laws. 
862 Under the Humphrey amendment, supra note 359. the Attorney General was both 
"a judge and jury," "not an appropriate role for the prosecuting attorney to play" 
(Sen. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa), 100 Cong. Rec. 14344 (Aug. 13, 1954)). 
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if so requested by an applicant for a license which initially is denied as 
a result of Section 105, would make the antitrust question an issue at 
the formal hearing provided by statute and regulation.363 
Section 105, as enacted by Congress and implemented by Commission 
regulation, represents a probable deterrent to private participation in 
the atomic energy field. Section 105a providing that no official action 
under the Atomic Energy Act shall prevent appropriate action by the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission under the anti-
trust laws merely states existing law for "normal application of antitrust 
to the civilian atomic industry." 864 These provisions are unobjectionable, 
even if unnecessary. The only basic objection to Section 105a lies in 
the unlimited discretion granted the Atomic Energy Commission in the 
event a licensee is found by a court to have violated an antitrust act, 
clearly a matter which should be left exclusively in the jurisdiction of 
the court, 865 without permitting extra punitive action by an administra-
tive body.366 
The language of Section 105b and c, especially with respect to the 
grounds on which the Attorney General may render an adverse advisory 
opinion or the Commission may refuse a license, go far beyond ordinary 
concepts of antitrust law developed heretofore by statutes, the courts, 
and administrative agencies.367 A final source of possible administrative 
overreaching under Section 105 lies in the requirement, under Sec-
tion 161p of the act, that licensees furnish information and reports, 
and permit inspections, "as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes 
8 68 Section 18ga, 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(a). 
364 Attorney General Brownell, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 632. 
3 65 See Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 61. 
8 66 "Those who engage in activity in this [atomic energy] field in violation of the 
antitrust laws should get no better and no worse treatment, be subjected to the same 
sanctions, imposed by the same administrative and judicial tribunals, and prosecuted 
by the same enforcement agencies, as are those who engage in any other business sub-
ject to the antitrust laws" ("Report of Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, 
supra note- 215 at 58). 
367 See "Report of Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 
58; Austern, supra note 3S7, at ISS; Austern, supra note 356 at 167-168: "In Section 
lOSe of the Atomic Energy Act, the Attorney General is to decide whether a proposed 
license would tend to create or maintain 'a situation inconsistent with the antitrust 
laws.' This language does not confine the Attorney General's interest in the matter to 
any particular area of the company's business. On occasion the Attorney General is 
bound to be influenced by the existence of litigation which he is conducting against a 
proposed licensee, even if the litigation does not directly involve atomic energy at all. 
" For a similar criticism of the standards in Section 7(c) of the 1946 Act, see 
ABA Committee Report, supra note 177 at 20. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS 1279 
of the Act, including Section IDS of the Act." 868 This statutory pro-
vision, as implemented by regulation,869 in effect constitutes an unlimited 
hunting license for the federal government to police the atomic energy 
industry without any of the traditional safeguards afforded other 
branches of industry subject to the antitrust laws. 
The provisions of Section IDS as enacted have been characterized as 
" 'passing the buck' on monopoly prevention" and as locking "the barn 
after the horse is stolen." 370 The power given the Atomic Energy Com-
mission under the 1946 act to decide antitrust questions has been sup-
ported and justified on the basis of the argument that eight Federal 
agencies,371 other than the Federal Trade Commission, have the same 
authority in the fields regulated by them.372 What has been termed the 
"collateral enforcement" of the antitrust laws is, however, subject to 
serious objection because of diffusion of responsibility 373 and possible 
inefficient administration. 874 
However, in enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 19S4, Congress has 
avoided adding to the conflicting interpretation and sometimes over-
lapping jurisdiction in the antitrust field by excluding the Atomic 
36s 42 U.S.C.A. §2201 (p). 
369 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§50.70 (inspections) and 50.71 (records and reports). These 
requirements present real problems for the licensee who conceivably could withhold no 
operating information from the Commission, and the Commission apparently is under 
no affirmative obligation to refrain from publishing what might ordinarily be a busi-
ness secret. Limited protection for business secrets is afforded by 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§2.790, which permits the Commission to "withhold any document or part thereof from 
public inspection if disclosure of its contents is not required in the public interest and 
would adversely affect the interest of a person concerned,'' subject, of course, to the 
exercise of Commission discretion. As of March 6, 1957, the Commission had received 
four requests for the withholding of certain information contained in license applica-
tions, two of which were granted. "Requests by License Applicants to Withhold 
Matters from Public Inspection," Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 13, 
at 183-186. 
3 70 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 125-126. See Adams, supra note 239 at 178-
179: "If monopoly comes to atomic energy, it shall not have been inevitable .... It 
shall have come about because of unwise, man-made, discriminatory, privilege-creating 
legislation which throttles competition and restricts opportunity .... " 
371 Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Civil 
Aeronautics Board, Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Tariff Commission, Federal Power 
Commission, Department of Interior, and Department of Agriculture. 
37 2 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 125-126. For a criticism of this situation, 
see Hoover Commission Legal Services Report, supra note 154 at 86 and Hoover Com-
mission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 25o-255. 
378 Austern, supra note 356 at 165; see Report of Attorney General's National Com-
mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws 367-369 (1955). 
874 See Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 206 
F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953). 
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Energy Commission from issuing orders based upon antitrust con-
siderations. There has been substituted the procedure for reports to and 
from the Attorney General, with the possible withholding of the license 
by the Commission based upon these reports. Because of the extra-
judicial character of the Attorney General's participation in the atomic 
energy licensing process, this procedure can hardly be regarded as an 
improvement from the standpoint of the licensee. 
More recently, still another extra-judicial forum to consider possible 
antitrust problems affecting individual licensees has been established. 
This results from the 1957 amendments by Congress to Section 261a 
of the Atomic Energy Act.375 In its review of the bases requested for 
appropriations by the Commission for financial assistance to private 
parties under the civilian power reactor programs, the Joint Committee 
will have the opportunity "to review the antitrust and patent implica-
tions of each individual arrangement before it is consummated." 376 
3· Hearing Procedures · 
The general licensing provisions of the 1954 statute,377 as imple-
mented by the Commission's regulations,878 establish procedures for the 
granting, denial, or revocation of licenses which substantially comply, 
both in spirit and in letter, with the requirements of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. Inasmuch as these hearing procedures in their 
formal aspects are only now being gradually utilized by the Commission, 
considerable question remains concerning their application and imple-
mentation. The hearing procedures of the Commission have, in fact, 
undergone considerable statutory and policy change since enactment of 
the 1954 legislation. 
Initially, Section 189a of the statute 879 provided only that "in any 
proceedings . for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending 
of any license . . . and in any proceeding for the issuance or modifica-
m 42 U.S.C.A. §2017(a). 
876 Remarks of Rep. Holifield outlining scope of review of Joint Committee under 
Section 261a, 1957 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 7 at 38: "Antitrust 
policy and patent policy: Under the Joint Committee bills ... the basis for each in-
dividual arrangement must be submitted to the Joint Committee ... before becom-
ing effective it it provides any financial assistance. Such basis shall include a descrip-
tion of 'the general features of the proposed arrangement or amendment' ... and it 
is contemplated that the Joint Committee may therefore be able to review the antitrust 
and patent implications of each individual arrangement before it is consummated." 
877 Sections 181-189, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2231-2239. 
878 10 Code Fed. Regs Pt. 2. 
879 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(a). 
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tion of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees ... 
the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person 
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding .... " Section 181 
provides that the "provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall 
apply to all agency action taken under this act." 380 Licensing under the 
Atomic Energy Act clearly constitutes adjudication under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 881 The Commission has taken the praiseworthy 
and correct 882 position that a "formal hearing" should be held on appli-
cations for the issuance, amendment, or transfer of a license or con-
struction permit 883 or the modification, suspension, or revocation 
·thereof.38• However, "informal" proceedings are obviously preferred 
by the Commission for the collection of necessary information and for 
rule making.885 
Prior to 1957, a "formal" proceeding could be initiated under two 
circumstances. Before the Commission acted on an application, such a 
hearing could be ordered upon the request of the applicant, an inter-
venor, or the Commission itself. Request by the applicant or an inter-
venor for such a hearing also could be made, within thirty days after 
notice of Commission action with respect to the license had been 
published. 388 
Further, "in such cases as it deems appropriate," the Commission 
could serve notice of proposed action on an application upon the appli-
880 42 U.S.C.A. §2231. 
881 Section :z(d), 5 U.S.C.A. §ux>I(a). 
882 Under Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004, formal 
adjudication occurs where the applicable statute requires a determination "on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing." Although Section 1B9;l of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 prior to the 1957 amendment did not use the words "on the record," the 
context in which the hearing requirement was used and the liberal interpretation to be 
accorded the Administrative Procedure Act warranted the Commission's position that 
a hearing "on the record" was required where requested under Section 1B9;l. See Wong 
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33. so, 70 S. Ct. 445 (1950) as modified, 339 U.S. 
goB, 70S. Ct. 564 (1950); Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 
43 at 167-170. For a contrary point of view, see Davison, "Requirements of Hearings 
in Administrative Adjudication," Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 15 
at 195. In the case of the first such request in a licensing proceeding, the Commis-
sion correctly ordered a formal hearing. In the Matter of Power Reactor Develop-
ment Company, AEC Dkt. F-16, "Notice of Hearing Order," 21 Fed. Reg. 78og (Oct. 
12, 1956). Prior to 1957, it was recommended that the Commission, as a Inatter of 
policy, order .a formal hearing in each Section 103 licensing proceeding, "Report of 
Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 59. 
883 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(a). 
884 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.202. 
885 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2,7o8. 
88810 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(a). 
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cant and interested parties and publish such notice, and a formal hearing 
could be held upon request of such applicant or other parties if request 
therefor was made within fifteen days after service of the notice.387 
Under this procedure, the Commission "uniformly" 888 took its action 
first, subject to a request for hearing within thirty days. 
However, after December 1956, the agency changed its practice and 
issued notices of intention to grant a license affording fifteen days' time 
in which to file requests for hearing.889 In April 1957, the Commission 
by rule formalized the latter procedure.890 The Commission's action was 
taken partly as the result of a Joint Committee Staff Study which set 
forth in compelling terms the reasons for requiring a formal hearing in 
every case prior to issuance of a construction permit or license under 
Sections 103 or 104 of the statute. 391 The proposal had, in fact, been 
opposed by the Commission.392 Subsequently, Congress followed the 
Staff recommendation, and in September 1957, it amended Section 1893-
to require that the "Commission ... hold a hearing after thirty days 
notice and publication once in the Federal Register on each application 
under Sections 103 or 104b for a license for a facility, and on any appli-
cation under Section 104c for a license for a testing facility." 898 
887 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(b). 
888 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 19. 
8 89 See "Notice of Proposed Issuance of Construction Permit to AMF Atomics, Inc.," 
Dec. 19, 1956, Dkt. No. F-17, as explained in AEC Press Rei. Dec. 28, 1956, Joint Com-
mittee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 14A and B at 186-189. 
8 90 This was done by amending 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.102(b) and (c); see "Notice 
of Proposed Rule Making," 22 Fed. Reg. 2433 (April 11, 1957). 
891 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 23: "The advantages of this notice 
of intent and hearing procedure are that it would provide the maximum amount of in-
formation concerning the proposed reactor to the public, and would also provide easy 
opportunity for participation by interested parties and the public. This type of pro-
cedure would seem to provide maximum assurance of fair and open dealings on the 
part of the agency." Sen. Anderson indicated support for such a recommendation dur-
ing floor debate on Section 189 of the 1954 act, id., at 17, n.2 see recommendation that 
the AEC, as a matter of policy, order a formal hearing in each Section 103 licensing 
proceeding, "Report of Workshop III," Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 
at 59· 
B92 Chiefly on the grounds that such procedure would destroy "administrative sim-
plicity" and cause unnecessary delay in proceedings, particularly where uncontested, 
Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 22-24 and App. 5 at 109-110. 
898 Pub. L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); see H.R. Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess. 12, 25 (1957). As the result of the amendment to Section 189a, the Commis-
sion was required to vacate the notice of proposed issuance of a construction permit for 
a Section 104b research reactor to Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Dkt. No. so-29, and 
to set the matter for hearing, 22 Fed. Reg. 7188 (Sept. 7, 1957). After a hearing on 
Oct. 8 and 24, 1957, the AEC on Nov. 19, 1957, published a notice of its findings and 
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This congressional action represents an important step in bringing 
administrative due process to atomic energy procedures, a development 
which had been parallelled to a certain extent by Commission procedure 
developed by regulation and precedent in the Power Reactor Develop-
ment Company licensing proceeding, the first of its kind held by the 
agency. 894 The requirement of an opportunity for a hearing before an 
application for a construction permit or license is issued also resolves 
the question concerning the suspension of such a permit or license which 
is once issued but later becomes the subject of a hearing. 895 
order and. of the issuance of a construction permit to Yankee, 22 Fed. Reg. 9237. The 
"Memorandum of Opinion of the Commissioners" granting the permit was not pub-
lished in the Federal Register, an omission which should be corrected in the interests 
of complete public information in the field of atomic energy (see BNA, Atomic Indus-
try Reporter 227: 6w). The Yankee proceeding was the first completed under the 
new Section 189a procedure. 
894 The PRDC proceeding "has already begun the development of quasi-judicial atti-
tudes and techniques on the part of the Commission" (Plaine, .supra note 1 at 75). 
8 9 3 In its order for hearing dated Oct. 8, 1956, in the PRDC proceeding, the Com-
mission denied the request of intervenors ·"for an immediate suspension of said con-
struction permit pending the final determination of the matters raised by said petitions 
•.• without prejudice to ultimate determination by the Commission as to whether the 
permit should be continued, modified, or vacated" (Para. (4) ). The intervenors in 
that proceeding argued that the "continuance of the construction permit to PRDC ... 
would be contrary to the Act and the regulations of the Commission" and that the 
permit "should be suspended" during the hearing (Reply Brief of Intervenors, .supra 
note 313 at 43). The dilemma in which the AEC had placed itself by issuing a provi-
sional construction permit and then by passing upon the merits of the controversy after 
a formal hearing thereon is stated by the intervenors in their Post-Hearing Brief, .supra 
note 291 at 36: "If this were . . . a case of initial licensing in which the Commission 
had not taken a position on the merits at the time of the hearing, there can be no ques-
tion that it would have been entirely appropriate for AEC not to take a position with 
respect to the issues .... But this is not in fact a case of initial licensing. The Com-
mission had already issued the license when the instant proceeding was instituted, and 
it has continued that license, in effect, over the strenuous objections of Intervenors. It 
is utterly unrealistic for the Commission to act as if it had not already rendered a de-
cision on the issues, and to ignore the fact that it was being called on, in effect, to de-
fend or reverse its position." Refusal of the Commission to take a position during the 
proceeding was claimed to be a denial of a fair hearing. In this connection, the fol-
lowing exchange occurred between AEC Chairman Strauss and Sen. Gore during the 
1957 Section 202 Hearings, .supra note 7 at 43-44: "Senator Gore. Is not that [the 
PRDC construction permit] in fact in a state of suspension? ... Mr. Strauss. There 
is a hearing in progress, Senator .... [C]onstruction is going ahead with no suspen-
sion or delay as far as the Commission is aware. Senator Gore. You have given a 
construction permit? Mr. Strauss. That is right. It is not in suspension in any way." 
Under the Federal Communications Act of 1952, 47 U.S.C.A. §Jog(c), a construc-
tion permit automatically is suspended for the duration of a hearing initiated by a 
protest. See Joint Committee Staff Study, .supra note 3 at 21. 
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Subject, of course, to actual observance by the Commission of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Adminis.trative Procedure Act in 
spirit as well as letter, the agency appears to have provided very ade-
quately by its rules for administrative due process on such matters as 
service of papers, 896 representation, 897 intervention, 898 consolidation of 
related proceedings,899 and notice of hearing.400 The burden of proof in 
any proceeding has been placed properly upon the applicant for a con-
struCtion permit or license; which must affirmatively "demonstrate at 
the hearing that it is able to satisfy those requirements of law and the 
Commission's regulations which are in controversy." 401 
896 10 Cqde Fed. Regs. §2.703. 
897 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.704- In formal hearings, involving as they do the practice 
of law, only attorneys at law will be permitted to represent others, 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§2.704(b); see Plaine, supra note 77 at 8o8-8og. 
398 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.705-.7o6; see Plaine, supra note 77 at Sog. The PRDC 
proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, raises an interesting question with regard to the right 
of intervention. The three unions petitioning to intervene therein largely based their 
right to do so on their representation of union members whose health and safety 
allegedly would be adversely affected if the application were granted; see Post-Hear-
ing Brief of Intervenors, supra note 291 at 1-2. The standing to intervene was ques-
tioned but not actually controverted by the applicant, and the Commission held that 
"[p]rima facie these allegations provide a basis for the granting of leave to intervene 
in the procedings before the Commission" ("Memorandum of the Commission" I 
(Mimeo Oct. 8, 19•6); see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 41). The applicant, 
in a subsequent filing with the Commission, asked to have one of the issues, i.e., the 
issue of financial qualification, eliminated on the grounds, inter alia, that the inter-
vening unions had no interest in the matter of financial qualification. On Mar. 4, 1957, 
the State of Michigan filed a petition, and was permitted, to intervene in the PRDC 
proceedings, to participate therein "as its interests may arise" (BNA, Atomic Indus-
try Reporter 3 : 77). 
89·o 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.707. 
400 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.735. This regulation provides for the specification of is-
sues by the AEC in its order for hearing, to which specification in the PRDC proceed-
ing intervenors strongly objected; Charging that the Commission had been "capricious~ 
in its limitation of issues in the order dated Oct. 8, 1956, counsel for the intervenors 
charged before the Joint Committee that "we [the intervenors] had to consider it 
[participation in the hearing] on their [the AECs] terms and only on their terms," 
without regard to "the question of whether the AEC itself had violated the law" (1957 
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 467, 476-477). It was the position of the in-
tervenors that, by its limitation of the issues of the proceeding "so as to preclude proof 
of illegal conduct on the part of the Commission in the issuance of a conditional con-
struction permit to PRDC," the AEC had denied them a fair hearing (Post-Hearing 
Brief of Intervenors, supra note 291 at 19) ; see Reply Memorandum for Applicant, 
st~Pra note 291 at 4. 
401 Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. No. F-16. "Memorandum of 
the Commission," supra note 398 at 1[6. 
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a. Hearing Officers 
In formal licensing proceedings, Atomic Energy Commission rules 402 
require that the hearing officer be either a member of the Commission, 
an officer or board to whom has been delegated final authority of the 
agency to act, or a hearing examiner appointed under Section I I of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.403 The appointment of Section II hear-
ing examiners in the first formal proceedings under the Atomic Energy 
Act of I954 404 indicates the Commission will use such examiners to the 
greatest extent possible. The powers of a presiding officer 405 are essen-
. tially those provided for under the Administrative Procedure Act.406 
The use of prehearing conferences 407 and deposition procedure 408 also 
is emphasized. Time-consuming interlocutory appeals to the Commis-
sion from rulings of presiding officers are prohibited "except in ex-
traordinary circumstances." 409 
Ordinarily, a presiding officer issues an intermediate decision which 
becomes final unless it is excepted to by the parties to the proceeding or 
402 to Code Fed. Regs. §2.732. This conforms to Section 7(a) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §10o6(a). 
4os 5 U.S.C.A. §toto. 
404 Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. No. F-t6, "Notice of Hear-
ing Order," BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 40; Yankee Atomic Electric Co., 
AEC Dkt. No. 5o-29; National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, AEC Dkt. No. 
5o-3o, "Hearings: Additions and Modifications," 22 Fed. Reg. 72t4 (Sept. to, 1957), 
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 53:67; General Electric Company, AEC Dkt. No. 
5o-7o, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4:95; see Plaine, supra note 77 at 812-813. 
On Aug. 5, 1958, the AEC .announced that an Office of Hearing Examiner has been 
established, and Samuel W. Jensch appointed thereto, "to fill the Commission's re-
quirement for hearings and to keep pace with the growth of the regulatory functions 
of the Commission" (AEC Press Ret. No. A-201). 
405 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.733, 2.744. 2.745, 2.746, and 2.747. 
40& Section 7(b), 5 U.S.C.A. §10o6(b). 
407 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.740; such a conference was held in the PRDC proceeding. 
408 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.745. 
409 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.748. This regulation provides that the hearing officer shall 
not permit interlocutory appeals to the Commission during a proceeding "except in ex-
traordinary circumstances where in the judgment of the presiding officer prompt deci-
sion by the Commission is necessary to prevent detriment to the public interest or 
unusual delay or expense." In the PRDC proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, the hear-
ing examiner refused to permit an interlocutory appeal from his order overruling ob-
jections to the use of written narrative testimony by PRDC witnesses. This decision 
was affirmed by the Commission Feb. 27, 1957, on the grounds that " ... to allow the 
requested appeal would simply mean allowing one of the parties to circumvent a sound 
rule aimed at expediting the course of hearings, and would encourage continuing inter-
ruptions of this hearing by recurring appeals to the Commission" (BNA, Atomic In-
dustry Reporter 3: 78). . 
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unless it is ordered by the Commission to be certified to it.410 Prior to 
December 1957, in neither its regulations nor its practice had the Com-
mission permitted a hearing officer to issue an initial decision, which 
would become final unless appealed.411 Such decisions, if permitted, 
would have afforded the agency the benefit of the views of the officer 
who heard the testimony.412 However, the Commission in orders issued 
in December 1957, instructed its hearing examiner to render initial de-
cisions in two proceedings, a development which, it is hoped, may 
establish a new policy for the Commission in the future. 418 
Hearing examiner orders, in cases where permitted by the Commis-
sion, and final orders of the agency itself are required to contain findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.m Provision also is made in the AEC 
regulations for briefs and oral argument before the Commission m and 
for petitions for reconsideration of a final order of the agency.m 
410 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.751-.752. 
411 The Commission, in every proceeding prior to 1958, has directed that the record 
be certified to it by the presiding officer without decision, Power Reactor Development 
Company, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, "Notice of Hearing Order,'' 21 Fed. Reg. 7809 (Oct. 
12, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 40; Yankee Atomic Electric Co., AEC 
Dkt. No. 5o-29, and National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics, AEC Dkt. No. 
5o-3o, "Hearing: Additions and Modifications,'' 22 Fed. Reg. 7214 (Sept. 10, 1957), 
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 53:67. 
412 If hearing examiners are to perform the quasi-judicial role intended for them by 
Congress, then agencies should permit them to tender initial decisions in every case, 
unless the parties stipulate otherwise; Hoover Commission Legal Task. Force Report, 
supra note 43 at 203-200. See Joint Committee Staff Study, S!~frra note 3 at 39, n. 7: 
"The Commission's reluctance to permit the hearing examiner to make an initial decision 
[in the PRDC proceeding] is understandable, since he had no previous background in 
atomic energy· matters, but it points up the need for qualified hearing examiners who 
are conversant with the Atomic Energy Act, AEC regulations and atomic energy tech-
nology." In questioning witnesses before the Joint Committee, Rep. Holifield claimed 
that the hearing examiner in the PRDC proceeding was a "special examiner appointed 
by the AEC" (1957 Section 202 Hearings, suPra note 7 at 441 and 467-468). For a 
criticism of the AECs refusal to permit a decision at the examiner level, see id. at 478. 
418 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, AEC Dkt. No. 5o-3o, 22 Fed. 
Reg. 9895 (Dec. 1i:, 1957), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 3:422; General Electric 
Co., AEC Dkt. No. 5o-7o, 22 Fed. Reg. 10126 (Dec. 18, 1957). On February 26, 1958, 
the hearing examiner gave his decision that the order for a construction permit be 
granted as of March 25, 1958, unless exceptions were filed to his decision or the Com-
mission took the matter under advisement. On March 3, 1958 the applicant moved that 
the construction permit be granted ·immediately, to which motion the Commission staff 
consented, and the Commission ordered the construction permit issued on March 7, 
1958. See BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 95-¢. 
414 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.749, 2.750, and 2.754. 
415 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.753. This rule does not contemplate oral argument before 
an intermediate decision provided under 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.751. However, in the 
PRDC proceeding, the Commission announced that it would have oral argument before 
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b. Evidence 
By both rule and practice, the Commission has shown a realistic but 
fair attitude towards the submission of evidence in formal proceedings 
before that agency. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 417 the AEC regulations provide for the submission of "such oral 
or documentary evidence . . . as may be required for a full and true 
disclosure of the facts," 418 with an admonition to the hearing officer to 
"exclude all irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." 419 
The regulations also encourage the submission of evidence in written 
form. 420 This practice has been used extensively, and it is believed 
wisely, in the Power Reactor Development Company proceedings.421 
the agency itself issued an intermediate decision; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 
4:22. Oral argument was held before Commissioners Floberg, Graham, and Vance 
on May 29, 1958, at which Commissioner Floberg stated that consideration had been 
given to remanding the case to the hearing examiner for an intermediate decision but 
that the Commission had decided itself to issue such a decrsion, to which the parties 
would have an opportunity to file exceptions and comments before a final decision was 
rendered; see BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 179. 
416 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.756. 
417 Section 7(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §10o6(c), which provides, in part: "Any oral or 
documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy 
provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence. . . . 
Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral or documen-
tary evidence . . . as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. . . ." 
418 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.747(a); see Plaine, supra note 77 at 816. 
419 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.747(b). In the PRDC proceeding the applicant charged 
that, as the result of cross-exainination by the intervenors, "the proportion of the 
testimony included in the transcript which is totally irrelevant to any issue presented 
is extraordinarily high" (Brief for Applicant, supra note 314 at 5, n. 7). 
420 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.747(a) : "The parties shall be encouraged to present evi-
dence in written form." 
4 2 1 At a pre-hearing conference in the proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, on Nov. 29, 
1956, the hearing examiner permitted the applicant to prepare the "substantial part" 
of its case in the form of sworn statements by witnesses, subject to objection by the 
intervenors and cross-examination of the witnesses. concerned; BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter 2: 387. On Jan. 8, 1957, the applicant presented and rested its case with the 
introduction of so-called "canned testimony" by six witnesses, whereupon the hearing 
was adjourned to Jan. 28, 1957, for objection to the testimony by the other parties 
concerned; id. at 3: II. After oral argument, the examiner on Jan. 29, 1957, over-
ruled all but 5 of 62 objections to the PRDC evidence. The principal attack by inter-
venors on the evidence was that (1) under 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.740(b), providing 
for pre-trial orders, the consent of intervenors was required to the entry of the ex-
aminer's pre-trial order with respect to written evidence and (2) counsel was denied 
the right to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. The intervenors filed an inter-
locutory appeal from the examiner's ruling (id. at 3: 45) which was denied by the 
Commission Feb. 27, 1957 (id. at 3: 78). The issue was extensively argued by the 
parties in their briefs, the intervenors taking the position that a fair hearing had been 
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It is a matter of common practice in the older established agencies like 
the Federal Communications Commission 422 and Federal Power 
Commission. 423 
c. Public Records 
An important problem that arises in connection with licensing by any 
agency is the manner in which the agency implements Section 3 (c) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act which provides: 
Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record 
shall in accordance with published rule be made available to 
persons properly and directly concerned except information 
held confidential for good cause found. 424 
Aside from problems which arise under the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's access permit program,425 that organization is one of the few 
executive agencies and departments which has spelled out by regulation 
the meaning of the term "public records." 426 
denied them; Post-Hearing Brief of Intervenors, supra note 291 at 6-7 and 37-41; 
Reply Memorandum for Applicant, supra note 291 at 2-4. In connection with the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics proceeding, AEC Dkt. No. 5o-3o, the 
presiding examiner requested parties thereto to distribute written copies of testimony 
to each other prior to the hearing; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 13. The use 
of sworn memoranda in proceedings, particularly where uncontested, was approved 
by the Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 21-22, 24· The AEC has indi-
cated that proposed written testimony by Commission witnesses will be submitted in 
advance of hearing to an applicant for a license where the application is not contested 
and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety report is generally favorable, whereby 
"the applicant and other parties will be in a position to cross-examine promptly, if 
they desire to do so." (Statement of Robert Lowenstein, Office of General Counsel, 
AEC, to Atomic Industrial Forum (mimeo, 1958) ). 
422£.g., In the Matter of Carolina Gas Corp., eta!., FPC Dkt. No. G-1335 (1950). 
42S E.g., In the Matter of Charges for and in Connection with Marine Telegraph 
Services, FCC Dkt. Nos. 9915 'and 9822 (1951). In particular, see testimony intro-
duced by South Porto Rico Sugar Company, operator of a small coastal radio station 
which was saved considerable expense by the use of "canned testimony." Indeed, with-
out such a device, such small companies would find participation in rate and other 
proceedings almost prohibitively high in cost. Further, the device speeds the proceed-
ing, a result which the intervenors in the PRDC case recognized but probably did not 
favor. 
424 5 U.S.C.A. §roo2(c). See Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra 
note 43 at 155: "A weakness of the Administrative Procedure Act is that it contains 
no definition of matters of official record. The majority of agencies have not defined 
this term. Even where a definition has been provided, it has usually been too restric-
tive .... " 
426 See text, s~tpra at note 289. 
426 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 9, adopted Dec. 8, 1956. For the more important provi-
sions of these regulations, see Joint Committee Staff Study, mpra note 3, App. 3C, at 
9Q-91; BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 355· 
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Adopted to meet the needs of the AEC's first adjudicatory proceed-
ing, the rules are not without their shortcomings, a fact which Congress 
has sought to remedy by amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 
The practice of the Commission prior to the PRDC licensing proceed-
ing was to withhold from the public the report of the agency's Ad-
visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).427 A qualified 
report by the ACRS with respect to the PRDC reactor 428 was leaked 
through Congressional sources, whereupon the Commission in October 
1956, published the Committee report together with the AEC's order 
setting the PRDC case for hearing.429 The Commission made clear that 
this action was not to be considered a precedent, but modified its pre-
vious procedure in licensing cases to the extent that a summary of the 
ACRS report was contained in the memorandum accompanying the 
Commission issuance of a construction permit or license!80 
This action did not, however, completely answer doubts raised as to 
the wisdom of the Commission's policy of withholding ACRS reports, 
particularly in view of the indemnity program then being considered by 
the 85th Congress.481 The result was that, in enacting legislation to pro-
vide for a federal indemnity for atomic accidents and a limitation on the 
liability of persons participating in the atomic energy program:32 Con-
gress gave the ACRS legislative status.433 This legislation also required 
that all applications for construction permits and licenses under Sec-
tions 103 and 104 be reviewed by ACRS, and that the report be "made 
part of the record of the application and available to the public, except 
to the extent that security classification prevents disclosure." 434 
427 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 29; see AEC, Twenty-third Semi-
Annual Report J20 (19s8). 
t2s Joint Committee Staff Study, svpra note 3, App. 8 at 133. 
429 See Para. (6), "Notice of Hearing," 21 Fed. Reg. 7&9 (Oct. 12, 1956), BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 52: 39; and Para. 9, "Memorandum of the Commission" 
Oct. 9, 1956, ibid., which stated in part : "This action is being taken because a copy 
of the Advisory Committee's report was sent to the Power Reactor Development Co. 
on June 18, 1956 .•.• The Commission has concluded that the public interest would 
be served in this instance by making the document available to the interveners and the 
public." 
430 Letter of AEC General Manager Fields to Joint Committee Executive Director, 
Oct. 17, 1956, Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3, App. 9 at 136. 
431 H.R. 7383 and S. 2051, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., favorably reported by the Joint 
Committee May 9, 1957, Sen. Rep. No. 296, supra note 32, and H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra 
note 223. 
432 Pub. L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
483 Section 29, 42 U.S.C.A. §2039. 
434 Section 182b, 42 U.S.<:;.A. §2232(b). The requirement for publicity of ACRS 
reports was closely tied in with that of Section 189a, as amended, requiring a formal 
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d. "Parallel Procedures" 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes the Commission to pro-
vide by regulation 
. . . in the case of agency proceedings or actions which in-
volve Restricted Data or defense information ... for such 
parallel procedures as will effectively safeguard and prevent 
disclosure of Restricted Data or defense information to unau-
thorized persons with minimum impairment of the procedural 
rights which would be available if Restricted Data or defense 
information were not involved.485 
This provision constitutes a landmark in administrative law and a 
praiseworthy attempt to accommodate the national need for informa-
tion security with administrative due process and fairness to persons 
participating in the atomic energy program. 486" 
The Commission delayed in implementing the statutory provision for 
hearing in all Section 103, 104b, and 104c procedings. See H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra 
note 223 at 12: "Having established the Committee [ACRS] under the bill, it was 
thought that its functions would be best served if its reports should be made public, 
and if the facilities of the type on which its report were required should be licensed 
only after a public hearing .... [F]ull, free, and frank discussion in public of the 
hazards involved in any particular reactor would seem to be the most certain way of 
assuring that the reactors will indeed be safe and that the public will be fully apprised 
of this fact." The policy of ACRS, according to its chairman, is to avoid "concerning 
itself with problems of national policy other than the question of safety. The Com-
mittee believes that it is possible to conduct the operation of nuclear reactors without 
unnecessarily exposing the public or workers to harmful amounts of radiation" ( 1958 
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 32 at 118). The emphasis by members of the Joint 
Committee on the role of ACRS is on its freedom of action "to exercise your judg-
ment fully without restriction in this field" (id. at II]). With respect to the ACRS, 
an official of the AEC has recently emphasized that the group is an advisory group 
only and "not an 'independent agency,' " with the ultimate responsibility for the issu-
ance or non-issuance of a license resting with the Commission ; meetings of the ACRS 
probably will not be open, although representatives of the applicant may be asked to 
answer questions of ACRS after preliminary study of the application by the latter; 
in cases where the ACRS report is favorable, "the hearing is not likely to be pro-
tracted" before a hearing examiner (Lowenstein, supra note 421). 
485 Section 181, 42 U.S.C.A. §2231. 
486 As originally proposed, Section 181 required the AEC to "provide by regulation 
for identical procedures except that they shall not be made public." The language of 
the section as enacted was proposed by Sen. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa), with the 
following comment (Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 68-69): " ... [T]he 
change in section 181 relating to the Administration Procedure Act is to provide the 
Commission with a little more flexibility in dealing with procedures than was pro-
vided in this section in the bill. ... [T]he procedures are such as to protect against 
the wrongful dissemination of restricted data and defense information while at the 
same time preserving as many of the normal procedures as possible. . .. " 
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such "parallel procedures." Apparently as the result of some prodding 
by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and "a need in pending pro-
ceedings" for such rules, the Commission finally in late 1956 provided 
for "parallel procedures" for Restricted Data.437 
As the Commission stated in its notice of rule making: 
Discharge of this responsibility [under Section 181 of the 
Act] requires the framing of novel procedures; and a delicate 
balancing of the need to provide adequate protection for Re-
stricted Data in relation to the importance of providing access 
for parties and the public to the records of administrative pro-
ceedings before the Commission and information relating 
thereto. 638 
An important step in the implementation of the statutory provision was 
taken in placing these rules in effect. 
The principal features of the new "parallel procedures" are ( 1) the 
obligation of parties to a proceeding to avoid introduction of Restricted 
Data,489 (2) the requirement of a notice of intent to introduce Re-
stricted Data/40 and (3) the authority of the presiding officer to rear-
range or suspend the proceeding pending the satisfaction of security 
requirements by interested parties and counsel.""1 Effective implemen-
tation of these rules will depend, in large part, upon the whole-hearted 
cooperation of parties, their counsel, the hearing officer, and the Com-
mission, a pattern which has been established in other types of adminis-
trative proceedings before federal agencies where the schedule of hear-
ings, admission of evidence, and the examination of witnesses often is 
adjusted to suit the convenience and needs of the parties by mutual 
consent. 442 The present rules are not without possible defect, and im-
637 21 Fed. Reg. 8594 (Nov. 8, 1956) and 21 Fed. Reg. 9741 (Dec. 8, 1956), 10 
Code Fed. Regs. §§2.8oo-.814- It is significant that on the same December date that 
the AEC published notice of intention to promulgate the parallel procedure regula-
tions, the agency announced promulgation of new rules with respect to public records; 
21 Fed. Reg. 9743, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§9.1-9-7. 
48821 Fed. Reg. 8594 (Nov. 8, 1956). 
•ae 10 Code Fed. Regs.· §2.8o6. 
uo 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.8o7-.8o8. 
441 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.8o9. 
442 See Section 5(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004(a) 
which provides, inter alia: "In fixing the times and places for hearings, due regard 
shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives." 
In the PRDC proceedings, AEC Dkt. No. F-16, the agency has had a "classification 
officer" available at the hearing to advise the hearing examiner on questions of se-
curity information; BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 3: 87 and 3: 102. 
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provements in the procedure certainly should result from experience 
gained by the Commission and private parties thereunder.448 
4. Revocation, Suspension, and Modification of Licenses and 
Construction Permits 
Revocation of a license is specifically subject 444 to the safeguards of 
Section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.445 This requirement 
is implemented by Atomic Energy Commission regulation providing for 
opportunity for a formal hearing. 446 However, unlike applications for a 
construction permit or license under Sections 103 and 104 of the statute, 
the suspension, revocation, or modification of a license requires only 
that the agency provide opportunity for hearing. 
As under the Administrative Procedure Act, a license or construction 
permit may be suspended or revoked,447 or an order to show cause im-
mediately issued,448 where "in the opinion of AEC the public health, 
interest, or safety requires, or the failure to be in compliance [with the 
Act, regulations issued thereunder, or license conditions] is wilful." 
Aside from failure to comply with the act, regulations issued thereunder, 
or license conditions, other grounds for immediate or future suspension 
or revocation of a license include a "material false statement" in an 
443 See Report of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy Law, 82 ABA Rep. 
J24-25 (1957): (1) "The ... rules seem to contemplate the interruption of public 
hearings whenever restricted data may be requested from a witness .... This might 
be completely disruptive, and, indeed, it might even be used for that purpose~ An 
alternative procedure would postpone the introduction of restricted data until some 
convenient occasion later in the hearing .... " (2) Provision of §2.8o5(d) for inter-
locutory appeals from rulings of a hearing examiner concerning safeguarding of re-
stricted data "would seem to open the door to innumerable interlocutory appeals which 
could delay and disrupt the proceeding .... [T]he presiding officer should be left 
in control of the proceedings with authority to certify questions relating to access to 
restricted data if in his judgment it should seem desirable to do so .... " (3) "No 
provision is made in the ... rules relative to court review of Commission decisions 
involving classified information .... It would seem desirable to take notice of the 
possibility of review in cases involving classified information. Provision could be 
made, for example, for certifying the non-classified record which could be amplified 
to contain non-classified statements concerning the general nature and content of the 
classified information. . . . The classified record could thereafter be made available 
upon court order to the court itself for the purpose of determining its relevance and 
importance to an adequate court review .... " 
4H Section 186a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2236(a). 
445 5 U.S.C.A. §1oo8(b). 
446 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 2, Subpt. B. 
447 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§2.20I(b), 70.6I(d), 40.25, J0.5I(c), 50.100, and 55-40(a) 
and (b). 
448 10 Code Fed. Regs. §2.202(a) (2). 
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application or report,449 conviction of the licensee for violation of the 
antitrust laws "in the conduct of the licensed activity," 450 and, in the 
case of an operator's license, for personal behavior on the job deemed 
by the Commission to create a hazard in the operation of a facility. 451 
In connection with the requirements of compliance with license condi-
tions, failure to maintain the records, submit the reports, and permit 
the tests and inspections imposed by the statute and regulations,m as 
required by the license, would constitute grounds for immediate or pro-
posed suspension or revocation of a license. When a license for a com-
mercial or non-commercial production or utilization facility is revoked 
or suspended, the facility can be seized and operated by the government 
upon payment of "just compensation." 453 
Prior to 1958, the Commission suspended only one license, and this 
without hearing because of the danger to public health and safety. By 
order dated May 2, 1957, a byproduct material license was temporarily 
suspended because of "certain incidents ... resulting in the contami-
nation of major portions of the facility from by-product material," the 
contamination of clothing or employees, and "a potential hazard to the 
health and safety of employees of the Company and members of their 
families." 454 
This AEC aCtion represents a wise exercise of the extensive discre-
tionary power which is conferred upon the agency with respect to licenses 
once they have been issued.455 However, in general, there is some reason 
" 9 Section 186a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2236(a}; 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§70.61(b), 40.24, 40-40, 
J0.51(b}, 50.100, and 55·40(a) and (b). 
450 Section 105a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2135(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.54(g). 
m 10 Code Fed. Regs. §55-40(c). 
452 Sections 65 and 103b, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2095 and 2133(b); 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§§7o.p(b) (5), 70.51-.54, 40·24. 40·29--30, 30-41--44, IIO.Io-.n, 50.34--35, 50.7o-.71, and 
55-41. 
m Section 188, 42 U.S.C.A. §2238; 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.102. 
454 Byproduct Material License No. 31-246-1 and 31-2,¢-2, M. W. Kellogg Co., 
''Temporary Suspension Order," 22 Fed. Reg. 3263 (May 9, 1957). The order was 
modified to permit, among other things, decontamination of the premises involved, 
"Notice of Proposed Modification of Temporary Suspension Order,"- 22 Fed. Reg. 
8965 (Nov. 7, 1957): For the complete text of the documents involved in this prO-
ceeding, including the full text of the conditions imposed in the modification order dated 
Nov. 7, 1957, and a statement by the General Manager with respect to the incident 
dated Nov. 2, 1957, see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 265: 203-208. On March 14, 
1958, the Commission permanently cancelled Kellogg's license at the request of the 
licensee; 23 Fed. Reg. 1938 (March 22, 1958). 
455 By order dated Feb. · 12, 1958, the Commission temporarily suspended without 
hearing Byproduct Material License No. 42-9000-2 of Radiation Products Company 
and issued an order for the licensee to show cause why the license should not be sus-
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for apprehension over the Commission's wide authority to revoke 
licenses. This is particularly important because the agency's regula-
tions themselves "do not impose self-restraints upon the exercise of that 
authority." 458 
S· Internal Separation of Functions 
Under Section s{c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, except in 
cases, among others, of initial licensing, a separation of functions is 
required in formal adjudication with respect to hearing officers and in-
vestigatory and prosecuting officers. 457 A hearing officer may not be 
subject to the direction or jurisdiction of an investigatory or prosecut-
ing officer, nor may such latter type of officer participate or advise in 
the decision of a case which he has investigated dr prosecuted. The 
principles involved in this salutary provision of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act have been thus summarized: 
By internal separation Of powers is meant an arrangement 
within an agency designed to prevent the contamination of 
judging by other inconsistent functions. The basic objective is 
to maintain the integrity of, and public confidence in, case ad-
judication affecting private rights. The agency employee who 
investigates should play no further role in such proceedings 
than that of witness. The legal staff members who present 
pended or revoked; "Temporary Order and Order to Show Cause," 23 Fed. Reg. 1100 
(Feb. 19, 1958). The order alleges that "[u]pon the basis of preliminary investigation, 
it apears that ... the company has willfully transferred quantities of Cobalt 6o, a 
byproduct material . . . to one or more persons in violation" of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 and the applicable regulations issued thereunder. A hearing on the order 
initially was set for Feb. 24. 1958, but the respondent waived the hearing. The AEC 
was· reported to have notified the Texas State Commissioner of Health and the Dallas 
City Health Officer of the action taken by the federal agency. " ... [T]he fact that 
the AEC has taken this action in the Radiation Products case may stem from the re-
action to last year's M. W. Kellogg Company radiation incident at Houston~· (BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 6o-61). On April 18, 1958, the AEC served notice of 
intent to revoke the Radiation Products Company license effective February 7, 1958, 
unless contested by the licensee, for violation of .the original suspension order. The 
Commission claimed failure by Radiation Products Company to request a transfer of 
the original license from it to Radiation Products Company, incorporated by the 
former principal, in Radiation Products Company, 23 Fed. Reg. 2817 (April 26, 1958). 
By order dated June 13, 1958, as modified July 24. 1958, the AEC temporarily sus-
pended part of the license of a user of byproduct material for non-destructive testing, 
and a hearing before the AEC hearing examiner on claimed violations of the license 
was held in July, 1958, In The Matter of Advance Industrial X-Ray Laboratories, 
By-Product Material License No. 41695-2B59. 
456 Trowbridge. supra note 146 at 859. 
457 5 t:.S.C .A §1004(c); see Plaine, supra note 77 at 813-14. 
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evidence on behalf of the agency should not participate in the 
ultimate decision of the case. The officer who presides at the 
hearing can exercise his independent judgment on the evi-
dence only if he is insulated against agency and staff influence. 
The agency members should exercise their judgment on the 
written record without consultation with those who investi-
gated, prosecuted and heard the case below. These are the 
fundamental objectives of internal separation of functions 
vital to the protection of private rights.458 
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Problems of internal separation have been presented to the Atomic 
Energy Commission in its first formal licensing proceeding, that in-
volving PRDC.459 One of these related to the role of agency counsel in 
the proceeding, since the PRDC conditional construction permit had 
been issued with the active support and encouragement of the Commis-
sion itself. The PRDC proceeding involved initial licensing, and the 
separation of functions ordinarily required by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act was not applicable!60 The Commission complied, to a limited 
extent, with the spirit of the latter statute by creating a separated legal 
staff for AEC participation at the hearing level.461 The Commission did 
not, however, permit the hearing examiner to issue an intermediate or 
•~s Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 176-177. 
459 Power Reactor Development Company, AEC Dkt. F-16. As the result of the 
criticism of the Commission's role in this proceeding, the Chairman of the Joint Com-
mittee directed its staff to study the problem of insuring "sharper separation of the 
licensing function within the AEC organization" and invited comments thereon from 
the AEC itself, Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at v and L See also BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 413. 
480 Section 5(c), 5 U.S.C.A. §1004(c). 
461 The separated staff was represented by the Acting General Counsel and two 
other attorneys of the AEC. Briefs filed by these attorneys stated that they were "sub-
mitted by the separated staff established for the purpose of representing AEC as a 
party to this proceeding" and reflected "only the views of the separated staff" and not 
those of the Commission itself. See AEC Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77 
at 1095; AEC General Manager Fields' letter to Joint Committee Chairman Ander-
son, Dec. 12, 1956, Joint Committee Staff Study, st~pra note 3, App. IIB at I78-179, 
which read, in part: " ..• [T]he Commission has established a separated· staff for 
the preparation and conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the AEC. . • . In the 
preparation and conduct of the proceeding, the separated staff will not be subject to 
supervision by persons not on the separated staff. This staff will not participate in 
advising the Commission with respect to its decision .... To assure the impartiality 
of these AEC staff members in advising the Commission, the Commission has directed 
that such staff members may not discuss with members of the separated staff ques-
tions relating to the position to be taken by the separated staff at the proceeding ..•. 
The separated staff will attempt in the public interest to insure that all relevant facts 
not brought out by the other· parties are fully developed at the hearing .... " 
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initial decision in the case, thus reserving unto itself all of the judging 
function. 462 
The PRDC proceeding brought to public attention an equally im-
portant problem with respect to the application of separation of func-
tions to the Atomic Energy Commission itsel£.463 Prior to December 
1957, the Division of Civilian Application of the AEC exercised regu-
latory functions with respect to licensing and non-regulatory functions 
with respect to the stimulation of reactor development by private in-
dustry.464 That the promotional efforts of the Commission might conflict 
462 Joint Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 39: "The separation of the 'judg-
ing' function in the PRDC case was of a limited nature, however, and only applied 
to staff advisers, because the Commission did not delegate to the hearing examiner 
any power to make an initial decision, but retained all 'judging' authority and responsi-
bility itself." The Commission recognizes the importance of maintaining the inde-
pendence of hearing examiners assigned to it. ( 1958 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 
32 at 87 and 89); see ~tatement by Commissioner Floberg to the Joint Committee, 
id. at Sg-go: "One of the things I am particularly sensitive to is the complete inde-
pendence of the trial examiners. As long as I have anything to do with this Com-
mission, our trial examiners will be the most independent of any agency in Washing-: 
ton" ; see note 404, sufi1:a. 
463 A less spectacular, but no less important, problem raised by the PRDC proceed-
ings concerned the role to be played by AEC employees and consultants as expert wit-
nesses during the course of the hearing. Since many such persons had played an 
important part in developing the PRDC project, the evidence of these witnesses was 
pertinent and important to the making of a complete factual record. During the pro-
ceedings, charges were made by the intervenors to the Joint Committee that the AEC 
had sought to draw "a curtain between nuclear experts [of the AECJ and critics of 
the Commission" (statement of B. C. Sigal, IUE, AFL-CIO, General Counsel, 1957 
Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 470). This situation was claimed to have arisen 
because of instructions issued to AEC staff members by the Director, Division of 
Civilian Application, generally cautioning against participation in such procedings as 
witnesses unless ordered to appear by subpoena (id. at 471-475). In the Post-Hearing 
Brie£ of Intervenors, it was argued that the "Commission denied Intervenors a fair 
hearing in warning consultants of the Commission that they may be subject to criminal 
prosecution under conflict of interest laws if they have testified for the parties in this 
case, other than AEC" (supra note 291 at 22-25). See AEC Response to Question-
naire, supra note 77 at 1096: " ... [T]here has been direction to AEC personnel con-
cerning their participation on behalf of parties other than the AEC in proceedings 
before the agency. AEC employees are directed to provide information and services 
to parties to a proceeding on the same basis as they would follow with regard to other 
persons, but are prohibited from consulting on their own time or voluntarily serving 
as witnesses for any party. AEC employees were for the purposes of the PRDC 
matter permitted to appear on subpoena by any party to a proceeding. In the matter 
of PRDC the General Manager did testify upon subpoena by the intervenors." 
464 AEC Release No. 1238, Dec. 26, 1957, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 209:21; 
see AEC Announcement No. PSM0-3, "Organization of the Division of Civilian Ap-
plication," Nov. 2, 1956, I oint Committee Staff Study ,-upra note 3, App. 1 r at 176-
178; statement of AE( 1 'ommissioner Graham, 1951:\ Section 202 Hearings, supra 
note 32 at 84. 
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with its responsibilities in adjudicating applications for construction 
permits and commercial licenses always was inherent in that agency's 
organization so long as promotional and adjudicatory functions were 
grouped at the staff level in one division.465 
The most drastic proposal for reorganization of the Commission con-
templated the creation of two entirely separate statutory agencies, the 
one concerned with regulation of private industry and the other with 
military matters and the promotion and development of atomic energy 
technology.466 The Commission, to date, has opposed this step.467 A 
middle course proposed by the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, which would create separate regulatory and promotional divi-
sions within the Commission,468 was, in fact, adopted by the Commis-
sion in December 1957.469 Under this reorganization, a Division of 
Licensing and Regulation, reporting to the General Manager ,'70 handles 
all licensing and regulatory functions theretofore assigned to the Divi-
465 The intervenors in the PRDC proceeding sought to take advantage of claimed 
conflicts of interest within the AEC between that agency's promotional responsibilities 
and those relating to licensing. They moved that the AEC Chairman disqualify him-
self from considering the case when it reached the Commission because of two public 
statements made by him concerning the PRDC project. These statements, the inter-
venors argued, revleaded "bias and prejudice in favor of PRDC' (Post-Hearing Brief 
of Interveners, supra note 291 at 25-28. In its Brief, supra note 314 at 8, the applicant 
argued that the position of intervenors "if sustained, would frustrate the administra-
tion of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It would mean that if, as here, the Chairman 
or a member of the Commission fulfills his executive obligations to expound congres-
sional and Commission policy and to make recommendations to Congress regarding 
its effectuation, he ipso facto disqualifies himself from performing the adjudicatory 
duties that the law places ui>on him .... " 
466 ]oint Cominittee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 44: "The separated agency would 
regulate the private atomic energy industry, while the AEC would continue to be 
responsible for the main operating program, including procurement of raw materials, 
production of special nuclear materials, manufacture of weapons, and the research and 
development program. . . . This separation could be achieved by reducing the present 
number of AEC Commissioners from 5 to 3, and by creating a second commission of 
3 members to regulate the atomic industry .... " 
467 AEC Chairman Strauss' letter to Joint Committee Chairman Anderson, Jan. 4, 
1957, id., App. 5 at 109; see 46-47. 
468 I d. at 44-45. 
469 Plans for the reorganization were announced by the AEC at the time it published 
Part 1 of its regulations dealing with the offices and divisions of the Commission; zz 
Fed. Reg. 9972 (Dec. 12, 1957). However, these regulations still provided for a Divi-
sion of Civilian Application, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §1.113. On Dec. z6, 1957, the Com-
mission announced that the Division of Civilian Application had been replaced by the 
Division of Licensing and Regulation and the Office of Industrial Development; 
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 3· 
470 Section 24a, 42 U.S.C.A. §zo34(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §I.H>7. 
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sian of Civilian Application. 471 An Office of Industrial Development, 
reporting to the Assistant General Manager for Research and Industrial 
Development,472 was assigned the responsibility for developing over-all 
Commission policy to encourage and assist private activities in the 
civilian application of atomic energy. 
The greater the internal separation of functions achieved by the 
agency itself within the spirit and the letter of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the less need, and the less pressure, for legislative action 
creating a separation at the level of the agency or the divisions thereof. 
In view of the special problems which affect the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and the industry regulated thereby,473 greater adherence by the 
AEC to the areas of internal separation marked out by the Congress in 
the 1946 procedure statute would go far to meet the criticisms leveled 
at the agency. Should these procedures fail to provide that degree of 
insulation of the judging from the prosecuting, investigating, and de-
velopmental functions which will assure administrative due process and 
encourage public and Congressional confidence in the atomic energy pro-
gram, then more drastic action by the legislature may well be favorably 
considered. Such drastic action, of course, will be invited by the Com-
mission if it fails to meet the standards set by the spirit as well as the 
letter of the Administrative Procedure Act.474 
6. Congressional Review of Licensing 
Although the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was given the 
authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 475 to sit as a reviewing 
body in the case of facilities' licenses. proposed to be issued by the 
4n 10 Code Fed. Regs. §I.IIJ. 
472 Section 24c, 42 U.S.C.A. §2034(cY; 10 Code Fed. Regs. §I.IIO. 
478 Joint Committee Staff Study, mpra note 3, at 42-43; see id. at 47: "At this 
stage of the atomic-development program, the arguments against a separate agency 
are perhaps more persuasive than they will be at a later stage when commercial pro-
duction of atomic power is achieved .and the Government's developmental and pro-. 
motional assignments are a less prominent part of the Government's overall role [in] 
atomic-power development. . . . As a longer range view is taken of atomic energy 
development, however, the strength of the arguments against a separate agency di-
minish, and tend at some point to be outweighed by the arguments favoring separa-
tion .... " 
474 Such was the case when Congress in 1947 conferred final authority on the Gen-
eral Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board with respect to investigation of 
unfair labor practices, issuance of complaints thereon, and prosecution of such com-
plaints before the Board, -29 U.S.C.A. §153 (d), while the Board continued to exercise 
the adjudicatory authority of the agency, 29 U.S.C.A. §160. 
m Section 7, 42 U.S.C. §1807 (1946). 
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Atomic Energy Commission, this authority never was exercised. As 
originally enacted, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not provide for 
such review, but, by amendment to the appropriations provisions of the 
statute in 1957, this review has been provided for indirectly. 
It is reported that the Chairman of the Joint Committee refused in 
January 1957 to have a hearing devoted exclusively to the then pending 
construction permit for Power Reactor Development Co.476 However, 
in the hearings which the Committee held thereafter with respect to the 
development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry 471 and 
to authorizing legislation for the AEC budget for fiscal year 1958,478 
the issues involved in the PRDC proceeding were a major source of dis-
cussion and controversy. Although the procedure whereby AEC funds 
were authorized and then appropriated had been the subject of prior 
adverse comment by some members of Congress/79 it is clear that the 
controversy resulting from the proposed construction permit for PRDC 
brought the matter to a head. The result was a drastic change in the 
authorizing procedure 480 which may well result in Joint Committee 
review of all construction permit and licensing proceedings involving 
in any way financial help from the federal government. 
476 By letter dated Jan. 16, 1957, Rep. Ashley (Dem., Ohio) requested Joint Com-
mittee Chairman Durham "to make it [the PRDC project] a proper subject of hear-· 
ings by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy." The Chairman responded that the 
question was "not appropriate" for a separate hearing. BNA, Atomic Industry Re-
porter 3:46-47. 
n1 See, e.g., exchange between between Rep. Holifield and counsel for some of the 
intervenors, 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 479: "Representative Holi-
field. So your contention essentially is this; That •.. you are now asking this com-
mittee to exercise its jurisdiction and go into this matter [the PRDC proceeding] 
thoroughly? Mr. Sigal. Yes ...• " 
478 See, e.g., Statement of Walter P. Reuther, President, UAW, AFL-CIO, 1957 
Authorizing Legislation Hearings, supra note 7 at 6o2: "The Atomic Energy Com-
mission will probably wait until this session of the Congress had adjourned and re-
affirm their decision taken last year. The only recourse the people of Detroit and 
Toledo have lies in this Committee. We urge you not to permit the construction of 
this hazardous fast-breeder reactor ...• We urge you to disapprO'Ue and disallow the 
authorization sought here until the AEC cancels the construction permit ... " [Em-
phasis supplied.] The opposite point of view was expressed by Robert W. Hartwell, As-
sistant General Manager of PRDC, id. at 634: "Messrs. Reuther and Sigal have 
asked the subcommittee to sit in judgment on the uncompleted record of the construc-
tion permit proceeding. • . . Messrs. Reuther and Sigal obviously want the subcom-
mittee and the Congress to sit as· a court of appeal and to do so before a!J. the facts 
are in. ... " 
479 H.R. Rep. No. 571, supra note 241 at 2; Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 518g 
(1957); BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter I: 19. 
480 Section 261, 42 U.S.C.A. §2017; see Green, "The Strange Case of Nuclear 
Power," 17 Fed. Bar J. 100, 123-125 (1957). 
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Prior to the 1957 amendment to Section 261 of the Atomic Energy 
Act, the Commission was required to submit the construction portion of 
its proposed program for the coming fiscal yea~ for review and authori-
zation by the Joint Committee and Congress before appropriations were 
requested from Congressional appropriations committees. The re-
mainder of the Commission's program, that is, expenditures not involv-
ing so-called "bricks and mortar," was submitted directly to the House 
Ways and Means Committee without prior authorizing legislation initi-
ated by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and passed by 
Congress.481 
The original appropriations procedure of the 1954 act was, in the 
opinion of the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
"inadequate as a framework within which appropriation requests can be 
adequately considered for atomic electric power." He criticized the prac-
tice of the Commission in "arbitrarily" dividing its civilian power 
reactor program under the first three rounds of invitation into two fiscal 
categories, one covering physical structures subject to prior Congres-
sional authorization by the Joint Committee and the other covering 
operating expenses not so subject to such prior authorization. The 
result, according to the Chairlllan, 
... has been that for fiscal years 1956, 1957, and 1958 the 
amount appropriated and requested for the civilian power re-
actor program totals $236.8 million, of which only $40 million 
was authorized under authorizing legislation reported out by 
the joint committee and approved by the Congress .... 482 
Section 261, as amended in 1957, now requires that appropriations 
involving any non-military experimental reactor designed to produce 
more than ro,ooo thermal kilowatts of heat or designed to be used in 
the production of electric power must be authorized by the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy before legislation appropriating the funds 
481 This departure from the treatment accorded .most regulatory agencies by legis-
lation aff~cting their appropriations was made possible by the former language of 
Section 261, which automatically authorized to be appropriated "such sums as may 
be ~ecessary and appropriated to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act 
except such as may be necessary for the acquisition or condemnation of any real prop-
erty or any facility or for plant or facility acquisition, construction, or expansion." 
Under Section 19 of the 1946 statute, 42 U.S.C. §1819 (1946), "there are hereby 
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry 
out the provisions of this Act," without any requirement for authorizing legislation. 
482 Rep. Cannon, 103 Cong. Rec. 5189 (1957); see H.R. Rep. No. 571, mpra note 
241 at 2. 
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therefor can be enacted.483 Specific authorization also now is required 
for funds 
. . . necessary to carry out cooperative programs with persons 
for the development and construction of reactors for the dem-
onstration of their use, in whole or in part, in the production 
of electric power or process heat, or for propulsion, or solely 
or principally for the commercial provision of byproduct ma-
terial, irradiation, or other special services, for civilian use, by 
arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and loans) or 
amendments thereto, providing for the payment of funds, the 
rendering of services, and the undertaking of research and de-
velopment without full reimbursement, . . . by the Commis-
sion of any other financial assistance pursuant to such 
arrangement. . . . 484 
The effect of this legislation 485 is to bring the regulation and develop-
ment of contractual arrangements between the Commission and private 
industry and many non-profit research institutions under the additional 
umbrella of JointCommittee supervision. Thereby, that committee will 
be placed in a position to review all applications for construction per-
mits or licenses involving financial benefits. m Although reform in the 
procedure for authorizing the appropriation of funds for the Atomic 
Energy Commission probably was long overdue, the atmosphere in 
488 Section 26Ia(I), 42 U.S.C.A. §20I7(a) (I). 
484 Section 26Ia(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §20I7(a) (2). 
485 The administration of Section 26Ia(2), as implemented by Section III of each 
authorization bill, is thus explained by the Joint Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 57I, supra 
note 241 at 9: "Under Section 26Ia(2) and proposed section III of the authorization 
bill, it is contemplated that ·the Commission will request each year authorization for 
a certain amount of funds as a lump sum for use in a program not to exceed another 
lump SUlii, larger in amount. The first amount would cover appropriations to be 
authorized, while the second amount would provide a total limitation on the payments 
and other cpnsiderations which could be made available under the program ... As 
each individual agreement is negotiated under that lump sum, the basis of the proposed 
individual arrangement ... must be submitted to the Joint Committee, and a period 
of 45 days must elapse while Congress is in session ... before the Commission may 
enter the individual arrangement" (emphasis supplied). The latter requirement is that 
provided in a uniform Section III for authorization bills agreed upon by the Joint 
Committee, id. at 8, and as enacted in the authorizing legislation for fiscal year I958, 
Pub. L. 85-I62, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (I957). 
486 This will affect all outstanding construction permits held by persons under the 
first and second rounds of the civilian power reactor program. See H.R. Rep. No. 57I, 
supra note 24I at g: "Thus [under Section 26I of the Atomic Energy Act and Sec-
tion III of authorizing legislation] the basis for each arrangement by the AEC with 
industry under the first, second, third, and all subsequent rounds, will be submitted 
individually to the Joint Committee before the Commission may proceed to enter into 
the arrangement. All arrangements heretofore entered into are subject to the authori-
zation and appropriation of funds, unless obligated. . . ." 
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which this legislative change has been effected was unfortunate. The 
new Section 261 was designed in general to increase Congressional con-
trol over the atomic energy program. In particular, it was intended to 
give the Joint Committee indirect control over the licensing of the 
civilian atomic energy industry both in the production of electrical 
energy and in research and development. 
It is clear that Commission financial support for many developmental 
projects will be required in the future. Under the civilian power reactor 
program, this aid has taken the form of waiver of established Com-
mission charges for use of source and special nuclear material, mutually 
agreed-upon research and development work in federal laboratories 
where such work is not reasonably available elsewhere, and support of 
research and development required to advance the technology of the in-
dustry as a whole. To limit this help, or to subject all contracts and 
other arrangements concerned therewith to Congressional scrutiny and 
possible rejection, therefore constitutes a limitation upon the licensing 
authority of the regulatory body involved. 
7· Judicial Review 
Under Section 14(a) of the McMahon Act of 1946 487 the provisions 
of Section 10 of the Administration Procedure Act 488 were made ap-
plicable to decisions of the Atomic Energy Commission. Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review of agency action causing 
legal wrong to any person is provided, except where " ( 1) statutes pre-
clude judicial review or ( 2) agency action is by law committed to 
agency discretion." 
The 1946 provision never was implemented by either statutory re-
view procedure or agency regulation. Only two judicial decisions have 
been found dealing with Section 14, and they did not construe the 
scope of review intended by Congress, except to emphasize the bar to 
judicial reconsideration of agency discretion.489 
The 1954 statute established a more explicit set of provisions for 
487 42 U.S.C. §1814(a) (1946). 
488 5 U.S.C.A. §1009. 
489 Fletcher v. Commission, 192 F. :zd 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1951), ceri. den. 342 U.S. 
914 (1952) (Court of Appeals can review Commission denial of award for alleged use 
of petitioners' inventions but not denial of "just compensation" for such alleged use, 
the remedy therefor being suit in Court of Claims); United Electrical, Radio & 
Machine Workers of America v. Lilienthal, 84 F. Supp. 64o (D.C.D.C. 1949) (Court 
cannot review "executive action committed by law to the discretion of the Atomk 
Energy Commission") 
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judicial review. Under Section 189b,490 judicial review is expressly 
permitted from final orders entered in proceedings for ( 1) the granting, 
suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit 
or. application to transfer control, ( 2) the issuance or modification of 
rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees, and (3) the 
payment of compensation, awards, or royalties. 
The area of judicial review may be actually narrower under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 than under the 1946 atomic energy legisla-
tion. It is not impossible that the government would claim that any 
other final order of the Commission entered in a proceeding not specifi-
cally listed in Section 189b is impliedly excluded from judicial re-
view.491 Such a position, however, would be contrary to the legislative 
intent in enacting Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.492 
The procedure for invoking review under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 is provided under a statute enacted by Congress in 1950.493 This 
legislation, after 1954, gave the Federal Courts of Appeals "exclusive 
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to 
determine the validity of, all final orders ... of the Atomic Energy 
Commission made reviewable" by Section 189 of the 1954 act.494 The 
restrictive language of this statute as to the reviewabie orders of the 
Commission also creates a likelihood that judicial review of Commission 
action will be sought to be closely restricted by the government. 
8. Indemnity and Public Liability 
By amendment in 1957 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,405 Con-
gress has sought to meet the problems of public liability and property 
49o 42 U.S.C.A. §2239(b). 
491 Thus, the Joint Committee report on the 1954 act stated that "Section 189 pro-
vides for judicial review of a final order of the Commission entered ill certain agency 
actions" (H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 29). [Emphasis supplied.] See Joint 
Committee Staff Study, supra note 3 at 71-75; McGrath v. Zander, 177 F. 2d 649 
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (orders of Alien Property Custodian). 
492 Sen .. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 275: . "To preclude judicial review under 
this bill [Administrative Procedure Act] a statute, if not specific in withholding such 
review, must upon.i~ face give cl~ and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. 
The ~ere .failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no 
evidence of intent to withhold review." 
498 5 U.S.C.A. §§WJI et seq. 
494 5 U.S.C.A. §1032. 
496 Pub. L. 85--256, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957). See Butler, "Liability Insurance 
for the Nuclear Energy HaZ<lrd," (io P. U. Fort. 9I3 (1957). 
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damage which might arise from a nuclear accident. As stated by the 
Joint Committee, 
... [T]he problem of possible liability in connection with 
the operation of reactors is a major deterrent to further in-
dustrial participation in the [civilian reactor] program. While 
the [Section] 202 hearings held in 1957 indicate that it may 
not be the most important deterrent-that appears to be the 
current lack of economic incentive-the problem of liability 
has become a major roadblock.496 
Although evidence available to date does not indicate that the ·chances 
for, and damages resulting from, such an accident are considerable;497 
Congress has shown salutary foresight and ingenuity in developing a 
system of private insurance and governmental indemnity which is made 
an integral part of the contracting and licensing controls of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. 498 The policy underlying the Congressional ac-
tion, as added to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 itself, is that 
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development 
of the atomic energy industry, in the interest of the .general 
496 H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 22J at I; AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Re-
port I77 (I9S8): "The remote possibility that privately owned nuclear reactors 'migh~ 
have a catastrophic accident created the problem that private organizations building or 
operating the facilities might incur a public liability larger than could be met either 
by the financial structure of their organization or by the resources of the insurance 
industry .... " See Hearings on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor. Safety Before 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. I47 (1957) (hereafter 
cited as I957 Indemnity Hearings) : " ... [I]n a recent poll conducted by the Atomic 
Industrial Forum, the unresolved liability question was rated second only to the lack 
of economic incentives as a roadblock to further progress" (testimony of Francis K. 
McCune, Vice-President, General Electric Co.); Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.~ 
Financial Protection Against Atomic Hazards (I957). 
497 H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223, at 3: "Assuming that there were IOO large. 
power reactors operating in the United States, the [Atomic Energy] Commission has 
found that the most pessimistic of the probabilities involved lead to the estimate that 
there would be less than I chance in so million of any person getting killed in any 
year in a reactor incident as compared to I chance in s,ooo for getting killed in an 
automobile accident. It is also concluded that hypothetical property damages range 
from a lower limit of about one-half a million dollars to an upper limit, in the worst 
imaginable case, of $7 billion. This latter figure is largely due to a contamination of 
land with fission products .... There was no disagreement that . the probability of 
major reactor accidents was exceedingly low." See testimony of AEC Chairman 
Strauss, I957 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 496 at II-I2; AEC, Twenty-third Semi-
Annual Report 177-178 (1958). 
498 The principal opposition to the enactment of governmental indemnity legislation 
was voiced by Rep. Holifietd in a vigorous dissent to the Joint Committee report favor-
ing the legislation, H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra 223 at 35-40. In his opinion, the legisla-
tion "would provide another Government subsidy to atomic power development with-
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welfare and of the common defense and security, the United 
States may make funds available for a portion of the damages 
suffered by the public from nuclear incidents, and may limit 
the liability of those persons liable for such losses.489 
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The system established by Congress, to be administered by the 
Atomic Energy Commission in conjunction with the Joint Committee, 
regulates both licensees and contractors of the Commission. Holders of 
licenses for the distribution of special nuclear material previously were 
required, as a condition of that license, to "hold the United States and 
the Commission harmless from any damages resulting from the use or 
possession" of such material. 500 This requirement has been modified to 
the extent that indemnification by the United States and limitation of 
liability are available to licensees and contractors 501 under new Sec-
tion 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.502 
Section 1700 requires that a person holding a license or construction 
permit pursuant to either Section 103 or Section 104 of the act 503 must 
provide certain financial protection against losses arising from a "nuclear 
out any commensurate benefits to taxpayers and power consumers" and "is just another 
prop for industries too timid to move ahead without paternalistic Government help" 
(id. at 35-36). 
499 Section 2i, 42 U.S.C.A. §2012(i). See H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 15: 
"The primary concern of the Federal Government is with the protection to the people 
who might suffer damages from the new atomic energy industry. Since many of the 
reactors which will be built will be producing special nuclear material which is vital 
to the defense of the country, it is in the interest of the common defense and security 
to see that these companies are protected in their operations by having moneys avail-
able to them for payment of public liability claims and having limitations of liability 
proceedings available when those funds are insufficient. Since title to special nuclear 
material is in the United States, Congress has special powers and duties with respect 
to the use of that material. One of the other constitutional bases for the limitation 
of liability program is the bankruptcy power of the United States for it is improbable 
that any firm could survive claims against it of $soo million, over and above the insur-
ance which might be available." 
5oo Section 53e(8), 42 U.S.C.A. §2073(e) (8). 
501 See H.R. Rep. No. 435, svpra note 223 at 15. 
5o2 42 U.S.C.A. §2210. 
503 In addition, the Commission has the option to require that a licensee for special 
nuclear materials (Section 53 of the 1954 act), source materials (Section 63), and 
byproduct materials (Section 81) furnish such financial protection, but it "is not ex-
pected that ordinarily the Commission will use the authority given to it with respect 
to these latter three types of materials." H.R. Rep. No. 435, svpra note 223 at 19. 
In its 1958 report to the Joint Committee required to be submitted under Section 17oi 
of the statute, the AEC stated that it was studying the problem of extending insurance-
indenmity requirements to licensees other than those licensed under Sections 103 or 104, 
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 116. 
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incident," 504 and also must enter into an indemnity agreement with the 
Atomic Energy Commission.605 Under Section 170b and temporary 
Commission regulation,506 financial protection, i.e., the ability to respond 
in damages for public Iiability,507 must be provided in the amount of 
$150,000 per thousand kilowatts of thermal energy capacity authorized 
by the applicable license, but in no cases shall the amount of coverage be 
less than $250,000 for each nuclear reactor. 508 
504 A "nuclear incident" is defined in Section uo, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(o), as "any 
occurrence within the United States causing bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, 
or loss of or damage to property, or for loss of use of property, arising out of or re-
sulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, 
special nuclear, or byproduct material." See H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 16: 
"The definition of 'nuclear incident' is designed to protect the public against any form 
of damage arising from the special dangerous properties of the materials used in the 
atomic energy program. ... [l]t was not thought that an incident would necessarily 
have to occur within any relatively short period of time. For instance, the steady ex-
posure to radiation ... could constitute an incident. . . . The indemnification agree-
ments are intended to cover damages caused by nuclear incidents for which there may 
be liability no matter when the damage is discovered, i.e., even after the end of the 
license .... " 
5011 Section 17oa also establishes a third type of licensing condition applicable to 
persons which have immunity against suit, i.e., state-owned educational institutions. 
Such an institution may be required by the Commission to "shed its immunity," H.R. 
Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 19-20; see 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.16. The provi-
sion of Section 17oa that the AEC "may require, as a furti:Ier condition of issuing 
a license, that an applicant waive any immunity from public liability conferred by 
Federal or State law" has created difficulties for the Commission which are not yet 
satisfactorily resolved. In its April 1958 report to the Joint Committee, the AEC 
stated that, with only one exception, federal and state agencies receiving facilities' 
licenses from the Commission claimed they could not waive immunity from public 
liability because of existing statutory or constitutional law. According to the AEC, 
work was progressing on possible legislation to waive federal immunity from tort 
liability with respect to claims arising out of nuclear incidents and on a model bill 
for such waiver by the states up to the amount of insurance carried and the AEC in-
demnity. BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: II5-II6. (Ed. Note: By Pub. L. 85-744 
( 72 Stat. 837), Congress added Section 170k to the Act to exempt nonprofit educa-
tional institutions from the requirements of Section 170 and provided for the federal 
indemnity of $soo,ooo to apply to public liability in excess of $250,000 arising from a 
nuclear incident.) 
5os 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.II. The temporary regulations were issued Sept. II, 
1957, shortly after enactment of Section 170 of the statute; 22 Fed. Reg. 7223, BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 227:625. In its report to the Joint Committee in April 
1958, the AEC submitted the draft of a proposed permanent regulation with respect 
to amounts of insurance to be carried by reactors, 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.II, and 
stated that it was considering the amendment of other provisions of the temporary 
regulation, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 54: 31. 
507 Section nj, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(i). 
11os AEC licensees under Sections 103 and 104 of the statute were required to sub-
mit proof of financial protection to the agency within 30 days after Sept. 26, 1957, 10 
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Although Section 170b and the Commission's regulations permit 
financial protection in the form of private contractual indemnities, self 
insurance, other proof of financial responsibility, or a combination of 
such measures,509 it is clear that insurance coverage from private sources 
is, and will be, the preferred method for complying with the Congres-
sional mandate. Insurance pools established by stock and mutual com-
panies prior to 1957 were believed capable of insuring losses up to 
$65 million in connection with a single nuclear accident. 510 
Provided a licensee has secured the necessary financial protection, he 
then is . entitled to an agreement of indemnity 511 from the Atomic 
Energy Commission. In providing for this protection, Section 170c of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides: 
The Commission shall, with respect to licenses issued between 
August 30, 1954, and August 1, 1g67, for which it requires 
financial protection, agree to indemnify and hold harmless the 
licensee and other persons indemnified, as their interest may 
appear, from public liability arising from nuclear incidents 
which is in excess of the level of financial protection required 
of the licensee. The aggregate indemnity for all persons in-
Code Fed. Regs. §140.13(a). Licensees are required to notify the Commission of any 
material change in proof of financial protection or in other financial information filed 
with the agency in connection therewith, id., §140.13(e). Where an insurance policy 
is furnished by the licensee, notice of renewal thereof must be furnished the Com-
mission at least 30 days prior to its expiration date, id., §140.14(b). Under 10 Code 
Fed. Regs. §I40.15(b), failure to provide proof of financial protection is grounds for 
suspension or revocation of a license. The proposed permanent amendment to 10 Code 
Fed. Regs. §140.II would require a minimum of $3,000,000 in financial protection for 
any nuclear reactor, with a. maximum required coverage of $6o millions, the amount 
of the insurance to be determined by formula based, among other things, on maximum 
power level, fuel cycle, and population possibly subject to a nuclear accident. 
509 10 Code Fed. Regs. §140.12. Under this regulation, "the licensee shall not sub-
stitute one type of financial protection for another type without first obtaining the 
written approval of the Commission." See H.R. Rep. No. 435, s11pra note 223 at 20-21. 
The AEC reported to the Joint Committee, in April 1958, that 12 out of 22 licensees 
required to submit proof of financial protection submitted insurance policies, and 
one elected to show adequate resources for self-insurance (BNA, Atomic Industry Re-
porter 4= II5). 
5to H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223· at 7 and to- II; AEC, Twenty-third Semi-
Annual Report 177-178 (1958) ; 1957 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 496 at 81-144-
511 Although the Commission has not yet announced a form of indemnity agreement 
to be used under Section I 70, "The Commission will, in due course, execute and issue 
agreements of indemnity," such agreements to be effective on the date of the regula-
tions issued under Section 170 170 (Sept. 26, 1957) or the "effective date of the 
license authorizing the licensee to operate the nuclear reactor involved, whichever is 
later" (Io Code Fed. Regs. §t40.17(a) ). Section 17of and 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§140.17(b) establish a fee o~ $30 per year per thousand kilowatts of thermal capacity 
authorized for the licensee to be issued an agreement of indemnity. 
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demnified in connection with each nuclear incident shall not 
exceed $soo,ooo,ooo including the reasonable costs of investi-
gating and settling claims and defending suits for damage. 
Such a contract of indemnification shall cover public liability 
arising out of or in connection with licensed activity.m 
Under Section 17oe, the liability of persons indemnified by the Com-
mission is limited to $500 millions, together with the amount of financial 
protection required, with respect to any single nuclear incident.518 Such 
limitation may be enforced by a proceeding instituted by the Commis-
sion or any person indemnified in the appropriate United States District 
Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy over the applicant.614 
Under Section 170d of the 1957 amendment to the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, the Commission is authorized 
. . . to treat with its own contractors in the same way it can 
treat with licensees under the provisions of this bill .... It 
is hoped that the Commission will adopt a policy of extending 
indemnity provisions to· contractors and subcontractors con-
sistent with that extended to licensees and their suppliers and 
subcontractors. . . . 
In this subsection, 'however, the Commission is allotted dis-
cretion as to the amount of financial protection which may be 
n 2 42 U.S.C.A. §2210(c). Section 170h further provides that the "agreement of 
indemnity may contain such terms as the Commission deems appropriate to carry out 
the purposes of this section," and shall require the person indemnified to cooperate 
with the Commission and Attorney General of the United States in any proceedings 
involving payment of the indemnity. With respect to the reasons for establishing a 
system of governmental indemnity, rather than of insurance, the Joint Committee has 
stated, H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 9: ."A system of indemnification is es-
tablished rather than an insurance system, since there is no way to establish any 
actuarial basis for the full protection required. The chance that a reactor will run 
away is too small and the foreseeable possible damages of the reactor are too great 
to allow the accumulation of a fund which would be adequate .•.. [I]f, as the Joint 
Committee anticipates, there never will be any call on the fund for payments, the funds 
will have been accumulated to no purpose. Hence, in this instance it seemed wisest to 
the Joint Committee not to treat this as an insurance problem but to treat it as an in-
demnification problem ...• " 
na In its· report the Joint Committee recognized that it might be necessary for Con-
gress to increase the amount of the indemnity, or the amount of limitation of liability, 
"in the light of the particular incident" (H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 21-22). 
GH I d. at 22-23. Under Section 17oi, the Commission is required to make a survey 
of the incident and report the same to the Joint Committee, as "an aid tO the Congress 
in establishing the causes of a nuclear incident. It is, in part, an aid to the parties in 
any action where it is unlikely that the public would be able to obtain the full amount 
of technical information which might be required .... " (H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 
223 at 24). The AEC also must report to the Joint Committee on April 1 of each 
year concerning operations under Section 170. 
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required of its contractors before the $500 million guaranteed 
indemnity attaches. This authority is to be available for any 
type of contract which the Commission may enter into, as well 
as to contracts and projects which the Commission may enter 
into jointly with other agencies of the Government .... 515 
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Although the Commission has not issued regulations with respect to the 
above provisions, persons contracting with a licensee will be afforded 
protection under the indemnity agreement made by the Commission 
with such a licensee.1118 
9· Transportation and Transmission 
Areas of possible conflict between the Atomic Energy Commission 
and other federal and state regulatory agencies arise in connection with 
the transportation of atomic materials and the transmission of electricity 
produced from nuclear energy. Although these two phases of govern-
ment regulation are generaJiy unrelated, they have a common character-
istic in that the jurisdiction of the AEC is either duplicated or supple-
mented, and they present possible problems of conflicting jurisdiction. 
a. Transportation 
Although possession of source, byproduct, and special nuclear ma-
terials must be licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission, in the case 
6u /d. at 21-22. 
1116 As a "person indemnified" within the definition of that term in Section 11r of 
the statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(r); see H.R. Rep. No. 435, supra note 223 at 17. The 
Joint Committee report also dealt with the problem facing carriers "transporting spent 
fuel elements from a reactor to a processing plant. If such a company, whether through 
negligence or otherwise, should have an accident which would spill the radioactive ma-
terials into a stream, this bill would afford protection to the public and to the carrier, 
even though the carrier is not required to be a licensee under the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 .... " Where the carrier transports materials and assemblies, such as reactor 
parts with fuel elements installed therein, it usually does so without any knowledge of 
the contents of the shipment, which is made by a contractor of the Commission. In 
such cases, the only recourse of the carrier, to assure protection in the event of a 
nuclear accident, may be to obtain a contract of carriage directly from the Commission. 
See 19.s8 Section 202 Hearings supra note 32 at 274-276. 
On January 16, 1958, the AEC announced that it was offering statutory indemnity 
to "[C]ommission prime contractors and their suppliers engaged in the operation of 
nuclear reactors or in operation of facilities such as gaseous diffusion plants or chemi-
cal separation plants" and "to other contractors engaged in activities involving the risk 
of occurrence of a substantial nuclear incident" (AEC Press Ret. No. A-9, see BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 227: 629). In May 1958 the AEC indicated to the Joint 
Committee that the decision. not to require private insurance from Contractors was 
being reconsidered; see BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 4: 159. 
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of persons transporting such materials, the ways and means for effecting 
such transportation come within the jurisdiction of four other federal 
agencies. After debate as to whether or not the Interstate Commerce 
Act was superseded by provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
with respect to transportation of atomic materials,517 the Atomic Energy 
Commission acceded to the claims of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for overriding authority in that field. In fact, the Atomic 
Energy Commission has temporarily relinquished its apparent authority 
over transportation of atomic materials not only to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission,618 but also to the United States Coast Guard/19 the 
Civil Aeronautics Board, 520 and the U. S. Post Office Department. 521 
This has been accomplished by exempting from Atomic Energy Com-
mission licensing regulation the interstate transportation activity of 
regulated carriers and the mails.522 In effect, the AEC has granted a 
general license to persons· subject to the jurisdiction of these four 
agencies, without actually relinquishing jurisdiction of the subject 
matter. 
The continuing jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission in the 
field of transportation is demonstrated by that agency's announcement 
on September 21, 1957, of proposed regulations 
. . . to establish appropriate precautions in connection with 
the transportation of special nuclear material to prevent acci-
dental conditions of criticality. Requirements to ·protect 
against other hazards in the shipment of such materials are 
prescribed pursuant to other parts [of the AEC's regulations] 
. . . and in regulations of other agencies having jurisdiction 
over means of transportation. Accordingly, the requirements 
of this part are in addition to, and not in substitution for, 
such other requirements. 528 
517 See Evans, Physical, Biological, and Administrative Problems Associated with 
Transportation of Radioactive Substances (National Research Council 1951), BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 281: 1-2. 
518 49 Code Fed. Regs. §§71.I-.I1, 72.1-.5, 73.1-430, 74-so6-.6oo, 75.65I-.659, 76.701-
·702, and 77.&>2-.870. 
519 46 Code Fed. Regs. §§146.01-4, 146.25-400. 
520 14 Code Fed. Regs. §§29.o-71. 
521 Post Offices Services Circular 2, Pt. 121, 124, and 125 (Dec. I, 1954); 39 Code 
Fed. Regs. §15.2(d), which was amended effective May 15, 1958, to limit the amount 
of radioactivity a package may contain, in addition to the previous limit on the amount 
of radiation from the surface of the package; 23 Fed. Reg. 2221 (Apr. 4, 1958), BNA, 
Atomic Industry Reporter 4 : 126. 
62210 Code Fed. Regs. §§30.7, 40.62(b), 50.11 I d), and 70.T2 
523 Proposed IO Codt> Fed. Regs. §71 I, 22 Ferl Reg. 7541 !Sept. 21. 11;57) 
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The Commission has summarized the proposed regulations as follows : 
The following proposed rule distinguishes between transpor-
tation by licensees [for special nuclear material] and transpor-
tation by such unlicensed carriers. Where special nuclear 
material is to be transported by a licensee, prior Commission 
approval of proposed shipping procedures must be obtained for 
all shipments in excess of the quantities of special nuclear 
material specified. . . . In the case of unlicensed carriers, 
there normally exists a possibility that a number of small 
quantities of special nuclear material from different shippers 
might come into hazardous proximity to each other. For this 
reason the quantity of special nuclear material which may be 
delivered to a carrier authorized to transport special nuclear 
material without a Commission license is set considerably 
lower ... except for cases where the licensee who makes the 
shipment is in a position to, and does, exercise such control 
over transportation of the shipment as to assure that the total 
quantity of special nuclear material in the shipment does not 
exceed the limits specified. . . . 624 
Although the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Coast Guard, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the U.S. Post Office usually 
do not require the issuance of a license as such, the packaging, marking, 
and container limitations imposed by these agencies constitute a form 
of indirect licensing control. Atomic material cannot be transported 
unless in conformity with these regulations. 
There apparently has been no effort to make these licensing require-
ments uniform even where practicable. More efficient and economical 
administration of the transportation of atomic material, and conse-
quently a less restrictive burden on the shippers and carriers involved, 
would result if the Atomic Energy Commission were to work out a 
uniform system of transportation requirements with the other four 
agencies involved, even though administration of these requirements 
were vested in the other agencies. 
G24 Ibid. Appendix A to the proposed regulation lists the qualities of uranium 235 
and 233 and plutonium which a licensee of special nuclear material may deliver to a 
carrier, without prior specific AEC approval, provided the licensee exercises "such 
supervision and control over the shipment as to assure that, if said special nuclear ma-
terial is transported with any other quantity of special nuclear material, the total 
quantity of special nuclear material does not exceed the limits specified in Appen-
dix A"; proposed 10 Code Fed. Regs. §71.22(a) (2). Appendix B lists the maximum 
quantity of types of special nuclear material which a licensee may deliver to a carrier 
unless in accordance with §71.22(a) or with special procedures approved by the Com-
Inission in connection with an application for a license for special nuclear material 
under §71 .23. . 
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b. Transmission 
Whenever the holder of a commercial atomic energy license transmits 
electric energy in interstate commerce or sells it at wholesale in such 
commerce, the Federal Power Commission is obliged to exercise juris-
diction with respect thereto. Such authority is in fact required as a 
condition of the Atomic Energy Commerce license. 525 
The dual jurisdiction thus involved creates the possibility of con-
flicting regulatory standards. This is particularly true with respect to 
accounting practices. The accounting standards required to establish 
financial responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act 526 may well differ 
from those of the Federal Power Commission for rate-making purposes. 
Indeed, critics of the present Atomic Energy Act have attacked its Sec-
tion 103 commercial licensing provisions as lacking the accounting and 
other financial restrictions imposed by the Federal Power Commission 
by statute and regulation. 527 
Further, a possible conflict in accounting practices may arise in con-
nection with the determination of a "fair price" to be paid by the AEC 
for the production of special nuclear material in a licensed reactor. Sec-
tion 56 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 528 provides that the agency, 
in determining such fair price, "may give such weight to the actual 
cost of producing that [special nuclear] material as the Commission 
finds to be equitable." Any difference in the methods of computing 
costs of such material under accounting regulations enforced by the 
AEC, Federal Power Commission, or a state agency would, of course, 
be undesirable and possibly result in inequity to the licensee. 
535 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 272, U.S.C.A. §2019; see 10 Code Fed. Regs., 
§50.43(c). Section 271 of the statute further provides that "[n]othing in this Act 
shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local 
agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power" (42 
U.S.C.A. §2018). 
526 Section 182a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2232(a); 10 Code Fed. Regs. §50.4o(b). 
527 H.R. ·Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5, at 122-123; Adams, supra note 239 at 168-170. 
In its report at the end of 1957, the Commission stated (Twenty-third Semi-Annual 
Report 98-99 (1958)): "Ascertaining costs for nuclear electric plants has required 
new applications of accounting principles. The items of capital costs of conventional 
plants are specified by the Federal Power Commission, for example, but as yet there 
is no agreement on the components of capital costs for nuclear reactors. During the 
past year the [Atomic Energy] Commission has studied the accounting problems in-
herent in power reactor construction and operations, and has developed an accounting 
basis for use in determining the operating economics of these new plants. . . . The 
Commission has been working with the Federal Power Commission and the National 
Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners on revising classification of accounts 
to cover production of power through the use of reactors." 
s2s 42 U.S.C.A. §2076. 
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D. Conclusions 
As officials of the Atomic Energy Commission often have observed 
since passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a license issued there-
under is not, like a contract, a mere matter of negotiation.529 Pre-
sumably, all requirements of the statute and regulations being satisfied, 
the applicant for a license will be entitled as a matter of legal right to 
engage in the activities covered by the 1954 act and his application. 
. This approach, however, oversimplifies the problem confronting the 
private organization or business seeking to risk its capital and resources 
in the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses.530 A license 
could.be a "gun [without] ... ammunition" if the Commission chose 
not to make available to the licensee such services as supplying enriched 
uranium, a matter of negotiation and not of right.531 Moreover, although 
an applicant may satisfy the requirements when the license is issued and 
may negotiate successfully for necessary supplies and services from the 
Commission, he can never be sure what changes in these requirements, 
and consequently changes in the terms of the license itself, will be made 
in the future. · 
· As the McKinney Panel has found, the over-all effect of the restric-
tions imposed upon Section 103 and 104 licensees "appears to be con-
trary to the stated objectives of the [ 1954] Act" and constitutes "an 
interference by the Federal Government in the right of the private 
investor to risk his own money, even to go broke, if he chooses to do 
so." 532 Further, 
The emphasis in the 1954 Act on licensing is sound as a means 
of establishing equality of treatment of private participants, 
only if it is recognized that licensing rather than Federal 
· ownership is to be the future course. 588 
So long as regulation of licensing is uniform and without serious 
changes in policy, the infant atomic energy industry can be reasonably 
certain of the requirements which must be met. In this respect, the 
529 Speech by Charles G. Manly, AEC Division of Civilian Application, July 27, 
1955, BNA, Atomic Industry Rep<>rter 277: I . 
• 5so See Brief for Applicant in the PRDC proceeding, supra note 314 at 87. 
531 Upton, supra note 207 at 496. The Commission occupies the dual function of 
iic~sing regulator and ''bargaining agent for the services" needed under a license. 
This means that the licensee is "dependent upon the Commission's good will alone and 
therefore is sm~ll consolation to lawyers accustomed to ascertaining their clients' rights 
and not merely negotiating their privileges" (id. at 498). 
582 McKinney Panel Repo~ supra note 10 at IJ2. 
533 !d. at IJ4. 
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Commission and its staff, in general, have performed an outstanding 
public service in establishing a unique system of federal regulation in 
which the interests of the government and of private industry, not 
always mutual, must be accommodated. The regulatory procedures 
established have been in general conformity with both the spirit and 
the letter of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, as required by 
the Atomic Energy Act itself and in the interest of administrative due 
process. 
The infirmities in the present licensing system are due not so much 
to the officials who administer the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 but to 
the statute itself, which these officials are bound to follow in promul-
gating the applicable regulations. The language of that act is so general 
in many important particulars as to be capable of differing interpreta-
tions. 584 For example, "national welfare" as used in the act has been 
interpreted with two entirely different emphases by proponents and 
opponents of private enterprise in the atomic field. The one interpreta-
tion favors minimum regulation to the extent consistent with national 
security and public health and safety. The other would require maximum 
regulation which would place private industry under complete govern-
ment domination in the licensed activity and thus tend to leave the field 
for public agencies alone. 
The result is that the 1954 act and the regulations issued thereunder 
contain within their provisions the possibilities for destroying the pri-
vate participation which the act purports to seek and encourage. Such 
an event could result from a radical change in Commission membership, 
with a consequent reversal of current policies. Therefore, in the inter-
ests of both the government and private enterprise, the 1954 statute 
should be re-examined with a view to establishing more definite stand-
ards for licensing, particularly with respect to commercial production 
and utilization facilities. If a reasonably favorable climate of regulation 
is lacking and especially if a markedly unfavorable attitude is adopted 
by the AEC and Congress, then it is clear that atomic development will 
be retarded, and the public will not enjoy the full benefits of this new 
source of energy. 
Re-examination of the antitrust procedures and conflicting jurisdic-
tional problems arising under provisions of the present act and its regu-
584 Stason, Atomic Energy Workshops, supra note 215 at 4: ". . . [T]here are 
only the vaguest 'standards' to guide the hand of the Commission. Whether or not 
licenses shall be issued in the first instance and whether or not they shall be modified 
or rev•lkerl subsequence to issuance, depends almost exclusively upon the uncontrolled 
discretion of thP Commission " 
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lations also is desirable in the public interest. If industry is to assume 
the role intended and stated by Congress in developing the field of peace-
time atomic energy without huge expenditures of federal funds, then 
the means for harassment of industry which are potentially present in 
the act must be modified, consistently with the public interest to encour-
age the development of a new and useful form of power. 
The statutory deficiencies in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 have 
assumed added importance in the light of amendments to that statute 
enacted by Congress during 1957, the cumulative effect of which is to 
add greatly to the powers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state 
. . . that the Congress, and in particular the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy, has seized control over the civilian atomic 
power program and has stripped the AEC of a large measure 
of the responsibility, authority, and discretion which it pre-
viously had possessed and which executive agencies normally 
possess. 585 
Under the 1946 statute, the Joint Committee came close to assuming 
the authority of the Commission itself, with the agency relegated to the 
role of general manager of the program. This unsatisfactory division 
of authority was rectified in some degree by the provisions of the 1954 
legislation. Yet, with the new powers exercised by the Joint Commit-
tee under the 1957 amendments, particularly with respect to detailed 
control over expenditures by the Commission, the pre-1954 situation 
may well have been re-established. 
Until the respective relationships and authorities of the Congressional 
Committee and the Commission are definitely established, uniform and 
consistent administration of the licensing provisions of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 is not assured, and a program of peaceful utiliza-
tion of atomic energy may well be inhibited. 
IV. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CONTRACTING 536 
Just as the issuance of licenses constitutes the most important aspect 
of the regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission, so the 
585 Green, supra note 48o at 124. See letter from AEC Chairman Strauss to Rep. 
Cole, Aug. 3, 1957, 103 Cong. Rec. A6319-A6321 (Aug. 5, 1957); Hartwell, supra 
note 478 at 639: "To encourage the parties in a formal AEC proceeding to try their 
case not only judicially but also at the same time before Congress is not only in deroga-
tion of the administrative and judicial processes provided by law but will in our judg-
ment go far toward destroying efficient and speedy administration of the development 
of civilian atomic power ... ;" 
ne For general background information on government contract problems and pro-
1316 FEDERAL REGULA TORY AND 
making of contracts provides the major means whereby the Commission 
administers and operates the atomic energy plant owned in a proprietary 
capacity by the United States government. Indeed, that plant is the 
largest single business of its kind in the United States, and probably in 
the free world. Atomic energy installations and other facilities have an 
estimated value before depreciation of approximately $7.06 billion. 587 
More than I 17,000 persons, including over 6,700 government personnel, 
are engaged in the operation of existing, and the construction of new, 
production facilities 538 under government control. Over one billion 
dollars was paid out by the Commission during fiscal year 1955 to cost-
type contractors and directly to subcontractors. 589 
Commission contracting powers go further than the mere provision 
for the construction and operation of the government's atomic energy 
plant. Under the civilian power reactor program authorized by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission's willingness to supply 
certain services and to contract for research has become an important 
adjunct to the system of licensing control established under that statute. 
The Manhattan Engineer District, predecessor of the Commission, 
established the policy of operating its facilities through contracts with 
private business units. This practice was continued by the. Commission 
when it took over the operations of the District on January 1, 1947.540 
cedure, see Tybout, Government Contracting in Atomic Energy (1956); Risik, "Fed-
eral Government Contract Oauses and Forms," 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 125 (1954); 
vom Baur, "Defense in the Atomic Age, the Law, and the Bar," 9 Wyo. L. J. 25 
(1954); Cuneo, "Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals; Tyrant or Impartial 
Tribunal?" 39 A.B.A.]. 373 (1953); Joy, "The Disputes Clause in Government Con-
tracts: A Survey of Court and Administrative Decisions," 25 Ford. L. Rev. II ( 1956) ; 
Shea, "Government Contracts; Standard Disputes Clause: Effect of Act of May II, 
1954,'' 40 Corn. L. Q. 355 (1955); Moss, "Practice Before Government Agencies," 15 
Fed. Bar J. 155 (1955); Schultz, "Proposed Changes in Government Contract Dis-
putes Settlement," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 217 ( 1953) ; Anderson, "The Disputes· Article in 
Government Contracts," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 211 (1945); Kennedy, "The Conclusiveness 
of Administrative Findings in Disputes Arising under Government Contracts," 4 Bay-
lor L. Rev. 160 (1952); Etheridge, "Appeals from Administrative Decisions in Gov-
ernment Contract Disputes," 31 Tex. L. Rev. 552 (1953). See also "Bibliography on 
Government Procurement and Contractual Procedure and Related Material," published 
by the Law Branch of the Army Library and revised at regular intervals, which can 
be obtained by writing the Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C. Numbers 
::z and 3 of Volume 16, Fed. Bar ]., contain an excellent summary of numerous prob-
lems relating to subcontractors of. the Federal Government. 
m AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 302 ( 1958). 
538 !d. at 307-3o8. 
53 9 Minsch, "Subcontracting in the Atomic Energy Program," 16 Fed. Bar J. 190-191 
( 1956). 
540 AEC. Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 10 ( 1958). 
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Government operation of production facilities appears to have been 
conclusively rejected by the Commission. This policy assumes additional 
importance under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, whereby Congress 
sought to encourage a privately owned and operated atomic energy 
industry through contractual relationships and cooperation between 
government and business. 541 
Despite the increasing importance of the role of contracting between 
the Commission and private business in the development and expansion 
of atomic energy for both military and industrial uses, the procedural 
and substantive problems created by this method of administrative con-
trol have tended to be overlooked by both government and private 
interests. This failure is unfortunate, but not surprising, in view of the 
current lack of development of procedures assuring administrative due 
process in other fields of government contract endeavor. 
A. Contracts in Administrative Law 
The current attitude of the Executive Branch of the government and 
of the courts towards contracts between the government and its citizens 
stems in large part from the c~ncept that, when entering into a contract, 
the government exercises a "proprietary" function. 542 This means that, 
since the government claims to assume the role of a private person in 
contractual dealings with private business, the government's actions are 
not necessarily held to be controlled by, or reviewable with respect to, 
accepted standards of administrative due process applicable to licensing 
and other more orthodox regulatory procedures. Moreover, government 
ownership of special nuclear material under the Atomic Energy Act of 
su See BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 221 : 1 : "Contractor operation of Commis-
sion-owned research and production facilities lays the foundation for eventual termina-
tion of Government monopoly in this field and for integration of atomic energy de-
velopment into the private enterprise system which is characteristic of this nation. 
Under the present atomic energy program as a whole, the Government draws upon the 
managerial skill of private enterprise, in return for which private enterprise acquires 
specialized technical knowledge in the field of atomic energy which, under present 
neces.si~ies of information control, is obtainable in no other manner." See also AEC 
Response to Questionnaire, supra note 77 at 1088: "The operations of AEC are 
carried out largely by industrial concerns and by private and public institutions under 
contract with the Commission .... " AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 138, 
161 (1958). 
542 The closest statutory definition of what constitutes a "proprietary" function is 
found in Section 4(2) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 
U:S.C.A. §1003(2), which refers to "any matter relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public prop~rty, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" and which ex-
cludes these subjects from the requirements for public rule making. 
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1954 543 gives the Commission, if it desires to exercise it, a powerful 
means of controlling not only contracting but also licensing under claim 
of exercise of the agency's "proprietary" rights. 
A corollary of the doctrine of "proprietary" function is that the 
private citizen or business dealing contractually with the government has 
only a privilege, not a right. 544 Persons contracting with the govern-
ment, as the Supreme Court has stated, are not "compelled or coerced 
into making the contract" which is considered a "voluntary undertaking 
on their part." 545 Should this exercise of the "privilege" be curtailed 
or denied in any way, therefore, neither general nor constitutional law 
provides an effective remedy for the injured party as a matter of right, 
except insofar as the courts are empowered to consider cases involving 
damages arising from breach of contracts. 
This concept of the government's "proprietary" functions and, as a 
corollary, the privilege status of private parties in the field of contracts 
are reflected in the provisions-or lack of them-with respect to con-
tracting in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. Pro-
cedures under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 546 are specifically 
exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act. 547 In Section 4(2) 
of the Administrative Procedure Act 548 the making of rules with respect 
to contracts, public property, and similar "proprietary" matters is ex-
cepted from the salutary requirements of public notice and hearing pro-
cedures required of most types of federally issued rules and. regulations. 
us Section 52, 42 U.S.C.A. §2072. 
544 See Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775, 843 
{1953) : "The government contractor ... is seen to have only the 'privilege' of 
dealing with the government. He is placed in a different position from that of the 
private citizen whose property or personal 'rights' are adversely affected by adminis-
trative action." For what a congressional committee has termed "All in all ... a 
shameful story" of unrestrained administrative over-reaching in the field of govern-
ment contracts, see Heyer Products Co., Inc. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409, 412 
(Ct. Cls. 1956). 
546 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100, 72 S. Ct. 154 (1951). See Wells 
Bros. Co. v. U.S., 254 U.S. 83, 87, 41 S. Ct. 34 (1920) ("Men who take million dollar 
contracts for Government buildings are neither unsophisticated nor careless .... "). 
u6 41 U.S.C.A. §§101 et seq. 
U 7 Section 2(a), 5 U.S.C.A. §IOOI (a); see Sen. Doc. No. 248, supra note 43 at 
44, 196, 302, 313, where the congressional. emphasis is upon the temporary wartime 
nature of the Contract Settlement Act as justification for the exception. 
548 5 U.S.C.A. §1003 (2) ; see Sen. Doc. No. 248, s~tf>ra note 43 at 199, 257: "The 
exception of proprietary matters is included because the principal considerations in 
most such cases relate to mechanics and interpretations or policy, and it is deemed wise 
to encourage and facilitate the issuance of rules by dispensing with all mandatory pro-
cedural requirements ...• " 
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In this connection, the rules of the Atomic Energy Commission with 
respect to procurement policy 549 and to the procedure of agency's Ad-
visory Board of Contract Appeals 550 were promulgated apparently, 
without public participation in the rule-making process. 
Although the federal government and the courts consistently adhere 
to the theory that the making and administration of public contracts is 
not a phase of administrative procedure/51 it is clear that a "Government 
contract . . . is but a convenient administrative device for the Govern-
ment to get its procurement work done and ... administrative de-
cisions of the Government's officers should be treated no differently 
from other administrative orders which affect private interests." 652 As 
is the case in most other federal agencies and departments, however, 
neither the statutory nor regulatory procedures of the Atomic Energy 
Commission recognize this obvious and important fact of governmental 
life. 
B. Contracting Authority under Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
Provisions of both the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 dealing 
with the contracting authority of the Atomic Energy Commission were, 
until 1957, substantially similar. The major difference arose from the 
implementation of sections of the later statute with respect to the use of 
electrical power produced by atomic energy, which authority was not 
sought to be exercised by the Commission under the earlier legislation. 
However, in 1957, Congress provided for certain special contractual 
treatment for publicly and cooperatively owned utilities 553 and for Con-
549 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 5, 16 Fed. Reg. 1759 (Feb. 22, 1951). 
55o 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 3, IS Fed. Reg. 5834 (Aug. 30, 1950). 
551 See Ramey and Erlewine, "Introduction to the Concept of the 'Administrative 
Contract' in Government Sponsored Research and Development," 17 Fed. Bar ]. 354, 
355 n. 3 (1957). 
552 Schultz, supra note 536 at 246-47, who adds: "Be that as it may, contract no-
tions are so deeply imbedded in the thinking of judges and businessmen that it would 
be revolutionary for one to deny their expectation that an individual or corporation 
contracting with the Government will be fully protected with traditional rights and 
remedies .... " Proposed legislation drafted by the Task Force on Legal Services 
and Procedure of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government specifically defines "the performance of all proprietary functions such as 
... the execution [or performance] of public contracts in which private rights, claims, 
or privileges are asserted or affected" as informal adjudication; Administrative Code, 
Section 202(b), Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 
366. 
5GSSection nt(a)(l), Pub. L. Ss-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); see discus-
sion, infra. 
1320 FEDERAL REGULATORY AND 
gressional review of contracts involving the expenditure· of public funds 
in connection with private projects. 554 
Authority to execute contracts was specifically granted the Atomic 
Energy Commission under the 1946 statute with respect to four major 
categories of activity. Three of these provisions were extensively used 
by the agency. The fourth, relating to byproduct power re$ulting from 
utilization of atomic energy, proved a deadletter. 
Under Section 3 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946/55 the Com-
mission was "authorized and directed to make arrangements (including 
contracts, agreements, and loans)" for the conduct of research and .de-
velopment activities relating to nuclear processes, the theory and produc-
tion of atomic energy, and similar matters of primarily scientific im-
portance. Section 4 (c) ( 2) 556 con fer red the authority to contract with 
private industry for the construction and operation of production facili-
ties for fissionable materials. Section 5 (a) ( 5) 557 authorized contracts 
for the purchase of fissionable materials outside the United States, or 
of "any interest in facilities for the production of fissionable material 
or in real property on which such facilities are located." Finally, under 
Section 5(b) (5) and (6),558 authority was granted the Commission .to 
contract for supplies of source material or for any interest in real prop-
erty containing source material, and for "exploratory operations, investi,. 
gations, and inspections" with respect to such material. 
In exercising its authority under the above sections, the Commission 
was permitted to forego competitive bidding by advertising "upon certi~ 
fication . . . that such action is necessary in the interest of the common 
defense and security, or upon a showing that advertising is not reasona-
bly practicable." 559 The statutory conditions imposed upon contractors 
under these sections related to health and safety measures, requirements 
for reports and inspections, and subcontracting only :with Commission 
approval. 560 
554 Section II 1 (b), Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1957) and Section 261a; 
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §2017(a), Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); see 
discussion, infra. 
555 42 U.S.C. §18o3(a) (1946). 
55642 U.S.C. §18o4(c) (2) (1946). 
55742 U.S.C. §18o5(a) (S) (1946). 
55s 42 u.s.c. §18o5(b)(5) and (6)( 1946). 
559 Otherwise required by Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, 41 U.S.C.A. §5. 
Under Executive Orders 10216 (Feb. 23, 1951) and 10210 (Feb. 2, 1951), Commission 
contracts ·made without competitive bidding had to contain a clause authorizing the 
Comptroller General to have access to, and to examine, the contractor's books. 
560 Section 3(a), 42 U.S.C. §18o3(a) (1946), also provided with respect to research 
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Two sections of the 1946 act related to sales of electrical energy gen-
erated in connection with the production of fissionable material. The 
first of these provisions under Section 7 (d) 561 was never utilized, since 
no commercial licenses which might have resulted in power generation 
ever were authorized. Under the second statutory provision enacted 
July 17, 1953,562 the Commission was authorized, in connection with the 
construction or operation of its Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth 
installations, to enter into contracts for electric-utility services for 
periods not exceeding twenty-five years. This authority served as the 
basis for a similar but expanded provision in the 1954 act.563 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 contained no provisions dealing with 
the general contracting authority of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
other than that the agency was empowered to· acquire materials, prop-
erty, equipment, and facilities, and to acquire, purchase, lease and hold 
real and personal property required to carry out its functions. ~84 Pro-
curement regulations,665 and the statutory 588 authority of, and regula-
tions affecting,587 the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals under the 
1946 act were continued in effect under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954,~88 and will be discussed in connection therewith. 
C. Contracting Authority under Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
1. Research 
Section 31 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ~69 is the counterpart 
of Section 3(a) of the earlier statute. The principal difference in 
language between the earlier and later provisions lies in the broadened 
scope of research and development activities under the 1954 act,570 this 
being in accordance with the proposed aims of that statute.511 
that no contract "shall ... contain any provisions or conditions which prevent the 
dissemination of scientific or technical information, except to the extent such dissemi-
nation is prohibited by law." 
68142 U.S.C. §I8o7(d) (I!)46). 
582 Section I2(d), 42 U.S.C. §I812(d)(1946). 
s8s Section I64, 42 U.S.C.A. §2204. 
~84 Section I2(a) (S) and (7), 42 U.S.C. §I8I2(a) (5) and (7) (I946). 
585 Io Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 5, I6 Fed. Reg. I759 (Feb. 22, I9SI). 
586 Section I2(a) (1) and (c), 42 U.S.C. §I8I2(a) (I) and (c) (I946). 
561 10 Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 3, IS Fed. Reg. 5834 (Aug. 30, I9SO). 
568 Note, 10 Fed. Regs. Ch. I, I9 Fed. Reg. 5628 (Sept. 3, I954). 
569 42 U.S.C.A. §20SI. 
510 Section 3(a) (4) of the Atomic Energy Act of I946 authorized AEC contracts 
for, among other things, "ut~lization of fissionable and radioactive Jnaterials and proc-
esses entailed in the production of such Jnaterials for all other purposes, including in-
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Under Section 3I of the present statute,572 the Commission is author-
ized and directed to make arrangements, including contracts, for the 
conduct of research, development, and training activities relating to 
(I) nuclear processes, ( 2) the theory and production of atomic energy, 
(3) utilization of special nuclear material and radioactive material for 
medical or other purposes, (4) utilization of special nuclear material, 
atomic energy, and radioactive material and processes entailed in the 
utilization or production of atomic energy or such material for all other 
purposes, including industrial uses, the generation of usable energy, and 
the demonstration of the practical value of utilization or production 
facilities for industrial or commercial purposes, and (S) protection of 
health and safety. Where the Commission "finds private facilities or 
laboratories are inadequate to the purpose," it is authorized to conduct 
research for private parties in its own facilities for the purposes stated 
in Section 31.573 Although Section I69 574 of the 1954 act prohibits the 
making of any subsidy to the holder of a license or construction permit 
under Sections 103 and I04, a payment made by the Commission to a 
permittee or licensee, pursuant to a contract under Section 3 I, is spe-
cifically permitted by Section I69. 
Section 3 I contains provisions with respect to contractual conditions 
assuring health and safety, requiring reporting, and permitting inspec-
tion of work done thereunder. As was the case under the Atomic 
Energy Act of I946,575 
No such arrangement [under Section 3 I] shall contain any 
provisions or conditions which prevent the dissemination of 
scientific or technical information, except to the extent such 
dissemination is prohibited by law.516 
Contracts may be made without public advertising for bids upon Com-
mission certification that such action is necessary in the public interest 
or upon a showing that advertising is not reasonably practicable. m 
dustrial uses." Under Section 31a(4) and the 1954 act, this class of contracts has been 
greatly extended beyond mere "industrial uses." 
571 Sections 1, 2a and g, and 3b and d, 42 U.S.C.A. §§20n, 2012(a) and (g), and 
2013(b) and (d). 
m Section 31a(1)-(5), 42 U.S.C.A. §2051 (a) (1)-(5). 
578 Section 33, 42 U.S.C.A. §2053. 
5'74 42 U.S.C.A. §2209. 
575 Section 3(a), 42 U.S.C. §18o3(a) (1941)). 
576 Section 31d, 42 U.S.C.A. §2051 (d). Control of information is covered in Sec-
tions 141-146, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2161-2166, of the 1954 act. 
377 Section Jib, 42 U.S.C.A. §2051 (b); see note 559, supra. Detailed regulations 
concerning procurement without formal advertising are contained in 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§§5.81-5.93. 
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2. Commission Production Facilities 
Contracting authority of the Commission with respect to the produc-
tion of special nuclear material under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 578 
is broader than under the 1946 statute.579 Under Section 41b of the 
new act, substantially equivalent to Section 4 (c) ( 2) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946, the Commission may continue former contracts 
or enter into new contracts for the construction and operation of facili-
ties owned by the Commissiot) for the production of special nuclear 
material. Such contracts must assure protection against health and safety 
hazards; must permit inspection by and require reports to the Commis-
sion,580 must contain security restrictions,1581 and may be negotiated with-
out competitive bidding under certain stated circumstances.582 The Com-
mission also is given authority to acquire production facilities or to 
acquire real estate for the construction of production facilities for its 
own needs, again in some cases without regard to public advertising.583 
3· Energy Generated in Production Facilities 
An important provision of the 1954 act, as originally enacted, with 
respect to the production of special nuclear material,58~ permitted the 
Commission "to dispose of usable energy generated in the production 
facilities or in the experimental utilization facilities owned by the Com-
mission." 5815 Concerning this statutory provision, the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy has stated : 
If the energy is sold to publicly or privately owned utilities or 
users, the price is to be subject to regulation by the appropriate 
agency, State or Federal, having jurisdiction. This section 
will permit the Commission to dispose of that utilizable energy 
it produces in the course of its own operations, but does not 
permit the Commission to enter the power-producing business 
without further congressional authorization to construct or 
operate such commercial facilities. 586 
m Sections 41-44, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2061-2064. 
579 Section 4(c), 42 U.S.C. §18o4(c) (1!)46). 
58o Section 41b(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §2161 (b) (1)-(2). 
GSt Section 1453. 42 U.S.C.A. §2165(a). 
582 Section 41b provides that "[a]ny contract ... may be made [without competitive 
bidding] ... upon certification of the Commission that such action is necessary in 
the interest of the common defense and security or upon a showing by the Commission 
that advertising is not reasonably practical." See notes 559 and 577, supra. 
1583 Section 43, 42 U.S.C.A. §2063. 
584 Section 44, 42 U.S.C.A. §2064-
585 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 14-15. 
586fbid. 
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By a 1957 amendment to .the statute, the agency was authorized to sell, 
or contract for the sale of, certain utilities, including electric power and 
steam, to purchasers within the Commission-owned communities or in 
the immediate vicinity thereof, where the Commission determined that 
such utilities "are not available from another local source and that the 
sale is in the interest of the national defense or in the public interest." 587 
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, preference and priority in the 
use of Commission-produced power must be given "to public bodies and 
cooperatives or to privately owned utilities providing electric utility 
services to high cost areas not being served by public bodies or coopera-
tives." 588 This provision· applies to contracts for the sale of energy 
derived from government plants the same priorities imposed upon 
holders of commercial licenses for a utilization or production facility for 
the generation of commercial power.ns9 
4· Purchase of Special Nuclear and Source Materials 
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Commission is authorized 
to contract for the purchase of special nuclear material outside the 
United States.590 This constitutes a little-known but highly important 
activity of the Commission in the field of contract authority.591 
The purchase of source materials by the Atomic Energy Commission 
is covered in some detail in the 1954 statute. Under Section 66 592 
thereof, the agency is authorized to acquire supplies of source material, 
interests in real property containing such material, or rights of entry 
into property believed to contain such material. Section 67 598 authorizes 
the Commission to lease lands belonging to the United States for mining 
or prospecting for source materials in special situations requiring Com-
mission inducement of private efforts in this field. 59• 
587 Section 161s, 42 U.S.C.A. §2201 (s), as added by Pqb. L. 85-162, Bsth Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1957). 
588 Section 44. 42 U.S.C.A. §2064-
589 Sections 103 and 182e, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2133 and 2232(c). 
590 Section 55, 42 U.S.C.A. §2075. 
591 This is done largely through the Combined Development Agency (CDA), es-
tablished in 1944 for joint foreign ·procurement by tile United States and the United 
Kingdom. Formerly a member of CDA, Canada sells uranium to the United States 
under AEC contracts. Belgium, South Africa, Australia, and Portugal have contracts 
with CDA. See AEC, twentieth Semi-Annual Report 3-5 (1956); AEC, Twenty-
second Semi-Annual Report 4-7 (1957). 
m 42 U.S.C.A. §2096. 
59s 42 U.S.C.A. §2097. 
594 See H.R. Rep No. 2181, supra note 5 at 17-18: "The Commission has exercised 
this right in the past based on reservation to the United States of all rights to source 
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5· Electric Utility Contracts 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contains the most controversial 
section dealing with the contracting authority of the Commission since 
the agency's inception in 1947. In 1953 Congress added a subsection to 
the 1946 statute permitting the Commission to make 25-year contracts 
for the purchase of electrical power to operate the Oak Ridge, Paducah, 
and Portsmouth installations, without advertising for bids therefor and 
with authority to terminate the contracts upon payment of cancellation 
costs.595 What had been enacted in 1953 as Section 12(d) of the 1946 
act was proposed in the same form in the first bill which the Joint Com-
mittee reported to Congress as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.596 
In an attack upon the Commission's interpretation of Section 12(d), 
which was proposed Section 164 of the new act, two members of the 
Joint Committee claimed that the agency proposed 
. . . to maintain its present firm contract for TV A power to 
run the Paducah Plant while contracting for some 6oo,ooo 
kilowatts of additional power to be delivered by the private 
utility group to the TV A for service in the Memphis area, 
several hundred miles away from any atomic-energy installa-
tion. In other words, the AEC would become a "power 
broker," purchasing power it does not need for an area far 
removed from its activities. The TVA would be forced into 
buying the power from the private group through AEC instead 
of building its own plant to serve the Memphis area. 591 
materials in the public lands. This re~ervation is contained in the Act. The Commis-
sion believes that it needs to have the power to lease expressly granted to it, now that 
this reservation is no longer carried in the bill .... It is the intent of Congress that 
this leasing power should be invoked only where it is the only means of achieving 
private development of deposits of source materials in lands belonging to the United 
States. It is not intended to supplant the mining laws in any normal situation." 
m Section 12(d), 42 U.S.C.A. §2204 Pub. L. 137, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 
See H.R. Rep. No. 676, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953): "By the arrangements that 
have been negotiated with the three utility companies [Ohio Valley Electric Co., Elec-
tric Energy, Inc., and Tennessee Valley Authority], the Commission is kept out of 
the utility business, the Congress is relieved of the necessity of appropriating an addi-
tional sum of $1 billion this year for power-generating stations for the new gaseous 
diffusion plants, and in the event of a shutdown in the future, the Government will not 
be faced with the problem of disposing of a super Muscle Shoals." In its opinion in 
Mississippi Valley Generating Company, Holding Company Act Rei. No. 12, 794 (Feb. 
9, 1955), the Securities and Exchange Commission indicated that it considered Con-
gress to have passed upon the validity of the MVG contract in enacting Section 164 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rep., 1'f76,JJO, p. 79,403. 
596 Section 164, H.R. 9757, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). 
GDT H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at 115. See also dissenting opinion of SEC 
Commissioner Rowen in Mississippi Valley Generating Company, supra note 595 at 
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The dissenters further argued that the legislative history of the 1946 
act did not substantiate the intrepretation placed by a majority of the 
Commission upon Section I 2 (d). 598 
As finally enacted,599 Section 164 contained the questionable device 
of a Congressional interpretation of authority, rather than an outright 
grant thereo£. 60° Further, the authority retained by the Joint Committee 
to consider a proposed contract for thirty days created serious problems 
with respect to the proper division of powers between the Executive and 
the Legislative Departments and was bound to be the subject of con-
79,411 : "The MVG plant will not make available to the AEC facilities additional elec-
trical energy not otherwise available .... The power to be generated by MVG will 
be supplied to TV A and will be consumed in the Memphis area .... " 
598 H.R. Rep. No. 2181, supra note 5 at us: "When the Atomic Energy Com-
mission sought and received this authority from the Congress to make long-term con-
tracts, and to pay cancellation charges to the utility groups involved in the event the 
contracts were terminated, the authority was specifically limited to utility services for 
the Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth installations of the Commission. As the 
former General Manager, Marion W. Boyer, testified in answer to a question from 
Congressman Holifield at the time the authorizing legislation was being considered 
by the committee: 'In othe·r words, it is limited to the power requirements for those 
three installations. It is not a wide-open authority.'" 
599 "The Commission is authorized in connection with the construction of the Oak 
Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth installations of the Commission, without regard to 
section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, to enter into new contracts, or 
modify or confirm existing contracts to provide for electric utility services for periods 
not exceeding. twenty-five years, and such contracts shall be subject to .termination by 
the Commission upon payment of cancellation costs as provided in such contracts, and 
any appropriation .presentiy or hereafter made available to the Commission shall be 
available for the payment of such ~ncellation costs. Any such cancellation payments 
shall be taken into consideration in determination of the rate to be charged in the 
event the Commission or any other agency of the Federal Government shall purchase 
electric utility services from the contractor subsequent to the cancellation and during 
the life of the original contract. The authority of the Commission under this section 
to enter into new contracts or modify or confirm existing contracts to provide for elec-
tric utility services includes, in case 'such electric utility services are to be furnished 
to the Commission by the Tennessee Valley Authority, authority to contract with any 
person to furnish electric utility ser-vices to the Tennessee Valley Authority in re-
placement thereof. Any contract hereafter entered into by the Commission pursuant 
to this section shall be submitted to the Joint Committee and a period of thirty days 
shall elapse while Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be 
excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of adjournment 
for more than three days) before the contract of the Commission shall become effec-
tive: Provided, however, That the Joint Committee, after having received the· pro-
posed contract, may by resolution in writing, waive the conditions of or all or any 
portion of such thirty-day period.'' 
60° Similar problems are created by Sections 51 and 61, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2071 and 2091, 
requiring submission of expanded definitions of special nuclear material and source 
material, respectively, for a period of 30 days to the Joint Committee. 
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flicting interpretation. The procedure provided in Section I64 set the 
pattern for Congressional review and control of Commission contracts 
under the Atomic Energy Act of I954 as amended in I957.601 
The controversy over the sale of energy by private facilities to TV A 
in alleged replacement of Commission power needs from TV A, has 
ended in the Court of Claims. 602 Incidental to the controversy has been 
the conflicting interpretation of the Joint Committee's authority under 
Section I64. Two days after the contract between the Commission and 
Mississippi Valley Generating Company was executed November I I, 
I954, the Joint Committee decided to waive the thirty-day waiting 
period under that section. On December I7, I954, the Comptroller 
General approved the contract, whereupon a minority of the Joint Com-
mittee maintained that the waiting period could not be waived until a 
contract, approved by that official and otherwise immediately effective, 
was presented to Congress. On January 28, I955, the Joint Committee 
6ot Section 26Ia, 42 U.S.C.A. §20I7(a). 
60 2 The early history of the MVG contract is summarized by the SEC in Missis-
sippi Valley Generating Co., supra note 595, at 79, 372-79, 395. On July 11, I955 
the President ordered the AEC's contract with the Mississippi Valley Generating 
Company to be terminated. At that time the Attorney General stated that a "negoti-
ated settlement" would be effected "and added that he had no idea how much the ter~ 
mination might cost the U.S." (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter I: 38). On July 
29, I955 the Comptroller General ruled that the Commission had authority to use its 
funds to pay costs for cancellation of a contract which did not contain any provision 
therefor and despite the language of Section I64 of the Atomic Energy Act of I954 
(Dec. B-I20I88). On October 7, I955 the Commission informed the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy that "negotiations for settlement of cancellation costs are being 
held in. abeyance to determine whether the contract actually exists, because of circum-
stances surrounding the contract's making. The AEC mentions 'possible conflict of 
interest and public policy'" (BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 1: 146). Five days 
later the General Accounting Office stated that it had "recommended a go-slow policy 
to the Commission in reaching a settlement of the contract ... that might circum-
vent the government's right to a court test on the validity of the contract" (id. at 
I: I59). Finally, in November I955, the Commission through its General Counsel 
repudiated the contract for the reason that "there is a substantial question as to 
whether there were material violations of law and public policy in the inception of 
the contract which would result in its being held invalid by the courts" (id. at I: 203). 
The result was the filing on December 13, I955, of suit by Mississippi Valley Generat-
ing Company in the Court of Claims to recover $3,543,778 in cancellation costs from 
the federal government (id. at I: 2I9). In its answer filed with the court, the Depart-
ment of Justice prayed that the action be dismissed because the contract was "in viola-
tion of the statutes and laws of the United States and ... unlawful, null, and void, 
and contrary to public policy" for the reasons that, among others, the activities of one 
government adviser "involved a conflict of interest so contrary to public policy as to 
render the alleged agreement null and void," the agreement violated Section I64 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of I954. and the contract had not been before the Joint Com-
mittee for 30 days ( id. at 2 : 229-230). 
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sought to justify rescission of its original waiver of the thirty-day 
period in these words : 
In our view the conditions of section 164 were satisfied regard-
less of the effect of the resolution of rescission. We do not 
believe that section 164 requires that contracts submitted to 
the Joint Committee thereunder be immediately effective upon 
the granting of waiver or the lapse of the thirty-day waiting 
period. The purpose of the requirement of section I64 for a 
waiting period' or a waiver was· to accord the Congress an 
opportunity to review the power to make such contracts and to 
take appropriate legislative action if it so desired . ... [T]he 
section does not require the submission to the committee of a 
contract which is immediately effective in all respects upon 
the expiration of the waiting period or the granting of a 
waiver. The con.tract has been on f.ile with the Joint Commit-
tee from November II, 1954, to the present time. Thus, even 
if the waiver action of November· 13, 1954, should be con-
sidered invalid, the prescribed waiting. period of thirty days 
expired on February 4, · 1955, the Congress having been in 
session since January 5, 1955. The effective date of the con-
tract ... is then either February 4, 1955, or December. 17, 
1954, depending on the effectiveness of the waiver, but this 
difference is not material. . . . (emphasis supplied.) ooa· 
By this statement, the Joint Committee itself has demonstrated the 
ineptness of. the language of Section 164 and the questionable nature 
of the requirement that contracts be referred to that body for a period 
of thirty days. The Committee claims that it merely reviews the "power 
to make such contracts." The fact is that the Committee reviews the 
contract itself before its execution and implementation, a power which 
may well affect what would appear to be essentially an executive func-
tiori .. 
6. Congressional Review of AEC Contracts 
Atomic Energy Commission discretion in the making of certain types 
of contracts under the civilian power reactor program has been severely 
curtailed by action of Congress in 1957. These contracts are those under 
the first, second, and third rounds of the program in which the agency 
contributes financial support directly or indirectly to reactor demon~ 
strati on. projects. 604 
Congressional action was due, in part, to a decision of the Comptroller 
eos BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:821. 
604 See text, supra, at note 16. 
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General with respect to the initial contract made by the Commission 
under the first round invitations of that program, that with yankee 
Atomic Electric Company. Under that contract, dated June 4, 1956, the 
co~pany was to bear ·construction costs of a pressurized water type 
reactor with an initially estimated cost of $34·5 millions, while the 
Commission was to undertake research and development work of up to 
$1 million in agency facilities and to underwrite up to $4 million of such 
work by the company itself. The Commission also agreed to waive its 
normal charge for the use of special nuclear material to fuel the reactor 
for a five-year. period after the issuance of an agency license, at an 
estimated ·loss of revenue to the Commission of $3.3 million. Research 
and development work under the Yankee contract commenced in June 
1956 and will continue through at least :ig6o.606 
In his report to the Joint Committee February 19, 1957, on review 
of the Yankee Atomic contract 606 the Comptroller General criticized, 
among other· things, the agreement by the Commission to waive its 
material use charge for five years,607 as permitted under the second 
round invitation for small reactor plants, 608 instead of for 2,0 years as 
provided under the first round· invitatiOJ1.609 Further, according to the 
Comptroller General, · · 
. . . AEC announcements provide that material use ·charges 
may be waived up to an agreed-upon amount of money. The· 
[Yankee] contract does not comply with this policy to the 
extent that it does not specify any limitation on the amount of 
money of the material use charge waiver but, instead, provides 
that AEC will waive its use charge for· all special nuclear ma-
terial used during the contract period. 610 
As a result of this criticism by the Co.mp~roller General and Joint 
Committee sen.timent "to shape the development of nuclear power along 
the lines of its own ·preference," 611 legislation was enacted by Congress 
in 1957 which gives, in effect, almost complete legislative control over 
60~ For the text of the contract, see 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 741-
752; see statement of AEC General Manager Fields, id. at 727-728; AEC, Twenty-
third Semi-Annual Report 105 .(1958); BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 187. 
606 1~57 Section 2o2 Hearirigs, supra note 7 at 757-768. · 
607 Id. at 764 
608 AEC Press .Re~. No. 953 (Jan. 7, 1957); 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 
at 76o. 
609 Sept. 21, 1955, 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, 1[6539; 1957 Section 202 
Hearings, supra note 7 at 76o-1. 
6 10 1957 Section 202 Hearings, supra note 7 at 766. 
611 Green, supra note 48o at 124 
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Commission contracts involving the expenditure of federal funds for 
the direct .or indirect benefit of the private .contracting party. This 
change in the operation and administration of the United States atomic 
energy program was effected by amendments to Section 261 of the 1954 
statute 612 and by provisions of the appropriation act for fiscal year 
1958.613 
As amended, Section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permits 
only the appropriation of funds, without authorizing legislation ap-
proved by the J ojnt Committee and enacted by Congress, for contracts 
involving non-military reactors designed to produce less than IO,ooo 
thermal kilowatts of heat. Otherwise, the basis for each individual 
arrangement, including contracts, agreements, or loans, which involves 
the expenditure of public funds for other than pure research unrelated 
to a specific project proposed under the civilian power reactor program, 
must be presented to the Joint Committee for appropriate authorization. 
This requires specific approval of "each of the seven arrangements 
contemplated under the first' and second rounds of its [the AEC's] 
program." oa 
Section 26r was implemented by Congress in the authorization act for 
fiscal year 1958 615 to effect the following procedures, thus described by 
the Joint Committee : 
... [B]efore the Commission enters into any arrangement 
(including contract, agreement or loan) or amendment thereto, 
the basis of which has not been included in the program justifi-
cation data previously submitted to the Joint Committee and 
which involves appropriations ... , the basis for the arrange-
ment or amendment thereto shall be submitted to the Joint 
Committee, and a period of 45 days shall elapse while Con-
gress is in session. . . . 
. . . [ S] uch arrangements or amendment must be entered 
into in accordance with 'program justification data' submitted 
in connection with the hearings [before the Joint Committee] 
and with the 'basis' of the arrangement. ... The phrase 'pro-
gram justification data' was intended to include the scope, poli-
cies, and criteria of the various 'rounds' of the Commission's 
power demonstration program, as explained by the Commis-
sion and interpreted by the [Joint] committee at the time of 
the hearings and outlined in committee reports. 
The effect of the requirement with respect to conformance 
612 Pub. L. 85-79, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
61a Pub. L. 85-162, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
614 H.R. Rep. No. 571, supra note 241 at 9. 
615 Pub. L. 85-162, supra note 613, §III(a)-(b). 
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of arrangements with program justification data . would 
be to prevent the Commission from changing its rules and cri-
teria after congressional review during the authorization proc-
ess. The scope, rules, and criteria of the various rounds of the 
program could be changed only in connection with resubmis-
sion in a subsequent authorization hearing by the Joint 
Committee. 
The contract or arrangement shall also be in accordance 
with the basis for the arrangement which has been previously 
submitted to the Joint Committee either during the hearings 
on the authorizing legislation, or else by the 45-day procedure 
set forth in the subsection. The Commission must specifically 
advise the committee when it is submitting a proposal to the 
Joint Committee as a basis for the proposed contract or ar-
rangement. For example, during the hearings on this bill ... , 
the Commission advised the Joint Committee that of the vari-
ous proposals which it had under consideration, it was sub-
mitting only one (Power Reactor Development Co.) for re-
view by the Joint Committee as a basis for a proposed contract 
or arrangement. 616 
1331 
That the Joint Committee will have the final word with respect to 
Commission contracts involving research and development for particular 
projects is demonstrated by the Committee's handling of the Commis-
sion's request for funds in connection with the Power Reactor Develop-
ment Co. ( PRDC) project. Under its contract with PRDC, the Com-
mission was to provide pre-construction research and development 
assistance in AEC facilities up to a maximum of $4,450,000. PRDC 
and its affiliate, Atomic Power Development Associates (A·PDA) were 
to pay the remaining cost estimated to be $9 million. The Commission 
further agreed to waive charges for the use of special nuclear material 
for five years in an amount aggregating $3,702,600.617 Two hundred 
and forty-four thousand dollars having been obligated by the Commis-
sion in fiscal year 1957 under the PRDC contract, the agency requested 
an additional $4,2o6,ooo for authorization in fiscal year 1958, with 
$1,500,000 of this amount to be obligated in that year and the remainder 
in fiscal years 1959 and 1g6o. 
The Joint Committee rejected both the request for authorization of 
funds for pre-construction research and for waiver of fuel charges, 
"since legal proceedings before the AEC to determine the probable 
safety of the proposed reactor are still pending." 618 The Committee only 
616 Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 33-35· 
817Jd. at 10; AEC Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 117 (1958). 
61BJd. at 19. 
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approved for authorization "the amount of $I,500,ooo ... [to] be 
expended for research and development in Commission laboratories to 
advance the technology of the fast breeder reactor concept," 619 and not 
for pre-construction research and development in connection specifically 
with the PRDC project. 
Coincident with its establishment of de facto control over AEC con-
tracting involving the expenditure of federal funds, Congress also has 
spelled out the manner in which the agency is to make contracts with 
publicly and cooperatively owned utilities. This Congressional action 
was designed to expand the Commission's second round invitation under 
the civilian power reactor program. 
The so-called "Cooperative Power Reactor Demonstration Program" 
inaugurated by Congress was legislatively launched in the authorization 
act for appropriations for fiscal year 1958.620 This program requires 
that, in connection with power reactors proposed to be constructed by 
publicly and cooperatively owned utilities : 
1. Arrangements for such projects must be effected by di-
rect negotiations between the Commission and the equipment 
manufacturer or engineering organization developing, con-
structing, and designing the nuclear reactor and related 
facilities. 
2. The Commission must contract with such utilities for 
"the provision of a site and conventional turbogenerating 
facilities, operation of the entire plant including training of 
personnel, sale by the Commission of steam [from the reactor 
complex to the cooperative or publicly owned organization], 
and other relevant matters." · 
3· Sale of steam by the Commission under its contract with 
the utility "shall be at the rate based upon cost or value of 
comparable steam from present or projected plants at the site 
area," regardless of the actual cost of producing such steam 
which probably would exceed that of, and be unable to com-
pete with, fossil fuel~ in the foreseeable future. 
4. Contracts for research and development in connection 
with these facilities shall be for periO<ls of not more than 10 
years. 
5· The reactor installation must be dismantled at the end of 
the contract period in the event the utility is unwilling to pur-
chase it "at a price to reflect appropriate depreciation but not 
to include construction costs assignable to research and 
development." 621 
619 Section 111(a)(2), Pub. L. 85-162, Ssth Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
620/d., Section III(a)(I). 
621 Sen. Rep. No. 791, sJ'pra note 23 at 33· The Comptroller General has approved 
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The special treatment to be accorded contracts with publicly and 
cooperatively owned utilities by the Commission, by Congressional di-
rection, stemmed from the feeling of the Joint Committee that 
Negotiations by the AEC which would result in jeopardiz-
ing the financial integrity of cooperatives and publicly owned 
organizations would not be warranted on the basis of advance-
ment of the atomic technology. Neither would it be wise to set 
a contractual pattern on the part of the Government with these 
small groups and thereby create a precedent for widespread 
subsidy to large profitmaking private utilities later.622 
The requirements established by Congress create a double standard of 
contractual relations which places the major financial and operating 
responsibility for reactor facilities to be operated by publicly or coopera-
tively owned utilities squarely upon a federal governmental agency.628 
D. Contracting with the AEC 
Although the Atomic Energy Act of.1954 did not deal comprehen-
sively with the contracting authority of the Commission, that legislation 
represented a distinct improvement over the 1946 act. As under the 
prior statute, the 1954 legislation authorized the Commission to acquire 
material, property, equipment, and facilities and to purchase, lease, and 
hold real and personal property, as required In the exercise of its func-· 
tions.624 The President is authorized to exempt any action of the Com-
two .proposed contracts of the AEC with the Rural Cooperative Power Association, 
Elk River, Minn., and with the City of Piqua, Ohio, which provided for a flexible 
price for sale of interruptible reactor steam by the AEC to the utility concerned ; 
Dec. B-136015, May 7, 1958, BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:830. 
622.Sen. Rep. No. 791, supra note 23 at 17. 
623 For an initial difficulty experienced by the· Commission in negotiating a contract 
for construction of a reactor under the cooperative program, see AEC, Twenty-third 
·Seini-Annual Report 109 (1958). This involved the proposed construction by Rural 
Cooperative Power Association of Elk River, Minn., of a 22,ooo-electric-kilowatt boil-
ing water reactor plant, accepted as a basis for contract negotiations under the second 
round invitation in April 1956. W~th the enactment of Pub. L. 85-162, the AEC be-
became responsible for direct negotiations with the selected reactor manufacturer. 
These negotiations were terminated when the manufacturer notified the Commission 
that its price for building the reactor, and for accompanying research and development 
work, would be $10.75 million rather than the $7.93 million ceiling previously agreed 
upon. Also, on Sept. 20, 1957, the AEC signed a contract with Consumers Public 
Power District of Columbus, Nebraska, covering construction and operation of a 
large-scale nuciear power plant at Hallam, Nebraska. This contract, entered as the 
result of a proposal made under the first round invitation, was signed after the Joint 
Committee waived the 45-day waiting period established by Pub. Law 85-162. 
62* Section 161e and g, 42 y.S.C.A. §2201 (e) and (g) ; see Section 174. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§2224-
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mission "from the provisions of law relating to contracts whenever he 
determines that such action is essential in the_ interest of the common 
defense and security." 825 
The statute deals with several matters which directly govern pro-
visions of a Commission contract with a prime contractor. First, the 
cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contract is outlawed.626 Second, the con-
tract may not provide "for direct payment or direct reimbusement by 
the Commission of any Federal income taxes on behalf of any con-
tractor performing such contract for profit." 627 Third, where a con-
tract is negotiated with a domestic concern without advertising, it must 
contain a provision permitting the Comptroller General to have access 
to the contractor's books for three years' after the final payment is made 
under the contract by the United States.628 Finally, subcontracts under 
a prime contract are forbidden unless authorized by the Commission. 629 
m Section 162, 42 U.S.C.A. §2202. 
626 Section 165a, 42 U.S.C.A. §2205(a); see, to the same effect, 10 Code Fed. Regs. 
§5.103. This type of contract also is outlawed by the Armed Services Procurement Act 
of 1947, 41 U.S.C.A. §153(b), and the Federal Property and Administrative Services 
Act of 1949, 41 U.S.C.A. §254(b). See Risik, supra note 536 at 130; Minsch, supra 
note 539 at 195. 
627 Section 165b, 42 U.S.C.A. §2205 (b). 
628 Section 166, 42 U.S.C.A. §2206; see AEC Manual, Section 9II1-03II. This re-
quirement applied to Conunission contracts prior to 1947 by virtue of Executive orders 
10210, 16 Fed. Reg. 1049 (Feb. 6, 1951), and 10216, 16 Fed. Reg. 1815 (Feb. 27, 1951), 
issued pursuant to the First War Powers Act of 1941, as amended. In contracting 
with Yankee Atomic Electric Company under the power demonstration reactor pro-
gram, the Commission agreed, subject to review by the Comptroller General, to amend 
the examination-of-records' provision to limit its applicability to that portion of the 
work performed by Yankee which was paid for by .the Commission. The Comp-
troller General ruled that, under the Yankee contract, records ·relating to all work 
performed thereunder, and not necessarily reimbursable work, were subject to exami-
nation by the General Accounting Office (Dec. B-129II4, Oct. 10, 1956). In connec-
tion with the AEC's contract with Power Reactor Development Co. (PRDC) the 
Comptroller General has ruled that, where research and development work by the 
Commission with appropriated funds would be made under separate contract subject 
to audit by the General Accounting Office, the prime contract between the agency 
and PRDC does not violate Section 166 when it fails to include a provision requiring 
such government audit of accounts in connection with the prime contract (Dec. 
B-131013, Mar. 22, I957). 
6 20 Section 4Ib(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §206I(b) (I). See Minsch, supra note 539 at 194-
I95:. "This somewhat unique statutory restriction on subcontracting is actually but 
a logical concomitant of the general scheme of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (and 
its predecessor statute) for ensuring, in the interests of the common defense and se-
curity and the health and safety of the public, that the AEC will have adequate con-
trol over the production and use of special nuclear material." Approximately one-
third of the. over $I billion paid by the Commission directly under contracts during 
fiscal year I955 went to subcontractors, id. at I90-19I. 
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1. Contracting in General 
The negotiation, execution, and administration of a contract with the 
Atomic Energy Commission does not have the same procedural and 
substantive safeguards which are afforded the businessman or firm 
seeking a license from that agency. Absent the assimilation of contract 
procedures to the requirements of administrative due process, the prin-
cipal safeguard that the prospective government contractor has is his 
own sense of caution and care in negotiating the terms of the agreement 
with the agency or department involved. In spite of the general success 
of the Atomic Energy Commission's program in satisfactorily adminis-
tering a contract program involving billions of dollars with little public 
criticism and litigation, healthy self-interest should never be forgotten 
by the private businessman or concern in negotiating with the 
Commission. 
Like every other agency and department of the federal government, 
the interests of the Atomic Energy Commission are paramount in 
negotiating and administering a contract with a private party. Indeed, 
the basic procurement policy of the Commission, in its own words, is 
"that supplies and services be procured by" the methods most advan-
tageous to the government." 630 In one of the two reported decisions 
in which he has reversed a recommendation of the Commission's Ad-
visory Board of Contract Appeals, the AEC General Manager has stated 
that he was "not convinced the rights of the Government should be 
relinquished by any action of mine which would not have adequate 
support in the record." 681 
Otherwise stated, "the Government has no paternalistic attitude 
towards its contractors," and the "contracting officer is going to make 
the best 'deal' he can for the Government and takes his obligation to 
protect the Government's interest with seriousness." 632 The General 
Counsel of the Navy Department has issued this advice in that regard: 
I believe there has been a great deal of misunderstanding 
about the very character of a Government contract. There are 
some people who apparently have felt that getting a Govern-
ment contract means "getting in on the gravy" -that you just 
6ao 10 Code Fed. Regs. §5.21; see, to the same effect, §§5.101 and 5.501. 
631 Raecolith Flooring Company, AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 3 (Board's recommenda-
tions rejected Sept. I, 1950), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:311. 
63 2 Moss, .supra note 536 at 159. He adds: "Many contractors seem to be laboring 
under the impression that the Government will 'take care of them' regardless of con-
tractual provisions. . .. Nothing is further from the truth. The Government is, in 
fact, a sharp trader, and its· officers are trained in that regard .... " 
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sign up with the Government, and the money ·begins to roll in. 
But nothing could be farther from the truth. The Govern-
ment has a carefully-worked out, meticulous and responsible 
system of purchasing, designed to provide quality, as well as 
quantity, which meets the complex and precise requirements of 
defense and at the very best price. As a result, the so-called · 
'Government contract' that we hear about has become, not a 
simple document that can be disposed of with a casual glance; 
on the contrary, just as the legal requirements and many of the 
goods which are called for by a Government contract are 
highly complex, the Government contract ·has also become 
·complex .... · 
... [T]he Government does not sit in a paternalistic ca-
pacity with its. contractors. It does not undertake to "take 
care" of anybody or to "guarantee" them against loss or 
against anything else. Its only position is that of a con-
tractor dealing at arms length. 633 
The misconception that the government contracts in other than an 
attitude of hard bargaining may even be encouraged by the agency or 
d~partment concerned. T)le emphasis in attracting would-be bidders for 
government contracts often is that the entire .matter is solely one . pf 
"public relations." 634 This approach is used to some extent by .the 
Atomic Energy Commission.685 
. In this connection, it always should be remembered that the govern-
ment is represented by legal counsel in preparing and negotiating .. con-
tracts with private persons.686 This follows logically from the govern-
638 Vom Bauer, supra note 536 at 29 and 31. 
es' Moss, mpra note 536 at 166. 
685 "Counselor, advisers, or agents are not necessary to obtain business from the 
AEC, its contractors or _subcontractors. Such persons cannot obtain AEC business 
which the reader of 'Selling to AEC' cannot obtain for himself." ( AEC, Selling to 
AEC (1956), reproduced in BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: x2I). This state-
ment goes beyond· the salutary warning needed against use of "five percenters" and 
"influence peddlers" and encourages the businessman not only to seek business from 
the Commission but to eXecute a contract therefor without adequate expert engineer-
ing or legal advice. 
sse Vom .Baur, supra note 536 at J2: "However, there are some Government con-
tractors who appear to feel that they do not need legal advice. They sometimes enter 
into contracts with the Government without benefit of counsel, and sometimes after-· · 
wards complain bitterly when they find out the exact nature of the rights and obliga-
tions which .they have u~wittingly assumed. True, the Government cannot insist that 
a contractor be represented by counsel. That is his own personal business. But I 
may say frankly, speaking personally at least, that in my opinion it is very greatly 
to the advantage of the Government, as well as to that of the contractor, to have him 
represented by a lawyer. He should be so represented not only at the outset of the 
negotiations so that the contractor may understand clearly what he is getting into, but 
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ment's understandable desire to make the best contract possible from 
its point of view.637 The need for adequately protecting his business and 
legal interests is required of the contractor dealing with the Atomic 
• Energy Commission, particularly with respect to cost contracts for large 
research and development projects. These so-called "administrative 
contracts" 638 deal only in the broadest terms with the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties. 639 
A contract negotiated by a private contractor with any government 
department or agency is not one negotiated between, or to be admin-
istered by, equals. The traditional concept of the Executive Department 
also in the course of the performance of the contract, and in cases before the Armed 
Services Board of Contract Appeals." See Ramey and Erlewine, supra note 551 at 
36o, n. 8 : "In AEC contract negotiations are normally carried on in the field by a 
'team' under the leadership of the field manager of operations ... and with the ad-
vice and assistance of the Assistant General Counsel, or other attorney, the Director 
of Finance and other appropriate staff .... " 
637 See Beryllium Corp., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 6 (Recommendations adopted by 
General Manager Dec. 19, 1949), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 312;. "Con-
tractor committed to construction of complete buildings for lump-sum consideration 
cannot recover from Government amount paid sub-contractor in reimbursement for 
expenses which, because of Government's need for speed, had been overlooked in 
computation of price." 
638 The term first was used by the AEC in 1951; AEC, Ninth Semi-Annual Re--
port 52 (1951): "The type of cost contract used to a large extent by the Commis-
sion for development work may perhaps best be described as an 'administrative con-
tract.' A main emphasis here, as in many other contracts, is upon cooperation be-
tween the Government and the contractor to accomplish the particular task. . . ." 
639 Set: BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 4-5. For a discussion of the "steady. 
trend away from a fixed and definite contract," see Moss, supra note 536 at I6o-
161. The most comprehensive discussion of the "administrative contract" is contained 
in Ramey and Erlewine, supra note 551 at 354 et seq. According to the authors, an 
"administrative contract" is merely a "memorandum of understanding," with a " ' char-
ter-like' nature," using "a minimum of legal or technical jargon" (id. at 363, 364, 
365). In such an agreement, "[t]he parties are not overly concerned with the legal 
consequences of their relationships in terms of enforcement through litigation, but are 
careful that the agreement will pass muster with the court of first instance in Govern-
ment contracts, the General Accounting Office" (id. at 355). Although cooperation 
between the Commission and its contractors is certainly to be sought, and ordinarily 
assured, this theory of cooperation to the exclusion of spelling out the legal relation-
ship between the government agency and the private party hardly converts the "ad-
ministrative contract". into a partnership between the parties. Nor does the "growing 
use of the regulatory approach [to government contracts, emphasizing a detailed con-
tract between the parties] seriously endanger . . . the cooperative, mutual agreement 
approach to the administrative contract" or defeat "the ·very purposes" of goverriment 
contracting (id. at 371). If any misunderstanding requiring administrative or judicial 
relief arises under the contra<;!, it is the private party, not the government, which will 
find the loose_ language of _the administrative contract the doorway to an adverse deci-
sion. Unfortunately for the private contractor, the government is not ordinarily forced 
to use that doorway. 
1338 FEDERAL REGULATORY AND 
and the courts that no real difference exists between government and 
private contracts 640 is unrealistic. The doctrine of sovereign immunity 
gives the government the choice of determining the forum in which dis-
putes and suits with respect to a contract may be determined. Indeed, 
"the Government, as a contractor, has insisted on and received favorable 
treatment in its contracting capacity which it would not receive under 
ordinary principles of private contract law." 641 The contracting officer, 
who administers the contract and initially determines disputes there-
under, is hardly an unbiased or disinterested party to the proceedings. 
Finally, the government has the ultimate authority, on behalf of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, to seize facilities of a manufacturer who 
refuses or fails to honor a mandatory order "to ·obtain prompt delivery 
of any articles or materials the procurement of which has been author-
ized by the Congress exclusively for the use of ... the Atomic Energy 
Commission." 642 
2. Types of AEC Contracts 648 
The Atomic Energy Commission uses three general types of con-: 
tracts. The first, the unit-price contract, is used in purchases of sup-
plies, materials, equipment, and other items on which a definite price can 
be fixed by unit of sale. Purchases of uranium concentrate from 
uranium processors fall into this category. 644 
Construction programs are largely effected through the use of lump-
sum contracts. This is also the type of contract used by the Commission 
in ~ontracting for research by educational and other types of institu-
tions, the latter being required to put up a certain percentage of the cost 
of the project. 
640 E.g., United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100, 72 S. Ct. 154 (1951); 
Martinsburg & P.R. Co. v. March, II4 U.S. 549. 553-554, 5 S. Ct. 1035 (1884); see 
Schultz, supra note 536 at 218-219, 222-223. 
an Schultz, supra note 536 at 220. 
842 Selective Service Act of 1948, so U.S.C.A. App. §468(a). The anned services 
are the only other branch of the federal government with this authority. 
848 For excellent discussions of this subject, see BN A, Atomic Industry Reporter 
221: 1-7 and I CCH Atomic Energy Law Reporter, 1f57I ff. 
644 See IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 6o, providing for purchases by the Commission of 
uranium at guaranteed minimum prices pursuant to contract ( §6o. I (d) ) . In connec-
tion with a contract by the Commission for the purchase of four to seven million 
pounds of high purity magnesium annually over a period of 5 years, the Comptroller 
General has ruled that the Commission lacks authority to contract beyond one year 
in the absence of special provision therefor, and that, while " ... no question will be 
raised about earlier contracts (by the AECI. the principles I in the decision] will 
apply in the future" (Dec. B-I3o8I5. April 2. 1957); see BNA, Atomic lndustry 
Reporter 3 : 133 
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Finally, there is the cost type contract, in which the government pays 
for the contractor's costs plus a negotiated fixed fee. This category of 
contract has been used for the construction and operation by private 
business of agency-owned facilities and represents the so-called "admin-
istrative contract." Under this type of agreement, its terms are stated 
in broad and general terms, the particulars to be developed and agreed 
upon as the work progresses. 
3· AEC Contract Clauses 
Like other federal government agencies,645 the Atomic Energy Com-
mission seeks to standardize clauses contained in the various types of 
contracts which it makes. 646 This is effected by establishing one series 
of clauses, the inclusion of which in every contract for over $500 is 
required, 647 and another series of clauses the inclusion of which is rec-
ommended in each type of contract to which applicable.648 
a. Mandatory Clauses 
Mandatory clauses or articles contained in Atomic Energy Commis-
sion contracts cover a multitude of public sins which the Congress, by 
legislation, has seen fit to proscribe. 649 The settlement of disputes also 
is prescribed in a mandatory contract clause. 
In the public policy category of mandatory clauses are the prohibi-
tions against 
I. Convict labor; 650 
2. Contingent fees; 651 
645 See Risik, supra note 536 at IJ2-I33· 
646 See AEC Manual, Section 911 I -<>22: "It is the policy of AEC to use standard 
contract articles and fonns wherever practicable. Unifonnity in fonn and substance 
of contract articles and fonns tend to assure impartial treatment of all contractors, 
expedites negotiation and contract review, and facilitates contract administration." Yet 
the Joint Committee has found that AEC "contract negotiations have developed a set 
of unrelated and complicated proposed contracts [under the civilian power demon·· 
stration reactor program]. Apparently the tenns of each proposal have depended 
upon the request of the proposer, and the AEC. has established no across-the-board 
standards. Accordingly, there is considerable variation between the types of assistance 
to be provided under the contracts [negotiated or being negotiated under the first, 
second, and third-round invitations] ... " (Sen. Rep. No. 79I, supra note 23 at I5-I6). 
641 AEC Manual, Section !)III-03I. 
64BJd., Section 9III-Q41. 
649 See Gantt, "Labor Provisions of Government Contracts and Subcontractors," 
16 Fed. Bar ]. 331 ( 1956). 
650 AEC Manual, Sections 9III-D32 and 9116-073· See I8 U.S.C.A. §436, 4I 
U.S.C.A. §35(d); Gantt, supra note 649 at 352-354. 
651 AEC Manual, Section 9I I I -033. 
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3· Non-discrimination in emplo-yment; 852 
4. Benefits to members of Congress ; 853 
5· Assignment of claims; u• · 
6. Work in excess of eight. hours; 655 
7· Payment of less than minimum wages established by Sec-
retary of Labor; 858 and 
8. Purchases of foreign goods contrary to the Buy Ameri-
can Act.857 
These clauses, together with the Commission's statements of policy with 
respect to aiding "small business," 858 represent the government's at-
tempt to implement, at the behest of Congress, prevailing social and 
economic policies. 659 
652 I d., Sections 9111-035, 9116-o83, and 4228-ox et seq. See Executive Order 
10557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Sept. 3, 1954) ; Gantt, supra note 649 at 366-370. 
&ss AEC Manual, Section 91II-036. See 18 U.S.C.A. §874, 40 U.S.C.A. §276c, 41 
U.S.C.A. §51 (the so-called "anti-kickback" acts); Ga~tt, supra note 649 at 348-352. 
85' AEC Manual, Section 9111-o37· See 31 U.S.C.A. §203, 41 U.S.C.A. §15. 
6 55 AEC Manual, Section 9111-0314. See 40 U.S.C.A. §§324-326; Gantt, supra note 
649 at 342-348. 
656 AEC Manual, Section 91II-0315. See 40 U.S.C.A. §§276a et. seq. (Davis-Bacon 
Act); Gantt, supra note 649 at 333-342. The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 
U.S.C.A. §§35-45, extends to workers employed under Government supply contracts 
the protections afforded by the Davis-Bacon Act and the Eight-Hour Laws; see Gantt, 
id. at 354-366. 
657 AEC Manual, Sections 911I-o317-o318 and gno-o1ga-o1gb. See 41 U.S.C.A. 
§§1oa-1od (Buy American Act); Gantt, supra note 649 at 364-
658 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§5.24. 5.6g(a) (2)-(4), 5.5o6. For a discussion of AEC 
policies with respect to "small business," see BNA Atomic Industry Reporter 2: 110; 
AEC, Twenty-third Semi-Annual Report 303 (1958); Minsch, supra note 539 at ~91, 
n.3 (nearly of the AEC direct payments to subcontractors "went to small business 
firms") ; and Risik, supra note 536 ·at 134 : "This clause is generated by a statement 
of government policy contained in several pieces of legislation to the effect that small 
business concerns must receive a fair share of government contracts. The purpose 
of this clause is laudable; it is not conceivable that our economy could function prop-
erly without small business concerns. But, it is difficult to see how a pious prayer such 
as the utilization-of-small-business-concerns helps the situation. The enforceability of 
such a covenant is doubtful to say the least, and at worst, a contractor might seek 
to escape responsibility for the acts of his small business concern subcontractors." 
659 Risik, supra note 536 at 133-134, 136: "Several clauses find their way into gov-
ernment contracts which actually have only a remote connection with the basic pur-
pose of a contract. . . . There has been an increasing tendency to use government 
procurement to implement social and economic policies. . . . The effect of these phi-
losophies is a severe headache to the draftsman of a government contract. Not only 
does the contract become cluttered with impediment which are not encountered in 
commercial contracting, but the net result is frequently poor and meaningless drafts-
manship. If government contracts could be shorn of these extraneous matters in 
some way. without necessarily freeing the contract from being subject tn such na 
tional polic-ies as an• deemffi by tht' l.ongress or an administration to be w1se. these 
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Other mandatory clauses deal with disputes, to be discussed here-
after; assignments of contracts without the permission of the Commis-
sion; 680 safety, health, and fire protection; 681 permits and licenses re-
quired to be obtained by the contractor from local authorities; 882 
security; 663 litigation and claims; 664 required bonds and insurance; 665 
and renegotiation of profits. 668 Aside from the disputes clause, par-
ticularly important to the contractor are the mandatory clauses which 
( 1) permit the Comptroller General to have aecess to the contractor's 
books for three years after a final payment under the contract in ques-
tion, 667 and ( 2) require the contractor immediately to notify the Com-
mission whenever "an actual or potential labor dispute is delaying or 
threatens to delay the performance of the work." 668 
b. Non-Mandatory Clauses 
Suggested articles to be contained in Commission contracts cover 
every type of situation which may be involved in the agency's procure-
ment work.669 Even though primarily or entirely drafted by the govern-
contracts would compare favorably with good commercial documents with respect to 
simplicity of content, length, and quality of draftsmanship." 
880 AEC Manual, Section 9111-o;38. 
6 61/d., Section 9111-o39- · 
662/d., Section 9111-o3IO. 
663Jd., Section 9JII-o312. 
664 I d., Section 9111-0JI!). 
665 Id., Section 9111-oJ2(>. 
666/d., Section 9III-QJ2I; see Renegotiation Act of 1951, so U.S.C.A. App. §§12II 
et seq. Under Sections 102(a) and 103(a), so U.S.C.A. App. §§1212(a) and 1212(c), 
all contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission "to the extent of the amounts re-
ceived or accrued by a contractor or subcontractor" on or after January 1, 1951, are 
made subject to the renegotiation procedure. 
687 AEC Manual, Section 9III-Q3II. This clause also requires the prime contractor 
to insert a similar provision in subcontracts. See Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-129114 
(Oct. 10, 1956). 
668 AEC Manual, Section 9II1-o313. See Mid West Contracting Co., AEC ABCA 
Dkt. No. 35 (Board's recommendation adopted· by General Manager April 29. 1953), 
BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 328: "Contract specification's requirement that 
contractor satisfy himself as to general and local labor conditions which can affect 
cost under contract bars his recovery of ·additional costs incurred when he was re-
quired to use plumbers instead of pipelayers to install iron water pipes; contractor 
was obligated by local custom and local union rules to use plumbers, instead of pipe-
layers, and he could and should have discovered this by reasonable inquiry required 
of him under contract specification; less than total observance of union jurisdictional 
boundaries in installing subdivision water lines does· not relieve contractor of obliga-
tion to use plumbers since he was engaged in overall large federal construction where 
many other trades and uniof!S were employed." 
6 89 AEC Manual, Sections 9111-04 through 096. 
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ment, such clauses tend to be strictly construed against the contractor 
and in favor of the government. 670 
E. Settlement of Contract Disputes at Administrative Level 
Controversies arising under government contracts traditionally have 
been sought to be settled by the use of a disputes clause inserted in the 
contract itself at the insistence of the public agency. In addition, many 
agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission have appointed a semi-
independent body generally known as a Board of Contract Appeals to 
review decisions of the contracting officer, with or without that decision 
being binding on the head of the agency. A third method of contract 
dispute settlement at the administrative level relates to the authority of 
the Comptroller General. 
1. The Disputes Clause 671 
The government has used 'two types of disputes clauses which em-
power the contracting officer, as the government's representative, to 
settle all controversies arising. under the contract, such decision to be 
final and conclusive, subject only to administrative review. The first, 
the "all disputes" clause, permits the contracting officer to decide all 
questions of law and fact. 672 The second, and more common,878 type is 
the "facts disputes" clause, which leaves to the contracting officer's final 
determination only questions of fact. 
The Atomic Energy Commission has adopted the "facts dispute" 
clause. m This clause provides : 
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute 
concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which 
is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Con-
870 See Frank Belluscio & Sons, Inc., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 4 (Board's recom-
mendations adopted by General Manager Nov. 16, 1950), BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter 221 : 3II-3I2, strictly construing a "changes" article. 
871 For a general discussion of this type of contract provision, used in some form or 
another in government contracts since after the Civil War, see Joy, supra note 536 at 
13-17; Schultz, iuPra note 536 at 219-220. 
612 See, e.g., Graham Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 91 F. Supp. 715, 716 (D. Cal. 1950). 
673 Generally, Article 15 of the contract, see Shea, supra note 536 at 356; Joy, supra 
note 536 at II. 
614 AEC Manual, Section 9111-034. 10 Code Fed. Regs. §3.1 specifically provides 
that such a clause may be included in subcontracts, a practice which is. not commonly 
found in the contract appeals procedure of other agencies, see Cuneo, "Disputes Be-
tween Subcontractors and Prime Contractors Under Government Contracts, 16 Fed. 
Bar J. 246, 253 (1956). 
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tracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and 
mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the contractor. 
Within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the con-
tractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing to the 
Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Commis-
sion, and the decision of the Commission shall, unless deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been 
fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as 
necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, be final and conclusive: Provided, That if 
no such appeal to the Commission is taken, the decision of the 
Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive. In connec-
tion with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the con-
tractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to 
offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final de-
cision of a dispute hereunder, the contractor shall proceed 
diligently with the performance of the contract and in accord-
ance with the Contracting Officer's decision. 
1343" 
This clause contains five component parts with respect to procedure 
at the administrative level. First, the contracting officer has sole au-
thority to decide "a question of fact arising under this contract" on 
which mutual agreement is not reached with the private contractor. 
This provision is detailed in the Commission's rules to require the con-
tracting officer to issue, and to serve upon the contractor, a "decision" 
consisting of a statement of his decision, specific findings of fact 
thereon, and a copy of the rules governing appeals to the agency's 
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals.615 
Second, ·the clause gives the contractor thirty days from the date of 
receipt «?f a "decision" by the contracting officer to file his appeal with 
the Commission, that is, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals. 676 
675 10 Code Fed. Regs. §3.10. In the Board's view, specific findings of fact are " ... 
important .... Not only do such Findings formulate the issues for appeal ... but 
they evidence a vital part of the mental processes essential to any decision. Until the 
formal Findings of Fact have been completed, any purported decision (no matter how 
designated) is tentative by the very nature of human thinking. The ultimate decision 
must rest on, and be supported by, the Findings of Fact, and absent such Findings, 
there is no decision ... " (Frontier Drilling Co., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 74 (Board's 
recommendations adopted by General Manager July I, 1955), BNA, Atomic Industry 
Reporter 221: 374). 
676 10 Code Fed. Regs. §§J.II-12. The 3o-day requirement has been liberally con-
strued by the Board in favor of the contractor, J. F. Byrd, AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 22 
(Board's recommendations adopted by General Manager June 6, 1951), BNA, Atomic 
Industry Reporter 221: 325; Sound Construction and Engineering Co., Dkt. No. 63 
(Board's recommendations adopted Dec. 23, 1954), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 
221: 355; Frontier Drilling Co., suPra note 6{5. 
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Third, if no appeal is taken, the decision of the contracting officer is 
"final and conclusive." Fourth, the Commission must afford procedure 
for the contractor to be given a hearing before it, which has been done 
throt,igh the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals. Fifth, the contractor 
must proceed "diligently" with the work during the pendency of the 
dispute. 
The government often has taken the position that the procedure 
established by the disputes clause represents a true form of arbitration 
consistent with principles of arbitration ·applicable to private contracts. 677 
The . facts, however, do not support this claim. The contracting officer 
is hardly an impartial third party, completely disinterested in the result 
of the settlement of the dispute,678 in spite of the AEC Board's praise-
worthy efforts to improve the status of the contracting officer in contract 
appeals procedure.679 The contracting officer's job is to keep the contract 
moving, with maximum benefit to the government, and the disputes 
clause procedure provides a "relatively inexpensive and rapid method 
bf settling controversies." 680 The disputes clause may afford some 
measure of due process in th~ settlement of controversies arising under 
a 'contract whil'e it is being carried out, but it is not a true agreement to 
arbitrate 
. . . because the deCision is made by a representative of the 
Government. The bargaining power of the Government is 
· 677 Joy, supra note 536 at II, 13; Anderson, supra note 536 at 220. 
678 See, e.g., Review of Finality Clauses in Gwernment Contracts, Beatings before 
House Judiciary Committee on H.R. I839 et al., 83d Cong., ISt and 2d Sess. 24 (1954), 
in which the representative of the American Bar Association stated, in part: "Such 
a contracting officer may not intend to ~o any wrong; unwittingly, he is just not im-
partial. ... " Other commentators are less charitable, see, e.g., Schultz, supra note 
536.at 224· 
679 See Otis Williams & Co., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. 88 (Board's recommendations 
adopted by General Counsel Nov. 8, 1956), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221:388: 
"Contracting officers have many duties in connection with the execution of, and per-
formance unde~, both prime and subcontracts. In most of these, they act purely as 
agencies of the· Co~mission as a party to a contractual arrangement. But when a con-
tracting officer proceeds ·under the 'disputes articles' of a prime or a subcontract, to 
decide a dispute, he. then acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, obligated to proceed im-
partially, ·and without favoritism either. to the subcontractor, to the contractor or to 
the Commission. Once he has rendered his decision, his judicial connection with the 
dispute ceases. . . ·. If the dispute was under a prime contract, he reverts to his status 
as an agent of the Commission and appears, in that capacity, as appellee. . . • [W]hen 
the dispute reaches this Board, appearances by counsel are on behalf of the proper 
parties, and a purported appearance for the contracting officer in his j~icial ca-
pacity is as impossible and as improper as would be the appearance in an appellate· 
court by counsel for the trial judge. " 
e8o Joy; supra note 536 at 20. 
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very great since many contractors depend upon Government 
contracts for their very existence, and are thus in no position 
to force their demands upon the Government. As a result, the 
disputes clause is heavily in favor of the Government.681 
2. Advisory Board of Contract Appeals 
1345 
Chartered in April, 1948, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals 
of the Atomic Energy Commission represents a salutary, although in-
complete, attempt by that agency to assure a measure of due process in 
the consideration of disputes appealed to the Commission from the 
contracting officer. Authority for the creation of the Board stems from 
Section 12(a) of the 1946 Act and Section 161a of the 1954 Act author-
izing the Commission to "establish advisory boards to advise with and 
make recommendations to the Commission . . . administration." 682 
This type of intra-agency review procedure also has been used effec-
ti~ely in other agencies of the government. Some of these boa~d~ follow 
the pattern of the Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Board, the 
decisions of which are merely recommendations.683 Others 68• follow the 
pattern of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the decisions 
of which are binding on the agency involved.685 
681 Shea, supra note 536 at 356 . 
. 682 42 U.S.C. §I8I2(a) (I946); 42 U.S.C.A. §220I (a). The general administration 
of advisory boards to the Commission, including the Advisory Board of Contract Ap-
peals, is provided for in IO Code Fed. Regs. Pt. 7, adopted Sept. I, I955, in "the 
midst of a growing controversy over what has been termed in press reports as 'big 
business domination' of the drive to develop industrial uses of atomic energy" (BNA., 
Atomic Industry Reporter I: I07). For a discussion of the antitrust problems aris-
·ing with respect to AEC advisory boards, see Jacobs and Melchior, supra note 350 
.at 53I-533. (Ed. Note: On February 3, I959, IO C.F.R., Part 3 of the AEC's Rule 
was amended to place the hearing of contract appeals under the agency's hearing ex-
·aminer, 22 Fed. Reg. 726.) 
683 General Services Administration Board of Review, established March 7, I950; 
Veterans' Administration Construction Appeals Board and Supply Contract Appeals 
Board, established April 8, I949, and March I2, I954. respectively. 
- 68• Department of Interior Board of Contract Appeals, established December 29, 
I9S4; Contract Disputes Board for Commodity Credit Corp., established April 4. 
~946; and Army Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board, established August 9, 
I946. Army overseas commands also have Boards of Contract Appeal with jurisdic-
tion of claims up to $50,000, see Joy, supra note 536 at I7 . 
. 6B5 Established May I, I949, and merging the former War Department and Navy 
Department Boards of Contract Appeals created August 24, I942, and December I, 
I944, respectively. See· Cuneo, supra note 536 at 376: "The charter of the Board 
also states that 'when an appeal is taken pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract 
which limits appeals to disputes concerning questions of fact, the Board may never-
theless in its discretion hear, consider, and decide all questions of law necessary for 
the complete adjudication of the issue,' and unless the contract provides otherwise, 
1346- FEDERAL -REGULATORY AND 
a. Jurisdiction 
Although obviously exercising considerable· influence on the Atomic 
Energy Commission with respect to contract disputes, the Commission 
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals is exactly what its title signifies-
an advisory body. Its decisions are merely recommendations to the 
General Manager, who, in every reported case but two through 1957, 
has approved such recommendations. 686 As the Board itself has stated, 
it is only "the creature of the Commission, and it has only such power 
as the Commissi9n has chosen to confer." 687 
The Boards' jurisdiction primarily is established by the scope of the 
disputes clause itself and by Commission regulation. Thus, the Board 
is limited by that clause to settling controversies which arise "under the 
contract." It does not have jurisdiction over questions of general law 
connected with, but not directly arising under, the contract, nor can it 
deal with controversies after the contract is completed.688 Further, the 
Commission's regulations ~tipulate that 
The General Manager of the Commission is the designated 
representative to decide finally all appeals arising under the 
"disputes articles" of commission contracts and subcontracts. 
The Commission has established an Advisory Board of Con-
tract Appeals to assist the General Manager in his discharge 
of this responsibility by hearing the appeal and recommending 
to the General Manager appropriate disposition of the 
appeal. ... sse 
if it appears that a claim for unliquidated damages is involved in the appeal, 'the Board 
shall, insofar as the evidence permits, make findings_ of fact with respect to such claim 
without expressing an opinion on the questions of liability.' ... The wisdom of the 
Secretaries in giving the Armed Services Board administrative authority not set forth 
in the contract was recognized by the Court of Claims in McWilliams Dredging Com-
pany, 118 Ct. Cl. I, 16 (1950). The court likened the Board as the representative of 
the Secretary, to an owner who would reverse his representative if he were wrong, 
not because the contract gave him the authority to make a final decision, but because 
it would be the natural and fair way for an owner to act. The courts have said that 
mistakes should be corrected within the agency whenever possible. Edmund J. Rap-
poli Company, Inc., g8 Ct. Cl. 499 (1943)." 
686 Raecolith Flooring Company, supra note 631; F. H. McGraw & Co., AEC 
ABCA Dkt. No. 6o (Board's recommendations rejected by General Manager Aug. 20, 
1957), BN.A, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 396 (cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor not 
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurr:ed in unsuccessfully contesting unfair 
labor praclice charge before National Labor Relations Board). 
687 Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675 ; see; to the same effect, C. H. Leavall & 
Co., AEc;::: ABCA Dkt. No. 112 (Board's recommendations adopted by Deputy Gen-
eral Manager Oct. 24, 1957), BNA, Atomic. Industry Reporter 221:397. 
&88 Ibid. 
ese 10 Code Fed. ·Regs. §J.I. 
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In construing the above grants of power, the Board has severely limited 
its authority. Thus it has held that 
... [T]he rules do not establish the Board as an advisor at 
large to the General Manager. Its advice can be sought, and 
given, only where the appeal falls within the first sentence of 
Section 3· I, namely a dispute arising under a contract or 
subcontract. . . . 
. . . Finally, the Board's jurisdiction is limited by the lan-
guage of the particular disputes clause involved. Section 3.2 
of the Rules provides for an appeal only where it arises "under 
the disputes article" of the contract involved. Absent a disputes 
article, the Board has no power to pass on any issue. . . . 890 
In exercising its limited jurisdiction, the Board also is governed by 
the provisions of Public Law 356 enacted by Congress May 1 I, 1954. 
This statute, which is fundamental law in the field of Government con-
tracts, provides : 
No provision of any contract entered into by the United 
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any de-
cision of the head of any department or agency or his duly 
authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a 
question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any 
suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any 
such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said 
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That 
any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same 
is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous 
as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 
No Government contract shall contain a provision making 
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative 
official, representative, or board.691 
ln construing the operation of the above provisions upon contract 
appeals within the Atomic Energy Commission, the Advisory Board has 
stated: 
It will be noted that this statute does not operate to deprive 
"any administrative official, representative or board" of juris-
diction over questions of law. It says, and means, only that 
whereas (under Section I of the same statute) decisions on 
questions of fact are final (absent the qualifications set out in 
the proviso to that section), decisions on questions of law are 
subject to judicial redetermination. But it is impossible for 
690 Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675. 
691 41 U.S.C.A. §§321-322 .. 
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Contracting Officers or their superiors to pass on claims with-
out reaching decisions on matters of law. Nor can this Board 
fulfill its advisory function without similar ·action, if a dispute 
involving such issues is otherwise properly before it. (Em-
phasis supplied.) 692 
The "proper" presentation of legal issues to the Advisory Board, 
however, poses the problem, heretofore unsatisfactorily resolved, of 
how to differentiate between questions of fact and questions of law. 
This ·problem arises most acutely in judicial review of administrative 
decisions. 698 It also has arisen in the field of contract law because of the 
understandable desire of procurement agencies to insulate themselves 
from judicial intervention in the exercise of a so-called "proprietary" 
function. 694 . 
The problem is not academic for contractors with the Atomic Energy 
Commission. It is almost impossible for the contractor to decide when 
the contracting officer, under the "disputes" clause, has decided a ques-
tion of fact which, unless appealed to the Advisory Board within thirty 
days, will .be binding upon him in any administrative or judicial pro-
ceeding involving the contract. The safest course for the contractor to 
take is to appeal within the prescribed time. 695 
692 Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675. 
693 See Schwartz, supra note 544 at 854-857; Hoover Commission Legal Task Force 
Report, supra note 43 at 216-217: " ... [I]t is seldom that any issue on judicial re-
view of administrative action is purely a question of law, see Dobson v. Commissioner, 
320 U.S. 489, 5oo-501 (1943). In almost every case the question of law depends in 
part upon the facts." As the foregoing report points out, the ultimate point in this 
judicial and legislative fetish of trying to distinguish facts from the law was reached 
in National Labor -Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1941). In 
this decision the Supreme Court, in sustaining a decision of the Board that newsboys 
were ''employees" of a newspaper under the Wagner Act (question of law) based upon 
the facts of the situation, "applied a restrictive review of fact issues rather than a 
broad review of legal questions." The judiciary's attitude in this chronic problem of 
court revic;w is pJ:aiseworthy, because it is based on a healthy desire to. prevent en-
croachment by the courts upon the authority of the Executive Branch. However, the 
insistence of the latter ui>on this restrictive scope of review is a part of the policy of 
administrative agencies to limit any judicial review of their decisions. One solution 
is to require courts, by legislation, to apply the law to the facts in all cases, see Sec-
tion 207(g) of proposed Administrative Code, Hoover Commission Legal Task Force 
Report, supra note ·43 at 374: "The reviewing court shall determine all relevant ques-
tions of law and interpret any constitutional and statutory provisions involved, and it 
shall apply such determination to the facts duly found or established, whether or not 
such court is the trier of the facts. . . ." 
694 Etheridge, supra note 536 at 556; Moss, supra note 536, at 163; Joy, supra note 
536 at 20-21 ; Schultz, supra note 536 at 246. 
695 Etheridge, supra note 536 at 556-557; Cuneo, supra note 536 at 377: "Another 
difficulty is to determine whether the dispute is factual or legal. The uncertainty of 
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The problem again arises at the Advisory Board level. Under its 
charter, the latter considers the "appeal ... de novo, and independent 
findings of fact will be made, although the findings of fact of the con-
tr~cting officer may be adopted by the Board in whole or in part." 696 
This type of review, of course, is not a true trial de novo in which the 
findings of fact of an administrative body would not be entitled to any 
legislative or judicial conclusiveness. 697 
The Advisory Board has endeavored to clarify the distinction be-
tween reviewable questions of fact, to which may be allied issues ·of 
law, and non-reviewable issues of law standing alone. It has held itself 
without jurisdiction to interpret a contract lacking a disputes clause.698 
However, the Board will make "some preliminary rulings" on legal 
issues where necessary to determine its own jurisdiction or "to put a 
factual dispute in its proper setting." 699 As a practical matter, like other 
intra-agency contract review boards, the Advisory Board of the Atomic 
Energy Commission probably will hear and decide an appeal from an 
initial determination of a contracting officer as an issue of fact to 
which issues of law are incidental. 
b. Nature of Proceeding 
On paper, the conduct of hearings by the Advisory Board appears to 
be highly informal and possesses none of the attributes of formal 
arriving at any clear-cut definition of what constitutes a question of 'law' or 'fact' has 
generally been recognized by lawyers .... Whenever there is any doubt as to what 
should be done, the wise course to follow is to appeal. In most cases the effort and cost 
involved are negligible." 
896 10 Code Fed. Regs. §3.22. 
697 For a statutory equivalent of this quasi-de novo administrative review, see 49 
U.S.C.A. §16(2) and 7 U.S.C.A. §210, providing for review of reparations' orders of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission and Department of Agriculture. "Such restric-
tion on the scope of review is inconsistent with a complete retrial of the facts under a 
trial de novo" (Hoover Commission Legal Task Force Report, supra note 43 at 219). 
698 Frontier Drilling Co., supra note 675. 
699 The Board held, in part, ibid.: "While, under such an ['facts disputes'] article, 
the Board can-and frequently must-make some preliminary rulings on legal issues 
where necessary either to determine (as here) jurisdictional questions, or to put a 
factual dispute in its proper setting, it is clear that the Board cannot pass on an ap-
peal which raises only legal issues. . . . . The present dispute raises only a question 
as to the interpretation of the contract. By long settled rule, the interpretation of 
contract clauses, although a dispute under a contract, is a dispute over issues of law. 
It follows that the Board has no jurisdiction .... " But see Retenbach Engineering 
Co., AEC ABCA Dkt. No. II (Board's recommendations adopted by General Manager 
May 29, 1951), BNA, Atomic Industry Reporter 221: 313: "Dispute over whether 
contract gave Government or contractor responsibility for rerouting traffic around 
construction site is question of fact determinable by Board under contract's disputes 
clause." 
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adjudication 700 or of an adversary proceeding. Such hearings, by rule, 
are required to "be informal, with no fixed form of procedure." 701 
These are no formal rules of evidence, 702 and parties may be represented 
"by any authorized person." 703 
Although neither the Atomic Energy Commission nor its Advisory 
Board of Contract Appeals ever has publicly taken the position with 
respect to contract review proceedings, there exists some sentiment that 
such proceedings are in the nature of an airing of grievances or of a 
friendly discussion. 704 The substance of contract appeals procedure and 
the issues at stake repudiate this characterization. So does the govern-
ment's own position in the proceedings by always being represented by 
legal counsel. In fact as well as in theory, a proceeding before the 
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion is litigation in the substantial sense and clearly quasi-judicial. 705 
Indeed, a prominent and long-time member of contract review boards 
in the Department of Defense has stated : 
Hearings before the Board have been described as being in-
formal. This does not mean that they are of a roundtable 
discussion or conference variety. The procedure and atmos-
phere more closely resemble a court trial without a jury.106 
1oo Under Section 2(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §wen (d), 
made applicable to Commission proceedings by Section 181 of the 1954 Atomic Energy 
Act, adjudication is the formulation of any agency order which finally disposes of 
any matter other than by rule making. "Formal" adjudication is that which is "re-
quired by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing'' (Section 5, 5 U.S.C.A. §1004), 
101 xo Code Fed. Regs. §3.23. 
702Jd., §3.23(d): "Testimony and evidence may be submitted without regard to the 
formal rules of evidence. • . ." 
11)3[d., §3.23(g). 
704 See, e.g., Moss, stlf'ra note 536 at 166, n. 26: "For example, one member of the 
ASBCA [Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals] argues openly that the Board's 
primary function is to provide contractors with a place to air their grievances, regard-
less of the validity thereof : a sort of wailing wall so to speak." This view coincides 
with the misconception that Government contracting is largely a matter of public re-
lations. 
705 Vom Baur, mpra note 536 at 32-33; Moss, supra note 536, at 163-164; see 
Plaine, mpra note 1 at 78: " ... [-P]ossibly the relationship between the AEC and 
the contractors [under so-called reimbursement-type 'administrative contracts'] could 
be considered, on analysis, as a branch of 'administrative law.'"· It also can be argued 
that Pub. L. 356 requires a hearing on the record within the meaning of Section 5 
of the Administrative Procedure Act and that such a right to a formal hearing is 
· required by the Constitution, even without the provisions of Pub. L. 356; see United 
States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 734-737, 64 S. Ct. 820 (1944); United States v. ]os. A. 
Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234. 238-241, 66 S. Ct. rooo (1946); Morgan v. U.S., 2()8 U.S. 
468, 477-482, s6 s. Ct. 906 c 1936). 
1oe Cuneo, mfJra note 536 at 435· 
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3· Comptroller General 
In addition to an appeal from the initial determination of a contract-
ing officer to the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, an Atomic 
Energy Commission contractor has another means of administrative 
review in the General Accounting Office, headed by the Comptroller 
GeneraP07 
This procedure has been well summarized, as follows: 
The GAO, while not a party to the contract, may enter the 
picture whenever vouchers are presented to it by an adminis-
trative agency for "direct settlement" with a contractor, or 
whenever a disbursing officer or head of an administrative 
agency requests an advance decision. The GAO also enters the 
picture when a contractor makes a claim against the United 
States where payment has been denied. It can deny payment or 
demand payment back; if the latter is refused, it can collect 
directly from any other governmental funds that may be due 
a contractor, and failing that method, it may request that the 
Attorney General sue on behalf of the United States in the ap-
propriate court. It can also pay claims denied by the contract-
ing agency, and a contractor dissatisfied with a decision of a 
contracting officer or board of contract appeals has a second 
opportunity for administrative review. Unlike the departmen-
tal review, however, this GAO review is optional and is not a 
prerequisite to filing a court action. . . . 
From the point of view of the contractor the administrative 
review procedure of the GAO is not too dissimilar from de-
partmental review. If anything, it is more informal. The 
statutes under which the GAO is authorized to settle and ad-
just claims by and against the United States prescribe no 
definite form of procedure for the presentation and settle-
ment of claims, leaving it entirely to the Comptroller General. 
Moreover, as an arm of Congress the GAO would appear to 
be excluded from the requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, under Section 2 (a). On the other hand, there 
may be some advantage to arguing a case to accountants, 
rather than lawyers, where the issue is cost accounting; there 
may also be psychological satisfaction in dealing with an office 
closer to the source of payment. And, of course, if the amount 
is worth fighting about, it is nice to have a second chance be-
fore resort to the courts. 708 
This administrative forum offers the advantage to the contractor of 
securing a determination of both his legal rights and the factual ques-
1o1 Pursuant to Section 305 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 31 U.S.C.A. 
§74-
708 Schultz, supra note 536 at 23o-232. See Joy, supra note 536 at 41. 
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tions under the contract, without being limited on further judicial re-
view to the restrictions of Public Law 356. Where both the contractor 
and agency submit a dispute to the Comptroller General, it may not later 
be redetermined by a board of contract appeals. Should the agency 
unilaterally submit the dispute to the Comptroller General, the con-
tractor does not lose his rights to administrative and judicial review 
under the disputes clause and, indeed, may immediately bring suit in the 
courts on the grounds that the agency, by its actions, has waived the 
procedure provided under that clause.709 
F. Judicial Review of Contract Disputes 
r. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Except where the Atomic Energy Commission voluntarily might 
waive the requirements of the disputes clause, the contractor is required 
to exhaust his administrative-or, more properly, contractual-remedies 
before he may proceed in court.110 This means that a dispute arising 
under the contract must be disposed of, first, at the contracting officer 
level; second, at the Advisory Board level; and, third, at the Gen-
eral Manager level, all in accordance· with the regulations of the 
Commission. 
This exhaustion of remedies at the various administrative levels does 
not mean that the agency can delay its decision indefinitely, thus keep-
ing the contractor out of the courts. Two years between the time of 
filing of a notice of an appeal of a contracting officer's decision and the 
date of a final decision by the agency has been held by the courts to be 
reasona,ble, but it appears that any further delay would be treated as a 
breach of the contract by the government which immediately would be 
actionable. 711 
2. Judicial Forums Available 
Two judicial forums are available to the contractor once the adminis-
trative proceeding stage has been passed. These are the Court of Claims 
and the Federal District Courts. 
Both of these tribunals have jurisdiction over suits involving "any 
claim against the United States ... founded upon any express or im-
7os Brooks~Callaway Co. v. U.S., 97 Ct. Cl. 689, 704 (1!).42); H.P. Andrews Paper 
Co., ASBCA Dkt. No. 2486 (1955). 
no Cuneo, supra note 536 at 377; Joy, supra note 536 at 21-22; Etheridge, supra 
note 536 at 558-559; see Schwartz, supra note 544 at 831. 
111 Southeastern Oil Florida v. U.S., 115 F. Supp. 198, 201 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ; Wessel, 
Duval & Co. v. U.S., 126 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.N.Y. 1954); see Joy, supra note 536 at 26. 
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plied contract with the United States; or . . . for liquidated or un-
liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 712 However, the 
amount in suit is limited in the District Courts to $10,000. No such 
limitation is imposed by Congress on the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims. 
The practical efficacy of submitting contract appeals to the courts is 
subject to some question, in view of the cost and time involved and the 
possibility that the government will fight the case to the Supreme Court 
if necessary.118 Indeed, one such contractor, who travelled the road to 
the Supreme Court via the Court of Claims and lost, thereafter told a 
Congressional committee : 
Contractors are reluctant to go into the Court of Oaims un-
less they are grossly wronged. It is a costly and time-con-
suming process to litigate a dispute under a Government con-
tract. It is usually in their best interest to accept a decision 
and go about their established business. . . . m 
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in that case, United States 
v. Wunderlich,115 the burden on the contractor to overturn an adverse 
decision by a contracting officer became almost impossible to meet. 
3· Scope of Judicial Review 
Prior to the ~Vunderlich decision in 1951, the courts clearly had estab-
lished the rule that the decision of the contracting officer would not be 
disturbed unless it involved "fraud or such gross mistake as would 
necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judg-
ment." 116 In Wunderlich, which involved a "facts dispute" clause simi-
lar to that used by the Atomic Energy Commission, a majority of the 
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of review to allegations and proof 
of actual fraud, that is 
. . . conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dis-
honest. . . . If the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too 
limited, that is a matter for Congress. 711 
m Court of Claims-28 U.S.C.A. §1491; district courts-28 U.S.C.A. §1346(a) (2). 
113 Schultz, supra note 536 at 249-250, who recommends that the $10,000 limitation 
imposed in the district courts by the Tucker Act of 1887 is now unrealistic and should 
be raised to at least $100,000. 
11 4 G. P. Leonard, Vice-President of Wunderlich Contracting Co., petitioner in 
United States v. Wunderlich, supra note 640, in a statement to the House Judiciary 
Committee on July 30, 1953, Hearings on H.R. I839 et al., supra note 678 at 10. 
115 Supra note 640. 
116 Kihlberg v. U.S., 97 U.S. 398, 402 (1878); see United States v. Moorman, 338 
U.S. 457, 461, 70 S. Ct. 288· (1950). 
717 342 U.S. !)8, 100. 72 S.Ct. 154 (1951). Three justices (Douglas, Reed, and Jack-
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Matter for Congress that decision did become. The standard imposed 
thereby was recognized as "a departure from the previously settled 
law" and "a clear invitation to injustice." 118 After prolonged hear-
ings,719 Congress in May 1954 enacted Public Law 356. 
The latter statute overrules the decision in Wunderlich. As noted 
previously, the legislation reinstates the pre-1951 scope of contract re-
view by providing that the final decision by the contracting agency, in 
cases where there is a disputes clause, "shall, unless determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, 
capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or 
is not supported by substantial evidence, be final and conclusive." This 
language is incorporated in the disputes clause used by the Atomic 
Energy Commission.120 The Commission clause also conforms to the 
statutory requirement that the decision of any administrative officer 
cannot be final with respect to questions of law. 
Not only did Public Law 356 restore a rule of law which gave the 
contractor some semblance of contractual due process, it also added the 
requirement of substantial evidence to underlie the agency decision. This 
means that, for such a decision to be sustained, it must be supported in 
the record on review by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 721 The new evi-
dentiary standard represents a definite reform in contract review pro-
cedure, since theretofore the decision of the contracting officer or agency 
could be sustained by a court on a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
The provision clearly was designed to bring into this field of judicial 
review at least one of the salutary standards required by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 722 Further, Public Law 356 has been construed 
son) vigorously dissented, stating in part, 342 U.S. 101: "But the rule we announce has 
wide application and a devastating effect. It makes a tyrant out of every contracting 
officer. He is granted the power of a tyrant even though he is stubborn, perverse or 
captious. He is allowed the power of a tyrant though he is incompetent or negligent. 
He has the power of life and death over a private business even though his decision 
is grossly erroneous. Power granted is seldom neglected." See Palace Corp. v. U.S., 110 
F. Supp. 476, 478 (Ct. Cl. 1953), literally interpreting the Wunderlich rule. 
ns Etheridge, supra note 536 I# 567; see Cuneo, supra note 536 at 374; Joy, supra 
note 536 at 18; Schultz, supra note 536 at 221-224. 
ns Hearings on H.R. 1839 et al., supra note 678; see H.R. Rep. No. 138o, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess: (1954) and Sen. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 
120 AEC Manual,. Section 9111-034· 
· 721 Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B.; 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 2o6 (1938); see Shea, 
supra note 536 at 358-359; Schwartz, supra note 544 at 852-853. 
122 Section Io(e) (B) (5), 5 U.S.C.A. §wog(e) (B) (5) (" ... the reviewing court 
... shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
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to permit consideration by a reviewing court of evidence outside the 
so-called "administrative record" considered by the deciding officer of 
the contracting agency.123 
G. Conclusions 
Except with respect to the controversy involving Mississippi Valley 
Generating Company, the contract policies and procedures of the Atomic 
Energy Commission have not of themselves evoked substantial adverse 
comment or criticism. Indeed, the agency appears to have done an out-
standing job in establishing and operating a multi-billion dollar atomic 
energy plant in the United States. 
This does not mean, however, that the contract procedures of the 
Commission cannot be improved. Such improvement only can be ef-
fected when the Commission and contractors alike recognize procure-
ment as a form of administrative procedure and dispel the present theory 
found to be ... unsupported by substantial evidence .... "); H.R. Rep. No. 138o, 
supra note 719 at 4-5. For decisions construing the provisions of Public Law 356, see 
Allied Contractors, Inc. v. U.S., 124 F. Supp. 366 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (contractor need 
not take appeal from contracting officer's decision on question of law); Atlantic Car-
riers v. U.S., 131 F. Supp. I, 5 (D.N.Y. 1955) (dismissing libel in admiralty for gov-
ernment breach of charter party by returning ship in damaged condition, the court 
holding: "A question of 'law' is not a 'claim' of which the court acquires immediate 
jurisdiction before the administrative fact-finding process is completed. Questions of 
law usually arise only after the disputed questions of fact relegated to administrative 
determination have been resolved. If a claim arising under a disputes clause involves 
solely questions of law, then immediate jurisdiction may properly be held to be pres-
ent") ; United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 131 F. Supp. 717, 732-733 (D.N.Y. 
1954), affirmed 225 F. 2d 302, 318-319 (2<1 Cir. 1955) (holding substantial evidence 
rule of Administrative Procedure Act and dissents iri Wunderlich case enacted into 
contract law by Public Law 356); Wagner Whirler and Derrick Corp. v. U.S., 121 
F. Supp. 664 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (overruling decision of contracting officer for lack of 
substantial evidence therefor in record). 
723 Volentine and Littleton v. U.S., 145 F. Supp. 952, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1956) : "There 
is logic in the Government's position. But we do not adopt it. It would require two 
trials in many cases involving this question. The first trial would include the 
presentation of the 'administrative record' and its study to determine whether, on the 
basis of what was in it, the administrative decision was tolerable. But the so-called 
'administrative record' is in many cases a mythical entity. There is no statutory pro-
vision for these administrative decisions or for any procedure in making them. The 
head of the department may make the decision on appeal personally or may entrust 
anyone else to make it for him. Whoever makes it has no power to put witnesses 
under oath or to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of docu-
ments. There may or may not be a transcript of the oral testimony. The deciding 
officer may, and even in the departments maintaining the most formal procedures, 
does, search out and consult other documents which, it occurs to him, would be en-
lightening, and without regard to the presence of the claimant." 
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that the contracting function of the government is exactly analogous to 
that of a private party. Congressional authority to, in effect, review 
certain types of Commission contracts presents a new and complicating 
factor in the relations between private industry and the federal agency. 
Within the Commission itself, the Advisory Board of Contract Ap-
peals should be reconstituted as a true intra-agency review body, with 
final-not advisory-authority to pass upon the initial determinations 
of contracting officers. The success of, and general public confidence in, 
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals which has authority to 
bind the Secretary of Defense, points the way towards a similar devel-
opment within the Atomic Energy Commission. 
The fiction that the Board only makes findings of fact, and reaches 
conclusions of law incidental thereto, also should be laid to rest. This 
can be done by amending the Rules of Procedure of the Board. There 
exists no sound reason why the Board cannot consider mere questions 
of law, which consideration, of course, would be reviewable in the 
courts as at present. Such a' step would benefit both the agency and 
contractors. The latter would be encouraged to confine the settlement 
of all disputes arising under or in relation to a contract within the 
intra-agency review framework, without any resort to the courts .. 
Any Commission or industry misconception that a proceeding before 
the Board is merely a forum to air grievances also should be dispelled. 
Form and theory to the contrary, such a proceeding is a quasi-judicial 
hearing in which adverse interests litigate. The present emphasis of the 
Commission's regulations on informality and lack of evidentiary rules 
is misleading and detrimental to the interests of both the government 
and the contractor. 
Time and effort are expended by both sides in a proceeding which 
could be shortened by greater formality and regard for the rules of 
evidence. The often repeated argument that informality simplifies ad-
ministrative proceedings is not borne out by the facts. Informality 
lengthens the record and permits the introduction of arguments com-
pletely unrelated to the subject matter of the proceeding. More im-
portant, however, the contractor choosing to take his case to the courts 
must do so with a recor~ which is difficult for the latter to review in 
many cases because of disregard for the rules of evidence at the agency 
level. In this, the contractor probably is the chief sufferer since he is 
seeking to reverse an agency decision. 724 Indeed, the substantial evidence 
724 Even those who favor the "administrative contract" admit that "judicial enforce-
ment of total performance by either party would be difficult" (Ramey and Erlewine, 
supm note 551 at 354; see Moss. supra note 536 at I6o-I6I) 
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rule used by the courts since 1954 to review contract decisions would 
seem to require that the record be made by practical and reasonable use 
of the rules of evidence. 
Finally, and most important, the contractor must realize the nature of 
the transaction in which he engages when he contracts with the govern-
ment. The fine print on the back of a government contract form is just 
as binding as the clauses of a contract prepared on typing paper. Despite 
the government's insistence at times on speed in negotiating and execut-
ing the contract, the private party should approach the transaction with 
the same care and caution which he would use in other legal matters 
affecting his business. 
PART V 
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF 
ATOMIC ENERGY 
Chapter I 
ATOMS FOR PEACE: 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCYt 
BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER * AND ERIC STEIN ** 
On October 26, I956, seventy states signed an international agree-
ment described as the Statute of an International Atomic Energy 
Agency. This signing followed a conference of over a month in which 
eighty-two states participated.1 All of the participating states sup-
ported the text which resulted from this conference-a truly remark-
able result considering that the subject of the conference was atomic 
energy with its far-reaching international security implications. The 
Agency came into existence on July 29, I957, as a result of the ratifica-
tion of the statute by the requisite number of states. On October I 
when its first General Conference convened in Vienna, the Agency had 
fifty-four members. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency in several respects is 
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Stanford Research Insti-
tute, Menlo Park, California, in the preparation of this article. The authors are in-
debted also to The University of .Michigan Law School for providing able research 
assistance by Mr. Frederick Juenger, graduate student at the Law School. 
Any views expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors and not 
necessarily the views of any agency of the United States Government. This article 
appeared originally in the April I957 issue of the Michigan Law Review; it has been 
revised to bring the developments concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency 
up to October I, I957. 
*Member, District of Columbia Bar; formerly Foreign Service Officer detailed 
to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as Chief of International Atomic Energy Agency 
Branch, Division of International Affairs; A.B. 1925, Harvard College; LL.B. Ig28, 
Harvard Law School ; member, Minnesota Bar ; from N' ovember I 954 to December 
I955, Special Assistant to the United States Representative for International Atomic 
Energy Agency Negotiations. · 
**Professor of Law, University of Michigan; J.U.D. I937, Charles University of 
Prague, Faculty of Law; J.D. I942, University of Michigan; formerly of the Depart-
ment of State, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the International Conference 
on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva and to the United States Representa-
tive for International Atomic Energy Agency Negotiations. 
1 See Official Records of the I956 Conference on the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the statute), IAEA/CS/OR.J9, p. 2, 
for the unanimous adoption of the statute. The text of the statute (reproduced as 
Appendix A, Item IO) is contained in booklet form in IAEA/CS/IJ. For the list of 
the states which signed the statute see IAEA/CS/OR 40, pp. II-IS. 
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unique among international organizations. In the first place, it com-
bines two functions. It has the positive function of seeking "to ac-
celerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health 
and prosperity throughout the world." 2 Also, it has the negative 
function of insuring, "so far as it is able, that assistance provided by 
it or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in 
such a way as to further any military purpose." 3 
When President Eisenhower first launched the idea of the Agency 
in the United Nations on December 8, 1953, he indicated that one of 
its prime objectives should be to "begin to diminish the potential de-
structive power of the world's atomic stockpiles." 4 This envisioned 
utilizing the Agency to siphon off fissionable materials from wartime 
uses to peacetime uses. 5 Thus one function aims at raising standards 
of living; the other theoretically relates to the over-all problem of 
disarmament. 6 
Another unusual feature of the Agency is that there will in fact be 
three different types of relationships between the Agency and its mem-
bers. This is reflected in the statute, particularly in the provisions on 
the selection of the Board of Governors.7 The first type of relation-
ship will apply to those members which now produce substantial 
quantities of fissionable materials; 8 those states probably will not apply 
2 Statute, art. II, first sentence. 
s Statute, art. II, second sentence. 
4 U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 8th Session (1953), Plenary Meetings, 
A/PV.470, p. 443 at 452, par. 122. 
G The same thought was repeated by Mr. Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission, in the International Conference on the Statute. 
He expressed the hope that the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency 
" ... will divert important amounts of fissionable material from atomic bomb arsenals 
to the uses of benefit to mankind, and those amounts will steadily grow with the 
maintenance of peace. More tons of these materials will be devoted to welfare, fewer 
tons to weapons and warfare." IAEA/CO/OR.I, p. 11. However, see the United 
States note of May 1, 1954 handed by Secretary of State Dulles to Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov [in Atoms for Peace Manual, S. Doc. No. 55, 84th Cong., 1st sess. 
274 (1954)] to the effect that " ... this proposal [for an international atomic energy 
agency] was not intended as a measure for the control of atomic weapons .... " 
e For the position of the Soviet Union on the relation between negotiations for the 
Agency and disarmament negotiations, see Appendix A, Items 1 and 7, and footnotes 74 
and 129 infra. 
T Statute, art. VI, par. A. 
s The statute defines fissionable materials in art. XX as follows : 
"1. The. term 'special fissionable material' means plutonium-239; uranium-233; 
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of 
the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall 
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in the foreseeable future for any assistance whatsoever from the 
Agency.9 The second type of relationship will involve the states that 
have substantial quantities of "source material" (uranium and tho-
rium) 10 and therefore will be in a position to make contributions to 
the Agency as well as to receive benefits from the Agency.11 This same 
category would include countries such as Norway, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, which have developed considerable technical skills in the 
field of atomic energy but lack, at the present time, source materials. 
The third type of relationship will involve those members that have 
neither technical skills nor source materials. These states constituting 
most of the membership will derive benefits from the Agency but 
their contributions, if any, are likely to be much smaller than the 
benefits which they will derive. 
While the states in this third category received texts of the draft 
statute as early as August 1955 and made suggestions both in the 
U. N. General Assembly and to the negotiating states, they did not 
participate directly in the negotiations until the convening of the 
International Conference.12 Many of the changes in the statute made 
at the conference resulted from their suggestions.18 
from time to time determine; but the term 'special fissionable material' does not 
include source material. 
"2. The term 'uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233' means uranium con-
taining the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of 
the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 
to the isotope 238 occurring in nature." Cf. the definition of "special nuclear material" 
in §ny of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 68 Stat. 921, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§20n et seq. (P.L. No. 703, 83d Cong., 2d sess., August 1954). 
o This group includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the 
U.S.S.R. and perhaps France. The Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
estimated that France would seek Agency assistance. (Hearings before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Sen., 85th Cong., 1st sess., on Exec. I, May 14-20, 1957, 
p. 117.) 
1o Art. XX of the statute defines "source material" in the following manner : 
"3. The term 'source material' means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes 
occurring in nature ; uranium depleted in the isotope 235 ; thorium ; any of the foregoing 
in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material 
containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Gov-
ernors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of 
Governors shall from time to time determine." Cf. the definition of "source material" 
in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x). 
11 E.g., France, the Union of South Africa, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, 
Australia. 
12 Ambassador Morehead Patterson, U.S. representative in the initial negotiating 
group, states in his Report to the President : "Many comments have been received 
either through communications to the State Department or through statements made 
in the recent debate on this subject in the Tenth General Assembly. These com-
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Three drafts emerged successively during the negotiations : 
I. The text of August 22, 1955, prepared by the initial negotiating 
group of eight states, referred to below as the eight-power draft; 14 
2. The text of April 18, 1956, prepared by the enlarged negotiating 
group of twelve states, referred to as the twelve-power draft; 15 and 
3· The final text approved by the International Conference.16 
Separate and parallel negotiations were carried on between the 
United States and the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union joined 
in the negotiating group of twelve in November 1955.17 
A. Membership 
The initial membership of the Agency is limited to states which are 
members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies 
which sign the statute within the specified period and ratify it_l8 As 
a practical matter, all states are eligible for initial membership ex-
cepting the Chinese Communist regime, North Korea, East Germany, 
Outer Mongolia, and Viet Minh. These regimes are neither members 
of the United Nations nor of any of the specialized agencies. States 
other than the initial members may become members "after their 
membership has been approved by the General Conference upon the 
recommendation of the Board of Governors." 19 
ments indicate that differences in viewpoints as disclosed to date are mainly concen-
trated on a few points such as: a) composition and manner of selection of the Board 
of Governors of the Agency; b) relationship of the Agency to the United Nations; 
c) procedures for approval of the budget and prorating ainong States of operating 
expenses. The United States and the other negotiating States have sought to give 
full consideration to the viewpoints expressed by all of the States." 34 Dept. of State 
Bul. 5 at 6 (1956). 
1 3 The vast majority of the amendments to the statute offered at the International 
Conference were proposed by these states. Approximately half of the amendments 
brought to vote at the Conference were adopted. For a list of amendments and 
their authors see IAEA/CS/INF-4/Rev. 1, dated October 3, 1956. 
14 Published in 33 Dept. of State Bul. 666-672 (1955). 
15 Annex III of the Report of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Doc. 31, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1956; 
also IAEA/CS/3, September 10, 1956, as corrected by IAEA/CS/3/Corr. 1 and 
IAEA/CS/3/Corr. 2. 
10 See note I supra. 
11 See Appendix A, Item I. 
1s Statute, art. IV, par. A. The statute was opened for signature on October 26, 
1956. Statute, art. XXI, par. A. Fifty-seven states deposited their ratification in time to 
become "initial members." 
19 Statute, art. IV, par. B. This provision also applies to members of the United 
Nations or one of the specialized agencies which have not signed the statute within 
ninety days after it was opened for signature. See Appendix A, Item 2. 
A TOMS FOR PEACE 1365 
B. Organs of the Agency 
The Agency has three organs: the General Conference composed 
of all members,20 the Board of Governors,21 and the staff headed by 
a director general. 22 The negotiators at an early stage concluded that 
in distributing responsibility among these three organs, the Board of 
Governors would be given preponderant authority.23 This conclusion 
was due to the fact that the great bulk of contributions to the Agency 
would come from the very few states that had fissionable materials or 
large resources of uranium. These states, which were the only negoti-
ators of the earlier drafts, were sure to play a large role on the Board 
of Governors. As the group of negotiating states broadened, the 
powers of the General Conference vis-a-vis· the Board of Governors 
have increased. This was in response to the strong views expressed 
by many states, particularly in the General Assembly and the Inter-
national Conference. 2• 
20 Statute, art. V. 
21 Statute, art. VI. 
22 Statute, art. VII. 
23 See the remarks of Mr. Morehead Patterson in his Report, 34 Dept. of State 
Bul. S at 6 ·(1956): "It was clear that the membership as a whole could not deal 
with the day-to-day technical problems which would confront the Agency. There-
fore, we provided in the Statute for a Board of Governors with broad authority to 
make most of the necessary decisions for the Agency. The membership as a whole-
described in the Statute as the General Conference-maintains its control over the 
Board of Governors through election of a number of its members and through com-
plete control over the purse." 
See also the eight-power draft, which already·provided (in art. VII, par. H), "The 
Board of. Governors shall be charged with complete authority to carry out the func-
tions of and determine the policies of the Agency in accordance with the present 
Statute subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference. . •• " 
u Already in the debates in the Ninth General Assembly (in 1954) some delega-
tions called for increased participation by underdeveloped countries in the drafting 
of the statute. E.g., Mr. Barrington (Burma) said that "it was to be regretted that 
Asia and Latin America had not been called upon to take part in the organization 
of the international agency .... " U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session 
(1954), First Committee, A/C.t/SR.723, p. 371 at 372. Similar views were expressed 
by Mr. Menon (India). /d., A/C.t/SR.725, p. 381. Increased representation of the 
"have-nots" on the proposed board as well as in the negotiations was advocated by 
a number of countries in the Tenth General Assembly (1955). See particularly Syria, 
U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1oth Session (1955), First Committee, A/C.I/ 
SR.764. p. 39 at 43; Indonesia, id., A/C.t/SR.76S, p. 45 at 47; Israel, id., A/C. I/ 
SR.765, p. 45 at 48; Liberia., id., A/C.t/SR.766, p. 53 at SS; Indio, id., A/C.t/SR.768, 
p. 63 at 65. The Indonesian representative said: "I have already cautioned against 
repeating the inequalities of the earlier industrial revolution, with its sharp division 
between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots,' between the producers of manufactured goods 
and the suppliers of raw materials .... It is our sincere hope that the governing 
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From the very outset of the negotiations, the General Conference 
was given control over the purse strings.25 The budget of the Agency 
required the approval of the General Conference. 26 
Among the additional powers granted to the General Conference at 
the International Conference is the authority to make "decisions" (as 
distinguished from recommendations) on matters referred to it by 
the Board. 27 If this amounts to a delegation of decision-making au-
thority it may be of practical importance particularly in the event of 
the inability of the Board to decide upon a course of action. The Gen-
eral Conference was also given the authority to "discuss any questions 
or any matters within the scope of this Statute or relating to the 
powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Statute, 
and may make recommendations to the membership of the Agency 
body of the agency will, in the first place, be founded on the principle of equitable 
geographic distribution. This means, naturally, that the Asian, African and Latin 
American Continents must be adequately represented on this body." /d., A/C.1/PV.765, 
pp. 22-23. In regard to the position of the underdeveloped countries see also William R. 
Frye, "Atoms for Peace: 'Haves' Vs. 'Have-Nots'" in 35 Foreign Policy Bul. 41 
( 1955). 
25 See art. VI, par. D, subpar. 5, and art. XVI of the eight-power draft; art. V, 
par. D, subpar. 5, and art. XIV of the twelve-power draft. 
26 The General Conference under Article V (E) 6 will approve reports to be 
submitted to the United Nations as required by the Relationship Agreement between 
the Agency and the United Nations, except reports referred to in par. (C) of art. 
XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations. (The reports provided 
in par. (C), art. XII, concern non-compliance by a state with orders of the Board 
of Governors to remedy violations of "safeguards" agreements.) Under art. III of 
the Draft Relationship Agreement (General Assembly Document A/3620, July 23, 
1957), the Agency must submit (a) reports covering Agency activities at each regular 
session of the General Assembly; (b) reports when appropriate to the Security Coun-
Cil "whenever, in connexion with the activities of the Agency, questions within the 
competence of the Council arise"; and (c) reports to the Economic and Social 
Council and to other organs of the United Nations on matters within their special 
competence. 
2 7 Statute, art. V, par. F, subpar. 1. This provision was part of the Indonesian-Paki-
stanian amendment (IAEA/CS/ Art. V /Amend. 8). Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan) stated: 
"This amendment has been submitted with the idea of giving greater authority to 
the General Conference within the scope of the present statute .... If ... there is 
any matter on which the Board of Governors is unable to arrive at a decision or on 
which it may definitely and explicitly want the opinion or the decision of the Gen-
eral Conference, then we think that instead of the present phraseology, the General 
Conference should be authorized to take decisions on those matters which are spe-
cifically referred to it by the Board." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, p. 46. Mr. Surjotjondro 
(Indonesia) remarked that " ... the insertion ... will add a very useful constitu-
tional provision fur a matter which we are justified in anticipating will come up in 
the course of the operation of the ag~nc~" r AEA/CS/0R.I9, p. 9. This amend-
ment was adopted bv ilJ votes t•· '· wtth 14 abstentions. IAI:.<\ 1<'S/OR.22, p 46. 
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or to the Board of Governors or to both on any such questions or 
matters." 28 This language follows closely article 10 of the United 
Nations Charter concerning the powers of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly. 'V"hile the Board of Governors still makes final de-
cisions on most matters and while the powers of the General Con-
ference are confined to those expressly granted to it in the statute, 
nevertheless, this authority of the General Conference to make recom-
mendations is significant. The Board of Governors is certain to give 
the greatest weight to the recommendations of the General Con-
ference. The legislative history raises some doubt whether the au-
thority to make "recommendations to the membership" means only 
general recommendations applicable to all members or whether it 
includes also specific recommendations directed to an individual mem-
ber. The authority to make recommendations of the latter type would 
provide a rather powerful means of pressure on individual members. 29 
28 Statute, art. V, par. D. This· addition also originated in the amendment proposed 
at the Conference by Indonesia and Pakistan. IAEA/CS/ Art. VI Amend. 8. In regard 
to this amendment Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) said: " ... [W]e recognize that 
perhaps the arrangements in the Agency should be brought a little more closely into 
line with those which now apply to the United Nations as a whole." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, 
p. 38. The Pakistanian representative remarked : "This paragraph . . . is taken from 
the Charter of the United Nations where the powers of the General Assembly vis-a-
vis the special organs of the United Nations are defined .... By the introduction of 
this new paragraph, the powers of the General Conference • . . would be widened." 
IAEA/CS/0R.I8, pp. 44-45. The Czechoslovak representative remarked: "Views that 
the General Conference should be an organ with decisive authority in matters con-
cerning the Agency's activities have been expressed by many Governments in their 
comments on the original draft, as well as in the opening statements of many dele-
gations at our Conference." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, p. 41. The amendment was adopted 
by 76 votes to none, with 4 abstentions. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 42· 
29 The importance of this new wording seems to lie in the power to make recom-
mendations to the membership of the Agency, because the former art. V, par. E, 
subpar. 1, of the twelve-power draft had already provided for the power "to make 
recommendations to the BoaTd of GO'Vernors on any matter relating to the functions 
of the Agency." (Emphasis added.) (The phrasing "within the scope of this Statute 
or relating to the powers and functions of any organs" does not seem to differ sub-
stantially from "relating to the functions of the Agency.") 
The amendment in its original form used the words "to the members." (Emphasis 
added.) Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) argued against this on the ground that 
a situation should be avoided in which the General Conference would make recom-
mendations to individual member states which were in conflict with arrangements made 
by the Board, and that therefore the term "membership" rather than "members" 
should be used. See IAEA/CS/OR.x8, p. 38. The Mexican representative said: "As 
we understand it, the United Kingdom representative proposes that the General 
Conference should be given authority to address recommendations to the members 
of the Agency as a whole, and not to an individual member or group of members. 
If that understanding is correct, the result, in our opinion, would be to restrict the 
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This increase in the powers of the General Conference 80 as the 
negotiations progressed 81 is reminiscent of the United Nations where 
the authority of the General Assembly was considerably increased at 
the San Francisco conference in contrast to the original Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals worked out by the great powers with emphasis upon 
the functions of the Security Council. 82 
The most difficult and controversial question which arose in the 
negotiations prior to the International Conference was the composi-
tion and manner of selection of the Board of Governors.88 
A number of formulae for the composition of the Board were con-
sidered and rejected. At one time, a system of weighted voting based 
powers and functions of the General Conference. The provision would lose any prac-
tical value." IAEA/CS/OR.Ig, p. 17. The Chairman of the Conference stated be-
fore the amendment was brought to vote: "I understand that the sponsors of this 
amendment will accept the proposed substitution of the words 'to the membership' for 
the words 'to the members.' " IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. 41. 
8o See Appendix A, Item 3· 
81 This progress is described by Mr. Michaels (United Kingdom) in the following 
manner: "I would point out to the Committee that the original draft of this statute, 
which was circulated in August 1955, gave the Board of Governors a very large 
degree of direct responsibility, not only in carrying out, but in initiating and approv-
ing the policies to be followed by the Agency. A number of countries criticized this 
arrangement because they felt that on certain broad matters of policy affecting the 
actions of the Board they should be more closely subordinated to the over-all direc-
tion of the General Conference. The twelve-power negotiating group, at its meeting 
in March of this year, took these criticisms very seriously, and although I will not 
enumerate them here, a number of very substantial changes were made to meet the 
views expressed .... [T]the article as it now stands describes reasonably satisfactorily 
the relative field of responsibility of the Board and the General Conference. To try 
to give the General Conference the attributes of the executive organ of the Agency, 
for which by its very nature it is not fitted, would, in view of my delegation, lead 
only to inefficiency and misunderstanding. It would leave the Board without effective 
influence or authority. As was pointed out by the representative of Portugal, the 
operation of the Agency undoubtedly would require decisions which cannot wait a 
year between meetings of the General Conference." IAEA/CS/0R.I8, pp. 36-37. 
32 Compare chapter V, sec. B, of the proposal for the Establishment of a General 
International Organization [Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, October 7, 1944, II Dept. 
of State Bul. 368 (1944)] with arts. 10, II and 14 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions. For the history of this development see Bentwich and Martin, A Commentary 
on the Charter of the United Nations 35 (1950), and Gilchrist, "The United Nations 
Charter with Explanatory Notes of Its Development at San Francisco ... ," 413 
International Conciliation 452-454 (I 945). 
38 Concerning the Board, the original outline of the statute transmitted to the 
Soviet Union on March 19, 1954 (see Appendix A, Item .1) provided in art. II, par. C, 
subpar. 1, for a "limited membership" representing governments in which it "might 
be desirable to take account of geographic distribution and membership by prospec-
tive beneficiaries," and that "the principal contributors would be on the Board of 
Governors." 
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on contributions was suggested but was discarded largely because of 
the technical difficulties of evaluating the contributions in different 
types of materials. The advisability of granting permanent seats to 
the most advanced atomic powers was also studied and rejected be-
cause of the impossibility of developing long-term criteria for per-
manent membership.34 As the number of negotiating powers increased, 
the proposed number of the Board members increased. The additional 
seats would be filled mainly by "atomic have-nots," thus diluting the 
influence of the "atomic powers" in the Board. The debate in the 
United Nations General Assembly created pressures in this direction.85 
The twelve-power draft and the final text provide for a Board of 
twenty-three of which ten are elected by the General Conference.36 
The remaining thirteen are chosen by the outgoing Board on the basi~ 
of (a) their potential for contributions in materials and skills, and (b) 
a pattern of geographic representation for the major regions of the 
world. The top five "atomic powers" 87 may claim what amounts in 
fact to continuing membership as long as they retain their leading 
position in the_atomic energy field-regardless of whether they actually 
contribute to the Agency and regardless of any geographic criteria. 38 
Despite widespread criticism in the International Conference of the 
composition of the Board and despite a number of amendments sug-
gested particularly by the Afro-Asian states to increase their repre-
sentation on the Board, the provisions of the twelve-power draft were 
adopted without change by the conference. 89 All the negotiating 
84 See Report by Ambassador Morehead Patterson, 34 Dept. of State Bul. 5 at 6 
(1956). Art. II, par. C, subpar. 2 of the first American outline [Atoms for Peace 
Manual, note 5 · svpra at 2671 stated that "arrangements could be worked out to 
give the principal contributing countries special voting privileges on certain matters, 
such as allocations of fissionable material." 
85 See note 24 supra. 
86 Art. VI, par. A, subpar. 3 of the twelve-power draft and identical article in the 
statute. The membership of the Board will be twenty-three, on the assumption that 
"the five members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy" continue to be 
the United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., Canada, France, or continue to repre-
sent three geographic areas. If the five represented more or fewer than three areas, 
it would change the size of the Board. The eight-power draft in art. VII, par. A 
provided for a Board of 16. Five of the members would be the most important con-
tributors of technical assistance and fissionable material, five others selected from 
the principal producers and contributors of source materials, and only six were to be 
elected by the General Conference. 
37 At present the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Canada. 
38 See Appendix A, Item 4· 
89 Seven amendments to art. VI were proposed, five of them dealing with the com-
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powers including the Soviet representative urged strongly that no 
change be made in the formula on the ground that no better formula 
could be contrived in view of the political realities. 40 
However, two concessions were made to the critics of this formula. 
First, it was provided that the question of a general review of the 
provisions of the statute should be placed on the agenda of the fifth 
annual session of the General Conference.41 In the debate, it was made 
clear that the composition of the Board would be included in such re-
view. In particular, the special representation of the producers of 
source materials would be reconsidered since many additional states 
during the next five-year period were likely to become large-scale pro-
ducers of either uranium or thorium. 
The second concession related to the composition of the Prepara-
position and selection of the members of the Board. These five amendments were 
sponsored respectively by: Denmark and Iran, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 2; Philip-
pines, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 4; Liberia, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 5; Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Indonesia and Syria, IAEA/CS/ Art. VI/ Amend. 6; and Italy, IAEA/CS/ 
Art. VI/Amend. 7. None of these amendments was adopted. Amendments z and 7 
were withdrawn. Amendment 4, though not formally withdrawn, was not pressed 
to a vote. Amendment 5 was rejected by 31 to IS votes, 20 abstaining. Amendment 6 
was rejected by z6 to z6 votes with I8 abstaining. (Amendments 5 and 6 attempted 
to increase the participation of Africa and the Middle East.) Art. VI as a whole 
was adopted by 7I votes to I, with 3 abstentions. 
40 The Soviet representative, Mr. Zarubin, said: "The draft article before the 
Committee seems to be the reasonable compromise .... [I]n a spirit of co-operation 
the delegation of the Soviet Union has decided not to move any amendments to 
draft article VI .... [T]he delegation of the Soviet Union hopes that the same 
spirit of co-operation will prevail among other delegations, and it appeals to all to 
accept article VI of the draft statute as it stands." IAEA/CS/OR.zo, p. J. 
Mr. Wadsworth, U.S. representative, agreed. "As the representative of the Soviet 
Union has just said, since the outset of the negotiations on the statute over two 
years ago, the question of the Board has presented arduous and complicated problems. 
It was only with considerable difficulty that agreement was reached among the 
original eight Negotiating States on the formula which was contained in the draft 
statute of 22 A~gust 1955 .... [S]ince this formula represents a finely balanced 
compromise, even one small part cannot be changed without affecting the whole!' 
IAEA/CS/OR:zo, pp. 4-6. 
Mr. Bhabha, representative from India, remarked: " ... [W]e recognize that 
the composition as set up in the present draft has been arrived at by give and take 
on all sides, and we cannot, therefore, expect to have those particular articles changed 
that we do not agree with without, naturally, others also asking for a change in 
articles w.ith which they do not agree. We are, therefore, prepared to accept this 
article as it now stands and to support it." IAEA/CS/OR.2o, p. 12. 
u Statute, art. XVIII, par. B. Interesting to recall is the analogy to the United 
Nations Charter : The critics of the Great Power veto at the San Francisco conference 
were placated in part by the inclusion in the Charter of a provision for a review and 
revision of this instrument (art. 109 of the Charter). See Goodrich and Hambro, 
Charter of the United Nations. Commentary and Documents 539-540 ( 2d ed .. 1949). 
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tory Commission set up under the statute with the task of completing 
the arrangements necessary for the actual establishment of the Agency. 
All six elected representatives on the Preparatory Commission were 
chosen from among the Afro-Asian and Latin American group!2 
Similarly, the first Board of Governors includes four Latin American 
states and seven states from the Middle East and Far East.43 
C. Functions of the Agency 
1. Peaceful vs. Military Purposes 
All Agency functions relate solely to the utilization of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes. The Agency is directed to ensure, "so far as it 
is able," that its assistance is not used in such a way as to further any 
"military purpose." 44 
During the International Conference, France introduced an amend-
ment defining "military purpose" as follows : "The only uses of atomic 
energy which shall be regarded as uses for non-peaceful purposes are 
military applications of the atomic explosion and of the toxicity of 
radioactive products." 46 This amendment seems to be based on the 
conclusion that the greatest menace to the world from the military use 
of the atom arises as a result of nuclear explosions and from the 
toxicity of radioactive materials. The concept of "military purpose" 
thus would be limited to these uses only and would not include, for 
instance, the use of nuclear fuel in the propulsion of a submarine, an 
aeroplane, or a missile; the menace from these latter uses is not much 
greater than that arising from the use of conventional fuels for 
similar objectives. Under the French amendment the use of power 
derived from atomic fuel in a munitions plant, for instance, would 
not constitute a military use. 
In urging the adoption· of a restrictive definition of "military pur-
poses" the Indian representative suggested that any state having a 
military program should be ineligible for any Agency assistance, since, 
for instance, material made available to such state, under Agency 
42 See Appendix A, Item s. 
48 The first Board of Governors is composed of the United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Brazil, India, South 
Africa, Sweden, Japan, Italy, Rumania, Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, Korea, Guatemala, 
Peru, Turkey, and Argentina. The 10 states listed last were elected by the first Gen-
eral Conference. 
44 Statute, art. II, second sentence. 
45 IAEA/CS/Art. XX/ Amend. 1. 
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safeguards, for its non-military program would release corresponding 
materials for its military program.46 
During the conference, it became apparent that any attempt to de-
fine "military purpose" in the statute would raise more problems than 
it would solve. France never brought its amendment to a vote.47 It 
would not have been desirable for the Agency to adopt a definition 
that by implication would sanction, for example, the use of Agency 
assistance for an atomic submarine. The present text sets up a broad 
standard under which the Board of Governors will have to develop 
criteria applicable to specific situations as they may arise. 
2. Atomic Power 
From the beginning of the negotiations, recognition has been given 
to the principle that the Agency shall have a broad responsibility for 
all phases of development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. How-
ever, the portion of President Eisenhower's address to the General 
Assembly of December 8, 1953, that had the greatest effect on public 
opinion throughout the world was his statement that " ... peaceful 
power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, 
already proved, is here-now-today." 48 Thus, the function of the 
Agency which has received the greatest public attention is to furnish 
atomic fuel for the production of electric power.49 The functions of 
the Agency, however, extend to many other matters such as research, 
training, exchange of information, and development of standards of 
health and safety. 50 The Report of the Preparatory Commission to 
the General Conference recognizes that on the basis of current eco-
46 IAEA/CS/OR.z8, pp. 66-67. 
47 France withdrew its amendment with the understanding that its substance should 
be considered by the Preparatory Commission. IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 33. There also 
was a proposed revision of the French amendment submitted by India. See Con-
ference Room Paper No. 17. This revision read: "Any military purpose shall mean 
the production, testing or use of nuclear, thermonuclear and radiological weapons." 
This revision also was withdrawn, the Indian delegate commenting: "We agree that 
this matter should be noted in the future and we do not wish at this stage to press 
this particular amendment to a vote." IAEA/CS/OR.36, p. 34· 
48 Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra at 5. 
49 It is widely expected that, in the long run, the development of reactors and, in 
particular of power reactors, will be the most important peaceful application of 
atomic energy, and that the Agency's assistance to its members in this field may in 
time become the most extensive of its activities. Report of Preparatory Commission 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (PRECO), G.C.11I, GOV/1 (New York 
1957) par. 43· 
50 See Statute, art. III. 
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nomics, the initial Agency programs are likely to stress these other 
functions. 51 
3· Training and Research 
The final text of the statute reflects the importance of the function 
of training-a recognition that the absence of trained technicians and 
engineers may be a serious obstacle to early development of worldwide 
electric power derived from atomic fuels. 52 There is every indication 
that the Agency will place great emphasis in its early years on the 
subject of training.58 
It should be noted that the Agency is authorized to encourage and 
assist research and "to perform any operation or service useful in re-
search." 5' While there is no express provision authorizing Agency 
research,55 it is doubtful whether the Agency could successfully carry 
out its safeguard and health and safety functions or attract qualified 
personnel without some research program. The Preparatory Commis-
sion suggested that the Agency undertake research programs in con-
nection with "its statutory functions, such as waste disposal, health 
and safety, and methodology of safeguards and should also encourage 
such work in Member States." 58 However, the Commission did not 
specifically recommend the immediate establishment of Agency labora-
tory facilities, but merely that "The Agency should examine at an 
51 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 43. 
52 Note, e.g., the inclusion of the words "and training" in art. III, par. A, subpar. 4 
of the statute, which originated in a Polish amendment. IAEA/CS/ Art. III/ Amend. 
2/ Rev. I. This addition was adopted by 78 votes. IAEA/CS/OR.22, p. II. 
58 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 70. A number of amendments were proposed 
during the International Conference which would provide for specific activities of the 
Agency, such as the amendments submitted by Bolivia and Ecuador to establish a 
world university of the atom (IAEA/CS/Art. Ill/Amend. 9), the Haitian amend-
ment to provide for granting scholarships by the Agency (IAEA/CS/ Art. III/ Amend. 
I), and the Polish amendment to publish an international periodical devoted to the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy (IAEA/CS/Art. III/Amend. 2/Rev. I). These 
amendments were all defeated on the ground that the functions of the Agency should 
be general and the decision on specific activities should be left to the Board of 
Governors. (E.g., the argument of Mr. Wadsworth, representative of the United 
States in IAEA/CS/0R.I6, p. 17). 
5f Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. I. 
55 The first United States outline (see Appendix A, Item I) mentioned "data 
developed as a result of its own activities" (art. III, par. C, subpar. 2), which would 
imply independent research by the Agency. In the later drafts no such clause can be 
found. However, there is nothing in the statute to prohibit research by the Agency 
as long as it is for peaceful .uses and furthers the purposes of the statute. 
ss PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 30, and generally pars. 20-4I. 
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early date the need for the establishment of laboratory facilities at its 
headquarters." ~ 7 
4· Health and Safety Standards 
The Agency has broad functions in the field of health and safety. 
It is authorized "to establish or adopt ... standards of safety for 
protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property 
(including such standards for labour conditions). . . ." It may "pro-
vide for the application of these standards to its own operations as well 
as to the operations making use of materials, services, equipment, facili-
ties, and information made available by the Agency or at its request 
or under its control or supervision .... " 58 As in the case of safe-
guards against diversion of materials, it may also "provide for the 
application of these standards, at the request of the parties, to opera-
tions under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request 
of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomiC en-
ergy .... " 59 States receivi~g Agency assistance must agree to meet 
Agency health and safety standards. 60 
The authority of the Agency to prescribe such standards is not con-
fined to the type of hazards peculiar to operations utilizing nuclear 
materials. Likewise there is nothing to prevent the Agency from ap-
plying to operations coming under its jurisdiction far more stringent 
standards than the country where the operation takes place applies to 
its operations. In such an event, as a practical matter, ·the Agency 
would probably have to rely for enforcement of these higher standards 
on its own inspectors. It could not readily utilize the local authorities 
even in policing non-radiological hazards if those authorities applied 
different and less stringent standards. 
It would seem advisable for the Agency in setting up the standards 
in this field to cooperate as fully as possible with the state where the 
facility is located; in general, the Agency should insist on more rigor-
ous standards than those prescribed by local laws only in the interest 
of preventing hazards affecting more than one state (for example, 
reactor incidents which would contaminate a considerable area or 
waste disposal affecting international waterways) .61 
57 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 104. 
58 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. 6. 
59 Thiel. 
so Statute, art. XI. par F subpar. 4(b); and art. XII, par. A, subpars. 1 and 2. 
s1 For a discussion of analogous problems arising from federal v. state regulations 
in this field. see State Regulation of Atomic Energy, Part III of this volume. 
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Health and safety standards and practically every function of the 
Agency, excepting the procurement and disposal of materials and the · 
operation of the safeguard system against diversion, are of some con-
cern to various specialized agencies of the United Nations. This makes 
it essential that there should be a clear-cut division of functions. 
The Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and 
the Agency 62 takes note of this situation and suggests as one of the 
principles of that relationship that the United Nations recognize "the 
International Atomic Energy Agency ... as the agency, under the 
aegis of the United Nations as specified in this Agreement, responsible 
for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy in accordance with its Statute, without prejudice to the rights 
and responsibilities of the United Nations in this field under the 
Charter." 63 If this principle is carried out, the present and prospective 
programs of some of the specialized agencies in the atomic energy field 
may be considerably curtailed. 64 
S· Exchange of Information 
The Agency is to disseminate the information obtained from the 
members and encourage the exchange of information among them. 
The statute differentiates between information arising from assistance 
extended by the Agency and other information. With respect to the 
former, "Each member shall make available to the Agency" all such 
information.65 The obligation in connection with information from 
other sources is much less sweeping : each member "should make 
available such information as would in the judgment of the member 
be helpful to the Agency." 66 This latter loose undertaking and the 
obligation to share in the administrative budget seem to be the duties 
which a member assumes through signing and ratifying the statute. 
Other obligations arise only in connection with specific agreements be-
tween the member and the Agency concerning the receipt of benefits, 
contributions to the Agency, or the application of safeguards on re-
62 General Assembly Document A/3620 of July 23, 1957. 
63 I d. at art. I. This provision follows closely the suggestions of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations in a study of the question of the relation of the 
Agency to the United Nations. Par. 4, General Assembly Document A/3122 of April 
20, 1956, reproduced in IAEA/CS/5, Sept. 24, 1956. 
64 See Appendix A, Item 6. 
65 Statute, art. VIII, par. B (emphasis added). 
66 Statute, art. VIII, par. A. (emphasis added). 
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quest. The Preparatory Commission recommended a fairly extensive 
initial Agency program for exchange of unclassified information. 67 • 
Under article III, paragraph A, subparagraph 5 of the statute, it 
would be possible to extend the Agency safeguards system into the 
field of information. Theoretically, therefore, the United States and 
other governments could turn over classified data to the Agency. 68 
As a practical matter, this is unlikely to happen since data available to 
the Agency will generally become available to all of its members. 69 
The Director General and the staff of the Agency are required not 
to "disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information 
coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the 
Agency." This provision was included by the Conference on the 
initiative of Switzerland.70 
D. Agency Facilities 
The Agency is authorized "to acquire or establish any facilities, 
plant and equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions, 
whenever the facilities, plant a,nd equipment otherwise available to it 
in the are~ concerned are inadequate or available only on terms it deems 
unsatisfactory." 11 This emphasizes a more gradual acquisition of 
facilities than another provision that "the Agency shall as soon as 
practicable establish or acquire" storage facilities and certain types of 
other facilities. 72 These provisions are the end product of discussions 
which commenced on the day of President Eisenhower's address as . 
to whether the Agency should be "a bank" -should have actual pos-
session of fissionable materials-or a "clearing house" merely arrang-
ing as an intermediary for the international distribution of fissionable 
materials from one country to the other. The statute clearly authorizes 
the Agency to be a "bank" and contemplates such a result. The Agency 
may, however, operate also as a "clearing hquse." 
67 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, pars. 58-65. 
68 For the provisions of U.S. law, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§2164, 2153, 2154 (Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, note 8 supra, §§144, 123, 124). 
69 The Department of State interprets the statute as imposing "no obligation for 
us to furnish any information. In no case is it contemplated that we furnish . the 
Agency or Members of the Agency classified information." Hearings before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra, at 55. 
1o Statute, art. VII, par. F. IAEA/CS/ Art. VII/ Amend. 5/Rev. 1, adopted in 
revised form (Conference Room Paper No.4) by 76 votes to none. IAEA/CS/OR.26, 
p. 12. 
11 Statute; art. III, par. A, subpar. 7· 
12 Statute, art. IX, par. I. 
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The Preparatory Commission concluded that "it would be premature 
at this stage to make definite proposals regarding the timing of the 
steps the Agency will have to take" to acquire storage facilities. 73 
E. Agency Safeguards 
There were three possible ways of dealing with the problems of safe-
guards against diversion of fissionable materials into military uses. 
First, international transfer of fissionable materials for peaceful uses 
might have taken place without any safeguards. The result of this 
course would have been that in a short time a number of states would 
have been in a position to develop atomic weapons.74 It certainly would 
not be in the interest of world peace if a large number of states were in 
a position to use or threaten to use atomic weapons. There is less 
danger when three states have atomic weapons than when more than 
eighty states have them. In this respect, it is possible that the interests 
of the United States and of the Soviet Union might coincide. 
A second possible course would have been to delay the development 
of the peaceful uses of atomic energy because of the danger to world 
peace through diversion to military purposes. In view of the rapid 
worldwide increase in power requirements and imminent shortages 
of conventional fuels any such course would have inevitably handi-
capped efforts to improve world standards of living. 
The statute follows a third and middle course which permits the 
development of peaceful uses with safeguards designed to deter the 
development of new weapons programs. The success of the system of 
safeguards will depend on a wide variety of factors including tech-
nological and political developments. 
The statute establishes the basic principle that safeguards will be 
imposed only in connection with agreements between the Agency and . 
states which are beneficiaries of Agency projects.75 States do not sub-
73 PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 102. The only other technical facilities with 
which the Commission deals in its Report are laboratory facilities, PRECO Report, 
pars. 103 and 104-
74 The possible increase of the production of atomic weapons resulting from peace-
ful uses was used by the Soviet Union as an argument against international co-opera-
tion in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. See, e.g., the Aide-Memoire of 
September 22, 1954 in the Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra, 278 at 281. 
75 Art. XI, par. F of the statute reads (in part) : "Upon approving a project, the 
Agency shall enter into an agreement with the member or group of members sub-
mitting the project, which agreement shall: ... 4· Include undertakings by the 
member or group of member:s submitting the project (a) that the assistance provided 
shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the 
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mit to the system of safeguards merely by ratifying the statute. A 
further step is essential. 
The Soviet Union during the. negotiations has on the surface at 
least made a complete about-face in its attitude toward safeguards. 
Pointing to the fact that weapons grade plutonium is a neccessary by-
product of the operation of every power reactor, the Soviet Union 
initially opposed all safeguards (and for that matter any agency deal-
ing with quantities of fissionable materials) in the absence of a pro-
hibition of atomic weapons. Gradually the Soviet Union altered its 
position until it accepted the present provisions of the statute with 
some vague warnings about infringement of sovereignty through 
operation of the inspection system. 76 
It is possible that the changed attitude was influenced by the dis-
cussions on the subject of safeguards which took place in Geneva in 
August 1955 immediately following the United Nations Scientific 
Conference. The exchange of notes between the United States and 
the Soviet Union on this subject indicates the probability of further 
bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union on the problem of safe-
guards.77 
project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in art. XII, the relevant safe-
guards being specified in the agreement .... " The Agency could not waive the 
inclusion of the safeguard provision in the project agreement. See art. XI, par. F, 
subpar. 4, and art. III, par. D referring to "agreements ... which shall be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the statute." [Emphasis added.] What would be the 
situation if the safeguards specified in the agreement are for some reason less stringent 
than the "relevant" safeguards specified in article XII? Could the Agency under 
article XII nevertheless enforce the "statutory" safeguards? There may be some sup-
port for an affirmative answer in the language of the statute and particularly in the 
fairly detailed enumeration of the safeguards therein. However, such detailed enumera-
tion may well have been due solely to the desire to avoid complaints on the part of 
beneficiary states that the proposed project agreements worked out by the Board bore 
no relation to the obligations which they thought they assumed when they signed 
the statute. It was agreed among the eight negotiating states that some provisions 
specifying the nature of the safeguards should be included in the statute. These pro-
visions were vastly expanded and improved in subsequent drafts. 
76 See Appendix A, Item 7. 
77 The Soviet Union in its Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1956 (United States Depart-
ment of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 28) stated that "the considera-
tion of this problem [of the extension of the Agency safeguards to bilateral agree-
ments] could be resumed after the statute is adopted by the Conference and after it 
is ratified by the countries involved." In its answer of August 1 S, 1956 ( icl. at 30, 31), 
the United States pointed to the fact that it will take some time until the Agency safe-
guards will be operative and that the United States Government is therefo·re interested 
in standardizing the already existing safeguards. Mentioning the statement of the 
Soviet Union that it had already initiated a program -for rendering assistance to a 
number of states and that the same was true with respect to the United IGngdom and 
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The statute elaborates in considerable detail the Agency safeguards,78 
which include the right of the Agency 
1. To approve the design of specialized equipment and facili-
ties, including nuclear reactors; 
2. To require the observance of Agency prescribed health and 
safety measures; 
3· To require the maintenance and production of operating 
records; 
4· To call for and receive progress reports; 
S· To exercise stringent controls over the operations con-
nected with production of power where diversion of fis-
sionable materials to weapons can most readily take place, and 
to approve means to be used for chemical processing of spent 
fuel elements ; 
6. To establish a system of inspection through a staff of 
international inspectors.79 
The statute deals in some detail with remedies in the event of non-
compliance with the safeguard requirements.80 Inspectors shall report 
any non-compliance to the Director General, who shall transmit the 
report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the 
recipient state to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds 
to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all 
members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the 
United Nations. If the non-compliance constitutes a potential or actual 
threat to international peace, the Security Council could exercise its 
considerable powers under the United Nations Charter, assuming, of 
course, that the five permanent members agree. The General Assembly o 
might also exercise its recommendatory authority on the basis of the 
report of the Board. 81 
Canada (France having similar plans), the Department of State, in the interest of 
assuring the effectiveness of the Agency proposed an early commencement of staff 
level talks to explore the possibility of reaching uniform safeguards for bilateral 
agreements not less comprehensive than the present ones of the Agency. The United 
States Aide-Memoire also mentioned that Canada, France and the United Kingdom 
indicated their interest in participating in such talks. 
78 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpars. 1-6. 
79 For the functions of the inspectors see art. XII, par. A, subpar. 6, par. B and 
par. C of the statute. The inspectors supervise the compliance with health and safety 
standards and safeguards against diversion both _in the Agency facilities and in the 
facilities of its members under project and other agreements. 
80 Statute, art. XII, par. C, and par. A, subpar. 7. The purpose of art. XII, par. A, 
subpar. 7 is not at all clear in view of the almost identical provision in art. XII, par. C. 
81 For full discussion of the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly 
in this respect see Goodrich and Simons, the U.N. and the Maintenance of Inter-
national Peace and Security. (1955). 
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In the event of non-compliance, the Board may direct curtailment 
or suspension of assistance provided by the Agency and call for return 
of materials and equipment made available to the recipient member. 
Obviously, the "recapture" of misused material would depend ul-
timately on the cooperation of the recipient state. The Agency may 
also suspend the non-complying member from exercise of the rights 
and privileges of membership.82 
It would seem that the finding of non-compliance by the Board may 
serve as a basis for immediate withdrawal of any Agency assistance 
and for other remedial measures. 83 The state affected will no doubt 
be given full opportunity to present its defense. However, it would 
appear that under the statute such a state does not have the right to 
avoid or delay the remedial measures by invoking the procedure for 
settlement of disputes discussed below.84 
The provisions for sending inspectors designated by the Agency 
"after consultation" with the state involved into territories of recipient 
states permit access of these 'inspectors "at all times to all places and 
data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with 
materials, equipment, or facilities ... to be safeguarded, as neces-
sary to account" for the materials, to check on compliance with health 
and safety measures and other conditions of the Agency project agree-
ments. 85 These are truly unprecedented inspection powers which apply 
regardless of the type or extent of Agency assistance. Yet, these pro-
visions resulted in relatively little controversy during the International 
o Conference.86 They may, however, cause considerable difficulty when 
82 Statute, art. XII, par. C, and art. XIX, par. B. Since the suspension can only 
take place in accordance with art. XIX, it seems that all the requirements of par. B 
of art. XIX must be present, namely, persistent violation of the statute or agreements, 
unless art. XII, par. C can be read as providing for an independent basis for suspen-
sion in accordance with the procedure laid down in art. XIX. 
as As to anticipated effect of remedial measures see Hearings before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 6o, 121. 
84 Pp. 776 and 777. 
85 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpar. 6. 
86 Switzerland proposed 2 changes in subpar. 6 of art. XII, par. A of the statute. 
The first of them was to clarify that the persons subject to control by Agency in-
spectors are only those who because of their occupations deal with materials, equip-
ment, and facilities supplied by the Agency. The second envisaged that the inspectors 
be accompanied by representatives of the state concerned, if the state requested it and 
the inspectors are not impeded thereby. See IAEA/CS/ Art. XII/ Amend. I/Corr. I 
and Corr. I/Rev. 1. See also Conference Room Papers Nos. 6 and 13 and the Swiss 
statement in IAEA!CS!OR.37, p. 102, for changes from the original wording of the 
amendments. Both amendments were accepted by 77 votes to none with no abstentions. 
For rather unenlightening statements on the scope of inspection, see IAEA/CS/ 
OR.29, pp. 17, 62, 87. 
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the time comes to apply them. Substantially the same powers of ac-
cess, however, are given to the United States audit inspectors under 
the bilateral agreements concluded by the United States.87 Some coun-
tries which are parties to these agreements might prefer to have the 
inspection performed by an international agency rather than by nationals 
of the United States. 88 
The principal opposition to the safeguards provisions in the twelve-
power draft came from India. Practically the entire debate on safe-
guards in the conference centered on the three reservations entered by 
India.89 The main thrust of the Indian objection was directed against 
the inclusion of source materials 90 in the accountability system and 
against the almost unrestricted right of the Agency to dispose of the 
by-product weapon grade material produced in operation of the power 
reactors. This latter right was considered essential to the safeguards 
system for a number of reasons, one of which was to prevent states 
8 7 See, e.g., art. X of the agreeme11.t for cooperation between the United States 
and France, 102 Cong. Rec. 10398 (June 29, 1956). For detailed comparison of 
Agency and U.S. bilateral safeguards provisions, see Hearings before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra, at 72-77. 
88 One of the problems that might confront the Agency in working out its system 
of inspection, namely the composition of inspection teams, was brought to the atten-
tion of the Conference in the proposed Philippines addition to article XII (IAEA/CS/ 
Art. XII/ Amend. 4) reading as follows : "Any mission of inspection to determine 
any diversion to military end contrary to this statute shall consist of at least three 
members: one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and two others from 
the five members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy referred to in 
sub-paragraph A-I of Article VI of this statute." (U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., Canada, 
France.) This amendment received no substantial support. For an explanation of 
the motivation of this amendment, see the statement of the Philippine representative 
in IAEA/CS/OR-27, p. 36. 
Mr. Virgin, Swedish representative, remarked: "The recruitment of the staff of 
inspectors and the selection of members of a mission will obviously give rise to many 
problems .... My delegation feels that on those questions one should not go into 
further detail in the statute itself than has been done, but that it should be left to the 
Agency to find an appropriate course of action and to arrange in each particular case 
for the inspection under the general rules of the statute and, of course, of any agree-
ment between the Agency and the recipient member country. The consultation en-
visaged in paragraph A 6 to which I just referred will give ample opportunity to the 
recipient country to give its views for the consideration and guidance of the Agency . 
. . . It would mean introducing an entirely new principle if staff members from par-
ticular countries or group of countries were to be given the right of being represented 
in a given function of an international organization." IAEA/CS/OR.27, pp. 67-68. 
For further statements in opposition to the Philippine amendment, see IAEA/CS/ 
OR.24, p. 67 (Australia); IAEA/CS/OR.Jo, pp. 26 (U.S.S.R.). The Philippine 
delegation did not press the amendment to a vote. IAEA/CS/OR.JO, p. 47· 
89 See Appendix A, Item 8. 
90 See note 10 supra for the definition of this term. 
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from stockpiling greater quantities of weapons grade by-product than 
they could presently use for peaceful purposes. 91 India contended that 
the statute would give the Agency perpetual and far-reaching power to' 
affect the economic life of states. The ingenious compromise solu-
tion reached in the conference retains the accountability of source 
materials but restricts the right of the Agency with respect to the 
"special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product" ; 
the states will have the right to retain (under continuing Agency safe-
guards) such quantities of the by-product materials as they can use 
"for research or in reactors, existing or under construction." 92 
The discussion on the safeguards occupied about half of the con-
ference debates. The compromise solution removed the last obstacle 
to the unanimous approval of the statute. 
While the provisions of the statute concerning safeguards are fairly 
detailed, the agreements between the Agency and its members will 
very likely have to go into considerably greater detail. The only re-
striction on the terms of the agreements is that all their provisions 
"shall be in accordance with the provisions of the statute .... " 93 
The elaboration and establishment of a detailed system of safe-. 
guards will pose a great challenge to the Board of Governors; out-
standing scientific skill coupled with wise political counsel will be 
required to meet this challenge. 94 If th~ Agency grows into an active 
91 For the United States view see the statement by Mr. Wadsworth, United 
States representative, in IAEA/CS/OR.29, pp. 59-61. 
92 Statute, art. XII, par. A, subpar. s. See Conference Papers Nos. 19 and 21, con-
taining the amendments adopted in the statute. As a practical matter under existing 
technology very little plutonium or U-233 would come under this exception at the 
present time, and the states will thus be required to dispose of the bulk of these 
materials as instructed by the Agency. In addition, states would have the right to 
require that special fissionable materials produced as a result of such operations and 
deposited with the Agency, "be returned promptly to the member or members con-
cerned for use under the same provisions as stated above." Thus economic and 
political factors could not deprive states of the plutonium and other fissionable by-
products produced from their reactors. At the same time, states would not be per-
mitted· to accumulate idle stockpiles of plutonium readily usable for atomic weapons. 
· 98 Statute, art. III, par. D. 
94 As the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Ahmad, put it, "It will be up t() the 
Board of Governors, as it considers different specific situations and as it attempts to 
implement agreements which the statute provides for, to consider most carefully 
where there is a necessity for applying rigidly the rules contained in the statute in this 
specific case, and I take it that it will, in a realistic way, seek ·for each project tech-
nical solutions which, ·while upholding the main ideas of control, will burden the 
recipient country with the minimum of difficulties." J AEA/CS/OR.28, pp. 24-25. The 
Report of. the Preparatory- Commission contains the following recommendations for 
implementatio11 of safeguard programs: 
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body. its standards of safeguards for security as well as of health and 
safety will have direct influence on national standards developed by 
member states. The Agency may contribute to worldwide uniformity 
of these vital standards. 95 Unprecedented questions will arise in co-
ordinating the inspection and enforcement functions between the 
Agency and the member states or groups of states such as EURATOM. 
F. Supplying of Materials 
The statute makes a differentiation between fissionable materials and 
other materials which may be useful to the Agency.96 
Theoretically, the Agency is to accept any amounts of special fis-
sionable materials offered to it subject only to reaching agreement on 
a proper price and matters incidental to the transfer.97 This would 
carry out the underlying concept advanced by President Eisenhower in 
the General Assembly in 1953 that the Agency should siphon off the 
supplies of fissionable materials from military to peacetime uses. 98 
"(a) The safeguard procedures should keep pace with the development of the 
Agency's activities, starting with problems related to the transport and storage of 
source and special fissionable materials and extending to the use of these materials 
in Agency-sponsored projects and to their subsequent treatment; 
"(b) The safeguard procedures should be adapted to the specific character of each 
individual project and the degree of potential risk of material diversion. The safe-
guards should ensure adequate accountability in accordance with the statutory pro-
visions, including both physical security and material accountability measures to the 
extent required; ... " PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 84(a) and (b). 
95 Secretary of State Dulles pointed out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
" ... if there is no such organization with a standard system of controls, then you 
may get into a situation where nations will shop around and buy their materials from 
the nation which imposes the least controls ... and in the end the whole control sys-
tem would break down." Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relatio1~s Committee, 
note 9, supra at 8. 
9 6 The definitions of the various types of materials as defined in art. XX (notes 8 
to 10 supra) bear resemblance to those of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
42 U.S.C.A. §2014(x) and §2014(y). The definitions in the statute are, however, more 
specific than those of the Act. Definitions similar to those of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 are contained in the bilateral agreements between the United States and other 
countries. See, e.g., art. I, pars. H and I, of the Agreement for Co-operation Between 
the United States and France, 102 Cong. Rec. 10398 (June 29, 1956). The Indian 
amendment (IAEA/CS/Art. XX/Amend. 2), which had proposed that irradiated 
source material should be excluded from the definition of special fissionable material 
(art. XX, par. 1), was not adopted by the International Conference. 
97 Statute, art. IX, par. A. This provision does not have the restriction contained 
in par. B for source materials, namely, the power of the Board of Governors to "de-
termine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will accept .... " 
98 See text at note 4, supra. For the proposition that such was the purpose of the 
language in par. A of art. IX, see Mr. duPlessis (representative of the Union of 
1384 INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
In contrast, the Agency would accept only such quantities of source 
materials and other materials as determined by the Board of Gov-
ernors.99 Without such a provision, the Agency might be overwhelmed 
with materials useful in connection with atomic energy programs but 
in surplus supply. 
The statute does not specify whether the contributed material win 
be sold or leased to the Agency; nor does it fix the legal form of the 
transaction through which the material will be made available by the 
Agency to the recipient state.100 This commendable omission will allow 
the Board to work out agreements tailored to different types of proj-
ects and fitting the requirements of national legislation.101 As long as 
the safeguards obligations are effectively imposed, the question of the 
legal form of the transaction is relatively unimportant.102 
One of the most difficult problems in connection with the supplying 
of materials will be the determination of the amount the Agency will 
pay for the contributed materials. This is intertwined with the prob-
lems of financing of the Agency and will be dealt with later in that 
connection. 
No member may require that the materials it makes available to the 
Agency be kept separately by the Agency or designate the specific 
project in which they must be used.103 It seems to be the purpose of 
South Africa), who said: "Article IX ... does not give the Agency the right to 
refuse these materials since such a right would be incompatible with the disarmament 
purposes of the Agency." IAEA/CS/OR.2o, p. 28. 
99 Statute, art. IX, par. B. 
100 The statute uses the inconclusive term "reimbursement" in art. XIII to de-
scribe the payment made to contributing members. The terms "withdraw" used in 
art. XII, par. A, subpar. 7, and "return" in art. XII, par. C of the statute are also 
inconclusive. 
101 For problems arising under the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in 
regard to the title to fissionable material and the forms of transaction used, see text 
at note 171, infra. 
102 For the solution adopted by EURATOM see Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and connected documents, Secretariat of 
the Interim Committee for the Common Market and EURATOM, Brussels, 1957, 
Chap. VI. 
1oa See art. IX, par. J of the statute. This provision refers both to material stored 
with the Agency and those stored by the member in accordance with art. IX, par; A, 
second sentence, for in either case the materials are "made available." While a mem-
ber has not the right to demand that its contribution be used for a specific project, 
the article does not seem to preclude the Agency from agreeing to such a use. To 
what extent would such agreement bind the Agency? Does the express exclusion of 
the right to demand the use of a contribution in a specific project exclude any and 
all conditions, e.g., the condition that the contribution be not used in a specified area 
or for a certain type of project? Ambassador Wadsworth suggested that such a 
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this provision to ensure that all contributed materials are available for 
all approved projects. 
Once a member has notified the Agency of its intention to make a 
contribution, the member must be in a position to make delivery im-
mediately to the recipient state as instructed by the Agency or to the 
Agency itself to the extent that such materials are "really necessary for 
operations and scientific research in the facilities of the Agency." 10* 
However, the member in its discretion may decide whether it will retain 
possession of the material pending instructions to deliver or make an 
agreement with the Agency for storage in the Agency's depots.105 The 
latter alternative will be feasible, of course, only when the Agency has 
established its storage facilities. 
One great problem that will confront the Agency is the location of 
storage facilities when they are established. The headquarters of the 
Agency in Vienna would not be a particularly suitable location for 
storage facilities. In storing special fissionable materials in its posses-
sion, the Agency is under obligation to insure the geographical dis-
tribution of these materials in such a way as not to allow concentration 
of large amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the 
world.106 It will be difficult to find locations where the fissionable ma-
terials could be disposed of on short notice in the event of an attempt 
to seize them. A possible location would be on an island where in an 
emergency they could be dumped into the sea. 
According to the statute, unless the Board decides otherwise, the 
materials shall initially be made available for the period of one year.101 
A provision of this nature was probably necessary since the chief 
contributors would not wish to bind themselves for any longer period 
until they could determine how well the Agency was functioning. 
condition "would be contrary to the spirit of paragraph ] of Article IX" and would 
result in "chaos fairly soon." For extensive discussion of this problem see Hearings 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 154-156. 
104 Statute, art. IX, par. D. This means that a state is obliged to deliver materials 
to the Agency only for the Agency's own immediate needs. Therefore, the Agency 
acts as a "bank" only for the materials stored at the request of the supplying member. 
All other material is transferred directly from the contributing to the recipient country. 
The word "really," which is bad English, was designed to emphasize the immediate 
character of the Agency's own requirements for operations and research. It was 
introduced in the twelve-power draft on Soviet insistence. 
1os Statute, art. IX, par. A, second sentence. 
·1os Statute, art. IX, par. H, third sentence. 
107 Statute, art. IX, par. F, second sentence. The statute does not say specifically 
whether the period covered py the contribution must be determined in the agreement 
with the contributor and whether the Board has discretion to modify such period. 
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However, it is somewhat unrealistic. The Agency projects will require 
a continuous supply of fissionable materials .. It will be necessary for 
the Agency, before it approves a project, to have some assurance of a 
continuing supply of fissionable materials for the life of the project. 
The bilateral agreements of the United States generally provide for 
the supply of materials for at least five years.108 In comparison, an 
Agency project would not be particularly attractive if it could guarantee 
materials only for one year. The United States has already indicated 
its intention to make materials available to the Agency for a longer 
period. On the final day of the conference, Chairman Lewis Strauss of 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission delivered a message of 
the President of the United States: 
To enable the International Atomic Energy Agency, upon 
its establishment by appropriate governmental actions, to 
start atomic research and power programs without delay, the 
United States will make.available to the Agency, on terms to 
be agreed with that body, 5,000 kilograms of a nuclear fuel 
uranium 235 from the 20,000 kilograms of such material 
allocated last February by the United States for peaceful uses 
by friendly nations. . . . In addition to the above mentioned 
initial 5,000 kilograms of uranium 235, the United States will 
continue to make available to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency nuclear materials that will match in amount the sum 
of all quantities of such materials made similarly available 
by all members of the International Agency, and cin com-
parable terms, for the period between the establishment of the 
Agency and July 1, 1960. The United States will deliver 
these nuclear materials to the International Agency as they are 
required for Agency approved projects.109 
During the General Conference in Vienna, Portugal offered to make 
available to the Agency Ioo,ooo kilograms of "black oxide of uranium 
in concentrated form," and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom 
reaffirmed their intention to contribute respectively so and 20 kilo-
1os E.g., in art. XI of the Agreement for Co-operation between the United States 
and Cuba, 102 Cong. Rec. 10396 (June 29, 1956), and between the United States and 
the Dominican Republic (also art. XI), id., 10401 at 10402. 
The Atomic Energy Commission on November 18, 1956, announced that it is pre-
pared to furnish fuel requirements beyond the term of ten years. Statement by the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC Press Release, Nov. 18, 1956, p. 3· 
1oo IAEA/CS/OR.4o, p. 7. The announcement of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
referred to in the preceding footnote, leaves the door open for arrangements between 
the United States and the Agency on terms similar to those of the bilateral agree-
ments. 
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grams of zo% enriched uranium.110 The Chairman of the United 
States Delegation stated that the United States would match these 
contributions referring to the terms of the President's message.m It 
should be pointed out that the President's offer to match contributions 
of other states was generally interpreted to refer only to fissionable 
materials and not to source materials.112 
G. Project Agreements 
The principal obligations of members of the Agency including the 
obligation to submit to safeguards and to health and safety regula-
tions will arise only when the member signs a project agreement with 
the Agency. The statute specifies the principal elements which must 
be included in such agreement.118 
A majority of members of the Agency will have at the O).ltset little 
technological skill in the field of atomic energy. For such a state to 
secure a power reactor through the Agency, it must obtain fissionable 
materials, technical advice, reactor components, and financing. 
The applicant state will receive its fissionable materials from the 
Agency as a result of an agreement with the Agency. On the other 
hand, reactor components and much of the technical advice are likely 
to be obtained from sources outside of the Agency.m The terms and 
conditions under which the services and components are obtained must 
110 See the statement of Mr. Nutting in the 718th meeting of the First Committee 
of the gth General Assembly on November 16, 1954, that the United Kingdom was 
prepared to hold available 20 kilograms of fissionable material as initial contribution 
to the Agency. U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), First Com-
mittee, A/C.1/CR.718, p. 347 at 348. The Soviet Union on July 18, 1955, stated that 
it is ready "to deposit into an international fund for atomic materials under an in-
ternational agency for atomic energy so kilograms of fissionable materials, as soon 
as agreement has been reached on the creation of such an agency." Note of the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy, in United States De-
partment of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. II. 
111 U.S. Press Releases, Vienna General .Conference, Nos. 4. 7 and 8. 
112 Mr. Strauss during the Senate Hearings stated that the figure of 5,000 kilograms 
referred to 20 percent enriched uranium. At the same time it was contemplated that 
the bulk of uranium to be utilized would be enriched only to the extent of 2 or 3 
percent. "If this [the uranium made available] had been stated, for example, in 
terms of 2 or 3 percent, the figure of 5,oo0 kilograms would have been multiplied. 
If one were mentioning it in terms of 100 percent enrichment, it would be yet another 
figure." Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at III. 
11a See art. XI, par. F of the statute. 
114 The Preparatory Commission recommended that the Agency be in a position 
to provide technical advice to its members. PRECO Report, note 49 supra, par. 49· 
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be set forth in the project agreement with the Agency.115 The Agency 
has no responsibilities in connection with financing the project but 
"upon request the Agency may also assist any member or group of 
members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from 
outside sources to carry out such projects. In extending this assistance; 
the Agency will not be required to provide any guarantees or to assume 
any financial responsibility for the project." 116 
H. Relation to Bilateral, Multilateral, and National Programs 
An important aspect of the functions of the Agency revolves around 
its relation to the bilateral agreements for developing peaceful uses of 
atomic energy (such as some forty bilateral agreements for coopera-
tion between the United States and other states) and multilateral 
arrangements (such as the EURATOM plan negotiated by the six 
members of the European Coal and Steel Community 117 and the pro-
posed scheme of the Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion).118 To what extent will the Agency replace bilateral and multi-
lateral arrangements for international cooperation in the atomic energy 
field? 119 To what extent will the parties to these arrangements utilize 
the Agency system of safeguards against diversion for military uses? 
115 Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 3. It is interesting to note that no specific 
provision is made in this subparagraph with reference to supply of information, unless 
the term "services" is meant to include supplying of information. Furthermore, subpar. 
3 seems to be limited to situations where a project is assisted by the Agency or by the 
Agency and a "member." What if assistance is given by a non-member? 
116 Statute, art. XI, par. B. This wording originated in amendment IAEA/CS/ Art. 
XI/Amend. 1, contained in revised form in Conference Room Paper No. 5, sponsored 
by all 20 Latin American countries, which was adopted by 57 votes to none. IAEA/ 
csioR.2B, pp. 2-s. 
117 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Secretariat of the 
Interim Committee for the Common Market and EURATOM, Brussels, 1957. For 
an earlier description of the EURATOM plan see "Report of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on European Integration" (Brussels, 1956), reprinted in Univ. of Mich. 
Law School Summer Institute, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy 
201-215 (1956). See also Knorr, EURATOM and American Policy (1956). 
11s For a description of this scheme see "Report of the Special Committee for Nu-
clear Energy to the Council," with annexes and decisions adopted by the Council on 
July 18, 1956, in Joint Action by O.E.E.C. Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy 
(1956). For an earlier report, see Possibilities of Action in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy (O.E.E.C.) (1956). On both EURATOM and O.E.E.C. plans, see Knorr, 
Nuclear Energy in Western Europe and United States Policy (1956). 
119 The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission discussed these 
problems before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and concluded that there 
would not be a duplication of activities. "The task is so great and the opportunities 
so broad that, for a number of years, the combined activities of the United States-
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During the United Nations General Assembly discussions of the 
Agency in the fall of 1954, in response to a question by Mr. Vyshinsky, 
Ambassador· Lodge indicated that the United States did not contem-
plate that the Agency would have exclusive authority for international 
transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful uses of atomic energy.120 
During the negotiations on the Agency statute it became apparent that 
one of the prime objectives of the Agency-prevention of the diver-
sion of fissionable materials to military uses-could be totally defeated 
if the United States, the United Kingdom, or the Soviet Union in their 
bilateral agreements should make fissionable materials available to 
other countries under less onerous safeguards than thos·e provided in 
the Agency statute.121 Obviously, if safeguards are to be effective, the 
systems of safeguards under bilateral and multilateral agreements must 
in general conform to the Agency safeguard system. 
A step in this direction was made by the United States in providing 
in its more recent bilateral agreements for safeguards substantially 
identical to those in the statute.122 Furthermore, states which are 
parties to these agreements undertook upon the establishment of the 
Agency to consult with a view to transferring the administration of 
together with countries with which we already have or will negotiate direct agree-
ments-and of the world Agency should all serve a constructive, harmonious purpose." 
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 85 and 86. 
120 In the 715th meeting of the First Committee Mr. Vyshinsky said that the meaning 
of the term "clearing-house" used for the activities of the Agency was not clear to him. 
He interpreted it to mean that if projects for the use of fissionable material trans-
ferred through the International Agency from one state to another were made con-
tingent upon approval by the International Agency, the Agency would have the right 
to approve or reject the plans established by states for the use of fissionable materials 
for peaceful ends. This would constitute a violation of international law, if the deci-
sions of the Agency should be unacceptable to the states concerned. U.N. General 
Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), First Committee, A/C.t/SR. 715, p. 329 at 
JJJ. 
In the 717th meeting Mr. Lodge answered that in practice the Agency would have 
no control over the use of fissionable material except when such material was specifi-
cally earmarked for Agency projects. Thus any state would be free to transfer fission-
able materials to another state without having to secure the consent of the Agency. 
A/C.1/SR.717, p. J4I at J43. 
1 21 A meeting of experts was held in Geneva immediately following the scientific 
conference in August I955 to discuss the question of uniform safeguards. See generally 
United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, and Appendix 
A, Item I. See also note 95 supra. 
122 In regard to the standardization of safeguards, see the United States Aide-
Memoire of August IS, I956, United States Department of State Press Release No. 527, 
Oct. 6, 1956, pp. 29-30, and the model article, id. at 31. For actual safeguards provisions 
in a "power-bilateral," see arts. XIII and XIV of the agreement between the United 
States and Australia, 102 Cong. Rec. 10412 at 10414 (June 29, 1956). 
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the safeguards to the Agency; either party was given the right to 
terminate a bilateral agreement if such consultations do not lead to an. 
understanding. 123 It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union 
would be willing to take a similar step with respect to the arrangements 
to which it is a party.124 The scheme proposed by the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation for the control of its activities in the 
nuclear field calls for arrangements with the Agency "with regard to 
the exercise of the control on the territory of countries participating 
both in the Organization and in the Agency." 125 The Agency statute 
now specifically provides that the Agency safeguards system ( includ-
ing inspection by Agency inspectors) may be extended "at the request 
of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrange-
12s On December I, I957, 39 bilateral agreements for cooperation were in force 
between the United States and other states. Of this total 29 were agreements for 
cooperation in the research reactor field and 10 were "power bilaterals." A number of 
other agreements are in the process of completion. On U.S. bilateral agreements, see 
Fisher, L'Energie Atomique et les :e.tats-Unis 24I -2g6 ( 1957). 
Before the middle of 1956 the agreements did not refer to the International Agency. 
Agreements concluded after that time took into consideration the future establishment 
of the Agency in the following manner : 
"The Government of and the Government of the United 
States of America affirm their common interest in the establishment of an international 
atomic energy agency to foster the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the event such 
an international agency is created: 
"1. The parties will consult with each other to determine in what respects, if any, 
they desire to modify the provisions of this agreement for cooperation. In particular, 
the parties will consult with each other to determine in what respects and to what 
extent they desire to arrange for the administration by the international agency of those 
conditions, controls, and safeguards, including those relating to health and safety 
standards, required by the international agency in connection with similar assistance 
rendered to a cooperating nation under the aegis of the international agency. 
"2. In the event the parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement following 
the consultation provided in paragraph A [sic] of this article, either party may by 
notification terminate this agreement. In the event this agreement is so terminated, 
the Government of shall return to the United States Commis-
sion all source and special nuclear materials received pursuant to this agreement and in 
its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction." See United States 
Department of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 33, and, for a practical 
example, art. XII, par. A, of the Agreement for Cooperation with France, I02 Cong. 
Rec. 10400 (June 29, I956). 
124 See note 77 supra. 
125 Sec. III, par. I2, subpar. a of the decisions adopted by the Council of the European 
Organization for Economic Cooperation on I8th July, 1956, Joint Action by O.E.E.C. 
Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy I32-133 (I956). For the type of security 
controls and safeguards contemplated, see id. at 57-73. For the controls and safeguards 
contemplated by EURATOM, see Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, note I 17 supra, arts. 77-85. 
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ment." 126 During the International Conference, at the suggestion of 
Thailand, this provision was further broadened to permit the safe-
guards system and the health and safety system to be extended "at the 
request of a state to any of that state's activities in the field of atomic 
energy." 127 This obviously is a further step in the direction of making 
possible a uniform international system of safeguards. 
The remaining steps necessary to transfer the concept of uniform 
safeguards from the realm of ideas have not yet been taken: first, an 
agreement among states disposing of fissionable materials outside the 
Agency that they will require in each instance the acceptance of the 
Agency system of safeguards as a condition of turning over the 
materials; and second, the ultimate establishment of a system of safe-
guarded disarmament which would apply the system of safeguards 
universally to the entire atomic establishment of all states including 
those possessing atomic weapons. In view of the present Soviet atti-
tudes, the outlook for the attainment of this last goal in the foreseeable 
future is most unpromising. Nevertheless, the Agency could create a 
working model of an inspection system which on a vastly broadened 
scale would be useful in a disarmament program.128 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union 
supported the Thai suggestion but gave no indication that their own 
programs would be subjected to Agency safeguards. The Soviet Union 
has on a number of occasions stated that it will supply fissionable ma-
terials to other countries without any safeguards excepting an agree-
ment by those countries to devote the materials only to peaceful pur-
poses.129 However, to date the Soviet Union has apparently not offered 
1 26 Art. III, par. A, subpar. 5 of the statute. This provision was first included in the 
twelve-power draft. 
127 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpar. s. Mr. Khoman, representative from Thailand, 
remarked in the Conference: " ... [l]f for no other reasons than those of equality 
and equity, as well as the reason that the roe7ztual establishment of world-'lf.'ide security 
from atomic danger is possible, these safeguards shall not be restricted to the present 
boundaries but extended to all the countries of the world." [Emphasis added.] 
IAEA/CS/OR.IS, p. 65. 
12s "The Agency will not, of course, achieve atomic disarmament, nor was it con-
ceived to attempt that. However, it can promote United States objectives in the field 
of disarmament by creating a practical working model of an inspection system, and a 
climate of international opinion in support of our objectives. This, we may hope, will 
facilitate establishment of the broader controls needed for a successful disarmament 
agreement" (statement of Mr. Lewis Strauss, Hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 87). 
129 Mr. Zarubin, representative of the Soviet Union, stated at the Conference: "The 
Agency should impose upon no country control that might infringe upon its sover-
eign rights .... It is ... necessary to note that the agreement on the peaceful 
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significant quantities of fissionable materials to countries other than 
those which it fully controls. 
Most of the inter-governmental discussions of the relationship of 
the Agency to bilateral or multilateral programs of cooperation have 
concentrated on the systems of safeguards. However, the success or 
failure of the Agency will depend equally upon working out a proper 
relationship on other phases of the program. It is apparent that the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union can through 
bilateral or multilateral agreements make available all types of assist-
ance which the Agency might provide. If the terms offered by one of 
these states are more favorable than those offered by the Agency or 
if the procedures are less cumbersome, then there would be little in-
centive for a state to request assistance from the Agency. 
If the Agency is to play a meaningful role in the development of the 
peaceful uses of the atom, it will be necessary to work out some form 
of relationship between the Agency program and bilateral and multi-
lateral programs. Three possible types of relationship immediately sug-
gest themselves. 
I. The United States (and also the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union) might gradually arrange for the Agency to take over the bi-
lateral and multilateral programs in their entirety. Some of the recent 
bilateral agreements of the United States provide for consultations 
between the parties after the establishment of the Agency with a view 
to possible modifications of the agreements.130 Any change in the 
agreements would require the consent of both parties. The present 
policy of the United States, however, contemplates . continuance and 
expansion of bilateral programs of cooperation.181 
utilization of atomic energy concluded between the Soviet Union and other countries 
does not contain any conditions which might infringe upon the sovereign rights of 
countries participating therein. The Soviet Union considers that a sufficient guarantee 
is to provide in the draft statute that countries must be obligated not to make use of the 
assistance which they receive from the Agency for the production of atomic weapons, 
and must submit reports with respect to the assistance received. The system of 
guarantees contemplated under the draft statute would have meaning if it had been 
connected with the prohibition of the atomic weapon and if it had been made applicable 
to both the recipient countries and the countries giving assistance." IAEA/CS/OR.3, 
pp. 31-35. For the position taken by the Soviet Union in regard to safeguards, see also 
Appendix A, Item 7. 
180 See note 123 supra. 
181 As to relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements see Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(statements of Mr. Lewis Strauss and of Mr. Gerard C. Smith), note 9 supra at 86 and 
165. 
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2. The bilateral and multilateral arrangements might continue with 
the parties requesting the Agency to assume the responsibility for the 
administration of safeguards. The statute contemplates this possibility, 
w}:lich was discussed above.182 
3· The bilateral and multilateral arrangements might continue to 
cover the same broad fields where the Agency furnishes assistance. In 
this event, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities, it 
might be advisable for the three Great Powers to agree that certain 
specific types or sizes of reactors would be furnished with the assistance 
of the Agency while countries in their separate programs would con-
centrate on other types or sizes.133 EURATOM and the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation have under study the establish-
ment of "common installations" (or "joint undertakings"), such as 
·isotope separation and chemical processing plants.134 Coordination of 
Agency activities with these multilateral arrangements will also be 
necessary. 
In the absence of some arrangement to correlate the various pro-
·grams, the Agency might find that practically all feasible projects were 
·being undertaken outside the Agency. 
I. Privileges and Immunities 
The statute grants the Agency such legal capacity and privileges and 
immunities in the territory of each member "as are necessary for the 
exercise of its functions." 185 The delegates of the members and 
Governors (members of the Board) with their staff as well as the Direc-
tor General and the staff of the Agency are accorded privileges and 
·immunities "necessary in the independent exercise of their func"' 
tions. . . ." 186 Separate agreements to be negotiated between the 
Agency and the members are to define the legal capacity, privileges, 
and immunities so conferred.181 These limited "functional" privileges 
follow generally the provisions in the Charter of the United Nations 
and the statutes of some specialized agencies of the United Nations.188 
1a2 Statute, art. III, par. A, subpars. 5 and 6. 
1sa See statements in note 131 supra. 
184 On EURATOM "joint enterprises," see Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community, note II7 supra, arts. 45-51. On O.E.E.C. "joint undertak-
ings," see Joint Action by O.E.E.C. Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy 23-52 
(1956). 
185 Statute, art. XV, par. A. 
136 I d., par. B. 
187 ld., par. C. 
1as See, e.g., art. 105 of the United Nations Charter, which, contrary to the Covenant 
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The question arises whether or not the grant of the legal capacity, 
privileges, and immunities was intended to become effective from the 
date of the ratification of the statute in the absence of separate agree-
ments. It is pertinent to note that the final draft omits the eight-
power draft provision to the effect that the requirement of separate 
agreements is "without prejudice to the immediate effectiveness" 189 of 
the grant of the legal capacity, privileges, and immunities.140 
J. Settlement. of Disputes 
"Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion" of the statute, not settled by negotiation, "shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the 
Court unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settle-
ment." 141 In order to bring a matter before the Court under this 
provision, it will apparently be necessary for the parties to conclude 
a special agreement unless both parties had previously accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The provision in the eight-power 
draft which would have conferred unequivocally upon the Court com-
pulsory jurisdiction in this matter has been abandoned.142 This is 
clearly a concession to the opposition on the part of the Soviet Union 
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court in any form 
or shape. 
The statute provides that both the General Conference and the Board 
of Governors "are separately empowered, subject to authorization from 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to request the Inter-
national Court to give .an advisory opinion on any legal question aris-
of the League of Nations, does not provide for diplomatic immunities but only (as 
in the case of the Agency) for limited privileges. The provisions in the constitutions 
of other specialized agencies are similar. See, e.g., art. 67 of the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization; art. 40 of the Constitution of the International Labor 
Organization. 
1s9 Art. XVII, par. C of the eight-power draft. 
Ho For a view that limited privileges are available even in absence of separate 
agreements, see the excellent statement of Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal 
Advisor, Department of State, in Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, note 9 supra at 161. 
141 Statute, art. XVII, par. A. 
142 Art. XIX, par. E, the relevant provision of the eight-power draft, read: "The 
Parties to the present Statute accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice with respect to any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Statute. Any such dispute may be referred by any Party concerned to the Inter-
national Court of Justice for decision unless the Parties concerned agree on some other 
mode of settlement. . " [Emphasis added.) 
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ing within the scope of the Agency's activities." 143 The General As-
sembly was to grant such authorization on all questions "other than 
a question concerning the mutual relationships of the Agency and the 
United Nations or the specialized agencies." 144 
The above-quoted provision of the statute referring to advisory 
opinion is broad enough to cover not only disputes among member 
states but also disputes between the Agency on one hand and a member 
on the other. The latter type of dispute would include differences aris-
ing between the Agency and a recipient state over the interpretation of 
a project agreement. Under the statute, any such project agreement 
is to "make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes." 140 
It is hoped that the Board will develop a formula to be included in all 
project agreements-for a speedy and binding solution of such disputes 
in the event the efforts at a settlement by the Director General and the 
Board should fail. A possible formula would be to refer the dispute 
to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion which 
the parties would undertake to accept in advance.146 Another possible 
143 Statute, art. XVII, par. B. This provision is based on art. g6, par. 2 of the 
United Nations Charter which provides that "other organs of the United Nations 
and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General 
Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising 
within the scope of their activities." It is of somewhat academic interest to speculate 
whether under this article, the Agency would be considered a "specialized agency." 
The Agency cannot be a party to a contentious proceeding before the International 
Court since the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides in art. 34. par. I, 
that only states can be parties in cases before it. It is interesting to note that the 
Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (General Assembly Document A/362o, July 23, 1957, arts. 
I and XX) apparently does not consider the International Atomic Energy Agency a 
specialized agency. Article I of the Agreement refers to the Agency as "autonomous." 
Article XX refers to the relationships of "The Agency with any specialized agency." 
144 See art. X, Draft Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, General Assembly Document A/3620, July 23, 
1957-
145 Statute, art. XI, par. F, subpar. 6. This provision originated in an amendment 
submitted by the Netherlands. IAEA/CS/Art. XI/Amend. 3. In view of its adoption, 
a Swiss amendment (IAEA/CS/Art. XVII/ Amend. 1/Corr.1) designed to provide for 
the settlement of disputes of any kind and including disputes with the Agency was with-
drawn. 
146 Although this formula by itself would of course not establish compulsory juris-
diction of the Court over the Soviet Union, the Russians nevertheless may be expected 
to oppose it. They may oppose it perhaps somewhat less vigorously and-it is hoped-
less successfully than the original text of the disputes article in the eight-power draft. 
For a possible procedure utilizing the advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice in an arbitration procedure see sec. 21 of the Headquarters Agreement between 
the United States and the. United Nations, signed June 26, 1947. U.N. General 
Assembly Off. Doc., Second Session (1947), Resolutions, 169 (II), p. 91. 
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formula would be to provide for arbitration by a special commission 
which could develop into an expert judicial body on matters relating 
to atomic energy.147 
K. Financing of the Agency 
One of the most difficult problems confronting the Agency will be 
that of financing its operations. The reason, of course, is that most 
activities in the field of atomic energy involve vast expenditures. 
It is clear that the International Agency, at the outset, will have 
the financial resources to carry on only a small fraction of the total 
activities associated with the peaceful development of atomic energy. 
The statute recognizes four methods of financing Agency activities. 
First, administrative expenses 148 will be included in a separate budget 
and apportioned among the members in accordance with a scale to be 
fixed by the General Conference. The General Conference, in fixing 
this scale, shall be guided by the principles adopted by the United Na-
tions in assessing contributions of member states to the regular budget 
of the United Nations.149 In the early years of the Agency, only a 
small fraction of the eighty-seven states eligible for initial member-
ship will be the beneficiaries of power projects. Most of the remaining 
members will be unwilling to accept large assessments which would be 
utilized for the general administration of the Agency without any direct 
benefit to them, thus limiting the funds assessed in this manner.150 
uT As pointed out above, a beneficiary state cannot avoid or delay the measures im-
posed by the Board for noncompliance with the safeguards provisions by invoking 
the dispute settlement provisions contained in art. XVII or in the project agreement. 
Any effort to provide for such avoidance or delay in the project agreement would 
seem to be contrary to the safeguards provisions of the statute, and particularly to art. 
XII, par. C. 
148 Administrative expenses are d~fined in art. XIV, par. B, subpar. I of the statute to 
include (a) costs of the staff of the Agency (other than the staff employed in con-
nection with materials, services, equipment and facilities required in carrying out the 
Agency's functions or necessary for Agency projects) ; cost of meetings, expendi-
tures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of infor-
mation, as well as (b) costs of implementing safeguards and expenses incurred in the 
"syphoning ·off" of special fissionable material not used for any project. The expenses 
under (a) are apportioned to the full extent. According to par. C of art. XIV, the 
expenses under (b) are apportioned only to the extent that they are not recoverable 
under agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency and 
parties to bilateral and multilateral arrangements. 
uo Statute, art. XIV, par. D. 
1Do During the Preparatory Commission discussions some question arose as to the 
scope of expenditures which could properly be included within the administrative 
budget. For example, it was contended that the cost of a fellowship program could 
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A second method of financing the Agency would be through borrow-
ing. Under rules and limitations to be approved by the General Con-
ference, the Board of Governors has the authority to exercise borrow-
ing powers on behalf of the Agency without, however, imposing on 
the individual members of the Agency any liability in respect of the 
loans.151 While the language of the statute is most -ambiguous, pre-
sumably loans would be utilized chiefly for the construction of Agency 
facilities and not for the day-to-day operations of the Agency.152 
' A third method of financing is through voluntary contributions. The 
Board of Governors is authorized to accept voluntary monetary con-
tributions made to the Agency.153 There are a number of parallels for 
financing international bodies in this manner, for example, the United 
Nations agency supporting the Palestine refugees. However, the 
amount of voluntary contributions which states might be willing to 
make is likely to be limited. 
The fourth method of financing the Agency is through charges 
imposed in project agreements between the Agency and states recipi-
ent of materials and services. Such charges will include costs of special 
fissionable materials and of their handling and storage and probably a 
large proportion of the cost of administering the system of safe-
not be deemed an administrative expense. The Commission ultimately recommended the 
inclus'ion within the administrative budget of $2so,ooo "for a limited fellowship pro-
gram which from the administrative point of view could be undertaken by the Agency 
during the course of 1958 if funds were to be made available." This was justified on 
the grounds that such expenses might be deemed as "other expenses, such as may 
for example be contemplated under Article XIV F of the Statute." PRECO Report, 
note 49 supra, pars. 170 and 171. This narrow definition of administrative expenses 
was emphasized during the Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
note 9 supra, at 57 and 136. _ 
151 Statute, art. XIV, par. G. The provisioti that the members shall not be liable for 
loans was included on British initiative following a suggestion made by Yugoslavia. 
IAEAICS/OR31, p. 42· See also IAEAICSIOR32, p. 17 and pp. 6o-61 for the 
British and U.S.S.R positions in this matter._ The amendment is contained in Confer-
ence Room Paper No. 12IRev. 1. The Soviet Union opposed any borrowing power 
for the Agency. The amendment proposed by the Soviet Union to delete par. G 
(IAEAICSI Art. XIV I Amend. 4) was rejected by 49 votes to 9, with 14 abstentions. 
IAEA/CSIORJ6, p. 22. 
1 52 See Appendix I. 
153 Statute, art. XIV, par. G, last clause. This provision was included in the statute 
as a result of an amendment submitted by Egypt, Indonesia, and Syria. IAEAICSI Art. 
XIV 1 Amend. 2, as revised by Conference Room Paper No. 10. The Soviet Union pro-
posed an amendment to add a new par. E to art. XIV providing for financing of ex-
penseS under par. B, subpar. 2, to the extent that they concern the acquisition of 
Agency-owned materials, facilities, and equipment, by voluntary contributions. 
IAEAICSI Art. XIV I Amend. 4· This amendment was rejected by 52 votes to 10, 
with 10 abstentions. IAEAICSI0RJ6, pp. 24-25. 
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guards. m Here again there are practical limitations upon the funds 
that can be raised through such charges. The greater the charges the 
greater the cost of production of electric power utilizing atomic fuel. 
If the charges imposed under Agency agreements are onerous, the 
result will be to delay substantially the time when atomic power will be 
competitive with conventional power. Furthermore, if the charges are 
greater under the Agency program than under bilateral programs, states 
will be discouraged in utilizing the Agency. On the other hand, there 
may be no other practical way to finance the safeguards system. One 
possible solution for this dilemma would be for states contributing 
fissionable and other materials to contribute those materials to the 
Agency at less than cost. There is nothing in. the statute which would 
prevent such an indirect subsidy of the Agency.155 
The Preparatory Commission recommended a first year budget of 
slightly in excess of four ~illion dollars (excluding working capital 
fund of two million dollars). 158 
L. Amendment Procedures 
Amendments to the statute come into effect when approved by the 
General Conference by a two-thirds majority and "by two-thirds of 
all the Members in accordance with their respective constitutional proc-
esses." 157 
to• Statute, art. XIV, par. B, su6pars. I (b) and 2. 
156 As stated previously, contributions of fissionable and other materials to the 
Agency will be made on terms agreed upon between the Agency and each individual 
state making the contribution. Statute, art. IX, pars. A and B. The agreement 
between the contributing state and the Agency might provide for furnishing the 
material at cost, at less than cost or at more than cost. There is nothing in the statute 
to require the Agency to pay uniform sums to the states making the contributions. For 
U.S. policy and legislation see note 16g infra, and text at that note. Chairman Strauss 
of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, in his statement to the International Con-
ference on October 26, 1956 (IAEA/CS/OR-40, p. 2 et seq.), indicated that the 
United States contributions would be "on comparable terms" to the contributions made 
by other members. Id. at 7· It thus would be possible for the United States and other 
contributors to adjust the amount they charge to the Agency in such a manner that 
the cost of fissionable materials to recipient states including surcharges for operation 
of the safeguards system would be comparable to the cost of fissionable materials 
furnished under the bilateral programs. It should be noted that under the bilateral 
programs of the United States the net cost of fissionable materials to cooperating 
states is reduced through the amounts which the United States pays to such states 
for the plutonium by-product recovered when the fuel elements are chemically reproc-
essed in the United States. The Agency would not be in a position to make similar 
payments until the technology of utilizing plutonium for peaceful purposes is further 
advanced so as to allow the Agency to make profitable use of it. 
t56 PRECO Report, note 49 supra at 39, pars. 174-187. 
t5T Statute, art XVIII, par C 
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A member unwilling to accept an amendment to the statute may 
withdraw from the Agency at any time but must fulfill its contractual 
obligations to the Agency. 158 In theory, at least, this right to withdraw 
from the Agency protects a member against unacceptable amendments 
which would make basic changes in the rights and obligations of mem-
bership. In practice, however, if the Agency becomes a truly impor-
tant source of assistance it might not be feasible for a state to withdraw. 
In all· probability, agreements between the Agency and its members 
for the supply of special fissionable materials will result in obligations 
extending over a number of years.159 It might be wise for a state 
furnishing fissionable materials to provide specifically in its agreement 
with the Agency for the termination of its obligation to furnish the 
materials in the event of its withdrawal from the Agency because of an 
amendment to which it was unwilling to agree. Likewise, the obliga-
tions of a state receiving assistance from the Agency will presumably 
extend for the life of the project and would make a withdrawal diffi-
cult. This raises the problem of the status of a power reactor con-
structed with assistance of the Agency if the state where the reactor 
is located withdraws from the Agency. Presumably the agreement 
between the Agency and the recipient state would cover this contin-
gency. The statute provides that withdrawal by a member from the 
Agency shall not affect its contractual obligations entered into pursuant 
to the provisions governing Agency projects. 
The United States Senate subjected its advice and consent to the 
"interpretation and understanding" that ( I ) any amendment to the 
statute shall be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, and 
( 2) the United States will not remain a member of the Agency in the 
event of an amendment being adopted to which the Senate by a formal 
vote should refuse its advice and consent.180 The act of Congress pro-
viding for the participation of the United States in the Agency made 
provision for "the prompt and orderly settlement of obligations and 
commitments to the Agency" and "orderly termination of United States 
participation in the Agency'' if such a contingency should arise.181 
158/d., pars. D and E. 
159 For considerations concerning the duration of obligations of member states con-
tributing materials, see text at note 1<>7ff. supra. 
18o The "interpretation and understanding" originated in The Committee on Foreign 
Relations (Ex. Rep. 3 on Exec. I, 85th Cong., 1st. sess., at 17, June 14, 1957) and was 
adopted by the Senate, 103 Cong. Rec. 8463 et seq., June 18, 1957. 
181 International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957, P.L. 85-177, 
85th Cong., 71 Stat. 455· 
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M. United States Cooperation with the Agency 
The statute appears to conform to the concept of "an international 
arrangement" for an "international atomic pool" into which the Presi-
dent was "authorized" by the Congress to enter by the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954.162 The adherence of the United States to such an "arrange-
ment" under the Act could have become effective either upon approval 
by the Congress or upon advice and consent of the Senate (as a 
treaty) .163 The Agency statute was submitted by the President to the 
Senate as a treaty, and, after approval by the Senate, was ratified on 
July 29, 1957. 
The Executive Branch of the United States Government had con-
cluded that under the conditions of the Act of 1954 United States 
cooperation with the Agency could and should be provided through the 
Atomic Energy Commission negotiating with the Agency periodic 
"agreements for cooperation" specifying amounts and terms of the con-
tributions of fissionable materials for a given period.m 
162 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2154 (P.L. 703, § 124). 
163 /d.; §§ 2145 and 2014 (I) (P.L. 703, § 124, §II k). The statute provides for 
"ratification or acceptance" in accordance with "respective constitutional processes." 
Art. XXI, par. D. For discussion of § 2154 (P.L. 703, § 124) and generally of sub-
chapter X (P.L. 702, c. II) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on International Ac-
tivities, see Cole, "The Meaning of the New Atomic Law," Nucleonics, p. 12 (March 
1955); Wit, "Some International Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 Law 
and Contem. Prob. 167-169 (1956). For a discussion of the provisions of the act 
concerning international activities generally see Ruebhausen, "New Atomic Problems," 
9 N.Y. City Bar Assn. Rec. 368 (1954). See also University of Michigan Law School, 
Summer Institute, Workshops on Legal Problems of Atomic Energy 63-84 (1956). 
164 This general position was set forth to the Senate by the Secretary of State. 
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, note 9 supra at 6 and 7. 
Section 124 (P.L. 703, § 124) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2154. 
contemplates that the United States' cooperation with the "pool" will be "pursuant to 
an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 123." Section 123 
(P.L. 703, § 123) provides for such an agreement with "any nation or regional de-
fense organization." Since the Agency is not a "regional defense organization," the 
question may be asked whether under § 123 (P.L. 703, § 123) an agreement with the 
Agency is possible. This question clearly must be answered in the affirmative since in 
the absence of new legislation any other arrangement in the general context of the act 
and the Agency's statute would seem to be impracticable. It could perhaps be said 
that the giving of advice and consent by the Senate to the statute (or the approval by 
Congress of the Statute), since the statute provides for agreement between individual 
contributors (such as the United States) and the Agency, supersedes §§ 123 and 124 
(P.L. 703, §§ 123, 124) to the extent that they are interpreted as precluding a bialteral 
agreement between the United States and the "international atomic pool." Cf. H.R. 
Rep. No. 2181, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess., "Separate Views on International Activities" and 
"Separate Views of Representative Holifield and Representative Price on H.R. 9757," 
reprinted in Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra at 156-160, 161, 190-193. 
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The safeguards provisions of the Agency statute might be considered 
sufficient to enable the Agency to undertake in the agreement for coop-
eration the guarantees against diversion of materials to military pur-
poses required in the Act. Upon completion of negotiations under 
this procedure the Commission would have to recommend approval 
of the agreement to the President. Before approving, the President 
would have to make "a determination in writing" that the agreement 
"will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the com-
mon defense and security." If it can be assumed that the participation 
of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the "international atomic pool" 
was contemplated by the Congress, such determination would be pos-
sible. Finally, before it came into effect, the proposed agreement-
after approval by the President-would have to lie before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress for thirty days while 
Congress is in session. 
The provisions of the Agency statute seemed compatible with the 
procedure required by the Atomic Energy Act interpreted in the above 
fashion. In fact, as pointed out earlier, the Agency statute itself en-
visaged notification by members of contributions made available "in 
conformity with its laws" and periodic agreements with contributors 
determining the terms of the contributions.165 
These procedures required by the Atomic Energy Act proved to be 
rather cumbersome in connection with bilateral agreements. Unfortu-
nately the Congress in the 1957 Act providing for the United States 
participation in the Agency appears to have complicated rather than 
simplified the procedures.166 
Under Section 7 of the Participation Act, the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 was amended to provide that with the exception of the 5,000 
kilograms containing uranium 235 already earmarked for the 
Agency,167 "The Commission may distribute to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency or to any group of nations such amounts of special 
nuclear materials and for such periods of time as are authorized by 
Congress." 168 This means that special legislation will be necessary 
for any further contribution to the Agency or for any contribution 
to other multilateral groups such as EURATOM. This requirement is 
far more burdensome than the procedures of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954. 
165 Statute, art. IX, par. C. 
166 P.L. 85-177, 85th Cong., 71 Stat. 453. 
161 Note 112 supra. 
1 6 8 Emphasis added. Sec. 7, P.L. 85-177, 85th Cong., 71 Stat. 455. 
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The same section of the Participation Act provided "unless hereafter 
otherwise authorized by law the Commission shall be compensated for 
special nuclear materials so distributed at no less than the Commission's 
published charges applicable to the domestic distribution of such ma-
terial," with the exception of certain relatively small quantities of 
materials which might be made available for research purposes. This 
provision was included in the Act despite the unqualified assurances by 
the Executive Branch that full payment would be required for any 
materials made available to the Agency.169 
It would seem desirable that the entire problem of United States 
cooperation not only with the Agency but also with certain regional 
arrangements such as EURATOM should be reviewed with a view to 
further amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Participation 
Act of 1957 to permit greater flexibility in the relationships between the 
United States and these international groups, under general policy 
directives determined by the Congress. 
Neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Participation Act specify the 
form of the legal transaction (sale, lease, etc.) through which the 
United States fissionable material may be made available abroad.170 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 does provide that the title to all such 
materials ((within or under the jurisdiction of the United States" shall 
be vested in the United States Government.111 The United States 
bilateral agreements provide for either a lease or a sale of such materials 
to the cooperating government with the further provision in the case 
of sale that the title must remain vested in that government (and not 
passed to a private party under its jurisdiction) as long as private 
ownership of fissionable materials is not recognized in the United 
Sta:tes.172 The cooperating government is also required to agree that 
any material supplied by the United States will not be transferred 
169 During the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Secre-
tary of State, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Ambassador 
Wadsworth, all stressed that the United States intended to receive full payment for the 
fissionable materials which it proposed to make available to the Agency and that the 
furnishing of these materials would not be on terms constituting in effect an indirect 
subsidy. For example, at the end of his testimony, Mr. Lewis Strauss, in response to 
a question, made the following statement : "They [countries receiving help from the 
Agency] will not get the donation out of the 5,000 kilograms we have been talking 
about because that is going to be cash on the barrelhead until Congress should de-
termine differently." Hearings before the Senate Fnreign Relations Committee, note 
9 supra at 125. 
11o Section 54 of the Atomk Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2074. 
111/d., §52 and § 2h, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2072 and § 2012(h) 
112 The sale arrangement is used in "power bilaterals," e.g .. art. VII of the Agreement 
with Australia 102 Cong. Rec. 10412 at 10413 (june 29, 1956) The lease arrange-
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"beyond the jurisdiction" of that government except as specified in the 
agreement itsel£.113 
It s~ems unlikely that the legislation authorizing distribution of 
United States materials to the Agency will specify the form of the 
legal transaction. It is hoped that within the framework of the Atomic 
Energy Act and the Agency statute the Board of Governors will be 
able to work out with the Atomic Energy Commission a formula which 
would allow the Agency to make use of the United States contribution 
in the form most suitable to a given transaction keeping in mind, of 
course, that under the statute no member "shall have the right to require" 
that its contribution be "kept separately" or used for a designated pur-
pose.174 Neither the concept of a lease nor that of a sale may necessarily 
fit the actual arrangements desired. 
N. Conclusions 
The Agency as originally conceived had the twofold objective of 
making available the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy on a 
worldwide basis and at the same time making a beginning in the direc-
tion of worldwide limitation of armaments through siphoning off to 
peaceful uses a portion of the materials available for nuclear weapons. 
For long periods of time during the negotiations the outlook for any 
tangible achievement toward either of these objectives was clouded. 
During the year immediately following the President's address to the 
United Nations, it appeared that the Soviet Union might not be a 
member and that the Agency might have limited membership largely 
confined to Western Europe and Latin America. Despite these fears it 
now appears that the Agency will have practically a worldwide member-
ship. 
The statute in its present form looks forward to a substantial contri-
bution by the Agency to the peaceful development of atomic energy on 
a worldwide basis. However, largely because of the vast cost of the 
necessary facilities, for some years, its role is likely to be less significant 
~ent is used in "research bilaterals," e.g., art. IV of the Agreement with New Zealand. 
Id. at 10403. 
The EURATOM plan contemplates that with certain qualifications EURATOM 
will have the option to purchase uncommitted quantities of source and fissionable 
material of the member states and will be the exclusive source of supply of such 
material for the members. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, note II7 supra, arts. 52-76. 
11a Par. a(4) of § 123 (P.L. 703, § 123) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2153. 
174 Statute, art. IX, par. }. 
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than the role of national, bilateral, and multilateral regional programs.115 
The safeguards system developed by the Agency should as a minimum 
reduce the possibility of diversion of fissionable materials from peaceful 
to military uses and should assist in establishing uniform worldwide 
standards of health and safety. It could serve as a model for a control 
system if agreement were reached among the Great Powers that all 
future production of fissionable materials be utilized for peaceful pur-
poses under adequate international control.176 
In the eyes of the world, the success of the Agency is likely to be 
gauged by its progress toward establishment of power plants utilizing 
atomic fuel in the various areas of the world. The provisions in the 
statute regarding the powers, composition, and manner of selection of 
the Board of Governors can be justified to the world only if the Agency 
in the near future disposes of substantial quantities of fissionable 
materials for this purpose. 
There are many hurdles in the path of rapid progress toward atomic 
power on a worldwide basis. ·Assuming as we may on the basis of the 
assurances given by the United States that the Agency will have a 
sufficient amount of fissionable materials to start operating, progress 
toward the goals of the Agency will, nevertheless, be slowed down by 
a shortage of trained technical personnel and a shortage of finances. 
The lack of available capital and personnel will affect not only the budget 
of the Agency but also national programs. Much skillful planning and 
action lie ahead to surmount these obstacles. The success of the under-
taking depends also in large measure on securing for both the Agency 
staff and the Board of Governors individuals with the highest technical 
competence and the creative imagination necessary to visualize the 
Agency program and carry it out successfully. Finally, the Agency will 
play a significant role only if the participating states show sufficient 
imagination to see its potentialities and give it the necessary support.m 
175 E.g., an Agency gaseous diffusion plant is an unlikely development for many years. 
178 See proposal of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
United Nations Disarmament Commission Document DC/113, Sept. II, 1957, Annex 5· 
111 The experience in negotiating the statute of the Agency has created a useful 
precedent for preparing drafting international legislation under U.N. auspices. Rather 
than trying to draft a treaty in a cotpmittee of the General Assembly, it is preferable to 
organize a small but representative group such as the twelve-power group including 
those most vitally interested in the project. This group would then prepare the draft 
treaty and submit it to an international conference of all members with the under-
standing that it should not be changed except as a result of a demand by two-thirds 
of the members. During the negotiations, intermediate reports could well be made to 
the General Assembly which might discuss the progress and the chief issues without 
entering, however, into the drafting process. 
Chapter II 
·SOVIET RUSSIA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL USE. 
OF ATOMIC ENERGY 
HORACE w. DEWEY* 
A. . Introduction 
The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers announced on June 30, 1954, 
that the world's first industrial power station using atomic energy had 
begun producing electrical current for industry and agriculture in the 
Soviet Union.1 Development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes 
was emphasized in the Soviet Union Communist Party's directives on 
the Sixth Five-Year Plan 11 and soon after the publication of these im-
portant directives the Council of Ministers issued a decree establishing 
a new body, the Chief Administration for Use of Atomic Energy, to 
direct atomic research, develop atomic reactors for electric power instal-
lations, and "further cooperation in the peaceful utilization of atomic 
energy between the U.S.S.R. and other nations." 8 By mid-1957 a 
report prepared for the United States Congress by staff experts of a 
subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee predicted a possible 
Soviet victory over the United States in the "first round" of the atomic-
energy "kilowatt race." 4 While kilowatts provide only one measure of 
progress, the consistency and magnitude of the Soviet effort in the whole 
area of peaceful utilization of atomic energy cannot be denied. 
• LL.B., Ph.D. ; Assistant Professor of Russian, Department of Slavic Languages 
and Literatures, University of Michigan. 
1 Pravda, July 1, 1954, p. I. 
11 Pravda, Feb. 26, 1956, pp. 2-7. These directives specified five areas in which the 
use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was to be "considerably expanded" : electric 
power, transportation, agriculture and industry, medicine, and scientific research. Since 
then the Soviet press has been full of reports on new atomic power plants (one with 
a capacity of 420,000 kw.), an atomic-powered icebreaker (the Lenin), new nuclear re-
search institutes, etc. 
8 Pravda, April 19. 1956, p. 3· 
4 N.Y. Times, July JJ, 1957, p. 2. The Soviets feel that the victory is already tlleirs. 
A. N. Nesmeyanov, President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, declared in late 
1955 that the Soviet Union had attained full supremacy in the field of atomic energy. 
Pravda, Dec. 31, 1955, p. 2. In his report to the Jubilee Session of the U.S.S.R. 
Supreme Soviet on Nov. 6, 1957, Khrushchev said, "I shall limit myself to reminding 
you that our country leads the world in the peaceful uses of atomic energy ..• " (New 
Times, No. 46 (Nov. 14), Supplement, p. 12 (1957).) 
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The Soviet Union undoubtedly is facing a host of legal problems 
relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy:. problems in administra-
tive law, torts, patents, and insurance law. Other areas, such as labor 
law and trade union legislation, may likewise be affected by atomic 
energy developments in the U.S.S.R. Although discussions of such 
problems have been published by the dozen in American periodicals, 
the Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to publish any legal materials on 
these subjects. The paucity of information on Soviet domestic legal 
problems connected with peaceful uses of atomic energy would lead one 
to believe that such information is considered secret because it affects 
state security. If this is the case, the reason may perhaps be found in 
the oft-repeated Soviet view that atomic energy's peaceful uses are 
inextricably interwoven with its military uses and that complete ex-
change of information and data on atomic energy cannot be expected 
between nations until nuclear weapons have been outlawed. 
Liability for radiation injuries is one example of the kinds of legal 
problems which have not received attention in available Soviet mate-
rials.5 Presumably, the imposition of liability is governed by Article 
404 of the Soviet. Civil Code which reads : 
Individuals and enterprises whose activities involve increased 
hazard for persons coming into contact with them, such as 
railways, tramways, industrial establishments, dealers in 
inflammable materials, keepers of wild animals, persons 
erecting buildings, and other structures, and the like, shall . 
be liable for the injury caused by the source of increased 
hazard, if they do not prove that the injury was the result of 
an irresistible force or occurred through the intent or gross 
negligence of the person injured. 
Note: The period within which actions based on this section 
may be filed against governmental agencies shall be limited to 
two years and shall be computed from the day of the injury. 
The period shall be suspended, aside from the general grounds 
for the suspension and extension of periods of limitations 
(Sections 48 and 49) from the day that the injured person or, 
in the event of his death, persons theretofore supported by 
him, apply to the proper agency of social insurance, until the 
s Several such incidents have been reported in Great Britain, Canada, and the United 
States in the last year. That Soviet scientists and doctors, if not lawyers, have been 
concerned with such cases is seen from such titles as Two Cases of Acute Radiation 
Sickness in Man and Labor Hygiene in Conditions of Ionizing Radiations-titles of 
Soviet papers delivered at Geneva in 1955. Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., World 
Development of Atomic Energy 156-16o (1955). 
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day when the pension is either awarded or refused (as 
amended December 27, 1926, R.S.F.S.R. Laws 1927, text 3).6 
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Is an atomic installation "an enterprise whose activity involves 
increased hazard" in the terms of the code? It seems likely to be so 
considered, in view of Soviet judicial practice, which has been to extend 
the increased hazard concept to automobiles, sea and river vessels with 
motors, various types of production in which mechanical motors are 
used, loading operations, chemical factories, and the like. 7 A commen-
tator on Soviet civil law has explained that the term "sources of in-
creased hazard" refers to properties of things or of natural forces which, 
at the present level of technological development, are not completely 
subject to human control and, as a result, create a likelihood of harm to 
human life and health, as well as to property.8 
Assuming the doctrine of increased hazard is involved, when is a 
radiation injury the result of an "irresistible force," relieving the de-
fendant of liability? The most common examples of "irresistible force" 
are such external forces as floods or earthquakes which act on the source 
of increased hazard and. cause it to manifest its dangerous properties. 
But Soviet law also recognizes as an ."irresistible force" one "which 
cannot be prevented by a given person but by a given society in 
general." 9 Another question is: What is the effect of the plaintiff's 
status ? Soviet materials indicate that a defendant enterprise might 
not be held "responsible without fault" for injuries to an employee 
despite ·the seemingly unequivocal language of the code.10 Still other 
questions are: What type of conduct manifests the necessary "intent" 
or "gross negligence," i.e., contributory negligence, to relieve from 
liability? Are there any exceptions to the two year period within which 
tort suits must be brought? In view of the delayed effect of some 
radiation injuries, the two year period is not realistic. What will be 
the nature of the damages? The customary damages in cases of injuries 
caus.ed by a "source of increased hazard" amount to the difference be-
tween the injured plaintiff's social insurance benefits and his wages at 
the time of injury.11 But would such a scale of damages be considered 
adequate in the case of radiation injuries? What damages are awarded 
6 Grazhdanskii Kodeks R.S.F.S.R. 71 (1954). The English text may be found in 
II Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law 2o8-209 ( 1948). 
7 II Bratus ( ed), Sovetskoe Grazhdanskoe Pravo 309 ( 195 I). 
8 Ibid. 
e I Gsovski, supra note 6 at 5o8 and sources therein cited. 
to See case cited .in Hazard, Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R. 237 (1953). 
11 I d. at 236. 
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if the plaintiff is uninsured-for example, a minor? This problem has 
arisen in other cases involving injuries from "sources of increased haz-
ard," and Soviet courts have handled it in various ways.12 Who must 
bear the economic loss if the "source of increased hazard" was being 
operated by some one other than the "holder" or "owner" (Russian 
vladelets) at the time of injury, as, for example, under a contract? 
Soviet law would presumably hold both the "holder" and the contract-
ing party responsible to the injured person.13 The "holder," however, 
apparently has rights of recovery against his own agent, if the latter is 
proved to have been negligent, to the extent permitted by labor legisla-
tion. The agent may, in addition, be held criminally liable if his actions 
displayed "signs of socially-dangerous activity." 16 
These are only a few of the legal questions that may demand solution 
in connection with the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Soviet 
Union. Any answers can only be conjectural until such time as Soviet 
"atomic law" is made available to legal scholars throughout the world. 
In contrast to the area of domestic Soviet "atomic law," in the area 
of international cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy the 
Soviets have published several documents and commentaries.15 There-
fore this paper will be limited to a survey of three forms which Soviet 
activity has taken in the international sphere that have been discussed in 
Soviet sources: the Soviet-sponsored Joint Nuclear Research Institute, 
the U.S.S.R.'s relations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
and bilateral agreements which the Soviet Union has conciuded with a 
number of states both inside and outside the Communist bloc. 
B. The Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
Soviet jurists contend that there are two basic types of organization 
for possible cooperation between European states in the peaceful use of 
atomic energy. One of these types-bitterly assailed by the U.S.S.R.-
is the "closed grouping of several states on the basis of existing military 
blocs in Europe," as primarily exemplified by EURATOM. The other 
-Soviet-approved-type is the "intergovernmental regional organiza-
12 ld. at 24o-41. 
1a Bratus, supra note 7 at 310. 
Hfbid. 
15 This paper is based primarily on Soviet sources. Considerations of time and 
space have not permitted extensive use of East European materials. The English 
titles of dozens of articles dealing with international cooperation in peaceful uses of 
atomic energy which have been published in East European countries may be found in 
the Library of Congress' East European Accession List, published monthly. 
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tion open to participation by all interested European states .. , The latter 
method of international cooperation, according to Soviet legal writers, 
has been outlined in the Soviet government's proposals for all-European 
cooperation in peaceful utilization of atomic energy. They add, in this 
context, that a "model multilateral agreement for peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy ·by means of an organized international scientific research 
center for study in the field of nuclear p~ysics and peaceful uses of 
atomic energy may be seen in the Charter of the Joint Nuclear Re-
search Institute, fo.unded on March 26, 1956, on the Soviet Union's 
initiative." 16 
On that date delegates from eleven Communist states signed an 
agreement making their respective countries "equal members" of an 
organization called the Joint Nuclear Research Institute (ob'edinennyi 
institut iadernykh issledovanii) .11 The Soviet press at the time para-
phrased certain passages of the agreement, emphasizing that the new 
institute was to be devoted exclusively to the peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy. 
The full text of the Agreement to establish the Joint Nuclear Re-
search Institute, published on July II, 1956, specified that the Insti-
tute's activities would be conducted in accordance with a separate 
Charter, which was to be prepared by the Institute's management and 
approved by the governments of the member states. This Charter was 
officially adopted, along with a Personnel Statute, at a conference of 
member states held on September 23, 1956, at Dubna, near Moscow. 
The Institute itself is located at Dubna. 
16 Malinin, "Pravovye formy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva v oblasti mimogo 
ispol'zovaniya atomnoi energii," Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo, No. 7 (July) 122-z; 
(1957). For texts of the Soviet government's proposals, see Appendix B, Item J. 
Malinin's mention of. the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in connection with the Soviet 
proposals for an intergovernmental regional organization open to participation by all 
European states, as opposed to "closed military groupings,'' is misleading. For one 
thing, the Joint Nuclear Research Institute itself resembles one of the "closed group-
ings of several states on the basis of existing military blocs" so vigorously con-
demned by Soviet writers, inasmuch as its membership thus far consists exclusively 
of Communist states which have concluded military alliances with the U.S.S.R. Another 
Soviet writer also mentions the Joint Nuclear Research Institute as a model of "re-
gional atomic c~ation," whose equipment is much more modem and complete than 
that of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (C.E.R.N.), organized in 
1953 and "just getting started" (Larin, Mezhdunarodnoe Agenstvo Po Atomnoi Energii 
10-12 (1957) ). Like Malinin, Larin cites the two Soviet proposals for all-European 
cooperation in peaceful use of atomic energy. 
1 7 Pravda, Mar. 15, 1956, p. J. The document signed at that time will be called the 
Agreement in this paper, as distinguished from the Charter. 
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The texts of the Agreement 18 and the Charter,19 which is doubtless 
regarded as subordinate to the Agreement and an implementation of it, 
and a considerable body of secondary sources dealing with the Joint Nu-
clear Research Institute are now available, and problems relating to 
membership in the organization, its functions, facilities, structure, basic 
operational procedures, and its relation to other international atomic re-
search organizations have become quite clear. 
According to the Agreement, the Joint Nuclear Research Institute is 
to be "an international scientific-research organization" with the "rights 
of a juridical person." 20 The Charter also defines the Institute as a 
legal entity and adds that it shall possess the capacity and status neces-
sary to achieve its aims and functions "according to the laws of the 
country wherein it is situated" 21-in other words, the laws of the 
Soviet Union. 
These generally-worded provisions, restated in more specific terms, 
would appear to mean that the Institute, in addition to managing and 
disposing of its property according to the terms of its Charter, may, in 
its own name, make contracts and enter into other formal negotiations 
and relationships with such Soviet organizations as the Chief Adminis-
tration for Use of Atomic Energy 22 or the All-Union Ministry of 
Medium Machine Building (to which the Chief Administration for Use 
of Atomic Energy is supposedly subordinated)/3 as well as with other 
Soviet organizations engaged in supplying the Institute with materials 
or designing and constructing new equipment for it. 24 The provisions 
18 The text of the Agreement is reproduced as Appendix B, Item I. 
19 The text of the Charter is reproduced as Appendix B, Item 2. 
2o Article 2. 
21. Article J. 
22 The Soviet Council of Ministers' decree setting up this body was published in 
Pravda, Apr. 19, 1956, p. 3· Its functions include "furthering cooperation in the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy between the U.S.S.R. and other nations." V. S. Emelianov 
was appointed its Director in September, 1957; Izvestiya, Sept. 8, 1957, p. 6. 
23 E. P. Slavskii, the former Director of the Chief Administration for Use of Atomic 
Energy, succeeded Mikhail Pervukhin as Minister of Medium-Machine Building. The 
All-Union Ministry of Medium-Machine Building is believed to be in charge of 
over-all atomic energy development. For the report of Slavskii's promotion and 
Western hypotheses regarding the role of the Ministry of Medium-Machine Building, 
see the N.Y. Times, July 25, 1957, p. 1. 
2• See the Soviet legal provisions pertaining to "legal entities" in Article 13 of the 
Soviet Civil Code. A detailed study of Soviet legal entities may be found in Bratus, 
Yudidicheskie Litsa v Sovetskom Grazhdanskom Prave 124 and 140-152 (1947). A 
scholar of Soviet law in this country has declared that Soviet legal entities are in 
fact "sham entities and their mutual contracts are sham contracts." (I Gsovski, Soviet 
Civil Law 392 (1948).) 
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would also appear to give the Institute the capacity, in case of disputes 
with these organizations, to sue or be sued in Soviet courts and tri-
bunals-for example in the Gosarbitrazh (State Arbitration System) 
which handles hundreds of disputes between Soviet enterprises yearly.25 
Both the Agreement 26 and the Charter 27 further stipulate that the 
Institute may deal with other national and international scientific-
research organizations and other organizations in the development of 
nuclear physics and the exploration of new possibilities for peaceful 
uses of atomic energy. The Institute's relations to organizations of this 
type will be examined in another context, later in this chapter. 
A comparison of the Institute's Charter with the basic documents 
of certain other international organizations devoted to peaceful utiliza-
tion of atomic energy reveals some similarities, but there are also funda-
mental differences. 
The Charter of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute specifies that 
the "Institute will concern itself exclusively with the development of 
peaceful uses of atomic energy to benefit all mankind" and authorizes 
five closely-related functions : ( I ) coordination of atomic research 
among member-states; ( 2) exchange of experience and research results 
among member-states; (3) communication with national and interna-
tional organizations devoted to the peaceful use of atomic energy; ( 4) 
training (on all levels) of member-state personnel; and ( 5) announce-
ment of results of the Institute's work in publications, reports to mem-
bers, or in conferences.28 
Such aims and functions, as far as they go, coincide largely with those 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM (both 
frequently contrasted with the Joint Nuclear Research Institute by 
Soviet writers) and, most of all, the European Organization for 
Nuclear Research (about which the Soviets have had much less to 
say).29 However, the basic documents of these organizations (especially 
25 A study in the English language on the Soviet arbitration system has been made by 
Yaresh, Arbitration in the Soviet Union (1954). This work discusses the types of 
conflicts handled by Gosarbitrazh and the scope of its activities. The role of Gosarbi-
trazh in handling disputes between the Institute and other organizations, at least those 
within the Soviet Union, is made the more likely by the absence in the Charter of any 
specific machinery to handle such litigation. 
26 Article 2. 
27 Article 4· 
28 Ibid. 
29 Compare the aims and functions of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute with those 
of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (C.E.R.N.) as stated in Atoms for 
Peace Manual, 549 ff. One. notes other similarities between the Joint Nuclear Re-
search Institute and C.E.R.N.: both originally had eleven members, then added a 
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of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of EURATOM) are 
far more detailed than the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's Agree-
ment and Charter, and contain considerably more implementing pro-
visions. The Institute's Charter, for example, fails to prescribe any 
machinery for handling disputes among member-states 80 and is silent 
on the subject of formal contracts or "project agreements" between the 
Institute and organizations in member-states, although as a "legal 
entity" it theoretically has the capacity to conclude such agreements. 
There is no mention in the Charter of guaranteeing the "sovereignty" 
of member-states or of making Institute assistance independent of 
"political, economic and military considerations" -conditions which the 
Soviet delegates insisted on including in the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Nowhere in the Joint Nuclear Research Insti-
tute's Charter will one find any clauses giving the Institute powers of 
inspection and control-functions so strongly opposed by the U.S.S.R. 
in the final draft of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute. 
Moreover, no health and safe.ty standards are prescribed. 
The Joint Nuclear Research Institute is, as its name would indicate, 
primarily a research organization and an educational or training center, 
encouraging the "comprehensive development of creative capacities of 
the member-states' scientific-research cadres." 81 As such, it has a far 
. more limited range of functions than those which the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM are expected to perform.32 
Its functions do not include supplying fissionable materials or designing 
and equipping atomic installations. Because it is a collective research 
body, rather than an atomic "bank" or distributor of fissionable mate-
rials, there was doubtless less need to include in its Charter any clauses 
setting up safeguards against diversion of fissionable materials from 
twelfth; the Institute has four laboratories, and C.E.R.N. has four basic "study groups" 
(but only one laboratory) ; the documents of both organizations carefully define the 
scale of payments each member-state must make to meet the costs of organizational 
activities (in the case of C.E.R.N., the scale of payments from Yugoslavia and Greece 
were eventually reduced to .Js%) ; both organizations have "open" membership, at 
least in theory. 
80 The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the other hand, pro-
vides for such machinery in its Article XVII, and EURATOM has its own "court of 
justice"; see Section IV in Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common 
Market and EURATOM. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (EURATOM) (Brussels, 1957) (hereinafter called the "EURATOM treaty"). 
81 Lebedenko, "Ustav ob'edinnogo instituta yademykh issledovanii," Sovetskoe 
Gosudarstvo I Pravo, No. 2 (Feb.), 117 (1957). 
82 For a description and analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency functions, 
see Bechhoefer and Stein, supra. 
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peaceful to military uses, although the Soviet Union has always in-
sisted that atomic energy's peaceful and military uses are inseparably 
interrelated. 
Could the danger of diversion-of materials or techniques--even 
arise in connection with the activities of the Joint Nuclear Research 
Institute? Would it be possible, for example, for a member-state such 
as China to use Institute materials, or techniques developed at the Insti-
tute, for military projects without the knowledge and approval of the 
U.S.S.R. and other Institute members? Such a development seems 
highly unlikely, at least in the case of materials. One might speak of 
two types of protection against diversion of this type. One of them 
could be called "external security" -the fact that the Institute and all 
its installations are physically located in the Soviet Union, eliminating 
such difficulties and problems as "infringement of sovereignty" which 
arise in connection with the enforcement of the inspection and control 
clauses contained in the International Atomic Energy Agency statute 
or the EURATOM treaty. The second type of protection might be 
termed "internal security," being afforded by the structure and opera-
tional procedures (which we shall presently examine) of the Institute 
itself. The requirement that all the Institute's undertakings be planned 
(or known to and approved) by the management, the Scientific Council, 
and the Finance Committee, as well as the collective character of these 
undertakings, would seem to rule out the possibility of serious diver-
sions of materials by individual member-states for unauthorized mili-
tary purposes. It would, of course, be virtually impossible to limit the 
application of techniques to the physical confines of the Institute. 
The Soviet Union has provided impressive facilities for the Institute. 
These include four laboratories : a laboratory of nuclear physics, which 
has a synchrocyclotron with proton energy of 68o megelectron volts 
(formerly the Nuclear Problems Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of 
Sciences) ; a high-energy physics laboratory which has a proton syn-
chrotron with proton energy of 10,000 megelectron volts (formerly 
the Electrophysics Laboratory of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences); 
a theoretical physics laboratory, and an electron physics laboratory. 
Both the Agreement and the Charter provide for other experimental 
installations and laboratories.83 Some of the world's top nuclear physi-
cists-men like Topchiyev and Veksler of the U.S.S.R.-work for the 
Institute. 
There were eleven original signatories of the Agreement to establish 
33 Article 4 of the Agreement; Article 28 of the Charter. 
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a Joint Nuclear Research Institute: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East 
Germany, China, North Korea,· Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the 
U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia. a. The original Agreement .specified, in 
its third article, that any other states wishing to take full part in the 
Institute's work should declare their concurrence with the provisions of 
the Agreement and that they could become members of the Institute by 
the decision of a majority of the member-states .. A somewhat different 
procedure, however, was followed in the case of the only new member 
to date, Viet Nam, which joined the Institute on September 20, 1956, 
upon the "invitation" ofthe member-states.8D 
Membership qualifications as set forth by the Charter 86 remain sub-
stantially the same as those in the Agreement.- An additional clause de-
clares that the amount of participation in the Institute's maintenance and 
construction costs allotted to newly-joined member-states shall be de,. 
cided by the Institute's Finance Committee and approved by the gov-
ernments of the member-states. The Charter's sixth article states that 
all members of the Institute shall participate equally iri its scientific 
.work and management. 
Soviet writers on the Joint Nuclear Research Institute have made a 
great deal of this "open-doors-to-all" membership policy, while criti-
cizing EURATOM as a "closed grouping" and condemning the "dis-
criminatory" policy of the United States and others who have insisted 
that only ·members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies 
should be members of the Internatiomil Atomic Energy Agency. Such 
a policy is held to be "illegal" and "in contradiction to the principle of 
universality and of truly extensive international cooperation in the 
.peaceful use of atomic energy." 87 
A condition of membership in the Institute is the payment of a spec-
ified percentage of the Institute's expenditures for construction and 
maintenance. The share 'borne by Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea, 
on the one hand, is only o.os percent apiece; the Soviet Union, on the 
86 The order of listing is according to the Russian alphabet, as followed in all docu-
ments. 
85 Izvestiya, Sept. 21, 1956, p. I. 
86 Article 5. 
· 81 Trud, Sept. 14, 1956, p. 3· The article goes on to denounce the exclusion of the 
German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the .Korean People's 
Democratic Republic and China from membership in the Agency. These states, it will 
be noted, were among those signing the original agreement to set up the Joint Nuclear 
Research Institute. See also New Times, No.8 ·(Feb. 21), II 12 (1957) and numerous 
sources cited in our chapter on the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 
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other hand, pays 47.25 percent_&8 The Agreement declares that the 
share of a member-state's contribution cannot be a factor bearing on 
the degree of its participation in the Institute's scientific work or admin-
istration. "Unless this principle were observed," writes a Soviet jurist, 
"membership in the Institute would be impossible for many states, and 
'open doors for all' would remain an empty declaration of policy." 39 
The Agreement's seventh article, and article 8 of the Charter, state 
that any member-state may withdraw from the Institute by having its 
plenipotentiary give the Institute's Director written notice of its inten-
tion to withdraw not later than three months before the end of the cur-
rent fiscal year. This would necessitate a revision of the percentage 
shares of the remaining member-states in meeting Institute expenses-
a procedure outlined in Article VI of the Agreement. 
The Charter's seventh article creates a type of guest membership for 
scientists from non-member states, enabling them to work in the Insti-
tute. Scientists from non-member states are encouraged to visit the 
Institute and to participate in Its activities, and we frequently read of 
such visits and participation in Institute activities by foreign scientists, 
including scientists from the United States.~0 
The present charter membership in the Joint Nuclear Research In-
stitute is exclusively Communist. This membership fails, however, to 
include one important Communist state, Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia- was 
not among the original signatories of the Agreement to organize a 
Joint Nuclear Research Institute, nor is there any record of its being 
"invited" to join the Institute, as in the case of Viet Nam. Detailed 
speculation on the reasons for Yugoslavia's non-membership could 
hardly be justified in this paper, although a number of possible explana-
tions come to mind. First, Yugoslavia may have been deterred from 
joining by considerations of its relations with the West. Second, 
Marshal Tito may have been reluctant to rush into joining a potential 
atomic Cominform in view of Yugoslavia's banishment from the polit-
ical Cominform in 1948. Third, Yugoslavia's membership as the only 
Communist state in the twelve-member European Organization for 
ss Article VI of the Agreement. 
39 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at 117. For a similar description of the "open doors" 
policy, see Kapryin, "V Dubne, pod Moskvoi," Pravda, Jan. 4, 1957, p. 4· 
4 0 Iordansky, "Atomgrad," New Times, No._ 4 (Jan. 24) 25-27 (1957) and Pravda, 
July 6, 1957, p. 4· One British scientist who has apparently become a regular staff 
member of the Institute is Bruno Pontecorvo, who fled England and obtained Soviet 
citizenship seve-ral years ago. His picture appears with a group of Institute scientists 
in Pravda, Jan. 4, 1957, p. 4· 
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Nuclear Research (CERN) may have been held against it by some of 
the states in the twelve-member Joint Nuclear Research Institute. Until 
the spring of 1958, Yugoslavia's absence from the Institute member-
ship rolls did not seem to make much difference. A bilateral agreement 
had been concluded with the Soviet Union, on what appeared to be 
highly advantageous terms, for "cooperation in the use of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes." 41 A Yugoslav scientist who visited the Joint 
Nuclear Research Institute was most impressed by its facilities and 
regretted that, so far, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had not ex-
changed scientific personnel-professors and research students. The 
scientist stressed, however, that the Soviet-Yugoslav bilateral agreement 
was especially satisfactory because "both from a political and a scientific 
viewpoint" it constituted "an arrangement between equal parties." 42 
The Communist-bloc attacks on Tito in 1958 would appear to lessen the 
likelihood of Yugoslavia's joining the Institute and may result in seri-
ous curtailment of over-all Soviet atomic aid to Yugoslavia.43 
The Joint Nuclear Research Institute is headed administratively by a 
Director and two Deputy Directors, elected by a majority of the mem-
ber-states (through their plenipotentiaries) from among scientists of 
those states. The Director is elected for a term of three years. A Soviet 
professor, D. I. Blokhintsev (corresponding member of the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences) is the present Director. Deputy Directors serve 
n The general terms of this agreement were outlined in a Tass communique from 
Belgrade, dated Jan. 28, 1956. The actual text of the agreement has not yet been 
published. 
42 }uric, "Nuclear Research in Yugoslavia," New Times, No. 23 (May 31), 20-21 
(1956). Yugoslav spokesmen have criticized the Soviet Union as well as Great 
Britain and the United States for keeping atomic data secret: "The Russians .•. 
kept silent about their work and only revealed their final results : the explosion of 
atomic and hydrogen bombs and the setting in operation of a nuclear power plant . . • 
In spite of all attempts of the big powers to keep [atomic information] to themselves, 
humanity will not be checked from progressing along its road." Popovic, "International 
Cooperation and Nuclear Energy," 6 Review of International Affiairs, No. 126-128 
(July-Aug.) 28 (1955). Yugoslav scientists and statesmen have called for the banning 
of atomic tests and have accused the U.S.S.R. (as well as Britain and the U.S.) of 
endangering world health by conducting nuclear tests. See statement by Academician 
Pavle Savic to Borba, "Extremely Harmful Consequences of Nuclear Explosions for 
the Whole World," Information Service Yugoslavia (n.d.) and statement by Tito on 
May 15, 1957, Information Service Yugoslavia (n.d.). 
43 During the crisis of mid-1958, Poland appeared to be the most reluctant of the 
Communist-bloc states to c_riticize Yugoslavia, and some Poles were inclined to hold 
China (rather than the U.S.S.R.) primarily responsible for the attack on Tito. 
Interestingly enough, a Polish-Yugoslav agreement for cooperation in peaceful uses 
of atomic energy through 1959 was reported by the Polish press on May 31, 1958; 
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1958, p. 10. 
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two-year terms. The current Deputy Directors are Professor Vaclav 
Votruba (of Czechoslovakia) and Marian Danysz (of Poland). The 
three together form the "management" or "Board of Directors" 
( direktsiia) of the Institute. They formulate the all-important plans 
for Institute activities and present the budget. The Agreement and 
Charter make this Board responsible to the governments of the member-
states and oblige it to submit regular reports to those governments.44 
The Board's role in amending the Charter will be discussed later. 
The Director acts as the Institute's plenipotentiary in relations with 
appropriate institutions in the member-states on all questions pertaining 
to the Institute's work.45 Professor Blokhintsev, for example, would 
represent the Institute in its dealings with the Polish Academy of Sci-
ences on research projects of mutual interest. He also serves as chair-
man of the Scientific Council ( uche1zyi soviet), which considers and 
approves the Institute's scientific research programs, examines the re-
sults of completed programs (and also the results of individual studies), 
and considers "other questions concerning the scientific. work of the 
Institute." 46 The Charter requires this body to meet not less than twice 
a year. 
Acting in his dual capacity of management head and chairman of the 
Scientific Council, the Director obviously wields great power; both 
executive and administrative. The Charter also confers on him the right 
to hire and discharge employees according to the Personnel Statute 
(the text of which has not yet been made public), to establish or alter 
the wages of all employees within the official wage limits approved by 
the Financial Committee, and to initiate individual pay raises of up to. 
fifty percent for highly-skilled workers!7 The· Director is the formal 
manager-in-chief of all the Institute's assets!8 He also appoints the 
deputy, or "Administrative Director," who is in charge of construction 
and business affairs of the Institute.49 
The policy-making importance and supervisory powers of the Sci-
entific Council are clear from the above-outlined provisions of the 
u Article V of the Agreement; Articles 20, 23, and 25 of the Charter. · 
u Article V of the Agreement; Article 21 of the Charter. 
46 Article 18 of the Charter. Member-states' representation in this body is more 
"equal" (three scientists from each state) than in the corresponding organs of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency or EURATOM; see Article 118 of the EUR-
ATOM treaty and Article VI of the Agency statute. Each member-state of C.E.R.N. 
has one vote in the Council ; Atoms for Peace Manual 550. 
tT Article 27 of the Charter. 
ts Article 26 of the Chart~;r. 
49 Articles 33-35 of the Charter. 
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Charter. The relative brevity of this Charter and its paucity of detail 
means that most of the Institute's activities are determined by the Sci-
entific Council. Minutes of the Scientific Council's first session give 
some additional information on the Institute's program and· provide 
insight into procedures within the Council itself. These procedures dis-
play unmistakably Soviet characteristics. We learn, for example, that 
a .five-year plan for further Institute development was approved in the 
first session of the Council. Elections for laboratory directors' posts 
were also held. First, the list of candidates was presented by the Board 
of Directors, and after this list was "discussed," three Soviet scientists 
were "chosen by secret ballot." Two of these laboratory directors 
(Veksler and Dzhelepov) immediately delivered addresses, apparently 
well-prepared, which furnished thorough and detailed "explanations" 
of the tasks to be undertaken by their respective laboratories. The In-
stitute. Director "suggested" a number of basic plans for constructing or 
acquiring new installations and equipment and for training specialists 
from member-states, after which a "lively discussion" took place. Dur-
ing this discussion "many questions were clarified, remarks studied, and 
certain legislative enactments were adjusted." There were "some dif-
ferences of opinion," but the session closed with the "unanimous con-
clusions" which one has come to expect in Soviet organizational pro-
cedures.&o 
To what degree is the Institute's Board dependent upon the Finance 
Committee? The Charter's twenty-first article declares that the Board 
of Directors shall be guided exclusively by the decisions of the Scientific 
Council and the Finance Committee. While the Director presides over 
the former, he would appear to have no formal influence over the ac-
tivities of the latter. The Finance Committee is made up of represent-
atives of all member-states (one representative from each state), ap-
pointed directly by the governments of these states. The chairmanship 
of this body rotates among its members. It meets at least once a year, 
and its decisions are made by a majority of not less than two-thirds of 
the votes cast by its members. Its approval is formally required for 
a wide range of expenditures,&1 and the Charter states that the Finance 
60 Votruba, "The First Session of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's Scientific 
Council,'' 2 Atomnaya Energiya, No. 1, 72-74 (1957) (each issue of this periodical is 
translated into English by Consultants Bureau, New York). Another reference to the 
single plan governing all Institute research may be found in Karnaukh, "Foreign Sci-
entists in Dubna-International Center of Nuclear Research,'' 2 Atomnaya Energiya, 
No. 4, 482 (1957). 
61 Article 10 of the Charter. 
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Committee shall "generally control all financial affairs of the Institute." 
Thus the budget which the Board of Directors prepares must be sub-
mitted to it, 52 and the Committee determines the amount of money (in 
Soviet currency) to be expended by the Institute for "equipment, instru-
ments and technical scientific literature or periodicals from states not 
belonging to the Institute." 53 It is the Finance Committee's function to 
establish "the manner of computing the value of equipment, materials 
and instruments supplied by the member-states, as well as the value of 
individual work accomplished according to Institute laws." 54 
Yet it probably would be erroneous to regard the Finance Committee 
as holding the purse strings and seeking to curtail, or otherwise actively 
interfere with, the plans of the executive. Since the members of the 
Joint Nuclear Research Institute are all states firmly committed to 
"planned economy," it seems likely that the Finance Committee's chief 
function is to work out practical financial arrangements in order that 
the plans of the Director and the Scientific Council may be carried out 
as effectively as possible. Its role is probably not to challenge any plans 
on their merits, beyond deciding on their economic feasibility. That the 
Committee operates largely in a "rubber stamp" manner seems clear 
from the aforementioned report on the Scientific Council's first session. 
The minutes note simply that "after the Scientific Council had finished 
its work, the first meeting of the Finance Committee took place; the 
Committee confirmed the tentative budget presented by the Institute's 
Directors for 1956-57 and thus guaranteed the completion of plans for 
the development of the Institute and of scientific-research problems ap-
proved by the Scientific Council." 55 Nevertheless, the Institute appears 
to follow strict accounting procedures. Each state's percentage share in 
the Institute's expenditures is credited with the value of equipment and 
materials which it delivers in accordance with orders placed by the 
Institute. Credit is also given for the value of research done by indi-
vidual scientists working on Institute assignments and for sums which 
are withheld or deducted from members' salaries in· form of taxes by 
the states of which they are citizens. 56 
We have already described the four laboratories which are attached to 
the Institute. Each laboratory has its own director, whose appointment 
by the Board (from among scientists of member-states) must, accord-
52 Article 12 of the Charter. 
53 Article 13 of the Charter. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Votruba, supra note so a.t 72. 
56 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at n7. 
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ing to the Charter's twenty-ninth article, be approved by the Scientific 
Council. Apparently the "secret ballot" procedure described earlier 
applies to the selection of four directors from a larger list of candidates, 
or represents a failure to observe the exact procedure provided for by 
the Charter. In this writer's opinion it makes little difference which 
method is followed ; the laboratory directors appear in any event to be 
selected by the Board. Each laboratory, under its director, is charged 
with preparing programs for the scientific research work assigned to it 
and with examining the results of this work as well as of studies made 
by individual scientists in the laboratory. The laboratories each have 
their own Scientific Council, which must be approved by the Institute's 
Scientific Council, and each laboratory contains a number of depart-
ments and "sections" (sektory) which may be altered by·the Institute 
Board. The laboratories have the right to confer learned degrees, in-
cluding the degree of "doctor" of physico-mathematical sciences, upon 
students at the Institute. Each laboratory may also consider "other 
questions concerning the scientific work of the laboratory." 57 
The Charter declares that all members of the Institute staff are 
employees or associates ( sotrudniki) of the international scientific 
organization and are obliged to carry out its purposes and tasks.58 A 
Soviet jurist speaks of some members being "dispatched" or "ordered" 
( komandirovannye) by their governments to work at the Institute for 
periods of not less than a year, while others have a considerably shorter 
tour of duty. 59 The rights and obligations of staff members are regu-
lated in detail by a Personnel Statute (polozhenie o personale) which 
is appended to the Charter. (This statute is mentioned in the thirty-
eighth article of the Charter, but its text has not yet been made public.) 
Its norms are said to correspond to the "basic principles of labor legisla-
tion" of the various member-states.60 The Charter specifies that Insti-
tute personnel shall be "subject to the laws of the country in which the 
Institute is located"-i.e., the laws of the U.S.S.R.61 
Are the member-states all equal participants in the Institute's sci-
entific research activities? Legally, yes. At least, the Charter's sixth 
article says that they are. Do member-states enjoy equality in deter-
mining and· administering Institute policy? Here the legal answer is 
less clear. A Soviet jurist has hailed the "democratic nature" (demo-
57 Articles 28 and 42 of the Charter. 
58 Article 36. Compare with Article VII of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
statute. 
59 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at I 18. 
60 Ibid. 
6t Article 38. 
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kratichnost') of the Charter provisions. 62 These provisions make the 
Institute's Board of Directors responsible for Institute activities to the 
collective governments of the member-states and require the Board to 
submit periodic reports to these governments. 63 In its twenty-second 
article the Charter also makes clear that the Institute's Board shall not 
undertake to carry out the instructions of any individual member-state, 
but shall be guided exclusively by decisions of the Scientific Council and 
the Financial Committee, in which all member-states enjoy equal repre-
sentation. We have already noted that a member-state's percentage 
share in the Institute's expenditures and maintenance is supposed to 
have no bearing on that state's degree of participation in Institute re-
search or activities. Thus, on the surface at least, member-states are 
equals when it comes to administering the Institute and shaping its 
policies, as well as participating in its research activities. 
Yet the Charter contains other passages whose legal effect would 
appear to increase the Soviet Union's influence over the Institute to the 
point of giving the Institute a Soviet character rather than an inter-
national one. We have already noted that the Joint Nuclear Research 
Institute is a Soviet "legal entity" whose rights-and obligations-are 
determined by Soviet law. This is in contrast to EURATOM whose 
legal personality is subject to separate definition under the respective 
municipal laws of the member-states.s. We have likewise noted that, 
while the Personnel Statute's regulations allegedly conform to the 
"basic principles" of labor legislation in member-states, the Institute's 
staff is specifically made subject to Soviet law. There is no passage in 
the Institute's Charter dealing with privileges or immunities of per-
sonnel, as is to be found in the fifteenth article of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency statute. Problems of conflicts of laws, in which 
jurisdiction and disposal of cases involving Institute personnel would be 
at issue, could hardly arise under the Institute Charter's provisions. 
The member-states' property rights in Institute installations have never 
been defined, but the Charter acknowledges the Soviet Union's rever-
sionary rights in these installations in the event of the Institute's dis-
solution, with the other member-states to receive monetary reimburse-
ment proportionate to the amount of their participation and monetary 
contributions. The installations include . "all Institute equipment and 
all . . . buildings." 811 
62 Lebedenko, supra note JI at 117. 
88 Article 22. 
6 4 Cf. Articles 184 and 185 of the EURATOM treaty. 
&5 Article 40. 
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Although the Charter makes no mention of it, we must assume that 
the ultimate source of authority over matters affecting the Joint Nuclear 
Research Institute is the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.66 \Vhatever 
the Joint Nuclear Research Institute may have in common with other 
international organizations devoted to peaceful uses of atomic energy, 
this political feature of subordination to a single national political 
party-the Soviet Union's Communist Party-sets the Joint Nuclear 
Research Institute apart. 
There are other considerations which lead one to doubt that the 
U.S.S.R. has only one vote in twelve in shaping Institute policy and con-
trolling its administration. Without the guiding impetus and tremen-
dous material contributions of the Soviet Union, the Institute could 
never have become the impressive organization that it is today. It might 
well continue to function effectively if one or more of the other member-
states withdrew, but what would become of the Institute if the U.S.S.R. 
chose to exercise its right of withdrawal? It is difficult to imagine the 
success of any Institute project if that project met the opposition of 
the Soviet Union. Questions of formal status aside, the U.S.S.R. re-
mains the scientific and economic "big brother" to the other members.. 
Representatives of the smaller states are the first to recognize this fact. 
Professor Andrzej Soltan, Director of the Polish Academy of Sciences' 
Nuclear Research Institute, has ha.iled the creation of the Joint Nucle~r 
Research Institute as "above all a manifestation of international sci-
entific cooperation . . . a great step forwards in the development of 
atomic nuclear physics research, which permits scientists of small 
countries to achieve work which they could not carry out by themselves. 
We will use not only the experience of the Soviet scientists, but also 
their equipment." 67 Lajos Janosi, a member of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, concedes that "such' a small state as Hungary would not be 
in a position to construct and equip such an institution by its own means. 
And it would not be expedient, anyway. The problem has been resolved 
66 The Soviet Communist Party's complete power over all national organizations 
within the U.S.S.R. is unquestioned. Does the Joint Nuclear Research Institute's 
status as· an "international organization" make a difference here? We believe not. It 
is an international organization of Communist states run by Communist parties, among 
whom the Soviet Communist Party continues to play the directing role. The Soviet 
Union's dominant position in international affairs between Co!l¥Dunist states (with the 
much-publicized exception of Yugoslavia) appears unaltered at this date. Even without 
considering the Charter provisions which favor the Soviet Union, we see no reason to 
expect any of the other Institute member-states to object to, or in any way challenge, 
the factual domination of that body by the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Communist Party. 
e1 Izvestiya, Apri14 1956, p. J.· . 
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correctly : the Institute was set up in a large country which has the 
necessary equipment at its disposal, while other lands are given the 
opportunity to participate in its work and to benefit by common ex-
perience." 68 
The Institute's Charter sets up a simple procedure for amendment of 
its provisions. Proposals for amending the Charter may be submitted 
by Institute members to the Board of Directors. The Board, in turn, 
has the right to introduce amendment proposals on its own initiative. 
In either case, the amendments take force when adopted by a majority 
of the member-states.69 
The Charter provides for the liquidation of the Joint Nuclear Re-
search Institute, but tells us only that this may be done "by agreement 
of the member-state's governments." 70 
The Institute's relations to other organizations and programs for 
peaceful utilization of atomic energy were highlighted by a visit which 
Sterling Cole, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, paid to the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in the spring of. 
1958.71 The Institute Charter's fourth article provides that one of its 
purposes shall be to maintain communication between national and inter-
national scientific research organizations for the peaceful use of atomic 
energy, and in the future some cooperation between the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Joint Nuclear Research Institute may 
be realized. For example, the Institute would appear to be the logical 
institution to which students and specialists from Agency member-
states would come for training under the Soviet program outlined in 
letters to Sterling Cole just before his trip to the U.S.S.R.72 
The record shows a fundamental difference, however, in the Joint 
Nuclear Research Institute's relations with the various organizations 
devoted to the peaceful use of atomic energy. It is hardly surprising 
that the Institute cooperates most closely with organizations in the 
Soviet bloc. Its Charter specifies that it shall coordinate the theoretical 
and experimental research of member-state scientists,73 and the Agree-
ment's second a~ticle states that it shall cooperate in its work with the 
68 Pravda, Jan. 4. 1957, p. 4-" 
· eo Section XII of the Charter. We are not told whether the majority in question 
refers to a meeting of the Scientific Council or to some sort of general vote of members. 
10 Article 40. 
11 Pravda, April 11, 1958, p. 6; Izvestiya, April II, 1958, p. 4; Izvestiya, April 12, 
1958, p. 3; Pravda, April 15, 1958, p. 6. 
72 Pravda, April 4. 1958, p~ 5· 
73 Article 4· 
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appropriate institutes and laboratories in the territories of member-
states. The member-states, as we have seen, are placing great hopes in 
this arrangement. The director of the Polish Academy of Sdiences' 
Nuclear Research Institute, for example, has declared that he is counting 
on the closest cooperation between the Institute and his organization. 74 
The Institute's relations with the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences are 
intimate. The Academy's Nuclear Problems Institute and Electro-
physics Laboratory have become laboratories of the Joint Nuclear Re-
sea.rch Institute, and the Academy's greatest scientists are working for 
the Institute. We have no information on the Institute's ties with the 
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Medium Machine Building or the Chief Admin-
istration for Use of Atomic Energy, but there can be little doubt that 
such ties are fully exploited. The lavish expressions of gratitude for 
Soviet assistance on the part of scientists of smaller states should not 
obscure the fact that th~ U.S.S.R. itself stands to benefit considerably 
from the results of the joint scientific research conducted by the Insti-
tute. According to a West German scholar, the Soviets expect valuable 
contributions from scientists of Poland, China, and Czechoslovakia in 
particular. 75 Further evidence of the advantages which the U.S.S.R. 
will enjoy by virtue of its Institute membership is seen, curiously 
enough, in a letter from a Rumanian scientist expressing thanks for 
Soviet assistance to his country. Commenting on the atomic energy 
program in the Soviet Union's own five-year plan, this Rumanian sci-
entist adds that "in carrying out the scientific part of this program, a . 
part will be played by the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, and Ru-
manian physicists are proud that they will be able to work at this 
Institute." 78 
With reference to non-Communist atomic organizations and agencies, 
however, the Institute's attitude assumes a political and diplomatic 
significance of a special type. The Institute's historical and political 
background reveal a pattern which must be considered quite apart from 
problems of research on peaceful uses of atomic energy. On the day fol-
lowing the announcement of the Agreement to organize the Joint Nu-
74 Izvestiya, April 4, 1956, p. J. See also Wspolpraca ze wszystkimi narodami, I 
Polska, No. 41, 6-7 (1958), which mentions bilateral agreements between Poland and 
Yugoslavia, and Poland and East Germany, in addition to Polish participation in the 
Joint Nuclear Research Institute. 
75 Huber, Internationale Ordnung Der Friedlichen Verwendung Der Atomenergie 
51 (1956). 
76 Sanielevich, "Aid Accorded to Atomic Scientists Coming from People's Democ-
racies," 2 Atomnaya Energiya, No. I, 98-99 (1957). 
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clear Research Institute, the Soviet government came out with a bitter 
attack against EURATOM, a "narrow and closed group of West Euro-
pean states" whose American and VI/ est European sponsors "intend to 
bypass the Paris Agreement clauses which prohibit West Germany from 
producing and stockpiling atomic and hydrogen weapons." 77 Shortly 
after the full text of the Agreement to organize the Joint Nuclear Re-
search Institute was published (on July I I, I 956), EURATOM was 
again denounced-this time in a statement by the Soviet government 
on general European cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 78 
Once again, the twin facts that EURATOM was a ''closed grouping" 
and that West Germany was to be one of its members drew Soviet 
criticism. It was pointed out that several states within this "closed 
grouping" were also members of closed military blocs, and the fear was 
expressed that EURATOM's creation· would in effect lead to the re-
moval of any restrictions on the production of atomic energy in West 
Germany. "This," in the words of the statement, "would permit re-
venge-seeking West German circles to organize in their country pro-
duction of atomic weapons, which would create a serious threat to the 
cause of peace in Europe." The statement went on to describe, by way 
of contrast, the "open" character of the Joint Nuclear Research Insti-
tute and the purely peaceful purposes for which it was being organized. 
Any doubt that the Joint Nuclear Research Institute had been or-
ganized as the Communist bloc's answer to atomic research organiza-
tions sponsored by the West must have been dispelled when a Soviet 
jurist wrote early in 1957 -that "C.E.R.N. is a closed organization 
which does not admit states of the Socialist camp into its membership. 
This has compelled a number of states to create their own international 
research organization. With this purpose in mind, a conference was 
held in Moscow, in March, 1956 .... " 79 
On March 17, 1957, in a declaration concerning the plans to create 
EURATOM and a Common Market, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs warned: 
The entire activity of EURATOM and the "common market" 
will be subordinated to the aims of NATO, whose aggressive 
character is widely known. Under such conditions the fulfill-
ment of plans to create EURATOM and the "common 
market" will inevitably lead to a further deepening of the 
division which splits Europe, to the increase of tensions in 
TTizvestiya, March 28, 1956, p. 3· 
78 See Appendix B, Item 4· 
79 Lebedenko, supra note 31 at n6. 
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Europe. It will greatly complicate the establishment of eco-
nomic and political cooperation on an all-European basis; it 
will bring into being new difficulties in solving the problems 
of European security.80 
The declaration cautioned those who believed that the creation of 
.EURATOM would lessen their countries' economic dependence on 
the United States: 
On the contrary, their dependence on the U.S.A. will only in-
crease, to the detriment of the national sovereignty of the 
countries participating in this grouping, since the United 
States-and nobody attempts to conceal this fact-will in 
reality control EURATOM, acting in the capacity of chief 
supplier of fissionable materials and of equipment for atomic 
production in the EURATOM countries. 81 
In place of EURATOM, the Soviet government proposed an all-
European organization for peaceful utilization of atomic energy, 
"bearing in mind that this organization would be a regional division 
or department of the International Atomic Energy Agency." Just 
what advantages such a "regional division" of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency would offer over the Agency itself was not disclosed. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency has suffered greatly by 
comparison with the Joint Nuclear Research Institute in the Soviet 
press. During the New York conference which began on September 20, 
1956, for examination and confirmation of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's statute, Soviet publications were filled with articles 
drawing distinctions between the Agency and the Communist-spon-
sored Joint .Nuclear Research Institute.82 These articles emphasized 
that membership in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute was open to 
all, even to non-Socialist states, but that membership in the Interna-: 
tional Atomic Energy Agency was denied, quite illegally, to such states 
as the German Democratic People's Republic, the Korean People's 
Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, and China. 
All member-states in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute were said 
to enjoy full legal equality. The draft statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency was condemned for its failure . to include any 
clearly-formulated provision that the sovereign rights of its member-
80 See note 16, supra. 
8t Ibid. 
82 Some examples may be found in Trud, Sept. 14. 1956, p. 3; lzvestiya, Sept 21, 
1956, p. 1 ; Pravda, Sept. 27, 1956, p. 4 and Sept. 28, 1956, p. 6; lzvestiya, Sept. 29, 1956, 
p. 4· 
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states must be observed in all activities of the Agency. With respect 
to the Joint Nuclear Re5earch Institute, the articles claimed that 
member-states have equal participation rights and equal use of the 
Institute's facilities, regardless of their financial share in meeting its. 
expenses. The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency was 
denounced as financially discriminatory, providing in essence that 
countries which obtain aid from the Agency should not only pay for this 
aid, but should also ensure that the Agency have the income which it 
needs to construct or acquire its own plants, laboratories, and other 
installations. The argument was advanced that the financial arrange-
ments naturally discriminated against the smaller, or economically-
undeveloped, countries. In addition, the articles charged that the capital-
ist countries producing atomic raw materials and fissionable materials 
in quantity were intent upon using the International Atomic Energy 
Agency as a marketing channel. Finally, the equipment and facilities of 
the Agency and of EURATOM were described as lagging far behind 
those donated by the Soviet Union to the Joint Nuclear .Research 
Institute, the finest in the world, and a .number of which were already 
in operation. 
From comparisons of this sort, one must conclude that the Joint 
Nuclear Research Institute serves not only as an international re-
search organization; but alsp as an instrument of Soviet diplomacy· 
and propaganda. 
C. The Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
The Soviet position with regard to the International. Atomic Ene~gy 
Agency, since Moscow's. first published reaction to President Eisen-
hower's proposal of December 8, 1953, deserves serious study. If we. 
are to understand the Soviet approach to international cooperation in 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Soviet role in the history of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency ~.nnot be ignored. 
· Two closely-related propositions form the ostensible basis of Soviet 
policy in international cooperation for the use of atomic energy. With-: 
out a consideration of these two tenets .any discussion of the subject 
is viewed by the U.S.S.R. as fruitless. Repeatedly raised and em-
phasized in all the channels of . communication available within the 
S~viet Union, the propositions amount simply to this.: (I) at present 
the peaceful ·uses of atoniic energy are inextricably interwoven with 
its military uses; and ( 2) effective cooperation in peaceful . use of · 
atomic energy cannot be fully achieved untif an international agree-
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ment to prohibit the manufacture, storage, and use of nuclear weap-
ons is reached. The author of a recent Soviet volume on the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency warns that the basic efforts of all states 
will inevitably be concentrated on the military, rather than the peaceful, 
uses of atomtc energy until atomic weapons have been outlawed.83 
Although American scientists and officials have repeatedly praised the 
personal goodwill and cooperative spirit of Soviet scientists at inter-
national congresses and other gatherings, Igor V. Kurchatov, director 
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Atomic Energy Institute has ad-
mitted that "full candor" in relations between Soviet and Western 
scientists cannot be expected until atomic and hydrogen weapons have 
become a thing of the past. 84 
In the following pages the Soviet position with regard to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, as presented to the reader of Soviet 
materials on the subject, is surveyed. It should be emphasized that 
the Soviet views reach an enormous public, both inside and outside 
the U.S.S.R. 
A Soviet legal scholar has enumerated four basic juridical forms of 
organization for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. One of these forms is the bilateral agreement concluded 
directly between interested nations. Another is created through so-called 
intergovernmental "regional organizations." A third is the organiza-
tion of international scientific-research centers based on multilateral 
agreements between states situated in various parts of the globe. The 
fourth form is the international organ created within the framework of 
the United Nations and (the Soviets insist on this) based upon the 
"principle of universality." 85 
What is the place of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this 
juridical scheme? In answering this question, the Soviet scholar has 
offered the following description of the Agency's relationship with the 
United Nations. First, the Agency was created within the framework 
of the United Nations, which ensures the proper observation and con-
trol of the Agency's work. Secondly, the United Nations Security 
Council and General Assembly have the right to demand reports from 
the Agency. They may criticize these reports, give the Agency in-
8s Larin, supra note 16 at 46. Larin's book is especially important because it is the 
only Soviet monograph on the International Atomic Energy Agency to appear thus far. 
The book was edited by S. B. Krylov, the prominent Soviet specialist in international 
law. 
84 Pravda, Feb. 28, 1958, p. J. 
8D Malinin, supra note 16 at 122. 
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structions resulting from their discussion of the reports, and may 
demand an accounting of the Agency's fulfillment of these instructions. 
Third, the Agency may not decide on questions falling under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Security ~ouncil. Therefore, any instruc-
tions of the Security Council which concern the ensuring of states' 
security are binding upon the Agency and its organs. These three 
characteristics of the Agency, taken together, show that the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency's statute provides for a closer relation 
between the Agency and the United Nations than that which exists 
beween the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The specialized 
agencies, having been created by intergovernmental agreements, are in 
matter of fact outside the United Nations. Their activity is merely 
related to, or coordinated with, the activity of the United Nations.86 
In contrast to the specialized agencies, the author reminds us, the 
Agency was placed in a definite relationship to the United Nations from 
the outset. This relationship was based, not on Article 63 of the United 
Nations Charter (which pertains to special agreements of the type used 
by the specialized agencies and the United Nations), but on the pro-
visions of the Agency's own statute. The statute's sixteenth article, 
to be sure, requires an agreement between the Agency and the United 
Nations concerning Agency reports to the United Nations, and con-
cerning the Agency's consideration of resolutions adopted by various 
United Nations organs on the subject of the Agency. But such agree-
ments, as seen from the sixteenth article itself, merely pursue the prac-
tical aim of making more precise certain general provisions contained 
in the Agency statute. 
Further distinctions between the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and United Nations specialized agencies can be found in the 
Agency's statute which define its relation to the United Nations and 
which emphasize that it was created within the framework of the 
United Nations. 
At the same time, the author points out, the Agency cannot be re-
garded as an auxiliary organ of the Security Council (such as the 
United Nations Disarmament Commission), created in accordance 
with Article 29 of the United Nations Charter. Such organs are set 
up to ensure the performance by the Security Council of its immediate 
functions, which clearly cannot be turned over to a body like the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, such organs are 
created by the Security Council itself, whereas the Agency was created 
sa /d. at 126. 
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on an intergovernmental basis. Again, the organs created in accordance 
with Article 29 of the United Nations Charter are completely sub-
ordinated to and exclusively controlled by the Secuity Council, while 
the Security Council's control over the Agency is limited to guarding 
the security of states and maintaining international peace. 
Thus the Soviet scholar concludes that the Agency, in its juridical 
position, differs both from a specialized agency and from an organ 
created in accordance with Article 29 of the United Nations Charter. 
In the author's opinion, the Agency is "a new internatio11al mechanism, 
created by intergovernmental agreement, albeit within the framework 
of the United Nations, and placed in direct relation to its chief organs-
the Security Council and the General Assembly." 87 
Turning to the historical background of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the first step taken by the Soviet Union was to dis-
count the United States' role in creating the Agency. President Eisen-
hower's proposal of December 8, 1953, to create an international agency 
for peaceful uses of atomic energy was · (and still is) dismissed as a 
"face-saving measure," one designed to cover up the Americans' refusal 
to outlaw nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Communists state that 
the President's proposal was much more limited in scope than claimed 
by the "bourgeois press" which had hailed it as an unprecedented step 
in the development of peaceful use of atomic energy. Actually (say 
Soviet spokesmen), Eisenhower's plan completely ignored the problem 
of removing the threat of atomic' warfare. Providing nierely that a 
small portion of atomic materials be set aside for peaceful purposes, the 
proposal tacitly assumed that the main mass of these materials would, 
as before, be directed toward the production of newer and more destruc-
tive nuclear weapons. 88 · This, according to the Russians, was con-
firmed by American sources themselves; the United States' memo-
randum of January 11, 1954, and Secretary Dulles' informal paper to 
Molotov at Geneva on May I, 1954, explained that the American pro-
posal was merely a "first effort" oil a "modest basis," naturally not 
conceived as a ·measure for bringing atomic weapons under control. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the United States was in no sense the 
initiator of international cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
The claim is advanced that the Soviet Union had stood for such coopera-
tion long before Eisenhower's proposaJ.89 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Larin, sufwa note 16 at 17. 
89 I d. at 18-19. See also the Soviet Aide-Memoire of April 27, 1954; Atoms for 
Peace Manual 269-274. The reader of such passages might well conclude that ·the 
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Before completion of the first draft of the International Atomic 
Energy Statute in July, 1955, the Soviet government presented anum-
ber of points which it declared should be basic principles of the new 
Agency. These points were contained in a pair of memoranda, the 
first issued on September 22, 1954 and the second on July 18, 1955.90 
The second (and more important) of these documents, in addition to 
certain broad and general suggestions (that the Agency should be 
created within the framework of the United Nations, and that it 
should encourage the exchange of scientific and technical information, 
establish research establishments, and maintain a number of specialists 
to assist states receiving help from the agency, etc.) contained some 
demands which proved to be sources of great discord in the subsequent 
history of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These demands 
included the principle that membership in the Agency should be open to 
all states, that there should be no privileged status for any state or 
group of states in the Agency, and that the Agency should never be 
used "for security purposes of any states." 
These principles became issues almost immediately. The U.S.S.R. 
was not represented among the powers responsible for preparing the 
first draft of the International Atomic Energy Agency statute, and 
when it received this draft at the end of ]uly, 1955, it criticized the 
document for three major reasons. First, no close ties were established 
between the Agency and the United Nations. Secondly, it was "undemo-
cratic," in that it gave all power to the Board of Governors, leaving the 
Soviet Union stood for an international agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons, but 
that the United States would hear of no such thing. The Soviet account fails to 
mention other highly pertinent passages in the American documents. Point 4 of the 
January II note, for example, states that "The United States is prepared to consider 
any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen 
and other weapons of destruction.;' Poi~t 5 goes on: "However, the United States 
believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might 
engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope." Atoms 
for Peace Manual 262. In the informal paper of May I, I954, Dulles declared (in 
point 3) that "the US cannot concur in the view of the Soviet Union that creation of 
an international agency to foster the use of atomic materials for peaceful purposes 
would not be useful in itself." In point 5 of the same paper, the American statesman 
repeated that "The US proposal of March I9 was, of course, not intended as a sub-
stitute for an effective system of control of atomic energy for military purposes. The 
US will continue, as heretofore, to seek means of achieving such control under reliable 
and adequate safeguards." Atoms for Peace Manual at 274. In contrast to the Soviets, 
Yugoslav spokesmen have fre.ely recognized Eisenhower's initiative in international 
cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy; Damjanovic, "Toward an International 
Atomic Agency," VII Review of International Affairs, No. I56 (Oct. I), II (I956). 
9o Atoms for Peace Manual 278-28I and Larin, supra note I6 at 2I-22. 
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General Conference with merely consultative functions, and it limited 
membership in the Agency to states which were members of the United 
Nations or its specialized agencies. Thirdly, by failing to define the 
dimensions of the budget, the draft statute would impose uncertain 
financial obligations on Agency members. 
In a memorandum devoted to the draft statute, dated October I, 1955, 
the Soviet Union raised the following seven points. The first stressed 
the necessity for control provisions ; since the Agency would be deal-
ing with dangerous fissionable materials, and because the production 
of atomic energy for military and peaceful purposes was closely con-
nected, it would be necessary to observe and control the 'activity of 
the Agency through some representative international organ such as 
the United Nations. Secondly, there must be no "privileged groups" 
in Agency membership. The statute must be based on recognition of 
the principle that no single country or group of countries be accorded 
a privileged position. In addition, the Agency's assistance was never 
to be made conditional on political, economic, or military considerations, 
or on any other considerations which were incompatible with the 
"sovereign rights" of states. Third, the statute's provisions dealing 
with the Agency's inspection and control powers must be in keeping 
with the "sovereign rights" of states receiving assistance from the 
Agency. Fourth, any state, regardless of whether or not it was a 
member of the United Nations or its specialized agencies, must have 
the right to be included among the founders of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Fifth, the first Board of Governors must include India, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and Rumania. Sixth, the statute must provide for 
a three-fourths majority vote in both the General Conference and the 
Board of Governors for approval of the budget and for establishing 
the scale of payments made by individual member-states. Seventh, the 
International Court of Justice was to have jurisdiction of cases involv-
ing the interpretation or application of the statute's provisions if the 
interested parties consented to its jurisdiction.91 · 
By the time of the negotiations for creating the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in the fall of 1955, the Soviet position was clear to 
everyone. At the tenth session of the United Nations General Assem-:-
bly, the Soviet delegate ( Kuznetsov) repeated the demand that mem'" 
bership in the Agency be open to all. It was "unfair and unjust" that 
01 Larin, supra note 16 at 22-23. We shall presently see, in discussing Soviet bilateral 
agreements with states outside the Communist bloc, that the Soviet Union was soon 
to conclude agreements with Egypt and Indonesia, and was offering aid to India. 
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Communist China and the German Democratic Republic had been 
excluded from the Geneva conference that summer ; no state should 
be barred from international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. The inevitable appeal was made for an agreement prohibiting 
nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation submitted a resolution that 
the General Assembly : ( 1) call upon all states to continue their efforts 
to reach such an agreement; ( 2) call for the creation of an international 
agency for peaceful uses of atomic energy within the framework of the 
United Nations; (3) call a conference of experts from various govern-
ments for joint consideration of problems relating to the drafting of 
a statute for the Agency; ( 4) recognize as desirable the periodic 
convocation of conferences on exchange of experience in the peaceful 
use of atomic energy in various fields (science, industry, agriculture, 
health, etc.), and authorizing the General Assembly to take steps for 
calling such a conference not later than 1957; and ( 5) decide on an 
international publication of works by scientists on problems of peace-
ful uses of atomic energy by 1956. The Soviet account would lead 
orie to believe that all these suggestions originated with the Soviet 
delegation and adds that most of them were included in the final text 
of the resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 
December 3, 1955.92 
According to the Soviet version, the Washington conference on 
drafting the International Atomic Energy Agency statute was sub-
jected, from the outset, to tremendous pressure by the United States. 
The Americans gave all to understand that the U. S. policy toward 
the Agency would depend on the extent to which American wishes were 
followed. 93 The U.S.S.R., supported by Czechoslovakia, India, and 
others, posed as a defender of the United Nations against the American 
machinations. Upon the insistence of these powers, a provision was 
included in the statute requiring the Agency to present reports to the 
General Assembly and, in necessary cases, to the Security Council and 
other United Nations organs. The Agency was to examine the resolu-
tions of these organs with respect to Agency activities, and was to 
submit reports on measures taken by it after consideration of these 
resolutions; "thus closer ties were set up between the Agency and the 
92 Larin, supra note 16 at 21· 
93 Larin, supra note 16 at 28-29. Once again, it is interesting to contrast the Soviet 
point of view with that of Yugoslav spokesmen who praised the "flexibility shown by 
the United States representatives towards the criticism of the attitude formulated in the 
original draft statute," which "made it possible· to broaden the platform on which the 
Agency would be created." Damjanovic, supra note 89 at 12. 
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United Nations." 94 But these powers condemned the limitation of 
membership in the Agency to states which are members of the United 
Nations or its specialized agencies as "discrimination" contradicting 
the very concept of international cooperation in peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy. The U.S.S.R. and Czech delegates also attacked a pro-
vision in the draft statute which would have enabled the Agency's 
organs (the Board of Governors and the General Conference) to de-
termine whether a given state would be capable of carrying out its 
obligations according to the United Nations Charter. They also argued 
that such powers belong to the United Nations' General Assembly and 
that the provision in question would lead to the "absurd result" that 
the Agency could pass on whether a particular state, already a member 
of the United Nations, could fulfill obligations contained in the United 
Nations Charter. According to Soviet reports, although the United 
States and othernations "stubbornly defended this provision," a new, 
changed formula was finally adopted. 
The most controversial problem to arise at the conference concerned 
the composition of the Agency's Board of Governors. Here again, the 
Soviet delegation came out as a defender of "democracy" and "fair 
representation" against the alleged attempts of the Anglo-American 
bloc to subvert these principles. First, the Soviets proposed that the 
number of members on the Board be increased from sixteen to twenty-
four. Secondly, procedures for election to the Board of Governors 
should be changed: nine member-states (including the five constant 
members of the United Nations Security Council) would be Board 
members by virtue of their advanced atomic technology andjor abun-
dance of atomic resources. Fifteen other Board members would be 
selected by the General Conference according to geographical dis_. 
tribution (three members of American states, three from West Europe, 
two from East Europe, three from the Near East and Africa, and 
four from Southeast Asia and the Far East). These selections were 
to be made on the basis of two principles : (I) the guarantee of repre-
sentation of members receiving benefits from the Agency, not con-
tributing to it; and ( 2) "the offer of services, equipment, and informa-
tion enabling the Agency to achieve its aims and fulfill its functions." 
The Soviet Union also demanded that Communist China be repre-
sented on the Board of Governors. Throughout the conference the 
U.S.S.R. maintained that the supreme organ of the International 
u• Larin, supra note 16 at JO. 
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Atomic Energy Agency should be its General Conference, with deci-
sions binding upon the Board of Governors. 05 
The Soviet delegation recognized the danger that fissionable ma-
terials obtained from the Agency might be used for military purposes 
rather than peaceful ones, but insisted that there should only be as 
much control as was "really necessary," and that the "sovereignty" of 
member-states should always be "strictly observed." The statute should 
therefore provide that the Agency's activities never be made subject· 
to conditions of economic, political, or military character-or in any 
way "incompatible with the sovereignty" of the recipient state. The 
United States-British insistence on strong inspection and control pro-
visions, and their failure to accept the Soviet proposals for weakening 
these provisions, were denounced as "a refusal to accept the Soviet 
proposals to safeguard the sovereign rights of states making use of 
Agency assistance." 96 
In budgetary matters the U.S.S.R. sought to guarantee the fulfill-
ment of the Agency's "true function"-assistance of underdeveloped 
countries in practical application of atomic energy for peaceful pur-
poses. The U.S.S.R. suggested that all decisions on financial questions 
be made by a three-fourths majority vote, rather than two-thirds as 
provided in the original draft of the statute. It also proposed that the 
maximum contribution of any single state not exceed fifteen percent. 
It recommended that the Agency provide nuclear materials to under-
developed countries at especially low prices, and in some cases entirely 
free. The Western powers were censured for rejecting this proposal, 
and for insisting that the Agency be given the right to acquire or con-
struct atomic plants, laboratories, and other equipment. According to 
Soviet spokesmen, this would require enormous expenses, which would 
of necessity fall upon Agency members, even when they considered such 
construction and acquisition unnecessary. 97 
Representatives of states attending the New York conference which 
opened on September 20, 1956, to draft a statute for the International 
Atomic Energy Agency were strongly reminded of the Soviet stand 
on most of the points raised earlier. Bulganin dispatched a telegram 
to the conference, repeating that only with prohibition of atomic and 
95Jd. at 31-32. In this instance the Soviet view (on the relation of the Board of 
Governors to the General Conference) is supported by Yugoslavia. Arnejc, "Conference 
for the International Atomic Agency," 7 Review of International Affairs, No. 155 
(Sept.), 9 (1956). 
96 Larin, supra note 16 at 33· 
97 ld. at 37· 
1436 INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
hydrogen weapons could the most favorable conditions exist for peace-
ful use of atomic energy. Other familiar problems emerged in the 
course of discussions: the participation of the Chinese People's Re-
public and other Communist states in the Agency, the Agency's general 
tasks and aims, membership policy, composition and powers of the 
Board of Governors, and the Agency's inspection and control functions. 
There was little new in what the Soviet delegates said, but some fresh 
arguments were presented in support of their position. 
On the question of Communist China's participation the Soviets 
have pointed out that such "states" as Monaco and the Vatican were 
invited to attend the conference, but the "great Asiatic power, the· 
Chinese People's Republic"; yet China's contribution could be a valu-
able one. Outstanding Chinese scientists were said to be devoting them-
selves to problems of peaceful utilization of atomic energy. The Soviets 
also claimed that considerable deposits of fissionable materials have 
been discovered in China and that the Chinese government is giving 
a high priority to atomic research. China has a twelve-year plan in 
science and technology which envisages the achievement by 1967 of a 
level in atomic energy research equal to that of the most advanced 
countries. The Soviet Union's position is that the Chinese People's 
Republic must sooner or later be admitted into the Agency and that the 
present "short-sighted and discriminatory policy" can only harm the 
Agency, undermining its influence and authority. 
At the conference G. N. Zarubin, the Soviet delegate, declared that 
the tasks and aims of the Agency must not be confined to serving the 
interests of a narrow group of highly-developed industrial powers; 
cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy can only be effective under 
conditions of equality of all participating states, with strict observance 
of their sovereignty and the principles of the United Nations. "In 
its foreign policy, the U.S.S.R. always adheres strictly to the principles 
of equality and observance of the sovereign rights of all people, great 
and small, highly-developed or backward," declared Zarubin (hardly a 
mouth before the tragic events which were to take place in Hungary 
that year), and he again emphasized that international cooperation in 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy could not be truly effective or com-
plete until an international agreement was reached outlawing atomic 
and hydrogen weapons and until these weapons were removed from the 
arsenals of all states. 88 
The American-British insistence on strong inspection and control 
88 /d. at 45-47. 
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provlSlons was interpreted by the Russian representative as an effort 
to acquire control of the atomic industry in other lands. Paragraph D 
of the statute's third article was seen as "making sovereignty dependent 
upon carrying out the provisions of the Agency statute," 99 constituting 
a violation of the United Nations Charter itsel£.100 The Soviets in-
sisted that a danger lies in the fact that whether or not the statute and 
agreements made in accordance with its provisions have been observed 
is a question of interpretation. The interpretation may differ widely, 
according to who is doing the interpreting, and what considerations 
guide the interpretation. One delegate from the Soviet Union claimed 
that "there will always be those who are ready to accuse a state of fail-
ing to comply with the provisions of the statute or the agreements in 
order to use this as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of that 
state." According to the Soviet view, there are other means which are 
quite adequate for bringing pressures to bear on states guilty of vio-
lating statute provisions or otherwise failing to carry out their obliga-
tions. It was pointed out in this connection that the Agency statute 
provides sanctions, including withdrawal of Agency assistance from 
offending states, and expulsion of these states from the Agency. 
Raising the question of Agency membership anew, the U.S.S.R. 
protested the exclusion of "certain states whose sociopolitical struc-
ture does not please the \Vestern powers : the German Democratic 
Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Korean Popular Demo-
cratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam." Claiming 
that the United States could offer no justification for its discriminatory 
policy, the U.S.S.R. advanced two arguments against the American 
position. One was that the wording of the statute's fourth article deal-
ing with membership contradicted the second and third articles. The 
second article spoke of the Agency's efforts to attain a broader and 
more rapid use of atomic energy for peace, health and welfare through-
out the whole world; the third article envisaged the Agency's contribu-
tions to scientific research in atomic energy, and practical application 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, over the entire earth. Such 
provisions made the Agency's aims and tasks clear to the Soviets: the 
Agency must be a body open to all states desiring to make a contribution 
to, or to benefit from international atomic cooperation. In other words, 
the Agency must possess. a truly universal character, embracing all 
states without exception; In the opinion of the U.S.S.R. the dis-
99 I d. at 47· 
100 The Charter provision in question is point 7 of Article 2. 
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criminatory membership terms contained in the fourth article clearly. 
contradicted such a universal character. The second Soviet argument 
was based on alleged inconsistencies in the American position. The 
Soviet representatives stated that originally the United States had no 
discriminatory policy. It was pointed out that the United States 
memorandum of March 19, 1954, in which basic principles for a treaty 
establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency were proposed, 
declared that "all states signing the treaty" would be Agency mem-
bers.101 Furthermore, they alluded to the statement of Secretary Dulles, 
at the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly on 
September 23, 1954, emphasizing the fact that the United States had 
no intention of excluding any states whatever from participation.102 
It was claimed that it was only in the spring of 1956, at the Washing-
ton conference, that the United States "came out against its own idea." 
In discussions concerning the composition and powers of the Board 
of Governors, the U.S.S.R. upheld the view that the General Con-
ference should be the general policy-making body. The Western in-
sistence that the Board of Governors have sufficient powers to make 
frequent decisions on important matters, without constantly being 
compelled to turn to the General Conference, was attacked ·on two 
grounds. First, it abrogated the principle of the "sovereign equality of 
all the Agency's members"-the principle that all interested countries 
should participate in deciding fundamental problems of Agency 
activity. Secondly, the Western position was not based on considera-
tions of expediency in the sense of making rapid, effectual decisions. 
This, to be sure, was the argument of certain Western powers, but in 
the Soviet view the real objective was to occupy a dominant position 
on the Board of Governors and to make the Board independent of the 
General Conference, where "the distribution of forces might sometimes 
be unfavorable to the Western powers." 108 
101 The text of this memorandum may be found in Atoms for Peace Manual 266-269. 
1 02 /d. at 283-285. Secretary Dulles' words were that "I would like to make perfectly 
dear that our planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As 
our proposals take shape all nations interested in participation and willing to take on the 
responsibilities of membership will be welcome to join with us in the planning and exe-
cution of this program." The Secretary of State apparently had the U.S.S.R. itself 
specifically in mind when he made these remarks, for he points out earlier in the 
address that ''to date the Soviet government has shown no willingness to participate 
in the implementation of President Eisenhower's plan except on this completely unac-
ceptable condition [a prior agreement outlawing nuclear weapons]. Yesterday when 
it was made known that I would speak on this topic today, the Soviet Union broke 
a five months' silence by affirming its readiness to talk further. But the note still 
gave no indication that the USSR had receded from its negative position." 
1oa Larin, supra note 16 at SS-57· 
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The Soviet arguments proved somewhat successful on the point be-
cause the U.S.S.R. and other opponents of the Western (particularly 
American) position were able to secure a number of amendments at 
the New York conference which broadened the powers of the General 
Conference to a limited extent.104 
The Agency's inspection and control functions were the most severely 
criticized by representatives of the Soviet Union who raised a series 
of objections and consistently used these provisions for attacking the 
United States. The inspection and control provisions contained in 
Article XII, first of all, conformed to the terms in the bilateral agree-
ments which the United States had concluded with other countries for 
assistance in peaceful uses of atomic energy. The terms of inspection 
and control in these bilateral agreements were not merely denounced as 
harsh by the Soviets, but they were described as "violations of sover-
eignty." 105 The United States, however, insisted upon retention of 
these provisions in the International Atomic Energy Statute. In es-
sence, the American position at conferences for drafting the statute was 
characterized by the Soviets as follows : "If you wish the United 
States to make its contribution, do not change these provisions." 106 
What were the motives underlying the American insistence on rigid 
inspection and control provisions ? According to the Soviet view, the 
United States and "certain other Western powers" hope to occupy a 
dominant position in the Agency, and once the Agency has acquired 
broad powers of inspection and control, the Western bloc will be able 
to use these powers for its own ends: to control the development of 
atomic industry in lands obtaining assistance from the Agency. The 
Soviets charged that the Western bloc further was seeking to place 
under Agency control all bilateral agreements for cooperation in peace-
ful use of atomic energy without exception, and thus to extend its 
influence and control to the atomic industries of all lands of the 
earth. The United States was alleged to be desirous of using the 
Agency's control powers to hinder free development of atomic energy 
in other lands, because such development would mean the undermining 
of American influence there. Furthermore, Soviet representatives stated 
that the United States was attempting to transform the Agency into an 
"international policeman," thereby contradicting the entire concept of 
104 /d. at 57· 
1o5 The correspondence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the question of 
inspectors and other controls was published in a special supplement to the Soviet 
periodical New Times, No. 42 (Oct. II) (1956). 
1o6 Larin, supra note 16 at 6o. 
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international cooperation in atomic energy development on the basis of 
equality and respect of the sovereign rights of states.107 
Soviet spokesmen did not deny the necessity of certain specific se-
curity measures in the handling of fissionable materials. They claimed, 
however, that the control mechanism which the United States suggested 
was worthless. American claims that strict measures were necessary in 
the interests of peace and security were denoted as "false and hypo-
critical." The Soviet delegates stated that if the Western powers were 
sincerely interested in such aims, they would support the Soviet pro-
posal for prohibiting the production, storage, and testing of nuclear 
weapons and rid humanity of the threat of atomic war. The Soviet 
view was that only when such prohibition has been effected will strict 
international control be fully justified; thereafter international control 
could be extended to all states and could be successfully directed toward 
the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes if all exist-
ing supplies of nuclear weap~:ms were destroyed. 
The Soviets argued that the Agency statute provided no controls 
over the United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R., or other states whose 
atomic energy development is highly developed because these powers 
will not be seeking help from the Agency; on the contrary, they will 
be rendering assistance, through the Agency, to other states. Further-
more, they stated that the Agency can have no control, regardless of 
strict provisions in its statute, over states possessing adequate tech-
nical and material resources for carrying on their own program in 
peaceful utilization of atomic energy without help from the Agency. 
If such states were to undertake the costs involved, they would be able 
to produce nuclear weapons on their own. According to the Soviet 
view, those nations which are sufficiently developed technologically to 
carry out their own atomic programs could make use of the Agency's 
assistance and still manage to evade control by the Agency.108 
The Soviets concluded with the following line of argument. Those 
states to whom the control provisions would apply are precisely the 
states least likely to produce atomic weapons in the first place; namely, 
the weakly-developed backward states whose need for Agency assistance 
is the greatest. We are thus confronted with a paradox : those states 
having no atomic installations ·or dangerous fissionable materials, and 
who need help from the Agency, are expected to submit to inspection 
and control at any time and any place. They can literally take no step 
101 I d. at 61. 
1os /d. at 63; the author does not elucidate. 
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in the development of their atomic industry without the Agency's knowl-
edge and permission. On the other hand, such states as the United 
States, which possess huge supplies of dangerous fissionable materials 
and are constantly manufacturing atomic and hydrogen bombs, remain 
completely outside the sphere of Agency control.'09 
In view of their conclusion regarding this paradoxical situation, and 
because no general agreement has been reached outlawing nuclear 
weapons, the Soviet Union felt that the promise of recipient states not 
to use Agency-furnished fissionable materials for military purposes, 
along with the statute's requirements for accounting and reports, should 
prove sufficient safeguards. At the New York conference, however, 
the "unnecessary" inspection and control clauses were adopted. The 
Soviet proposals, made to "protect the sovereignty of states," found 
some reflection, however, in the Agency statute to the extent that 
the Agency cannot make its aid contingent upon political, economic, 
military, or other conditions which are incompatible with the Agency's 
rules, and that the Agency's activities with respect of fulfillment of 
control functions must be agreed upon between the Agency and the 
recipient states.110 
Despite its dissatisfaction with many provisions of the International 
Atomic Energy statute, the Soviet Union was the first great power to 
r~tify the statute, "thereby demonstrating once again its desire for 
broad international cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of atomic 
energy." 111 However, the same familiar issues were immediately raised 
by the Soviet Union at the general conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in October, 1957. In a telegram to the chair-
man of the first session, K. Voroshilov (Chairman of the U.S.S.R. 
Supreme Soviet Presidium) declared that the Soviet Union attached 
great significance to the new international organization and had taken 
an· active part in its creation, seeking to "ensure for it the mo~t demo-
cratic character possible, and to ensure the broad participation and equal 
treatment of all countries participating in its work." He reminded the 
conference delegates that the U.S.S.R. had been the first great power 
to ratify the Agency's statute. He repeated the plea for an interna-
tional agreement prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons and stressed 
that the Soviet Union was ready to conclude such an agreement. "How-
109 Id. at 64. 
110 Article III. 
111 Larin, "Atoms for Peace and Progress," New Times, No.8 (Feb. 21) 11 (1957). 
For decree of U.S.S.R. SuP.reme Soviet Presidium, ratifying the statute, and dated 
Feb. 9, 1957, see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Mar. 8, 1957, at 163. 
1442 INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
ever, the Soviet Union's proposals to prohibit atomic and hydrogen 
weapons have unfortunately not met with support from the Western 
powers." 112 The U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia renewed their efforts 
to admit Communist China into the Agency,113 and the Soviet embassy 
in Washington dispatched a note to the U. S. State Department insist-
ing that the "Kuomintang (Nationalist China) has no right to repre-
sent China in the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet 
Union again reaffirms its position and declares that it does not recog-
nize the legality either of the Kuomintang's signature on the statute 
nor the Kuomintang's ratification of this Statute, since it does not 
represent China." 114 
So far, according to Soviet sources, the tone of the general con-
ference had been "normal" and "business-like." But suddenly an 
attempt was made to "poison the atmosphere and bring back the cold 
war spirit," when the United States delegation, "for no apparent rea-
son," introduced a resolution questioning the authority of the delega-
tion representing the Hungarian People's Republic. "Of course, the 
American delegate was unable to provide any reasonable explanation of 
this provocatory resolution." The Soviets also expressed strong dis-
approval of the American insistence on procedures "which have be-
come standard for the United _Nations and other international organs" 
because these procedures blocked a proposal to exclude Nationalist 
China and prevent the admission of Communist China intothe Agency. 
In general, the United States opposed Soviet proposals, which flowed 
from "the principle of the Agency's universality" (the apparent excep-
tion from this "universality" was Nationalist China), and the Soviet 
"efforts to create a healthy setting for the Agency's practical activity." 
The Soviet Union's spirit of cooperation and good will was claimed 
to have been shown· in the appointment of the Agency's General Di-
rector. Although the U.S.S.R. would have preferred a representative of 
a "neutral state" for this post, the U. S. A. "stubbornly insisted" that 
Sterling Cole be named director, and the Soviet delegation "refrained 
from objecting" to Cole's candidacy.115 
The "bourgeois press" made a great deal of the American offer "to 
supply Uranium 235 on a commercial basis." Some Western news-
papers went so far as to proclaim the Agency an "enterprise subsidized 
112 The text of this telegram was published in Pravda, Oct. 2, 1957, p. 2. 
us N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1957, p. 4· 
tH Pravda, Oct. 4, 1957, p. 5. 
115 lzvestiya, Oct. 10, 1957, p. 4· 
SOVIET RUSSIA'S PROGRAM 1443 
by America," but all these "fantasies died a quick death" on October 10, 
1957, when V. S. Emelianov, the Soviet representative, gave a speech 
outlining the U.S.S.R.'s aid program. This program included placing 
fifty kilograms of enriched uranium at the disposal of the Agency.116 
While recognizing the importance of supplying the Agency with an 
adequate amount of fissionable material, the U.S.S.R. claimed that the 
more urgent problem was how to utilize the material. The heart of the 
problem lay in training national cadres of scientists and specialists in 
underdeveloped countries. Thus a particularly strong impression was 
created when the Soviet delegate spoke of the Soviet Union's readiness 
to offer Agency member-states assistance in training scientific cadres 
in the technology necessary for manufacturing heat-generating ele-
ments for reactors. The U.S.S.R. was ready to take fifty or one hun-
dred students from member-states to study in Soviet institutes of higher 
learning and to grant fifty scholarships to students from underdevel-
oped countries. It was moreover prepared to train specialists from 
member-states in the use of radioactive isotopes in science, industry, 
medicine, and agriculture. It would also be willing to design the atomic 
power and experimental projects and installations which were to be 
built by the Agency in prospecting for uranium and in mining uranium 
deposits. The Soviet account also stated that the American, British 
and French delegates made a "general statement that they were pre-
pared to share their own atomic knowledge and experience with the 
Agency. Unfortunately, they did not specify any concrete form in 
which this aid might be rendered." 117 
The specter of American domination was raised again at this time. · 
Far from having any desire to help underdeveloped countries in the 
peaceful use of atomic energy, ·the United States (according to the 
Soviet account) is interested only in using the Agency to control the 
work which scientists of other states are doing in the field. "These 
118 Izvestiya, Oct. 18, 1957, p. 4- This report fails to mention Sterling Cole's expressed 
hope that the Soviet Union would increase its contribution to the Agency's stocks of 
fissionable material. The Soviet contribution was only a hundredth of the pledge made 
by President Eisenhower; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1957, p. II. Here again the Yugoslav 
position is worth noting. With reference to Eisenhower's promise of 5,000 kilograms 
of urairlum· 235, a Yugoslav writer notes· that this offer "has enabled the Agency to 
take -steps for· atomic research and for the realization of energy programs without 
. delay." Amejc, "Positive Prospects," 7 Review of International Affairs, No. 158 
(Nov.) 9 (1956). -
117 Izvestiya, Oct. 18, 1957, p. 4· Another statement that the U.S.S.R. regards the 
Agency's chief aim to be in creating "national cadres of ·specialists and lOcal produc-
tion bases in underdeveloped .lands" may be found in a short article by Podkliuchnikov, 
Pravda, Oct, 1957, p. 4-
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motives, in particular, explain why the American delegation spent its 
whole effort in getting Sterling Cole, former chairman of the U. S. 
Congress' joint committee for atomic energy, appointed as the Director-
General of the Agency." It was no accident that the United States had 
~<no concrete proposals for rendering aid to underdeveloped countries 
through the International Atomic Energy Agency." The "ruling 
circles of the United States" want the Agency to be their subservient 
organ so that the United States may control every step of the Agency's 
members.118 
In April, 1958 Sterling Cole received three letters from L. M. Za-
myatin, U.S.S.R. Deputy Permanent Representative to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. The first of the letters contained the informa-
tion that the Soviet Union would appoint twenty to thirty advisers 
and consultants for temporary aid to Agency member-states and that 
the Soviet government would bear all expenses connected with the as-
signments of these specialists, who were to be sent by the Agency to 
various countries to assist in setting up national scientific and technical 
programs for the peaceful use of atomic energy. The other letters 
stated that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to accept forty to forty-five 
students in the academic year of 1958-59 for a period of from five to 
six years of instruction in basic atomic specialties. The Soviet govern-
ment would assume the maintenance and tuition oosts for twenty-five of 
these students. In addition, the Soviet Union would be willing to 
accept fifty scientists and specialists from Agency member-states for 
three-to-six-months "refresher courses" with the Soviet government 
bearing the expenses of twenty of these specialists.119 
Such have been the views, as presented to the reader of Soviet pub-
lications, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, some of the 
provisions of its statute, and the role played by various states in the 
Agency. These published views appear to bear out a remark made by 
John Foster Dulles (in the early stages of negotiations for creating the 
Agency) that "negotiations publicly conducted with the Soviet Union 
tend to become propaganda contests." 120 American readers will quickly 
recognize the extent to which the United States' role in the Agency has 
been distorted and may be puzzled by certain inconsistencies in the 
Communists' own position. The active Soviet role in international 
cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy is stressed, and one is 
us Podkliuchnikov, supra note II7. 
119 Pravda, April 4. 1958, p. S· 
120 Atoms for Peace Manual 283. 
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repeatedly reminded that the U.S.S.R. was the first major power to 
ratify the Agency statute, despite the Soviet Union's originally negative 
attitude toward the project of such an Agency.121 Voroshilov's telegram 
in1957 described the U.S.S.R. as a "disinterested member" and claimed 
that the Soviet Union was striving for the greatest degree of inter-
national cooperation, employing a completely objective and harmonious 
approach to the Agency and its operations, yet almost in the next breath 
he expressed satisfaction that the Agency's headquarters were in a 
"neutral state" (Austria).122 In bemoaning the election of an Ameri-
can rather than some "representative of a neutral state" to the post of 
Director-General, the Soviet press makes it clear that, come what may, 
America remains in the "enemy camp." 128 
There is more political expediency than logical consistency in the 
Soviet view on the Agency's relations to the United Nations. On one 
hand, the U.S.S.R. has always insisted that the Agency be within the 
framework of the United Nations and strictly accountable to it, and 
Soviet jurists have defined the Agency's ties to the United Nations as 
considerably closer than those of the specialized agencies to the United 
Nations.124 On the other hand, the Soviets have denounced American 
insistence on following United Nations procedures 125 and have insisted 
that the statute's membership provisions are discriminatory and un-
acceptable because they exclude states not members of the United Na-
tions. Whereas the U.S.S.R. at one time called for a strong control 
mechanism, with inspectors investigating atomic installations of re-
cipient states,128 it became satisfied with minimum safeguards, ( exclud-
ing inspection or control within the recipient state), ostensibly because 
inspection and control provisions make no sense in the absence of an 
over-all prohibition of nuclear weapons and because such provisions 
would result in violations of the recipient states' sovereignty by the 
United States (not the U.S.S.R.). 
Early in 1958 the United States proposed international inspection 
teams to implement a general agreement to outlaw nuclear weapons-
the very type of agreement which the Soviets have constantly advo-
cated. The American position was that no agreement to outlaw nu-
121 Supra notes 89 and 102. 
122 Supra note 112. 
12s Izvestiya, Oct. 10, 1957, p. 4· 
12• Supra notes 86 and 87. 
125 Supra note 115. 
120 Dept. of State Press Release No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 23; see Bechhoefer and 
Stein, supra at note 77· 
1446 INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
clear weapons could have meaning without concrete implementation 
of this type.127 The initial Soviet response was disappointing,128 but 
U. S. officials later saw hopes that an accord might be reached.129 It 
remains to be seen whether the U.S.S.R. will agree to effective meas-
ures implementing a general agreement to ban nuclear weapons, 130 and 
how such an agreement will affect the Soviet attitude towards the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and other forms of international 
cooperation for peaceful use of atomic energy. 
D. Bilateral Agreements on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in the 
Communist Bloc 
Primary sources for studying bilateral agreements pertaining to the 
peaceful use of atomic energy within the Communist bloc are meager. 
The Soviet press periodically reports such agreements between the 
U.S.S.R. and other states, and the Soviet government has published 
a number of "joint declarations" concerning its negotiations with other 
states for cooperation in peaceful utilization of atomic energy. Passing 
references are made to bilateral agreements between other Com-
munist states/81 but so far the actual texts of bilateral agreements in 
the Communist bloc have not been made public. The testimony of 
former citizens of the Communist states who have defected to the West 
has provided some additional information not found in Communist-
bloc publications, but it is apt to be heavily biased and must be read 
with caution. 
According to some reports, the U.S.S.R. has been furnishing radio-
active isotopes to Communist-bloc states since 1951 and was approached 
by China with a request for assistance in constructing atomic labora-
tories in March, 1954.182 It was not until January, 1955, however, 
127 The text of Eisenhower's arms inspection proposal was published in the N.Y. 
Times, April 8, I958, p. IO. For concrete data on the proposed inspection teams, see 
N.Y. Times, April I6, 1958, p. 9· 
12s The text of Khrushchev's reply was published in Pravda and lzvestiya, April 
24, I9s8, p. 2. 
129 N.Y. Times, May 12, I958, p. I; June 3, 1958, p. I and June 10, I958, p. I. 
130 It has been suggested that the Soviet Union would enjoy important strategic 
advantages if all nations stopped testing nuclear weapons without guarantees of real 
world-wide disarmament; Kissinger, "Missiles and the Western Alliance," 36 Foreign 
Affairs, No. 3 (April) 383-401 (I958) and Sulzberger, "Nuclear Tests and Soviet 
Strategy,'' N.Y. Times, April 9, 1958, p. 32. 
131 See, for example, Wspolpraca ze wszystskimi narodami, I Polska, No. 41, 6-7 
(1958) and N.Y. Times, June 2, 1958, p. 10, for references to bilateral agreements 
between Poland and Yugoslavia and Poland and East Germany. 
182 Huber, supra note 75 at 4I. 
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that the Soviet Union embarked on a vast program of extending scien-
tific, technical, and industrial aid to other states for the establishment 
of "experimental scientific centers to develop atomic energy for peace-
ful purposes." In the original announcement of this program,183 the 
Soviet government promised five states-China, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Rumania, and East Germany-that it would aid them in design-
ing and supplying equipment for the construction of "experimental 
atomic piles," with a capacity of up to five thousand kilowatts, and for 
the. construction of accelerators of elementary particles.m The U.S.S.R. 
was to furnish these five countries with necessary quantities of fission-
able materials for their atomic piles and scientific research work. Means 
of extending the number of countries to be aided were considered. 
Recipient states were to supply "appropriate raw materials" to the 
U.S.S.R. in return for Soviet aid. 
This program was inaugurated very rapidly. At the beginning of 
March, 1955 a Czech government committee for research and use of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes met to discuss problems of carry-
ing out the Soviet proposals.185 By early June bilateral agreements had 
been drafted and signed with the five states named in the original 
Council of Ministers announcement, and similar aid was promised to 
Hungary and Bulgaria in the near future. 136 Agreements to aid 
·Hungary and Bulgaria were reported a week later.187 · 
Although the texts of these bilateral agreements have not been 
published, their main features have been summarized in the Soviet 
press.188 The Soviet Union was to supply the other states with experi-
mental reactors and accelerators designed in the U.S.S.R. and to pro-
vide free scientific and technical documentation concerning them, as 
well as assigning Soviet specialists to aid in assembling and placing 
tsa This announcement appeared on the front page of both Pravda and lzvestiya on 
Jan. 18, 1955, the day after its issuance by the Council of Ministers. 
134 Some revision in these figures was supplied in a report in Pravda, Aug. 29, 1955, 
which stated that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and the German Demo-
cratic Republic would have reactors with a capacity of 2000 kilowatts and cyclotrons 
with up to 25 million electron volts of energy. China, on the other hand, was to acquire a 
similar ·cyclotron, but a reactor of 6500 kilowatts thermal capacity. A United Press 
dispatch from Tokyo on Mar. 7, 1958, announced the completiton of a 7000 kilowatt 
reactor "with Soviet assistance." · 
ts5 Pravda, Mar. 12, 1955, p. 2. 
tso Pravda, April 30, 1955, p. 2. 
taT Pravda, June 15, 1955, p. 2. 
t3s Pavda, April 30, 1955, p. 2. This issue summarized the· agreements with China, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rutpania, and East Germany, stating that similar agreements 
would be concluded with Hungary and Bulgaria. 
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them in operation. The Soviet Union was to make available to these 
states the necessary amount of fissionable and other materials, and the 
U.S.S.R. was to deliver necessary amounts of radioactive isotopes until 
the experimental reactors went into operation. The agreements further 
declared that scientists and engineers from these states would receive 
training in the Soviet Union in nuclear physics, radiochemistry, use 
of isotopes, and reactor technology. · 
By mid-July of 1955, top-ranking scientists of Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, and East Germany were referring gratefully to the atomic 
"assistance agreements" between their states and the U.S.S.R., and 
it was reported that Poland and Czechoslovakia were reorganizing 
their over-all atomic energy programs (combining existing laboratories 
into single research institutes and establishing national committees to 
coordinate their research efforts) in order to take full advantage of 
Soviet aid.189 
A Soviet-Yugoslav protocol on economic and scientific-technical co-
operation was signed in Moscow on September I, 1955. On January 28, 
1956, a Soviet-Yugoslav Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of 
Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes was signed in Belgrade.140 This 
agreement provided for "general cooperation and experimental ex-
change in the field of atomic energy" and for Soviet scientific and 
technical aid in constructing a reactor for Yugoslavia. The type of 
reactor was to be based on the Yugoslav program and specifications. The 
Soviet Union promised to supply the equipment and nuclear fuel neces-
sary to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the reactor. Prices for 
materials and nuclear fuel were to be set according to "prices in the 
world market." In addition to the agreement itself, supplementary pro-
tocols setting forth "technical and commercial details" were to be 
signed.141 
1ao See New Times, No. 30 (July 21) 13-14 (1955). 
140 Pravda, Jan. 29, 1956, p. 6. According to Huber, this agreement would have been 
concluded in 1955, but Yugoslavia was bound under an agreement with the World Bank 
not to accept new credits until the end of 1955; Huber, supra note 75 at 53. 
141 Talks were held in Belgrade during practically the entire month of May, 1956, to 
"implement" the January agreement; Izvestiya, May 27, 1956, p. 3. The Soviet press 
reported early in 1957, in a very brief communique, that a new protocol to the agreement 
of Jan. 28, 1956, had been signed, providing for further cooperation between Soviet and 
Yugoslav organizations and scientific institutes in the field of nuclear physics research 
and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. In the words of the communique, 
"the negotiations took place in a spirit of mutual understanding and desire to cooperate 
further in this field" ; lzvestiya, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 12. A United Press dispatch of April 
30, 1958, quoted Tanjug, the official Yugoslav news agency, to the effect that Yugoslav 
scientists had successfully tested a nuclear reactor and that the reactor would go into 
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In 1956 the Joint Nuclear Research Institute was also organized. 
The Institute has figured prominently in some of the later "joint dec-
larations" between the Soviet Union and individual Communist states. 
Four states which are members of the Institute (Albania,142 North 
Korea, Viet Nam, and Mongolia) have not yet concluded bilateral 
agreements with the U.S.S.R. A possible explanation is that these 
states lack the necessary technical personnel. 
An agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt for cooperation 
in the peaceful use of atomic energy was signed in Cairo on July 12, 
1956. Its terms appear to be very similar to those of the bilaterals con-
cluded between the U.S.S.R. and states in the Communist bloc.143 
Later in July a "statement of the results of negotiations between 
government delegations of the Soviet Union and the German Demo-
cratic Republic" reported a new· bilateral agreement. The statement 
limited itself to a description of the benefits which East Germany was 
to enjoy under the agreement; no terms favorable to the U.S.S.R. (for 
example, shipment of East German uranium ore to the Soviet Union) 
were listed. The U.S.S.R. was to assist in designing an East German 
atomic power plant with a capacity of up to 100,000 kilowatts, and 
the Soviet government undertook to supply the German Democratic 
Republic with the necessary equipment and materials.1". 
In a general agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia, signed 
on September 15, 1956, the parties agreed, inter alia, to cooperate in 
operation in early May, 1958. It remains to be seen what effect the ideological conflict 
between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. which was resumed in 1958, will have on Soviet 
atomic assistance to Yugoslavia. 
142 The Joint Soviet-Albanian Declaration of April 17, I9S7, contains a single sen-
tence on the subject: "The parties have discussed cooperation in peaceful uses of 
atomic energy"; New Tintes No. 17 (April 2S) 38 (I9S7). 
143 Pravda, July IS, 19S6, p. s. 
144 Pravda, July 18, I9S6, p. 4· A joint statement over the signatures of Bulganin 
and Grotewohl in January, 1957, restricted itself to remarks on the desirability of a 
"general European organization for the peaceful application of atomic energy, which 
both parties ardently support," and concluding that "utilization of . atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes would bring the European working people higher living standards." 
New Tintes, No. 3 (Jan. 17) 36 (I9S7). For a description of the administration of 
East Germany's atomic energy program, see Huber, supra note 7S at 44-46. Pravda 
for Mar. IS, I9S7, p. 6, reported negotiations between Soviet and East German delega-
tions on payments for the products of the Wismuth Aktiengesellschaft (a Soviet-con-
trolled corporation which administers uranium mining in East Germany), but the 
report was couched in such general terms that it adds nothing to our knowledge of 
Soviet-East German relations in the atomic energy field. Construction on East Ger-
many's first atomic power station started on October 8, I9S7- New Times, No. 42 (Oct. 
17) 32 (19S7). . 
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peaceful uses of atomic energy, particularly in the use of radioactive 
isotopes in medicine, science, and technology, and in the training of 
Indonesian specialists in the use of atomic energy.145 
Shortly after the Polish unrest and th"e Hungarian uprising of late 
1956, a series of "joint declarations" between the U.S.S.R. and other 
Communist states were published. Some analysts believe that the Soviet 
Union was induced by the events in Poland and Hungary to make 
concessions (including concessions in the field of atomic energy) which 
were reflected in these declarations.148 The declarations were ex-
tremely broad in scope, and several of them touched upon the question 
of cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Those involving 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary deserve particular attention. 
In the Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Declaration of January 29, 1957, 
the two governments agreed that the Czechoslovak Republic would con-
tinue to supply uranium ore to the Soviet Union. The declaration -em-
phasized that Czech uranium, ore was being sold to the U.S.S.R. at a 
"fair and mutually-advantageous price which makes possible the con-
tinued development of mining and refining of this raw material." The 
Soviet. Union undertook to provide Czechoslovakia with the necessary 
assistance for the construction of an atomic power plant and a nuclear 
physics institute. It promised close cooperation with Czechoslovakia in 
problems of peaceful application of atomic energy. The declaration 
concluded with references to the two countries' active partin the work 
of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute.147 It contained one other im-
portant statement which will be discussed later in a different context. 
ua Izvestiya, Sept. 18, 1956, p. 1. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1958, p. 53, for Indonesian 
plans to earmark special funds to finance the Soviet aid program. 
148 According to Soviet sources themselves, these bilateral talks were based on a 
Soviet government declaration issued on Oi:tober 30, 1956, "On the Principles of De-
velopment and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the 
Soviet Union and Other Socialist States"; Pravda, July 14, 1957, p. s. 
147 New Times, No. 6 (Feb. 7) 42 (1957). The Czech government committee for 
research and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes met early in March, 1955, to 
discuss problems concerning the Soviet government's proposal to grant Czechoslovakia 
scientific, technical and production assistance in setting up scientific bases for devel-
oping research in nuclear physics and the peaceful use of atomic energy; Pravda, 
Mar. 12, 1955, p. J. A national committee for the study of peaceful uses of atomic 
energy was established shortly afterwards, to "coordinate research effort," and it was 
hoped that the Soviet-built reactor and cyclotron would be in operation before the end 
of 1956; New Times, No. JO (July 21) 14 ( 1955). (According to later reports, the 
first Czech atomic reactor started operations on Sept. 25, 1957; Pravda, Sept. 26. 1957, 
p. J). According to a former member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, a 
Czech-Soviet treaty was concluded in 1945 (but kept secret until late in 1947) in 
which Czechoslovakia agreed to deliver its entire stock • 11 uranium ore, and its 
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In respect to the declaration on negotiations between the govern-
ments of the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria, it was announced that "together 
with the other Socialist countries, Bulgaria will take an active part in 
the work of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute, both in theoretical 
research and experimentation." It was further agreed that the Bul-
garian People's Republic would continue to supply the Soviet Union 
with uranium ore "at a fair and mutually advantageous price that will 
enable the further development of the mining of uranium ore." 148 
Bulganin and Kadar signed a "Declaration of the Governments of 
the Soviet Union and Hungarian People's Republic" on March 28, 1957. 
This declaration listed four points of cooperation between the U.S.S.R. 
and Hungary in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. First, both 
states would continue to participate in the work of the Joint Nuclear 
Research Institute. Second, the Soviet Union would continue to render 
Hungary economic and technical assistance in the geological survey of 
uranium deposits and to supply equipment and instruments. · Third, 
the U.S.S.R. would aid Hungary in constructing atomic power plants 
and in obtaining fissionable material necessary for their operation. 
Fourth, after "reorganization of the mining of uranium ore," Hungary 
would sell the Soviet Union surplus ore "not required by her own econ-
omy" at a "fair and mutually advantageous price." us 
entire production thueof, to the Soviet Union. Mining and shipping of uranium were 
to be under Soviet direction. The terms of payment were left undefined, the treaty 
stating simply that Soviet payments would be based on "expenses incurred in mining 
the ore." Since vast quantities of ore were already on the surface, in pit heaps, these 
"expenses" amounted to very little. It would have been far more to Czechoslovakia's 
advantage to sell the ore at world market prices. The Czechs were obliged to supply 
eapital for new investments, which were made on an enormous scale. The Soviet de-
mands became so "cynical and ruthless," however, that finally the Czech Communist 
premier (Gottwald) had to dispatch an envoy to Moscow to try to negotiate more 
favorable terms. The Russians finally consented to appraise the pit heaps on the basis 
of the market price of uranium and to refund investments financed by Czechoslovakia. 
Kasparek, "Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia's Uranium," 10 Russian Review, No. 4 
(Oct.) 97-105 (1951). 
148 New Times, No. 9 (Feb. 28) 37 (1957). Bulgaria's copper, mica and important 
uranium mines are operated by Gorubso, a joint Soviet-Bulgarian corporation; Levitsky, 
"The Soviet Union and Satellite Uranium," IV Bulletin of the Institute for the Study 
of the U.S.S.R., No. 2 (Feb.) 39 (1957). 
149 New Times, No. 14 (Apr. 14) Supplement, p. 8 (1957). The formation of an 
"All-Hungarian Atomic Energy Committee" was reported in early 1956; Pravda, 
Jan. 22, 1956, p. 5· But all was apparently not well. The Hungarian scientist Lajos 
Janosi (the same Lajos Janosi whose enthusiastic approval of locating the Joint 
Nuclear Research Institute was cited earlier in this paper) reportedly complained in 
November, 1956, that the ~oviet authorities had zealously guarded everything con-
nected with uranium and had kept the Hungarian experts-including himself (he was 
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The Soviet Union's joint declarations with Poland and Rumania 
contained no clauses on cooperation in peaceful utilization of atomic 
energy although both those countries are known to possess uranium 
deposits. It has been reported that Gomulka brought up the question of 
Polish uranium mines when in Moscow in late 1956, and Poland may 
have ~eceived Soviet agreement on a similar arrangement to that which 
the U.S.S.R. has worked out with Czechoslovakia and East Germany.150 
But the Joint Statement on Soviet-Polish Talks, signed by Khrushchev, 
Bulganin, Gomulka, and Cyrankiewicz in Moscow on November 18, 
1956, made no mention of atomic energy.151 The Soviet press reported 
that a reactor was commissioned in Rumania in early August of 1957,152 
but little else is known about Rumanian-Soviet relations in this area. Ac-
cording to one source, Soviet geologists discovered important uranium 
deposits in Rumania several years ago and established a corporation 
(Sovromquartz) in charge of uranium mining and export. This same 
source cites a Soviet-Rumanian agreement of October 22, 1956, under 
which the Rumanians acquired the right to buy up the Soviet share in 
this corporation "under advantageous conditions." 158 G. Ionescu, an 
anti-communist Rumanian economist, claims that Sovromquartz was 
working exclusively on Soviet army requirements and not on peaceful 
uses of atomic energy.m Nothing pertaining to peaceful uses of 
atomic energy was to be found in the Statement on Soviet-Rumanian 
Negotiations signed by Bulganin and Stoica on December 3, 1956.185 
Vice-Chairman of the "All-Hungarian Atomic Energy Committee")---<:ompletely in 
the dark; See Stolte, "Moscow's Current Hungarian Policy," IV Bulletin of the In-
stitute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., No.7 (July) 27 (1957) and sources therein cited. 
A former Soviet economist has summarized the role which the issue of Hungarian 
uraruum-mine control played in that country's tragic uprising in 1956. He reports 
that the uranium mines had been controlled by the Soviet Union since the end of the 
second World War, in accordance with a secret treaty which gave the U.S.S.R. the 
exclusive rights to Hungarian uranium for twenty-five years without compensation. 
When the Hungarian revolt broke out, the revolutionaries demanded that the terms 
of the secret agreement be made public and that the mines be returned to Hungary 
Failing this, they threatened to seize the mines by force, and as the revolution pro-
gressed the mines were so badly damaged that Hungarian uranium production came 
to a standstill. In early 1957, Kadar announced that the Soviet-Hungarian uranium 
agreement would be 'reexamined"; Levitsky, supra oote 148 at 4o-41, and sources 
therein cited. The declaration we have quoted followed soon thereafter. 
uo Levitsky, supra note 148 at 40. 
151 New Times, No. 48 (Nov. :zz) 37-40 (1956). 
m New Times. No. 32 (Aug. 8) 5 (1957) 
t5s Levitsky, supra note 148 at 40· 
1 s• See C retzianu ( ed.) Captive Rumania 93 ( 1956). 
'"' Nt·w Times, No. 50 (Oec. 6) Documents, pp. 1-4 (1956). 
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An agreement for Soviet assistance to Poland in the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy was signed on January 22, 1958. The account of 
negotiations preceding the agreement discloses that both sides "dis-
cussed" a number of problems of technical assistance, including: the 
construction and equipping of a second experimental reactor in Poland; 
the design and construction of Poland's first atomic-powered electric 
plant; problems of uranium prospecting, mining and processing; the 
organization of Polish production of equipment and apparatus neces-
sary for experimental work and equipment of nuclear physics and 
chemistry laboratories; further development of research and preparation 
of specialist cadres for peaceful utilization of atomic energy; and the 
organization of work in radiology. Technical assistance was to be car-
ried out by: transmission of specialized literature and technical docu-
ments; delivery of special materials and equipment for nuclear physics 
and chemistry laboratories and also of equipment and apparatus which 
could not be produced by Polish industry; the assignment of Soviet 
specialists to Poland for advising and consulting; the training of Polish 
specialists in technology and production methods in the Soviet Union; 
education of Polish students in Soviet institutions of higher learning; 
and the assignment of teachers from Soviet institutions of higher learn-
ing to Poland for lecturing and consultation. The Soviet technical as-
sistance to Poland was to be paid for according to the terms of a trade 
agreement which had been concluded earlier between the two countries.158 
The Polish delegation visited the Joint Nuclear Research Institute after 
the signing of the agreement, and V. Billig (the head of the Polish 
delegation) declared there that this new agreement, along with Polish 
participation in the Institute "in which the number of Polish associates 
is increasing," gave Poland a "firm basis for further successful solu..: 
tion of our problems in the field of peaceful utilization of atomic 
energy." 157 
As in other areas of international cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy, Soviet writers have contrasted the activities of the 
U.S.S.R. and the Western powers in the field of atomic bilateral agree-
ments. The American and British agreements with other lands have 
been denounced as "incompatible with the principles of sovereignty and 
156 Pravda, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 4. Poland's first nuclear reactor went into operation on 
June 14, 19s8. It will be used in research work in medicine, physics, chemistry and 
biology and will produce isotopes of iodine, gold, coal and cobalt. Most of the equipment 
was purchased from the U.S.S.R., but Poles did most of the assembly work. The 
Poles report plans for another, larger nuclear plant which they hope to build them-
selves. N.Y. Times, June 16·, 1958, p. 9· 
157 Pravda, Jan. 28, 1958, p. 6. 
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equality of states' rights"; the "ruling circles of imperialist states," 
writes one Soviet jurist, "seek to use such bilateral agreements to dictate 
their will to the other contracting parties, to seize sources of atomic 
raw-material and to interfere in the internal affairs of those states. The 
aid which the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is rendering through 
its bilateral agreements is in full harmony with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, being based on complete equality of rights 
between states. It is not accompanied by any political, economic or mili-
tary conditions whatsoever which would in any degree affect the inde-
pendence of states." tss The jurist also emphasized that although it 
had cost the U.S.S.R. vast sums to develop and construct atomic re-
actors and accelerators, the necessary scientific and technical documenta-
tion and experience was furnished other lands free of charge. The 
aided countries pay only the actual costs of making the equipment which 
is to be delivered to them. m 
We are handicapped through our lack of the texts of the bilateral 
agreements. Although they are said to be "in full harmony with the 
principles of the United Nations," they have not yet been registered 
with the United Nations. It appears beyond question, however, that the 
agreements serve important political and diplomatic purposes. The tim-
ing of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' first announcement on the 
atomic aid program, for example, is highly significant. This announce-
ment, described earlier, was published on January 18, 1955, at the very 
moment when a United Nations consultative committee was meeting in 
New York to prepare for the International Conference on Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy. On the day following the Council of Ministers' 
announcement, Pravda carried a front-page editorial contrasting the 
"two policies and two paths" followed by the Soviet Union and the West 
in using atomic energy. The editorial repeated some of the Soviet 
views on Eisenhower's proposal of December, 1953, which were dis-
cussed in connection with the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
and then added : 
It must be clear to everyone that two policies and two paths 
arose long ago concerning the use of atomic energy. The 
us See Malinin, supra note 16 at 122-123, referring to U.S. treaties (with Turkey, 
South Korea and Latin American states) and the British treaty with Germany. A 
particularly violent attack on U.S. bilateral agreements with other states was made in 
connection with the U.S.-Swiss agreement of June 21, 1956. In an article appearing in 
Izvestiya. Sept. 4, 1956, p. 4, it was claimed that the terms of this treaty gave the 
United States the right to control the activity of all Swiss scientific institutes and en-
terprises which were to receive American. supplies and information. 
tse Larin, s11pra note 16 at 8. 
SOVIET RUSSIA'S PROGRAM 
Soviet Union is struggling consistently to free mankind for-
ever from the danger of war and to pave the way for the 
most extensive peaceful use of atomic energy. In contrast to 
the American government, which prefers to make verbal state-
ments on the peaceful use of atomic energy and in practice to 
prepare for atomic war, the Soviet government is furthering 
by concrete practical measures the use of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes. 
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Subsequent events have made it difficult to agree with this important 
editorial. It seems more likely that the Soviet Union, far from feeling 
genuine contempt for America's ''verbal statements" on the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy, had become alarmed at the progress of the 
American aid program and negotiations for creating the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. It may have felt impelled to· launch its atomic 
aid program and to include as many states in this program as possible 
before the American aid program had progressed further and the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency could start operations. Bilateral 
agreements with Communist states were quickly concluded. The Joint 
Nuclear Research Institute was created. Atomic aid treaties were made 
with the important "uncommitted" countries of Egypt and Indonesia. 
Libya and Sweden received Soviet offers of assistance. An offer was 
made to India, but that state concluded a treaty with Great Britain three 
weeks after the Soviet offer.160 According to E. P. Slavskii, then Direc-
tor of the Chief Atomic Administration of the U.S.S.R., an agreement 
could have been reached between the Soviet Union and Switzerland 
"had the latter referred this question to us." 181 
The political and diplomatic aspects of atomic energy negotiations and 
agreements were likewise apparent in the various "joint declarations" 
made in late 1956 and early 1957. Cooperation in peaceful use of atomic 
energy was merely one of many points covered in these declarations. 
All of them stressed the solidarity and "everlasting friendship" of states 
in the "socialist camp"; they uniformly condemned the United States 
and Western "warmongers" and went to great lengths to justify Soviet 
actions during the revolt in Hungary. 
The U.S.S.R. has constantly emphasized the peaceful purposes of its 
atomic aid program. Some observers, however, might wonder whether 
the Soviet aid program has exclusively peaceful uses of atomic energy 
in mind. Two days after announcing the atomic aid program, the 
180 Huber, supra note 75 at 55-56. 
1e1 Pravda, Sept. 7, 1956, p. 2. 
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Soviet press explained why the U.S.S.R. had been engaged in producing 
atomic and hydrogen bombs : 
Although the Soviet Union has had to produce atomic and 
hydrogen weapons in order to defend the peaceful life and 
labor of its peoples, Soviet scientists and engineers have been 
working persistently and purposefully to utilize atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes.162 
Some of the raw materials for these bombs doubtless comes to the 
U.S.S.R. from states with which it has concluded pacts for cooperation 
in the "peaceful" uses of atomic energy. In the words of the Joint 
Soviet-Czechoslovak declaration of January 29, 1957: 
The parties declare that the Czechoslovak uranium ore is being 
sold to the Soviet Union at a fair and mutually-advantageous 
price which makes possible the continued development of min-
ing and refining of this raw material. But it is not only a 
matter of economic adva.ntage. The Czechoslovak people fully 
realize that in the hands of the Soviet Union nuclear energy 
is a powerful instrument of the peace and security of nations 
against the atomic threats and frrovocations of the interna-
tional forces of aggression. 168 
Such a declaration as this adds new significance to the Soviet pro-
gram of atomic. assistance to other countries, at least those countries 
which are loyal "satellites" within the Communist bloc. From the 
"joint declarations" on this program, and from the little that has been 
published concerning the bilateral agreements which implement it, one 
can say that it embraces frankly political and diplomatic aims, as well as 
economic and technological ones. The Joint Soviet-Czech declaration 
appears quite clearly to show that the Soviet aid program for "peaceful" 
use of atomic energy has important military objectives as well. 
102 Pravda, Jan. 19, 1955, p. I. 
1ea See supra note 147. Emphasis added. 
Appendix A 
ITEM 1 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
1. First Phase of Diplomatic Correspondence Between the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
The first outline of a statute for an agency of the kind envisaged in 
President Eisenhower's proposal of December 8, 1953, was contained in 
a United States Department of State memorandum handed to Soviet 
Ambassador Zarubin on March 19, 1954. This memorandum is the first 
in a series of six documents representing the first phase of the correspond-
ence between the United States and the Soviet Union, covering the period 
from March 19 to September 23, 1954. For the text of these documents 
see Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra at 266-283; also U. N. General 
Assembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), Annexes, Agenda Item 67, p. 4 
(Doc. A/2738). The outline already contained many features of the 
Agency in its present form. In its reply the Soviet Union claimed that the 
United States memorandum evaded the problem of nuclear weapons and 
would tend to intensify the atomic armament race. Soviet Union Aide-
Memoire of April 27, 1954, in Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra, 
26g at 271-272. Later on, however, the Soviet Union indicated its willing-
ness to separate the issues of disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. Soviet Union Aide-Memoire of September 22, 1954, id. at 278 
et seq. 
2. Negotiations of Eight States 
Ambassador Morehead Patterson, U. S. representative in the original 
negotiating group consisting of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Portugal, the Union of South Africa, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom, describes the development that followed the discussion in the 
9th General Assembly in the fall of 1954: "The United States prepared 
a first draft of the Statute taking into consideration suggestions received 
from other negotiating States and also from the United Nations General 
Assembly debates. This draft was then submitted to the negotiating States 
on March 29, 195'5. During April and May the United States discussed 
this draft with all the negotiating States and also received further com-
ments from interested agencies of the United States Government which 
had not participated in the original drafting. 
"After a thorough discussion, it developed that there was sufficient 
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unanimity among all negotiating states so that substantially all of the sug-
gested changes could be reconciled and incorporated into a new draft of 
the Statute. This new draft was transmitted to the Soviet Union on a 
confidential basis on July 29, 1955, and its comments were requested. It 
was distributed by the United States on behalf of the negotiating States, 
also on a confidential basis, to all eighty-four States Members of the United 
Nations or of the specialized .agencies on August 22, 1955. Comments on 
the Statute were requested from all States." Report of Ambassador More-
head Patterson, 34 Dept. of. State Bul. 5 at 6 ( 1956). 
J; Discussion in the Ninth General Assembly 
The question of th~ Agency came up for the first time for general inter-
national discussion in the 9th General Assembly. (See U. N. General As-
sembly Off. Rec., 9th Session (1954), Plenary Meetings, A/PV. 475, p. 17 
at 25, A/PV. 478, p. 63 at 66, A/PV. 503, p. 339 at 339-349; First Com,. 
mittee, A./C. 1jSR. 707-725, pp. 289-387, Annexes, Agenda Item 67.) The 
debates there led to the unanimous adoption of a draft resolution which 
referred to " ... negotiations ... in progress ... for the· establishment 
of an International Atomic Energy Agency . . .," expressed the hope that 
" ... the International Agency will. be established without delay .. . ," 
and suggested . that ". . .. once the Agency is established, . it negotiate an 
appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations .. . ," and that 
t• • •• Members of the United Nations be informed as progress is achieved 
in the establishment of the Agency and that the views of members 
which have manifested their interest be fully considered .... " Resolution 
81o(IX), Document AjResolution/230, in U. N. General Assembly Off. 
Rec., 9th Session (1954). Annexes, Agenda Item 67, pp. 24-25. For the 
report of the First Committee, see id. at 22-23 ... 
4· Second Phase of Dipiomatic Correspondence Between the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
In the second series of notes (Department o! State Press Release 
No. 527, Oct. 6, 1956, containing fifteen notes exchanged between Nov. 3, 
1954 and Jan. 27, 1956) the Soviet Union demanded that the Agency be 
closely connected with the United Nations (in particular the Security 
Council) and that no member should have a "privileged position" within 
the Agency. 
The United States, in a note of April 14, 1955 (id. at 8, 9), expressed 
its willingness to consider these comments and made clear that it kept the 
door open for the Soviet Union to join the negotiating group. It stated, 
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however, its intention in the meantime to carry on the negotiations regard-
less of Soviet participation. The United States furthermore submitted an 
agenda for a joint discussion by experts of both countries on safeguards 
against diversion of fissionable materials. 
The U.S. S. R., on July 18, 1955 (id. at II-13), declared its readiness 
to participate in the negotiations and agreed to deposit so kilograms of 
fissionable materials with the Agency as soon as agreement on the creation 
of the Agency has been reached. Again it referred to principles which it 
considered basic, among them the participation of all nations (obviously 
designed to bring in Red China) in the Agency with no privileged position 
for any s~te. The joint study of safeguards should take place after the 
completion of the scientific conference in Geneva scheduled for the summer 
of 1955. 
In its answer of July 29, 1955 (id. at 14-15), the United States trans-
mitted the draft statute worked out by the eight-power negotiating group 
(note 14 supra), which was identical with the draft distributed on August 
22, 1955 to all members of the United Nations and of the specialized 
agencies, except for two minor changes. Later on the United States and 
U. S. S. R. agreed on the conference of experts on the safeguards to 
'include experts from Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, and the United 
Kingdom. On Oct. 1, 1955 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet 
Union wrote to the American Embassy (id. at 22-24) that the eight-power 
draft could, with certain amendments, serve as a basis for drawing up 
the charter of an atomic energy agency. The permanent members of the 
'Security Council should become permanent members of the Agency's Board 
of Governors. There should be a strong control mechanism, with inspectors 
investigating atomic installations of countries receiving aid under provisions 
which should give "due regard to the sovereign rights of the states.'' India, 
I11donesia, Egypt, and Rumania should be added to an increased first Board 
of Governors. A -! majority in the Board and the General Conference 
should be necessary for financial decisions. In conformity with the eight-
power draft, these Soviet proposals now envisaged the Agency acting not 
only as a clearing house but also as a "bank" for fissionable materials. The 
International Court of Justice should not have compulsory jurisdiction over 
disputes arising from the application of the statute. After the discussion 
of the Agency in the 10th General Assembly (see infra), the exchange was 
continued in a United States note of Jan. 27, 1956 (id. at 25) suggesting 
further discussions at a twelve nation working group meeting scheduled 
for Feb. 27, 1956. 
The remaining portion of the exchange between the United States and 
the U.S. S. R. is concerned with the problem of safeguards, in particular 
the possible extension of safeguards to existing international arrangements 
(see note 77 supra). 
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5. Discussion in the Tenth General Assembly 
The main points of discussion in the 1oth General Assembly of the 
United Nations were the relationship between the Agency on one hand 
and the United Nations and its specialized agencies on the other; fair 
representation of states, both in regard to the negotiations on the statute 
and in the mode of selection and voting of the Board of Governors; uni-
versality of membership; and the relationship of the Agency to regional 
or bilateral programs outside the Agency. See U. N. General Assembly 
Off. Rec., 10th Session (1955), First Committee, A/C. I/SR. 757-772, 
pp. 5-93· A resolution was adopted unanimously [Resolution 912 (X) 
Document A/JII6, in U. N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 10th Session, 
Supp. 19 (A/3116), pp. 4-5,] welcoming the intention of the nations spon-
soring the draft statute of the Agency to invite all members of the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies to a conference on the final text of 
the statute ; welcoming the invitations extended to Brazil, Czechoslovakia, 
India, and the U. S. S. R. to join the sponsors; recommending that the 
sponsors take into account the views expressed by the Agency during the 
debates in the United Nations and the comments made directly to the spon-
sors ; recommending that measures be taken to establish the Agency without 
delay ; and requesting that the Secretary General in consultation with his 
Advisory Committee study the question of the Agency's relationship to the 
United Nations and transmit the results of this study to the sponsors before 
the conference. 
6. Negotiations of the Twelve States 
A working group consisting of representatives of the original eight 
negotiating powers and of the representatives of Brazil, Czechoslovakia; 
India, and the U. S. S. R. met in Washington from Feb. 27 to April 18, 
1956, for further discussion of the draft statute. The report of the working 
level meeting dated July 2, 1956, reads (in part) : " ... [T]he Group 
reviewed each article of the Statute, together with the proposed amend-
ments, taking into account the comments advanced during the proceedings 
of the tenth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly as 
well as those of the thirty-nine States which submitted observations on the 
Statute in response to a request made by the initial Negotiating Group in 
August 1955 to all States Members of the United Nations and its Special-
ized Agencies .... At the final plenary session on April 18, 1956, the 
Negotiating Group approved, ad referendum, the revised text of the draft 
Statute. . . . While the Australian, Czechoslovak, Indian and Soviet Dele-
gations reserved their positions on certain provisions of the Statute, . . . 
all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a whole. . . . At the same 
session, the Group agreed that a conference should be convened at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York in the latter part of September 
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1956 to discuss, approve and open for signature the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency .... The Group also unanimously ap-
proved the Agenda and Rules of Procedure for the Conference." Report 
of the Working Level Meeting on the Draft Statute of the International 
Atomic Energ,y Agency, Doc. 31, Washington, D. C., July 2, 1956, pp. 1, 2. 
ITEM 2 
(Footnote 19) 
Article V, par. D, subpar. 2 of the twelve-power draft mentioned as one 
of the functions of the General Conference "to admit new Members in 
accordance with Article IV." This was changed in art. V, par. E, subpar. 2 
of the final text to read "to approve states for membership in accordance 
with Article IV." (Emphasis added.) The change was perhaps motivated 
by the desire to make it clear beyond any doubt that a favorable recom-
mendation by the Board is necessary for the admission of a new member. 
The drafters may have had in mind the advisory proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice on the question whether a favorable recom-
mendation from the Security Council is required for admission of a state 
to the United Nations by the General Assembly. The Court answered this 
question in the affirmative. Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice of March 3, 1950, in I. C. J. Reports of Judgments, Advisory 
Opinions and Orders, 1950, p. 4 at 10. 
In approving states for membership under this paragraph the Board of 
Governors and the General Conference make the determination "that the 
State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the 
agency." Statute, art. IV, par. B. In making this determination "due 
consideration" is to be given to the state's ability and willingness to act in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations. The eight-power draft would have had the Board of Governors 
and the General Conference each make two determinations: first, that the 
state was in a position to carry out the obligations of the Agency, and 
second, that the state was able and willing to carry out the obligations 
contained in the Charter of the United Nations. This would have excluded 
Switzerland which considers that it is not in a position to undertake the 
obligations required by the Charter of the United Nations. · 
ITEM 3 
(Footnote 30) 
The powers of the General Conference were a much debated item in the 
International Conference on the statute of the Agency. Apart from the 
additional powers already mentioned, the International Conference provided 
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for the authority of the General Conference to approve the appointment 
by the Board of the Agency's chief executive, the Director General. See 
art. V, par. E., subpar. IO and art. VII, par. A: This originated in an 
Indonesian-Pakistanian amendment. IAEA/CS/ Art. V /Amend. 8. The 
amendment was adopted by 77 votes to I, with I abstention. IAEA/CS/OR. 
22, p. 43· 
Already before the discussions in the International Conference, the 
powers of the General Conference had been controversial matter. The 
smaller nations, not being represented on the Board of Governors, wanted 
to accord more authority to the General Conference. In response to the 
suggestions made to the negotiating parties, the twelve-power draft added 
a provision in art. V, par. E, subpar. 3 giving the General Conference the 
power to "propose matters for consideration by the Board and request 
fro~ the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the 
Agency" (now art. V, par. F, subpar. 2 of the statute). Furthermore, the 
reference to the policy making power of the Board in art. VII, par. H of 
the eight-power draft no longer appears in the twelve-power draft and the 
statute. The powers of the General Conference other than those mentioned 
earlier are : 
To elect the ten members of the Board mentioned in art. VI, par. A, 
subpar. 3 of the statute (art. V, par. E, subpar. I) ; 
To determine the place of its sessions (art. V, par. A); 
To elect a President and other officers (art. V, par. C); 
To adopt its rules of procedure (art. V, par. C) ; 
To request the Director General to convene special sessions (art. V, 
par. A); 
'ro approve states for membership upon recommendation by the Board 
(art. IV, par. B); 
To suspend members (art. XIX); 
To consider the Board's·annual report (art. V, par. E, subpar. 4); 
To approve or return to the ·Board reports .to the United Nations (art. V, 
par. E, su!;.par. 6; art. III, par. B, subpars. 4 and 5); 
To approve or return to the Board agreements between the Agency and 
the United Nations or other international agencies (art. V, par. E, subpar. 
7; art. XVI, par. A) ; 
To approve rules regarding (a) the exercise of borrowing powers by 
the Board (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8; art. XIV, par. G); (b) the accept-
ance of voluntary contributions to the Agency (art. V, par. E, subpar. 8; 
art. XIV, par. E); (c) the use of the general fund (art. V, par. E, 
8; art. XIV, par. F) ; 
To approve amendments of the statute (art. V, par. E, subpar. 9; art. 
XVIII, par. C(i) ). 
It seems that the enumeration in art. Vis exclusive, i.e., the Conference 
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has no other powers besides the ones specifically mentioned. A Polish 
amendment ( IAEAjCS/ Art. V /Amend. I) to art. V proposed to insert 
at the beginning of the functions of the Conference a sentence reading "to 
determine the general policy of the Agency." This amendment, in effect 
a general clause granting additional powers to the Conference was rejected 
by 37 votes to 24, with I8 abstentions. IAEAjCSjOR. 22, p. 42· 
The voting procedures of the Conference are laid down in art. V, par. C. 
Every member of the Agency has one vote. Except for decisions on 
financial questions (art. XIV, par. H), approval of amendments (art. 
XVIII, par. C ( i)), and the suspension of privileges (art. XIX, par. B), 
which requires a -J majority, decisions are made by the majority of mem-
bers present and voting, the majority of members constituting a quorum. 
Simple majority suffices for the determination of what additional questions 
are to be decided by a -J majority. 
ITEM 4 
(Footnote 38) 
The eight-power draft, art. VII, par. A, subpars. I and 2, as well as the 
first outline of the statute, art. II, par. C, subpar. I, third sentence [Atoms 
for Peace Manual, note 5 su,pra, 266 et seq.], envisaged actual contributions 
as a prerequisite for selection to the non-elective seats on the Board. This 
prerequisite was dropped in the twelve-power draft. In the International 
Conference on the statute, Denmark and Iran jointly submitted an amend-
ment to art. VI, par. A, subpar. I, which provided that in designating 
members of the Board under this sub-paragraph the contributions to the 
Agency should be taken into consideration. IAEA/CS/ Art. Vlj Amend. 2. 
In explaining this· amendment the Danish representative said: "The main 
idea behind the Agency is that countries which are advanced and which 
are producing source material should give to other countries . . . their aid 
and their help .... [S]tress should be laid also on the contributions ... 
because that is really the main point in the building up of this idea. . . . 
[N]o one in this room will suggest that any member elected on the basis 
of advanced technology and of production of source materials should be 
allowed to sit if that member were not willing to make contributions and 
was not actually making contributions." IAEA/CSjOR. 19, p. 27. The 
Philippine representative remarked: "[T]hat paragraph [i. e., art. VI, 
par. A, subpar. 2] mentions 'producers ... .' However, what good would 
that do as far as the Agency is concerned unless they make a contribu-
tion?" IAEA/CSjOR. Ig, pp. 29-30. In arguing against the amendment, · 
Mr. duPlessis (Union of South Africa) pointed to the difficulty of evalu-
ating contributions and deciding what transactions were to be regarded as 
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contributions. IAEA/CSjOR. 20, p. 26 et seq. Subsequently, this amend-
ment was withdrawn. See IAEAjCSjOR. 23, p. 3· 
The composition of the Board in its present form is somewhat compar-
able to that of the Council of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization. Art. 17, Convention of the IMCO. For the text of this 
convention, which is not yet in force, see 18 Dept. of State Bul. 499 et seq. 
(1948). There six members with the largest interest in the international 
seaborne trade and six with the largest interest in providing international 
shipping services are represented in this Council, together with 4 members 
eleCted by the Assembly of the IMCO. Other international organizations 
such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the International Monetary Fund have a system of weighted voting, based 
on actual contributions. See art. V, sec. 3 of the Articles of Agreement 
of the IBRD, and art. XII, sec. 5, of the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF. Certain other organizations have all-elected executive bodies with 
one vote for each member, e.g., the United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-




See IAEAjCSjOR. 39, p. 61. The six states elected were Egypt, Indo-
nesia, Pakistan, Japan, Argentina, and Peru. Apart from these six elected 
members, the Preparatory Commission was composed of representatives of 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portu-
gal, Union of South Africa, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The Commission came into existence with the opening of' 
the statute for signature and continued till the first General Conference 
was convened and the first Board of Governors was selected. Statute, 
Annex I, par. A. The functions of this Commission were of a provisional 
nature. Apart from organizing itself and appointing its staff it was to 
make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference. This 
included the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of pro-
cedure. The Commission was to designate members of the first Board in 
accordance with art. VI, pars. A and B; to make studies, reports and 
recommendations on various important problems for the first meetings of 
the Board and the Conference; and, finally, to enter into negotiations with 
the United Nations for a draft agreement on the relationship of the Agency 
to the United Nations and to make recommendations to the first sessions 
of the Conference and of the Board in regard to the relationship to other 
international organizations. Annex I, par. C, subpars. 1-7. The Report of 
the Preparatory Commission included detailed recommendations for an 
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initial Agency program. (G. C. 1j1, GOV ji, Report of the Preparatory 




The specific question of the Agency's relation to the specialized agencies 
for which the statute provides in art. XVI, par. A is dealt with in a mem-
orandum by the executive heads of the specialized agencies presented to 
the International Conference (IAEA/CSj6, Sept. 24, 1956). In this mem-
orandum attention was called to par. 9 of the United Nations, Doc. A/3122 
(reproduced in IAEA/CS/5, Sept. 24, 1956), which calls for effective 
coordination between the activities of the Agency and those of the special-
ized agencies, with the aim of avoiding overlapping and duplication of 
activities. The annex to the memorandum contains comments by the Inter-
national Labor Organization ( ILO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO), which seem to indicate a tendency not to relinquish much of the 
jurisdiction of these bodies to the Agency. Thus it was the opinion of the 
ILO that the protection of the health and safety of the workers cannot be 
the responsibility of an agency dealing solely with atomic energy. ILO 
felt that the present position, whereby the draft statute fails to make any 
explicit provision for cooperation with the ILO, but specifically authorizes 
the Agency "to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of 
health and minimization of danger to life and property (including standards 
for labor conditions)," called for further consideration at the Conference. 
IAEA/CSj6/Annex. See also the statements of the representatives of 
various specialized agencies in the International Conference on October 4, 
I956. IAEA/CS/OR. I6, p. 3I et seq. 
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. I, the Agency is given responsibilities in 
connection with "research on, and development and practical application of, 
atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world .... " The Food 
and Agricultural Organization includes among its functions "to stimulate 
and coordinate the use of radiation and radioisotopes in agricultural re-
search and development, and to promote necessary investigations of the 
possible effects of radioactive materials on agriculture and food produc-
tion." FAO is organizing an information service on the applications of 
atomic energy in agriculture and related fields. United Nations, Economic 
and Social Council, Doc. E/293I, Annex II, October 18, 1956, p. 7· 
UNESCO authorized its Director General "to study and, if necessary, 
to propose measures of an international scope to facilitate the use of 
radioisotopes in research and industry." ld. at 9. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development states: 
"In carrying out its responsibilities, both to itself and to its members, in 
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respect of the foregoing the IBRD will, from time to time, undertake 
studies. of general and specific power needs, and the relationship of atomic 
fuels to conventional energy resources." I d. at 19. 
Under art. III, par. A, subpar. 3 the Agency is authorized "to foster the 
exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic 
energy." Under par. A, subpar. 4 of this article the Agency is authorized 
"to encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the 
fields of peaceful uses .of atomic energy." UNESCO's program of work 
includes an item entitled "Training of Specialists." UNESCO proposes to 
convene an international conference "to organize a far-reaching exchange 
of information on the methods at present in use in various countries for 
training engineers, technicians, laboratory research workers and, in general, 
all the different scientific specialists who are concerned with the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy." !d. at II. The conference will also recommend to 
UNESCO "action at the . international level to secure the most efficient 
cooperation possible among the various countries; in particular, problems 
relating to exchange of teachers and students will have to be considered." 
Id. at 12. 
Urider art. III, par. A, subpar. 6 the Agency is given certain functions 
in developing standards of sa'fety for protection of health and minimization 
of danger to life and property (including such standards for labor condi-
tions), and to provide fot the application of these standards to its own 
operations as well as to other operations coming under the jurisdiction of 
the Agency. The International Labor Organization states "the most imme-
diate problems of concern to ILO is the protection of workers against 
ionizing radiations." Id. at 3· It is also planned to issue codes of practice 
d~ling with the technical protective measures required in industrial and 
other undertakings. In addition, ILO will be able to provide advice and 
assistance. to governments and industry in the training of specialized safety 
personnel and inspectors. !d. at 5· The World Health Organization has 
adopted a provisional program of work which includes training of special-
ists for health protection in atomic energy laboratories or plants, public 
health administrators and medical users of radioisotopes. The WHO also 
includes in its program the entire subject of the "health problems involved 
in the control of the location of reactors and in radioactive waste disposal 
from factories, laboratories and hospitals." I d. at 16 (emphasis omitted) . 
. The World Meteorological Organization has an extensive program con-
cerning collection and analysis of atmospheric radioactivity and its relation 





The history of the Soviet attitude toward the safeguards provisions is 
of considerable interest. The first outline of an International Atomic 
Energy Agency (see Appendix A above) in art. III, par. B, subpar. 3 
included provisions for both health and safety standards and safeguards 
against diversion of fissionable materials. Mr. Molotov, in his reply of 
April 27, I954 (in Atoms for Peace Manual, note 5 supra, 2&} at 271) 
described very vividly the situation which makes safeguards a necessity in 
connection with any program for the peaceful uses of atomic ener!JY. He 
said: "[T]he level of science and technique which has been reached at the 
present time makes it possible for the very application of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes to be utilized for increasing the production of atomic 
weapons." Mr. Molotov's solution to that problem was the restatement of 
the Soviet line calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons without safe-
guards. In a memorandum handed to Ambassador Zarubin by Assistant 
Secretary of State Merchant on July 9, I954, (id., 274 at 276) the United 
States pointed out: "In reality,however, ways can be devised to safeguard 
against diversion of materials from power producing reactors. And there 
are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon grade ma-
terial arises." On Sept. 22, I954, the day before the opening of the General 
Assembly, Mr. Gromyko handed an Aide-M~oire to Ambassador Bohlen 
in Moscow ( id., 278 at 28I) stating: "The Soviet Government is ready 
to examine in course of further negotiations the United States Govern-
ment's views on this question (safeguards)." 
In the 716th Session of the 9th General Assembly's First Committee on 
Nov. IS, I954, Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized the necessity of control pro-
visions by referring to President Eisenhower's plan contained in his speech 
before the General Assembly of Dec. 8, I953: " ... [A]lthough the plan 
had contained no safeguards to ensure that atomic energy would be used 
only for peaceful purposes . . . that did not mean that the Soviet Union 
considered it a bad one." [Emphasis added.] A/C. I/SR. 716, p. 335 at 339· 
The note of the Soviet Union of Oct. I, 1955, to the American Embassy 
in Moscow called for an appropriate staff of inspectors to investigate atomic 
installations of the beneficiary states and to verify the use of materials and 
equipment received from the Agency, such observations and control to be 
accomplished "with due observation of sovereign rights of the above-men-
tioned states and within the framework of an agreement between a given 
state and the Agency." United States Dept. of State Press Release No. 527, 
Oct. 6, 1956, p. 23. See statement of the Soviet representative in the First 
Committee of the roth General Assembly, Oct. II, 1955, U. N. General 
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Assembly Off. Rec., roth Session (1955), First Committee, A/C. I/SR. 
759, p. 13 at 14. 
In its opening statement at the International Conference the Soviet Union 
representative, Mr. Zarubin, stated that " ... the conditions for control 
and inspection, which are contemplated in the agreements between the 
United States and other countries and in the draft statute, do, in our 
opinion, infringe upon the sovereign rights of the recipient countries, and 
do therefore give rise to justified criticism on their part." IAEA/CS/OR. 
3, p. 31. In the following discussion on Agency safeguards, Mr. Zarubin 
said: "The delegation of the Soviet Union had already declared that it 
considered that a sufficient safeguard would be to abide by the provision 
of the .. statute which makes recipient states assume their obligation not to 
use the assistance received for the production of nuclear weapons and to 
submit reports on the use to which the assistance given by the Agency has 
been put. The safeguards and controls which the draft statute provides 
would be significant only if these provisions found their place within the 
framework of a general prohibition of nuclear weapons and if these guar-
antees and safeguards extended to all States, both the States receiving the 
assistance of the Agency and those supplying it. The application of safe-
guards to recipient countries alone-that is, in the first place, to under-
developed countries-falls short of the mark and imposes upon the recip-
ient countries such conditions of control and inspection as violate their 
sovereignty and which would no doubt slow down the utilization of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes in these countries." IAEA/CS/OR. 36, 
pp. 6, 7· 
ITEM 8 
(Footnote 89) 
India made three reservations to art. XII of the twelve-power draft. 
Report of the Working Level Meetings, Annex IV, p. 3· First, the pro-
visions of the twelve-power draft and also of the final statute require the 
agreement between the Agency and states receiving fissionable materials 
from the Agency to provide for certain Agency rights and responsibilities 
"to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement." The Indians would 
have added to this that the safeguards should be required only as specifically 
provided for in individual agreements between the Agency and the members 
thereof, thus permitting agreements with less safeguards than those pre-
scribed in the statute. While there was considerable discussion on this 
subject India never submitted a specific amendment to the International 
Conference. 
The second reservation concerned art. XII, par. A, subpar. 3 requiring 
the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring 
accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced 
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in the project or arrangement. The Indians would have amended the article 
to restrict accountability to fissionable materials supplied. This would have 
eliminated from accountability all of the source materials as well as plu-
tonium or U-233, produced as by-products of the operation of the reactor. 
IAEAJCSJOR. 7, p. 48 et seq. France joined India in advocating the 
removal of source materials from accountability. IAEA/CS/OR. 24, p. 46 
et seq. The third reservation (both the second and the third reservations 
are contained in amendment IAEA/CS/ Art. XII/ Amend. 5 sponsored by 
Ceylon, Egypt, India, and Indonesia) related to art. XII, par. A, subpar. 5, 
dealing with the chemical processing of fissionable materials and the dispo-
sition of plutonium and U-233 produced as a result of the reactor opera-
tions. The statute provided for complete Agency control over both the 
chemical processing of fuel elements and of the disposition of the fission-
able materials produced in the reactor. This is one of the crucial points in 
reactor operations where. diversion to war uses can most readily take place. 
India called for considerably less stringent control in connection with the 
by-product materials that would be produced from a reactor. Under this 
suggestion, states would be able to stockpile the plutonium and U-233 
produced in reactors for use within the state for peaceful purposes and 
under Agency safeguards. Under present technology there are few peaceful 
uses for plutonium and for U-233. The result of the Indian suggestions 
would be that substantial stockpiles of materials unusable for peacetime 
purposes would accumulate in many parts of the world. The United States 
regarded this as a serious potential threat to the peace. India insisted that 
under the original wording of the statute, the Agency would be in a position 
to dictate in perpetuity what fissionable materials would be allotted to all 
states; it was entirely possible that the Board of Governors of the Agency 
on the basis of political or economic considerations unrelated to interna-
tional safety would prevent states from acquiring the fissionable materials 
necessary for development of their economic welfare. IAEAjCSjOR. 28, 
p. 55 et seq. 
ITEM 9 
(Footnote I 52) 
Art. XIV in pars. B and E in effect reduces to a minimum the occasions 
when the Agency would be justified in utilizing its borrowing powers under 
art. XIV, par. G. Theoretically, all of the expenditures coming under the 
administrative budget (par. B, subpar. I) will be apportioned among the 
members pursuant to par. D of art. XIV. All other expenditures will be 
met through a combination of revenue from a scale of charges (art. XIV, 
par. E) and voluntary contributions (donations). The Board of Governors 
is required to fix a scale of charges at least adequate (together with dona-
tions) to cover the operational expenditures described in par. B, subpar. 2. 
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Indeed, it is contemplated that there might be an excess of revenue which 
would go into the general fund (see par. F of art. XIV) and thus be 
available, for example, to meet a part of the cost of the safeguards system. 
On the other hand, the administrative expenses are likely to exceed the 
amounts that could be raised through apportionment among the members, 
especially if the administrative budget includes substantial sums for items 
such as the construction of safeguards facilities and storage costs for the 
"syphoned off" fissionable material not used for Agency projects. Statute, 
art. XIV, par. B, subpar. I(b), last clause. Could the words "the costs of 
handling and storage of special fissionable material" in that clause be 
interpreted to include also the costs of building storage facilities for this 
material? Similarly, Agency facilities to be included in the operational 
budget under par. B, subpar. 2 may prove too expensive to be charged to 
the beneficiary members in accordance with art. XIV, par. E. It is these 
deficits which might be covered through borrowing. It seems probable that 
Agency borrowing would be directed primarily to that objective. Repay-
ment of loans would come from the General Fund of the Agency resulting 
from an excess of revenues arising from the scale of charges and from 
donations. If loans are used for administrative expenses they could pre-
sumably be repaid by apportionment among members. Presumably, loans 
to construct facilities would be repaid over a period of years bearing some 
relationship to the life of the facilities. 
The financing provisions were the subject of a lively discussion in the 
International Conference. The main point raised was the question as to 
who should be burdened with the financing of Agency facilities. See 
Mr. Zarubin (U. S. S. R.), IAEA/CS/OR. 3I, p. 11; Mr. Wershof 
(Canada), id. at I6; Mr. Wadsworth (United States), id. at 26, and other 
statements in IAEA/CS/OR. 3I and 32. 
ITEM 10 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC 
ENERGY AGENCY 
ARTICLE I 
Establishment of the Agency 
The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") upon the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth. 
ARTICLE II 
Objectives 
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of 
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It 
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shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its 
request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to 
further any military purpose. 
ARTICLE III 
Functions 
A. The Agency is authorized : 
I. To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical 
application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, 
if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing 
the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or 
facilities by one member of the Agency for another; and to perform any 
operation or service useful in research on, or development or practical 
application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes; 
2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, 
services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and 
development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful pur-
poses, including the production of electric power, with due. consideration 
for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world; 
3· To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on 
peaceful uses of atomic energy; 
4· To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in 
the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy; 
5· To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special 
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and informa-
tion made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision 
or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; 
and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement, or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's 
activities in the field of atomic energy ; 
6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in col-
laboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the 
specialized agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health 
and minimization of danger to life and property (including such standards 
for labour conditions), and to provide for the application of these stand-
ards to its own operations as well as to the operations making use of ma:-
terials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by 
the Agency or at its request or under its control or supervision ; and to 
provide for the application of these standards, at the request of the parties, 
to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or, at the 
request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic 
energy; 
7· To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment useful in 
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carrying out its authorized functions, whenever the facilities, plant, and 
equipment otherwise available to it in the area concerned are inadequate or 
available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory. · 
B. In carrying out its function, the Agency shall: 
1. Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations to promote peace and international cooperation, and 
in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establish-
ment of safe-guarded world-wide disarmament and in conformity with 
any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies ; 
2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received 
by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are used only for 
peaceful purposes ; 
3· Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient utilization 
and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the world, bearing 
in mind the special needs of the under-developed areas of the world; 
4· Submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in 
connexion with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions 
that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall 
notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take 
the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in 
paragraph C of article XII ; 
5· Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other organs 
of the United Nations on matters within the competence of these organs. 
C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to 
members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions 
incompatible with the provisions of this Statute. 
D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agree-
ments concluded between a State or a group of States and the Agency 
which shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, the activities 
of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign 
rights of States. 
ARTICLE IV 
Membership 
A. The initial members of the Agency shall be those States Members 
of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which shall 
have signed this Statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature 
and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification. 
B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States whether or not 
Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, which 
deposit an instrument of acceptance of this Statute after their membership 
APPENDIX A 1473 
has been approved by the General Conference upon the recommendation of 
the Board of Governors. In recommending and approving a State for 
membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall 
determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of 
membership in the Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and will-
ingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its members, and all members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obli-
gations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute. 
ARTICLE v 
General Conference 
A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all members 
shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall 
be convened by the Director General at the request of the Board of Gov-
ernors or of a majority of members. The sessions shall take place at the 
headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise determined by the General 
Conference. 
B. At such sessions, each member shall be represented by one delegate 
who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The cost of attend-
ance of any delegation shall be borne by the member concerned. 
C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other officers 
as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office 
for the duration of the session. The General Conference, subject to the 
provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each 
member shall have one vote. Decisions pursuant to paragraph H of article 
XIV, paragraph C of article XVIII and paragraph B of article XIX shall 
be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. 
Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional 
questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, 
shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. A majority 
of members shall constitute a quorum. 
D. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any matters 
within the scope of this Statute or relating to the powers and functions of 
any organs provided for in this Statute, and may make recommendations to 
the membership of the Agency or to the Board of Governors or to both on 
any such questions or matters. 
E. The General Conference shall: 
1. Elect members of the Board of Governors in accordance with article 
VI; 
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2. Approve States for membership in accordance with article. IV; 
3· Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of membership in 
accordance with article XIX ; · 
4· Consider the annual report of the Board ; 
S· In accordance with article XIV, approve the budget of the Agency 
recommended by the Board or return it with recommendations as to its 
entirety or parts to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference; 
6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required 
by the relationship agreement between the Agency and the United Nations, 
except reports referred to in paragraph C of article XII, or return them 
to the Board with its recommendations ; 
7· Approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency and the 
United Nations and other organizations as provided in article XVI or 
return such agreements with its recommendations to the Board, for resub-
mission to the General Conference; 
8. Approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of borrowing 
powers by the Board, in accordance with paragraph G of article XIV ; 
approve rules regarding the acceptance of voluntary contributions to the 
Agency; and approve, in accordance with paragraph F of article XIV, the 
manner in which the general fund referred to in that paragraph may be 
used; 
9· Approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with paragraph C 
of article XVIII ; 
IO. Approve the appointment of the Director General in accordance with 
paragraph A of Article VII. 
F. The General Conference shall have the authority: 
1. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the General 
Conference for this purpose by the Board; 
2. To propose matters for consideration by the Board and request from 
the· Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency. 
ARTICLE VI 
Board of Governors 
A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows: 
I. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first Board, 
the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for 
membership on the Board the five members most advanced in the technology 
of atomic energy including the production of source materials and the 
member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the 
production of source materials in each of the following areas not repre-
sented by the aforesaid five: 
(I) North America 
( 2) Latin America 
(3) Western Europe 
(4) Eastern Europe 
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(S) Africa and the Middle East 
( 6) South Asia 
· ( 7) South East Asia ~nd the Pacific. 
(8) Far East. 
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2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first Board, 
the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for 
membership on the Board two members from among the .following other 
producers of source materials: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Portugal ; and shall also designate for membership on the Board one other 
member as a supplier of technical assistance. No member in .this category 
in any one year will be eligible for redesignation in the same category for 
the following year. 
3· The General Conference shall elect ten members to membership on 
the Board of Governors, with due regard to equitable representatioQ on 
the Board as a whole of the members in the areas listed in sub-paragraph 
A-I of this article, so that the Board shall at all times include in this 
category a representative of each of those areas except North America. 
Except for the five members chosen for a term of one year in accordance 
with paragraph D of this article, no member in this category ·in any one 
term of office will be eligible for re-election in the same category for. the 
following term of office. · 
B. The designations provided for in subparagraphs A-I and A-2 of this 
article shall take place not less than sixty days before each regular annual_ 
session of the General Conference. The elections provided for in sub-
paragraph A-3 of this article shall take. place at regular annual sessions of 
the General Conference. 
C. Members represented on the Board of ~overnors in accordance with 
sub-paragraphs A-I and A-2 of this article shall hold office from the end 
of the next regular annual session of the General Conference after their 
designation until the end of the following regular annual session of the 
General Conference. 
· D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance with 
sub-paragraph A-3 of this article shall hold office .from the end· of the 
regular annual session of the General Conference at which they are elected 
until the end of the second regular annual session of the General Confer-
ence thereafter. In the election of these members for the first Boru:d, how-
ever, five shall be chosen for a term of one year. 
E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote. De-
cisions on the amount of the Agency's budget shall be made by a two-thirds 
majority of those present and voting, as provided in paragraph H of article 
XIV. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of addi-
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tiona! questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds 
majority, shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. Two-
thirds of all members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. 
F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out the func-
tions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its responsi-
bilities to the General Conference as provided in this Statute. 
G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may determine. 
The meetings shall take place at the headquarters of the Agency unless 
otherwise determined by the Board. 
H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other officers 
from among its members and, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall 
adopt its own rules of procedure. 
I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees as it deems 
advisable. The Board may appoint persons to represent it in its relations 
with other organizations. 
J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to the Gen-
eral Conference concerning the affairs of the Agency and any projects 
approved by the Agency. The· Board shall also prepare for submission to 
the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or may be required 
to make to the United Nations or to any other organization the work of 
which is related to that of the Agency. These reports, along with the annual 
reports, shall be submitted to members of the Agency at least one month 
before the regular annual session of the General Conference. 
ARTICLE VII 
Staff 
A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director General. The 
Director General shall be appointed by the Board of Governors with the 
approval of the General Conference for a term of four years. He shall be 
the chief administrative officer of the Agency. 
B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment, organ-
ization, and functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority of and 
subject to the control of the Board of Governors. He shall perform his 
duties in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board. 
C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and technical and other 
personnel as may be required to fulfil the objectives and functions of the 
Agency. The Agency shall be guided by the principle that its permanent 
staff shall be kept to a minimum. 
D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment of 
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be to 
secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical compe-
tence, and integrity Suhject to this consideration, due regard shall be paid 
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to the contributions of members to the Agency and to the importance of 
recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. 
E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be appointed, 
remunerated, and dismissed shall be in accordance with regulations made 
by· the Board of Governors, subject to the provisions of this Statute and 
to general rules approved by the General Conference on the recommenda-
tion of the Board. 
F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the staff 
shall not seek or receive instructions from any source external to the 
Agency. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their 
position as officials of the Agency; subject to their responsibilities to the 
Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential 
information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for 
the Agency. Each member .undertakes to respect the international character 
of the responsibilities of the Director General and the staff and shall not 
seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties. 
G. In this article the term "staff" includes guards. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Exchange of information 
A. Each member should make available such information as would, in 
the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency. 
B. Each member shall make available to the Agency all scientific infor-
mation developed as a result of assistance extended by the Agency pursuant 
to article XI. 
C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible form 
the information made available to it under paragraphs A and B of this 
article. It shall take positive steps to encourage the exchange among its 
members of infom:tation relating to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic 
energy and shall serve as an intermediary among its members for this 
purpose. 
ARTICLE IX 
Supplying of materials 
A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of special 
fissionable materials as they deem advisable and on such terms as shall be 
agreed with the Agency. The materials made available to the Agency may, 
at the discretion of the member making them available, be stored either by 
the member concerned or, with the agreement of the Agency, in the 
Agency's depots. 
B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials 
as defined in article XX and other materials. The Board of Governors 
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shall determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will 
accept under agreements provided for in article XIII. 
C. Each member shall notify the Agency of· the quantities, form, and 
composition of speCial fissionable materials, source materials, and other 
materials which that member is prepared, in conformity with its laws, to 
make available immediately or during a period specified by the Board of 
Governors. 
D. On· request o£ the Agency a member shall, from the materials which 
it has made available, without delay deliver to another member or group 
of members such quantities of such materials as the Agency may specify, 
and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such quantities of such 
materials as are really necessary £or operations and scientific research in 
the facilities· of the Agency. 
E. The quantities, forin and composition of materials made available by 
any member may be changed at any time by the member with the approval 
of the Board of Governors: · 
F. An initial notification iri accordance with paragraph C of this article 
shall be made within three months of the entry into force of this Statute 
with respect to the member concerned. In the absence of a contrary decision 
of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made available shall be 
for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when this Statute 
takes effect with respect to the member concerned. Subsequent notifications 
shall likewise, in the absence of a contrary action by the Board, relate to 
the period of the calendar year following the notification and shall be made 
no later than the first day of November of each year. 
G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and, 
where appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has 
requested a member to deliver from the amounts which that member has 
notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The Agency shall also 
verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those quantities 
periodically to the members. 
H. The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials 
in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be 
safeguarded against (I) hazards of the weather, ( 2) unauthorized re-
moval or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including sabotage, and 
( 4) forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its pos-
session, the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these 
materials in such a way as not to allow concentration of large amounts of 
such materials in any one country or region of the world. 
I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such of 
the following as may be necessary: 
I. Plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of 
materials; 
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2. Physical safeguards; 
3· Adequate health and safety measures; 
4· Control laboratories for the analysis and verification of materials 
received; 
5. Housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for the 
foregoing. 
J. The materials made available pursuant to this article shall be used 
as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance with the provisions 
of this Statute. No member shall have the right to require that the ma-
terials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency 
or to designate the specific project in which they must be used. 
ARTICLE X 
Services, equipment, and facilities 
Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and 




A. Any member or group of members of the Agency desiring to set up 
any project for research on, or development or practical application of, 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes may request the assistance of the 
Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services, equip-
ment, and facilities necessary for this purpose. Any such request shall be 
accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the project 
and shall be considered by the Board of Governors. 
B. Upon request, the Agency may also assist any member or group of 
members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from outside 
sources to carry out such projects. In extending this assistance, the Agency 
will not be required to provide any guarantees or to assume any financial 
responsibility for the project. 
C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials, services, 
equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or more members 
or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these directly, taking into 
consideration the wishes of the member or members making the request. 
D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send 
into the territory of the member or group of members making the request 
a person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this purpose the 
Agency may, with the approval of the member or group of members mak-
ing the request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably qualified 
nationals of any member. 
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E. Before approving a project under this article, the Board of Governors 
shall give due consideration to : 
1. The usefulness of the project, including its scientific and technical 
feasibility; 
2. The adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure the 
effective execution of the project; 
3· The adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for handling 
and storing materials and for operating facilities ; 
4· The inability of the member or group of members making the re-
quest to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities, equipment, and 
services; 
5· The equitable distribution of materials and other resources available 
to the Agency ; 
6. The special needs of the under-developed areas of the world ; and 
7· Such other matters as may be relevant. 
F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement 
with the member or group of members submitting the project, which agree-
ment shall: · · 
1. Provide for allocation to the project of any required special fissionable 
or other materials; 
2. Provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their then 
place of custody, whether the materials be in the custody of the Agency 
or of the member making them available for use in Agency projects, to the 
member or ·group of members submitting the project, under conditions 
which ensure the safety of any shipment required and meet applicable 
health and safety standards; 
3· Set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which any 
materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by the 
Agency itself, and, if any such materials, services, equipment, and facilities 
are· to be provided by a member, the terms and conditions as arranged for 
by the member or group of members submitting the project and the sup-
plying member; 
4· Include undertakings by the member or group of members submitting 
the project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a 
way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be 
subject to the safeguards provided for in article XII, the relevant safe-
guards being specified in the agreement; 
5· Make appropriate provision regarding the rights and interests of the 
Agency and the member or members concerned in any inventions or dis-
coveries or any patents therein, arising from the .project; 
6. Make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes ; 
7· Include such other provisions as may be appropriate. 
G. The provisions of this article shall also apply where appropriate to a 
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request for materials, services, facilities, or equipment in connection with 
an existing project. · 
ARTICLE XII 
.4gency safeguards 
A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the 
Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the 
Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the exterit 
relevant to the project or arrangement: 
i. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, includ-
ing nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring 
that it will not further any military purpose, that it complies with applicable 
health and safety standards, and that it will permit effective application of 
the safeguards provided for in this article; 
. 2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures pre-
scn"bed by the Agency ; 
3· To require the maintenance and production of operating records to 
assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials 
used or produced in the project or arrangement; 
4· To call for and receive progress reports; 
S· To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of 
irradiated materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will· not 
lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes and will comply 
with applicable health and safety standards; to require that special fission-
able materials recovered or produced as a by-product be used for peaceful 
purposes under continuing Agency safeguards for research or in reactors, 
existing or under construction, specified by the member or members con-
cerned; and to require deposit with the Agency of any excess of any special 
fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is 
needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these 
materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or mem-
bers concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency 
shall be returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use 
under the same provisions as stated above; 
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, 
designated by the Agency after consultation with the State or States con-
cerned, who shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any 
person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, 
or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded, as neces-
sary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied and 
fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the 
undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to 
in sub-paragraph F -4 of article XI, with the health and safety measures 
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referred to in subparagraph A-2 of this article., and with any other condi-
tions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or 
States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be accom-
panied by representatives of the authorities of the State concerned, if that 
State so requests, provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed 
or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions; 
7· In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or 
States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to sus-
pend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment 
made available by the Agency or a member in furtherance of the project. 
B. The Agency shall,. as necessary, establish a staf(of inspectors, The 
staff of inspectors shall haye,the responsibility of examining all operations 
conducted by the Agency itself to determine whether the Agency is com-
plying with the health and safety measures prescribed by it for application 
to projects subject to its approval, supervision or control, and whether the 
Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent the source. and special 
fissionable materials if} its c~stody or used or produced in its own operations 
from being useq in· furthera,nce of any military purpose. The Agency shall 
take remedial action forthwith to· correct any non-compliance or failure to 
take adequate measures. · · · · 
C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining 
and verifying the· ~ccoun~ng referred to in sub-paragraph A-6 of this 
article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking 
referred to in sub-paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred 
to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other conditions of the 
project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or 
States concerned. The inspectors shall report; any non-compliance to the 
Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of 
Governors. The Board shall . call upon the recipient . State or States to 
remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The 
Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to· the Security 
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of 
failure of the recipient· State or States to take fully corrective action within 
a reasonable time, the 'Board may take one or both of th~ following meas-
ures : direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the 
Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment 
made available to the recipient member or group of members. The Agency 
may also, in accordance with article XIX, suspend any non-complying 
member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Reimbursement of members 
Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the 
member furnishing to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or facili-
APPENDIX A 1483 
ties, the Board shall enter into an agreement with such member providing 
for reimbursement for the items furnished. 
ARTICLE XIV 
Finance 
A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference the 
annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate the 
work of the Board in this regard, the Director General shall initially 
prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference does not approve 
the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to the 
Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General Con-
ference for its approval. 
B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the following 
categories: 
I. Administrative expenses: these shall include: 
(a) Costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff employed in 
connection with materials, services, equipment, and facilities referred to in 
sub-paragraph B-2 below; costs of meetings; and expenditures required for 
the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of information; 
(b) Costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in article XII in 
relation to Agency projects or, under sub-paragraph A-5 of article III, in 
relation to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together with the costs 
of handling and storage of special fissionable material by the Agency other 
than the storage and handling charges referred to in paragraph E below; 
2. Expenses, other than those included in sub-paragraph I of this para-
graph, in connexion with any materials, facilities, plant, and equipment 
acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out its authorized func-
tions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and facilities provided 
by it under agreements with one or more members. 
C. In fixing the expenditures under sub-paragraph B- I (b) above, the 
Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as are recoverable under 
agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency 
and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements. 
D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to in 
sub-paragraph B-1 above, among members in accordance with a scale to be 
fixed by the General Conference. In fixing the scale the General Confer-
ence shall be guided by the principles adopted by the United Nations in 
assessing contribution! of Member States to the regular budget of the 
United Nations. 
-E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of charges, 
including reasonable uniform storage and handling charges, for materials, 
services, equipment, and facilities furnished to members by the Agency. 
The scale shall be desigried to produce revenues for the Agency adequate 
to meet the expenses and costs referred to in sub-paragraph B-2 above, less 
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any voluntary contributions which the Board of Governors may, in accord-
ance with paragraph F, apply for this purpose. The proceeds of such 
charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall be used to pay mem-
bers for any materials, services, equipment, or facilities furnished by them 
and to meet other expenses referred to in sub-paragraph B-2 above which 
may be incurred by the Agency itself. 
F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the expenses 
and costs there referred to, and any voluntary contributions to the Agency, 
shall be placed in a general fund which may be used as the Board of Gov-
ernors, with the approval of the General Conference, may determine. 
G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General Conference, 
the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exercise borrowing 
powers on behalf of the Agency without, however, imposing on members 
of the Agency any liability in respect of loans entered into pursuant to this 
authority, and to accept voluntary contributions made to the Agency. 
H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of 
the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency's budget shall require 
a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. 
ARTICLE XV 
Privileges and immunities 
A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal 
capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exer-
cise of its functions. 
B. Delegates of members together with their alternates and advisers, 
Governors appointed to the Board together with their alternates and ad-
visers, and the Director General and the staff of the Agency, shall enjoy 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise 
of their functions in connexion with the Agency. 
C. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this 
article shall be defined in a separate agreement or agreements between the 
Agency, represented for this purpose by the Director General acting under 
instructions of the Board of Governors, and the members. . 
ARTICLE XVI 
Relationship 'With other organizations 
A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Confer-
ence, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing 
an appropriate relationship between the Agency and the United Nations 
and any other organizations the work of which is related to that of the 
Agency. 
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B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the 
Agency and the United Nations shall provide for: 
1. Submission by the Agency of reports as provided for in sub-
paragraphs B-4 and B-s of article III; 
2. Consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it adopted by 
the General Assembly or any of the Councils of the United Nations and 
the submission of reports, when requested, to the appropriate organ of the 
United Nations on the action taken by the Agency or by its members in 
accordance with this Statute as a result of such consideration. 
ARTICLE XVII 
Settlement of disputes 
A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court, 
unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement. 
B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are separately 
empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an 
advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the 
Agency's activities. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
Amendments and withdrawals 
A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any member. Certi-
fied copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be prepared by 
the Director General and communicated by him to all members at least 
ninety days in advance of its consideration by the General Conference. 
B. At the fifth annual session of the General Conference following the 
coming into force of this Statute, the question of a general review of the 
provisions of this Statute shall be placed on the agenda of that session. 
On approval by a majority of the members present and voting, the review 
will take place at the following General Conference. Thereafter, proposals 
on the question of a general review of this Statute may be submitted for 
decision by the General Conference under the same procedure. 
C. Amendments shall come into force for all members when: 
(i) Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of 
those present and voting after consideration of observations submitted by 
the Board of Governors on each proposed amendment, and 
( ii) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members in accordance with their 
respective constitutional· processes. Acceptance by a member shall be 
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effected by the deposit 'of an instrument of acceptance with the depositary 
Government referred to in paragraph C of article XXI. 
D. At any time after five years from the date. when this Statute shall 
take effect in accordance with paragraph E of article XXI or whenever a 
member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may with-
draw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the 
depositary Government referred to in paragraph C of article XXI, which 
shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all members. 
E. Withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect its con-
tractual obligations entered into pursuant to article XI or its budgetary 
obligations for the year in which it withdraws. 
ARTICLE XIX 
Suspension of privileges 
A. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its 
financial contributions to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if 
the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions 
due from it for the preceding two years. The General Conference may, 
nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure 
to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member. 
B. A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this 
Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute may 
be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership 
by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the members 
present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors. 
A~ used in this Statute : 
ARTICLE XX 
Definitions 
1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; ura-
nium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material con-
taining one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material 
as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term 
"special fissionable material" does not include source material. 
2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means 
uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that 
the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is 
greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in 
nature. 
3· The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture 
of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235·; 
thoriuni; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, atloy, chemical com-
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pound, or concentrate ;· any other material containing one or more of the 
foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time 
to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall 
from time to time determine. 
ARTICLE XXI 
Signature, acceptance, and entry into force 
A. This Statute shall be open for signature on 26 October 1956 by all 
.States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized 
agencies and shall remain open for signature by those States for a period 
of ninety days .. 
B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute by deposit 
of an instrument of ratification .. 
C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of 
ac~;;eptance by States whose membership has been approved under para-
graph B of article IV of this Statute shall be deposited with the Govern-
ment of the United States of America, hereby designated as depositary 
Government. 
D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected by States 
in accordance with their respective constitutional process. 
E. This Statute, apart from the Annex, shall come into force when 
eighteen States· have deposited instruments of ·ratification in accordance 
with paragraph B of this article, provided that such· eighteen States shall 
include at least three of the following States: Canada, France, The Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Instruments of rati-
fication and instruments of acceptance deposited thereafter shall take effect 
on the date of their receipt. 
F. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all States signa-
tory to this Statute of the date of each deposit of ratification and the date 
of entry into force of the Statute. The depositary Government shall 
promptly inform all signatories and members of the dates on which States 
subsequently become parties thereto. 
G. The Annex to this Statute shall come into force on the first day this 
Statute is open for signature. 
ARTICLE XXII 
Registratio~ with the United Nations 
A. This Statute shall be registered by .the depositary Government pur-
suant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
B. Agreements between the Agency and any member or members, agree-
ments between the Agency and any other organization or organizations, and 
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agreements between members subject to approval of the Agency, shall be 
registered with the Agency. Such agreements shall be registered by the 
Agency with the United Nations if registration· is required under Article 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
Authentic texts and certified copies 
This Statute, done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives 
of the depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Statute shall 
be transmitted by the depositary Government to the Governments of the 
other signatory States and to the Governments of States admitted to 
membership under paragraph B of article IV. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 
Statute. 
DoNE at the Headquarters of the United Nations, this twenty-sixth day 
of October, one thousand nine, hundred and fifty-six. 
ANNEX I 
Preparatory Com mission 
A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first day 
this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one representa-
tive each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, 
India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United 
States of America, and one representative each of six other States to be 
chosen by the International Conference on the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in 
existence until this Statute comes into force and thereafter until the General 
Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in 
accordance with article VI. 
B. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan 
provided by the United Nations and for this purpose the Preparatory 
Commision shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate 
authorities of the United Nations, including arrangements for repayment 
of the loan by the Agency. Should these funds be insufficient, the Prepara-
tory Commission may accept advances from Governments. Such advances 
may be set off against the contributions of the Governments concerned to 
the Agency. 
C. The Preparatory Commission shall : 
I. Elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often 
as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish such com-
mittees as it deems necessary ; 
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2. Appoint an executive secretary and staff as shall be necessary, who 
shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Commission 
may determine ; 
3· Make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference, 
inCluding the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of pro-
cedure, such session to be held as soon as possible after the entry into force 
of this Statute; 
4· Make designations for membership on the first Board of Governors 
in accordance with sub-paragraphs A-1 and A-2 and paragraph B of 
article VI; 
S· Make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first session of 
the General Conference and for the first meeting of the Board of Gov-
ernors on subjects of concern to the Agency requiring immediate attention, 
including (a) the financing of the Agency; (b) the programmes and 
budget for the first year of the Agency; (c) technical problems relevant to 
advance planning of Agency operations ; (d) the ~stablishment of a per-
manent Agency staff; and (e) the location of the permanent headquarters 
of the Agency; 
6. Make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board of Gover-
nors concerning the provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the 
status of the Agency and the rights and obligations which will exist in the 
relationship between the Agency and the host Government ; 
7· (a) Enter into negotiations with the United Nations with a view to 
the preparation of a draft agreement in accordance with article XVI of 
this Statute, such draft agreement to be submitted to the first session of 
the General Conference and to the first meetings of the Board of Gover-
nors; and (b) make recommendations to the first session of the General 
Conference and to the first meeting of the Board of Governors concerning 
the relationship of the Agency to other international organizations as con-
templated in article XVI of this Statute. 
Appendix B 
ITEM 1 * 
AGREEMENT ON THE EsTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT NucLEAR 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
ARTICLE I 
To insure joint theoretical and experimental research into nuclear physics 
by scientists of the states signatories of the present agreement, an inter-
national scientific. research orgcLnization known as the Joint Institute. of 
Nuclear Research is· hereby established. 
ARTICLE 2 
The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall conduct all its activities 
in accordance with a charter, ihe draft of which shall be prepared by the 
Institute's management and approved by the governments· of the states 
members of .the Institute. The Join,t In~titute of Nuclear Research shall 
ha~e the. rights of a juridical person. It may cooperate in its work with 
appropriate institutes and l~boratories in the territories of the states mem-
bers of the Institute. _The Institute ~hall .be located in Kalinin region, the 
USSR. . 
ARTiCLE 3 
The membership of the Jo~nt Institute of Nuclear Research consists of 
the signatory states _of the present agreement. Other states, wishing to take 
part in the work of the Joint Institute of ;Nuclear Research, shall declare 
their concurrence with. the provisions of the present agreement and shall 
become members of the Institute by dt;cision, ofthe majority of the states 
members of the Institute. . 
ARTICLE 4 
The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall comprise the following 
research organizations : 
I-A laboratory of nuclear problems with a synchrocyclotron with proton 
energy of 68o megelectron volts (former Nuclear Problems Institute of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences). 
2-A high energy physics laboratory with a proton synchrotron of a 
planned proton energy of IO,OOO megelectron volts (former Electrophysics 
Laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences). 
The aforementioned Nuclear Problems Institute and the Electrophysics 
* The basic English text of this Agreement was published in a TASS press release 
dated July I I, I956. 
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Laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences shall be delivered by the 
Government of the USSR to the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research with 
all equipment, principal, auxiliary and administrative installations and 
buildings, on the date the present agreement comes into force. 
With a view to the further development of nuclear research the follow-
ing installation shall be built at the Joint Institute: 
I-A laboratory of theoretical physics with a calculating department and 
electronic computing machinery; 
2-A laboratory of neutron physics with an experimental nuclear reactor 
with a high density of the neutron current; 
3-A cyclotron for accelerating multicharged ions of various elements 
and for experiments with them as part of the nuclear problems laboratory; 
4-0ther experimental installations and laboratories. 
ARTICLE 5 
The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall be managed by a director 
and two deputies, elected by the majority of states members of the Institute 
from among scientists of these states. The director shall be elected for a 
term of three years, and deputy directors for two-year terms. The Institute 
director and his two deputies shall be elected in due manner by the pleni-
potentiaries of the states members of the Institute. 
The Institute's director is a plenipotentiary person effecting relations with 
appropriate institutions in the states members of the Institute on all ques-
tions bearing on the latter's work. The management of the Joint Institute 
of Nuclear Research is responsible to the governments of the states mem-
bers of the Institute for the Institute's work and shall report regularly to 
them. 
A scientific council shall be established at· the Institute to discuss and 
approve research plans, the results of their fulfillment, and othei: questions 
bearing on the Institute's scientific activities. The members of the scien-
tific council shall be appointed by the states members of the Institute from 
among their scientists, each state appointing ·three persons. The director 
of the Joint Institute shall appoint a deputy in charge of construction and 
the business affairs of the Institute. 
ARTICLE 6 
Each state member of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research shall make 
annual contributions for the maintenance of the Institute and the building 
of new research facilities, and shall participate in the material maintenance 
of the Institute. 
The shares of the founder states in expenditures on the building and 
maintenance of the Institute are determined by the following scale: 
Albania-o.os percent; Bulgaria-3.6 percent; Hungary-4 percent; Ger-
1492 INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 
man Democratic Republic 6.75 percent; Poland-6.75 percent; Rumania-
5-75 percent; USSR-47.25 percent; Czechoslovakia-5.75 percent. 
In the case of new members joining the Institute or the withdrawal of 
any state from the Institute, the shares of the states in the expenditures 
on the building and maintenance of the Institute are subject to revision, 
and the new scale shall be submitted for the approval of the governments 
of the states members of the Institute. The share of the states members 
of the Institute shall have no bearing on the degree of participation of a 
member state in the Institute's scientific work and administration. 
ARTICLE 7 
A financial committee composed of representatives of all states members 
of the Institute shall be formed to prepare the budget and control the 
Institute's financial affairs. Each member state shall have one representa-
-tive on the financial committee. The committee members shall be appointed 
by the governments of the states concerned. The chairmanship of the 
financial committee meetings shall rotate among the representatives of 
every state. 
ARTICLE 8 
Any state member of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research has the 
right to withdraw from the Institute. Written notification of the with-
drawal from the Institute shall be sent by the plenipotentiary of the gov-
ernment of the member state desiring to leave the Institute to the Institute's 
director not later than three months before the end of the current year.1 
ARTICLE 9 
The Joint Institute of Nuclear Research may be liquidated by agreement 
among the governments of all the states members of the Institute. In case 
of liquidation, all equipment, principal, auxiliary and administrative instal-
lations shall become the property of the USSR on whose territory the 
Institute is located. The other member states shall be compensated in 
accordance with their share in the capital expenditures of the Institute. 
In case of the Institute's liquidation, the cash resources, with the excep-
tion of the part to be used to meet the Institute's obligations, shall be 
divided among the states members of the Institute at the time of the 
Insitute's disbandment proportionally to the actual cash contributions made 
by these states during their membership in the Institute. 
ARTICLE 10 
This agreement shall become effective on the date of its signature by 
all member states. For each country joining the Institute thereafter the 
t The eighth article of the Institute's Charter states that "resignation from the In-
stitute shall become official upon termination of that fiscal year in which the state 
declared its withdrawal from the Institute." 
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agreement shall become effective on the date of its admission to membership 
according to the procedure provided for in Article 3· 
The present agreement was signed in Moscow on March 26, I956. It 
was done in one copy, in Russian. Certified copies of the agreement shall 
be communicated by the Government of the USSR to all other signatories. 
ITEM 2* 
CHARTER OF THE }OINT NucLEAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
SECTION I 
Creation and Location of the Institute 
ARTICLE I 
The Joint Nuclear Research Institute, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Institute," shall be an international scientific-research organization, created 
by the Agreement for the organization of such an institute which was con-
cluded among the following governments on the 26th of March, I956: 
The People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 
the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the 
Chinese People's Republic, the Korean Popular-Democratic Republic, the 
Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian 
People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czecho-
slovakian Republic. 
ARTICLE 2 
The Institute shall be located in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
in the town of Dubna, Moscow district. 
Mailing address: P.O. Box 79, Central Post Office, Moscow 
ARTICLE 3 
The Institute shall be a legal entity and, according to the laws of the 
country wherein it is situated, shall possess the capacity and status neces-
sary to achieve its aims and functions. 
The Institute shall have the right of free access to foreign publications. 
The Institute shall have its own seal, an impression of which is affixed to 
this Charter. 
• The Russian text of this Charter is to be found in 2 Atomnaya Energiya, No. 1, 
76-82 (Russia 1957). An English text may be found in the English translation of 
this periodical (published by Consultant's Bureau, New York). 
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SECTION II 
Aims and Functions of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
ARTICLE 4 
The purpose of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute is: 
(I ) to guarantee the coordination of theoretical and experimental re-' 
search done by scientists of member-states in nuclear physics ; 
( 2) to further the development of nuclear physics in the member-states 
by the exchange of experience and of theoretical and experimental research 
results; 
(3) to maintain communication between the national and international 
scientific-research organizations and other organizations interested in the 
development of nuclear physiCs and in the exploration of new possibilities 
for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy; 
(4) to help develop specialized skills of every description in the scientific-: 
research personnel of the member-states. 
The Institute . will concern itself exclusively with the development of 
peaceful uses of atomic energy to benefit all mankind. 
Results of scientific research done at the Institute shall be announced 
either by publication or at scientific conferences and meetings. 
Reports on the work accomplished shall be sent to all member-states. 
SECTION III 
Membership.in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
ARTICLE 5 
The members of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute are those states 
which signed the agreement concerning the organization of this Institute. 
Other states, wishing to participate in . the work of the Institute and 
concurring with the conditions of the Agreement concerning the organiza-
tion of the Institute, shall become Institute members upon the decision of 
a majority of the member-states. 
The amount of participation in the Institute's maintenance and construc-
tion expenses allotted newly-joined member-states shall be decided by the 
Finance Committee and approved by the governments of the member-states. 
ARTICLE 6 
All members of the Institute shall participate equally in the scientific 
work and management of the Institute. 
ARTICLE 7 
The Institute's Board of Directors, with regarding to the principle of 
cooperation, shall decide individually all questions regard the use of the 
Institute for work by non-member state scientists. 
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The Institute Board shall determine the size and form of compensation 
required for the use of Institute equipment and materials according to 
the agreement reached with the interested state, scientists, or scientific 
institution. 
ARTICLE 8 
Any Institute member-state can resign from membership. 
Written notice of withdrawal from the Institute shall be submitted by 
the government of the state wishing to withdraw from the Institute to the 
Institute's Board no later than three months before the termination of the 
current fiscal year. 
Resignation from the Institute shall become official upon termination of 
that fiscal year in which the state declared its withdrawal from the Institute. 
After reviewing the budget for the fiscal year in which the state announced 
its withdrawal from the Institute, the Finance Committee shall determine 
the amount of monetary reimbursement due the resigning state, according 
to the share of capital outlay for the Institute apportioned that state. 
SECTION IV 
Finance Committee and·Budget 
ARTICLE 9 
A Finance Committee consisting of representatives from all member-
states shall be set up to control the financiat affairs of the Institute and to 
approve the budget. . 
Each member-state shall have one representative on the Finance Com-
mittee. Members of the Committee shall be appointed by the governments 
of the respective states. 
The Finance Committee shall convene at least once a year. Representa-
tives of each state in turn shall preside over the sessions. 
The Finance Committee's resolutions shall require a two-thirds majority 
vote for adoption. 
ARTICLE 10 
The Finance Committee shall examine ~nd approve : 
·a) the estimated costs of financing Institute scientific and .economic 
works; . . · 
·.b) the departmental structure, personnel, and official pay rates for all 
~tegories of Institute workers; · . 
c) amounts and terms of monetary payments toward Institute construc-
tion and maintenance from member~states, ·according to the proportionary 
scale provided in the Agreement of the member-states; 
. d) ~e plan ~or financing capital constr;uction. 
The Finance Committee shall generally control all financial affairs of the 
Institute. 
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"ARTICLE II 
A budget for the Institute covering the period from January xst to 
December 31st inclusive shall be drawn up each year. 
ARTICLE I2 
_ In the budget presented by the Board to the Finance Committee, pro-
vision shall be made for all Institute expenses, itemized as follows: 
_ a) financing of scientific research and payment of Institute workers; 
b) cost of developing scientific research and other Institute objectives; 
. c) money to reward and encourage Institute workers, for length of 
service, etc., and to give financial help to workers when and if needed; 
· d) other expenses incurred in the course of the Institute's activities. 
ARTICLE 13 
Each member-state shall produce on the dates specified monetary pay-
ments, according to the budget approved by the Finance Committee, toward 
the maintenance and development of the Institute and its objectives. 
These payments shall be payable in the currency of the country wherein 
the Institute is situated. 
In those cases where the Joint Nuclear Research Institute requires cur-
rency to purchase equipment, instruments, materials, technical scientific 
literature or periodicals from states not belonging to the Institute, member-
states shall pay a portion of the sum allotted them by the Agreement in the 
currency of those states. The amount of the sum in this currency will be 
established by the Finance Committee. 
The value of equipment, materials, and instruments supplied by member-
states, as well as the value of individual work accomplished according to 
Institute laws may be computed as part of the allotted participation. 
_The manner of computation shall be established by the Finance Com-
mittee. 
ARTICLE I4 
:The scale of allotted participation in the Institute development and main-
tenance costs shall be revised both upon the admittance of new member-
states and upon the withdrawal of any state from membership, and a new 
stale · shall be presented to the governments of the member-states for 
approval. 
ARTICLE IS 
During the fiscal year, the Institute may partially redistribute the monies 
itemized in the budget under the divisions of capital construction and 
exploratory work. 
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ARTICLE I6 
At the end of each fiscal year, the Institute Board shall report to the 
Finance Committee on the budget balance according to its status at that 
ti11_1e. 
The Finance Committee shall specify the date on which the report is to 
be presented. 
SECTION v· 
The Scientific Council of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
ARTICLE I7 
The Scientific Council of the Institute shall consist of three scientists 
from each member-state, to be appointed by their states. 
The. staff of the Scientific Council shall include the Director and Vice-
Directors of the Institute (who are chosen according to article 20 of this 
statute), who shall have the right to vote. 
Laboratory Directors, who have not been appointed members of the 
Scientific Council by their various governments, shall be included in the 
staff of the Scientific Council with the right of participating in the debates. 
ARTICLE 18 
The Scientific Council of the Institute shall : 
a) consider and approve the Institute's scientific research programs; 
b) examine the results of completed scientific research programs and 
also the results of individual studies; 
c) consider other questions concerning the scientific work of the 
Institute. 
The Scientific Council shall convene at least twice a year. 
ARTICLE 19 
The Institute Director shall be president of the Scientific Council. 
The Scientific Council shall announce its own rules of procedure. 
SECTION VI 
Board of Directors of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
ARTICLE 20 
The Institute shall be headed by a Board of Directors consisting of an 
Institute Director and two Vice-Directors, to be elected from the scientists 
of the member-states by a majority of these states. The Director shall be 
elected for a three-year term, the Vice-Directors for a two-year term. 
The Board of Directors shall be elected by the plenipotentiary represent-
atives of the member-states. 
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ARTICLE 2I. 
The Institute Director shall be a plenipotentiary officer, who shall main-
tain relations with the appropriate institutions of the member-states in all 
questions regarding the Institute's work. 
The Institute may establish direct communication with scientists and 
scientific organizations of other countries. 
The Institute Vice-Directors !!hall assist the Director in the management 
of the Institute, substitute for him in his absence, and shall have a respon-
sibility equal to his for all activity of the Institute. 
ARTICLE 22 
The Institute Board is responsible to the Governments of the member-
sUi-tes for the activity of the Institute and shall report to them periodically. 
Only decisions of the Finance Committee and the Scientific Councii may 
direct the Institute Board in the management of the Institute; the Institute 
Board shall not obey any orders from individual merilber_.states. 
ARTICLE 23 
On the appointed dates, the Institute Board shall present a yearly budget 
estimate and a report of the budget balance to the Finance Committee. 
ARTICLE 24 
The Institute Board shall direct the scientific work of the Institute 
according to the prOgr-am for scientific research procedure approved by the 
Institute's Scie11tific Council, and shall direct the financial affairs according 
to the decisions of the Finance Committee. 
The Institute Board shall have.the right of partially altering the scientific 
research programs as~igned. to the various. institute Laboratories. 
The 'Board niust · infqrm the Institute's 'Scientific Council of all such 
'I.· ,. . 1 I . ' . ,j .•.• ;I I .. , 
changes. or mooifi'caticins. 
ARTlCLE 25: .. 
Each year,. tile Jnstitu.te Boarq shall present to the Institute's Scientific 
Council for ~~~iew a~d approval draftsqf.s.ummary programs fo~ scientific 
research works, drafts of programs for the future development of the 
Institute, and a rep<)rt oi'the Institute's' scientific work. 
ARTICLE 26 
The Institute Director shall be manager in chief of Institute assets. He 
shall be in charge of all the Institute resources and property. 
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ARTICLE 27 
The Institute Director shall have the right : 
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a) to hire and discharge employees according to the Institute's personnel 
s~tute;_ 
b) to establish or alter within the official wage limits approved by the 
Finance Committee the wages of all employees, and to initiate individual 
pay raises for highly-skilled workers of up to so% of the original wage 
within the limits of the sums estimated for this. 
SECTION VII 
Laboratories of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
ARTICLE 28 
The Institute staff shall include: a Nuclear Problems Laboratory, a 
High Energy Laboratory, a Neutron Physics Laboratory, and a Theoretical 
Physics Laboratory, each of which shall coordinate the research in their 
respective fields of nuclear physics. 
· The Institute Laboratories shall consist of scientific departments and 
sections. 
Decision of the Institute's Scientific Council can change the number of 
Laboratories to fit the requirements of the work at hand, and decision of 
the Institute Board can change the number of departments and sections. 
ARTICLE 29 
Scientists from member-states will be chosen by the Institute Board to 
serve as Laboratory Directors and subsequently approved by the Scientific 
Council; their function shall be the management of the Laboratories. 
The Laboratory Directors shall be responsible to the Institute Board for 
their actions and for the work of their Laboratories. 
ARTICLE 30 
The Laboratory Directors shall direct all scientific research work in their 
Laboratories according to the program approved by the Institute Scientific 
Council; their function shall be the management of the Laboratories. 
The Laboratory Directors shall be responsible to the Institute Board for 
their adions and for the work of their Laboratories. 
Through the Institute Board, Laboratory Directors may select personnel, 
h~re and discharge Laboratory employees, determine and alter, within the 
approved pay-rate limits, wages paid Laboratory employees according to 
the extent and quality of each employee's work, and may declare bonuses 
or fines. · 
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ARTICLE 3I 
A Scientific Council shall be set up in each Laboratory, the staff of which 
shall be approved by the Institute Scientific Council. 
The Laboratory Director shall be the president of the Laboratory Scien-
tific Council. 
The· Laboratory Scientific Council : 
a) shall prepare programs for the scientific research work assigned the 
Laboratory ; 
b) shall examine results obtained by such scientific research work and 
by individual studies; 
c) shall confer doctorates and bachelors degrees in the mathematico-
physical and technical sciences ; 
d) shall consider other questions concerning the scientific work of the 
Laboratory. 
ARTICLE 32 
On specified dates, the Laboratory Directors shall present a draft pro-
gram of the Laboratory's scientific research work, a report on the Labora-
tory's work, and requests for needed materials and equipment to the Insti-
tute Board. 
SECTION VIII 
Administrative-Economic Management of the Joint Nuclear 
Research Institute 
ARTICLE 33 
The Institute Director shall appoint one of his assistants as Administra-
tive Director to manage the administrative-economic work and construction 
of the Institute. 
ARTICLE 34 
The Administrative Director shall direct the work of the departments 
within his jurisdiction, which departments provide the framework of the 
Institute. He shall have the right of hiring and discharging workers in 
these departments. 
ARTICLE 35 
The Administrative Director as proxy for the Institute Director shall 
manage the assets and shall be responsible for the correct expenditure of 
Institute funds as outlined in the budget approved by· the Finance Com-
mittee. 
The Administrative Director shall be subordinate to and responsible for 
his actions to the Institute Director. 
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All persons on the Institute staff shall be employees of the said inter-
national scientific organization and under obligation to further its aims 
and undertakings. 
ARTICLE 37 
Institute employees shall be recruited from member-state citizens. 
The Institute's Board shall consider the proposed contingents from each 
member-state, and the Scientific Council shall approve them. 
The question of scientific workers sent by member-states for short-term 
work at the Institute shall be decided by the Institute Board. 
ARTICLE 38 
The obligations and rights of Institute personnel shall be determined by 
a Code of Regulations for personnel of the Joint Nuclear Research Insti-
tute. Personnel of the Institute shall be subject to the laws of the country 
in which the Institute is located. 
ARTICLE 39 
The Institute Board may take university students or graduates who are 
citizens of member-states for practical study in the Institute's Laboratories. 
In such cases, the states shall stand the expenses incurred by their students 
or novices. The form and term of this practical study shall be determined 
by the Institute Board. 
SECTION X 
Liquidation of the Joint Nuclear Research Institute 
ARTICLE 40 
The Joint Nuclear Research Institute can be liquidated by agreement of 
the member-states' governments. 
Upon liquidation, all Institute equipment and all principal, subsidiary 
and administrative buildings shall become the property of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, wherein the Institute is located. Other member-
states shall receive monetary reimbursement proportionate to the amount 
of participation assigned each of these states in capital outlay for the 
Institute. 
Upon liquidation all Institute monetary assets on hand, except those 
portions required to pay Institute obligations, shall be distributed among 
those states who are members of the Institute at the time of its liquidation, 
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in proportion to the amounts of monetary payments actually contributed 
by these states during their participation in the work of the Institute. 
SECTION XI 
Ratification of the Charter 
ARTICLE 41 
This Charter shall be ratified by the Council of Plenipotentiary Repre-
sentatives of the member-states. 
The ratified copy of the Charter shall be kept at the Institute. 
SECTION XII 
Amendments to the Charter 
This Charter may be amended or changed. 
Proposals to change the Charter shall be directed to the Institute Board. 
The Board shall also have the right to propose changes in the Charter. 
Upon the acceptance of such proposals by a majority of the member-states, 
the Institute Board shaH consider those changes as part of the Charter. 
This Charter for the Institute has been drawn up in the Russian language 
_on the 23d of September, in the year 1956. Witnessed copies of this 
document shall be sent by the Institute Board to aU Institute member-states. 
In witness whereof the plenipotentiary representatives of the Institute 
member-states' governments have signed this document and certified it 
with the Institute's seal. 
Authorized by the Government of the People's Republic of Albania 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prifmi, Mihal 
Authorized by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gerasimov, Lyuben 
Authorized by the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kish, Arpad 
Authorized by the Government of the Democratic Republic of VietNam 
.................................................. Chan Dai, Ngia 
Authorized by the Government of the German Democratic Republic 
............... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rambusch, Karl 
Authorized by the Government of the Chinese People's Republic ..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wan Gan, Chan 
Authorized by the Korean Popular-Democratic Republic ............ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kim Khen, Bon 
Authorized by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic ... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sod nom, N amsrain 
Authorized by the Government of the Polish People's Republic ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Billig, Wilhelm 
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Authorized by the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic ... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Khulubei, Khoriya 
Authorized by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics ........................................ Slavsky, Efim Pavlovich 
Authorized by the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kozheshnik, Y aroslav 
ITEM 3 * 
SoviET GovERNMENT STATEMENT ON GENERAL EuROPEAN 
COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL UsE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 
On July 12, the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry sent to the Governments 
of Austria, Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, 
and to the Government of the United States, through their embassies and 
legations in Moscow, the text of the Soviet Government statement: "On 
general European cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy." 
The text of the aforementioned statement was simultaneously brought 
to the attention of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, 
and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, through their embassies m 
Moscow. 
Here is the text of the statement of the Soviet Government. 
The great discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy have considerably 
expanded the opportunities for technical progress, development of power, 
industry, agriculture, transport, science, and culture, and for improving the 
welfare of the people. Further development in the field of atomic energy 
and its practical application in science and engineering call for an appro-
priate industrial and scientific-technical base, call for collective efforts of 
states in organizing production and utilizing atomic energy for peaceful 
aims .. 
At present, when the Cold War· and mutual. nonconfidence in relations 
between states, which hampered the development of general international 
cooperation are receding into the past, more favorable conditions are ap-
pearing for the efforts of scientists, engineers, and other atomic specialists 
to be .directed not toward military uses of atomic energy, but toward its 
use for peaceful aiins, for the benefit of. mankind. 
*The English text of this statement was published in a TASS pr~ss ~elease dat~d 
July IJ, 19$6. . . . . 
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The Soviet Government considers that the attainment of an interna-
tional agreement on the unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen 
weapons and on their withdrawal from the armaments of the states would 
open wide prospects for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and make it 
possible to switch over the huge material-scientific-technical and other 
resources from the production of means of destruction to the creation of 
material benefits and spiritual values. 
Working consistently for unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons and for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the 
Soviet Government is already taking the necessary steps for a general 
development of international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses 
for atomic energy. Moreover, the Soviet Government bases itself on the 
fact that international cooperation in this field must completely exclude the 
use for military aims of atomic materials which are provided on the basis 
of corresponding agreements. 
It goes without saying that cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy can be effective only under conditions of equality of all the 
interested parties, in the presence of strict respect of national sovereignty 
of the states and noninterference in their internal affairs, in the strict 
observance of the high principles expressed in the U. N. Charter. Such 
cooperation can be fruitful only if it will not harm the security of any of 
the states, and the assistance granted is not conditioned by any kind of 
demands of a political or military nature. 
· The Soviet Union, as one of the states which is developing the production 
of atomic energy and which possesses atomic raw material, is actively 
taking part in the development of international cooperation in the cause 
of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The USSR, together 
with other states, is taking part in the measures for the creation of an 
international agency for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
The Soviet Government considers that the possibilities for development 
of international cooperation in the field of application of atomic energy· 
are far from exhausted. In particular, this refers to development of 
cooperation in this field on a regional basis. 
At the present moment the attention of broad public circles is being more 
and more attracted to the question of the organization of cooperation in the 
field of peaceful uses of atomic energy between the European states. The 
development of such cooperation between the European countries would 
have contributed considerably to the strengthening of confidence among 
them and ·would have been in accord with the interests of general European 
security. In present conditions it is the European states, together with the 
United States, which have the most favorable prospects, including the 
existence of highly-developed industry, qualified manpower, well-trained 
scientific and engineering cadres, and the necessary reserves, for the devel-
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opment of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy 
between European countries; and to render corresponding assistance to 
other states. 
Nevertheless, one must but note that lately in some of the Western 
European states definite attempts are being made to exploit the under-
standable aspirations of the peoples for development of international co-
operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, for the creation 
in this field of a closed grouping of a few states-which will hamper the 
broad cooperation in this field on a general European basis. Such a group-
ing is envisaged by the plans for setting up the so-called Euratom, an 
atomic merger of six European countries-France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. 
According to the plan for the establishment of Euratom, drawn up by a 
special inter-governmental committee of the aforementioned six states, a 
monopoly of rights is to be given to this organization for the possession 
of all the nuclear materials as well as the right to distribute these materials 
among states of the group. The authors of this plan propose to grant the 
executive organs of Euratom rights and authority which would enable this 
organization to control, in fact, the whole atomic industry, and, to a con-
siderable extent, branches of national economy connected with if in the 
states participating in this merger. Thus, in substance, a supranational 
character has been contemplated for this organization. 
One cannot fail to see that the creation of such an organization under 
circumstances in which several West European states are members of 
closed military blocs which oppose other European states would result in 
the fact that the activity of the Euratom would be subject to the military-
strategic aims of these blocs. By the nature of the organization of Euratom, 
it naturally could not be expected to carry out its activity in the interest of 
those states which have no opportunity to develop the production of atomic 
energy in their countries. 
This means that economically stronger states and, in fact, the correspond-
ing large monopolies of these countries, will have an opportunity to use 
Euratom to impose conditions on other countries which are much weaker 
economically. Obviously, this could lead only to the increasing of distrust 
in relations between states and would create additional difficulties in the 
organization of a system of effective European security. 
One must also take into consideration the fact that the creation of this 
organization, to which only a part of Germany will belong, would lead to 
an even greater consolidation of the division of Germany into two parts 
and would make more difficult the achievement of measures for the creation 
of a single peace-loving and democratic German state. 
One must also note the circumstance that the creation of Euratom would, 
in fact, lead to the remo~l of any restrictions in the production of atomic 
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energy, which are now being contemplated in relation to West Germany. 
This would permit the revenge-seeking West German circles to organize 
in their country production of atomic weapo~s, which would create a 
serious threat to the cause of peace in Europe. 
The Soviet Union has always stood and continues to stand for wide 
international cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. It does not 
make a secret of its achievements in the peaceful application of atomic 
energy and willingly shares it with all countries. It is giving effective 
assistance to several countries in the development of research in the fields 
of nuclear physics and the uses of atomic energy for peaceful aims, in the 
construction of atomk reactors, trai~ing of specialists, a·nd so forth. 
To bring about the cooperation of scientists in various countries in theo-
retical and experimental research in the field of nuclear physics and to 
broaden the possibilities for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
on the initiative of the Soviet Union a conference was convened in Moscow 
in March 1956 of representatives of eleven countries of Europe and Asia 
who concluded an agreement on setting up an international scientific re-
search organization under the name of the Joint Institute of Nuclear 
Research. In accordance with the agreement, the Soviet Government has 
handed over to the Joint Institute of Nuclear Re-search, the Institute Of 
Nuclear Problems and the ·Electro-Physical Laboratory with all their 
unique equipment. 
It is clearly provided for in the agreement that other ·states, wishing in 
·the future to take part in the work- of the Institute,-can state their agree-
ment with the articles of the agreement, and, following a decision of the 
majority of the members of the Institute, become members of the latter, 
with equal rights. Thus, the-Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, open to 
other countries for participation, is-destined to become an important center 
of cooperation between -scientists of different states. 
Proceeding from the fact that exchange of knowledge and experience 
in the field of the peaceful utilization of atomic energy will be a powerful 
incentive for the further development of atomic science and will contribute 
to the elimination of suspicion and distrust in this field, the Soviet Union 
submitted in April 1956, for examination by the I rth session of the Euro-
pean Economic Commission, a proposal on creating, within the framework 
of this organization, a body to deal with questions of the utilization of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 
Introducing this proposal, the Soviet Government proceeded from the 
fact that some countries, especially smaJl countries, do not have the ability 
to- solve by themselves the complex questions connected with the peaceful 
utilization of atomic energy. Such questions as the training of scientific 
cadres, the creation of a material base for the development of scientific 
research work, the setting up and development of the production of atomic 
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energy for peaceful purposes are very complex matters which demand huge 
expenditures and the existence of a corresponding technical base. Without 
doubt, the broad cooperation of all European states in this field will speed 
up the development of the production of atomic energy for peaceful pur-
poses and will to a large extent, contribute to raising the well-being of the 
peoples. 
Attributing great importance to cooperation in the field of peaceful 
utilization of atomic energy, the Soviet Government holds that the time 
has come for convening a conference of the countries of Europe for the 
discussion of the question of setting up a general European regional body 
for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. Such a body could be set up 
o~ an inter-government basis, with the participation of all the European 
states wishing to join. The United States could also participate in such 
a body. 
In the opinion of the Soviet Government, such a conference could dis-
cuss the question of the rights and powers of the above-mentioned body, 
while bearing in mind that its competence should include such questions as, 
for instance, the study of the economic aspects of the peaceful utilization 
of atomic energy ; study of the possibility of coordinating the utilization 
of raw material resources ; the rendering of technical assistance ; exchange 
of information; granting of technical and scientific consultation by !)tates 
advanced in the atomic field, to other states ; assistance through cadres ; 
discussion of the question of maintaining permanent relations between the 
international and national organizations existing in Europe in the field of 
the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 
The conference could, of course, examine any other proposals of states 
regarding the extension of international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
utilization of atomic energy. · 
It goes without saying that a broad development of general European 
cooperation in the task of peaceful utilization of atomic energy by no 
means excludes bilateral agreements in this field. On the contrary, bilateral 
agreements, concluded on the basis of equality and without imposing on 
one of the parties any political, economic, military, or other demands in-
compatible with the principles of respect for the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of states, will contribute to the unification of the efforts of the 
states ;md to cooperate between them in the field of utilization of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes. 
The Soviet Government expresses its conviction that the governments 
of all interested countries will respond with suitable attention to the appeal 
of the Soviet Union for uniting their efforts in this important field. It 
expresses its conviction that such cooperation of all European states would 
contribute to a large extent to reaching an agreement on banning the atomic 
and hydrogen weapons and eliminate them from the armaments of the 
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states-which, in its turn, would secure the utilization of all nuclear ma-
terials exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the progress of science and 
technology, for the use of the people. -
ITEM 4 
DECLARATION OF THE U.S.S.R. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
oN PLANS To CREATE EuRATOM AND A "CoMMON MARKET"* 
At the present time the governments of France, the German Federal 
Republic, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg are preparing the crea-
tion in Western Europe of two new closed organizations, a "partnership" 
of the six named countries in atomic energy (the so-called "Euratom") 
and a "common market," within whose framework is planned the gradual 
abolition of customs duties in the economy of each of the countries, "free" 
movement of labor force and capital, and joint exploitation by the partici-
pating countries of French, Belgian and Dutch colonial domains. 
In view of the fact that the plans to create Euratom and the "common 
market," which concern ·problems of economic cooperation and cooperation' 
in the use of atomic energy (problems which are important ones for all 
European countries), envisage measures whose fulfillment will entail dan-
gerous consequences for the peoples of Europe, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has been authorized to make the following declaration. 
The Soviet Union has constantly sought, and now seeks, the fullest 
_development of international economic cooperation, including cooperation 
in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, since such cooperation 
corresponds to the interests of all countries, strengthens confidence between 
peoples, and creates a solid basis for the peaceful co-existence of states. 
'rhe Soviet Union attaches special importance to the establishment of 
such cooperation in Europe on an all-European basis, inasmuch as it would 
contribute to overcoming the division of Europe into opposed military 
groupings, which (division) has been the result of the Western powers' 
policies, and would contribute to European peace. 
The development of peaceful production of atomic energy on a wide 
scale in European countries would open up favorable perspectives for the 
development of economy, science and culture, and for the increased well-
being of the peoples. The use -of the tremendous opportunities which 
peaceful utilization of atomic energy gives naturally requires a correspond-
ing productive and scientific-technical base, and the united efforts of the 
states in organizing the broad industrial production of atomic energy. 
Therefore the Soviet government regards with understanding the aspira-
• Pravda, March 17, 1957, p. 3· 
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tions of various European states, especially those which do not have suffi-
cient resources and technical experience at their disposal to carry out work 
in this field, to unite their efforts and opportunities for peaceful use of 
atomic energy and to make use of the scientific and technical experience 
which has been accumulated by other countries. 
The Soviet government understands equally well the interest of Euro-
pean countries in establishing broad economic cooperation in all other 
fields. The broadening of economic cooperation between European coun-
tries would have a highly favorable effect on the development of these 
countries' economy, on increased employment, and on the improvement of 
the living standard of the population. It would exert a positive influence 
on the world economic situation as a whole. Economic cooperation on an 
all-European basis would assist in restoring traditional trade ties and 
scientific-technical ties which have been destroyed; it would help overcome 
artificial obstacles and limitations in the area of commercial and other 
economic relationships; it would bring European states closer to one an-
other, and would increase the European peoples' sense of security and 
faith in the morrow. 
However, the plans to create Euratom and the "common market" stand 
in clear _contradiction to these aims. One's attention is drawn first of all 
to the fact that all the members of Euratom and the "common market" are 
members of the military grouping, NATO. It is obvious that_ the entire 
activity of Euratom and the "common market" will be subordinated to the 
aims of NATO, whose aggressive character is widely known. 
Under such conditions the fulfillment of plans to create Euratom and 
the "common market" will inevitably lead to a further deepening of the 
division which splits Europe, to the increase of tension in Europe; it will 
greatly complicate the establishment of economic and political ·cooperation 
on an all-European basis ; it will create new difficulties in solving the prob-
lems of European security. 
New and serious obstacles will also arise in the path of restoring the 
national unity of the German people, since Western Germany will be still 
more deeply drawn into the system of closed military groupings of the 
Western powers which are opposed to other European states. In this 
connection it is necessary to note the understandable concern expressed by 
the Social Democratic Party through its lead~r Ollenhauer in his declara-
tion of March 6th of this year, in which he pointed out a number of 
dangerous consequences for the German people in the plans to create 
Euratom and the "common market." 
The affiimations of certain leading statesmen in the Western countries 
to the effect that Euratom and the "common market" will concern them-
selves exclusively with problems of peaceful cooperation among the par-
ticipating countries represent nothing more than a concealment of the actual 
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plotting of their organizers and originators. One must not forget that 
certain United States circles which actively support the creation of Euratom 
are seeking the earliest possible restoration of German militarism and the 
equipment of the already-created West German army with all types of 
modern arms, including atomic arms. As is known, it was on the initiative 
of the United States that a decision was made on this question at a NATO 
Council session in December, 1956. The creation of Euratom will be a 
practical step in the fulfillment of these aggressive plans, so dangerous for 
all peoples. 
There can be no doubt that revenge-seeking circles in Western Germany 
will miss no opportunity to use Euratom for accumulating atomic materials 
and raw materials in order more quickly to prepare for the production of 
their own atomic weapons. In this way, the creation of Euratom will clear 
the way for German militarism to prepare for new military adventures ; 
in the middle of Europe there will again arise a dangerous center of unrest. 
In this connection, however, it must again be noted that the equipment of 
the West German army with nuclear weapons will be pregnant with dan-
gerous consequences, above all 'for the population of West Germany itself, 
which may find itself the object of a retaliatory atomic blow. 
Concerning the plans of the ruling circles of certain West European' 
coun~ries to use Euratom as · a means of controlling the production of 
atamic eriergy in Western Germany, such plans have been shown by experi-
ence to be without foundation. It is well known that when the European 
Coal and Steel Union was created, the French government, seeking to 
ensure ratification of the agreement to create this Union by the French 
parliament, also declared that it would be possible by way of this Union 
to gain control over Western Germany's war-industry potential. Seeking 
the ratification of the Paris agreements, the French government asserted 
that these agreements would be a means of achieving military control over 
Western Germany. It is now clear to all that these calculations proved 
illusory. The creation of Euratom-regardless of others' wishes-will 
inevitably lead to the removal of all limitations in the field of atomic arms 
production in Western Germany, and this will create a direct threat to the 
people of France as well as to the peoples of other West European nations. 
Equally without foundation are the plans of certain circles in France, 
Italy, and other West European states that the creation of Euratom wilt 
contribute to a lessening of these countries' economic dependence on the 
United States. On the contrary, their dependence on the U.S.A. will only 
increase, to the detriment of the national sovereignty of the countries par-
ticipating in this grouping, since the United States-and nobody attempts 
to conceal this fact-will in reality control Euratom, acting in the capacity 
of chief supplier of fissionable materials and of equipment for atomic 
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production in Euratom countries. It is not by accident that influential 
circles in England have come out against England's joining Euratom, 
realizing full well the consequences which participation in it would have 
for England. 
The plan to create a "common market" likewise represents a serious 
threat for the peoples of European countries. . . ~ 
... Proceeding from these considerations, the Soviet Union has already 
put forth a number of suggestions aimed at establishing genuinely all-
European cooperation: 
I. In April, 1956, at the eleventh session of the European Economic 
Commission of the United Nations, the Soviet Union introduced a proposal 
to create, within the framework of this commission, an organ dealing with 
questions of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This proposal 
is included in the agenda of the twelfth session of the United Nations' 
European Economic Commission, whicli operied on April 29th of this year. 
2. In its declaration "On All-European Cooperation in ·Peaceful Utiliza-
tion of Atomic Energy" of July 12, 1956, the Soviet government proposed 
that a conference of all the European· countries be ·convened to discuss the 
question of creating an all-European organization on peaceful utiHzatioh of 
atomic energy, bearing in mind that this organization would be'a regional 
division or department of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the 
opinion of the Soviet government, such an organization could be founded 
on an inter-governmental ·basis, with participation in it by all interested 
European states, and also by the United States. 
This regional organization for peaceful use of atomic energy, as sug-
gested by the Soviet Union, would not be directed against any state 
or group of states and would not act counter to any national interests 
whatever. 
Cooperation in the framework of an all-European regional organization 
on atomic energy would, beyond any doubt, be able to contribute to the 
progress of each of the European countries in the peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy and to the raising of the European peoples' living standards, 
not to mention the fact that it would be an important means of improving 
the situation in Europe generally. 
The establishment of all-European cooperation in peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy would contribute in many respects to a solution of the most 
urgent modern-day problem: the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen 
weapons as weapons of mass destruction. 
Guided by its desire to contribute to a positive solution of the problem 
of all-European cooperation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, 
the Soviet government proposes that certain supplementary problems be 
considered, including the following: 
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a) the creation of a scientific-research institute or institutes in atomic 
energy, on an all-European basis; 
b) cooperation in creating enterprises for pr~ducing atomic energy for 
industrial and scientific-research purposes, including problems of ensuring 
a supply of raw materials for these enterprises. 
It goes without saying that, when cooperation in peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy is made possible on an all-European basis, European coun-
tries will have the opportunity to take advantage of the Soviet Union's 
experience in this field. . . . 
. . . The Soviet government is ready to consider any other proposals 
concerning principles and forms of all-European economic cooperation, as 
well as cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. 
The Soviet government believes that the proposals outlined above for 
all-European economic cooperation and cooperation in peaceful use of 
atomic energy may be considered at the twelfth session of the United 
Nations' European Economic Commission. 
The Soviet government hopes that the governments of · all interested 
lands will give due attention to 'the Soviet Union's proposal on the question 
of all-European economic cooperation and of cooperation in the field of 
peaceful use of atomic energy. 
